Relations among nation states have been determined on the basis of many complex factors like national security, patterns trade and other related economic requirements. While the main characteristic feature of the contemporary world is its interdependence, international relations may not accept the rules of the game of such an interdependent world. Since every nation-state has to pursue its own national interest, its bilateral and multilateral relations have been determined by such a basic goal of maximisation of national interest through foreign policy. In the pursuit of
its national interest, the United States of America had a low level of co-operation with India from 1950's to 1980's. The post world war II International relations were characterised by confrontation and antagonism between the North Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) and WARSAW pact countries and in such a highly polarised world, India's policy of non-alignment and co-existence with different political systems was suspected by the United States. The United States foreign policy towards India was on the basis of an understanding that India has tilted towards the soviet block of countries. This understanding of the United States was always reflected in its dealing with India and the result was that Indo-US relationships were based more on distrust than constructive co-operation. This was reflected on crucial issues concerning India's security during the whole cold war phase of international affair.

After the second world war the major objective of the United States as a super power was to 'contain' the spread of communism through the building of a set of military alliances which would create a defensive barrier around the Soviet Union. India emerged in 1947 as an independent country with very definite ideas of how it wished to conduct it's external relations. India opted for a democratic form of Government, but did not subscribe to the view that communist regimes were evil and that one should try to militarily counter them. Instead, it opted a policy of non-alignment which permitted it to try and
develop relations with both the eastern and western blocks. The policy was however not to the liking of the United States.

By the time India attained independence the cold war had already started. The polarization of a large part of the world into Soviet block and western block has taken shape. Thus India from the very beginning of her independence, was confronted with the problem of evolving a foreign policy consistent with her national interests in the context of a world divided between the two contending blocks. The immediate impact of the hostile coalition of forces was felt by the Indian leaders also, after decades of colonial rule, were eagerly looking forward to attaining a rightful and honoured place for their country in the world and to letting her, make her full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind. From that world of fear and suspicion, of balance of power and spheres of influence, of cold-war and military alliances, India brought a breath of fresh air and an independent approach to international affairs. It was with a sense of realism, grounded in the realities of her own situation as well as in the facts of political life around her, that India chose the policy of non-alignment.

In the early years of independence the United States tended to attach more importance to India than to Pakistan. The United States president, Harry S. Truman once
observed that his country "has no desire to win the favour of Pakistan at the cost of friendship with India." Pakistan was largely unknown in the United States when transfer of power took place, there was no envoy of the United States present in Karachi, whereas there was Henry F Brady, a senior diplomat in Delhi. By this one can understand that U.S. has taken much interest to get India's support in its struggle to fight against Soviet block.

Nehru's First Visit to United States:

After independence United States invited Indian Prime Minister to visit United States. In response to their invitation Nehru visited United States in October 1949. Americans expected that India will join with United States block under mass leadership of Nehru. But when he declined to toe the United States line, they greatly disappointed. He had given an indication of his unwillingness to go along with the American even before leaving for the United States in a letter to his sister Vijayalaxmi Pandit on 24 August 1949. He had said.

"I think often of this coming American visit .... I want to be friendly with the Americans but always making it clear what we stand for I want to make no commitments which come in the way of our basic policy ..... I go there to learn more than to teach......... I propose to be
receptive in the United States I want to see their good points and that is the best approach to a country. At the same time I don't propose to be swept away by them. I don't think there is much chance of that."^4

By this one can understand that India was not interested to tilt towards United States. On the other occasion Nehru had observed "it is astonishing how nice the Americans are in their foreign policy. It is only their money and their power that carries them through, not their intelligence or any other quality."^5 The visit of Nehru instead of strengthening relations, sowed a seed of suspicion in the minds of Americans towards India.

