Mamāṭa’s dealing of Dhvani can be classified mainly into following:

**A.**
1. Suggestive poetry based on Indication, where the Direct meaning is transferred to another "Arthan-tarasāmkramita".
2. Where the Direct meaning is altogether denied, "Atyantatiraskṛta".

**B.**
Suggestion based on Denotation ‘Vivakṣitānyaparavācyā’. The two kinds of ‘Vivakṣitānyaparavācyā’ are:
1. That in which the order of the sequence is not perceptible, ‘Asamlaksyakramavāgya’.
2. Suggestive poetry of perceptible order of sequence, ‘Samlaksyakramavāgya’. This again is three-fold:
   a) That in which the suggested meaning arises from the force of word, ‘Sabdaśaktyudbhava’.
   b) That in which the same arises from the force of meaning or sense, ‘Arthaśaktyudbhava’.
   c) That in which the same arises from the force of both—word and sense, ‘Ubhayaśaktyudbhava’.

Of these varieties again the first ‘Sabdaśaktyudbhava’ is of two kinds—
1. Where a figure is suggested.
2. Where matter is suggested.
The second division of *Samlaksyakramavyangya* is *Arthasaktyudbhava*. It is primarily of three kinds -

1. When the suggestive sense is self existent.
2. When it exists by the bold assertion of the poet *Kavipraudhoktimatrasiddha*.
3. When it exists by the bold assertion of some character delineated by the poet *Kavinibaddhapraudhoktimatrasiddha*.

Each of these suggestive factors is either a figure of speech 'Alamkāra' or a bare fact 'Vastu'. Thus *Arthasaktyudbhava* comes to be of six kinds. Each of these may suggest a figure or a fact. Thus there are twelve varieties of *Arthasaktyudbhava*.

The third division of *Samlaksyakramavyangya* is *Sabdārthobhayasaktyodbhava* i.e. that in which the suggested meaning arises from the force of both word and meaning. It has no sub-division and is only one.

Of these again *Ubbhayāsakti* is present only in a sentence.

Each of other seventeen varieties is found both in a sentence and a word. Each of the twelve varieties of *Arthasakti* is found also in a 'Prabandha' or composition.

*Asamlaksyakramavyangya* may be said to be of four kinds:

1. By parts of words *Padaikadesa*.
2. By style ′Racana′.
3. By individual letters ′Varnas′.
4. By a composition.

After totalling all these varieties the number comes to 51. Each of these simple varieties have their own 51 varieties so the number comes to 51 x 51 = 2601. Each of these varieties have again 3 kinds of Šamkara or commixture and one kind of Šamsṛṣṭi (Uniform conjunction). The total number hence is 2601 x 4 = 10404 and adding 51 simple varieties the final total comes to 10455.

Dhvani and its Subdivisions

The earliest commentator Mānikyacandra has tried to explain the various divisions and subdivisions of Dhvani as they are. Before defining the suggestion where the order of the sequence is imperceptible the almost completes his work in a formality. However, he has defined these varieties of Dhvani in his own way. These are clearer definitions than the original one. Suggestion with imperceptible order of sequence is defined where there is not even smell of Indication. A sub-variety of this very variety ′Šabdasaktyudbhava′ according to him is where the suggestiveness of the meaning is a auxilliary and that of word primary. He also supports the theory of Mammaṭa that there are three main varieties of suggestion namely; two of ′Vācyta-saha′ namely ′Vicitra′ (beautiful) or Alamkāra and ′Avicitra′ (non-ornamental) or
The third variety is Vactāsaha i.e. Rasa, Bhāva, Rasābhāsa etc. Manikyacandra has categorically stated that Rasa is by no means capable of being expressed or 'Vactāsaha', 'Rasādī kadāpi vācytaṁ na sahata'. He declares that it can only be expressed through suggestion and not at all by any other process. He further supports Mammaṭa's view that Indication is not possible without suggestive meaning and that Rasa is not capable of being presented by Indication 'Lakṣṇa', because even the fact is not indicated by it; hence how can Rasa be? Following Mammaṭa he feels that even according to the view of 'Antitā-bhidhānavādins', the general meaning of the sentence cannot be directly expressed, hence suggested meaning's direct expression cannot be thought of even. This is also true in the case of 'Abhīhitānyavādins'. In both these cases the meaning other than the expressed is the meaning of the sentence.

