PART II
BASIC STUDY (KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA) AND COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF MĀMMĀTA
CHAPTER I

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE KĀVYAPRAKĀŚĀ

ULLĀSA I

(a) Invocation of the appropriate deity - The poet's Muse (Kaaverbhāratī) or the Poets' creation has been applauded more superior than that of the Brahma.

(b) The utility of Kāvyā - It brings forth fame and riches, averts evils, teaches the ways of the world, gives pure and unmixed pleasure, containing useful instruction.

(c) The essential qualifications of the poet - Poetic genius, facility in composition, 'Nipunatā' arising from a careful observation of the world and study of various Kāvyas and Śāstras under experts.

(d) Definition of Kāvyā - It consists of words and sense without faults 'Doṣa', with merits and with rhetorical excellence 'Alamkāra', which may at time remain uncertain.

Three varieties of Kāvyā-Kāvyā of the highest, the middle and of the lowest kind.

(a) Best poetry - When the suggested sense 'Vyaṇgyārtha' dominates the expressed one 'Vācyārtha' it is the best poetry.

(b) Middle poetry - When the suggested sense is not dominant but is at par with or inferior to the expressed sense, it is of the middle class.
(c) Lower poetry — When there is no suggested sense at all (but mere rhetoric etc.). The kāvyā is of the lowest kind.

ULLĀSA II

Three kinds of meanings are to be recognised in rhetoric:

(a) Directly expressed or current or important meaning ‘Vācyārtha’.

(b) Indirectly expressed or figurative meaning ‘Laksyārtha’.

(c) A suggested sense or implied meaning ‘Vyangyartha’ of a word happening to have one of these meanings.

Words, having these meanings are respectively called directly expressive word (Vācaka) indirectly expressive or figuratively used word ‘Lāksnīka’ and suggestive word, ‘Vyaṅjaka’.

According to a class of Mīmāṃsakas, the followers of Kumārila as well as older Naiyāyīkas and Vaiśeṣikas who are Abhihitāṇvyavādins; a fourth meaning ‘Tatparyārtha’ is also to be admitted.

The followers of Prabhākara another class of Mīmāṃsakas who are ‘Anvitābhīdhāṇvādins’ do not see any utility in admitting it.
**Abhichā and Samketgrahe**

Each of the three kinds of meaning, the current 'Vācaka' the figurative 'Lāksnike' and suggested 'Vyajjaka' may give rise to a suggestion ('Vyajjanā'). 'Vācaka or a word used in its current sense directly expresses the meaning given to it by 'Samketa' (convention) or common consent actual or supposed — 'Asmacchabādayamartho, bodhavya, ityākaraḥ śakti grāhakah samayah'. Samketa is to be placed not on 'Vyakti' (individual) but on 'Upādhi' i.e. the characteristics of the individual, 'Jāti', 'Guṇa', 'Kriya' and 'Sanjña', according to the Mahābhāṣya; it is to be placed simply on 'Jāti' according to the Mīmāṃsakas, for individuals are endless and it is not possible to go round the world and observe each and every individual and place 'Samketa' on it. If to avoid this difficulty the 'Samketa' is to be placed on a limited number of individuals then there would rise a defect namely 'Vyabhicāra' or violation of a principle. If 'Ghataś' for instance were to signify those jars only which are Samketita i.e. on which Samketa has been placed, the jars that have not been seen and consequently not Samketita would not have been signified by the term. If this be accepted then there would be 'Vyabhicāra' or violation of the rule that a word signifies only those things on which Samketa has been placed. Further if Samketa were restricted to Individual alone, then the wellknown classification of the meanings of words into 'Jāti',
'Guna', 'Kriyā', and 'Dravya' would be impossible. When we see a white ox by name Dittha moving, we use the expression 'Gau Śuklascaloditthah', i.e. the ox which is white and named Dittha is walking. If everyone of the three four words denotes merely the individual and not its character then there would be no reason why we shall use four words instead of one, for one would be sufficient to indicate the 'Individual'.

Upādhi

Now what is Upādhi on which Samketa is to be placed? Upadhi is either Vastudharma (a property or character that belongs to the Individual) or 'Vaktryadrechāsannivēsitadharma' (Something fastened upon the individual by the wish of the speaker); or it can be 'Sanjña'. The former (i.e. Vastudharma) is again divided into (Siddha) actual existing and Śādhyā (That which is to be accomplished). Kriyā or Siddhavastudharma is further of two kinds (1) Padarthasyaprāṇapradah (that which constitutes the life or essence of the thing denoted by the word i.e. 'Jāti') and Vivesadhanahetu (That which is the means of distinguishing one object from another i.e. Guna).

Samketa is to be placed on Jāti, Guna, Kriyā and Sanjña conceived as a property of an individual. These are the four divisions of Upādhi. The Mīmāṃskas hold that there is a class of Gunas, such as Śuklatva (There being
something in all white substances such as snow, milk etc. by virtue of which they are called white). A Jāti of Kriyā such as pākatva (in the cookings of the diverse things such as molasses, rice etc.). A Jāti of Sanjārtha i.e. Dravya which the Sanjā appertains such as 'ditthatva' (in the object named Dittha) undergoing change at every moment, and as such Samketa is to be placed on Jāti alone and not on four things namely Jāti, Guna etc.

Lakṣṇa (Indication)

Indicative word (a word used in figurative sense) is the basis or substratum of Lakṣṇa or indication (The vṛtti or function by which is understood a new meaning connected with the principle or current meaning of word).

When the current meaning is barred by incompatability and another meaning connected with the current meaning comes to be attached to the word either through usage or for a special purpose (Pryojana) then the function by which the new meaning is presented is called Lakṣṇa or Indication.

Following are the varities of Lakṣṇa or Indication:

1. Upādanalakṣṇa "Kuntāh praviṣanti" (Lances enter the battlefield). Here in order to establish the logical connection of the lances with the act of entering the soldiers armed with lances must be understood to be the meaning of the word "Kuntāh praviṣanti ityadau svasya kuntādeh siddhye, avya-siddhye parasya kuntadhariṇah ēkseya bodhanam Upādanalakṣṇeta-yucyate".
The special purpose served by indication here is to draw attention to the intensity of the instruments of war.

2. Laksāṇa Laksāṇa "Gangāyāmghoṣah". Here the term Gangā gives up its current meaning for the figurative one "Gangāyām ghoṣah ityādau prākrithe taṭādirūpaṁtha siddhye svasya pravaharūpaṁdyarthasya smarpanam tyāgah, Laksāṇa Laksāṇa-tyucyate".

3. Suddhasāropā Laksāṇa "Āyurghṛtam" (Clarified butter is longevity). Here Āyu means 'Āyurdāyaka' (Giver of longevity) the primary meaning 'Āyuh' being barred. In this example the Viśayin or that which is imposed (e.g. 'Āyuh') and the 'Viśaya' or that upon which the Viśayin is imposed (e.g. Ghṛta) are mentioned as correlated, both of them being distinctly mentioned. The purpose served is to bring about the notion that clarified butter gives longevity better than anything else.

4. Suddhāsādhvyavasāna Laksāṇa "Āyuridam". Here the viṣayin (Āyuh) swallows as it were the Viṣaya (Ghṛta) the latter being not mentioned at all. The purpose served is to bring about a notion of infalibility of clarified butter in producing longevity. These four kinds of indication (Laksāṇa) are Suddha because they do not involve any idea of similitude.

5. Gaurī Saśropā Laksāṇa "Gaurvāhīkah". Here the viṣayin and the Viṣaya 'Vahīka' are both distinctly mentioned
the purpose served is to show the extreme stupidity.

6. Gaunā Sadhyāvasanā Laksṇā "Gaurayam". Here the Visayin swallows as it were the 'Viṣaya'. Here the purpose is to bring about a notion that the stupidity of the 'Vāhīka' is still greater as it is shown by the assertion of the complete identity between the two.

The last two kinds are Gaunā because certain qualities are common to expressed and indicative meanings and thus they are based upon the relation of similarity.

When Indication (Laksṇā) is based on convention (usage) there is no suggested meaning at all, but when it is based upon special purpose, there is a suggested meaning and the suggested meaning may either be hidden or explicit. Thus indication: (Laksṇā) considered from another point of view is of three kinds. (a) Indication (Laksṇā) without any suggested meaning, (b) Indication (Laksṇā) with a hidden suggested meaning, (c) Indication (Laksṇā) with an explicit suggested meaning. The purpose for which a word is used figuratively cannot be brought out by any function other than suggestion (Vyanjana). Abhidhā is totally powerless as the purpose is not the current meaning of the word. Thus in the case of expression like 'Gangayāṁ ghoṣah'; the sanctity, coolness and such other qualities which constitute the purpose are not the direct meaning of the word Ganges. Nor has 'Indication' (Laksṇā) any scope here because the necessary
conditions thereof are wanting. In the expression 'Gangā-
yāmghoṣah' indication (Laksṇā) is resorted to because the
primary meaning of Gangā is incompatible. If in the same
manner the sense of the word Ganges were also incompatible,
then alone could be the word by a second indication (Laksṇā)
mean the intended sanctity, coolness and so-forth. But this
is not so.

**Suggestion (Vyañjana)**

The figurative meaning or Lakṣyārtha of the word
in the example quoted above cannot include the intended idea
of sanctity and so forth or in other words the figurative
meaning of Gangā in 'Gangāyāmghoṣah' 'Sitapāvanatvādiviṣiṣṭa
Gangātāta'. For it is a well known diction that the subject
and the fruit of knowledge are different from each other.
For the subject or the object of the knowledge which is
taken to be 'pāvanatvādi viṣiṣṭa' in the sentence 'Gangāyām
Ghoṣah' is not different from sanctity etc. The recognized
fruit of knowledge of indication (Laksṇā).

After describing the suggestion (Vyañjana) based
upon indication (Laksṇā) the author proceeds to describe
the suggestion (Vyañjana) based upon expression (Abhidhā).
When a word has several primary meanings and thus there is
uncertainty as to the meaning which suits it best in a
particular sentence, the determinant factors in such a
case are 'Sāmyoga', 'Viprayoga', 'Sāhacarya' and Virodhata.
Thus, in the expression ‘Sas’amkhacakro Hari’ the meaning of the word Hari, which has many meanings, is restricted to Viṣṇu on account of his Samyoga with ‘Sankha’ and Cakra. When such a word after being fastened to a particular meaning in a sentence gives rise to another meaning, the function by which such a meaning is brought about, is suggestion (Vyañjanā) based upon expression (Abhidhā).

Suggestive (Vyañjaka) word is a word endowed with the function (Vṛtti) of suggestion (Vyañjanā).

