Chapter - 3

INDIA AND UN PEACE - KEEPING OPERATIONS
Peacekeeping is considered meaningful, if not the most visible activity of the United Nations since its early years towards achieving the common goal of restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. Although the challenges to post-war world peace were varied in nature, they arose notably from territorial and other disputes between newly Independent countries, as part of their colonial legacy. The occurrence and intensification of those disputes in the international climate dominated by the East-West Cold War was clearly a major challenge to the credibility and usefulness of the world organization. The UN response was manifested by the development of impartial missions comprising thousands of military personnel contributed by Member countries to defuse armed conflicts in parts of Asia, Africa and Central America. These UN-sponsored missions soon came to be known as the UN "Peace-keeping Operations".1

The founders of the United Nations recognized that the organization they established in 1945 was not likely to abolish war for all time. Nevertheless, they believed that it was "the best mechanism for maintaining International Peace and Security .... (they) could devise for the moment". Indeed maintaining peace and security remains the most important function of the organization. But how the United Nations has undertaken this task has changed over time in ways never envisaged by
its founders. In particular, the techniques of peacekeeping were not embodied in the United Nations Charter; rather, they were developed during the Cold War era when it proved impossible to implement the collective security components of the Charter due to the East-West conflict.²

The United Nations Charter, in Article 2, obligates all members to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to cooperate with United Nations-sponsored peace actions. The Charter empowers the Security Council with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in chapter VII, gives it the authority to identify aggressors (Article 39, 40), to decide what enforcement measures - including the use of force - should be taken to resist aggression and restore the peace (Article 41, 42, 48, 49), and to call on member states to make military forces available to the United Nations for this purpose (Article 43-45).

In addition to the Security Council's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the Charter also empowers the Secretary General with the authority and the responsibility to bring to the Security Council's attention any and all matters that threaten international peace and security (Article, 99). Frequently, the Secretary-General may be called upon (or seek) to play a formal or informal role as an intermediary.
between the parties to a dispute. Article 7 also gives him/her broad responsibility for securing and upholding the principles and objectives of the organization. This, combined with Article 99, has been used as a legal basis by the six successive Secretary-Generals to assume an international political and diplomatic role. There are different terms, which denotes different peace efforts of the United Nations Organization.3

**Peace-making**

Peace-making refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. The United Nations provides various means through which conflicts may be contained and resolved, and their root causes addressed. The Security Council may recommend ways to resolve a dispute or request the Secretary - General's mediation. The Secretary General may take diplomatic initiatives to encourage and maintain the momentum of negotiations.

The Secretary-General plays a central role in peacemaking, both personally and by dispatching special envoys or missions for specific tasks, such as, negotiation or fact-finding. Under the Charter, the Secretary - General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter, which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.4
Peace-keeping

United Nations peace-keeping operations are a crucial instrument at the disposal of the international community to advance international peace and security. The role of peacekeeping was internationally recognized in 1988, when the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces received the Noble Peace Prize.

While not specifically envisaged in the Charter, the United Nations pioneered peacekeeping in 1948 with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{5}

Peacekeeping operations and their deployment are authorized by the Security Council, with the consent of the host government and usually of the other parties involved. They may include military and police personnel, together with civilian staff operations may involve military observer missions, peacekeeping forces or a combination of both. Military observer missions are made up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire. The soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defense.
Peace-Building

Peace-building involves actions to prevent the resurgence of conflict and support structures and practices that strengthen the solidarity and peace. Preventive peace-building involves the broad range of long-term political, institutional and developmental activities seeking to address the root causes of conflict. Past-conflict peace-building encompasses all efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict and to foster the consolidation of a peace process, thereby laying the foundation of sustainable peace.6

The United Nations peace-building consists of five main activities. The first, in the military and security area, includes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants and destruction of arms. The second involves humanitarian activities, such as repatriation of refugees and care for children affected by the conflict.7 Political action is another area, which involves institution-building and fostering good governance, constitutional reforms and elections. Another area is human rights, encompassing human rights monitoring, reform of the judiciary and the police, and investigation of abuses. Finally, economic and social measures include the reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed in a conflict, the alleviation of economics and social injustice and the creation of conditions for good governance and economic development.
The United Nations remained innovative in devising means to discharge certain functions in peace-keeping and peace maintenance. While none of such devices could prevail against a big power of determined aggressor or, as in Vietnam, in the proxy wars of the great powers, they did help in retaining among members a certain amount of confidence in the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace, if not to enforce it, and to resolve peace where-ever it was disturbed among the lesser powers.

Peace-keeping has taken a number of different forms in the varied circumstances in which it has been applied. Since there is no provision for peacekeeping in the Charter, a broad set of customs, principles, and practice have emerged over time through experience. These principles were formally articulated in 1973 with the establishment of the second UN Emergency all subsequent operations. Thus, the UN refers to peace-keeping as ‘an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in area of conflict.’

Sir Brian Urquhart, the former UN Undersecretary General for Political Affairs (and widely regarded as the father of peace-keeping”) summarizes the particular requirements for UN peace-keeping as follows:
The consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, to its mandate, to its composition, and to its appointed commanding officer.

❖ The continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating authority, the Security Council.

❖ A clear and practicable mandate.

❖ The non-use of force except as a last resort in self-defense, however including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeepers from discharging their duties.

❖ The willingness of troop contributing countries to provide adequate numbers of capable military personnel and to accept the degree of risk which the mandate and the situation demand.