Śrīdhara in his Kāvyā Pr. Vīvesa has mostly quoted Rucaka's Samketa to support his view. Sometimes he is even giving only the explanation of the aforesaid commentator, and does not take pain to explain himself. When controlled by context, speaker etc. a meaning other than the expressed

\[1\] Samketa, p. 105.
\[2\] Ibid., p. 106.
\[3\] Ibid.
\[4\] Ibid., p. 109.
arising from the force of word cognized; which is purposive; then there it is suggestion based on Denotation.\(^1\) This is a variety of suggestion in which order of sequence is perceptible. In its other variety the suggested meaning arises out of the force of meaning or sense, and in third variety the suggested meaning arises out of the force of both words and meanings. The meaning given by the figures of speech is a connected meaning while in the meaning arising out of fact may not be so.\(^2\) The example of suggestion arising out of figure of speech, the suggestion arises not only from the power of word but from both, but as both 'Śabdaśaktimūla' and 'Arthaśaktimūla' can be there in it so it can be rightly called the example of Śabdaśaktimūla. In the example of suggested sense arising out of fact, the Expressed meaning is debarred and the suggested being there, there relation as 'Upmana' and 'Upameya' does not arise.\(^3\) Anywhere, where there is omission of Upama and the relationship arises out of something else there it is 'Śabdaśaktimulavastudhvani'.\(^4\) The Dhvani which subsists in the suggestive is of six kinds, each again having two varieties of figure and fact the number swells to twelve. Where the suggestive is instrumental cause

\(^{1}\)Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 98. 'Tatra dvitiyabhidhā-śaktimūlam'.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 100.

\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 103. 'Atra vācyā bodhaneva vyaṅgyasya sthitatvātayornopamanopameyabhāvah'.

\(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 103.
in suggesting meaning, there the varieties like 'Svatah-sambhāvī' etc arise and not from the suggested meaning itself. In a suggestive poetry where both word and meaning are equally prominent the variety named is 'Udbhayaśaktimūla'. Twelve varieties arising out of the power of meaning, two varieties where direct meaning is transferred to another and where the direct meaning is altogether denied, one where the order of the sequence is imperceptible, two varieties of suggestion arising out of the power of word, one from both word and meaning make it eighteen.

There can be innumerable varieties of one Rasa only because of situation, place, time and other factors, hence only one variety of the Dhvani where the order of sequence is imperceptible has been accepted. Śrīdhara has pointed out how various forms of Rasas, make it impossible to count the number of varieties of suggestive poetry where the order of sequence is imperceptible. Out of the eighteen varieties enumerated above seventeen pertain to Pāda and sentence both separately while the eighteenth pertains only to sentence. The suggestion based on the force of meaning occurs in context also. All the examples of types in which meaning arises by the force of word and sentence have not been given but one from Malatīmadhava has been given to supplement the text. Rasa which is manifested also by parts

\[^1\]Kav. Pr. Viveka, pp. 112-113.
of words, by style and by Individual letters. Padas (words) can either be in the crude form or an affix or suffix. The crude form has also two varieties the root and the noun in uninflected state. 'Tih' and 'Sup.' are the varieties of terminations. The total pure varieties\(^1\) of Dhvani are fifty-one. By the mutual combination of these, in the three forms of commixture and one form of uniform conjunction, the number swells to 10404. The commentator here however has pointed out the various points of views in regard to the number, some 'Śrīdharācārya' (Jyotiśacārya) has accepted the total varieties 2652 and their half without sentence varieties\(^2\) 1326.

By another method of multiplication the number has been fixed at 5355 by some people.\(^3\) Here the various ways of counting are followed. To supplement the examples of varieties of suggestive poetry arising from commixture, Śrīdharā has given a good number of verses and their explanation.

Govinda Thakkura's definition of Sabdaśaktimūla is that where the meaning arises from a particular word and not by its synonyms there it is the suggested poetry in which the meaning arises out of the force of words.\(^4\) In the suggested

\(^1\)Kāv. Pr. Viveka, p. 131. 'Dhvanem prakārāh prathameka panchāśatapraṇāṣante'.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 131. 'Saikapadam 52, Tenāhatapadam 2652, tasyā dalam 1326.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 132.

\(^4\)Pradīpa, p. 134. 'Sabdaśaktimūlatvam caitadeva yattenaiva sabdenārtha pratītiṁratu prayāyantarenāpi'.

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poetry in which the meaning arises out of the force of meaning, it is not particular words, but it is the meaning which matters. This cannot be conveyed by Denotation. However, the Denotation is not altogether subdued here, because then it cannot form the basis of suggestive sense based on Denotation. In case of the suggested sense being called Alamkāra Dhvani, it is so called on the analogy of the expression 'Brāhmaṇaśramaṇa nyāya'. In fact in suggestion the secondary or the Primary position is determined on its comparison with Denotation and not as compared with Rasa. As compared to Rasa all things become secondary. Twelve varieties of suggestive sense based on meaning have been accepted. The suggestion based on both meaning and word is found only in sentence, yet in the works like 'Śisupālavadha' it is said to be in Prabandha which however is only because of usage, otherwise basically it is only in the sentence. All other seventeen types of Dhvani are in the sentence as well as in the Pada. Though the suggestion is prominent only in the word the sentence is called suggestive because of its existence there.