ULLĀSA III

Suggestiveness of meaning is that function of the meaning which gives rise to another meaning to be comprehended by a person endowed with appreciative genius, through the peculiarities of (1) the speaker (2) the person spoken to (3) Intonation i.e. the change of voice indicating emotions (4) The sentence (5) The expressed meaning (6) The presence of a person who is neither speaker nor person spoken to (7) Context (8) Place (9) Time.

The meaning that suggests another meaning is brought before the mind by the word and therefore words constitute a contributing cause of suggestion (Vyañjanā) in the ordinary kāvya, in drama however what is seen namely the scenes and acting etc. may also be suggestive (Vyañjaka).
Dhvani is of the two kinds 'Avivaksita Vācyā' and 'Vivakṣitānyaparavācyā'. The former is based upon Indication (Laksṇā) and the latter on Expression (Abhidhā). Avivakṣita-vācyā is the kind of Dhvani in which the directly expressed meaning is not desired to be conveyed—it being modified into another meaning (Arthāntresamkramita) or entirely rejected (Atyante Tiraskṛta). 'Tvām vacmi etat Kurū' 'I tell you, do it, is an example of the former kind. Here the expression I tell you is superfluous if it is taken in literal sense. So 'I tell you' means 'I advise you' and suggests that the advice cannot be neglected with impunity (Anupeksīyatva) 'Upkṛtambahutatra Kimucyate' is an example of 'Atyantatiraskṛta Vācyā'. This being addressed to a man, who has caused much injury to the speaker, the expressed sense is wholly inapplicable and 'Upakṛtam means 'Apkṛtam'. The suggestion is the seriousness of the injury or the crookedness and insincerity of the pretended friend.

'Vivaksitānyapara Vācyā' is one where though expressed meaning is not barred yet it is subservient to the suggested meaning. This kind of Dhvani is of two kinds 'Asamlaksyakrama Vyaṅgya' and 'Saṃlaksyakrama Vyaṅgya'.

Asamlaksyakrama

In the former the sequence of the expressed meaning is not perceptible, while in the latter such a sequence is
perceptible. The 'Asamīlakṣyakramāvyāngya' is treated first as it has fewer varieties than the other one. Asamīlakṣyakrama has eight varieties namely (1) Rasa (2) Bhāva (3) Rasabhāsa (4) Bhāvabhāsa (5) Bhāvasānti (6) Bhāvodya (7) Bhāvasandhi (8) Bhāvasābalī. When they appear as predominant factors they constitute Dhvani and are to be embellished (Alaṃkāra) but when the literal meaning (Vācyārtha) dominates over the suggested meaning i.e. when Rasa, Bhāva and others assume a secondary character then they become embellishments (Alaṃkāra) known as Rasavat, Preya, etc. Instances of these are to be found in Ullāsa V.

**RASA**

Bhārata's Sūtra about Rasa is 'Vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicāri Samyogad Rasanipatti'.

**Bhatta Lollata**

Bhatta Lollata and his followers explain it in the following manner:

Permanent feelings being called up by basic causes (Ālambana Vibhāva) such as women and excited by the exciting causes (Uddāpanavibhāva) such as gardens and made cognizable by effects (Anubhāva) such as side long glances embraces etc. and developed by the transient subordinate feelings (Vybhicāribhāva) such as self disparagement become Rasa

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1Bhārata's Nātyaśāstra Ch. VI, p. 236, G.O. Series.
(Poetic sentiment) originally produced in the character personated e.g. Rama and subsequently recognized as subsisting in the actor by reason of his imitation. When thus recognized it becomes a source of charm to the spectator and is called Rasa. Thus manifestation of Rasa is caused by Samyoga or the relation of 'Produced and Producer'. This is the view of Mīmāṃsakas and is known as Utpattivāda.

(This theory is weak as it fails to explains how the spectator can be charmed by the emotion which is originally produced in the character and is subsequently recognized in the actor and does not at all exist in the spectator himself)

Sri Saṅkuka

The theory of Śrī Saṅkuka is as follows:

When a place is covered with fog looking like smoke we infer the existence of fire which is inseparably connected with smoke. In the same way when an actor personates Rāma the spectator has with regard to him peculiar idea that this is Rāma himself! Hence, is inferred the existence of emotion (Rati) in the artificial Rāma. Though an inference, it is different from ordinary inferences and gives immense delight to the spectator on account of peculiar charm. This inference of emotion brought about by Samyoga or the relation of 'Gaṁya Gaṁaka bhāva' (the Vibhāva etc. being Gaṁaka or indicative and the Rasa being Gaṁya or indicated) is manifestation of Rasa. This is the view of Naiyāyikas and is known as 'Anumitivāda'.
(This interpretation is also defective as it disregards the fact that it is the direct cognition of a thing and not its inference that can give us such an extraordinary bliss).

**Bhatta Nāyaka**

Bhattanāyaka explains the sūtra in the following manner:

In poetry and drama words are endowed with three powers: Expression (including indication), Bhāvakatva and Bhojakatva. Bhāvakatva is the power of generalised presentation (Sādhārānīkaraṇa). This power generalizes the Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vybhicāribhāva or in other words, by the force of this power, these constituents of Rasa and the love (Rati) of Rāma towards Sītā assume a general form giving up their specific properties. For instance Sītā does not appear as a particular woman but as a woman in general; Rāma's love towards her assumes detached nature i.e. it appears without any reference to the person who loves or the object loved.

Then the generalised Vibhāva etc., through the power of Bhojakatva makes the Rati to be realised through the predominance of the quality of harmony (Satva). Thus enjoyment of Rasa through the Sanyoga or relations of Bhojyabhojaka Bhāva is Rasa Niṣpatti. This is the Sāṅkhya view of the Sūtra and is known as 'Bhuktivāda'.
This view is also not acceptable as there is no authority for the assumption of the two powers, Bhāvakatva and Bhājakatva and further the Rāti non-existent in the spectator is enjoyed through an extraordinary process.

ABHINAVA GUPTA

The explanation propounded by Abhinava Gupta is as follows—

In the mind of spectators endowed with appreciative capacity (Sahādyatā), there remain already present the permanent feelings of love and other emotions in the form of impression (Vasānā). These feelings are manifested by such agencies as women or other thing which are known as causes. In poetry and drama however they cease to be called causes and come to be spoken of as Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vybhicāri-bhāva etc. When a Kāvyā is read or heard, or the staging of drama is seen, there is expansion of mind caused by the force of Vibhāva etc., which are recognized in their general form without any specific relation with the power of Bhāvakatva, the Sthāyi also appears in its generalised form and the spectator loses for the time being all sense of separate personality and has his consciousness merged in the universal. The emotion thus manifested becomes the source of transcendental bliss and is spoken as Rasa. Thus the enjoyment of Rasa is the manifestation of Rasa which is through the Samyoga or relation of 'Vyaṅgya.
Vyanjaka Bhāva. This is the view of Grammarians and known as 'Abhivyaktivāda'.

Rasa is not an effect i.e. something produced by the Viṣhāva etc. as all effects such as jars are seen to exist even after the destruction of their causes such as stick etc. which are popularly known to be its causes.

Rasa is manifested and as such is not something to be made known (Jñāpya) because it is always an accomplished entity 'Siddha Vastu' that can be known just as a jar is known through the help of a lamp.

Rasa cannot be grasped by 'Nirvikalapikajñāna' (Indeterminate cognition) as the Rasa exists so long as the Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vybhicāri-bhāva exist and thus its existence after all is dependent upon the investigation of Vibhāva etc. Nor can Rasa be grasped by 'Savikalpakajñāna' (Determinate cognition i.e. the cognition of an object with its distinguishing properties) as Rasa consists in nothing but its own realisation. It absorbs the mind completely and at the time of its relishing all other ideas are lost.

Rasa is transcendental (Alaukika) in nature and its transcendental nature is thus established.

The same Vibhāva the same Anubhāva and the same Vybhicāribhāva may relate to more than one Rasa. Tige is a Vibhāva for Bhayānaka, Vīra, Adbhuta and Raudra. The
sheding of tears is an Anubhāva for Śṛngāra, Karuṇa and Bhayānaka. Anxious thoughts are 'Vybhicāribhāvas' for Vīra, Karuṇa and Bhayānaka.

There is no hard and fast rule that Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vybhicārī all the three should be mentioned in every poetry. Direct mention may be made of even only one of them, the other two being left to be indirectly implied.

Eight kinds of Rasa:-
1. Śṛngāra (the Erotic)
2. Hāsya (the Comic)
3. Karuṇa (the Pathetic)
4. Raudra (the Furious)
5. Vīra (the Heroic)
6. Bhayānaka (the Frightful)
7. Bībhatsa (the Disgustful)
8. Adbhuta (the Marvellous)

Two kinds of erotic Samyoga (the Erotic in Union) and Vipralambha (the Erotic in Separateness or Privation).

The erotic in privation in its turn is of five kinds, the feeling being due to (a) ‘Abhilāśa’ longing (b) ‘Vṛaha’ separation (c) ‘Īṛṣyā’ jealousy (d) ‘Pravāsa’ residence abroad and (e) ‘Śāpa’ Curse. The basic feelings ‘Sthāyi’ of the Rasas are:-

Erotic (Śṛngāra) Love (Rati)
Hāsya (Comic) Mirth (Hāsa)
Karuna (Pathetic)    Grief (Soka)  
Raudra (furious)     Resentment (Krodha)
Vīra (Heoric)        Heroism (Utsāha)
Bhayānaka (Frightful) Fear (Bhaya)
Bibhatsa (the Disgustful) Loathing (Jugupsā)
Adbhuta (Marvellous) Wonder (Vismya)

Subordinate emotions are Nirveda, Glāni (Indolence) Sankā (apprehension) etc.

The Śānta (the quietistic) is the ninth Rasa of which Nirveda (self disparagement) is the basic feeling.

Definition of Bhāva (emotion):

Love of which the subject is a God (or a Brahmaṇa, a sage, a king, a preceptor, or a friend) as also a Vybhicārībhāva when suggested not as a primary factor being nourished by causes like Vibhāva etc. becomes Bhāva. When Rasas and Bhāvas are improperly manifested they constitute what are called Rasābhāsa and Bhavābhāsa (semblance of Rasa and Bhāva). Of subordinate emotions (Vybhicārībhāvas) there are (a) Allayment (Sānti) (b) Manifestation (Udaya) (c) Mixture (Sandhi) (d) Variegation (Sābalatā) (Bhāva-sandhi and Bhāva-sābalatā). When two opposite emotions striving for supremacy are represented as relished in one and the same place and at the same time they constitute a mixture of emotions (bhāva sandhi). When however a number of emotions each succeeding one putting down the preceding one is represented as not being relished simultaneously,
they constitute a variegation of emotions.

