CHAPTER VI
LATER HISTORIANS

Of a large number of historians of Indian freedom movement, Sumit Sarkar, Judith M. Brown and Francis G. Hutchins are advisedly taken up here. These historians are all young, all born nearly nine years or so after Gandhi's most successful movement 'Salt Satyagraha' or just about three years before Gandhi was to launch Quit India Movement, the last mass Satyagraha of his life and also of the freedom struggle. They were small kids when Gandhi was alive, thus these historians neither saw nor met Gandhi or even if they did, they were too young to retain those moments.

Their works appeared in 1970s and 1980s when access to Gandhian and other historical records of Gandhi's movement was relatively less difficult. For this reason alone they can be studied as a group. Moreover they have to be taken up as a separate category as their works are influenced by recent schools of history or trends in history that emerged in the later part of this century. Though the interpretation is always the historian's prerogative, yet the period they belong to does leave its impact, as is evident in the works of contemporaries and later historians, although these were published almost simultaneously. There might be some similarities in the analysis, but the general outlook of the authors is widely different. Directed to these historians, our queries are similar to the earlier set except one - how have their interpretations been different as the later historians.

Sumit Sarkar

Sumit Sarkar is a Professor of History at University of Delhi. His first book 'Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-08' established his reputation as an outstanding Marxist historian of our country. The second book Modern India 1885-1947 is well-known for its new approach to the study of history of national movement.
Modern India 1885-1947

Modern India 1885-1947 first published by Macmillan India Ltd., in 1983, is written with a completely new outlook. Unlike earlier works on this period which have an elitist basis, concentrating on the leaders or leading groups, this work depends on field studies. Here focus is shifted towards the tribals, peasants and workers. This work is an immediate successor of Subaltern studies written with a purpose of constructing history from below.¹ The emphasis on the participation of the masses is an attempt at synthesis, keeping the anti-imperialist struggle as its central focus, while trying also to place it within the totality of economic, socio-cultural and political development since the late 19th century.

The author begins with pointing out the paradoxes in the pattern of India's social, political and economic scene. His effort is to study the situations and forces which could possibly be the factors for the unfulfilment of aspirations of the national struggle period i.e. the Gandhian dream of peasant coming into his own in Ram Rajya and as much as Left ideals of social revolution. In the author's own words, "our major theme must necessarily be the search for the roots of this profoundly ambiguous and contradictory pattern and the central focus will be provided by the complex and conflicting history of anti-imperialist movements in Modern India."²

Non-cooperation 1920-22

The situation on the eve of Gandhi's first movement in 1920, Sarkar mentions, the war had an adverse effect on Indian economy if the taxes, revenues, prices of industrial goods went up, the prices of agricultural produce were almost static. The Indian Industrialists supported nationalism to protect their vested interests.³ Sarkar maintains that to protect their involvement varied, it was an "important feature of Gandhian movements."⁴ While making substantial financial contribution the industrialists were reluctant to be active. Sarkar argues because they needed state
support against labour unrest⁵ and the impact of Bolshevik revolution 1917 was visible in trade unionism as strikes and agrarian riots become common.

Gandhi combined the issue of Punjab wrongs and Swaraj with the Khilafat movement which was well on its way in 1920. Between September and December 1920, Gandhi was able to convert the old guard of the Congress to his own side for starting non-cooperation movement, it was because of their political calculation of election prospects.

Gandhi’s declared aim and programme of the movement, Sarkar points out, was of ‘Swaraj within one year through non-cooperation’. Gandhi’s deliberate or inadvertent omission to define Swaraj created ambiguity and vagueness in the popular mind. So was the case with the term ‘Khilafat’. In U.P., poor Muslims took it as Khilaf (against) the authority whereas Moplahs made it antiland lord revolt.⁶ Sarkar sees merit in Gandhi’s reorganization of Congress into mass political party.⁷

Non-cooperation has been analysed in chronological phases at All-India, regional and local levels, so also the responses from different social groups, classes and communities. Mass participation of working class, peasantry and tribals is attributed to the impact of Bolshevism. The promise of Swaraj within one year had raised false hopes. The author points out contrary to Gandhi’s plans of keeping the movement non-violent, it turned into an "immensely variegated, disorganised, but formidable revolt", forcing the British government to think in terms of Round Table Conference and revision of reforms. To some extent, as the author mentions rumours such as ‘Gandhi would provide and restore land holdings’⁸ or ‘Gandhi Raj has come’, were responsible for disorganization at mass level as 669 prisoners broke out from Rajashahi jail.⁹

For violence at Chauri-Chaura, Sarkar holds police responsible, and regrets that there were no nationalist protests over attempt to take 172 lives in return for the 22
policemen killed. After discussing Jawaharlal Nehru's reaction and Rajni Palme Dutt's criticism of suspension of the non-cooperation movement of the Chauri-Chaura incident by Gandhi, Sarkar writes,

"In fairness to Gandhi it may be argued that he had given ample warning that he was prepared to lead only a specific type of controlled mass movement and was not interested at all in class struggle or social revolution." Yet people looked up to him as there was no other radical leadership. Yet people looked up to him as there was no other radical leadership.

Gandhian style of functioning is called Satyagraha, entailing trained and disciplined cadres having particular ideology such as readiness for negotiation, vegetarianism, nature-therapy, experiments in sexual self-restraint draw in the masses by noble means and at the same time restraining them through non-violence. The second aspect of his style is ahimsa or non-violence which restricted mass participation from becoming uncontrolled and violent. The author thinks that this aspect worked wonders. It did not only tickle the imagination of the masses but also was most "acceptable to business groups as well as to relatively better off or locally dominant sections". The third aspect social ideals favouring a 'social utopia' which seems unrealistic and obscurantist to the author. Gandhi's khadi, village reconstruction, Harijan Welfare, self-reliance, self-help through Swadeshi and identification with the poor masses, is, according to Sarkar 'his peasant appeal'.

Gandhi appeared to the peasants as the saviour who would provide land holdings to them. His leadership with religious overtones was a historical necessity. The author finds a sort of inverse relationship between organisational power and the strength of elemental, often violent and radical, popular outbursts in Gandhian Movements.

**Civil Disobedience 1930-34**

By 1930, the political scenario had changed as there was labour upsurge and Simon Commission had caused disappointment and anger. Demand for 'Dominion
Status’ had changed into ‘Poorna Swaraj’, Sarkar relates Gandhi’s reluctance to launch a movement to bourgeoisie hesitation and ambiguities\(^{15}\) and to the state of Congress organization, membership being only 56,000 in May 1929.

Gandhi’s 11 point Ultimatum "seemed to many a sad climb down", and even the choice of salt as the central issue appeared somewhat eccentric to others including Nehru and Irwin. To Sarkar ‘11 points’ concretized the national demand and grievances of all sections. Salt symbolizes the peasant woes whereas Khadi had given paltry but psychologically important extra income through self help and a chance of symbolic identification with mass suffering to the Urbanities\(^{16}\).

