Chapter — 2

EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
India is one of the oldest country and civilization of the world. India has been the home of ancient civilization, religions and cultures. The name India is derived from Indus, which is derived from the old Persian word Hindu, from Sanskrit Sindhu, the historic local appellation for the Indus River. The ancient Greeks referred to the ancient Indians as Indoi, the people of the Indus. The Constitution of India and common usage in Hindi also recognise Bhartat and has been in use since the 12th century, though its contemporary use is unevenly applied.

Influential Factors on India’s Foreign Policy

As in the case of other states in India also, there are permanent and changing factors of foreign policy.

1. Geographical Factors

Foreign policy is determined by a certain order of facts, geographical, historical and economic. No state can escape its geography or history. India’s strategic location set in the centre of the Indian Ocean, with China, Afghanistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as its immediate neighbours and huge land frontiers and very considerable coastline. India has had to be close to land powers as well as maritime powers.
2. Historical Tradition

Historical tradition plays a vital role in the making of a foreign policy. The historical relations between India and Britain for instance, cannot be easily wiped out. These relations crystallize in the form of economic and emotional bonds. The common political tradition of parliamentary government and the bond provided by the English language, ultimately tied down the two countries. Then, the other bond was that of India’s membership to the Commonwealth. The British Governments decision to quit India touched the heart and stirred the emotions of Indians and inspite of sharp differences, friendly relations between India and British persisted. The historical love for the metaphysics coloured the thinking of Indians on foreign affairs. The relations between China and India could partly be explained in terms of history. The fact that Burma was at one time part of India partially affected our attitude towards that country just as the historic ties between India, on the one hand, and Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, on the other, have something to do with our relations with those countries. The fact that India has had no tradition of wars is also an important element.

3. Ideological Sources

One view is that the ‘Mahabharat’ and ‘Arthasastra’ are the ideological sources of Indian foreign policy. According to Pannikkar, for instance, Mahabharat is that encyclopedia of Indian thinking to which,
inspite of all our familiarity with western literature and thought, we still return for the solution of our problems. Arthasastra of Kautilya, according to him "enables Hindu thinkers to evolve a purely secular theory of state of which the sole basis is power".1

The main tenants of Indian foreign policy as laid down by the Congress party, namely (1) opposition to imperialism (2) avoidance of foreign entanglements and (3) peace were ideas drawn from the founding fathers of the American Republic, who were not mere idealists but conversed in real politick.

Ideologically speaking, in fact, democratic socialism more than Gandhism, seems to have affected India's foreign policy and thinking. India's view of capitalist democracy, private enterprise and colonialism was conditioned by Marxism as Laski interpreted it.

4. Economic Factor

Economic forces have greatly influenced the making of Indian foreign policy. A major economic factor has been the comparative backwardness of the country. The economy is yet to be stabilized and our agriculture and industries are still developing. India is in need of foreign aid to assist in building our economy and is extremely sensitive about political strings that may be attached to them. Economically the partition of the sub-continent disrupted India's economy so that India began with the doctrine that political freedom would remain incomplete
without rapid economic progress and emancipation. This compulsion urged (1) foreign aid from all available sources-the West as well as the East, and aid without political stings; (2) non-involvement in military alliances or conflicts of super powers; (3) a demand for a better deal from the North to the South. These factors generated the concept of Non-alignment.

5. Factor of Personality

Another source of India's Foreign policy can be said to be the personality of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who governed for about 17 years, who was also the foreign minister and the main architect of foreign policy. Men like Sardar Patel, K. M. Pannikkar, V.K.Krishna Menon, of course, materially influenced its course, tone and tenor. The role of Parliament in India's foreign policy, on some occasions, such as the Hungarian issue (1956), Goa (1961), Bangladesh (1971–72) and Sri Lanka's genocide against the Tamils (1984–85) has been considerable.

6. External Affairs Ministry and Foreign Service

The influence of the External Affairs Ministry and the Foreign Service on Foreign policy is as great as any where else. It was in 1947, that the two departments of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations were under the overall control of the Prime Minister. Two years later the appendage Commonwealth Relations was dropped. The
Indian Foreign Service was instituted as a specialised service for the conduct of the whole range of India's Foreign Service – political consular and commercial. It was created in October 1946, by the Interim Government of India. At present India have diplomatic and consular relations with about 155 countries.

The functions of Indian Foreign Service in general terms may be defined as one of executing the foreign policy of this country and establishing links between India and the rest of the world. The Foreign Service is responsible for the furtherance of India's policies and interests; its members have to conduct diplomacy which means negotiations with other Governments.3

7. Parliament

There is an informal consultative committee of Parliament on foreign affairs to which members of all parties and groups are invited and which meets under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. But its influence is not considerable. The domination of the Congress party and the charter of Indian Parliament is partly responsible for this. Again most of the foreign policy decisions have received national approval and all parties agreed on the basic principles.

8. Political Parties and Foreign Policy

Political parties are the indispensable links between the people and the representative machinery of government. Political parties are
inevitable for the success of the democracy. But they are considered extra-constitutional bodies in almost all democratic countries. It means that the fundamental law of the land does not recognize them as a part of administrative or political machinery. Insde of this they function within the limits of the constitution and make the democracy fruitful.

In India foreign affairs were of secondary importance to the Political parties. Almost all political parties for a long time entirely engrossed in internal politics and paid little attention to foreign developments. Indian political parties before independence, were not parties in the true sense of the term as they were pressure groups devoted to the one and only cause—the freedom of India and were functioning under an imperial not a democratic government. After Independence the democratic constitution of India did not recognize political parties as constitutional bodies. Unlike American constitution, Indian constitution has not given a chance for parliament to approve foreign agreements entered upon by the Government of India. This naturally, reduced the importance of political parties in foreign affairs.

These days the country's foreign policy and international strategic situation do not come up for discussion in the Lok Sabha as much as they used to do in the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. The debates on the subject are not at the level at which they used to be in the 1950s and 1960s. This is understandable. In the 1950s and 1960s as Jawaharlal
Nehru was trying to steer India on the non-aligned strategy, he was under criticism both from the right and the left.

Then came a period of consensus. Non-alignment became more than a strategy, almost a creed. That suited India. The end of the Cold War and the beginning of Indian integration with the globalization process marked a shift in the Indian policy. The shift was further reinforced with India becoming a nuclear weapon state, a space power and an Information Technology (IT) power, its economy growing at more than 7 per cent and its trade expanding rapidly.

9. Role of Regional Parties in Foreign Policy

While the mainstream all-India parties have a natural interest in foreign policy, the same cannot be expected of the smaller parties, though individual members of those parties may have significant expertise in the area. Regional parties will be looking for opportunities to attract foreign investments to their states, promote exports from them and secure greater slices of outsourcing pie in respect of manufacturing and services. Major parties have foreign policy cells at their headquarters and they have the task of briefing the party members on foreign policy issues. The regional and smaller parties do not have adequate human and financial resources to develop similar capability. Only very recently, a small number of think tanks have developed in India dealing with foreign policy, international economic and strategic
issues. Our universities are yet to develop a culture of attempting to shape and influence such issues. Under those circumstances the parliamentarians of regional parties and smaller parties have to consider ways and means of educating themselves on foreign policy and international relations.

10. Press and Pressure Groups

The press has however, played an important role in the shaping of our foreign policy both by the publication of news and by the editorial comments. The Indian press is largely controlled by the business and the editorial notes and therefore, are the largely prowess. The fact that the Indian press depends for the foreign news on Western agencies i.e., Reuters Agency, France-Press and the United Press of America, accounts for the news of communist countries being partially reported and sometimes distorted. Even Asian countries are not covered adequately and an average Indian does not get very much from the press about the neighbouring Countries.

The impact of the pressure groups on foreign policy is on the whole insignificant at present. The trade unions are not well knit and are too loose to influence. The chambers of commerce, of course, influence, trade and commercial policies and may thus be said to affect the course of foreign policy also. The whole background of foreign office officials and diplomats is influenced by business interests.
Pressure groups may emerge here in course of time, and may become a powerful influence on international relations.  

**Basic Principles of India’s Foreign Policy**

Of course, the national interest has been the first and foremost consideration, as is the case with the foreign policies of other governments. The foreign policy of each country is determined essentially by the men or women in power and authority. That is, by the ruling party and the Governments of the day. The main factors that help determine India’s foreign policy are; the geographical situation, the economic requirements and resources, the defence needs and strategy, the existing alliances and understandings, tacit oral or written, with other states, and of course, the recent past, contemporary world events, the ideology and the political system. The basic aims principles and parameters of India’s foreign policy were outlined by Jawaharlal Nehru. These have not changed much even after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru and they are as follows.