Though it is Rasa which is predominant factor in poetry and the Vybhicāribhāvas (their sānti, udaya etc.) are subservient to it, still they also become predominant sometimes — their predominance being like that of a servant of the king whose marriage is attended by the king himself (who thus for the time being becomes subservient to his servant). Here ends the description of eight kinds of suggestion with imperceptible sequence being Rasa, Bhāva, Bhāvābhāsa, Bhava-sānti, Bhavo-daya, Rasābhāsa, Bhāvasabalatā, Bhāva-sandhi.

Samlakṣyakarama Vyāṇga

(The suggestive poetry in which the order of sequence between the suggested meaning and the suggestive word is perceptible) is of three kinds (1) That in which the suggested meaning arises from the force of word 'Sabdasaktyudbhava' (2) That in which the same arises from the force of sense (Artha) 'Arthasaktyudbhava' (3) That in which the same arises from both word and sense 'Ubhayasaktyudbhava'.

Sabdasaktyudbhava — Of these varieties again, the first 'Sabdasaktyudbhava' is of two kinds (1) Where a figure 'Alaṃkāra' is suggested (Alaṃkāra Dhvani) (2) Where matter is suggested (Vastu-dhvani).

Arthasaktyudbhava — The second division of this
type is 'Arthaśaktyudbhava' (that in which, the suggested meaning arises from the force of the sense). It is primarily of three kinds (1) When suggestive sense is self existent (i.e. not owing its existence to the poet's assertion but existing by itself) (2) When it is 'Kavipraudhoktimatrasiddha' (i.e. not existing by itself but by the bold assertion of the poet), (3) When it is Kavinibaddha praudhoktimatrasiddha (i.e. owing its existence to the bold assertion of some character delineated by the poet).

Each of these suggestive factors is either a figure of speech or bare fact. Thus 'Arthaśaktyudbhava' comes to be of six kinds. Each of these may suggest a figure or a fact.

Thus we have twelve varieties of Arthaśaktudbhava:-

1. The suggestion of a fact by a self existent fact.
2. The suggestion of a figure by a self existent fact.
3. The suggestion of a fact by a self existent figure.
4. The suggestion of a figure by a self existent figure.
5. The suggestion of a fact by a fact creation of poet's fancy.
6. The suggestion of a figure by a fact the creation of poet's fancy.
7. The suggestion of a fact by a figure the creation of poet's fancy.
8. The suggestion of figure by a figure the creation of poet's fancy.
9. The suggestion of fact by a fact based upon the bold assertion of a character portrayed by the poet.

10. The suggestion of figure by a fact based upon the bold assertion of a character portrayed by the poet.

11. The suggestion of a fact by figure based upon bold assertion of a character portrayed by the poet.

12. The suggestion of a figure by a figure based upon the bold assertion of a character portrayed by the poet.

The third division of Sāmālakṣyakramavyāṅga is 'Sabdārthobhyasaktyudbhava', it is one only.

So there are eighteen varieties of Dhvani (Including five main varieties).

Of these again 'Ubhayasaktyudbhava' is present only in sentence. Each of the other seventeen varieties is found both in sentence and a word (Pada).

So suggestion comes to be of 35 kinds. Each of the 12 varieties of 'Arthasaktyudbhava' is found also in a Prabandha. Suggestive sense comes to be of 47 kinds. Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa, Bhāvabhāsa etc. can be suggested (1) by parts of words, (2) by style, (3) by individual letters as well as by composition. So 'Asamlakṣyakramavyāṅga' which is a sub-division of 'Vivakṣitāṅyaparavācyā' may be said to be of four kinds. So suggestive sense comes to be of
51 kinds. Each of these simple 51 varieties has its own fifty-one co-mixture varieties again. So the varieties come to be 51 x 51 = 2601. Each of these varieties has again three kinds of co-mixture and uniform conjunction. So the total number of varieties comes to be 2601 x 4 = 10404. These mixed varieties along with simple varieties make the number 10455.

ULLĀSA V 'POETRY OF MIDDLE KIND (GUṆĪ-BHŪTAVYĀNGYA)

There are eight varieties of the poetry of subordinate suggestion accordingly as the suggested meaning is:

1. **Obvious** i.e. capable of being grasped even by those who have no special appreciative capacity.

2. **Subservient to something else** i.e. to another Rasa or to the direct meaning.

3. **An essential factor for the understanding of the direct meaning.**

4. **Abstruse** i.e. grasped with difficulty even by the appreciative minds.

5. **Of doubtful prominence** in comparison with the direct meaning in the matter of creating charm.

6. **Of equal prominence** with the direct meaning, in the matter of creating charm.

7. **Rendered manifest only by intonation** without which the meaning of the sentence loses its being altogether; or manifested abruptly by intonation and thus giving no scope for indication.
8. Less charming than the direct meaning.

These eight kinds of poetry of the middle kind, where the suggested sense is subordinate to the direct sense have in their turn a very large number of varieties like suggestive poetry (Dhvanikāvya).

It should be noted, however, that the poetry where a figure is suggested by a mere fact (Vācyavastu) should be regarded not as a subordinate suggestion but as Dhvanikāvya, because the beauty of the Kāvya rests on figures more than on facts directly expressed and as such figures cannot be regarded as subordinate to the direct meaning.

Of the things that are suggested some are and others are not so. Of the first kind again some are Vicitra (beautiful i.e. ornamented) and others are Avicitra, What is Vicitra is a figure (Alahkāra) what is (Avicitra) is a mere fact (Vastu). Of the second kind (i.e. the suggested things that can never be expressed directly) are Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa etc. so considered from the view of the suggested, suggestive sense is of the three varieties.

Dhvani

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\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Vācyatāsaha} & \text{Vācyatāsaha} \\ \hline
\text{Vicitra} & \text{Avicitra} \\
\text{(i.e. Vastu)} & \text{(i.e. Alamkāra)} \\
\text{or fact)} & \\
\end{array}
\]

(Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa etc.)
Now how can an Alamkāra, when it is suggested and thus becomes fit to be ornamented, still go by the name of Alamkāra (ornament) the answer to that it is due to the 'Brāhmaṇaśramaṇa Nyāya'.

If Rasa is to be Vācyatāsaha it should be expressed either by the generic word Rasa or by the specific words such as Śṛngāra, Hāsyā, Karuṇā, etc. As a matter of fact none of these words can generate Rasa when Vibhāva, Anubhāva, etc. are absent. On the other hand when Vibhāva, Anubhāva, etc. are present Rasa is cognised even in the absence of words like Rasa, Śṛngāra, Karuṇā, etc. So the cause of the cognition of Rasa is Vibhāva, Anubhāva, etc. and not any words signifying Rasa such as Rasa, Śṛngāra, Karuṇā, etc.

Rasa is not capable of being presented by the indication, for the requisites of the indication are wanting. Rasa is therefore suggested, that is, presented by suggestive sense. Suggestion cannot but be admitted as a separate Vyātti i.e. function of words. We have seen its operation in the cases of Rasa, Bhāva, etc. Its operation has to be admitted in other cases as well. In Lākṣaṇamūladhvani such as Arthantrasaṃkramita and Atyantatiraskṛta, there can be no indication at all without the suggestion of the fact. In Sabda Saktisāla, Dhvani also 'Abhidhā' or denotation, being restricted to a certain meaning, any other meaning (which is after all a fact) not capable of being
expressed by Denotation as also the 'Similie' or any other figure that may be perceptible, must be regarded as arising through the force of suggestion.

In Arthaśāktimūla Dhvani (suggestion of a fact or figure) the meaning of a sentence is understood through the help of the denotation. The question is whether this denotation can include suggestion. Now there are Abhihitā- nvyavādins and Anvītābhidhānāvādins, who hold different views as to how the sense of a sentence arises. According to the former, words have general meanings and logical connection between these meanings is not known from the words themselves, but from Ākāṃkṣā, Yogyātā and Sannidhi. When this connection is known, the sense of the whole sentence is grasped and this is known as import meaning or meaning of a sentence. It will thus be seen that denotation is not competent to explain even the logical connection between the several notions conveyed by the words but has to take the help of 'Ākāṃkṣā', 'Yogyātā', etc. for this purpose. When denotation cannot yield the full meaning of a sentence by explaining the syntax of the meanings of the words constituting the sentence, it can hardly be expected that it will yield the suggestion of that sentence which will come out only after the meaning of the sentence has been expressed.

Suggested sense cannot be included in the denoted sense according to the 'Anvītābhidhānāvādins' as well. The
Anvitabhidhānavādins have offered the following explanation regarding the process by which the meaning of the words are originally grasped.

A young child perceives by his sense and predicate. The young child knows by inference from the movements of the man ordered, to that the latter has understood the meaning of what has been said to him by the other man. The two fold potency (the potency of the sentence to denote and its meaning to be denoted) comes to be understood by means of presumption based on apparent in explicability on any other hypothesis (Anythānupapatti) and the child knows what the whole sentence signifies. Thus the relation subsisting between the sentence and its meaning is understood by the means of cognition. (Prtyakṣa, Anumāna and Arthāpatti). Another time he hears such sentences (Citragāmānaya etc. and from the use and non-use of different words in these sentences he comes to the meaning of the words like 'Go' and 'Asva'. It must be noted that a sentence (and not mere disconnected words) can set a man to action and stop him from it. So Samketa pertaining to each individual word is known only from sentences. The meaning of a sentence therefore is nothing but the meaning of its component words, the relations between meanings are involved in or form a part of the meaning themselves. It is wrong to think that each word expresses its own meaning and then the meanings of different words in a sentence become correlated with another through Akhaṅka etc. From this it might be thought that in the sentence
'Gāmānaya' bringing means 'Gavānvita-ānayana' and 'Go' means 'Ānyanānvita Go'. But it is not so really. For in the sentence 'Āsvamānayana' the meaning 'Gavānvita-ānayana' of 'Ānaya' will not do. Similarly, in the sentence 'See the cow' the meaning 'Ānyanānvita' of 'Go' would be incompatible. If it be admitted that in 'Gāmānaya', 'Ānayana' means 'Gavānvita-ānayana' and so on, innumerable meanings of the word bring (Ānaya) will have to be acknowledged and moreover there would be no recognition of the word 'Ānaya' when the sentence is heard. Because 'Ānayana' here is different from all other 'Ānayananas' so the meanings of 'Ānaya' in 'Gāmānaya' is (as related with other objects including the object 'Go') Gvānvitānayana. In other words in the sentence 'Āsvamānaya' is heard because 'Ānyana' here is different from all other 'Ānyanas' so the meaning of 'Ānaya' in 'Gāmānaya' is 'Itrapadārthānvitānayana' as related with other objects including the object and of 'Go', Itrapadārthānvita-Go'. In other words in the sentence 'Gāmānaya', 'Ānaya' means not the particular 'Ānayana' of 'Go' but 'Ānayana' in general and 'Go' means not 'Go' as the Karma of Ānayana but 'Go' in general i.e. as merely related to other subjects. Now, the question is how from the sentence 'Gāmānaya' does the meaning 'Gavānvitānayana' and not 'Āsvitānayana' comes to be comprehended. The answer is when the different words are correlated in a sentence they denote their specific
character implied by the general one.