❖ The willingness of the member states, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logistical support.

The advantages of peacekeeping operations of this type over collective security measures as envisioned in Chapter VII of the UN Chapter are numerous. Because peacekeeping traditionally has required the approval of all parties to the conflict, there was at least a nominal consent to cooperate with the UN forces. In contrast to Chapter-VII enforcement action, moreover, no aggressor need be identified and
singled out for blame. Also, because most of these operations entail small numbers of observers, the commitment of troops by members in most cases has been relatively modest a distinct advantage, since the troops involved are volunteered by member nations. Only in the Congo operation of 1960 to 1964 and since 1992 has the UN required large military units for peacekeeping operations.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping units were drawn almost exclusively from the armed forces of non permanent members of the Security Council often from small, neutral and nonaligned members in order to keep the superpowers out of regional conflicts or in the case of postcolonial problems, to keep former colonial powers from returning. Countries which have contributed contingents to a number of operations include Canada, India, Sweden, Norway, Fiji, Ghana, Brazil, Argentina, Bangladesh, Senegal, Togo and Nepal. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially with the undertaking of much larger operations, major powers have also contributed forces for UN peacekeeping.

But even this innovation of Preventive Diplomacy could not remain free from cold war impact. A crisis arose over the payment of the cost of two peace-keeping operations-UNEF and the ONUC. The United States insisted on the application of the ONUC. The United States insisted on the application of the Article 19 to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Union threatened to leave the United Nations if it were deprived of the power of veto.

Basically the financial crisis was a political one in that it arose from a divergence of views on the nature of the role of, and control over the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations by super powers dominated Security Council. The crisis, however, conclusively demonstrated the impossibility of undertaking any peace-keeping operation in future without the concurrence of both the super powers.

Ironically one incidental of result of the Cold War was the exclusion of the forces of the Great Powers, especially of the two Super Powers, for participation in any UN peace-keeping operations. This was due partly to the decision of the two super powers to exclude each other’s forces and partly to unwillingness of the concerned states, lest the conflict should get embroiled in the Cold War. Though they would have to give their blessings to operate, they would at the same time have to be kept at arms length.

Thus the Great Powers themselves by their intense mutual dislike, fear and suspicion, destroyed the Charter designated responsibility for maintenance of peace and security. They would have borne this responsibility if they had maintained their unanimity.
India’s Role in UN Peace-Keeping

Since Independence, India has played an important role in strengthening the United Nations capability in the maintenance of international peace and security. Faced with the problem of Kashmir where Pakistan supported raiders, in violation of the six month stand still agreement to work out future status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had entered the state, the ruler of the state called for assistance from India, within hours Indian troops started to move by air and surface transportation and on entering the state, faced Pakistani raiders some hard fighting ensued. Inspite of the critical times, India pledged its support for the United Nations security system by calling on the Security Council to play a role in ending the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir and readily agreed to deploy United Nations Military observers to supervise a cease fire which was negotiated by the United Nations between India and Pakistan. The decision by the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to stop fighting, instead of allowing the Indian Army to continue with its successful campaign, in favour of United Nations sponsored cease-fire and negotiations was significant. Nehru wished to avoid direct fighting between India and Pakistan forces by stepping in the general area of Uri, which was at some distance from the Pakistani frontier. Regardless of the merits, or demerits of this decision, the Indian Prime Minister had chosen United Nations direct military action.
India has risked the lives of its soldiers in peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations, not for any strategic gain, but in the service of an ideal. India's ideal was, and remains, strengthening the world body, and international peace and security. Indian troops have taken part in some of the most difficult operations, and have suffered casualties in the service of the UN. Professional excellence of the Indian troops has won universal admiration. India has taken part in the UN peace-keeping operations in four continents. Its most significant contribution has been to peace and stability in Africa and Asia. It has demonstrated its unique capacity of sustaining large troops commitments over prolonged periods. Presently, India is ranked as one of the largest troop contributors to the UN. India has also offered one brigade of troops to the UN Standby Arrangements. Over 55,000 Indian Military and Police personnel have served under the UN flag in 35 UN peace-keeping operations in all the continents of the globe.

India's first opportunity to send abroad a sizable contingent, including senior military officers, diplomats and troop came with the ending of fighting in the Korean Peninsula in 1953. India agreed to provide the Neutral Nations Reparation Commission (NNRC) and sufficient troops to guard prisoners of war of both sides who were to go through an agreed arrangement for their repatriation. The NNRC was
headed by Maj. Gen. K.S. Thimmayya, A. Chakravarti was political adviser and Maj.Gen. Thorat was the commander of the troops. This formidable trio placed India's armed forces on the world map. Although this operation was not called peace keeping at that time, the role of the NNRC was indeed peace-keeping.9 Within the first decade of Independence Nehru had defined the role of India's armed forces before parliament. The military had three-fold role, i.e., defend India; provide aid to civil power and to assists the United Nations.

First Mission in the Suez

After the formation of Israel, the batallion commander of Egypt in the Sinai, General Abdul Naser determined to change the Arabs, inspired a group against King Farouk and emerged as the leader of the Egyptian military Government. After him assuming the power, he obtained a World Bank loan. But when he returned to the Czechs to purchase arms, the United States persuaded the World Bank to withdraw their offer for a loan. Naser retaliated by an Anglo-French consortium.