1. **Opposition to Colonialism and Imperialism**

India’s foreign policy has persistently opposed all forms of colonialism and imperialism. India expressed her solidarity with the people of Asia and Africa in their fight against imperialism and colonialism. Now she is showing her concern against the rise of neo-colonialism in all its manifestations.
2. Opposition to Racial Discrimination

From the very beginning India is against all kinds of discrimination based on race and culture etc. It was pioneer in highlighting the problem of racial discrimination at the International level and severely criticized the policy of racial segregation being pursued by the government of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). In 1952, India along with twelve other Afro-Asian States raised the question of apartheid at the United Nations (UN) and asserted that its practice not only constituted a flagrant violation of the UN charter and the Declaration of Human Rights but also constituted a serious threat to world peace. In subsequent years, it took up the cause of the Negroes in America and blacks of South Africa. It played its role in the freedom of Zimbabwe and Namibia from white domination. In brief, it can be pointed out that India has always worked against racial discrimination wherever it was being practiced.

3. Promotion of International Peace

India's foreign policy has been one of building bridges of friendship and cooperation with all countries, irrespective of their economic or political systems. The aim has throughout been to promote and consolidate world peace and the creation of conditions for economic progress. Article 51 of the chapter IV of the Indian Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy) enjoins upon the Government of India to work for international peace and security. Thus,
India is committed to peace as a war between great powers is likely to destroy mankind in view of the destructive nature of the nuclear weapons. At least the instinct for survival calls for a policy aimed at promoting peace. Even small conventional wars may hit our economic development programmes in view of the Interdependence of nations today.

4. Panchsheel and faith in Peaceful Coexistence

Another important principle of India’s foreign policy is coexistence and cooperation. Like other features it is also the outcome of contemporary world situation and India’s national interests. The principle of co-existence has been enshrined in the Panchsheel. The principles were first stipulated in a treaty signed by India and China on the issue of Tibet on May 29th 1954. The principles were;

i. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,

ii. Non-aggression,

iii. Non-interference in each others internal affairs,

iv. Equality and mutual benefit, and

v. Peaceful co-existence, the Panchasheel became very popular among sovereign states of the world. The erstwhile Soviet Union, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Laos, Vietnham etc., accepted these principles of
International conduct. Panchasheel was India’s great contribution to International relations.

5. Special Relations with Asian States

No doubt, India is for cooperation among all countries of the world yet a special bias for the countries of Asia in its foreign policy is evident. It endeavoured to develop very close relations with countries of Asia, and tried to promote unity among them by organising a number of conferences especially during late forties and fifties. Its intentions were not to create a separate Asian bloc but to promote cooperation among the countries of Asia. Under this very principle India played active role in the formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and continues to be its active and significant member.

6. Links with Commonwealth

Good relations with Commonwealth have been another important feature of India’s foreign policy. India continued with the membership of Commonwealth even after adopting a Republican constitution, because, it thought that the membership of Commonwealth shall be beneficial in the economic and other spheres. India played a leading role at the various Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs).

India is an Original member of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) since its inception in October 1945. It has expressed full faith in its objectives and principles. It actively supports all efforts of UNO aimed at maintaining peace throughout the world. It has been taking active part in all its organs. Whether it was Korean problem, Vietnam crisis, Cambodian problem, Lebanon crisis, West Asia crisis or peace-keeping anywhere it always supported the UN efforts aimed at maintaining peace. India has contributed military and other personnel to peace-keeping forces stationed in certain countries over the years. On May 10th 1991, however, the Indian ambassador to the UN told the Special Committee on peace-keeping operations that India supports the peace-keeping role of the world organisation. But at the same time he stressed the ‘bedrock requirement’ that such operations must be carried out with due respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country or countries concerned. The United Nations future depends upon reforms. India has made a strong plea for making the UN bodies more representative and more democratic to enable this organization to deal with the growing international challenges and resolve conflicts in the international arena many of which have defied solution. It is suggested that the 15 member Security Council should be made more democratic and transparent and thus more effective and efficient.
8. Nuclear and Conventional Disarmament

India's foreign policy has always been for nuclear and conventional disarmament. It is very much in favour of peaceful use of nuclear energy, but at the same time it is opposed to nuclear weapons, bombs and warheads. In Six-Nation Summit held at the initiative of India in 1985 in New Delhi, solid proposals were advanced in favour of nuclear disarmament. It may, however, be noted that India is not a signatory of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it considers it discriminatory and a measure to perpetuate the monopoly of superpowers of nuclear weapons and energy. India has clarified from house top many a time that it would shun from using nuclear energy for any purpose other than peace.

9. Support to New International Economic Order (NIEO)

India's commitment to non-alignment and a New International Economic Order, (NIEO) based on Justice, equality and mutual cooperation is unshakable. This indicates a total dedication to the twin issues of peace and development. Though India's association was peripheral and its representatives got little opportunity in framing the procedures and provisions in the UN documents, that could help the emerging nations to acquire a measure of economic freedom, yet India's contribution during 1950-60 has been significant in envisaging changes in the international economic relations. Indian representatives were successful in getting General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
(GATT) rules amended to permit the developing countries to the post import restrictions aiming at improving their export potential. India has played a significant role in the struggle for NIEO. Its representatives proposed important suggestions regarding NIEO in the Sixth and Seventh Special Session of General Assembly. It has been endeavouring for NIEO through various sessions of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), G-77 and G-15.¹

10. **Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)**

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) became the logical framework of India’s foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the founders of NAM along with Nasser and Tito. Through the adoption of a policy of independence, support to the anti-imperialist struggle elsewhere and through a policy of promoting peace in the world. Jawaharlal Nehru took foreign policy out of the vortex of domestic politics and made it promote the cause of unification and stability in the country.

Military blocs, apart, the Non-Aligned Movements struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, racialism and for peaceful co-existence and the right of small countries. To determine and shape their own future defined the parameters of India’s foreign policy. These became the cardinal aspects of Indian foreign policy for all these decades of development after Independence.⁶
Characteristic Features of India's Policy of Non-Alignment are;

a. Maximum participation in international affairs.
b. Promotion of International understanding, mutual co-operation, peaceful co-existence and respect for national sovereignty;
c. Avoidance of local, regional and global wars;
d. Strengthening the cause of international peace and security;
e. Consideration of each international issue on its own merit; and
f. Pursuance of an independent foreign policy without aligning itself with any power or bloc.  

11. National Interests

They change according to the needs, requirements and circumstances internal as well as external. Even then, there are certain basic interests which India's foreign policy always endeavours to fulfill. They can be described as follows.

i. To maintain her own territorial integrity.

ii. To maintain friendship with the neighbouring states to get an access to the oil of the Middle East.

iii. To safeguard the interests of the Indians living in the border states.

iv. To promote her trade in foreign countries.

v. To get maximum aid and assistance for economic development

vi. To enhance its defence capabilities.

vii. To accomplish the security of the Indian air and sea routes.

viii. To maintain dynamic neutrality in the worldwide power conflict.
Historical perspective of India's Foreign policy

Indian foreign policy-making is shaped by two major strands that have never been synthesized to create a doctrine that takes into account the national interest: one, traditional principles drawn from the Gita and Mahabharata and most heavily from the doctrine of statecraft framed by the 4th century BC scholar-statesman, Kautilya (also known as Chanakya); and two, modernist principles that uneasily combine enlightenment values with a passive, sometimes dependent realpolitik, instilled by the experience of British colonialism in the 19th to mid-20th centuries. Most Indians perceive the two strands as internally conflicting, especially when it comes to issues of normative behaviour.

Traditional Indian foreign policy doctrine highlights the following key principles: firstly, the behaviour of states should adhere to rule-based or legal norms, with the important corollary that the law must enshrine an ethical worldview whose core principle, derived from the Mahabharata and Gita, is that war is the worst of last resorts. The canonical text of Indian statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra (laws of political economy), which remains the most widely quoted text by Indian policy-makers, laid down that the primary goals of a good government were to provide peace, security and prosperity for its citizens. The best governments, said Kautilya, adhered to the norms set out in the Dharmashastras (laws of principle and duty), which formed the state’s
judicial system and should be administered by a group of judges and ministers.\textsuperscript{9}

Secondly, the most effective means of delivering these goals were normative means such as international alliances, trade, infrastructure development and free movement across national borders.

Thirdly, the behaviour of a state should be assessed by the transparency of its actions. Before a government act or agreement could be implemented, the group of judges and ministers that administered the law would have to decide whether the government’s acts and agreements were valid or void. The criterion for valid agreements was that they should be transparent.\textsuperscript{10}

Thus the Arthashastra highlighted three key pillars of normative statecraft viz., engagement with the world, adherence to rule-based norms and transparency. Written for the most outward looking of India’s several empires, the Mauryan dynasty, whose rule spanned the Indus valley and was home to one of the greatest universities of its time: the Buddhist seat of Taxila (now in Pakistan), the Arthashastra based its normative principles on national interest, and has been described as an “interest-based framework that (saw) international relations as an interlocking pattern of the foreign policy priorities and dispositions of crucial states”.\textsuperscript{11}
Kautilya’s thinking included a distinctly realist strand. The neighbourhood was viewed as a core foreign policy priority and defined as a set of concentric circles. If the proximate neighbour was an enemy, the enemy’s next-door neighbour would be an ally and his neighbour would be an enemy: a kind of Swiss roll version of containment. He also counseled further and more general realist precepts: greater powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers could be defeated through judicious alliances, and weaker powers could be attacked, patronised or ignored.