So according to the Anvitābhidhānvādins, Denotation cannot yield the meaning of the sentence in the manner in which the meaning of the words are connected with each other though such a meaning is present actually in the sentence itself. It is futile to expect therefore that Denotation will yield the suggested sense, which is understandable only after the meaning of the sentence is realized.

Now there is a maxim, 'such causes only are to be supposed as are appropriate to the effect'. So some day when we see a particular expression producing a suggested sense, we should infer that it is that expression which through Expression has given rise to that idea and should not think of any other cause. Here suggested sense or rather the understanding of the suggested sense being effect sabda (words) may be regarded as cause and the Vyāti (function) by which the suggested sense is presented may be said to be Denotation. In reply to this view may be said the following.

A cause is either Karaka that which produces or jñāpaka that which makes known. Now words cannot be regarded as Karaka causes of the suggested sense, as it is well known that words do not produce the things they signify. Now can they be regarded as Jñāpaka of suggested sense, if process of suggesting be denied, because a word though Jñāpaka cannot through the process of Denotation make known
a thing which has never been known as being its meaning.
In suggestion what is suggested is not known as the meaning
because it is not Samketita i.e. no Samketa has been placed
on it. It has been observed that Samketa is placed on the
primary meanings of words which are correlated in a
sentence and not on any other meaning such as suggestive
meaning which is known afterwards.

Others argue about the power of Denotation in this
way as an arrow discharged by a strongman becomes endowed
with a single power namely the Samskāra called vega and cuts
through the enemy's armour pierces his vital and takes away
his life, so a word may, by the single power of denotation
bring home to us its ordinary or current meaning, its syntax
and the sense it suggests. In other words according to the
maxim 'Yatparah Sabdah sa Šabdārthah' whatever sense is
apprehended as a consequence of the hearing of any word;
import is the primary meaning of those words. Thus denota-
tion is quite competent to express what is known as suggested
sense.

Those who argue in this way do not realise what
Import meaning is. The Import meaning of a sentence lies
in what is intended to be conveyed and thus consists in the
meaning directly meant by the words actually used and not
in anything and everything that may be implied. If anything
that may be implied be included in import sense then 'Paścimo
Dhāvati' (The latter man is running) might be a part of the
import sense of 'Pūrvo Dhāvati' (The former man is running) 
West being implied by East (they being relative terms).

The import sense of the sentence 'Viṣam Bhakṣaya 
mācāsyagrhe bhukṭāḥ' is that in no circumstances you should 
eat in this man's house. This sense is not directly 
expressed by the sentence but implied by it. Then how can 
it be said that import is apprehended directly from the 
words themselves? The answer is that the conjunctive 
particle 'ca' in the above sentence indicates that the two 
sentences are to be construed together as one sentence and 
though there cannot generally be any Body-limb relation 
between two complete sentences, yet the sentence 'eat poison' 
cannot be taken in its literal sense and as such should be 
regarded subordinate to the second sentence. The meaning 
of the first sentence thus comes to be 'Eating in this 
man's house is more harmful than eating poison', and this 
meaning is obtained by Indication. So the whole meaning 
is: "You should never eat in this man's house, because 
eating in this man's house is worse than eating poison". 
In other words, the sentence 'eat poison' only furnishes 
a reason for not eating in this man's house. Thus the 
sense arrived at does not go beyond that expressed by the 
words therein.

Another thing, if we accept the view that whatever comes into the mind after one bears certain words is
the result of Denotation (on the analogy of the arrow referred to above) then in case of the sentences 'Bho putraste jātah'; 'Kamyā te sarbhini jātā', the feelings of joy and sadness that come into the consciousness of Brāhmaṇa might also be regarded as the direct meaning of words. There would be no further necessity of admitting Indication for the gradually extending power of expression that might account for meaning obtained by it. Moreover, there would be no reason to suppose that of 'Sruti', 'Liṅga', etc. each preceding one is of greater authority than each succeeding one (as in taught by Jaimini) on the ground of their relative potency to express meanings earlier. For, if denotation be the only power which expresses all meanings, then all the meanings whether they are presented by 'Sruti', 'Liṅga' or 'Vākya' etc. would come through the power at one and the same time and thus no distinction in point of authority would be attached to any of them on the ground of expressing the meaning earlier.

Suggestion is discarded, there would be nothing to remind us of indecorous in expressions like 'Rumakuru' because the portion 'cinkū' which is 'Aśliṇa' meaning a private part of the female body, is not an independent word here and, as such, cannot be correlated to any other word and denote anything by Denotation.

Then again if the function of suggestion be not
admitted as distinct from denotation there would be no classification of Doṣas into permanent and impermanent.

"Cyuta Saṃskṛti" is a permanent defect being always a defect and "Sruti Kaṭutva" is an impermanent Doṣa when occurring in words suggesting the sentiment of love, but an excellence when the sentiment suggested is Furious. The underlying idea is that harsh sounds help the suggestion of the sentiment of resentment but retard that of the sentiment of love. For, there is no difference, in the meaning of a word (expressed by the power of Denotation) whether used in connection with Śṛngāra, Furious or Raudra and as such, if denotation be the only function which expresses the meaning, then 'Sruti Kaṭutva' always would either be a Doṣa or a Guṇa and there would be no such classification as permanent and Impermanent. If, however, the power of suggestion be admitted, it can explain the harsh sounds as helping the suggestion of the sentiment of resentment and retarding that of the sentiment of love and thus justify the classification of Doṣas into Permanent and Impermanent.

Sometimes the synonyms of a word cannot bring out all that is intended to be conveyed by the word itself. The reason is, of synonyms, some are capable of suggesting the appropriate things, while others are not. In the sentence "Dvyaṃ gatam Samprati Śocanīyatām Smāgama prārthanyā Kapālinah". The pitiableness of the situation implied by the word 'Kapālinah' cannot be conveyed by its synonym
'Pinakinah' though there is absolutely no difference between the denotation of the two words, both being synonyms of Siva.

This also proves the existence of the power of suggestion as distinct from denotation. The denotative word is the same to all persons but the suggested sense differs according to the speaker and person spoken to. 'Gatoastamarkah' (the Sun has set) may suggest various things. It may suggest (1) The idea of taking rest for the night, when addressed by one labourer to another (2) The idea of taking the opportunity of attacking the enemy when addressed by the general to the king (3) The idea of dispersing for twilight prayers, when addressed by a religious student to another and (4) The idea for a woman is to meet her beloved'.

The difference between two things is known from their having different properties and causes. The Expressed meaning and suggested sense, have different properties and their causes are also different. So Expressed meaning is different from suggested sense. The following seven points explain their different natures and causes.

1. Character - In some cases expressed meaning is negative while the suggested meaning is affirmative and vice-versa.

2. Time - The expressed meaning is comprehended first and then the suggested meaning.
3. Conveying agent - The expressed meaning is conveyed by a word, while the suggested meaning may be conveyed by a word, a part of the word, by a letter, by a style or by the meaning of word or words.

4. Means of Knowledge - The expressed meaning is understood with the help of grammar, Lexican etc., while the suggested meaning is understood from content and other things as well as by grammar etc.

5. Effect - One who understands the expressed meaning is called (intelligent) while one who understands the suggested meaning is entitled to be called cultured; further, the expressed meaning brings about a simple comprehension while the suggested meaning causes an exquisite charm.

6. Number - The expressed meaning is only one while the suggested meaning may be manifold.

7. The Object - The expressed meaning may be intended for one person, while the suggested meaning for a different person.

Not only expressed meaning and suggested meaning differ from each other but there is a difference between (expressive) and (suggestive) also. An expressive is word expressive of the meaning which is samketita (i.e., the meaning on which the Samketa of word has been placed), a suggestive on the other hand is necessarily not a word, because meanings are also suggestive.
In subordinate poetry (a Kāvyā in which the suggested meaning is not more charming than the expressed one) also the suggested sense is not denoted by the words of sentence, nor does it fall with in its import yet it is cognized and this cognition occurs through the suggestion. This is another reason for admitting suggestion. 'Ramoṣmi sarvam sahe', I am Rāma and shall bear everything, 'Rāmo-āsau Bhāyaneṣu Vikramgūṇaiḥ prāptah prasiddhīṁ paraṁ, Rāmena priyajītvitena tu kṛtam prempaḥ prīye nocitam', O love I, who am Rama and too fond of my life, have not done what befits love. In these sentences the word Rāma respectively means 'one who is known to have suffered all kinds of grief - one who pleases every body' and a cruel being, all these meanings are Indicative meanings. These meanings are also the causes of peculiar appellations like 'Arthantrasaṁkramitavācyalakṣṇā', Atyantatiraskṛta-vācyalakṣṇā', etc. The comprehension of Indicative meaning is dependent upon both word and meaning. Indication in the above cases is obviously dependent upon context and other conditions such as the peculiarity of speaker, the person spoken to etc. Now it will be recalled that in suggestion also we find these conditions fulfilled. We have seen that Suggestive meanings are diverse according to the circumstances Arthantrasaṁkramitavatva and Atyantatiraskṛta-vācyatva etc. pertain also to suggestive meaning.
Suggestive meaning for its comprehension, is also dependent on Sabda, Artha, context etc. Then what is the necessity of admitting suggestion distinct from Indication.