Unable to prevent an assault on the canal and to Storm the advance of Israeli troops across the Sinai, Egypt prepared itself for the United Nations to act. At a special session of the General Assembly, it was decided to organize a Peace Keeping Force of about 8000 officers and men to separate the parties to the conflict guard the canal clearing
operations and arrange withdrawal of foreign forces. Later this force named as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) would move to guard the straits of Tiran, the Gaza Strip and patrol the Sinai border.

India provided an infantry battalion group of about 1100 personnel, only second in size to the Canadian contingent which later was slightly reduced in size, leaving India with the largest contingent in UNEF. The Indian battalion (the first two were Para units later to be selected more widely) was involved from the start in the canal. They followed the Israeli withdrawal, clearing mines, improving roads and finally were deployed at Dier el Belah, just south of Gaza guarding the armistice demarcation-line. The many services units being smallest, joined with the Canadian Base Maintenance units to provide logistic support.

At the United Nations, India had played a key role in the evolution of the UNEF. India's permanent Representative, Ambassador Arthur Lall, had worked closely with the architects of UNEF, Lester Person, Minister of External Affairs of Canada and Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary General. The Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, the leader of the Indian delegation to United Nations had facilitated the entry of UNEF in Egypt by the same quiet diplomacy.
The Indian diplomatic position at the United Nations was equally important. India supported Egypt's right to withdraw consent although it counselled restraint in actual withdrawal as it could lead to resumption of fighting. However, the much publicized versions in the western press that India had ordered unilateral withdrawal of its troops as had Yugoslavia was nothing but mischievous fabrication by those who did not wish India well as no less the United Nations. The conduct of Indian troops during the 6-Day war when they were caught in between was exemplary and many acts of bravery were performed. India's diplomatic stand was correct and handled with great skill.

Crucial Role in Lebanon

The problem that brought United Nations observer mission to Lebanon UNOGIL was of a different making. A constitutional crisis in the summer of 1958 threatened to end in civil war and in open conflict between Lebanon and its own Arab allies. The country's population of one and a half million is divided almost equally between Muslims and Christians. The latter held political power at the time and because of this, foreign policy tended towards an entente with the western democracies, to which Lebanon looked for support. For some time there had been marked dissatisfaction on the part of the Muslim Community and in other Arab capitals with the government's pro-western policy and with the fact
that president Chamoun, a Christian, wished to continue in office for a second term.\textsuperscript{10}

Following the murder of a prominent anti-government agent-serious rioting broke out in the major towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, increasing in intensity and violence as day passed several people died in the violence, for which Chamoun blamed Syria in particular as being the chief instigator. He appealed to the Security Council to consider Lebanon's charges and to halt the interference in its national affairs. The Security Council delayed action until the Arab League had an opportunity to settle the dispute, on the basis that it would be preferable if the dispute could be settled under regional arrangements; but when the Arab League proved unsuccessful, the Council met on 11\textsuperscript{th}, June and adopted a Swedish resolution calling for the immediate dispatch of an observer mission to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personal or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border.

The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) wasted no time in forming. Its top tier was a politico-military triumvirate (Galo plaza, former president of Ecuador, General Odd Bull of Norway, and Rajeshwar Dayal of India). Supporting them there were one hundred field observers, who were deployed throughout the country and not only along the Syrian border. To increase the mission's observations
capability it was provided with eight light reconnaissance planes and two
helicopters by the United States and Sweden - those from America being
flown in by United Nations pilots. But UNOGIL's main problem was to
gain access to those frontier areas held by dissident tribesmen, into and
through which the infiltrations were allegedly being made.\textsuperscript{11} India has
also provided an infantry battalion to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon

India's role in UNOGIL though small was significant. Rajeshwar
Dayal was besides Galo plaza the other diplomat. As an Indian his role
was crucial. He established helpful contacts and warm relations with
Lebanese leaders and Arab leaders of the neighbouring states. Indian's
had also provided a group of military observers. However, Dayal's
contribution was vital to the success of the United Nations Mission.\textsuperscript{12}

Congo: A Distinctive Role

The Independence of Congo turned to be very different from the
way the Belgians had envisaged it. But the Belgians had not created
Congoles cadres to replace them in either the Government or the
security forces and within a few days of Independence, the whole
administration disappeared in chaos and bloodshed. The force Publique,
renamed Arme Nationale Congoles mutinied demanding removal of
white officers. To appease the soldiers, the Prime Minister, Partice
Lumumba, appointed victors Lundula, a former medical corps non-commissioned officer as the new force commander and Joseph Mobulu, a former civilian Neuter Master's dark, as chief of staff. He then allowed the soldiers to elect their officers.13

Dissatisfied with these developments, Maize Tshombe, president of the Copper-rich province of Katanga, proclaimed Katanga's own Independence on 11th, July. Belgium troops, which had remained in the bases, permitted them under a treaty of friendship, were joined by metropolitan forces from Belgium; together they intervened to protect life and property. Fearing that Belgians intended to re occupy the country, the Congolese Government sought help from the United States, which advised them that United Nations endorsement was essential. On 13th, July, Lumumba requested Dag Hammarskjold, United Nations Secretary General, for military assistance and in the meantime asked Ghana for help.

On 14th, July the United Nations Security Council called upon the Belgians to withdraw their forces from the Congo and authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with what military assistance might be necessary until National Security Forces were capable of fulfilling their tasks. Then on 22nd, July in addition to calling upon Belgians to withdraw speedily, it requested all states to
refrain from action that might impede the restoration of law and order or in any way prejudice the Congolese Government's authority.