Kautilya believed that alliances for peace were preferable to war even if war highlighted a country’s primacy over others. Kautilya emphasized the role of diplomacy and assigned two types of diplomats to negotiate: envoys who would issue demarches and envoys that would make agreements. He also set humanitarian standards for civilian protection during and after war.¹²

Had the traditional strand remained dominant in Indian foreign policy doctrine; it would have been easy to classify India as a normative (although not necessarily naively idealist) international player. But British colonialism added a new element to Indian foreign policy – that of dependency. Whereas previous empires had been rooted in India and adopted foreign policies that served Indian state interests, Britain was a far-away country and India’s foreign policy was adapted to suit
British interests. Thus, it can be said that unreal politics of international action (because it subordinates national interests to that of other countries) entered into Indian foreign policy. Unreal politics behaviour gained strength through the education policy framed by T.B. Macaulay in 1835, who argued that the Indian education system should generate contempt for native traditions and respect the superiority of European values and practice. This led successive generations of Indian policy-makers and analysts to doubt their own ability to frame the national interest.\textsuperscript{13}

The foregoing analysis reflects India's behaviour as a foreign policy actor. During the cold war, India's positions in the international arena were mostly normative but divorced from political reality and were directed to exclusively milieu goals. From 1920, when Indian National Congress leader Mahatma Gandhi sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to demand that the territories of the former Ottoman Empire be granted the same rights to self-determination as those granted to the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire—qualified in this case as the right to Muslim rule—India's foreign policy focus was on decolonisation and multilateral constraints over Great Power domination. Furthermore, Indian leaders sought consensus rather than using economic, political or military pressure to influence world affairs, an approach that lasted well into the 1990s.\textsuperscript{14}
Indian Foreign Policy during the pre-Independence period

Before Independence, India had no formal foreign policy, because its relations with every country were determined by the British Government till August 14th 1947. The imperial government committed the entire empire to war in 1914 without any formal consultations with the dominions or India. But during war, because of its own needs and dependence upon the resources of India and other dominions, it started the practice of holding consultations with dominions and India on matters of defence and foreign affairs. India was denied the dominion status but it was linked with other dominions because of the Indian contribution to the imperial war efforts. The August 1917 Montague Declaration, accepting the establishment of responsible Government in India as the final objective of the British, was made to ensure Indian help during the war. In 1917, Lloyd George’s Government agreed to India’s participation in the war conferences. Indian participation in war conferences of 1917 and 1918 did strengthen India’s position in relations with the imperial government and consequently, its participation in international politics increased. An Indian delegation participated in the Paris Peace Conference and India got original membership of the League of Nations. Thus, India was in a position to achieve a recognized international entity, status and to participate in international relations during the inter-war period. The experience that
India gained during this period was utilized by the foreign policy makers of free India.\textsuperscript{15}

It was during World War I that matters of foreign policy had seriously engaged the attention of the Indian leaders whose primary concern continued to be dislodging the foreign rulers. At the end of the war, India signed the treaty of Versailles (1919) and became an original member of the League of Nations. India’s participation in the League activities was regular and her delegations to Geneva invariably comprised non-official representatives. India had already been admitted to the membership of the Imperial Conference in 1907 and she was duly represented at Imperial War Conference. In the early years, the Secretary of State for India used to lead the Indian delegation at Geneva. But in 1930 this honour was conferred on Sri Mahammed Habibullah and in 1931 on Sri B.L. Mitter. India held a permanent seat on the governing body of the International Labour Organization (ILO), and in 1931 Atul Chandra Chatterjee was elected Chairman of the permanent committee of the International Labour Organization. India took part in important International conferences like the Washington Conference and the World Economic Conference.\textsuperscript{16}

The most important pronouncement regarding India’s foreign policy in the pre-Independence days was the Congress Resolution adopted at the Haripura Session in 1938 which made it clear that the
people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other countries and for this purpose wish to remove all causes of conflict between them. Therefore in order to establish world peace on enduring basis, imperialism and exploitation of some people by another must end. All these experiences and pronouncements helped to frame an independent foreign policy by the independent India.

**Foreign Policy of India in Post-Independent Era**

India which come out of the colonial yoke through the Gandhian path of 'ahimsa' (non-violence) had a set of nationalist leaders led by Pandit Nehru and in September 1946, while providing an outline of the interim government's objectives on the cusp of Indian Independence, Nehru stated: "It is because of this expectation of an early realization of full Independence that we have entered this Government and we propose to function so as progressively to achieve Independence in action both in our domestic affairs and our foreign relations....as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation." There is further elaboration of the Nehruvian vision of Indian Foreign Policy and a few months after he became Prime Minister of Independent India, he observed: "Foreign policies.... are not just empty struggles on a chess board. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will
be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping." After attainment of Independence every Prime Minister of India took active part in foreign policy matters. The foreign policy initiatives under each Prime Minister were discussed briefly.

Foreign Policy during Jawaharlal Nehru Period (1947-1964)

Unquestionably, the fabric of Indian foreign policy is largely the handiwork of Jawaharlal Nehru. It was he who laid the ground work of India's foreign policy. As the first Prime Minister of India and his own foreign minister, he was at the helm of affairs for seventeen years and enjoyed virtually monopolistic jurisdiction over foreign affairs. This gave him an unchallenged position to translate his ideas accumulated during freedom movement into foreign policy. Since he played a key role in shaping it both before and after independence, it is no wonder if Indian foreign policy reflects and projects Nehru's mind and personality. Indeed, "he was the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of country towards the outside world." However, "there were many different cross-currents in Nehru's intellectual make-up which he was unable to synthesis into a coherent intellectual pattern." In fact, he never tried to reduce his ideas into a doctrinaire ideology with the result he was never dogmatic in his approach. To quote B.R. Nanda "his vision was a happy amalgam of Western liberalism, Marxism and Gandhism." His famous broadcast on September 7th 1946 was a full fledged articulation of his foreign policy outlook. All the
major elements that went into the making of his foreign policy are explicitly present in that speech: "the emancipation of dependent peoples and countries, recognition in theory and practice of equality of opportunities for all races, keeping away from the power politics and groups aligned with one another, working for an avoidance of a world war, and building up a world commonwealth where there is free cooperation of free peoples and no class or group exploits another."22

Key Stones of Nehru's Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru with his remarkable foresight had peered into the future of world affairs when Jawaharlal Nehru wrote from prison in 1946, that much will depend on American and Soviet policy and on the degree of cooperation or conflict between them. Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly perceived the role the two emerging powers were to play in the post-War-II world politics. He took no time to understand the dangerous implication of the two camp thesis, and the bi-polarization of world politics. Jawaharlal Nehru detected the unsoundness of containment doctrine and plainly told so to American President Truman in 1949.

As a matter of fact, Nehru himself wanted to contain communism in Asia and took some steps accordingly. For instance, he helped the Prime Minister of Burma in crushing the communist insurgency in Burma, winked at the British attempt in doing the same in Malaya, hailed the Brussels Pact (1948) and condoned the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) (1949). He also reconsidered the earlier decision regarding the membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations-perhaps the emergence of communist China in 1949 was the decisive factor and refurbished the protectorate over Bhutan and Sikkim. and raised even objection though mild, against the rape of Tibet (1950). In the Korean War (1950-53), too, he supported the Western stand in the initial stage and until the 38th Parallel was crossed by the UN forces. But while sharing the objective (anti-communism) of the Western powers, he did not share their understanding of international communism. Nehru saw fundamental difference between Mao's China and Stalin's Russia. Nehru was helped in this understanding by Marshall Tito and M.N. Roy. M.N.Roy categorically recorded that Mao would prove a second Tito. M.N.Roy had also characterised the Chinese communism as nothing but nationalism painted red. Nehru himself never regarded Mao as Stalin's stooge. He, therefore, put more store in Mao's Asianism. Nehru fully realised that it is only by winning China's confidence and only with her support that India's role as a bridge builder could be sustained for some time and thereby keep Asia out of the theatre of the Cold War. Thus was laid the ground for a united front of Afro-Asian countries (reflected in the Bandung Conference of 1955) and for the Declaration of Panchsheel.