Though there may be several Indicative meaning of a word, yet in the same sentence one Indicative meaning is applicable just like one denotative meaning of a word which has several expressed meanings but there may be many suggestive meaning of one and the same sentence. Secondly, the Indicative meaning must have a direct constant connection such as nearness, similarity etc. with the expressed meaning but the suggested meaning under the influence of context etc. may have an accidental connection or an indirect or remote connection ‘Saṃbadha sambandha’. Thirdly, in Indication primary meaning must be barred, but in suggestion this is not necessary. Fourthly, it has already been pointed out that in ‘Prayojana Laksna’ the function of suggestion is an essential factor in bringing about the cognition of Import. Fifthly, Denotation and Indication are closely connected, as both of them are dependent upon time and time in the case of Indication being ‘Mukhyārthabādha Tadayoga’ and either convention or purpose. So Indication as it were, the tail of denotation. But suggestive is not so. Sixthly, suggestion sometime follows Indication (so, one is different from other). Not that suggestive meaning always follows Indication (so, one is different from other). Not that suggestive meaning always follows Indicative meaning for
suggestion may be based upon Denotation as well. Not that
suggestion is dependent either on Indication or on Denota-
tion for it is found to be cognized even from letters and
syllables, which do not denote anything at all. Not that
suggestion is based upon sound alone, for it may proceed
from side long glances and other gestures. From all these
considerations it followed that suggestion as a process is
far different from the process of Expression Indication
and Import and hence cannot be rejected.

The Vedāntins (also grammarians Bharatṛhari) hold
that the meaning of the sentence, comprehended as it is
through a single indivisible cognition 'Akhanḍabudhini-
grāhya' is what is expressed and therefore what is expressive
is the whole sentence and not the words. According to them
the suggested sense is not beyond the range of what the
sentence denotes and as such the admission of a separate
vṛtti like suggestion is not necessary. In answer to this
it will suffice to say that in practical life 'Vyavahāra-
dāśā' even Vedāntists cannot do away with the consideration
of words and their meanings.

The Naiyāyikas and rhetoricians like Mahima Bhaṭṭa
deny the necessity of admitting suggestion and derive the
suggested sense from inference in the following way.

There is certainly some relation between the
suggested meaning and the expressed meaning, otherwise any-
thing and everything could be suggested from any word. So
what is involved in a case of suggestion is this —

a) There is a constant relationship or invariable concomitance between every suggestive meaning and the Expressed meaning which suggests it, the suggestive meaning being 'Vyāpaka' and the Expressed being 'Vyāpya' 'hetu', or in other words, the 'Hetu' is in what is already known to be 'Sādhyādihiakarṇa' that is to say that 'Hetu' is 'Sapakṣa Vṛtti'.

b) 'Hetu' (Vācyāṛtha) does not occur in anything which is not a receptacle of 'Sādhyā' (Suggestive meaning) or in other words, 'Hetu' is 'Niyata' or 'Sapakṣa Vṛtti'.

c) Expressed meaning is found in that which is to have the suggested meaning and therefore the 'Hetu' is 'Dharmaniśṭha' or 'Pakṣavṛtti'. So all the conditions of Inference viz. Sapakṣa, 'Vipakṣa Vṛttis' and 'Dharmaniśṭhatva' of 'Hetu' are fulfilled whenever a thing is said to be suggested. As an illustration, the verse 'Bhramaḥ dhārmika', etc. may be cited, which means as follows:-

"O virtuous man, you roam about here (at home) with confident heart; that dog has been to-day killed by that mighty lion, living in the lower on the bank of the Godāvari".

The advice to roam about in the house leads to the inference of the danger of roaming on the bank of the Godāvari by reason of the lion's presence there. The
roaming of a coward is always preceded by a certainty to the absence of all causes of fear. And hence the advice to roam about in the house. The knowledge of the lion's presence on the Godāvari serves as a cause of fear. From this is inferred the advice not to go to the lower on the bank of the Godāvari and this is suggested meaning.

So what is called the suggested meaning can be arrived at by the process of inference.

This view may be refuted thus “Even a coward (one afraid of dog) often goes to a place where there is a cause of fear for reasons such as orders of the preceptor or master, love for his beloved and so forth. Therefore the proposition 'the roaming of a coward is always preceded by a certainty as to the absence of causes of fear "Yad yad bhīrū bhramaṇam tattad Bhayakāraṇasya Nivṛttyuplabdhi pūrvakam" is not invariably true. Thus the 'Hetu' is Anaikāntika and again, a brave virtuous man might fear the dog for its impure touch but, being brave would not fear the lion. So 'the knowledge of the lion's presence on the Godāvari' can co-exist with the opposite of what we want to establish namely with the roaming there of a coward 'Bhirū'. Thus the 'Hetu' is Viruddha "Bhirū Bhramaṇa Sādhyābhāvena vyāptatvāt viruddham", and further the presence of the lion is not known from direct knowledge or inference but from the words (of a person of questionable character) and as such no reliance can be placed upon it.
So the Hetu (which is the lion's presence) is 'Asiddha'.
Thus the Hetu being Anaikāntika, Viruddha and Asiddha cannot establish anything.

Similarly, in the verse NiśeścyutacWandamam etc., the final meaning is that the messages friend 'Dūti' of the speaker went to the latter's lover for enjoyment, and this meaning is brought about by the fact of the removal of the sandal paint from her breasts and similar circumstances. Now if the fact of going to the man be an Inference, the Hetu must be removal of the sandal paint etc. caused by the dalliance with that man. This Hetu is Anaikāntika (not invariably concomitant with dalliance), for the reason that it may be caused by other circumstances also, such as bathing and as a matter of fact, it is so stated in the verse itself. The upholder of the suggestion theory can explain it as a cause of suggestion due to association with the word Adharma applied to the lover (which suggest is in fidelity). It cannot be argued that the epithet 'wretch' may also lead to Inference, for the simple reason that the fact of his being a wretch is not something already from the means of proof.

As to how a word etc. can in the absence of concomitance yield, by suggestion the intended meaning suggestive meaning, it may be replied that suggestion does not need actual committance and 'Pakṣadharma' but mere
possibility of these which is never absent in case of
Suggestion.

ULLĀSA VII

The lowest kind of poetry is of two kinds:
(i) Sabdacitra (ii) Arthacitra (called Vācyacitra also). In
Sabdacitra words and in Arthacitra meanings are intended
to produce charm. Words and meaning do not operate quite
independently of each other, but the prominence of the one
or the other determines the name of the Kāvyā. Thus when
word is more prominent than meaning, it is Śabdacitra and
when meaning is more prominent than word, then Kāvyā is
Arthacitra. In both these kinds of poetry there is not
clear suggestion of Rasa, though there are Vibhāva, Anubhāvas
and Vybhicaribhāvas. Hence they are almost devoid of
suggestiveness and this is what constitutes their
inferiority.

ULLĀSA VII - THE DEFECTS OF POETRY

A Doṣa is what detracts the principal meaning. By
principal meaning should be understood Rasa and Vācyā which
is an essential factor for the manifestation of Rasa. Words
(Sabda) letters (Varna) and Composition are really the
instruments by which Rasa is suggested and sense conveyed,
and thus Doṣas pertain to words, letters and arrangement as
well. Doṣas are mainly of four kinds (1) Sabda Doṣas (2)
Artha Doṣas (3) Vākyā Doṣas (4) Rasa Doṣas.
Sabda Dosas

A word is defective when it is

1. Srutikatu - Unpleasant to the ear.
2. Cuptasamkrti - Lacking in grammatical correctness.
3. Aprayukta - Unusual i.e. Though formally correct yet not sanctioned by usage.
4. Asamartha - Lacking the power to signify the intended meaning in the particular usage, though it has that power in other usages.
5. Nihitartha - Used in a sense which is not generally known.
6. Anucitārtha - Indicative of an improper sense.
7. Nirarthaka - Useless or redundant.
8. Avācaka - Not expressive of the meaning in which it is used.
9. Adīta - Indecorous of three kinds (a) Indecency (b) Disgust (c) Inauspiciousness.
10. Samdiḍgha - Ambiguous.
11. Apratīta - Not easily intelligible being used in a sense known only in a technical literature.
13. Nevārtha - Used in a secondary of figurative sense which is not admissible.
15. Avimrṣṭa Vidheyham - Of unemphasised predicate.
Vakya Dosas

Following are the 'Pada' defects occurring in sentence only.

1. **Pratikūlavarna** - Full of discordant letters.
2 & 3. **Upahṛtavisarga** and **Luptavisarga** - When by euophony the 'Visarga' is transformed into 'O' too frequently, as also when it is too frequently deleted.
4. **Visandhi** - Bad as regards euophonic combination. This defect may manifest itself in three ways (a) In the euphonic combination not being above (b) In the euophonic combination suggesting something indecorous (c) In the euophonic combination giving rise to harshness.
5. **Hatavṛtta** - Of bad metre. This is of three kinds, (a) When the metre in spite of conforming to all formal conditions becomes unpleasant to the ears i.e. unmelodious.
6. **Nyūnapada** - Deficient in words. This defect arises when an expressive word which is necessary to convey the intended sense, is wanting.
7. **Adhika** - Of redundant words. This defect arises when the words without which even the intended meaning can be arrived at, are used.
8. **Kathitapada** - Of needlessly repeated words. This
defect arises when the same word in a sentence is unnecessarily repeated.

9. **Patatprakarṣa** - Of diminishing excellence i.e. when the excellence with which a sentence was started is not mentioned to the end.

10. **Smāptapunarāṭta** - Resumed though concluded i.e. when a sentence, though logically complete, is enlarged by the addition of an adjective to the subject or predicates.

11. **Ardhāntaraikvacaka** - When a word required in the first half of a sentence is placed in the second half in which it has no subjectical connection.

12. **Abhavanmatayoga** - Devoid of connection i.e. in which the connection which two words in a sentence are intended to have, is not clearly brought out. This may be due to the use of different case endings where the same case ending should be used to the non use of requisite words, to the lack of 'Akāṅkṣā' etc.

13. **Anibhīhitavācyā** - In which occurs the omission of 'Dyotaka' words the use of which is absolutely necessary in the sentence.

14. **Asthānasthpada** - Of misplaced words (When words are misplaced, in a word they may convey an idea quite different from the intended one).

15. **Asthānasthasmāśa** - Of misplaced compound i.e.,
in which a long compound occurs where it should not be but does not occur where the suggestion of Rasa requires it.

16. **Samkirana** - Of confused words i.e. in where the words of one sentence are mixed up with those of another.

17. **Garbhita** - Of parenthetical expression i.e. in the middle of which occurs a sentence which is parenthetical in character.

18. **Prasiddhyastikranta** - Opposed to usage.

19. **Bhagnaprakrama** - Of broken uniformity in which occurs the breach of the uniformity of action. 'Prakrama' is to be maintained not only in regard to Sanjña and Dhatu (noun and verbal root) but also in regard to pronouns, synonymus, number and arrangement etc.

20. **Akrama** - Out of proper order i.e. in which words like 'ca' 'Itham' etc. are not placed where they should have been.

21. **Amataprārtha** - Of undesirable second meaning or suggestion in which a Rasa repugnant to one under delineation is suggested by the words used.