The United Nations quickly established, the ONUC, the peace keeping force, and troops from several nations were airlifted and dispatched to the national capital, Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and the provinces to deal with the disorders.

It was only a matter of weeks when Indian staff personnel had brought order to chaos at ONUC Headquarters, together with their colleagues from other countries. Indian supply and medical units were in full operation. Besides the Indian units specialized service units were provided by Canada, Pakistan and the Nordic Countries, air crew from Canada, India, Nordic States, Yugoslavia and Latin America. India held many key related staff positions at Headquarters. It was, thanks to their abilities and to the good will they established with their working partners from other nations that an almost impossible task of administering and logistic support of ONUC was done as well as it could be.

The third and final rounds of ONUC's military operations were conducted by the second Indian brigade group under command of Brigadier (later Lt. Gen) Reginald Noonan. A second brigade was composed of Swedes, Ethiopians and Irish troops. A Katanga Command
was established with Maj.Gen.D. Prem Chand as the General Commanding Officer, the military part was conducted efficiencies, continuing the great tradition established by Brig. Raja's Brigade. Additional factors that assumed success were an improved-armed command was established with Maj.Gen. D. Prem Chand as the General Commanding Officer. The military part was conducted efficiently continuing the great tradition established by Brig. Raja's Brigade. Additional factors that assured success were an improved area command and intensive preparation at political level. India emerged with dignity and honour and greatly enhanced its prestige in the United Nations. The Indian infantry brigade group returned to India in 1962 without replacement. Several important staff positions continued to be held by Indian officers as also some service units remained until the end of ONUC operations in June 1964, these would be called upon to play an important role in the newly Independent of Belgions.

Korea

India provided a paramedical unit to facilitate withdrawal of the sick at wounded in Korea. After the ceasefire, India became the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. One brigade group of the Indian Army participated in the operation in Korea, authorized by the UN General Assembly through Uniting for Peace
resolution. Indian troops provided guards for the prisoners of war. The Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was Lt. Gen. K.S. Thimmaya and the Commander of the Custodian Force to take custody of the Prisoners of War (numbering over 22,000) was Maj. Gen. S.P.P. Thorat.¹⁴

**Middle East**

India also contributed to peace in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created in 1956 following cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. India provided an infantry battalion, which accounted for the bulk of the UN force. Over 11 years, from 1956 to 1967, more than 12,000 Indian troops took part in UNEF. Pursuant to the Geneva Accord, an International Control Commission (ICC) for Indo-China was set up in 1954. India was the Chairman of the Commission, which implemented the ceasefire agreement between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and France. India provided one infantry battalion and supporting staff until the ICC was wound up in 1970.

**Congo**

The UN faced one of its worst crises when war between the government and the secessionist forces broke out in Congo. The UN operation in the Congo, ONUC, was unique in many ways. The
operation involved heavy casualties. It was also the first time that the UN undertook an operation in an intra-State, rather than an inter-State conflict. The operation upheld the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congo. The Indian contingent lost 39 men in action in the Congo. The performance of the Indian troops was distinguished by their discipline, self-restraint and humanitarian concern.

Yemen

Indian Army provided a Force Commander and observers for the Observer Mission in Yemen in 1963-64 (UNYOM).

Cyprus


Peace-Keeping in Post Cold War

During Cold War the main efforts of Peace-Keeping was to separate antagonistic forces, monitor a ceasefire and discourage the resumption of hostilities. With the end of Cold war and more possibilities of consensus in the Security Council, the UN has been given new assignments that have exerted major strains on UN capability and blurred the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement, both in mandate
and performance. In these assignments, the basis for consent and impartiality has been undermined. In Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Haiti, the peace-keeping operations either proceeded without genuine consent of the parties to the conflict or they, in an effort to restore government, protect vulnerable elements in the population and promote a transition to democracy, slided into a Chapter VII enforcement posture. But the financial resources and military capability remain meager despite the blending of enhanced peace-keeping with peace enforcement. The leading states are enthusiastic in expanding the responsibilities of the Security Council without providing the increased means required to give this far more ambitious role some reasonable prospect of success.15

Since the end of the Cold War the most controversial change in UN activities has been the increased resort to peace enforcement, i.e. armed intervention or the threat of armed intervention pursuant to a UN mandate authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with UN sanctions or resolutions (adapted from WEU Document 1366, p.18). Whereas the UN launched only one enforcement operation between 1945 and 1990 (Korea 1950), four have been authorized since then (Kuwait 1990, Somalia 1992, Rwanda 1994 and Haiti 1994), and two others have been supported (Liberia 1990 and Northern Iraq 1991). Bosnia also qualifies as an enforcement case but it differs from the others in that it started out as peace-keeping.
Due to financial bankruptcy, the prestige of the United Nations has gone to show that the countries like Taiwan are being encouraged to offer huge sum to get the membership of the United Nations. If financial crisis is manifesting such outrageous acts, the lightly armed UN troops in Bosnia are vulnerable to be captured, humiliated and used as a human shield against the strike by NATO which is supposedly providing air defence to the very UN forces. The Security Council sets up a court of trial of those committing fenocide in Bosnia but it keeps on denying the Bosnians their fundamental right to defend themselves against that same genocide. UNPROFOR is neutral even when genocide is committed despite Security Council’s resolution 836 which authorized it “to take the necessary measures, including the use of force” for the protection of the ‘safe areas’.