1 Pradīpa, p. 138. 'Pradhānyāpradhānye vyaṅgyasya vacyaṃpeksyaiva na tu Rasmepekṣyaipy'.
2 Ibid., p. 152.
3 Ibid., p. 153. 'Padamātrasya vyāṅjakatve-ṣpi yadvākyavartī sabdasyārthaṣyaṣa kasyāpi ati-sayitārtha-vyāṅjakatvam tadvākyasyaiva dhvanitvamityupagamam alla kaścididdoṣah'.
Before accepting the final number of 10455 the commentator has raised another objection about the counting of the sub-varieties. According to a new method one more is added to the original number and then multiplied by the number half of it, this is way to count the varieties of 'Saṃkara' and the number thus coming is to be again multiplied by four to get exact number of varieties. This way the total number of sub-varieties of Dhvani comes to 5304.

According to Vidyācakravartin's Sampradāya-prakāśini there are three basic varieties of the suggestion where the order of sequence is perceptible. This is what has been said by Anandavardhana. He has made a clear cut distinction between Vastu (Fact) and Alamkāra (Figure). According to him where the meaning with community (Jāti) and Guṇas devoid of 'Vaicitrya' and expressed in a simple way is present the suggestion is called of fact. Twelve varieties of suggestive meaning arising from the force of meaning have been accepted. There however is no difference between the commentator and Māmaṭa as far as the number of varieties is concerned. He also does not offer any other noteworthy comment in this part of the chapter.

Bhattagopala the writer of the commentary Sāhitya-cūḍāmaṇi defines the passages cited as examples with detail. He however accepts the varieties and sub-varieties of Dhvani

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1Pradipa, p. 183.
in toto. He also does not offer any other noteworthy comments.

Mahesvara Nyāyaśāmākāra in his commentary Ādarsa has clearly stated that where the suggestive arrives from specific power i.e. power of meaning word or both, its nomenclature also becomes same. As far as the division of the sub-varieties of Dhvani and its number is concerned he agrees totally with Mammaṭa. But he has sometimes criticized the explanations of the verses cited as examples. For instance most often criticized is Cakravartin while Candīdāsa's explanation has been criticized once. Candīdāsa has explained that in the verse 'Dhanyāśi' etc. which has been cited as an example of 'Svataḥsambhavi vastuvanyakam'; the sense that the other woman is not fortunate comes through Indication, but the sense that the speaker is fortunate comes through suggestion existent in 'Vytireka'. But Mahesvara thinks that the main suggestive sense here is the later one and not the former. Though some discussion is done on the total number of the sub-varieties and the way of multiplication, but he supports Mammaṭa on this point.

Siddhicandra Gani has only explained the varieties upto the 12 varieties of the suggestive sense based on the power of meaning. Here also he differs from Mammaṭa accordingly there are only eight varieties of this type. He excludes

1Ādarsa, p. 162.
2Ibid., p. 211.
3Kav. pr. Khandana, p. 25. 'Ityastavidho Dhvaniḥ'. 
the variety of 'Kavinibaddha Praudhokti' and other 3 varieties arising from it, with the remarks that anything other than these varieties is nothing but a show of one's wisdom. The varieties of suggestive power arising from both word and meaning can be there only in sentence according to Mammaṭa but Siddhicandra quoting Navīnas say that it is also there in the Pada as well, because where one Pada is prominently there it is to be called in Pada, while where different Padas of equal suggestive power are present it is of sentence. With these pure varieties more varieties of commixture occur for which three factors are responsible namely; 'Sandeha', 'Anugrahyānugrāhakatya', 'Ekavyaśjananupravesa'. Thus the chapter is closed without giving the actual number of varieties of Dhvani.

Bhimasena the writer of the Sudhāsāgara supports the number of varieties given by Mammaṭa. The text has been often explained with words copies from Govinda. While the explanation of the verses is sometimes given different from all the commentators. Often the explanations of the earlier commentators are quoted, strongly enough Govinda Ṭhakkura has also been criticized for his explanations of the verses cited as examples. The attack on method of multiplication of

1Kav. Pr. Khaṇḍana, p. 25.
3Ibid., p. 28.
varieties of Dhvani as done by Govinda Thakkura is done and the reply is also same in same words.¹

Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, the commentator on Pradīpa also agrees with Govinda Thakkura as far as the number of the Dhvani varieties are concerned, but he often gives lengthy explanation of the verses cited as examples. Even the maxims of the original text are sometimes explained more clearly but this practice is not followed regularly. The suggestive meaning is said to be either arising from the word or meaning. The main difference between 'Kavipraudhokti' and 'Kavinibaddhapraudhokti' is that the latter is more charming because of expression of more passion. 'Kavinibaddhapraudhokti' according to Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa has charm as the saying of an old man has charm for the young one.² When only either of the word or meaning is suggestive then the suggestive meaning is said to be arising either from the word or from the meaning.