**Artha Doṣas**

A meaning is defective when it is -

1. **Apusta** - Not assisting or feeding the sense i.e. irrelevant.
2. **Kastā** - Obscure or very difficult to be understood.
3. **Vvahata** - Inconsistent.
4. **Punrukta** - Repeated.
5. **Duskrāma** - Of bad order, i.e. when the due order of narration is broken.
6. **Grāmya** - Vulgar i.e. when it implies a vulgar idea.
7. **Samidgṛha** - Ambiguous i.e. which cannot be definitely understood without a knowledge of the context etc.
8. **Nirhetu** - Inconsequential i.e. when the reason of an action though not well known is not stated.
9. **Prasiddhaviruddha** - Contrary to the current notions prevailing among ordinary people and poets.
10. **Vidyāviruddha** - Contrary to Vidyā means here the several sāstras such as Dhramaśāstra, Kāmaśāstra, Arthaśāstra etc.
11. **Anavikṛta** - Monotonous i.e. wearisome on account of the lack of diversity in narration caused by the frequent repetition of an expression.
12. **Saniyamasparivṛttta** - Too unrestricted i.e. when owing to the omission of an expression there is lack of restriction of meaning, although such a restriction is necessary.
13. **Anivamasparivṛttta** - Unnecessarily restricted i.e. when the meaning though required to be unrestricted is restricted by the use of an additional word.
14. **Vīsesaparīvṛttta** - Devoid of necessary particularization.

15. **Avisesaparīvṛttta** - Endowed with an unnecessary particularization.

16. **Sākāṅka** - Of unsatisfied expectancy i.e. incomplete, a word necessary to make the sense being absent.

17. **Apadayukta** - Inserted in a wrong place. This defect is caused when the insertion of a sentence gives rise to a sense quite different from the intended or to be conveyed.

18. **Sahacarabhinna** - Mismatched i.e. of different nature from the meanings with which it is associated.

19. **Prakāśitaviruddha** - Of repugnant implication i.e. when the implied meaning produced by the insertion of a sentence is contrary to the meaning to be expressed.

20. **Vidhyāyukta** - Of improper predication i.e. when the predicate is improperly stated. This defect may manifest itself in two ways (a) When what is not predicate (Vidheya) is stated as such (b) When several predicates are stated in an improper order.

21. **Anuvādāyukta** - Of improper translation. This defect is caused when something stated as an adjunct of the 'Anuvādyā' (subject) becomes incongruous to 'Vidheya' (Predicate).

22. **Tyaktapunahsvikṛta** - Taken up again though
abandoned as complete. When a sentence is complete and the relation subsisting between a noun and a verb is clearly brought out, the introduction of another word clause to be connected in the same or some other relation with the verb constitutes this defect.

23. Asliila - Indecorous - When the implied meaning brings, in some indecorous idea.

'Artha Dośa', 'Punruktatā' and 'Apustaśrthta' will cease to be a defect in expressions like the following when used with a special purpose; 'Karnaśatansana', 'Sravanaṅkūṇḍala', 'Dhanurjyā', 'Muktāhāra', 'Puspamala' etc.

It is to be noted that modern writers should not invent expressions on the analogy of the instances cited. The use of the expressions like 'Karnaśatansana' etc. has been justified on the ground that they are found in the words of standard authors. The expression 'Jaghnakāṇci' is not found in my standard work and as such it is a faulty expression.

Criticism of the view of Vāmana as to when 'Apustaśrthata' may further be ignored.

'Jagāda Madhurām Vacam Visadākṣra Śālinīm' (He uttered a speech full of sweet and clear words). Here the use of word Vacam (speech) is superfluous because 'Jagāda' denotes the uttering of speech. Thus there is the defect of 'Apustārthta' in this sentence. Vāmana has sought to justify such uses by saying
that though a word is superfluous or irrelevant *Apuṣṭa*
being implied by another word in the sentence, its distinct
may be allowed when it is intended to be under discussion
though the sense of the noun 'Vācām' may be obtained from
the word 'Jagāda', yet the noun 'Vācām' has been mentioned
and therefore there is no *Apuṣṭārtha* here. This conten-
tion is wrong because the purpose of adding these epithets
may better be served by the use of adverbs. The sentence
may easily take the form '*Jagāda Madhuṇām Vidvān Madhurākṣara*
Sāli ca' without sacrificing any part of the intended meaning.
Vāmana's view holds good, however, when the purpose served by
the epithet qualifying the noun cannot be served by any
adverbial expression. *'Charṇatraparitṛṇarāhitaḥbhyaḥmapi,
padābhyaḥ Vrajaṁeṣa na khidyate'*. Here the word *'Padābhyaḥ'*
is undoubtedly superfluous, but its use is necessary on the
ground that no adverbial expression could express the sense
conveyed by the qualifying epithet. Nirhetu or inconsequen-
tiality (which is an Arthadosa) ceases to be a defect when
what is stated does not require an explanation, it being a
well known fact.

Instances where some Pada Dosas also cease to be Dosas

When a writer reproduces the speech of another he
should reproduce it as it is and as such his writing will not
be defective by any defects occurring in the reproduced speech.
Hence the general rule *'Anukarṇe tu Sarveṣām'*. 

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By virtue of the peculiarities belonging to the speaker, the person spoken to, the meaning suggested, the object of description (Vācyā), the context etc., a defect sometimes becomes an excellence and sometimes it is neither a defect nor an excellence. Thus when the speaker or the person spoken to is a grammarian, or when the Rasa suggested is Raudra when awe inspiring things are described, when a person speaks on being engaged the defect of harshness of words becomes an excellence. Kaṣṭatva is neither a Guṇa nor a Doṣa in a Kāvya where there is no sentiment depicted.

Aprayuktatva and Nihitārthatva are not Doṣas occurring in the figures 'Ślesa' and 'Yamaka'.

'Vṛddāśilālatva' Indecorousness implying indecency is a Guṇa in conversations leading to sexual dalliance.

Indecorousness implying disgust 'Jugupāśilālatva' is a Guṇa in discourses about quietistic sentiment.

'Amaṅglāśilālatva' is a Guṇa when it prognosticates a future event, in favour of the hero.

'Samādīghatva' is a Guṇa when in spite of apparent ambiguity, it tends to a definite meaning through the greatness of the thing under description and leads up to the figure 'Vyājastuti'.

'Apratitva' is a Guṇa when both the speaker and the person spoken to are conversant with the technicalities used.
'Apratitva' is also a Guṇa in soliloquy (Svagata Bhāṣaṇa) Grāmyatva is a Guṇa in the speeches of lower class people. 'Nyūnapadtvā' is a Guṇa when it serves to intensify the feelings depicted such as of joy, confusion sorrow etc. In some cases it is neither a Guṇa nor Doṣa.

'Adhikapadtvā' is a Guṇa when it serves the purpose of singling out or particularising something or when the speaker is overpowered with joy sorrow etc.

'Kathitapadtvā' Repetition of the same word or words serves to produce 'Lātānuprāsa' is a cause of suggestion in 'Arthāntarasamākramitavācyalakṣṇā' and is necessary when what has been spoken of, requires to be referred to in the same form.

'Ptatprakraṣatvā' is in some cases a Guṇa.

'Smāptapurnāttatvā' is neither a Guṇa nor a Doṣa in certain instances. 'Apadasthamāsatvā' is a Guṇa in certain cases.

'Garbhitatvā' is a Guṇa when the sentence inserted is for the purpose of emphasis etc.

**Rasa Doṣas**

1. Svasābdavācyata i.e. when any Rasa or any or any Sthāyibhāva is mentioned by its own name whether generic or specific.

   Thus the description of a Rasa by the generic word or any of its specific names which go by the generic name of
Vybhicāribhāva, of a, Śtāyibhāva by the word Śtāyibhāva itself or by the name of particular Śtāyibhāva would cause Rasa Doṣas.

2. Kaśṭakalprāvyakti i.e. when a Vibhāva or an Anubhāva is comprehended with difficulty.

3. Pratikulavibhāvādigraha i.e. when a Vibhāva and Anūbhāva or a Vybhicāri is adverse to the Rasa under delineation.

4. Punahpunradīpti - Repeated heightening i.e. when repeated attempts are made to further develop a Rasa, though it is already developed and realized.

5. Akāndaprathana - Untimely delineation.


7. Aḥgātivistṛti - Excessive delineation of a subordinate factor.

8. Aṅgyānanusāmbhāna - Ignoring the principal factor - the hero or the heroine.


10. Aṅgābhidhāna - Praising or attaching value of smelling not helpful to the suggestion of the Rasa under delineation.

The description of a lover getting angry at being struck by the feet of his beloved and so forth will also constitute a Rasa Doṣa. In short as the Dhvanikāra has

Pradīpa, p. 366.
said, propriety is the only thing to be looked after and anything improper will mar the suggestion of Rasa.

In certain cases the mention by name of Vybhicāri does not constitute a defect.

Admission of an adverse Vibhāva, Anubhāva or Vybhicāri is rather conducive to excellence when being represented as counteracted, it serves to heighten the principal Rasa.

When two Rasas become repugnant to each other if described in the same substratum, they should be described to exist in the different substrata. Vīra and Bhyaṅaka are repugnant to each other when found in the same person. So when the Rasa in hero is Vīra, Bhyaṅaka may be depicted subsisting in his opponent. When two Rasas become repugnant to each other on account of the one closely following the other, a third should be introduced between the two.²

Two incompatible Rasas do not mar each other also when (a) One is merely remembered (to develop the other) (b) When both of them are intended to be in equal importance (c) When both of them become subservient to the third Rasa.³

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¹Dhvanyāloka, p. 254.
²Pradīpa, p. 376.
³Sampradāya-prakāśinī, p. 160.
It should be noted that one Rasa cannot be incompatible with another neither can the relation of principal and subordinate subsist between any two Rasas so in the present context i.e. whenever the incompatibility of two Rasas has been spoken of, Rasa has been used to signify Sthāyibhāva. 1

ULLĀSA VIII - GUṆAS

Mammatā first of all gives the definition of GuṆas and Alamkāras.

GuṆas

GuṆas according to him have inseparable concomittance with Rasa and are conducive to its maturity. These belong to Rasa, the principal factor in poetry.

Alamkāras

Alamkāras are those qualities which sometimes adorn the existing Rasa, like the ornaments of a body. They may not enhance the charm of the poetry even with their presence. The theories of Bhaṭṭodbhāṭṭa and Vāmana about GuṆas and Alamkāras have been refuted. The first theory which says that the difference between such Excellences as bravery etc. and ornaments as Necklace etc. may be that while the former subsists by inherence the latter is present only by conjunction; is not correct. The reason is that in case

1Prādīpa, p. 381. Sampṛdāyaprakāśini, p. 164.
of Rasa and its delineation both, Excellences like Florridity (Oja) etc. and the Alamkāras like Simile etc. subsist by inherence only. Consequently any distinction between the two must be regarded as merely based upon blind tradition.