Gandhi’s Dandi March and Civil disobedience movement owed their success pressures from below, as the village officials began to resign their posts or sought permission to start no revenue campaign along with violation of forest laws. This was the reason that the movement went beyond Gandhian limits at many places such as Bengal and Punjab with 56 and 26 terrorist incidents, Chittagong armoury raid, Peshawar massive upsurge after the arrest of Gaffar Khan, and Sholapur textile strike with burning of liquor shops and official buildings. The author thinks that all this happened despite total ignoring of the working class by the Congress and the Communist aloofness from the movement\(^{17}\).

Most remarkable was the participation of Indian women who displayed unusual courage. The Muslim League kept aloof. He quotes Webb Millar on the government’s handling of the movement. Organization of the Congress party had improved which often proved as a brake to the popular enthusiasm.

Salt provided the initial vital catalyst\(^{18}\) With the onset of monsoon picketing replaced salt. The movement when studied at regional levels had different colors, but still the running thread was same.
The author seeks to explain Gandhi’s moderate attitude during his negotiations with Lord Irwin. He attributes this change in Gandhi’s attitude not only to the pressure from the liberals but to that of capitalists.  

The author, like Nehru is critical of clause 2 of the Gandhi Irwin Pact. He thinks the Viceroy had been forced to treat Gandhi on the basis of equality and courtesy. The psychological impact of the pact was enormous, as the pact heightened the morale of the activists for sometime. It proved to be a weak truth necessitating another round of civil disobedience due to pressures from below provided by economic depression and Congress reluctance for radical programmes. 

In a recent article he has maintained that civil disobedience in 1930 fitted in perfectly with the interests of a bourgeoisie, which needed to utilize man’s discontent, and yet wanted to keep it within bounds. He further says that the bourgeoisie had established a working understanding with the high complex phenomenon of Gandhism, and could be able to use it till the need for that disappeared on the eve of the transfer of power. 

Lord Wellingdon’s handling of civil disobedience 1932-34 is described, “he was becoming a sort of Mussolini in India”. But the more brutal the repression, more valiant was the resistance for one and a half years more. The number of convicts was more than in 1930-31, mainly of illiterates. Sarkar says even the propertied classes had by this time realized the inefficiency of Gandhian Satyagraha and were moving to other parties. Below the surface other forces were working as is apparent from the election results in 1937 when the Congress won majorities and absolute majorities.

World War II

India was unilaterally made a party to war, much to the indignation of Indians, by the British. The Congress offered cooperation provided a constituent Aassemble
to decide future constitution of free India was promised. The government made an offer of Dominion status after the war was over. The Cripps' proposals were rejected by the Congress and the League though for different reasons, and both had refused support to the British war effort.  

The author unlike other historians makes a special mention of economic consequences in India of war being fought away from it. "The rise in agricultural prices was not as yet very sharp and came as a relief for the bulk of peasantry after a depression... employment in factories went up by 31%." The initial reluctance on Gandhi's part to start any movement, besides self-imposed constraints due to commitment to ahimsa, the author feels could also be possible due to pressure of the business community.

Conflicting opinions on the issue of war dominated the Congress from 1939 to 1944. The Right wingers and Gandhi, the author maintains followed a policy of restraint and some kind of agreement with the British, whereas the entire "Left urged militant anti-war, anti-government action". Gandhi in summer of 1940, from the moment the Congress ministries resigned, announced that there was no immediate possibility of civil disobedience and expressed doubts, "as to whether his principle of ahimsa allowed direct support to the war." The author maintains that besides other factors the Left pressures for action eventually compelled towards more militant policy and civil disobedience was discussed at Congress 1940 leaving the time and form of action entirely to the personal discretion of Gandhi.

Gandhi chose to limit any action to individual Congressmen, and on October 17, 1940, nominated Vinoba to start the Individual Satyagraha by voicing anti-war slogans.
To secure Indians' support in war, Cripps Mission in 1942 promised self-government after the end of the war which was not accepted by Congress or Gandhi.

**Quit India 1942**

Summer of 1942 found Gandhi in a "uniquely militant mood" repeatedly urging the British to leave India to God or to anarchy". On 8th August he gave the call for Quit India and asking for "mass struggle on the widest possible scale," inevitably under Gandhi, with the significant rider that if the Congress leadership was removed by arrest, every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide..." 'Let every Indian consider himself to be a free man.... Mere jail going would not do'. Gandhi declared in his passionate 'Do or die' speech the same day... 'if a general strike becomes a dire necessity, I shall not flinch', was yet another most uncharacteristic remark made by Gandhi in an interview on 6th August. Gandhi, it may be noted in parenthesis, was prepared for once to counter political strikes, precisely at a moment when the communists were bound to keep aloof from them.... in sharp contrast to his attitudes in previous periods of Left-led labour militancy in 1928-29 or the late 1930s and early 40s."24

Gandhi's sensitivity to the public mood is emphasised by the author. The air was full of agitation and anger due to the return of migrant labour from Singapore, Malaya and wounded and disabled soldiers from Burma, the shattered white prestige in South east Asia, racial discrimination, molestation of Indian women by the Allied forces stationed in India, shooting prices of edibles (resulting later in 1943 in Bengal famine), British withdrawal from East Coast and lastly, seizure and burning of boats from people in Bengal and Orissa25 were the additional factors.

Quit India movement is viewed in three broad phases (i) lasting for 10-15 days was massive and violent with strikes, hartals, clashes with army and police was urban

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middle class movement, (ii) shift to country side, setting up of national governments in few provinces, lasted for nearly a month, and (iii) least formidable but longest phase pre-dominantly terroristic. The intense government repression was let loose with public flogging, bombing from air, use of machine guns, rapes and burning of villages.26

The author holds the government provocation responsible for the movement to acquire a violent form. The extent of upsurge, destruction is explained on the basis of official statistics.27

Regional variations in the movement are pointed out and explained,

"Punjab and even the Congress province of NWFP were unusually quiet, with only two cases of police firing and about 2500 arrests each. Politics in the Panjab was already set hard in the communal mould, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh, while wartime army employment and rising grain-prices kept quiet a peasantry which had developed a prosperous Kulak-type upper stratum. Congress weakness in N.W.F.P. reflected the trend towards the loss of Muslim support. Muslims almost everywhere kept aloof from 1942, though they remained neutral rather than actively hostile or pro-British-there were no major communal incidents during the movement. The movement was relatively weak also in Madras Presidency, except for scattered pockets like Guntur and West Godaviri in coastal Andhra and Coimbatore and Ramnad in Tamil Nadu."28

The author chooses to call it August rebellion and reminiscent of 1857 hatred against the whites in gravity and extent.29 The British, after this revolution, would never risk such a confrontation. For the Congress leaders imprisonment till 1945 helped in "restoring the full popularity of the organisation among the masses". The Communists were branded as collaborators and traitors.