So to the dismay and a even anger of the Americans the leaders of India refused to join the United States led alliance against communism on the other hand, the leadership of the Pakistan were quite eager and ready to their bidding. It was immaterial for the Americans to find out or even acknowledge the true motives behind the Indian refusal to join or behind Pakistan’s anxiety to line up with them. As Pakistan showed interest to tie with US interests, the United States expressed eagerness to improve relations with Pakistan. Pakistan’s interest was to settle Kashmir dispute in her favour and to have security against India. One of the Indian interests for opposing the arms supply and entry of Pakistan in to alliances was that, Pakistan being a neighbour, cold war would come nearer to Indian borders, and
that there would be a setback to her policies in Asia in general and South Asia in particular.

KOREAN WAR:

The period from 1947 to the outbreak of Korean war in 1950, was a formative period in the relations between the two nations. Among the fundamental considerations which shape Indo-American understanding was India's need for economic aid and secondly the American commitment to democracy. The differences between India and American foreign policy became noteworthy only when the cold war entered Asia. The United States tried to India's friend in the task of stemming the tide of commission in Asia. On the question of non-recognition of China by US, Indian press was very hostile. When United States was considering to recognise China in 1950, the war broke out in Korea. Soviet Union also induced China successfully to interfere on behalf of North Korea. In this struggle India assumed a neutral position.

The Korean war brought the Indo-American ties from good to bad and vice-versa. During the last phase of Korean war the two countries faced forbiddable challenges in the various stages of the truce agreement. Undoubtedly in Korea, India passed through vital experience in the conduct of its foreign policy. Its relations with American suffered a setback during the crucial phase.
Hungarian Crisis:

The internal crisis in Hungary in October-November 1956 was an anti-communist upheaval in which Soviet Union interfered and suppressed it by force. This was an issue of cold war in which Indian, American perspectives were divergent. When it was in the United Nation on November 9, 1956, India alone among the non-aligned nations, voted with the Soviet block countries against the resolution which urged the removal of Soviet troops from Hungary and holding the elections under United Nations auspices. There was a speculation that special United Nation delegate of India Krishna Menon acted, without direct authorization, but Nehru defended the Menon's action and few days later remarked in Parliament that to force an election under United Nations auspices on an unwilling Government could be a dangerous precedent for Kashmir.

United States thought that India will abstain from voting on the Hungarian crisis. But surprisingly India, voted with the Soviet block, which greatly annoyed United States officials.

United States and Liberation of Goa:

Goa, a territory of sub-continent was secured by Portugal and ruled it as a colony over four hundred years
till 1960. India's ambition to liberate this territory peacefully did not meet with success initially. India adopted methods of peaceful 'satyagraha' for liberating Goa. Portuguese authorities in Goa used violence against 'satyagrahis', though it was not admitted. The United States did not appreciate India's support to the Goan struggle since Portugal was a member of NATO and an ally of America.

From the beginning there was some negative official and unofficial reactions in the United States regarding Indian struggle for Goa. However, it is not clear that whether United States Government had any strategic or military interest in Goa for taking stand in favour of Portugal. The Portuguese attempt to turn NATO into a protector of colonialism was disliked by United States initially because article 6 of NATO did not specifically cover Goa or any outlying territories other than those expressly specified.

On the eve of proposed satyagraha in Goa in August 1955, American Secretary of State stated at a Press Conference that the United States hoped that the dispute would be settled by peaceful means in line with United Nations charter. However, American Press, in general was highly critical of India for having created a situation where violence and bloodshed were stated to be inevitable and completely ignore the merits of India's case and blindly accepted the Portuguese version of the events. The soviet
leaders condemned European colonialism and in particular Portuguese colonialism on the Indian sub-continent and gave complete support to India's claims.⁹

At this time, taking advantage of provoked temper of American public opinion, in a Joint communique issued on December 2, 1955 Dulles with Dr. Paulo Cunho, Portuguese Foreign minister, described the portuguese possession in Asia as portuguese "provinces". This statement brought of a storm of denunciation and protest in India and in other former colonial dependencies as well. The Indian Press reacted strongly to Dulles-Cunha statement which had reversed earlier United States attitude of not taking sides. The press in India and some neighbouring countries called it one of the great diplomatic blunders of modern history. "The Times of India" on December 7 1955, wrote an editorial under the little 'Mid Winter Madness'. It declared that Dulles-Cunha statement would have a worse effect on Indo-Americans relations than American military aid to Pakistan.¹⁰

Consequently, there was an immediate outcry in India. Public demonstrations and protest meetings were held all over India. Spokesman of all political parties in India criticized bitterly the Joint Statement. It had cut the efforts of the American Ambassador Cooper in India who had been presenting Americas anti-colonialist traditions in India. India charged that Dulles-Cunha statement was at
variance with the facts India had never recognised as implied by Dulles the status of Portuguese colonies as provinces.