In respect to Somalia, an investment of mere 16 million dollars in humanitarian assistance with ten times of that expenditure on peace-keeping operations reflect a distortion of priorities. It is difficult to escape the reality that it was the US that led the UN into Somalia by its unilateral actions and was one of the earliest to withdraw, compromising both the commitment of the UN as well as the prospects of success in taking the residual commitments to its logical end.
In both these cases, the politics of gestures has placed the UN in a position of humiliating impotence. This is the example of ‘pragmatism devoid of vision: the UN peace-keeping and peace enforcement roles are being irresponsibly discredited since 1989. In the process the Security Council is fast loosing its credibility. It is increasingly seen as acting completely arbitrarily in the interest of its permanent members or lacking the will to carry out its missions. Operations in Somalia and Bosnia have re-enforced these notions. The Security Council has been little more than a resolution-producing machine in Bosnia and is seen as representing the developed world’s interest in Somalia.

Liberating Kuwait

On 2\textsuperscript{nd} August, 1990 Iraq overran Kuwait in a matter of hours. Saddam Hussein’s unwillingness to withdraw eventually led to the adoption of UN resolution 678 on 28\textsuperscript{th} November authorizing the US-led multinational force to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security if Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15\textsuperscript{th} January. Iraq’s failure to comply triggered the coalition attack on 16\textsuperscript{th} January, and 100 days later Kuwait had been liberated. The force evicting Iraq from Kuwait was under US command and 541,000 troops were from the USA.
The legal case could hardly be clearer. The Iraqi aggression was precisely the kind of behaviour that the UN had been set up to prevent. The clear-cut case for enforcement goes a long way in explaining the unusually broad international support for the war but the USA also increased the incentive for other states to support its policy by rewarding support and punishing opposition. Washington offered economic and political carrots to China, the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria to obtain their support for resolution 678, pressure was exerted on Germany and Japan to induce them to increase their economic contributions to the coalition effort in the Gulf and Yemen’s.¹⁶

It was more difficult for the Administration to obtain domestic support, but the UN authorization to use force finally persuaded the US public and Congress to come around. National interest in the traditional sense is the single most important factor behind the US decision to use force in the sense that the Bush administration perceived the Iraqi invasion as a threat to its strategic and economic interests from the start. Fear that Saddam Hussein might continue into Saudi Arabia and take control of 40% of the world’s known oil reserves thus dominated the first crisis meetings held by the Bush Administration in response to the invasion. The decision to use force if necessary was effectively taken in October when President Bush decided to double the number of US troops to give the force an ‘offensive capability’.
This left no other alternative than force because the Administration feared that the coalition and the domestic support would collapse before sanctions could force Saddam to withdraw. The actual timing of the attack was determined by weather conditions and Muslim religious holidays that made military operations most desirable between 1st January and 15th February.

The chances of success were viewed as good. Victory was perceived as certain but not easy. The argument that the Administration deliberately exaggerated the strength of the Iraqi military gained currency after the war. However, it is more accurate to say that uncertainty and fear of a second Vietnam led the US military to overestimate it. The military planners were confident of victory but uncertain about the cost. The uncertainty is reflected in Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Powell and General Schwarzkopf’s preference for containment over the offensive option, and the order placed by the Pentagon for 16,000 body bags before the fighting started.

The CNN effect was not relevant in this case. The media did not generate domestic pressure on the Bush administration to go to war. It was the public that was on the receiving end as the Administration tried to use the media to mobilize support for its policy. In sum, the war was driven by traditional national interest. The Bush administration perceived
US interests as threatened and used all necessary means to push its policy through. The decision to work through the UN and the clear case helped it succeed.

**Setting Up Safe Havens in Northern Iraq**

The Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War was followed by an unsuccessful attempt by the Kurds and the Shiites to overthrow Saddam Hussein. After the rebellion had failed, people began to flee en-massee towards the Turkish and Iranian borders to avoid anticipated reprisals. By early April about one million refugees were concentrated along the two borders. Extreme weather conditions and lack of food and shelters produced a human tragedy and a US-led force intervened to set up safe havens for the refugees. The intervention force was replaced by 500 lightly armed UN guards at the end of September 1991.

The UN set up a Military Observer Group to monitor the situation on Iran-Iraq border. India provided military observers during the period 1988-90. Following the end of the Gulf War, the UN established the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Indian observers continue to participate in the operation.\(^7\)

While the humanitarian case for action was clear, the legal case (UN resolution 688 passed on 5\(^{th}\) April) did not authorize an intervention,
because several countries, including China, regarded such action as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Therefore, the allies had to justify the intervention on the grounds of overwhelming humanitarian need and claim that it was consistent with resolution 688. This argument was generally accepted. Support was strongest in the Western world, but the fact that Iraq was the only state to condemn the intervention in public indicates that the large majority of states accepted it.

Strategic and economic interests cannot explain the decision to intervene. It was the CNN effect that put the question of intervention on the agenda. Special circumstances made the media-generated pressure politically unbearable for the Western leaders. Not only were President Bush and Prime Minister Major seen as partly responsible for the tragedy because they had urged the Iraqis to take up arms against Saddam Hussein, but Western inaction also revealed the hollow nature of the ‘New World Order’ rhetoric.