But the Bandung Spirit could not last long. Jawaharlal Nehru soon discovered that Mao's China did not stand for world peace and coexistence instead; Jawaharlal Nehru favoured the East-West conflict.
Hence Nehru became wary of China. As soon as he found Khrushchev hitting hard at Stalin and standing for peaceful coexistence, Nehru chose his company. He even helped Khrushchev in building bridges of understanding with America. Gradually abroad affinity developed between India and the Soviet Union not only on such problems as Kashmir and Goa but also on wider world issues. Hence Nehru's tilted towards the Soviet Union. This explains why Nehru showed undue deference to the susceptibilities of the Soviet Union and was unduly critical of the West in world affairs.

According to Michael Brecher, the core elements in Nehru's foreign policy were: Anti-colonialism, non-alignment, mediation in the Cold War, creating third force for peace, rejection of isolationism and playing an active role in world affairs, pursuit of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation, and maintaining a fine mixture of idealism and realism. "Nehru adopted a broad approach in national and international politics in which idealism and realism, the long view and the short view, were conciliated into equilibrium. He tried to remain basically a realist-to develop a powerful structure in India, including a strong economic infrastructure, armed forces, a stable and viable constitutional and administrative system, and to protect and promote India's national interest according to his best judgement. But at the same time the idealist influence of the recent Indian political traditions, in particular that of Gandhi, and his own philosophical and ideological convictions impelled
him to nurture and cherish a broader vision of international cooperation and world peace."²³ Thus, his realism was tempered by his humanism and his ideological predisposition. He defined idealism as realism of tomorrow. He justified idealism in international politics by saying that realism as such leads to incessant conflict and the realist looks at the tip of his nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is stumbling all the time. For Jawaharlal Nehru, realism is a regressive doctrine in international politics it is an ideology of status quo. However, as a pragmatic idealist, he attempted to combine idealism with national interest. Even the policy of Non-alignment was not a moral postulate but an alignment with national interest. He tried to present a synthesis of idealism and realism in foreign policy and proposed to look after India's interest in the context of world cooperation and world peace.²⁴ But whether Nehru was able to combine idealism and realism rationally in the specific application of his foreign policy is a debatable issue. He often started with high principle and committed the state to a certain idealistic position, as in regard to Kashmir, China and Goa. But he would never hesitate to modify his idealistic commitment substantially or abandon it altogether under pressure of circumstances, as again in the case of Kashmir and Goa. In the case of China, his fundamental and long term realism prevented him from having a sharp awareness of the short term threat. In fact, he was more interested in framing the broad outlines of
policy than in giving operational shape to them. Or perhaps he wanted to be firm on fundamentals and flexible and pragmatic on details.

Follies and Failings of Nehru’s Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru, because of his high profile global role, paid little attention to South Asia and South-East Asia—our immediate regional concern, to economic and cultural diplomacy, and to institution building in the Ministry of External Affairs. His administration of policy lacked the idealism that characterized his foreign policy in general. During his era the Indian foreign policy was globalist in the sense that Nehru kept his stance fixed on the central super powers divide and projected India as a bridge between the two. But the attempt to play a global role from a weaker base of national power at times proved futile and fatuous.

His main follies were: (i) Taking the Kashmir issue to the UN and thereby getting it caught in the cross-fire of the Cold War and (ii) Making wrong assessment of China’s design against India.

Nehru’s Contribution to Indian Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru is generally acknowledged as the chief architect of our foreign policy. His main contribution to the making of Indian foreign policy was his attempt to reconcile high-minded idealism with hard-headed realism, short term and long term policy into a stable equilibrium according to his best light based on his extensive
knowledge of history, politics and international relations. He sought to synthesise geopolitical compulsions with Indian ethos. To be sure, the policy of non-alignment was his unique contribution not only to Indian foreign policy but to the theory and practice of international relations in general. This policy has vindicated the fallacy of both the Marxist theory of the inevitability of the bipolar international class conflict (since admitted by Gorbachev) and the Western theory of the balance of power (renounced by Nixon regime) and demonstrated the feasibility and desirability of a third dimension of international relations-third leg of a triangle.25

It goes to his credit that his foreign policy framework still remains sound and valid. It is a measure of his wisdom and far-sightendness that its basic formulations still require no modification except the nomenclature. Regional cooperation within Asia (first Asiatic Relations Conference was called in 1947), tricontinental cooperation to the Third World and global engagement can be regarded his permanent legacy. Undoubtedly, in his period India came to enjoy a prestige and exercise and influence out of all proportions to her conventional power.

**Foreign Policy during Lal Bahadur Shastri Period (1964-66)**

Nehru was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1964. In sharp contrast with Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri was truly a child of the
Indian soil, and a true representative of the Indian people, in terms of his class background, upbringing and socio-cultural belonging. The political career of Lal Bahadur Shastri was almost entirely made by Jawaharlal Nehru.

Lal Bahadur Shastri was, a man of very small proportions, and was actually conscious of the fact. Yet, he did not develop an inverted inferiority complex on account of his short stature. Like Prime Minister Clement Attlee (Britain), he was "a modest little man with much to be modest about". Lal Bahadur Shastri’s mild manners, apparent modesty and sincerity disarmed his critics and he soon won the love of his countrymen by keeping his head low. Though, fully committed to Nehru’s policy formulation, he replaced the rhetoric and global sweep of Indian diplomacy as well as personalized style of decision making during the Nehru era by pragmatism, bilateralism and institution building.

In the initial phase, Lal Bahadur Shastri did fumble, but very soon he began to find his feet. Following Nehru, he gave equal importance to the development of Indian economy, particularly in the agricultural field (he put agriculture at the top priority) side by side with the building up of India’s defence necessitated by China’s hostile posture in collusion with Pakistan. He sent his Foreign Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh on a goodwill mission to Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan
and other neighbouring countries with a view to improving India's bilateral relations with them. These visits were widely welcomed. It is worth mentioning here that the Lal Bahadur Shastri-Swaran Singh diplomacy led to all round good neighbourly relations and, to a large extent, to the solution of the vexatious problem of the people of Indian origin (Tamils) in Ceylon.

Lal Bahadur Shastri's finest hour, however, came in 1965. His personality as a war leader as well as a peace-maker was amply revealed during the Indo-Pak war (1965) and the Tashkent Agreement that followed it (1966).

Not being as confident as Jawaharlal Nehru of his own wisdom, Shastri had to resort to a number of innovations in the institutional aspect of decision making. He tried to create a stable institutional framework for decision making in foreign policy which would in the long run make for greater rationality in foreign policy than the personalized decision style adopted both by his predecessor as well as successors. It was during this period that Policy Planning and Review Division was added (1965) to Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs. By appointing L.K. Jha as his principal Secretary, he laid the foundation of a new institution—the Prime Minister's Secretariat (PMO).

On the whole, Lal Bahadur Shastri, like American President Truman (USA), filled the bill ideally, though unexpectedly. But his term
was abruptly cut short by his untimely death at Tashkent on January 10th 1966 even before completing his two years in office. Commenting on his brief term, S. Nihal Singh said, "Shastri was indeed to become a sad footnote in history" just a punctuation mark in Indian political history. Being a true follower of Nehru, Shastri had neither the urge nor the time to think of any modification in the Indian foreign policy. In short, little, changed in the interlude, the stamp on policy and policy making remained that of Nehru.

**Foreign Policy during Indira Gandhi Period (1966-77)**

Following the death of Lai Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi was chosen as the third Prime Minister of India on January 24th 1966, with the help of the so-called syndicate, who preferred a dumb doll (a docile dummy or a pliant puppet) in comparison with a veteran and doughty politician like Morarji Desai. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was her father's (Nehru's) counter personality in many ways. Jawaharlal Nehru possessed strong political instinct and was a highly learned man. Jawaharlal Nehru was a liberal and convinced democrat Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, gave the impression of great acquisitive instinct. She was very earthy with the robust common sense in-her personality. Further, she was haughty and arrogant, yet gracious. She was able and competent but cold blooded. In the opinion of Henry Kissinger, she had few peers in cold blooded calculation of the elements of power. Her interest and her
values were inseparable. She was a superb tactician, master strategist and manipulator and flawless in timing.

Indira Gandhi, however, was a tragically lonely person. It is generally believed that her alienated childhood, her unhappy marriage, insufficient education and tremendous inferiority complex, and her sense of political insecurity after the death of her father had combined to give her a persecution complex, which was projected in her authoritarian and aggressive policy in both foreign and domestic affairs.28 Underneath her confident exterior, she suffered from insecurity and a feeling of intellectual inadequacy. Because of personal as well as political insecurity her threat perceptions used to be extraordinarily high. Aloof and insecure person like Mrs. Gandhi could feel secure only with the absolute possession of power. No wonder, her sense of insecurity was transferred to political scene of her country. According to Ashish Nandi, "Her problem was her unending search for total security and total acceptance, which made her intolerant of criticism and unwelcome advice."29 And above all, she had the reputation of never forgetting and never forgiving.