The work reflects a Marxist point of view which is free from dogmatic Marxism. The author has at times deviated from the red line, e.g. on the suspension of the movement, he does not blame Gandhi like other Leftists do.30 The work is significant
because the author has set a new trend in writing history in finding explanation and substantiation in people's actions, reactions and responses and attitudes. But the author has not discussed events in the light of social and cultural context - a prerequisite for social history which he so frequently emphasises. His description of mass movements, seem to the reader a mere conglomaration of popular outbursts at local level, which does not sound very impressive as it denotes lack of coherence in the movements. Though he impresses upon the view that the Congress movements were the result of pressures from below yet we are unable to find the answer to a few questions such as that if the pressure was so much then why did the movement peter out, when ever the Congress suspended the movements? Why could not the popular movement, take the form of an all India movement? Why could not these movements do without the support from the Congress leadership.

The work is more than a mere text-book. Apart from official sources, the author has depended on regional studies, which represents a recent trend in historiography.

Judith M. Brown

Fellow Royal Historical Society, Professor of History at Oxford, Judith M. Brown is a well-known historian with a focus on Gandhi, India and religion.

Two of Prof. Brown's works on Gandhi viz. (i) Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922, and (ii) Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: Mahatma in Indian Politics 1928-1934 are taken up here, for the two together make the story of Gandhi's Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience complete.

Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-22

Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-22 was published by Cambridge University Press in 1972 in association with Blackie India, The first book we are dealing with, according to the author is not a biography... nor is this a detailed survey
of Indian politics between 1915-22). It is an analysis of Gandhi's place in the complexities of Indian politics. No one who studies Gandhi can evade the problem of his aims and aspirations, and the balance within him of the religious seeker after truth and the politician on the look out for power.

The author has tried to relate changes in Gandhi's life to changes in the nature and tempo of nationalist politics. She analyses Gandhi's role in politics and ventures to see what forces of change he was either creating or exploiting. As the non-cooperation movement was launched during this period, this work discusses the movement in detail.

**Non-cooperation 1920-22**

Non-cooperation seems to be viewed as a situation of crisis for the Indian Political leaders as the title 'Crisis for Politicians' indicates.

Joining of Khilafat with non-cooperation, Brown considers a deliberate attempt of Gandhi to put into practice his belief in Hindu-Muslim unity. About Gandhi's making Punjab wrongs as an issue in the movement is attributed to its Hindu mass appeal. Punjab issue provided Gandhi the chance of neutralizing the fears of the Hindus and swinging them into a working communal alliance by championing a Hindu cause to match the Khilafat. The non-cooperation in its totality was the anti-thesis of politics as practised by the western educated, but in the initial stages it depended for its success on their cooperation as the liberals opposed non-cooperation on the directive to boycott the new Councils.

The government did not want to enhance his power deliberately by arresting Gandhi, for his arrest might give him 'the Crown of martyrdom, and instead decided to catch Gandhi's subcontractors in order to detach the layer of men who were both the strength and weakness of Gandhi's leadership.
Gandhi’s power in Congress rested on three main basis - newly mobilized groups and areas previously non- participating in the national politics, an unstable alliance with sections of Muslim Community providing him with the allies in the ranks of politicians and unwilling consent of some sections of the political elite in the Presidencies. About the impact of the measures adopted surrender of titles had least affect. The Muslims resigned as protest against the arrest of the Ali Brothers.

Some great lawyers like Moti Lal Nehru and C.R. Das quit the bar but most others resigned only for a couple of months. The boy-cott of educational institutions was far more impressive but short lived as the pull of the Western education was as strong as ever. The Spinning Wheel and Khadi were adopted by most of the nationalists. Total imports of cloth decreased in value from Rs.102 crores in 1920-21 to Rs.57 crores in 1921-22. The response to the call for non-cooperation, Judith Brown maintains, came from provinces politically backward and new groups. The "non-cooperation propaganda galvanized the poor Muslim Cultivators of Malabar Coast into insurrection against the government and murder and pillage amongst their Hindu landlords and neighbours. The movement collapsed by mid March 1922. Gandhi failed to control his subcontractors, the multifarious forces which he put at work drifted towards violence, with his henchmen in prison who could steer the movement, he hesitated to start the final phase of civil disobedience.

Brown writes emphatically that highly successful business communities supported Gandhi with votes in the Congress and cash donations. The Muslims emerged in Congress as a force to reckon with. Apart from Moti Lal Nehru, C.R. Das, Lajpat Rai, Shaukat Ali Gandhi was opposed by Jinnah, Joseph Baptista, Srinivas Sastri, Jamna Das Dwarka Das, Annie Besant, G.S. Khaparde and Sir D.E. Wacha and a few others. Yet the shrewed politicians acknowledged the realities of Gandhi’s
power and at all level in Indian society supported him in order to salvage their positions in the political crisis produced by Gandhi. 39

At the local levels the movement was a patch work of aspirations and enterprises. It has the capacity to suck in all manner of local leaders. It was not a monolithic campaign she adds, "instead it became a chamellion campaign taking color from its surroundings as it was shaped in each locality by the particular forces at work." The movement became decentralized to a point, where only local congress councils were to be counted but even these were unable to restrain the violence. Moreover the movement shifted from the hands of political leaders to those of the Maulvis. 40

Brown considers non-cooperation movement to be a tactic in the mythology of Indian Nationalism which enabled politicians to escape from an impasse. When both politics of terrorism and politics of petition had failed, it was viable alternative to fight colonial government. The author stresses the point that it failed to secure the swaraj within one year. 41 But she accepts that during the visit of Prince of Wales the strike was so total that it compelled the Government to parley with leaders of the movement. 42 But "non-cooperation failed in that India had not gained Swaraj at the end of 1921. Moremover by March 1922 the leader of the non-cooperation was in Jail, having called off Civil Disobedience after an outbreak of violence in the U.P., and his movement, far from Undermining the foundations of the raj, lay in ruins leaving the British as masters of the field." 43 She opines that in 1922 Gandhi was recognised as a major political figure but through an erratic process. His career in India shows that the wheel came full circle beginning as an isolated politician and a humanitarian reverted to the same political isolation and practical philanthropy.

She maintains that Gandhi’s movement "invited repression from the raj" 44, and calls his associates his ‘henchmen’ and goes on to add "Much nationalist mythology and hagiography surrounds the first non-cooperation movement and its leader." 45 "As
the non-cooperation disintegrated Gandhi also lost the leverage he had acquired among the former political leaders. Only gaol saved him from a fall from power as ignominious as his rise to power had been startling. She calls him an erratic leader who could not control the aroused sections of society, and also could not channel the energy they generated. Her style of writing her selection of words, language and even source material is reflective of her bent of mind.

Gandhi and Civil Disobedience 1928-34

Prof. Brown's second work on Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, as with the subtitle The Mahatma in Indian Politics 1928-1934 was published in 1977 by Cambridge University Press. The book is dedicated to the author's mother whose influence on the author is reflected in a letter where she discusses the interest of her family in India. The book is a continuation of her already discussed work which ended with the "collapse of his (Gandhi's) first continental campaign against the British Raj." The theme of this work is "re-emergence of Gandhi at the end of 1920s in a position of singular importance in Indian politics". The author investigates Gandhi's politics and its relevance to his countrymen during a particular period of time.