Major gave in first and presented the safe haven proposal at an EC summit on 8th April. That it was the domestic pressure for action that prompted Major to act is evident from his statement at the summit that the EC leaders were reacting to the tidal wave of outrage that has swept the world as we have become aware of Saddam Hussein’s cruelty to his own people. A remark from one of Major’s senior advisors points in the
same direction. In his view, Major was being panicked by newspaper headlines. The EC’s endorsement of Major’s safe haven proposal added to the pressure that Bush was subjected to from Congress, his Secretary of State Baker and the media, and his decision to intervene was announced 8 days later.

While the CNN effect put the issue of intervention on the agenda, the decision to go in was facilitated by a perception that the chances of success were good. The terrain made it possible to draw a line in the sand and use air power to defend the deployed troops. The recent Iraqi defeat also reduced the likelihood that the Iraqis would test the resolve of the intervention force.

In sum, a clear humanitarian case and the CNN effect put intervention on the political agenda whereas good chances of success explain why the Western governments bowed to the public clamour for action.

**Creating a Secure Environment in Somalia**

Following reports of mass starvation, the Bush Administration offered to send combat troops to Somalia. The humanitarian case was clear and the intervention enjoyed strong international support. Legal objections raised by China and other states anxious to protect the non-
intervention principle were overcome in the resolution by referring to Somalia as a state without government.

As was the case with the safe haven operation in Iraq, the CNN effect put intervention on the agenda. The crisis had enjoyed media attention since July, and the pressure on the USA to do something grew after the presidential election was over in November. Former White House Press Secretary Fitzwater said.

After the election, the media had free time and that was when the pressure started building up. We heard it from every corner, that something must be done. Finally the pressure was too great. The President said: ‘I just can’t live with this for two months’.

The CNN effect does not provide the full story, however. The decision to go in was ultimately decided by good chances of success. The US military planners viewed an intervention as doable and this made it attractive for both Bush and the Pentagon. A cost-free intervention in support of a popular cause would permit Bush to leave office on a high note and had the advantage of committing Clinton to continue his internationalist approach to foreign policy. The Pentagon hoped for a public relations boost much needed in its efforts to prevent the budget cuts Clinton had pledged during his presidential campaign. The Pentagon
made the most of it, delaying the landing of the Marines for a day so that the US television crews were in place on the beach. A final factor making intervention attractive was the prospect that it might remove the unwelcome pressure for intervention in Bosnia.

The UN Operation in Somalia is considered one of the most difficult and challenging operations the UN has ever attempted. Indian naval ships and personnel were involved in patrolling duties off the Somali coast, in humanitarian assistance on shore, and also in the transportation of men and material for the United Nations. The UNOSOM II operation involved peace enforcement under Chapter VII. The objective was humanitarian relief. The Indian contingent successfully combined the often conflicting roles of coercive disarmament and humanitarian relief to the civilian population. With stand-alone capacity, the Indian brigade had operational responsibilities for one-third of Somalia viz. 1,73,000 sq. km area of responsibility, the largest ever held by any contingent. In spite of such a large areas of operations, there were minimum civilian casualties in the area of responsibility of the Indian contingent. The Indian contingent dug a large number of wells, constructed schools and mosques, and ran mobile dispensaries and relief camps, which provided veterinary care, and medical and humanitarian relief to a large number of Somalis and their
livestock. In spite of suffering casualties the Indian contingent exercised utmost restraint in firing in self defence. It also organized and carried out rehabilitation and resettlement of thousands of refugees and helped to repatriate them to their homes. The Indian contingent played a vital role in reviving the political process by organizing reconciliation meetings. The last remaining units of the Indian contingent were repatriated from Somalia on board Indian naval ships from Kismayo port. India demonstrated its capacity to provide an integrated force, comprising land and naval forces as well as air support. In sum, a clear humanitarian case and the CNN effect put the issue of intervention on the agenda and the issue was decided by good chances of success.18

Establishing a Humanitarian Zone in Rwanda

Following the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana on 6th April 1994, the Hutu dominated Presidential Guard began systematically massacring critics of the regime and members of the Tutsi minority. The UN reacted by reducing its presence from 2500 to 270. Fear of another Somalia initially deterred the Western powers from acting and one million people had to die before France finally offered to undertake a humanitarian intervention in mid-June. The Security Council accepted the offer and French troops entered Rwanda to set up a humanitarian protection zone in the border area. The French force handed over the operation to a UN peacekeeping force on 21st August.
Although the humanitarian case for intervention could hardly be stronger, international support was reluctant. Suspicion that the French offer was motivated by national interest meant that the Security Council only authorized the French intervention but Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria and Pakistan abstained. Two factors support the prevailing national interest explanation of the intervention. First of all, French actions were devoid of humanitarian sentiment until the decision to intervene was taken in June. The French government did not allow its paratroopers evacuating French citizens from Rwanda to stop the massacres, it supported the initial withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force, and finally failed to offer logistical and financial support to an African peace-keeping force approved by the Security Council on 8th June.