However, all these debit side traits in her personality were balanced by her considerable personal charm, astonishing willpower, indomitable determination. Moreover, she was level headed, forceful, effective and down to earth. She had an extraordinary political acumen,
and was a very successful leader! The secret of her success was ascribed to her acute sense of timing-taking right decision at the right moment probably she was gifted with gambler’s instinct. Altogether, unlike her father, she lacked vision and planning perspective. Without any ideology or world view or blue print to direct her, she was woefully deficient in humdrum task of nation building. In short, she was a good politician but a poor statesperson.

The year of 1966 (when Mrs. Indira Gandhi took over) was a year of reverses all around. The politico-economic structure looked like a thoroughly leaking boat tossed in the tempestuous sea. The country was facing unparalleled drought, acute food shortage, galloping inflation, official language controversy, demand for a Punjabi state etc. The year was marked by bandhs, marches, demonstrations and strikes. It was against this background that Indira Gandhi began her first innings. Naturally, she had a shaky and inauspicious start. In her first Republic Day broadcast, she pledged to follow her father’s policy of friendship among nations-to implement the Tashkent Declaration, to maintain friendliest relations with neighbours, to resolve all disputes peacefully and to uphold the policy of non-alignment The underlying philosophy behind her foreign policy was implicit in her statement “Where there is friendship, we must enlarge it. Where there is difference we must blunt it. Where there is misunderstanding we must remove it. Yet national interest we cannot compromise.”30 To quote
Trevor Drieberg, "She took particular care to emphasize that she was a believer of a firm base of Indianness as against Nehru's emphasis on internationalism." The days of global and moralistic overtone in the Indian foreign policy were over.

In March 1966, Indira Gandhi undertook her first foreign tour as Prime Minister, visiting Paris, London, Moscow and Washington. She left great impression on this Wall Street. President Johnson was all praise for this little girl. She returned from Washington with a bagful of promises of help from the US administration and the World Bank, of course, conditional upon rupee devaluation, Johnson in return purchased her silence for some time. Indira Gandhi, however, became tough on Vietnam when she found that only the socialist camp was willing to help India in real terms.

The fourth general elections of 1967 (known as a watershed of Indian politics) smashed the long monopoly of the Congress for the first time. In this election, the Syndicate leadership too was made to lick the dust. As her second successive term began in 1967, she found her difficulties multiplying both on domestic as well as foreign fronts. The closing of the Suez Canal after the Arab-Israel war of 1967 affected the Indian economy very adversely. She made efforts to further consolidate the pro-Arab policy to satisfy the Indian Muslims and Muslims of neighbouring countries like Iran and Pakistan. She managed an invita-
tion for India to attend the World Muslim Conference in 1969 at Rabat (Morocco), which, however, proved fiasco.

The year 1969 will go down as the year of great divide in the Congress. The death of Dr. Zakir Hussain, the third President of India in May 1969, posed the issue of leadership in the Congress organisation, resulting in a major split. But after the split, Mrs. Indira Gandhi acquired a dominant position in the government, for until 1969 she was in office but not in power, and she continued to enjoy this position until 1977.

The revival of economic and political momentum during 1969-71 culminated in an increasingly high profile foreign policy. The Sino-Pak axis against India had started developing in the early sixties. The growing rapprochement between the US and China in the early seventies extended this axis into a global one, and seriously threatened the security of India. It was in this situation that the liberation movement in East Pakistan started, followed by the military crack down in March 1971. As the resistance movement escalated, the number of refugees pouring into India reached the staggering figure of twelve million and imposed an unbearable strain on the Indian economy. Predictably, the US and China threw their weight on the side of West Pakistan vis-a-vis East Pakistan. It was in the context of this threat to India’s security that Mrs. Indira Gandhi adopted a diplomatic strategy which was typical of her personality and political style. On August 9th 1971, she took the bold
and desperate step of signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which to a certain extent compromised India's policy of non-alignment as traditionally understood. But it could be justified as a historical necessity and strategic compulsion in the given international context as a measure of countervailing the Sino-American adventurism in coalition with Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation would not have been possible but for the military intervention on the part of India. India, no doubt, derived a great strategic as well as diplomatic advantage from this event. With resounding victory in the third Indo-Pak war of 1971 and the liberation of Bangladesh, the political career of Indira Gandhi touched its peak. Indeed, the year 1971 was her masterful moment—her finest hour. With this crowning movement, the dumb doll (Gungi Gudia) became the goddess Durga.

The immediate aftermath of Bangladesh, liberation was her finest moment, indeed, but like all moments of glory, it was all too brief. While basking in international limelight, conditions at home were turning sour. The exorbitant cost of Bangladesh war was coming home to roast. Additionally, a disastrous monsoon coincided with populist policies—nationalization of Banks and General Insurance, coal mines, wheat trade, and Garibi Hatao slogans. By 1973, the all-round disillusionment turned into anger which first exploded in Gujarat and Bihar. By 1975, her popularity rating dipped to its lowest point and the Allahabad High Court judgment, invalidating her election of 1971 made her
panicky and desperate. It was out of desperation that she declared internal emergency on June 26th 1975. During the emergency period, her regime turned into a dictatorial dispensation. Her style of functioning made her establishment—both government and party into one pillar structure. No wonder, the Cabinet became just a committee of ratification during the closing year. It was because of the emergency stigma that she and her party were trounced in the 1977-elections.

But whatever may be her failings on the domestic front, her foreign policy report card was quite impressive. Some of her foreign policy achievements during the first term were as follows: (1) Creation of Bangladesh (1971) and the assertion of dominance of Indian power in South Asian region, (2) Normalisation of relations with Pakistan, following the Simla Agreement (1972), (3) Repairing of relations with China (1976), (4) Strengthening of relations with small neighbours—boundary and sea zone pacts with Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976), with Indonesia (1974) and with Bangladesh (1974)—by exchanging Dahagram and Belonia with Berubari enclave, (5) Conversion of Iran into a good friend (1973), (6) Merger of Sikkim as the 22nd state of the Indian union (1975), (7) Showing sturdy independence on the nuclear policy—refusing to be pressurised into signing the NPT, and (8) the nuclear explosion at Pokharan—explosion was meant to serve as an image booster and as a domestic diversion for her shaky regime at a time of mounting economic and political crisis. In short, in international
affairs India had never had such a favourable situation as in her regime until 1975. She had definitely made contribution by tilting the super powers in India’s favour. Besides, her bilateralism alto reaped rich dividends. But at the same time she ignored a major region, South-East, Asia, and snubbed an important economic power, Japan.32

But her real failings lay in the sphere of foreign policy administration. With her built-in sense of personal insecurity, her eternal mistrust of people around her and her inevitable authoritarian political style, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was psychologically incapable of operating through the normal institutional channels for the administration of her foreign policies.33 One characteristic feature of her foreign policy administration was the frequent change of her foreign ministers and officials. In fact, she would not like a particular Foreign Minister to become effective or powerful. She wanted to exercise almost total control over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. If she failed to rely on her Foreign Ministers for the making of her foreign policy neither did she rely on the foreign office. She relied only on personal factotums who were irrevocably loyal to her. Ironically, the moths who flew too close buried themselves after brief flickering in its radiance.

To conclude, in comparison with Jawaharlal Nehru’s millenarian principles, her tendency to see world politics in terms of hard interest and cost-calculations was refreshingly realist. She enunciated pragmatic
precepts in Indian foreign policy outlook. She realistically appreciated India's limitations and hence avoided mediatory or exhortary role as was the case in her father's time. Yet, she was only a short term realist lacking broader conception of national good.

**Foreign Policy during Morarji Desai Period (1977-1979)**

After lifting of emergency, fresh elections were held for Lok Sabha in 1977. In these elections Janata party emerged victorious and veteran Congress leader Morarji Desai assumed the office of Prime Minister. With the formation of the Janata Government in 1977 it was expected that a drastic changes in India’s foreign policy would take place. It was hoped that there would be a certain amount of cooling off of relations with Soviet Union and more intimate relations with USA. This feeling was largely the outcome of the fact that while in opposition leaders of the Janata Party (from the forums of their respective political parties) had severely condemned India’s tilt towards Soviet Union. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then External Affairs Minister had particularly been a bitter critic of India’s growing intimacy with Soviet Union, and considered it a violation of the principle of genuine non-alignment. But all these speculations were set at rest when Atal Behari Vajpayee, announced that the views expressed by him and his Cabinet colleagues while in the opposition will not influence their conduct of foreign policy. However, he made it clear that the new government wanted to pursue a policy of genuine non-alignment. The Janata Government, therefore,
tried to develop very intimate relations with both the Super Powers and bring about greater balance and sobriety.