The book is a study of Gandhi's "political career", his significance for his contemporaries and later generation as a political leader and innovator. Gandhi's leadership was not a static phenomenon but one which altered over time as the context changed and his peculiar ambitions and aptitudes meshed with and served the interests of other people and groups. She is hesitant to treat Gandhi as an all India figure without relating it to the local men whose hands were on the pulse of local life for it produces a distorted picture of Indian politics because by stressing the nation-wide action and nationalistic rhetoric it obscures the divisions in Indian society and calculated alliances of diverse groups.
The work is divided into seven chapters, and is supported by three appendices and a glossary. Dr. Brown studies Gandhi in India which she maintains has several political systems - arenas and some leaders concerned themselves only with one while others operated in several simultaneously and using the resources of one to forward their enterprises in the other or others.

The Congress was a constellation of changing alliances rather than a corporate body with shared and defined goals and ideas. Gandhi's deliberately staying away from politics during 1924-1928 helped in refashioning him as a potential all-India leader. The British treatment of Gandhi, the author believes also affected his position as all India leader, when they accepted him an all-India leader, they confirmed him in that position, their refusal tended to erode his standing.

The author maintains that he got a similar treatment from the Congress. He was accepted because the degree of unity, his resolution permitted or a mass campaign without him appeared impossible. Gandhi, on the other hand, "Stuck out for his main resolution which he felt would secure the unity he required and the type of campaign he was willing to lead, banking on the fact that he was indispensable to many of these present, and appearing to Congress discipline. But the cracks were barely covered. Gandhi found himself leading congressmen who presented the appearance of an ill-assorted rabble rather than a group of disciplined followers."

Civil Disobedience 1930-34

Lord Irwin too, to her seemed to adopt a dual policy. "He feared alliance between the younger congressmen and communists as the government" decided to crack down on leading communists in order to break their organisation... launched the Meerut conspiracy case indicting thirty one leading communists... promulgated public safety ordinance..." after its failure to introduce it as a bill in the Assembly. Efforts at reconciliating the congress were made in the form of October 31, 1929
declaration. About the failure of Irwin and Indian Leaders' talk in December, she thinks that the failure or these discussions demonstrated the constraints within which Gandhi had to operate if he was to lead because he could not risk a split in the Congress.54

Civil Disobedience was supported for pursuing the personal goals, Judith Brown mentions, to Bose it was for establishing a parallel government, to Moti Lal Nehru it was collapse of administration, for Gandhi it was Purna Swaraj. Gandhi had "to tailor his tactics to Indians outside the divided congress, whose support or at least neutrality were essential." Author here refers to Sikhs, Muslims, Liberals and non-congress Hindus Business groups.

Announcement on 2nd January to observe 26th January as independence day, Brown views as "holding a publicity tactic" and before resuming confrontation, Gandhi's 'Eleven Points' are no doubt considered reversal of Delhi Manifesto, proved useful in explaining the meaning of Independence to ordinary people, aimed at accommodating Muslims', liberals' and non-congress Hindu points of view.55

Making Salt Tax as an issue, Dr. Brown thinks was a clever tactic on the part of Gandhi to attract wide support of masses would promote Hindu Muslim Unity. It could be a mass rallying cry arouse wide spread sympathy in England and America. Being moral one, the issue would despite its broad appeal and emotive publicity be of a low violence potential.

According to a vague plan of Jawaharlal Nehru the movement was to develop in three stages:

(i) To be initiated by Gandhi and his assistants;

(ii) After Gandhi's arrest the movement would be carried on by the members of AICC, CWC and PCCS; and
(iii) Only after the arrest of these leaders it will be carried on by the masses at local level. So was the mode of Civil Disobedience till March 2. The Dandi March had a great educative impact throughout the country.

The important world economic depression resulting in fall of prices, lesser money for agricultural products meant hardships to peasants, closure of factories and retrenchments leading to unemployment to the industrial workers proved helpful in securing country wide support.

The movement put Lord Irwin in a dilemma, the author quotes Gandhi, "The government's plight is that of a serpent which has swallowed a rat. It would find hard to resort to either course of action - allowing me to remain out or putting me behind the bars". The author states "Gandhi's attempt through satyagraha to shatter the psychological roots of collaboration on which the Raj stood had evidently succeeded to a very significant extent, as has his redefinition of independence in his "Eleven Points" and anti-salt tax campaign. The momentum of the movement is summed up, "officials were surprised at the strength and depth of Congress organisation displayed in Civil Disobedience, when early in 1931 local governments were asked whether congress could reorganised Civil Disobedience of it had been effectively called off, they were unanimous that it could and very swiftly". The strength of the movement is judged from its regional manifestations, which the author maintains varied due to local politics and grievances.

Another index of the strength and stretch of the Civil Disobedience is spotted in fall in income from revenues. Boycotting election to the Legislative Councils and Assembly were a major thrust of the Congress campaign. Though the author maintains that the Muslims did not participate in the movement yet the Tables show marginal fall in the number of Muslim voters along with the Hindu voters. This trend is visible.
in all the provinces with the exception of Bombay Rural Muslim Voters for the councils and Bombay only for the Assembly Elections. A similar trend is also noted in the election of legislative councils. Her argument for this fall is that the movement had made its impact along with picketing of polling booth by the Congress and also abstention of congress candidates from elections who used to be the only candidates with a real programme.

She further tells us that even the census was boycotted but not with zeal because it might be disadvantageous in the future. So census was interfered only in Bombay and Gujarat.

Discussioning the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, the author finds Gandhi open to a dialogue with Lord Irwin and signing of the agreement enhanced Gandhi's political influence and prestige in India. In 1931 Gandhi's utility and influence on his followers was reduced which lessoned his leverage and undermined his political strength. The non-involvement to minority communities, she lays special stress on the hostility of Muslims towards the movement. Sikhs as a community were uncertain and divided on their attitude towards those who joined the movement. Whether they were Muslims or liberal Hindus or Communalists they were under pressure to prove their credibility.

She also mentions the participation of women, which she says that Gandhi did not encourage. But as he had preached a new role for them in Indian Society, the enthusiasm of educated women were partly responsible for this. She considers the movement to be national as far as geographical spread is concerned.