Secondly, France has traditionally regarded Francophone Africa as an area of strategic interest. It has maintained close contacts with its former 15 colonies and undertaken 18 military interventions to support Francophone governments since 1962. The Intervention in Rwanda was therefore widely seen as an attempt to prevent the overthrow of the Francophone Hutu government by the Anglophone Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), as it would undermine French credibility in Africa.
Nevertheless, the national interest explanation is weakened if one takes a closer look at the decision-making process. The French government was deeply divided on the issue. While President Mitterand and his African advisors were in favour of maintaining France's high profile in Africa, Prime Minister Balladur, Cooperation Minister Roussin (Ministere de la Cooperation deals with former French colonies) and Defence Minister Leotard all opposed an intervention believing that France no longer should assume the role of an African power. Reportedly, the French military was also skeptical because of RPF's hostile attitude and serious overstretching problems. Juppe took the same line on 11th May, arguing that the international community could not act as a global police force and send peacekeepers to all the places where people fight.

India provided a contingent comprising one infantry battalion and support elements to the UN assistance mission in Rwanda to help ensure security for the refugees, and to create conditions for free and fair elections. After successful completion of the assignment, the Indian contingent was repatriated in April 1996.

**Restoring Democracy in Haiti**

On 30th September 1991, Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a bloody coup led
by General Raoul Cedras. The failure of economic sanctions and international mediation eventually led to UN resolution 940 authorising the USA to use all necessary means to remove the military leadership on 31st July 1994. On 17th September, a trio made up of former President Carter former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Nunn persuaded the junta to give up with 61 planes carrying part of the 20,000 member intervention force already under way. Cedras and the other coup leaders were forced to leave Haiti, and Aristide returned in mid October. A UN force took over from the USA on 31st March 1995.

The humanitarian case for intervention was clear due to massive outflow of refugees and reports about human rights violations. Obtaining international support was therefore easy.

Strategic and economic interests did not drive the intervention. Lack of such interest induced the US public, the Republicans and the Pentagon to oppose an intervention, and Clinton aides also emphasized ideology and feasibility rather than necessity in their efforts to justify it.

A surprising feature about the intervention is the decision to go ahead without broad public support. By doing so, Clinton violated one of the main principles that have guided US use of force since Vietnam. A
few dead US citizens would have raised an uproar in Congress and in the public at large, but Clinton was placed in win situation. The Republicans would have criticized him for lack of resolve, as they have over Bosnia, if he did not intervene and he desperately needed Black Caucus (the most severe critics of his Haiti policy) support for his health-care plan.

In sum, a clear humanitarian case, the CNN effect and favourable conditions of success once again brought about an intervention. However, this case differs from the other humanitarian cases in that the CNN effect failed to generate broad domestic pressure for intervention. It only convinced a handful of very well-placed persons of the need to intervene.

**An Indian Success Story - Baidao**

When the 5,000 strong Indian contingent of the UN forces set up its brigade headquarters in Baidao in September 2001, it was known as the city of death. Almost 300 people perished daily of starvation in this key Southern Somalian city as famine and civil war ravaged the nation.

In 2002 the Indians have transformed it into a city teeming with life. Every morning, over 100 children from an orphanage set up by the contingent jog on its streets for their morning exercise.

In the northern end of the city, on an open ground, the camel market is doing bustling business again. Almost two-thirds of the 8-
million Somalis are pastoralists and count their wealth according to the number of camels they own.

Elsewhere in the Southern Somalian countryside, which the Indian contingent also looks after, there are signs of a major agricultural revival. Situated on the Horn of Africa, Somalia is as big as Andhra Pradesh and the region the contingent controls encompasses a third of the nation's territory. Its two rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba, flow through the area, making it Somalia's granary.

Much of the recovery in this region has been possible because the Indian troops have successfully held the major warring factions in check. Avoiding the shoot-first approach of the US troops, which had to leave in humiliation in March, the Indians adopted a strategy of winning over the populace with a minimum show of force and large doses of human kindness. General Mohammed Ibrahim Ahmed Liquiquato, among the most respected neutral Somali leaders says that: "The Indians took pains to understand our culture and tradition. And coming from a developing country, they also empathized with our problems. They are the most effective among the UN troops."\(^{19}\)

If the Indian troops are succeeding it is only because they had done their homework well. The contingent was quick to grasp that the Somali
crisis was essentially a battle for clan supremacy. “We realized early enough that if we had to maintain order we had to work through the traditional power structure of clans,” says Colonel Dinesh Merchant, the deputy commandant of the Indian contingent. It was not an easy task. Formed thousands of years ago, the clan structure is as complex as the caste system in India. The nomadic Somalis developed it as protective armour against the harsh ecology of the region.

Initially, the UN, especially the US forces, made the major mistake of converting what was essentially a clan war into a personality oriented battle. The US, upset over the way General Aidid thumbed his finger at them, targeted him for attack. Aidid outsmarted the US troops and evaded capture and the Americans had to pull out in disgrace.

The Indians, instead of taking to arms, spent time initially studying who called the shots. They held regular meetings with various clan chiefs and political leaders and had special passes issued which allowed the leaders to meet the army commanders at any time of day or night. In the office of Colonel S.S. Mallick, the Bay region commander, a chart containing the entire genealogy of the clans and pictures of its chieftains has been put up to enable officers to keep tab on shifting loyalties. Ibrahim Mohammed, the Malak Mukhtar Malk or chief of chiefs of the Bay region, says: “Unlike the other UN forces that tried to bypass our authority, the Indians acknowledge our role.”
The contingent also decided to remain neutral in the clan warfare and to use minimum force to bring about order. Initially, in fact, the Indians were laughed at and General Mohammed Said Morgan, a powerful factional leader in South Somalia and son-in-law of Said Barre, recalls: The Indians used to be referred to as tame elephants till they showed us how tough they can really. In March, when an Irish convoy escorted by the Indian Army was ambushed by several heavily-armed technicals near Baidao, Indian troops immediately turned on them. Destroying three vehicles, killing nine militia and capturing a dozen others.

