CHAPTER III
STANDPOINTS AND INQUIRIES INFORMING THE STUDY OF THE SELECTED COMMENTATORS OF THE KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA

ULLĀSA I

1. **Salutary Verse** - It is neither salutary nor indicative of the subject matter. Also whether it is suggestive or not?

2. **The purpose of the poetry**, while other things are there to serve the purposes mentioned by Mammaṭa, why poetry alone can serve these purposes? The difference of opinion amongst the commentators about the purposes of the poetry.

3. **Causes of poetry** - The three causes referred to by Mammaṭa can generate the poetry or not? Views about their necessity, whether singularly or collectively they can be the causes of the poetry? How the poetry generating from each one of them cannot be of the requisite standard?

4. **Definition of poetry** - Attacks on Vīśeṣya and Vīśeṣaṇa portions of it. Why Sabda and Artha, both are essential for the poetry, why not Sabda alone? Why there is not anything special in the adjectives in the definition of the poetry given by Mammaṭa? Why there is no distinguishing factor in the definition? Why there is no direct reference to Rasa or Dhvani in the definition? The appropriateness of otherwise of the adjectives? Severe criticism by Candīḍāsa, Visvanātha etc.
5. **Divisions of Poetry** - Various views of the commentators, why not four or two divisions or only one and why there can be three divisions only?

6. How the verse given as an example of the highest poetry can be justified as denoting suggestion. Various interpretations of the verse? Whether the general nature or the specific nature of adjective can justify its position as an example of suggestive poetry thereby implying it to be the highest poetry? Similarly, examples of middle and lower poetry.

**ULLĀSA II**

1. Why definition of Śabda and Artha is not given? Why straight away division is given?

2. Whether any fourth power of the words as import meaning can be possible or not? View of Prabhākaras and Kumārilas. The true interpretation of the views of Mammaṭa, if he does hold any.

3. Divisions of the word and meaning and their justification.

4. Whether the suggestiveness of all the words is possible or not? Use of word 'Prāyaśo' by Mammaṭa to show that except Rasavyāñjaka words, all words do possess the suggestive power.

5. Definition of vācaka, artha and the use of words 'Sāksāt' and 'Samketita' in it.
6. Different views about 'Samketagraha' whether 'Samketagraha' is possible in Jāti, or Vyakti or in 'Jātivisistavàyakti' or in all the four viz. Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Yadvàchā?

7. The difference of opinion amongst the commentators, about the definition of 'Mukhyārthabādha'.

8. Various interpretations and explanations, of the Kārikā describing indication. Whereas it seems that Mammaṭa recognizes indication as 'Prātiyārtha'. Some commentators like Govinda Thakkura are of the view that it is not like that. They interpret Yat as Yaya1.

9. What is Indication is also a mootable point. Naiyāyikas are of the view that it is 'Sākyasaṅgbandha'; Māṃsaṅkās say that it is 'Bodhyārthasaṅgbandha' which is indication. More debatable is the statement of Mammaṭa that indication is an 'Āropitadharmā', various divisions of the indication. Many of the so-called Navyas have given 80 divisions of the indications, while Mammaṭa gives only six.

ULLĀSA III

1. The types of meaning, whether there can be all the three types of meaning as enumerated by Mammaṭa or some more?

2. Why should there be separate enumeration of the suggestiveness of the meanings of all the three types when it has already been stated that all the meanings have suggestiveness?
3. Appropriateness of the examples of the suggestiveness of meaning given by Mammaṭa.

4. Whether the example of intonation is a pure dhvani or admixture of ‘Guṇibhūtavyāṅgya’ and ‘Svatah Sambhavi Vastu vyanga Vastudhvani’?

5. Why the suggestiveness of the word should be treated as secondary to the meaning?

6. Suggestiveness of a combination of the ten specialities of various types of suggestiveness of meaning.

7. How the words help the suggestiveness of meaning?

ULLASA IV

1. Whether Rasa is only ’Alakṣyakramavyāṅgya’ or it can also be ’Samlakṣyakramavyāṅgya’ or both?

2. The nature of Rasa - Bharata’s sūtra about Rasa and the explanations of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, Śrīsaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta; which of these explanations is correct and suits the dhvani theory? Whether the ’Abhivyaktivāda’ can be regarded as true explanation of Bharata’s sūtra?

3. Whether Rasa can be made known or not? Whether Rasa can be grasped by indeterminate cognition ’Nirvikalpaka jñāna’ and or by determinate cognition and can it be termed as transcendental or not?