In reply the American official sources informed that the Dulles-Cunha Joint statement did not signify any departure from American policy in respect of Goa, that they did not mean to take any position on the merits of the question. They explained that the reference in the Joint statement to 'Portuguese provinces' had no international significance. Having not satisfied with the American explanation in a further note, Indian Government informed United States that it had failed to obtain satisfactory clarification or assurance and expressed deep regret that the "United States should have taken a position without warrant, in matter of such vital concerns to India". On the whole official reaction has been diplomatic. Nehru clarified to United States that "India would not tolerate the continuance of the last remunerates of Portuguese colonialism on Indian soil." 

However, the issue of liberation of Goa was not solved till 1961, since the United States maintained neutrality all the while and sometimes continued to support the Portuguese rule ultimately failing to bring the international pressure on Portuguese colonialism in India, she had unitaterally expelled Portugal by force out of Goa in December 1961. United States Government opposed this
measure and sent the strong regret that India resorted to force in Goa against the appeal of American President to Prime Minister. Indian Government had to take action owing to serious agitation in the opposition parties and public circles of India to liberate Goa.

Initially, Nehru was averse to use the force in Goa. He expected Kennedy administration to prevail upon Lisbon towards a negotiated and peaceful transfer of control of the territories. But when the US ultimately failed to influence Portugal, nothing could have been worse at a time when Soviet Union was adopting a neutral attitude in the China India dispute. The use of force became Washington's main grouse against Nehru. American reaction to the Indian action in Goa was of violation of peace. The United States was too critical on India and the relations harmed again.

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO INDIA:

The supreme evidence of United States goodwill for India under the Kennedy regime was witnessed when this country was attacked by communist China on 20 October 1962. The Indian troops soon faced reverses on the frontier at the hands of the Chinese who were superior to India's both in arms and in numbers. The Soviet Russia remained neutral in this crisis. So India urged the United States and other western powers to help in the crisis. In this hour of crisis, Nehru wrote to Kennedy on October 26 asking for his
'sympathy' and 'support. India's Ambassador to Washington, B.K. Nehru, explained to the President while delivering the letter in Person that Nehru, after all these years in the non-aligned camp, found it difficult to make a direct request for armaments from the US. He hoped, instead, that president in his reply, would offer, 'support' instead of 'military assistance' on the basis of 'sympathy' in stead of an 'alliance'. The President kennedy told the ambassador that he had no wish to take advantage of India's misfortune to coerce her into a pact and assured him of US support out of sympathy.  

But Nehru's reluctance to mention military specifics was only temporary. On 29 October, 1962 he formally decided to accept United States military aid, after J.K. Galbraith had delivered him letter from the President giving "comfort" and 'offering helps. On 30 October, 1962 Galbraith sent a telegram to the State Department in which he asked Washington to come out openly in favour of India whereas United States had been 'very delicate' in her support so far. It was only on 27 October 1962, that the State Department had accepted, after initial hesitation, Galbraith's proposal of supporting the Indian stand on Mc Mohan line.

Thus, after 30 October, the United States come out openly in favour of India. Kennedy although not coming close to fulfilling all the pleas for armaments, promptly
agreed to send substantial arms to India without political strings and without waiting to workout payment details. The United States planes carrying infantry weapons, mortars and light artillery for the Indian army began arriving at Calcutta on 3 November. The United States dispatched spares for Indian transport planes and a squadron of C-130, transport aircraft to supply the troops at the high altitudes of Ladakh and in shifting both forces and equipment to North East Frontier Assam (NEFA) from Kashmir.