She acknowledges that Gandhian tactics intergraded different levels of political awareness and different generations for a common campaign also channelised frustrations causing violence into constructive work. Gandhi got support from the youth as manpower and the finances from the business groups. Her explanation is that
the Press Bill was designed to suppress incitements to violence and the Finance Bill was to cope with the continued fall in government revenue and to keep up India's Credit.\textsuperscript{65}

She attributes the changes in situation in India during Gandhi's absence to Jawahar Lal Nehru's activities who had compelled Patel too to be prepared for civil disobedience. Her explanation for the arrest of Khan brothers is that in NWFP Khan brothers declared the aim of Red Shirts as Complete Independence and planned to unfurl the Congress flag at public buildings, whilst, mildly pointing out that the Government reaction-swift and severe - was symptomatic of the abadonment of Irwin's policy.\textsuperscript{66} The Government issued more ordinance, resulting in arrests of nearly 33,000 in January and February and ban on Congress bodies. On the January 1932, Gandhi was arrested, under the increasing pressures. The pattern of the movement was same as in 1930, with the Congress plan of boycott of those services, goods which could reduce government's income and increase civil defiance.\textsuperscript{67} Following the attack of Government on Congress organisations, some of the Congress activists went 'underground', formed 'war councils' and appointed local organising 'Dictator'.

The author recognizes the active participation of women. She emphasises that the convicts below 21, who formed a majority, belonged to poor families or were unemployed.

In Bombay import and export transactions fell marginally. There were communal riots as a consequence of congress pressure on Muslim Traders.\textsuperscript{68} Despite the ban, congress session was held at Delhi, which was attended by 200 according to Brown, and lasted for five minutes. She thinks that congress was faced with a leadership dilemma because a number of congressmen were opposed to Gandhi. Gandhi solved the problem by suspending the movement. Gandhi wanted a role to fulfil his personal aspirations, to influence his compatriots and the government.
Although the Congress ratified his decision to suspend the agitation yet he resigned to achieve his objectives of detached influence.\textsuperscript{69} Gandhi was made the leader of All-India Village Industries.

She maintains that Gandhi's power during 1928-34 as continental leader followed by even swifter erosion in 1934 he had realized that he could no longer act as a continental leader in the role of civil disobedience 'expert'. Hence, instead of being dictated by others he decided to retire. She says, "Ironically by retiring himself Gandhi did for himself what British had done for him in 1922".\textsuperscript{70}

That the author belongs to the Cambridge school of historians, is reflected in the explanations which she offers to various acts of the British Government. She dismisses Hijli Camp firing, Dharsana and Wadala salt work raids in rather cursory manner. Her selection of material also reflects her approach. She relies on British Government reports and correspondence. Whenever she adopts Indian sources she either takes from liberal politicians or those who opposed Gandhi.

The language suffers from overtones as an administrator e.g. when she says the Government was forced to arrest Khan brothers, promulgate ordinances in NWFP and impose Martial Law in Peshawar.\textsuperscript{71} She emphasises the differences within the congress and calls it an alignment of diverse groups of opinion and interest. Highlighting the episodes which undermined both the movement and its leadership terms as 'hired volunteers', 'paid volunteers', notorious Midhapur, and Gandhi a 'Gujarati Bania',\textsuperscript{72} Maintaining the imperialist view that India was a conglomeration of different religious and diverse groups as different patterns of the movements are analysed on the basis of communities, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Liberal Hindus and communalist Hindus.\textsuperscript{73}
Francis G. Hutchins

Francis G. Hutchins, well known for his Spontaneous Revolution - The Quit India Movement and Illusion of Permanence, British Imperialism in India is a historian for his specialization on India’s non-violent revolution.

Spontaneous Revolution

Spontaneous Revolution - The Quit India Movement by Francis G. Hutchins is one of the many works on India’s struggle for Independence but with a different shade. First published in 1971 by Manohar Book Service, New Delhi, it emphasises the view as is evident from title, that Quit India Movement was a spontaneous revolution through which the Indian National Movement reached its climax. And the very modern political system, the author explains, in British India was overthrown by a unique revolution, which at another point he calls saintly revolution.

The book is divided into nine chapters. In the first chapter - Relevance of Revolution, the author discusses the nature of societies as revealed under stress.

The author considers it unjustifiable on the part of the British of dragging 300 millions Indians into a war in a remote corner without even showing the courtesy of consultation to their elected representatives. The resignation of the Congress ministries expressive of their indignation was viewed as opening of a new opportunity when the government could justify bold initiatives e.g. resuming some of the powers which have been devolved to the provinces, the author thinks that the 1935 Act had definitely made it clear that the British were willing to end its rule in India.\textsuperscript{74} The popular Congress ministries of 1937-39 were the result of the British Parliament’s decision to prepare for withdrawl and a national Congress Govt. appeared to be the logical beneficiary of complete withdrawl.
"The accident of war took the congress out of powers and brought Churchill into power. The British Indian Administration who were still irreconciled to being replaced by Congress, unexpectedly had a Prime Minister at home prepared to back them up."

The war gave an opportunity to the British to hold India tightly. On the other hand the Indians had realized that in case of a Japanese attack their lot would be worse.

The Government had treated Gandhi's protests during 1940-41 with amused indifference. The Government considered the individual Satyagraha of Gandhi, a dull movement and expected its early fizzling out. In a year only 23,000 persons were imprisoned. But when they were released in December 1941, Gandhi was thinking of going to jail again.

Regarding reaction of the British Government to the Quit India Movement, Hutchins maintains that the Government had decided to nip the movement in the bud. Though such an action was motivated by both bravedo and fear yet this preemptive attack proved most disastorous to British interest in India. The Governments of U.P., Bihar took to illegal acts such as taking of hostages, burning of buildings, imposition of collective fines, destruction of property, forced employment. The situation was similar to Martial law. Police indulged in indiscriminate firings. The Government had made Indian Judiciary ineffective in order to prove its own legitimacy. The measures did succeed in containing the anger of the people temporarily but the Government had to yield Indian independence soon after the war.

Why 'Quit India' is called Spontaneous Revolution, elaborating his argument, the author writes, after the arrest of the Congress leaders, Congressmen in all other areas started acting on their own responsibility as provided by the Quit India Resolution. Conditions were most appropriate for a revolution inspite of the leadership behind the bars, the masses kept the movement alive. The author further
says that "without Gandhi every one acted on his own authority and interpreted Gandhi according to his own lights and desires."81

But these activities varied from region to region. It was strongest in U.P., Bihar and Bombay followed by Madras, Assam, Bengal, Orissa, Delhi and Central Provinces.

Response of various political parties to Gandhi's call is considered a test to their capacity to maintain their independence and also of their loyalty. The attitude of Hindu Mahasabha was sympathetic but aloof. Sikhs and untouchables were non-committal or rather critical. The communist leadership under the influence of Russia, helped the British war effort whereas its youth joined the Congress. Socialists were divided between Soviet socialism and Bose's Forward Bloc and the Congress Socialist Party. The Muslims kept aloof as no incidents of communal violence were reported. The Hindus did not terrorise Muslims, nor did the Muslims give support to any of the parties the British or the Congress. But the author suggests that Quit India Movement, though belied the doubts of the British and the Muslims about anarchy, provided the real test for the Muslim League to speak for the Muslims.82

Gandhi had been waiting and waiting for the right moment to launch his movement. He was making experiments through his Individual Satyagraha. Gandhi's intention was "to build a movement which could ultimately possess sufficient momentum to survive the elimination of its leaders and this necessitated a slow process of education and careful restraint of premature confrontation". These tests had demonstrated that Indians were ready to move and the British were not.83

Gandhi, the author asserts, withdrew the moral support he had extended to the British war effort, Gandhi also withdrew the moral opprobrium from violent resistance to it. As Gandhi was impatient to fight slavery, he was ready to undertake the fight "even at certain risks.".
Gandhi endorsed violent resistance without advocating it. As in the spring of 1942, Gandhi argued that under certain circumstances the use of violence would not injure the national cause. He recalls that Gandhi's stance between 1919-25 was that of absolute non-violence and in 1930s, "use violence if you must". One individual recalls being told by Gandhi, "But do not do it in connection with the Congress Programme please set up your own organization".