The new government of Morarji Desai continued friendly relations with the Soviet Union realizing it fully well that India had immensely benefitted from the close connections with Soviet Union through supply of sophisticated military hardwares, assistance in diversification of country’s economy through establishment of basic industries and ever expanding trade between the two countries. Any deviation from this policy would have done much harm to the country. Therefore, the Janata Government tried to develop very intimate and close relations with Soviet Union with out showing in any way a tilt in its favour. The leaders of the two countries, Morarji Desai and Gromyko, exchanged visit to keep up the existing intimate relations intact. A new dimension to growing bilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific and technological field was added by setting up an Indo-Soviet Joint Commission.

The Morarji Desai Government also tried to improve relations with United States of America which had been cooling-off since 1976. A new chapter was opened in Indo-US relations with the visit of US President Carter. Most of the irritants and suspicions which had marred the relations between the two countries were removed and a spirit of mutually beneficial co-operation was revived. For the first time the
traditional donor-recipient relationship between USA and India was replaced by an equal partnership based on friendship and common will to cooperate both in bilateral matter and on international issues. It is true that during the Janata period also their continued to be difference of opinion between the two countries on same issues, but by and large there was a comparative lack of rancor in their mutual dealings and discussions. In short, one can say with Pran Chopra that the Janata Government “tried to be more even handed in dealing with them (USA and USSR), more free of unnecessary asperity towards the USA on the one hand and on the other hand more free for warmth and praise for the Soviet Union. It has not gone out of its way to heat up controversies with the USA or to line up in haste with the Soviet Union or too readily grasp every offer of aid by Moscow.”

Another outstanding feature of the Janata Foreign Policy was an attempt to develop closer relations with the neighbouring countries. Atal Behari Vajpayee said in his address at a seminar held at the Indian School of International Studies, The Janata Government from the first day of its existence set out deliberately to clear the cobwebs of suspicion, remove misunderstanding and banish the fear of interference. India has not only professed strict non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours but also practiced it, often in the face of great temptation to do the contrary. India generally tried to persuade the neighbours to mutuality advantages in bilateralism and allowed the
irresistible logic of geography to assert itself. India done away with the
duality that had crept into the conduct of its foreign policy in the past. By
promoting trust and co-operation Janata government furthered India’s
national interests. The Janata Government took a number of concrete
steps to improve its relations with neighbouring countries like
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal etc., by coming to an understanding
regarding some of the outstanding disputes. Thus it reached an
agreement with Pakistan on the question of Salal Dam in Kashmir. It
concluded an agreement on Farakka with Bangladesh which was an
improvement over the interim agreement concluded by Mrs. Indira
Gandhi with Sheik Mujibur Rahman earlier. The concession given by
the Janata Government to reach an understanding with neighbours like
Bangladesh and Nepal met with criticism at certain hands and the
government was accused of bartering away India’s essential interests
for the sake of more good neighbourliness. Again it has been contented
that there was nothing new with policy of good neighbourliness,
because even the earlier government tried good relations with the
neighbours but could not succeed due to the involvement of the big
powers. By this time the involvement of the big powers had decreased
and the Janata Government made full use of this opportunity to improve
relations with the neighbours. In fact, this process started during the
times of Mrs. Indira Gandhi herself. Another consideration which
compelled India to improve relation with neighbours was that India
needed markets for its rapidly expanding agricultural surpluses, especially food grains, Pakistan and China, which were importing huge quantities of wheat could be the most suitable markets. In this context good neighbourliness became a strong concern with the Janata Government.

The Janata Government tried to improve its relations with China for two reasons. First, uneasy relations with China in the past had distorted the priorities of the country by imposing a heavy defence burden. Secondly, it was desirable to cultivate friendly relations with Beijing so that Pakistan may not revert to its old stance. On the other hand China was also eager to improve relations with India because they were so much engrossed in their domestic problems that they wanted peace on borders with India. An improvement in relations with China manifested itself in the resumption of trade and exchange of trade delegations. The two countries also cooperated in the cultural and sports activities. As a result of these exchanges the tension between the two countries was greatly relaxed. But in view of some of the irritants, existing between the two countries the relations could not be fully normalized. The Janata Government, however, expressed its desire to settle the outstanding differences through bilateral negotiations.
In addition to this, the Janata Government continued the policy of improving relations with the countries of South-East Asia and West-Asia and extended full support to the anti-racial policies and liberation movements in Africa. It also claimed to play a more positive role in disarmament and insisted that it should not be left to the Super Powers alone to provide a lead in this regard. It emphasized that Non-aligned nations should be more effectively involved in disarmsments as they have to divert the much needed funds (which could be fruitfully utilized for development purposes) to military preparations.

In short, Janata party followed a foreign policy which was highly pragmatic and aimed at promotion of national interests. However, there was not much deviation from the basic principles on which the Indian foreign policy had been based so far. According to Pran Chopra, “the shifts in India’s foreign policy under the Janata rule are neither new nor great. They are continuing adjustment. Sometimes more marked than in the past, to India’s changing need in the challenging external and domestic context.”35 Even Atal Bihari Vajpayee admitted in the course of his address to the Indian School of International Studies, “If there has been a change, it has been to impart honesty and sincerity to India’s national purpose consistently with our principles a fresh thrust to the promotion of the cause of peace and disarmament to strengthen stability and cooperative spirit to fortify independence and freedom from exploitation.”36
Foreign Policy during Indira Gandhi's Second Term (1980-84)

In January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi staged a dramatic comeback to power with an overwhelming mandate from the people and a steam-rolling majority in the Lok Sabha. During her second term, however, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's policies and postures were halting, vacillating and lacking initiative and thrust. For some time her originality and characteristic fearlessness were conspicuous by their absence. To substantiate, her hasty recognition of the new Kampuchean regime led by Heng Samrin (resulting from Vietnamese invasion) unnecessarily antagonized both China and the ASEAN group. Her qualified disapproval of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the equivocal stand on the resulting Afghan crisis made India suspicious in the eyes of most of the Non-aligned countries. Because of her undisguised tilt towards the Soviet Union she made India's Non-alignment policy look like the leaning Tower of Pisa.

During her second term India's relations with her immediate neighbours were suddenly turned sour. India had again started being in a big brotherly manner and invited the charge of bullying with neighbours. India's unending search for military superiority in the name of external threats created mistrust and suspicion in the neighbouring countries. Indira Gandhi's tactic of negotiating from a position of strength had the disadvantage of putting the neighbour's back-up, particularly, after the Janata interlude.
But by the middle of 1982, Mrs. Gandhi had recovered her dash and dynamism and began to show considerable skill in handling the country's foreign policy. A few studied attempts on her part gave India greater flexibility in the conduct of her foreign policy. Her visit to Washington in July 1982 greatly succeeded in mending our fences with Washington without causing a setback to our relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, she brought the country closer to Western European order to reduce dependence on the Soviet Union for sophisticated weapons. In the last few months of her rule, she even tried to improve relations with immediate neighbours like Bangladesh and Pakistan.

**Foreign Policy during Rajiv Gandhi Period (1984-1989)**

Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi continued the foreign policy of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi and reaffirmed his faith in the United Nations, the Non-aligned movement, opposition to colonialism, old or new. In his very first broadcast to the nation on November 12\textsuperscript{th} 1984. He said, “India would adhere to the United Nations, to the Non-aligned Movement and to opposition to Colonialism, old or new. He asserted that India would carry forward the foreign policy bequeathed by Jawaharlal Nehru and creatively enriched by Indira Gandhi that closer relations in a spirit of peace, friendship and cooperation could be developed with our neighbours and that crusade against the arms race and the work for narrowing international disparities would be continued.”

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As regards India's relations with two super powers, Rajiv Gandhi declared, "We highly value the wide-ranging and tested relationship with the Soviet Union, based upon mutual cooperation friendship and vital support when needed. With the United States of America we have a multi-faceted relationship. We attach importance to our economic, technological and cultural cooperation with them". Rajiv Gandhi also indicated his determination to work for narrowing international economic disparities; develop closer relations with immediate neighbours; pursue policy of non-interference, peaceful co-existence and NAM promised to pursue the concept of common regional development of South Asia; improvement and strengthening of relations with China, Soviet Union and United States; to carry on relentless with China, Soviet Union and United States; to carry on relentless crusade against arms race; to promote dialogue between the North and South to build a just world economic order. He was faithfully pursued these objectives and not only improved relations with United States of America and other neighbouring countries but also made frantic efforts to promote internal peace, nuclear disarmament and greater economic cooperation between North and South.