Kennedy's ready response to Nehru's appeal for military aid was dictated by Washington's desire not to see India weakened lest that should automatically strengthen China's position in the region. It was because India was only country on the Asian mainland capable of competing for political and economic leadership with the Chinese. But Kennedy refused to involve United States directly in a war with China. Encouraged by success in the Cuban missile crisis some of Kennedy's advisors urged more 'direct' or 'extensive' American action in support of India. Kennedy, however said that he saw no gains either for India, for the United States or for the free world in making this fight "our fight" in the Himalayas.

But only a few hours after Nehru's appeal for help, the chinese declared a "Unilateral Ceases fire". Thus, prompt and generous United States military and
diplomatic assistance to Indian following the Chinese attack in October had "Created almost overnight" a new, highly favourable attitude in India towards the United States.15

But no sooner did the war come to an end than the process deterioration of Indian goodwill towards the United States started because of the continuing American interest in Pakistan. After the cease-fire India look up the task of modernising its armed forces and sought American assistance in this task. But Pakistan strongly opposed any possible, United States aid to India. As a result of the pressure exerted by the pro Pakistani elements within pentagon and the State Department, a plan that had been prepared to help India in the task of modernizing its forces was scuttled. American final decision not to conclude an arms agreement further deteriorated Indo-American relations in 1964.16

The United States Role in Indo-Pak War of 1965:

In August 1965 Pakistan embarked on the course of wrestling Kashmir from India by force. An unspecified number of infiltrators crossed Indian Kashmir from the Pakistan side, with the hope of igniting a successful revolt among the people of Kashmir. India's repeated warning to Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators, other wise she will reply in the only (viz. force) which Pakistan ignored. Consequently,
India crossed the cease-fire line and occupied three posts in Kargil to defend her supply routes. Pakistan then declared open hostilities with India. In this war Pakistan used United States arms and equipment including Patton tanks, F86 sabre jets, and F-104 super sonic fighters in Kashmir. India pointed out that this violated assurances given to the Indian Government by President Eisenhower in 1954. 

The war left the Indians completely disillusioned with the United States. A general feeling prevalent among Indians was that the United States was responsible for this war. Had the United States not supplied arms to Pakistan—this war would never have taken place. Although the United States did not play any active role in bringing the two belligerents to the conference table it was keenly desirous of a cease-fire and peace in subcontinent. Infact, America appalauded and praised Tashkent declaration as beneficial not only for India and Pakistan but also for Indo-American relations. War between India and Pakistan was all the more undesirable to US because of Chinese designs on the subcontinent.

1971 War or Bangladesh Crisis:

There were bitter differences between India and the United States during 1971 war in sub-continent in connection with the revolt of East Pakistan. There were
disturbances in 1969 and 1971, violence broke out accompanied by the worse possible horrors of civil war and relentless military suppression of the East Pakistani dissidents. There was constitutional deadlock and the crisis was created as a result of East Pakistan's non-violent and non-co-operation movement. The unparalleled wave of repression unleashed by west Pakistan army, that led to the declaration of independence by Bangladesh on March 25, 1971. Pakistan Government has sent the army to crush the dissidence forcefully resorting to maximum brutality and terrorism.19

India's support to the Bangladesh crisis was sympathetic. India extended her support to the cause of freedom fighters. The United States Government sided with west Pakistan. India unsuccessfully tried her best to make the United States to take right stand. The United States State Department continued its military supplies to Yahya regime inspite of the fact that the American weapons were being used against East Bengalis.