Such like statements, the author thinks, give opportunity to his critics to present Gandhi as having contradicted himself. But the author has at length explained that Gandhi neither suffers from contradiction nor confusion as while giving advice, he determines a hierarchy of recommendations, starting with the perfect ideal and ending up with what he considers better than nothing. Non-violence, violence and cowardice formed a hierarchy and Gandhi had no qualms in recommending that violence was better than cowardice.

For further explanation the author cites. Mahadev Desai's analysis of Gandhi's stance of non-violence, violence and cowardice formed a hierarchy.84

Hutchins supports Gandhi's demand for British withdrawl and finds it just. While India remained enslaved the British war-effort was indistinguishable from the Japanese, and the British lost any claim on higher moral standing.85

The author believes that until Gandhi's fast in February 1943, his views were suppressed because he suggested that "the Government goaded the people to the point of madness."86 Hutchins believes that Gandhi though anticipated the events of August in the event of his arrest yet he doubts whether Gandhi had planned the strategy or wanted the situation to turn the way it did. He had warned the Government that if they do not settle with him others might use violence.87
‘Quit India’ was the greatest challenge the British faced, since 1857, making them realize that they must leave, never mind if it meant leaving ‘Indians to anarchy’.

The British, physically powerful, responded to the Movement with an awareness that no new effort could establish British Rule on a solid footing.

Gandhi’s mastery of the technique of spontaneous revolution was complete. In Quit India Movement he did not stay his hand, the restraint he exercised, was strategic to build the movement’s momentum. The author further says that as a non-violent revolutionary, Gandhi was intent on revolution by non-violence if possible, by violence if necessary.

The author thinks that Gandhi’s purpose of loyalty to the Empire was an effort to overwhelm the British as the best-behaved boy. But after the World War I he realised the futility of this effort. He tried to combine the roles of an agitator and a mediator.

Gandhi’s influence on the people is discussed in terms of Max Weber’s concept of charismatic leadership. Through fasting and sexual restraint he was meeting minimal conditions for leadership. Gandhi’s charismatic leadership combined in it all the three types of leadership: rationality, tradition and charisma. His charisma reflected a wide spread popular recognition of the radical rationality of what he proposed. As a charismatic innovator he does not invent problems, but suggests solutions. Gandhi exemplified the liberation he urged on others. His language reflected his radicalism, his earnestness was reflected in his informality and inflexible commitment in his individual gestures.

Gandhi used Ruskin’s scorn for luxury as a basis for attack on economic foundations of the British empire. The author discusses the idea behind Gandhi’s
broken of the salt law. Through this act he demonstrated the parasitic nature of British rule. He condemned the British revenue policy which to collect revenue popularised liquor and taught indulgence. He opposed economic development as put forth by the English and advocated village autonomy. The author believes that Gandhi treated India as a village to be liberated from the city of London. The author thinks the tactics that Gandhi adopted were developed for use of an unarmed nation against a potently superior military force, thereby came his system of ashram a training centre for the Satyagraha rigors of jail life.

Gandhi wanted Indians to be Indians and stop trying to be Englishmen. They should speak mother tongue and adopt Indian life style. Similarly the other terms used by him are Satya, Ahimsa and Swaraj. Though complete independence was declared in 1930 yet in 1920 he had suggested national swaraj which could be achieved by the boycott of foreign cloth, British schools, courts, titles and degrees etc. "Gandhi's placing of women at the centre of his movements typified his method and his goal", because the author believes that women being the most oppressed section of society had developed a capacity for endurance. Moreover he believed in turning liabilities into assets, which the British interpreted as an unworthy motive of Gandhi.

The British misjudged Gandhi’s non-violence as ineffectuality and tried to consider it compatible with the preservation of the empire. But Gandhi’s utilization of this concept was in an unique style. Truth and non-violence would direct different actions in different circumstances. He used words as weapons. Even his praise for the British empire for its good will was a challenge and his disappointment was potent as Truth could not be imposed by force on others so compromises have to be made with the errors of others. In author's opinion Gandhi used non-violence as psychotherapy used by Freud. Freud used it for individuals whereas Gandhi used it for groups.
He tolerated differences of opinions but did not accept the validity of differing moral orientations. The author thinks that though Gandhi intended to accept others as potential equals yet he subjected them to his own will, thus could destroy the individuality of average persons close to him.\textsuperscript{97}

The author points out Gandhi's conviction that only an arduous abstention from violence could make possible the emergence of a human relationship of an entirely different kind. As sex was intrinsically violent, this drove him to lead a life of unremitting austerity. Gandhi firmly believed that it is difficult to develop a revolutionary commitment without the comparable moral exaltation for oneself.\textsuperscript{98}

Gandhi's technique of encouraging others to criticise him was well suited for struggles against strong rivals. He harnessed the leftists by welcoming them and asking of them only a change of heart and not of mind. Gandhi's method of working about the feasibility of social reform through moral exaltation seemed too difficult for others to find faults in him, they opposed him and yet followed him.\textsuperscript{99} Gandhi was able to impress the conservative by his efficient management of resources and the leftist by his ability to get results. His movements were all encompassing - people from all classes and castes could join him. When the conflicts were between Indian groups he sought to mediate it and if the conflict was anti-government he used it.

The author views the role of Gandhi and the movements he launched in the light of American war of independence and the Irish Revolution. His language is that of a The New School of thought impressed by Marxism but still different from Marxian school of thought - we can call him a radical non-marxist. He also contends that revolutions occur when the state prepares the soil by its actions of indifference to the masses. Much cannot be said as he has not written many books. His language is simple. The work is exclusively devoted to interpretation of the Quit India Movement and provides a refreshing understanding of Gandhi and his action.

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These historians are actively associated with academics. Prof. Sarkar teaches at University of Delhi, Prof. Brown is at Oxford and Dr. Hutchins has been associated with various universities of United States of America. Belonging to different countries, their ideas are influenced separately by the different cultural milieu in which they have grown up. Sarkar comes from Bengal which can be called a cradle province of Marxism in India, and Sarkar besides being a leftist writer, has used a new technique - the writing of history from below. Judith Brown, though born in India and brought up in England, did her research at Cambridge has the imperialist outlook. Hutchins’ approach is certainly of a person looking at the event without involvement of any type or at any level, nor representing a particular school.