Under the Stewardship of Rajiv Gandhi, the position of India in international arena was further consolidated. Some significant regional foreign policy initiatives were pursued including a thawing of relations with China (which had gone into the deep freeze after the 1962 war)
and improved relations with the USA. This was also a period when India's fiscal prudence was not as astute as it may have been and while on one hand there was a visible element of India's military capability being effectively enhanced—as perceived in the Indian Navy's expansion and the swift assistance to Maldives in November 1988 which was threatened by a renegade takeover—the macro economic and fiscal indicators were deteriorating. This was also a period of considerable internal turbulence for India and there was a quick succession of Prime Ministers and short-lived Central governments. Political instability was compounded by the terrorist assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and a very complex internal security environment. Apart from Jammu and Kashmir, the prosperous state of Punjab witnessed a rash of separatist violence that was finally quelled.39

Foreign Policy during V.P. Singh Period (1989-1990)

The National Front Government headed by V.P. Singh came into power in November 1989 reiterated its determination to continue policy of NAM. However it expressed its desire to effect improvement in relations with immediate neighbours which had got strained during the past few years. Soon after assumption of power it initiated moves to hold talks with the leaders of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to remove some of the irritants present in the relations of India with these countries. It expressed its determination to develop more intimate relations with the United States, without jeopardizing good relations with
Soviet Union. The Janata Dal(s) which came to power after the fall of Mr. V.P. Singh government also continued the policy of the earlier governments and did not make any change in the traditional foreign policy of the country.

**Foreign Policy during P.V. Narasimha Rao Period (1991-1996)**

This was the period when the Cold War was coming to an unintended end and Gorbachev’s Glasnost-Perestroika and the rapprochement with the USA led to a dramatic turn of events at international level. Overnight on December 8th 1991, the Soviet Union became former and Russia emerged with a very different geography and political identity. Bi-polarity was relegated to the pages of history and a very new global strategic systemic was born. The USA which had just led a very successful coalition in early 1990 for in Gulf War I-(the War for Kuwait) was perceived as the sole hegemony with no challenger in sight. China was struggling to recover from the opprobrium of Tiananmen at that time.

The end of the Cold War led to a complete review and re-orientation of the Foreign Policy of most nations, for the global strategic grid was completely transformed, it was the equivalent of a double-whammy for India since the domestic situation was also undergoing considerable turbulence. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao assumed office in June 1991 succeeding two predecessors who had served for
less than a year each. India's economic health was frail and the fiscal indicators were alarming with a balance of payment crisis looming. India's foreign exchange reserves were down to a few weeks. Thus the country was faced with an exigency wherein all three determinants that shape and influence foreign policy were in a state of flux-namely the global system, national capabilities and resources, and a new leadership that was grappling with political, economic and social turbulence—the right-wing Bharatitya Janata Party (BJP) party was gaining ground in India at the time.

India's major foreign policy transformation came about in the Narasimha Rao years (June, 1991-May, 1996) and much of it was impelled by the economic liberalization that Delhi was embarked upon. India's socialist command planning model and the license-raj permit economic and trade system gave way to a more liberalized approach and in many ways the Indian economy was freed from the politico-bureaucratic shackles imposed upon it for decades. The macro-results were very favorable. The inflexible Hindu rate of growth suddenly accelerated and this was also enabled to a great extent by deft financial planning led by then Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and the global techno-commercial wave related to the computer and information revolution. As Baru has noted: "after recording virtually no growth in the first half of the 20th century, the Indian economy grew at an annual average rate of 3.5 percent in 1950-80 and 5.4 percent in 1980-90 and
Thus the economic sinews were strengthened under the Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh stewardship and to achieve this objective, necessary changes were brought about to India’s foreign policy orientation. Trade and investment were accorded a higher priority as opposed to ideological positions and much of this is reflected in India’s relations with the USA, ASEAN and China.

Serious economic difficulties and domestic turmoils also obliged India to make adjustments in its foreign policy. It tried to forge closer relations with United States of America so India responded favourably to American proposals for military cooperation. It is hoped that the new relationship with United States would provide India an opportunity to establish an opening in critical United States departments (Pentagon and State) which have been fairly hostile. India also hopes to attract substantial United States investments in the country. The new government also initiated moves to improve relations with the countries of Europe and settle outstanding problems with the neighbouring countries.

Mr. Narasimha Rao’s government tried to give a new orientation to the foreign relations in the light of harsh economic realities. Greater emphasis was laid on economic diplomacy. In fact Prime Minister Narasimha Rao openly declared that his government would use foreign policy as a dynamic instrument for promotion of national interest in the
changed global context. This constituted a clear departure from traditional foreign policy. Another notable change in Indian foreign policy under Narasimha Rao took place with regard to Israel. India established diplomatic relations with Israel, which was hitherto considered heretical. India also supported the United States in repudiating the 1975 United Nations Resolution equating Zionism with Narasimha Rao though the government was quite alert to changing global scene; it persisted with policy of non-alignment. The relevance to NAM according to Narasimha Rao had greatly increased in the new context in which independent decision-making was very important. Under Narasimha Rao, India played more active role in the process of restoration of peace, security and stability in different parts of the world. Indian peace keeping forces took leading role in the socio-economic development of Somalia. India has moved closer to resolving boundary question with China and the two agreed to reduce their military-strength on the border. With United States also India improved its relations despite differences on issues like NPT, Nuclear Weapons, free Zone in South Asia, Missile Programme etc. The two countries held Joint Naval exercises in May 1992. In 1995 the visits by United States Defence and Commerce Secretaries led to conclusion of several Indo-US Cooperation agreements. However American pressure on India to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to abandon the missile programme gave set back to the process of improvement of relations with US. With China
also India increased economic cooperation and the overall relations between two countries showed improvement. Thus under the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao the Indian foreign policy was given a new orientation.

**Foreign Policy during Deva Gowda Period (1996-1997)**

The United Front Government, a coalition of 13 parties, which came into power under the leadership of H.D.Deve Gowda in June 1996, continued the earlier foreign policy. However, it laid emphasis on improvement of relations with the neighbouring countries. It put forth Indra Kumar Gujral Doctrine under the unilateral concessions were made to neighbouring countries with regard to travel and trade without expecting reciprocity. Effort was also made to promote free trade among the SAARC countries and to convert it into an economic union at the earliest. The government too refused to accept the offer of mediation by USA, Britain and Iran in Kashmir dispute. In other words the new government tried to make it clear to the various powers to keep out of South Asia.

**Foreign Policy during I.K. Gujral Period (1997-1998)**

Indra Kumar Gujral became Foreign Minister in June 1996 and then Prime Minister in March 1997. I.K Gujral was intellectually above many of his predecessors and was more knowledgeable too, besides being articulate and sober. While a votary of the Nehruvian vision, he
had developed his own approach about foreign policy in the changed circumstances. His ideas on foreign policy came to be known as the Gujral Doctrine. At the core of his ideas was the belief that as the dominant state in South Asia, India need not weigh the concept of reciprocity in numerical or arithmetical terms. As the largest country in the region India could afford to be more generous while protecting its fundamental interests. It was not a case of all give and no take but India could give a little more than it took. If the neighbour was willing to move an inch forward, India should be willing to move a yard forward. Certainly India was too big and mature to trade insult for insult, invective for invective and India must more actively pursue opportunities for establishing a new quality of relations with neighbours. These ideas could influence public opinion in the neighbouring countries even more than those of the governments there. In any case India’s sober and constructive responses would have a beneficial impact on relations with neighbours.41


The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led coalition government under Atal Behari Vajpayee which came to power in 1998 while adhering to the traditional principles of Indian foreign policy laid special emphasis on;

➢ Need to exercise nuclear option in the interest of national security. It affirmed its resolve to oppose all attempts to impose a hegomonistic
nuclear regime by means of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

➢ To pursue vigorously the matter of India’s permanent membership of the Security Council.

➢ To promote closer regional relations through development of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and improve bilateral relations with neighbouring countries.

➢ To persuade Pakistan to abandon its policy of hostile interference in our internal affairs by supporting insurgent and terrorist groups.

➢ To improve relations with China by seeking speedy resolution of the outstanding border problem.

➢ To support a united Sri Lanka in which the legitimate aspirations of Tamil people are fully accommodated.

➢ To maintain warm and friendly relations with Nepal and to develop new avenues of fruitful cooperation with that country.

➢ To improve relations with Myanmar and promote greater cooperation in the field of defence, security, economy and culture.

➢ To further consolidate friendly ties with Bhutan.

➢ To improve relations with Bangladesh and impress on the Bangladesh authorities the need to check illegal infiltrations into India. In short the BJP government has reiterated its commitment to peace among all nations and prosperity of the people of the world. It
is in favour of India playing more effective role in the world affairs in
keeping with its status.\textsuperscript{42}

One of the first acts of the A.B. Vajpayee government was to
conduct nuclear test. On May 11\textsuperscript{th} 1998 at 3.45 P.M. India conducted
three underground tests in succession at Pokhran, one of them a
thermonuclear test indicating a hydrogen bomb capability. Two days
later India conducted at the same site two more underground tests with
a low yield to obtain additional data for improved computer simulation of
designs, and to obtain the capability to carry out sub-critical
experiments, if considered necessary. The Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee
declared that India had no need for more tests and undertook a
voluntary moratorium on further testing. This promise came handy in
future negotiations with the West.

Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee took some bold steps to break the
impasse with Pakistan and pushed through a process of reconciliation.
A bus service between Delhi and Lahore was inaugurated in February
1999 and A.B. Vajpayee himself took the inaugural bus service (in parts)
and met Nawaz Shariff, then the Prime Minister of Pakistan on February
20-21, 1999 at Lahore during his two-day visit. The visit generated
tremendous enthusiasm in the two countries, perhaps more so in
Pakistan than India. Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee signed
what came to be known as the Lahore declaration.
This was followed by the singing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the foreign secretaries of the two countries reaffirming their unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing and spelling out other confidence building measures.

A.B.Vajpayee took another initiative and invited the General Musharaff President as well as commander of the armed forces for talks at Agra in July 2001. The summit was held without any ground work having been done and without an adequate basis having been laid.43

**Foreign Policy during Manmohan Singh Period (2004- till Date)**

The elections to Indian Parliament resulted in a dramatic defect of the National Democratic Allowance (NDA) under A.B.Vajpayee and the victory of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi. Mrs.Sonia Gandhi declined the office of Prime Minister and instead selected the eminent economist (who was also Finance Minister under Narasimha Rao), Dr.Manmohan Singh to head the government. Dr. Manmohan Singh carried forward the earlier policy of seeking better ties with them or raising them to a new level. The Government was also confronted with critical problems in Nepal and Sri Lanka. For continuity’s sake India has consider developments with Pakistan first.
In terms of foreign policy there was little change of substance. The UPA government continued with almost the same policy as the NDA, and in some cases, like relations with USA and to some extent with Pakistan carried the process of building a new relationship much further than the NDA was able to do. The continuity in foreign policy was both marked and significant. India and US continued and expanded their cooperative activities between the militaries of their two countries. They kept the negotiations ongoing during the second phase of the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).

The then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Washington was a prelude to the signing of a far-reaching agreement with the US; Mukherjee signed with US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington a defence cooperation agreement. The New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship signed on 29th June envisioned a 10-year programme of accelerating cooperation in the defence field including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighter aircrafts, if India so desired.

Pranab Mukherjee’s visit was followed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to Washington to a red carpet welcome and an even more significant agreement. The US President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies and the United States would work with friends and allies to adjust International
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguard nuclear reactors at Tarapur.  

Speaking on occasion of annual combined commanders conference in October 2005, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh outlined his government's foreign policy initiatives in the changed international environment. In his own words he observed that "The end of the Cold War, increasing global inter-dependence and the trans-border nature of many threats have made strategic concepts developed in a bi-polar world somewhat irrelevant. The United States is today the dominant economic, military, technological and cultural power. However, it can be anticipated that the European Union, Russia, China, Japan and India will consolidate their individual positions to play a global role. We must evolve a new paradigm of security cooperation relevant to an emerging multi-polar world in which global threats obtain global responses".  

This is precisely what India has sought to do. India has entered into strategic partnerships with the United States, Russia, Japan and the European Union and is pursuing strategic cooperation with China. Today, nations are engaged simultaneously both in competition and cooperation. Indian strategy has to be based on three broad pillars. Firstly, to strengthen ourselves economically and technologically.
Secondly, to acquire adequate defence capability to counter and rebut threats to our security, and thirdly, to seek partnerships both on the strategic front and on the economic and technological front to widen our policy and developmental options.

With this in perspective, India too is reciprocating positively to overtures of other major players in the global balance of power. No doubt this involves sophisticated bargaining with each of them. It is unrealistic to expect nations to act for altruistic reasons. International relations are in the final analysis, power relations. This balance of power politics in international relations is more sophisticated than during the Cold War era. We must learn to deal with this new reality and plan our long-term security based on a proper appreciation of these evolving trends. Consequently, we should develop friendly interactive relations with as many major powers as possible. 46

Well India is raising its stand in the international community. Consequently, its international profile, engagements and obligations have also grown significantly. There are newer, challenging and complex demands on India from the international community at every level that both arouse and strain, India’s aspirations and legitimate interests. This leads to an intense and absorbing debate within and outside India on the course that Indian foreign policy should chart and the position that India should take, or not take, on specific issues. While
Indian policy makers and strategic community need to grasp and address these issues, the international community also is expected to understand India's aspirations and imperatives of its global engagements.

**Long Term Implications of India's foreign policy**

The innovations in India's foreign policy strategy since the early 1990s has resulted in the happy situation of simultaneous expansion of relations with all the major powers, growing weight in Asia and the Indian Ocean regions, and the prospect of improved relations with important neighbours. Given its impending relative rise in the international system, India is bound to be confronted by a number of challenges.\(^{47}\)

The new focus on the importance of power is not without problems. Despite being marginalized in recent years, the imperatives of idealism and moralism have not completely disappeared from India's foreign policy. Since 1991, India has moved from its traditional emphasis on the power of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power. Given its noisy democracy, India cannot build domestic political support to foreign policy initiatives purely on the argument of power. It would continue to need a set of values and norms to justify its actions on the world stage. As a consequence the tension
between power and principle would remain an enduring one in India's foreign policy strategy.

Increased power potential will mean that India would have to take positions on major international issues and regional conflicts. In recent years, New Delhi has either avoided or merely substituted them with generalized slogans. Just as Beijing is being pressed to become a stake-holder in the international system, New Delhi too would come under greater pressure to stop being a free rider. In other words, India would have to often find ways to limit the pursuit of national interest in order to contribute to collective interests of the international system.

As India emerges as an important element of future balance of power in the world, it would be pressed to make choices in favour of one or the other great powers at least on specific issues. The absence of great power confrontation in the last few years has allowed India the luxury of converting the slogan of non-alignment into an independent foreign policy. But amidst potential new rivalries among the US, China, Europe, Russia, and Japan, New Delhi would be compelled to make often wrenching political choices. While India making potential alliances with one or other major powers cannot be ruled out in the future, as a large country, India would remain loath to limit its freedom of action through formal alliances.
The demands on India to contribute to order and stability in its immediate and extended neighbourhood would dramatically increase in the coming decades. This would in turn draw India deeper into great power rivalries in various regions and the internal conflicts of smaller countries. Use of military force, either unilaterally or under multilateral mechanisms, could also become frequent. Meanwhile India, like China, is increasingly turning towards other developing countries for stable supply of energy and mineral resources, giving growing amounts of economic assistance, providing arms and military training, and seeking long-term naval access arrangements. A rising India would, then, be no longer remaining immune to the many tragedies of great power politics.48

India, like other great powers before it, is also in the danger of falling a victim to ultra-nationalism and an over-determination of national interest. Tempering nationalism and balancing ends and means are two challenges that come inseparably with a rising power potential on the world stage.
Inference

Under colonial rule India has no foreign policy of its own. Soon after Independence the architect of modern India Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru framed befitting foreign policy principles, which followed by his successors with slight modifications. These principles were conditioned by geographical, historical, ideological, economic, and personality factors. The most important characteristics of India's foreign policy include support to Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), opposition to racialism and colonialism, protection of national interest, support to United Nations organisation etc., Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India played its due role in international politics. Jawaharlal Nehru declared that India will never join in any power blocks, which came into existence after the end of the Second World War. The initiative taken by Jawaharlal Nehru, with like minded world leaders led to the formation of Non-Aligned Movement. But, the defeat of India in the hands of China annoyed Nehru and it become inevitable for the self-retrospection of India's foreign policy. The second Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri never deviated by the set goals of India's foreign policy. Lal Bahadur Shastri successfully led the 1965 Indo-Pak war. During Indira Gandhi's regime the tilt of India towards Soviet Union become more and more clear as Indira Gandhi concluded a long term friendship treaty with USSR. The role of Indira Gandhi in the creation of Bangladesh is memorable movements in the history of India's foreign policy. The short lived
Janata Government led by Morarji Desai, maintained cordial relations with two super powers without any bias. During Indira Gandhi’s second term she chaired the NAM summit and made efforts for further strengthening of the movement. During Rajiv Gandhi’s Prime Ministership the South Asian regional organisation came into being. Rajiv Gandhi strongly believed that, cordial relations with neighbouring countries is crucial for India to play effective role in international politics. Besides, Rajiv Gandhi also shown interests to develop relations with both Super Powers as well China. The foreign policy of India under P.V.Narasimha Rao Prime Ministership revolved around economic issues. Another short live United Front Government headed by H.D.Deva Gowda continued his predecessor’s foreign policy initiatives. The NDA Government headed A.B.Vajpayee made rentless efforts to improve relations with neighbours as well as other major powers of the world. Under the Prime Ministership of Manmohan Singh, India entered into civil nuclear cooperation agreement with United States of America.
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