The second theory of Vāmana which propounds that while Excellences serve to produce charm in poetry, Alamkāras serve to heighten the charm already produced; is also not right. The reasons are that the charm of the poetry may not be enhanced by the presence of Alamkāras and that even without Excellences a verse can be termed as a piece of poetry.

**Number of Excellences of Gūnas**

These are only three according to Mamnata (1)

1. **Sweetness (Madhurya)**
2. **Florridity (Oja)**
3. **Lucidity (Prasāda)**

1. Madhurya or Sweetness is a source of delectability, it is what leads to mollification in the case of Erotic Passion (Śṛngāra Rasa). It is present in excessive degree in the case of the Pathetic, the Privative Erotic and the Quietistic (Karuna, Viyoga Śṛngāra and Sañta).

2. Florridity (Oja) is the source of lustrous expanding of the heart, it resides in the Heroic Passion (Vīra Rasa). It is present in an excessive degree in the Disgustful and Furious passions in order.

3. Lucidity (Prasāda) prevades the mind like
fire among dry fuel or like a clean stream of water and it is present everywhere.

These excellences though really belong to the soul of the poetry, yet figuratively they are held to subsist in words and their meanings.

Some of the ten Guṇas enumerated by others can be included in these three Guṇas while others in certain cases have the character of Defects; so these are only three.

Sīlā, Śmādhī, Udāratā and Prasāda, Guṇas of Vāmana are included in Florridity (Oja) of Mammaṭa.

Mādhurya has been admitted by Mammaṭa also.

Samatā is in some cases a defect while Saukumārya and Kānti are negations of the defects, 'Vulgarity' and 'Harshness' respectively. Arthavyakti is included in Lucidity (Prasāda).

Of the ten Arthaguṇas 'Prauḍhi' is merely a flourish of style and not Excellences. Prasāda is the negation of the defect of 'Redundancy'. Mādhurya is the negation of the defect of 'monotony'. Saukumārya' is the negation of the defect of 'Indecorous Inauspiciousness'. Udāratā is the negation of the defect of 'Vulgarity'. Arthavyakti is included in the Figure of 'Śvabhāvokti'. Kānti is included under the 'Suggestion of Passion'. Śleṣa is only a flourish of the poetic fancy. Samatā is negation of a defect and not
a positive Excellence. Samādhi is also not Excellence.

The three Excellences are suggested by Letters, compounds and diction.

Suggestive of Sweetness (Madhurya) are (1) The 'Sparsa' consonants, with the exception of those of the 'ta'-group combined with the last consonant of their group (2) The consonants 'r', 'n' when short (3) Expressions free from compounds (4) Compounds of medium length (5) Harmonious diction.

Suggestive of Florridity (Oja) are (1) The combination (a) of the first and the third consonants of a group with the consonant following them (b) of any consonant with 'r' and (c) of any two similar consonants (2) The consonants beginning with 'ṭ' (3) The consonants 'ś' and 'ṣ' (4) Long compounds (5) Bombastic diction.

Lucidity (Prasāda) has been held to be that Excellence, common to all by virtue of which the comprehension of the meanings of words follows on the mere hearing of it.

The diction, the compounds and the letters are sometimes altered in accordance with the nature of (1) The speaker (2) The subject (3) The form of the composition.
ULLĀSA IX - ĖABAĐĀLĀKĀRAS

In Ullāsa IX Mammaṭa has described six sābdālām-kārās namely (1) Vakrokti or Equivoque (2) Alliteration or Anuprāsa (3) ‘Yamaka’ or ‘Chime’ (4) Śleṣa or Pun (5) Citrā-laṃkāra or Figure Pictorial (6) Punaruktvadabhāsa or Semblance of Repetition. Vṛttis namely Upanāgariṇa, Paruṣā and Komalā have also been discussed in this very Ullāsa.

1. Vakrokti or Equivoque - When what is said by one person in one sense is construed by another person in a different sense—either through Punning (Śleṣa) or through intonation (Kāku) it is vakrokti or Equivoque. It is of two kinds (1) Based on Punning (Śleṣa) (2) Based on Intonation (Kāku).

2. Alliteration or Anuprāsa - It consists in the similarity of the letters. It is firstly of two kinds (1) Chhekanuprāsa (2) Vṛttyanuprāsa.
   (a) Chhekanuprāsa is there when there is a single repetition of several consonants.
   (b) Vṛttyanuprāsa is there when there are several repetitions of one or more consonants.

Diction or Vṛtti is of three kinds —
   (a) Upanāgariṇa is that which is characterized by consonants suggestive of Sweetness (Mādhurya).
   (b) Paruṣā is that which is characterized by consonants suggestive of Florridity (Oja).
(c) Komalā is characterized by the consonants other than the two kinds mentioned above.

Vāmanā etc. have called these very Vṛttis as Vaidarbhi etc. These two varieties are called 'Varnānuprāsa'.

There is another variety of Anuprāsa which is known 'Sabdānuprāsa'. In this variety, the words repeated are the same and their meaning is also same but their 'Tātparya' is different. This 'Anuprāsa' or 'Alliteration' is called 'Lātanuprāsa' because of its being popular amongst the people of Lāta country.

Sabdas are either Padas or 'Nāmans' (Simple basic substantives). In the alliteration of Padas either there is a repetition of several words or of a single word. In the alliteration of 'Nāmans' the repetition can be of three kinds, (1) In the same compound (2) In different compounds (3) Once in a compound and once in a non-compound.

3. Yamaka or Chime - The repetition of a group of letters in the same order with a different meaning - where there is meaning constitutes 'Yamaka' or Chime.

It becomes manifold as occurring in the several feet of a verse or in several parts thereof.

4. Ślesa or Pun - When words that are different on account of the difference in their meaning becomes coalesced (identified) through the sameness of pronunciation, it constitutes Ślesa or Pun.
It is of two kinds (1) Sabhaṅga (2) Abhaṅga.

In Sabhaṅga Slesa there is coalescence of words having different forms and thus necessitating breaking up for an understanding of their meanings. It is of eight kinds—
(a) Of Varṇas (Letters) (b) Padas (Words) (c) Liṅga (Gender)
(d) Vacana (Number) (e) Bhāṣā (Dialects) (f) Prakṛti (Crude forms) (g) Pratyaya (Suffix) (h) Vibhakti (Declensional terminations).

In Abhaṅgaślesa two meanings are understood without the expression being split up in different ways.

After this follows the discussion, whether Śleṣa should be termed as Sabdālaṃkāra or Arthālaṃkāra? After refuting various arguments of Udbhata given in favour of his assertion that Śleṣa is Arthālaṃkāra, Mammaṭa declares that it is Sabdālaṃkāra.

5. Citrālaṃkāra or Figure Pictorial — Where the letters assume the form of such objects as the sword and Padma etc, it is Citrālaṃkāra Mammaṭa describes four of its varieties (1) Khadaga (2) Muraja (3) Padma (4) Sarvatobhadra.

6. Punrūktavadabhāsa or Samblance of Repetition — When one and the same meaning appears to be expressed by words in diverse forms the figure is 'Punrūktavadabhāsa'.

It subsists in words as well as in meanings. The figure is said to subsist in words when the words cannot be
replaced by their synonyms and in meanings where such replacement is possible without spoiling the effect.

**ULLĀSA X - ARTHĀLAṆKĀRAS**

Mammaṭa has described the ideal figures of speech based on meaning in the tenth chapter.

1. The first is Upamā or Simile. Mammaṭa has divided first of all Upamā or Simile into two parts i.e. Pūrṇa and Luptā or Complete and Elliptical. He has further divided these two varieties into 25 varieties. The complete simile is described as of six kinds and the Elliptical, of nineteen kinds. The complete simile is when all the factors are mentioned i.e. (1) Object compared to (2) The subject compared to (3) The common property (4) The terms signifying similitude.

   The complete simile is (a) Directly expressed (b) Implied and it appears (1) in sentence (2) in a compound (3) in a nominal affix.

   Elliptical simile is there when one of the four factors which are mentioned as essential for the complete simile is missing. The Elliptical simile is divided first of all into seven kinds. Three kinds when the object compared to the common property and the term signifying is missing. In this case only the subject is visible. Of three kinds when two properties are missing and of one kind when there
is only the object compared. These seven kinds are further divided into 12 kinds.

All the nineteen kinds can be enumerated as under:-

1. The Elliptical simile, omitting the common property and directly expressed, in a sentence.

2. The Elliptical simile omitting the common property, implied.

3, 4, 5. The Elliptical simile, omitting the common property (a) directly expressed in a compound (b) implied in a compound (c) implied in a nominal affix.

6, 7. On the omission of the object compared to the simile occurs in a sentence and in a compounds.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. On the omission of Vā and such other terms (expressing similitude) it occurs (8) in a compound (9) In the affix 'Kyaca' as denoting the objective. (10) In the same affix as denoting location (11) In the affix 'Kyāna' (12) In the affix named used with a substantive used accusatively (13) In the same affix used with a substantive used nominatively.

II. The second figure of speech described by Mammaṭa is 'Ananvaya' 'Comparison Absolute'. When one and the same thing appears in a single sentence as both the object compared and the object compared to it is 'Comparison Absolute'.
III. Upameyopama - Reciprocal Comparison. When there is alteration of the object compared and the objects compared to then the figure of speech is called Upameyopama.

IV. Utpreksā - Poetic Fancy.

V. Sasandeha - Doubtful - may be of two kinds i.e. when the certainty is left concealed and when the cognition leads on to certainty. The second kind of it has been omitted by Rudraṭa.

VI. Rūpaka or Metaphor - Where there is non-difference between the object compared to and the object compared it is Metaphor. It is of three kinds (1) Metaphor Universal (2) Partial Metaphor (3) Consequential metaphor.

Universal again is of two kinds Equipped with all constituents (2) Applicable only on one part.

Partial Metaphor may also be of two kinds (1) Pure (2) The string or Mālārūpaka.

Consequential Metaphor is also of two kinds (1)Where the expressive word is either coalescent in Pure (2) Distinct.

VII. Concealment - Aphnuti - When the object to be described is, negativated and another is affirmed, it is 'Aphunti' concealment. Some of the commentators¹ regard it as of two kinds namely based on word and based on meaning. But Mammaṭa seems to be silent about it.