To Sumit Sarkar, the son of a historian Prof. Sushoban Sarkar, history comes in inheritance, Judith Brown is the daughter of a parson who was posted in West Punjab before the partition of India. She has a background of religion and of ruling community. About Hutchins not much information is available about his family background, but his pursuit of academics at Harvard University confirms his interest in the field.

Sarkar feels the need to write history from the grass-root level, as the existing elitist historical accounts have not taken into consideration the people’s role in creating history. Judith Brown’s narrative is so obviously representative of the Cambridge School she belongs to Hutchins influenced by the American war of Independence and in the present century by other revolutions considered Indian struggle as a non-violent revolution because the conditions created by the Empire were quite identical in two countries. He is a radical non-marxist for whom revolutions do not always have only economic basis but cultural aspect is more important.

The focus in these works is primarily political. Though Sarkar desires to write a history from below yet it considers the popular outbursts just as a support for his
argument. No other aspect of the public life is touched upon. Brown’s focus is solely political, she neither claims to be otherwise. Similarly Hutchins has discussed political issues but has also considered cultural impact of both the Empire and Gandhi on the minds of Indians which helped in causing a revolution overtly or covertly.

Each of them tries to identify factors attributing to Gandhi’s leadership, each differs. Sumit Sarkar believes that Gandhi was accepted by society because he was able to launch the movements when the situation was ripe for such agitations due to various factors people were agitated and there were pressures from below. Judith Brown states that Gandhi made himself indispensible to different groups. The old guard and the younger generation all looked to him for guidance. More over Gandhi had a good number of subcontractors who helped him at local levels.

Hutchins has provided a different explanation for this factor. He has attributed Gandhi’s followership to his various experiments of self-control and to his charisma. Hutchin’s too, like Sumit Sarkar believes that the situation was ripe for a revolution. Gandhi made it non-violent.\textsuperscript{151}

Hutchins, while concentrating on Quit India movement, discusses that how earlier leaders had tried to assimilate in the European culture whereas Gandhi differed from them adopted the life style which is most acceptable to masses.\textsuperscript{102} Thus he did not isolate himself from them rather became a part of the masses. For Judith Brown Gandhi had a big followership because of various factors such as the importance given by the British Government to him, his charisma his own tactics as a politician and the failure of earlier methods of getting independence -the political mendicancy and terrorism.\textsuperscript{103} Both Hutchins and Sarkar emphasize that Gandhian restraints on diet and sex were a big drawing force for masses.

Sarkar considers Gandhi’s actions to be steps towards long-term goals which though political in nature had a moral basis and Gandhi’s decision such as on Chauri

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Chaura were criticised are, not viewed as deviations from his commitment to idealism. To Brown Gandhi is a politician with leanings towards religion but goal is to gain political power the process of which was erratic in 1915-22 but he was at the peak of his power in 1930-31 which he had resumed in 1928-30 period. Hutchins thinks Gandhi was a saint, who believed in reform through personal example, he wanted to reform society.

Sumit Sarkar deals with Gandhi and INC as two interdependent units, Gandhi as the leader and the congress as the followers. Judith Brown considers congress to be an inanimate organization, a citadel, whose control Gandhi was able to capture. Gandhi, though a humanitarian seems to her an out and out politician. For Hutchins, it is Gandhi the leader who matters, congress does not emerge as an important body. Probably in 1942, the situation and Gandhi- Congress relationship was such that of father and prodigal son; which had made Hutchins treat both independent of each other.

While discussing Gandhi’s treatment of religion and politics Sarkar does not explore the effects of mixing religion with politics, but for him religious discontent had mass support and economic basis. For him even Muslim League is a political organisation only. Judith Brown considers Indian organisation in terms of communities, religion and caste. Gandhi’s mixing religion with politics for her is a political tactic to acquire support of the muslims also, which has its roots in Gandhi’s stay in South Africa. She calls Gandhi’s concept of religion with politics as sub political which so influenced his movements. As Gandhi in 1920-22 even as a politician was the agent of Gandhi the idealist. Hutchins treats Gandhi’s religion and politics as a part of his saintly character and a significant element of his ideology.

Sarkar does not touch upon the issue of Hindu-Muslim unity, but Brown thinks that Hindu Muslim unity in 1920 was not a solid rock basis of swaraj but a quick sand.
The muslims supported in non-cooperation movement only for their own cause, in 1930 they did not support Gandhian movement. Hutchins takes no note of the issue of Hindu Muslim unity.

While these historians deal with the British government, both Sarkar and Brown seem to hold a common view. The directives for controlling the movement are from the seat of Empire-London, yet the role of the individual predilections of the Viceroy are not insignificant in their treatment of Gandhi. For Hutchins British government is only an imperialist power.

Sarkar’s language reflects his ideology, he continuously talks of working class, labour, industrial workers, Bourgeoisie comprising upper middle class, Industrialists and business groups. Brown mentions class only a few times that Gandhi drew hero worship from the lowliest, otherwise, as already mentioned it is communities of a complex India.

Sarkar’s sympathies lie with Indians generally and with the working classes if it happens to be hardship suffered by them. Judith Brown seems to be apologetic for what the British empire did to the Indians, therefore she defends the actions of the British Government. Hutchins sympathises with the soldiers of revolution violent or non-violent.

For Hutchins as Gandhi’s field was to reform cultural life of Indians so he did not need support of a political organization.

Judith Brown finds Gandhi - though an idealist - a humanitarian turned politician is a political manueverer and she accepts the rumours that Gandhi’s sub contractors had bought delegates at Calcutta Congress by paying for them. Sarkar has a sympthatic understanding of Gandhi on issues like Chauri Chaura in 1920 and 11 points in 1930.
Judith Brown mentions at one point that Gandhi was worshipped by the lowliest and the Hindu women who would put their children in Gandhi's lap, she seems to be not conversant with the working of Indian mind, who follow the Mahatmas blindly. She just touches up this issue and the role of rumours. 105 Mentioning influence of Gandhi on the masses, even Sumit Sarkar discusses the role of rumour.

We find in certain issues in Sarkar which need elaboration. He mentions that in 1930 the labour kept aloof. However, he also calls it a mass-movement. How can a mass movement take place if the labour abstains from joining it? He also seems to have believed along with the subaltern group that Gandhi's followership consisted of illiterates, but such a generalization is nearly impossible as Gandhi's followers included the intelligentsia also.

Brown concludes her works and holds that Gandhi is defeated in every struggle and finds him responsible for creating the conditions for the treatment meted out to him by the British Government.