Namibia

The UN operation in Namibia is considered one of the success stories of the United Nations. Lt. Gen. Prem Chand of India was the Force Commander. Indian military observers in Namibia were responsible for the smooth withdrawal of foreign troops, elections and subsequent handing over of the authority to the government.

Mozambique

The UN established the ONUMOZ to restore peace and conduct elections in Mozambique. India provided a large contingent of staff officers, military observers, independent headquarters company, and engineering and Logistics Company. The operation has ended successfully.
Cambodia

In recent times, one of the biggest peace keeping operations which were completed successfully was the UN operation in Cambodia. India provided an infantry battalion, military observers and a field ambulance unit. India has also regularly sent military observers to various UN operations. This includes ONUCA (Central America) in 1990-92, ONUSAL (El Salvador) in 1991 and UNOMIL (Liberia) in 1994.

Angola

The Indian army has participated in the successive phases of the UN mission in Angola since 1989. The Indian contingent comprised one infantry battalion group, one Engineer Company, staff officers and military observers. The contingent has made a sizeable contribution towards construction of quartering camps. The Indian contingent was also involved in rebuilding bridges over the Conga, Rio Quisaju, Rio Mugige and Rio N'hia Rivers. One high risk task was the demining of the main arterial road connecting Lobito and Huambo and repairing a 60 mile stretch of the road. The Indian contingent has also built a 3,300 feet airstrip at Londuimbali. The Deputy Force Commander was an Indian army officer. India also participated in the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), which succeeded UNAVEM III.
Sierra Leone

The Chief Military Observer of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was also an Indian army officer. India provided a medical unit and civilian police personnel to UNOMSIL. After the upgradation of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone in November-December 1999, India provided two infantry battalion groups, a quick reaction company, a field engineering company, a level III medical facility, a special forces company, an artillery battalion, transport and attack helicopters and the backbone of the force headquarters in Freetown. Maj. Gen. V.K. Jetley was the first UN Force Commander in Sierra Leone.

India is also participated in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with an infantry battalion, a Force Reserve Company and a Field Engineer Construction Company.

Recent peacekeeping operations have tended to be multi-dimensional, and include police monitors and election observers. India has contributed police personnel and election observers to the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola. India provided 123 police personnel to UN mission in Haiti (Phase II). India has also provided police monitors for the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), Western Sahara (MINURSO) and Kosovo (UNMIK). In addition, two companies
of CRPF have deployed in UNMIK as Special Police units. The Police Commissioner of MINURSO is an Indian Police Officer, Mr. O.P. Rathor.

India sent Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, as the Force Commander of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia in 1992-93. India has also provided senior staff to assist the UN Secretary-General at the UN Headquarters. Major Gen. I. J. Rikhye served as Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General from 1960 to 1969.

India also hosted a UN Regional Training Workshop for Peacekeeping Operations in New Delhi during January 20-26, 1996 in which 17 countries of the Asia-Pacific region participated. Mr. Kofi Annan, the then Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping visited India in this connection. India also held an International Seminar on UN Peacekeeping in March 1999 in which over 70 countries participated. The United Services Institution (USI) of India hosted another seminar in New Delhi in September 2000 in collaboration with the Swedish National Defence College. A Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) was set up under the aegis of USI in New Delhi in 2000. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited the Centre in March 2001 during his visit to India.
India has considerable experience in de-mining activities and has made significant contributions to the de-mining work in various missions in Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola and Cambodia. Experienced Indian Army Engineers have been employed for training of selected personnel from the host countries to execute mine clearance programmes as also to generate awareness of the problem among the local people. Indian Army has also undertaken mine clearance projects in support of repatriation and rehabilitation programmes of the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{22}

India has also provided opportunities for training to military officers from different countries. India also send an army training teams in six countries: Seychelles, Laos, Mauritius, Botswana, Zambia and Bhutan. India has also offered diverse courses to service personnel at various military training institutions across the country. This includes officers from Bangladesh, Bhutan, France, Germany, Japan, Jordan, Kazakastan, Kenya, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE, UK, USA, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Cadets from countries such as Maldives, Palestine, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and also many African States receive pre-commission training at the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla and the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Over 100 Indian soldiers and officers have sacrificed their lives while serving in UN peacekeeping operations.
Inference

Article 2, of the UN Charter asks the Member States to solve the difference through amicable means. As the active member of UN, India played key role in UN efforts to strengthen world peace. The first peace mission to which India extended its helping hand was Suez crisis. India played crucial role in Lebanon crisis of 1958, Congo crisis of early 1960s. The role of India is laudable in Koran, Middle East, Congo, Yemen and Cyprus. During the post cold war era India sent its troops to Somalia. India condemned the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and extended its moral support to Kuwait people. India provided a contingent comprising one infantry battalion to support the Rwanda refugees. For the restoration of peace in Haiti, the help of India is appreciable. India send its military observers to Namibia and Contingent Officers to Mozambique. India played important role in Cambodia, Angola and Sierra Leone Peace Process and is considered to be a reasonable contribution.
References


4. Ibid, p. 73.

5. Ibid, p. 79.


10.Ibid, p. 82.

11.Ibid, p. 84.

12.Ibid, p. 87.


20. Ibid, p.244.