¹Sāhitya-Cuḍāmaṇi, p. 289.
VIII. Ślesa - Paranomasia - When in a single sentence there are several meanings, the figure is Ślesa or Paranomasia. In Chapter IX Māmata has described it that it can be both based on word as well as on meaning or Śabdaślesa and Arthaślesa.

IX. Samāsokti - Modal Metaphor - Where the other object is implied by means of paranomastic differentiating adjuncts, it is Modal Metaphor.

X. Nidarsanā or Illustration - Where an impossible relation of things constitutes the similitude it is illustration.

This figure appears in the form of String (Māla).

There is another kind of illustration, where the action itself indicates the casual relation between itself and its cause.

XI. Aprastutaprasansa - Indirect Description where the description of an irrelevant thing points to the object meant to be described, it is Indirect Description.

It is of five kinds - where what is meant to be described is (a) the effect (b) the cause (c) Universal (d) Particular - What is actually spoken of is their converse (correlative) (e) When what is meant to be described is one thing, and what is spoken of is something else of the same class.

Of the fifth class there are again three varieties...
(1) By a Pun (2) By Modal Metaphor (3) By mere similarity.

XII. Atisyokti - Hyperbole - The figure is there
(1) When the object to be described is indicated as swallowed by the other (b) When the object to be described is represented as another (c) When there is an assumption introduced by some term meaning (d) When there is reversal of the normal order of sequence between a cause and its effect.

XIII. Prativastupama - Typical comparison is that where a single common property stands twice, in two sentences. It may also be stringed typical comparison.

XIV. Drstanta - Exemplification is the reflectional representation of common property the object compared and the object compared to. This can be of two kinds i.e. (1) Per similarity (2) Per dissimilarity.

XV. Dipaka - Illuminator (a) When the (common) property belonging to several objects - that to be described - occurs once (When a single substantive occurs in connection with several verbs it is the Illuminator.

XVI. Tulyayogita - Equal Pairing the single mention of a property as belonging to a number of things of the same kind constitutes equal pairing.

XVII. Vyatireka - Dissimilitude - Superiority - The dissimilitude of the object compared and the object compared to constitutes the figure of the same name.
It is of 24 kinds: (1) When the ground of dissimilitude is mentioned (2-4) the three cases where the said ground is not mentioned - each of these four kinds has the similitude either expressed by word or by meaning, or implied and each of these 12 again occurs in a paronomastic word also.

Just as we have stringed Typical comparison so it is possible to have the stringed Dissimilitude; of which also we may deduce the number of varieties. In the absence of any such terms as 'iva' 'tulya' and the like, the comparison is found to be implied by the epithets with double meanings.

In this manner, other varieties are also possible, even in the absence of any separate mention of words capable of being used with double meanings.

XVIII. Ākṣepa - 'Hint' - When something desired to be said is, as if, suppressed, for the purpose of conveying a special idea - it is Hint; and it is of two kinds, as having its subject, either (a) About to be mentioned (b) Already mentioned.

XIX. Vibhāvanā - Peculiar casuatio - consists in the mention of the effect, even though there is denial of the cause.

XX. Visesokti - Peculiar Allegation consists in the omission to affirm the effects, even when its causes are present in full force.

It is of three kinds (a) Having the reason of the
non-appearance of the effect not mentioned (b) Having the reason mentioned (c) Having the reason such as is inconceivable.

XXI. Yathāsākhya - Symmetrical - It consists in the orderly connection among things mentioned in a definite order.

XXII. Arthāntaranyāsa - Transition - Where either a Universal or a Particular is supported by its converse - either through similitude or otherwise; it is transition. Hence it can be said of four kinds (1) Where a universal statement is supported by a particular case, through similarity (2) Where a particular statement is supported, through similarity, by a Universal one (3) Where a Universal case is supported by a particular one through dissimilarity (4) Where a particular is supported by the Universal, through dissimilarity.

XXIII. Virodha - Contradiction - When something is spoken of as contradictory, even when there is no contradiction - the figure is contradiction. It is of ten kinds -

1. Community contradicted by Community.
2. Community contradicted by quality.
3. Community contradicted by Action.
4. Community contradicted by Substance.
5. Quality contradicted by Quality.
7. Quality contradicted by Substance.
10. Substance contradicted by Substance.

XXIV. Svābhāvokti - Natural Description - When the Action and the form as subsisting in the things themselves is described - it is Natural Description.

XXV. Vyājastuti - Dissembling Eulogy - When, what on the face of it, is praise or disparagement turns out to be otherwise - it is Dissembling Eulogy, it may be of two kinds (1) Disparagement turned into praise (2) Praise turned into disparagement.

XXVI. Sadokti - Connected description.

XXVII. Vinokti - Privatine Description that is a privative description in which one thing, without the other is, either (a) Not beautiful (b) The contrary.

XXVIII. Parivṛtti - Exchange.

XXIX. Bhāvika - Visualisation - When past and future things are delineated as if they were before the eyes.

XXX. Kāvyaliṅga - Poetical Reason - When a reason is expressed either (a) By a sentence (b) By a word, it is Poetical Reason. It may be of three kinds (1) Expressed by a sentence (2) Expressed by a word (3) Expressed by several words.

XXXI. Paryāyokta - Periphrasis.
XXXII. Udāṭta - Exalted (a) In the Exaltation of the thing (b) It consists also in the representation of great beings as adjuncts.

XXXIII. Saṃuccaya - Concatention - When one cause conducive to the effect to be described is already present, other causes are also mentioned.

The second variety is there when the compound 'Gunakriyah' is explained as meaning (1) Two qualities (2) Two actions (3) Quality and Actions.

XXXIV. Prāyāya - Sequence - When one thing (1) Consists (2) Is made to appear in several things, it is sequence.

When several things successively (1) Subsist (2) Are made to appear in one thing, it is another kind of sequence.

XXXV. Anumāna - Inference - It is the description of the Proleas and the Probandum that constitutes Inference.

XXXVI. Parikara - Insinuation is description with significant epithets.

XXXVII. Vyaṅgokti - Artful Assertion consists in concealing, by some artifice, the unhidden character of a thing.

XXXVIII. Parisamkhyā - Exclusion - Where something, either (a) Asked or (b) Unasked, on being mentioned, serves to exclude other things similar thereto, it is said to Exclusion. Thus it can be of four kinds.
1. Preceded by question - the Excluded Implied.
2. Preceded by question - the Excluded expressed.
3. Not preceded by question - the Excluded implied.

XXXIX. Kāraṇamāla - The string of Causes - Where each preceding one appears as the cause of each succeeding one - it is string of causes.

XL. Anyonya - Reciprocal - When two things are productive of each other, through an action.

XLI. Uttara - Answer may be of two kinds -
(a) When from the hearing of only the answer, the presumption of the question is made (b) When the question being there, an unconceivable answer is given, and this more than once - it is - Answer of two kinds.

XLII. Śūkṣma - Subtle - Where a subtle fact somehow noticed, is expressed to another person, by means of some property - it is the subtle.

XLIII. Śāra - Climax is the successive rising in the excellence of the things to the highest pitch.

XLIV. Asaṅgati - Disconnection - When there is representation of two properties, which appear to each other the relation of cause and effect, as subsisting at the same time, in totally different places - it is Disconnection.

XLV. Smādhi - Convenience - When, through the
help of other causes, the fulfilment of an effect is described as becoming easier.

XLVI. Sama - Compatible - When the connection between two things is considered to be right and proper, it is the compatible. It may be of two kinds (1) Compatible when the connection is between two good things (2) When the connection is between two bad things.

XLVII. Viṣama - Incongruous - is of four kinds when (a) Between two things no compatibility can come about, by reason of extreme dissimilitude (b) Where the agent does not obtain the fruit of his action, but comes by an adverse effect (c, d) Where the quality and action of the cause are incompatible respectively, with the quality and action of the effect - the figure is called Incongruous because it is the reverse of congruity.

XLVIII. Adhika - The Exceeding - is of two kinds (a) When the container is described as larger than the contained (b) When the contained is represented as larger than the container.

In both these varieties the larger described thing is in fact smaller.

XLIX. Pratyanika - Hostile - It is the hostile, when a person, unable to injure his enemy, is described as offering an insult to a relative of that enemy - such description tending to eulogise this latter.
L. Milita - The Obsecure may be of two kinds,
(a) The obsecuring being done through an innate characteristic
(b) When the obsecuring is done through adventitious characteristics.

LI. Ekāvalī - Necklace - Where among a number of things the succeeding thing is other (a) Affirmed (b) Denied, as qualifying the preceding things. It is the Necklace which is of above two kinds.

LII. Smarāṇa - Reminiscence - When on the perception of a thing similar to it, there is, remembrance of an object as previously perceived, it is Reminiscence.

LIII. Bhrāntimān - Illusion - Where there is cognition of another thing, at the sight of thing similar to it - it is Illusion.

LIV. Pratīpa - The Converse (a) Where there is discarding of the object compared to or (b) Where that object itself is treated, with a view to its being condemned, as the object compared it is the converse of two kinds.

LV. Śaṁānya - Indentification - Where with a view to delineate the presence of common properties, the object described is represented as identical with another, through its connection with this latter, it is called to Identification.

LVI. Vīṣeṣa - Extra-ordinary - When the contained
is represented as existing without its recognised container, (b) The thing is represented as subsisting in the same form, and the same time in several things (c) Where while a person is engaged in the doing of one thing, he is described as accomplishing in the same manner a different thing, which (In reality) is not capable of being accomplished (by that same effort) - It constitutes what has been described as the figure Extraordinary with its three varieties.

LVII. Tadguna - Quality borrowing - When a thing through contact with another possessed of extremely brilliant qualities, renounces its own quality and takes up the qualities of that other thing, it is quality-borrowing.

LVIII. Atadguna - Non-borrowing of qualities - If, however, there is no absorbing by the one from the other, it is the non-borrowing of qualities.

LIX. Vyāghata - Frustration - When onething, which has been accomplished, in one way, by one person, is turned otherwise in that same way, by another, that is called - Frustration.

LX. Samsṛṭi - Collocation of Figures - When these figures are present, distinctly from one another, it is collocation. It may be of three kinds. It may be that the figure may be either (a) In the word or (b) In the meaning or (c) In both - these are three kinds of Samsṛṭi.

LXI. Sānkara - Commixture (a) When there is a
relation of subserviency among the said figures of speech, which are incapable of independent existence by themselves, then it is commixture(b) When there is no reason in support of nor any objection against, the recognition of anyone (to the exclusion of the likely figures) there is uncertainty which forms the second kind of commixture (c) Also, when in a single word, both the Ideal and Verbal figures of speech are clearly manifest.