This set of historians is influenced by the upcoming school of thought in the post Gandhian era. Sumit Sarkar is very close to the Oxford Historians - the group studying the sub-alterns, Judith Brown who belongs the Cambridge school of history, in first two works has shifted to the Oxford school in recent years as is obvious from her latest work 'Gandhi; Prisoner of Hope'. Although she believes that Gandhi failed in each all-India Movement leading to his entry in jail, yet in her latest work she has tried to have a little sympathetic look at Gandhi - a human being with his strength and weaknesses. It seems while studying the subjects the researcher has herself been influenced. Hutchins, too, reflects the spirit of the era, a desire to change from tradition to modernity, from imperialism to democracy. All these historians are attracted and influenced by the recent trend - subalterns - in the writing of history.
REFERENCES

1. Ranajit Guha (ed.): Subaltern Studies - Writings of South Asian History and Society. New Delhi. Oxford University Press, 1982, also focusses on history from below. The authors of this study have tried to release history of nationalist movement from elitist bias-nationalist or imperialist - by adopting the term 'Subaltern' from Antonio Gramsci's "Selections from Prison Notebooks 1926-31", where he propounds that it is the subaltern or the masses who determine the trend of the movements by their popular outbursts. This approach is described as subaltern approach.


3. During the 1920s and 1930s, they were demanding a favourable exchange ratio at 1s 4d to boost their cotton good exports and restrict imports.


5. Ibid,


12. Here Sarkar's views are very close to Lloyd and Susan Rudolph's views as put forward in Tradition of Modernity, Ashis Nandy in The Intimate Enemy has
suggested that Gandhi made use of these traits not only to combat the imperialist but also identified himself with the masses, also see Sumit Sarkar Op. Cit. p.179.


15. For further details see Sakrkar Modern India, pp.281-82.


17. Sarkar also mentions that these instructions were issued by CWC after Gandhi’s arrest.


19. He mentions few letters written by the Governor of Bombay to the Viceroy and Lord Irwin to Wedgewood Benn Sarkar has elaborated this view in ‘Logic of Gandhian Movement: Civil Disobedience 1930 and Gandhi-Irwin Pact 1931’. Indian Historical Review. Vol.XII, 1986.


21. Sumit Sarkar above mentioned article.


23. Sarkar has discussed these factors in detail please consult pages 375-80.


27. Ibid, p.395.
28. Sarkar opines that vested interests of the Bourgoisie were significant factors to give such a trend to the movement. Sumit Sarkar, Op.Cit., pp.397-99.


30. The way M.N. Roy, R.P. Dutt and EMS Namboodripad have reacted.


33. Ibid, p.250.


35. Ibid, pp.310-12.


38. Ibid, p.268.


40. Judith M. Brown has provided detailed information in pages 322-27.

41. See Gandhi's Rise to Power, see page 309 and Modern India pages 217-19.


43. Ibid, p.309.

44. Ibid, p.342.
45. Ibid, pp.343-46.


47. Bipan Chandra places Judith Brown amongst Cambridge Historians on the basis of terminology applied by her which is also used by earlier Cambridge historians such as Anil Seal, John Gallagher, C.J. Baker and others. See Bipan Chandra and others. India's struggle for Independence, p.19.

48. Prof. Brown's letter to the researcher regarding her Biographical details and the growth of her interest in the subject of her study.

49. Also see Judith Brown's 'Mahatma in Old Age' in Richard Sisson and Stanley Wolport (ed.): Congress and Indian Nationalism Pre-Independence Phase, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1988.


51. Judith M. Brown thinks that the need for a National Leader was realised and Gandhi was considered to be the right person. Ibid, p.12.

52. Ibid, p.80.

53. Ibid, pp.60-61.

54. Ibid, p.74.

55. Ibid, pp.80-81.

56. Here Brown projects Gandhi as a political manueveror, she believes that whatever decision Gandhi made was a political tactic, p.86.

57. Ibid, p.96.
58. M.K. Gandhi: CWMG, Vol.XLIII, p.188.


60. Ibid, p.118.

61. Please see Judith M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, p.126 and also see appendix (i) and (ii), pp.391-93 if we take the fall in Bombay Muslim votes it was 11.7% whereas total fall in voting was 7.76% which was quite marginal.


63. This happened perhaps due to Gandhi’s weak position at the second RTC in London, where the British Government and the minorities joined hands against Gandhi: please see pages 247-62.

64. Brown discusses in a detailed manner the progress and manifestations of the movement in provinces and offers explanations to it in a language reflecting an imperialist bent of mind. Ibid, pp.130-152.


66. Ibid, p.261. Here the language seems to be an apologia.


68. Ibid, pp.292-97. In these pages Dr. Brown admits the success of the movement and helplessness of the Government which resulted in promulgation of ordinance.


70. This theory has been Judith M. Brown’s favourite idea and is reflected in all her writings that in every movement despite Gandhi’s successes for sometime he failed as a national leader at the fag end of the movement, please see Gandhi’s


72. Ibid, please see pages, 56, 74, 85, 118, 188, 200, 234, 243, 254-56, 279, 340-47, Chapter VII and conclusion.

73. Also mentioned by Jawaharlal Nehru in An Autobiography.


75. Ibid, p.185.

76. Ibid, pp.181-82.

77. While evacuating Burma, the British had made two roads, one for the whites and other for the blacks. The white road was well-looked after, the Evacuees did not suffer whereas Indians on the black road died of disease and hardship. Ibid, p.236.


80. Hutchins has elaborated the situation in detail in pages 206-17.


82. Ibid, pp.287-90.

83. Hutchins considers Individual Satyagraha to be a test of People's Strength, pp.227-28.

84. He has emphasized change in Gandhi's attitude towards violence, pp.242-47.

86. Ibid, p.312.

87. Ibid, p.322.

88. The Public response had made the British Government realise their illegitimacy, pp.340-44.

89. For detailed information please consult pages 348-50.

90. Francis Hutchins, The Spontaneous Revolution, p.159.

91. Ibid, pp.156-57.

92. Ibid, p.146. This trait in Gandhi's personality has been discussed by various authors as a source of his influence on the masses, as a Mahatma, a leader and a man of the masses who fitted in the image of their ideal. They are Rudolphs, Ashis Nandy, Bhikhu Parekh, Erik H. Erikson, Sumit Sarkar and Judith M. Brown.


94. Ibid, p.162.

95. Ibid, p.163.

96. Erikson has also commented on similar lines. Hutchins, The Spontaneous Revolution, p.166.

97. This view is widely maintain that Gandhi's associates were mesmerised and no one contradicted him. Please see pages 169-70.
98. In order to regenerate/uplift the masses Gandhi wanted to be the ideal himself and followed the axiom ‘Practice before you preach’ Hutchins Op. Cit. p.172.


100. Sumit Sarkar and Ranajit Guha have identical views, but Sarkar does not use the term ‘subaltern’ however the focus for both of them is same. They study and base their research on regional data and popular rebellions.

101. Judith Brown has depended on Government reports, correspondence of the British Officials, she has given a lot of importance to local politics as a factor in national politics in the same manner as Anil Seal and others have made use of.


103. These factors are already discussed in this chapter as a study of Francis G. Hutchin’s The Spontaneous Revolution.


105. Sumit Sarkar: Modern India, p.7 and p.196.