4. Whether the same Vibhāva, the same Anubhāva and the same Vyabhicārī- Bhāva can relate to more than one Rasa or not?

5. Whether Rasa can be realised even when any of
the Vyabhicāribhāva, Anubhāva and Vibhāva is missing in a poetry or not mentioned by the poet?

6. The number of Rasas - While Bharata gives only eight Rasas, why the ninth Rasa should be accepted, and why not, more Rasas such as Bhakti and Vātsalya be included in the category of Rasas? Some commentators on the contrary think that the number should be smashed from eight to 3 or 4 and so on.

7. The acceptance of Śānta as Rasa and Nirveda (self disparagement) as its basic feeling (Sathāyibhāva) or Śama (Quiet) as its basic feeling.

8. Allayments of emotion, manifestation of emotion, conjunction of emotion and admixture of emotions.

9. Various varieties of Dhvani, which of these can be found in word, meaning, sentence and a Prabandha and the suggestiveness of the particles of words?

ULLĀSA V

1. The various varieties of subordinate suggestion.

2. Whether Rasa can be expressed by generic word Rasa or by the specific words such as Śṛngāra, Hāsya etc. or not?

3. Capability of Indication to present Rasa.

4. Whether expression can include the suggested sense or suggestion, or not? The views of Abhihitānvyavādins and Anvitābhidhanavādins about this question.
5. Whether the maxim 'such causes only are to be supposed as are sufficient to account for the effect can be treated as proving the uselessness of suggested sense?

6. Operation of power of expression like an arrow and its ability to bring home its ordinary or current meaning, its Anya and the sense it suggests.

7. Whether whatever comes to our mind after hearing of certain words, is the result of Abhidhāvyātī or not?

8. If suggestion is discarded then can there be anything to remind us of indecorous things in expressions like 'Rucimkurū'?

9. Whether Doṣas can be classified into permanent and non-permanent after discarding the suggestive sense?

10. Capability or otherwise of synonyms of a word, to bring out all that is intended to be conveyed by the word itself?

11. Character (Svarūpa), Time (Kāla), Conveying agent (Āsraya), means of knowledge (Nimitta), Effect (Kārya), Number (Saṃkhyā), Object (Viṣaya) as the seven points differentiating the nature and causes of suggestion from the nature and causes of expression (Abhidhā).

12. Difference between what is expressive and what is suggestive.

13. Whether suggestion is identical with indication or not?

14. The view of Vedaḥtins and the Grammarian
Bhartrhari about the suggestion.

15. Whether suggested meaning can be derived from the inference as accepted by Naiyāyikas and Mahimabhaṭṭa?
The use of Vyañjanā Vṛtti in this regard.

16. Whether words, sentence etc. can in the absence of 'Vyāpti' yield, by suggestion the intended meaning or not?

ULLĀSA VI

There is nothing mootable in this chapter of Kav.Pr. except that the capability of the lowest kind of poetry to produce charm has been questioned.

ULLĀSA VII (Defects or Dosas)

1. The three types of Dosas namely Rasa, Doṣa, Sabda Doṣas and Artha Doṣas. The definition of these varieties and also the number of Doṣa varieties.

2. The following of the Sabda Doṣas have been debated by the commentators.

i) Avācaka (Not expressive of the meaning in which it is used). Some commentators have termed it as superfluous because Asmartha has already been admitted.

ii) Apratīta has been confused with Aprayukta.

iii) Some commentators have sounded a note that Klīṣṭatva, Avimṛṣṭa Vidheyānśa and viruddhatikṛta, when found in compound are to be called Pada Doṣas, otherwise these are Vākya Doṣas, while there are commentators who opine contrary to it. Some commentators have the strong opinion
that Cyutasamskr̥titva, Asamarthatva and Nirarthakatva doṣas cannot be in any case found in sentences, these are only Pada-doṣas, Mammapa's view however is different.

3. The following of the Vākya-doṣas or defects of a sentence have been debated.

i) Pratikūlavarna - Some commentators say that this defect can also be found in words while some opine that it can be only found in a sentence.

ii) Some commentators have given three varieties of Visandhi while others have given only one.

iii) 'Abhavanmatayoga and Avimr̥tavidheyansa' have been termed one and the same thing by some commentators, while others assert their separateness as given by Mammapa.

iv) Asthānaṣṭhapada and Akrama have been termed as one thing by some commentators while others opine differently.