Indian Government refused to comment on this problem till March 26, 1971. As soon as Bangladesh declared it independence, Indian people and Government extended their whole-hearted support to the freedom fighters of Bangladesh. Later along with moral, the material including military support was also provided by India. But the policy of United States state Department was, to treat the crisis as an internal affairs of Pakistan and the refugee problem in
India as one which she should continue to bear indefinitely with restraint. The Nixon administration pro-yahya activities and postures persisted throughout the period from March to December 1971.20

Finally, Pakistan started WAR with India and made declaration of war on December 3, 1971. The United States then launched a reflex condemnation of India pilloried it in the United Nations and brought forward resolutions in the security council making India's position helpless if Russia would not have used vetoes. Much to the Chagrin of India, the Nixon administration went out of its way to side with Pakistan and showed great hostility to India. The United States branded India as aggressor, cut all military and economic aid to India. Moved three resolutions in the security council and one in the General Assembly in support of Pakistan, threatened to invoke against India its treaty obligations with Pakistan. There were also secret plans for the supply of United States arms and spare parts in utter disregard to public opinion in United States itself.

However, despite provocative act America refrained from direct military intervention. Even before war began America had made its position clear. William Rogers stated that the United States regard both India and Pakistan as its "Good friends" and in the event of war between the two, the United States would keep out. Perhaps
this was what president Nixon meant by the phrase "Special relations" with India—a relationship that was as important as American's treaty relationship with Pakistan.  

When Mrs. Indira Gandhi put the opposition in Jails after the proclamation of emergency in 1975, Washington contentedly condemned this action on her part. Emergency came under heavy and strident slauQht in the American mass media. In August 1975, President Ford canceled his proposed visit to India because Emergency conditions obtaining in India.

When the Janata Party came to Power in March 1977, it was keenly expected that Indo-American ties would undergo some-change that would augur well for the future. A new chapter was foreseen in mutual relation. Washington opined that possible changes in Indian foreign policy represent a thing of a winfall for Washington. The defeat of congress party had offered "fresh opportunities". The Janata Party and Carter administration both upheld the human rights in their election manifestos. The constituent parties in Janata Government like Janasangh and other considered to be in favour of close ties with the United States.

In America, Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee, on 30 March voted for repeal of anti-Indian amendment adopted by American Congress in 1974, in reaction to India's nuclear explosion. This had earlier statutorily
required that American representative to the World Bank would vote against low-interest loans to India. Speaking on the repeal of amendment, H.H. Humphery Chairman of Foreign assistance Sub-Committee explained that "after two and half years of dictatorial rules India has emerged in a free election............ we ought to encourage this sort of thing rather than kick it (India) around". He hoped that "the rather important and fundamental change" in India Government Policies would follow after the coming in power of Janata regime.

The hopes soared high when American President, Jimmy Carter, paid a State visit to India from 1 to 3 January 1978. The Joint Communiqué signed by India and United States listed many common foreign policy objectives of both countries. Both recognized that "Ultimate sanction of power and public policy" rest in the respect; for the "dignity and well being of the individual". Both emphasized the need for removing global economic disparities for achieving international peace and stability. Both leaders noted that "war is not an acceptable means to settle political disputes". The two countries failed to agree on the nuclear question. In spite of the American anxiety in this regard the two countries differed on this issue.

Indian Reaction to Afghan Crisis:

The United States-Pakistan military relationship invited Soviet Union into Afghanistan even in 1930's.
Bilateral relations of South Asian nations were disturbed. It has also created problems for the United States shortly after the American Pakistan military agreement was signed, the Pakistan closed the Afghan border which forced Afghanistan to go through Soviet Union for trade. This resulted in a major Soviet military and economic loan and supply of equipments to Afghanistan. Till 1954, the Afghans has successfully and courageously resisted Soviet blandishments but later, soviet union exploited the situation which arose out of United States-Pakistan relations.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 created great upheaval in the United States-South Asian relations. On the sub-continent the United States produced abortive efforts to strengthen security links with Pakistan and a modest improvement in the always difficult relations with India. In early 1980, the United States improve ties with Pakistan by having Congress end the ban on aid and offered $400 million assistance immediately (half military, half economic) and prepare a long term assistance.

The United States supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan on the pretext of communist threat in neighbour Afghanistan annoyed Indian leaders. India does not believed United States assurances that they would not be used against India, as it was seen in the two wars with Pakistan, in which pak used US arms and inability and disinterest of United States to stop the use of its arms against India.
The American Military Base in Indian Ocean and India's Reactions:

The Indian ocean has been another area of disagreement between the United States and India. The latter is a major littoral state and is concerned about the super powers rivalry in the ocean. The United States has looked upon the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as having implications for the security of the Indian ocean region and for the interests of the various countries that heavily depend on the region for their vital supplies. She is, therefore, determined, to vigorously counter any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The increasing American naval presence and militarization of the Indian Ocean were opposed by India, since the break-up of Pakistan in 1974. American naval presence in the Indian ocean has been increasing without interruption. A number of naval exercises has been made by Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). The United States rapidly developed its naval base at Diego Garcia. It has become from 'an austere communication base' to a 'support base' and finally to 'a major strategic base'.

American naval activities in this area are resented by India. For example, India expressed on 12 March 1978, its distress and concern at the reported dispatch of the United States carrier-led naval task force to the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf area. When Morarji Desai paid a state visit to America in June 1978, he raised the question of American Naval presence in the Indian ocean with President Jimmy Carter. Both countries difference on this 'issue area'. India continually and firmly expressed the view that the Indian ocean should be a 'zone of peace'.

In early years of 1980s the importance of the south Asian region has increased substantially in the eye of Reagan administration in the context of the developments that have taken place in Afghanistan. The Reagan administration made clear intention to broaden co-operation with threatened states in critical regions like Pakistan in South Asia. As a major country in the region, India has been directly affected by the United States decision to supply sophisticated arms to Pakistan in the wake of the soviet presence in Afghanistan. The importance of Pakistan has increased in America's global strategy to counter Soviet moves in the region following the fall of the Shah of Iran, the general failure of American policy in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Washington attached importance to Pakistan as a 'buffer' against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and offered $3.2 billion American Programme of military and economic aid to her for a period of five years.

India wanted to obtain Washington's support for her own Government and for India. Yet, the United States difference to India's interests was manifest in many
decisions, ranging from the establishment of a multiservice United States Central Command in the Indian Ocean, to ideologically inspired opposition to India's application for concessionary finance, such as a three-year $3.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Mrs. Gandhi made a personal visit bid to win favour in the United States during her State visit of July 1982. A Gandhi-Reagan Science and Technology initiative signed during her visit, which was a bright step in improving bilateral relations.

Though Mrs. Gandhi assured the United States of India's continued non-alignment, of its sincere desire to improve relations with China and Pakistan, and explained India's intentions to diversify sources of defence equipment, her Government concluded a previously negotiated agreement with Soviet Union on defense purchase to tune of $1.6 billion. India also took position opposed to those of the United States in giving diplomatic recognition to Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Heng Samrin Government in Kampuchea. These decisions of India were interpreted in the United States as being Pro-Soviet.

The Vice-President George Bush visited India in May 1984. He said that 'the United States arms sales to Pakistan were not intended to threaten-India', but the United States was committed to helping Pakistan remain strong while soviet troops were in neighboring Afghnistan. Despite American assurances, India felt that these arms may jeopardize her security interests in the region. 28
At the invitation of the President of United States, Ronald Reagan, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid an official visit to the United States from 11-15 June 1985. Both leaders discussed wide range of issues relating to the world situation to their respective regions, to their bilateral relations. Indira Gandhi Reagan Science and Technology initiative (STI) signed in 1982 was renewed for three more years in 1985 during their meeting. After Rajiv's visit to United States in 1985 the relations between two countries slowly improved. 29

The Nuclear issue in the Indo-American Relations:

Ever since atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 during World War II, it has been everyone's dream to somehow ensure that these weapons of mass destruction are never used again. However all efforts in this direction have so far come to naught, and the threat of nuclear holocaust hangs over humankind even after the end of cold war. The maximum objection to the renunciation of nuclear weapons have, unfortunately, been raised by the most powerful nuclear power, the United States. The cold war era had been dominated by the NPT devised by nuclear power nations in 1970. The treaty was patently discriminatory as its principal aim was to perpetuate the monopoly in nuclear weapons and delivery systems which the nuclear powers already had. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
devided the world into two categories those that had exploded a nuclear explosive devise prior to 1967 and those that had not under the treaty, the countries that had already acquired nuclear weapons could go on acquiring more nuclear warheads, testing new nuclear weapons and building delivery systems. All other countries, in contrast, were supposed to abstain from developing nuclear weapons and throw open their nuclear establishment, if they had one, to international inspection.