4. The following of the Artha Doṣas - defects of the meaning, have been debated.

i) Kathitapatatva and Punaruktatva have been misunderstood by some as one thing.

ii) Sandigdha has been termed as superfluous by some after the acceptance of the Pada-Sandigadha.

iii) Saniyamapurivṛṭta can be confused with Nyunapadatva and Anabhītavatvatva.

iv) Aniyamapurivṛṭta and Adhikapadatva can be termed as same thing.

v) Sakaṅkṣa and Nyūnapadatva have been enumerated as one thing by some commentators.
vi) Apadapryuktatva and Prakasitavitruddhatva have been termed as without any difference by some commentators.

vii) The similarity of Smaptapunrtatata and Tyaktpunah-svikrtatva has been propounded by some.

viii) Some commentators have noted that the example cited by Mammaţa to support the view of Våmana that a noun, though implied by the verb is to be mentioned when there is a necessity of expressing some of its qualifications; is inappropriate.

ix) There is almost no controversy about the Rasa Doğas amongst the commentators.

ULLASA VIII

1. Definition of Guṇas and Alamkāras. The line of demarcation between the two.

2. Whether Guṇas are properties of Rasa or words?

3. Which of the Guṇas, and Alamkāras causes excellence to Rasa?

4. Whether Guṇas produce beauty and if they do, which of these Guṇas produce it? Whether Alamkāras only enhance the beauty caused by Guṇas or they also produce beauty?

5. The number of Guṇas. Whether there can be separate Sabda and Artha Guṇas? The assimilation of ten Sabda Guṇas and Artha Guṇas into only three Guṇas.

6. Compatibility of certain letters to suggest certain Guṇas.
ULLASA IX

1. Definitions of various Alamkāras.
2. Interpretation of word Vṛtti in connection with Vṛttyānuprāsa.
3. Whether Śīleśa should be treated as Arthālamkāra or Sābdālamkāra? Views of Vāmana and Mammaṭa.
4. Appropriateness of Citrālamkāra.

ULLASA X

The following Arthālamkāras and some examples have also been debated.

1. Whether Taddhitagāsrauti Upama and Upamanaluptaśrauti is possible or not?
2. Whether Niscyāntasandeha should be treated as an Alamkāra or Not? Some people think that it is devoid of charm.
3. Appropriateness of Yathāsāmkhya as an Alamkāra, some people opine that it is nothing but the absence of the fault called 'Apakrama'.
4. Righteousness of the verse 'Mrūṣālavayādi-davadahanarāśi' etc. as an example of the first variety of Virodha. Some commentators like Naṇgojī Bhaṭṭa have pointed that it is rather an example of Rupaka.
5. In connection with Parivrṛtti Alamkāra, there is a conflict of opinion as to whether there should be two parties for mutual giving and taking or only one party to give up something and receive something instead?
6. Some people have termed Bhāvika and Atiśayokti as similar. According to some this only helps the other figure.

7. There is also divergence in views about the Alāṃkāra 'Pṛyāya'.

8. The two fold explanation of the expression Sadasadyoga in connection with the figure Smuccaya which; one is correct and should be accepted is the debatable point. Whether this figure should be constituted by the first six causes of the 'Visēṣyas' or by all seven?

9. Whether there can be any distinction between Niyata and Parisamkhyā or not?

10. When there is multitudeness of answers to a single question and vice versa and when there are identical questions and answers, can there be the figure Uttara also or not?

11. Whether the figure Adhika can also occur when two things 'Āṣrya' and 'Āṣrayin' are small and when one of them is represented as smaller than the other?

12. Whether there can be figures 'Yathāsāṃkhyā' and 'Vyatireka' in the verse 'E, ehi, dāva, Sundari!' etc. cited as an example of a variety of Pratipa?

13. The difference of the figure Sāmanya from the figures 'Mūlita, Bhṛantimāna, Rūpaka' and 'Atiśayokti'.

14. Whether the figure 'Saṃṣṛṣṭi' and 'Saṃkara' can be treated as separate figures or not?

15. Whether the figurative use of the words should
be encouraged or not and in what factor—subordinate or principal?

16. When does the 'Eka padapratipādyasaṅkara' occur? By mixing up of two Śabdālaṃkāras or Arthālaṃkāras?

17. The varying explanations of the expression used in connection with a defect of Upmā.