India's refusal to sign the NPT remained a sore point in Indo-American relations. In early fifties differences between the United States and India were noticeable in India's reaction to the 'Atoms for peace' proposed by the President Eisenhower. The proposal was putforward by President Eisenhower in a speech before two United Nation General Assembly on 8 December 1953. Though initially the Government of India welcomed the proposal, there was a gradual change subsequently when the implication of the proposal became obvious. The idea behind the proposal was no doubt to assist countries in the development of civilian nuclear energy but in return these countries would have to guarantee that they would use such assistance only for peaceful purposes to the satisfaction of the donor.

The differences between United States and India on the subject of control of nuclear energy come out in the
open on the question of the scope and powers to be given to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the time of
its establishments. In the negotiations leading to the
signing of the IAEA statute, the United States and India
differed on many crucial issues. India emerged as a leading
critic of the United States safeguards system.32

The United States contended that the number of
countries having independent sources of nuclear weapons
ought to be limited as their proliferation would create an
amount of irresponsibility and uncertainty in international
conduct. As evident from several policy pronouncements
India thought that the primary task before mankind was to
bring some sense of responsibility to those who had
engendered the nuclear weapons and were still going on
proliferating them among themselves on an even higher scale
unmindful of the consequences and of their own
responsibility.

The ideological differences as witnessed between
the United States and India in the fifties on control of
nuclear energy continued to persist and even enlarge. They
came out in clear terms over the question of NPT India did
not subscribe to the United States view that some countries
could be more responsible than others. Any rational and
tangible treaty on non-proliferation, India believed should
emphasize the need for tangible progress towards
diaarmament, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a complete freeze on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and substantial reduction in the existing stocks. In ideological terms, one may infer that the discussions on the NPT highlighted the different roles of India and the United States as protagonist of the nuclear 'have nots' and nuclear 'haves' respectively.

Non nuclear weapons states like India were annoyed that the United States and USSR reached agreement about the terms of the NPT, largely without meeting the demands of the non-nuclear weapon and developing countries. The simultaneous prevention of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation has been central to India's concept of NPT. But however NPT seemed to rest on the premise that no state would dare challenge the nuclear prescription against horizontal proliferation laid down by the superpowers. India asserted its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But the United States has taken the position that it is possible to see advanced nuclear weapon states having peaceful nuclear explosions, but for a non-nuclear weapon states, a peaceful nuclear explosion capability meant a nuclear weapon capability. Even with the change of Government on NPT in 1977 India's stand remained unchange on NPT.

A doubt has been often raised about the genuineness of the United States commitment to the policy of
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even though Israel and South Africa refusing to put their nuclear complexes under international reaction, America continuing to avoid both countries militarily politically and economically. The United States has consistently opposed moves in the United Nations to ban all nuclear co-operation with South Africa in the light of its stubborn refusal to adhere to the UN resolutions. By this it is evident that United States intentionally persuading India to sign the NPT, because, India declined to support it in many international issues. The United States also feared that India may emerge in future as powerful country economically and militarily and may challenge its prospects in international arena.

The Indian stand on nuclear issue continued to be same even in 1980s. The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited United States in June 1985 and confirmed India's stand. Speaking at the Press Club during his visit, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi indicated that there would be no shift on India's approach to the NPT. He considered the NPT to be very 'unfair' since it speaks of two different levels of controls vis-a-vis the nuclear have's and nuclear have-nots. He further observed that India thinks that 'anything which is so blatantly unfair should not be in existence and we will not sign it'. The nuclear issue continued to remain a bone of contention between two countries even in the present time.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

Economic relation is an area where there can be greater co-operation between the United States and India because of the common interests involved and which can provide a solid foundation for more mature and enduring relations is trade. Both Governments encouraged commercial co-operation between the two countries in the private as well as the public sectors.

In spite of several differences and divergent policies and strain in their relations, the United States provided massive economic aid to India. The fear of spread to communist influence in India made American critics in the congress change their tone and aid India.

The United States provided valuable assistance to India under the Technical Co-operation agreement of 1951. The United States also made available to India huge quantities of foodgrains to tide over the problem of food shortage facing the country. India also received enormous assistance from various private foundations like the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie.35

In 1955, the United States authorised $200 million to be contributed to international peace and security and to assist the people of Asia. In accordance with the American policy of helping to strengthen free nations, which were
striving to maintain their Independence, the United States assisted India in carrying out her Five Year plans. The continued assistance also serves as an evidence of American interest and friendship for the Indian people. This clearly brings out the American attitude about aid given to India. The United States Economic aid was offered in terms of tenets of her Foreign policy. America also wanted India to win the race with Red China in developmental activities.  

In 1951 United States provided $189.7 million wheat loan to face foodgrain problem. The total United States aid to India in 1951 was $194.2 million. But it was declined in between 1952-56. In 1952 total United States aid to India was $53.2 million. In 1953 total United States aid to India was $45.2 million. In 1954 it was $88.9 million. It was slightly increased in 1955 to $113.5 million. Again it was declined to $92.8 million in 1956. In 1957 it was sharply increased to $438.8 million. In 1960 it reached more than $925.6 million.  

In 1960's the United States aid to India continued to flow with some ups and downs. In 1967 United States sharply cut short her aid to India, when India has taken different attitude to world problems. In 1970s the United States cancelled economic and other aids to India after the Indo-Pak war of 1971. India refused to bow to American pressure and continued its efforts in the world to support the right.
The United States private investors also showed interest to invest in India. Upto January 1948 the United States private investment in India was Rs. 112 million. Upto December 1960 it was Rs. 730 million. Upto March 1970 it was Rs. 4,313 million. By the end of March 1980 it was Rs. 5,918 million. In between 1981 to 87 March the United States Private investment in India was Rs. 1289.30 million, which shows slow improvement of United States private Foreign investment in India upto 1990's. 38

There are number of Indo-United States collaborations in India, which are approved by India. The following table gives the details of Indo-American collaborations.

### NUMBER OF UNITED STATES COLLABORATIONS AGREEMENTS APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (GOI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1957-74</th>
<th>1975-79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>811</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2,460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* : Cumulative

Source : THIRD CONCEPT.

Indo-American collaboration in science and technology received high acclaim and financial boost from both Governments as well as private institutions and individuals. The Indo-United States Sub Commission on Science and Technology as well as Science Advisers in both embassies were kept busy processing schemes for
collaborative projects and/or joint research. Many joint research projects were proposed in the frontier areas of international scientific interest and had global implications; for example; ocean climate, atmospheric, Chemistry, solar physics, satellite communications, etc. 39

Till 1988, the United States remained as largest Foreign investor in India with approved United States investment in India increasing from Rs. 295 million in 1987 to Rs. 971.3 million in 1988, the total United States investment in India in the decade of 1980's has been more than Rs. 2,260.7 million. The United States companies entered into 262 agreements with Indian counterparts of which 191 involved transfer of technology and 57 equity participation. Since 1981 to 1987 United States companies have signed a total of 1,250 agreements for technological collaboration and 372 involving equity participation. 40

Through out the cold war period the Indo-American relations were marked by ups and downs. In the cold war era, the United States fear of spread of communism, made it to come more close and close to its ally Pakistan in the sub-continent. The arms supply to Pakistan to face communist threat in the region, remained the greatest impediment to a better relationship between the two countries. The United States-Pakistan collusion succeeded only in alienating India from both the United States and Pakistan.
One may conclude that the United States approach to its relations with India, in cold war period was short sighted and selfdefeating, it is based exclusively on a resolve to pursue its 'global strategic' interest at the cost of its own general principles, its values and its good will for India.
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