Vamanācārya has profusely quoted his earlier commentators to emphasise the validity of his views. But the most often quoted are Pradīpa and Uddyota. He has given unstringed support to Mammaṭa on the question of number of varieties.

The difference between Vastu and Alamkāra is not based on some distinctive factor but the negation of one is the existence of the other i.e. non-presence of Alamkāra means

¹Sudhasagara, pp. 217-237.
²Uddyota, p. 140.
Vastu. By quoting Uddyota he has refuted the view of Panditraja Jagannatha who seems to have held the view that 'Kavinibaddhapraudhokti' and 'Kativaktypraudhokti' are one and the same thing. In the suggestion where the suggestive sense arises from the power of both word and meaning the change (Parivṛttisahatva) and non-change (Parivṛtti-āsahatva) in both factors is permissible, "Parivṛtti-āsahatva-vābhyaṁ mūlatvam jñyem" such a power is there only in sentence and not in literary composition. Govinda is quoted to support this viewpoint. Towards the end Govinda is again quoted to support the method of multiplication adopted by Mammaṭa while enumerating the varieties of Dhvani.

Gunibhūtavyāṅgya and Establishment of Dhvani

The chapter (Ullāsa) V of Kavyaprakāśa is bold attempt of Mammaṭa for establishing suggestive sense. It can be pointed out that he has almost refuted the claims of all the opponents of suggestive sense. The arguments put forward by him cover a vast field. From the commentator's point of view this portion has a special significance because it is on the basis of this chapter that we can come to know about their following of various poetic schools in this field. Suggestion is the corner stone of Rasa and Dhvani theories and those who do not accept it are also opposing the theory of Dhvani. Mammaṭa made a great deal of effort in showing that the acceptance of suggestion in literature is most essential.

\[^1\text{Balabodhini, p. 146.}\]
Manikyacandra the earliest of the commentators, has explained the various examples of the types of subordinate suggestion. Unlike some other commentator he has taken little pains to explain these varieties of Guṇībhūtavyāṇgya. He also supports the theory of Mammaṭa that suggestion has three varieties namely two of the 'Vācytāsaha' (capable of being directly expressed also); i.e. 'Vicitra' (beautiful) or 'Ālaṃkāra' and 'Avicitra' (not ornamented) or 'Vastu' or fact. The third variety is 'Vācytāsaha' i.e. 'Rasa', 'Bhāva' and 'Bhāvabhāsa' etc. Manikyacandra has categorically stated that Rasa is by no means capable of being expressed (Vācytāsaha) 'Rasādi Kadāpi vācytām na sahata' and more it can only be expressed through suggestion and not at all by any other process. He further supports Mammaṭa's view that Indication is not possible without suggestive meaning and that Rasa is not capable of being presented by Indication because even the fact is not indicated by it hence how can Rasa be? He feels that even according to the view of 'Anvītābhīdīhānāvādins' the general meaning of the sentence cannot be directly expressed hence, suggested meaning's direct expression cannot be thought of even. This is also there in case of 'Abhīhitānvyāvādins'. In both these cases the meaning other than the expressed is

1. Śaṃketa, p. 105.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 106.
4. Ibid.
the meaning of the sentence. The potency in causes, necessary for expressing the idea or Samketa is not for the effects (Naimittakas). So there cannot be direct cognition of any effect, and when there is no such cognition how there can be definite fixed meaning in a cause. Hence the theory that causes are inferred from effects does not hold good here.

The people who say that action of word is like an arrow, its reach being prolonged further and further; so that in whatever sense a word may be used, that is the meaning expressed or denoted by it; are also not correct. In this regard the reasons put forward by Mammaṭa have been explained. The power of making known a meaning comes from 'Prakāśakatva' of word and not the power of generation or production. So it is also incorrect to say that anything and everything that happens to be perceived on the bearing of a certain word, is the action of the word and is always Denotation only. In this connection it is pertinent to add that the Denotation is only in the meaning to which a word has been hinted (Samketita) and not in any other meaning. Gradually descending authority attached to Direct Vedic Declaration, Indicative power, Syntactical connection, context, position and name, cannot be said correct if Denotation is accepted as all powerful. But the above authority has been established

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1Samketa, p. 109.
2Ibid., p. 113.
beyond doubt in sacrificial acts. Various Vedic and non-Vedic examples have been given to prove the correctness of descending authority attached to above six factors. Hence the assertion of the Anvītabhidhānavādins that affirmation is not suggestion is defective. Māṇikyaścandra leaves uncommented a portion of this chapter. Indication is also not suggestion this has been already proved it is clear that suggestion is some thing else. Even the Grammarians (Māṇikyaścandra interprets 'Ye' as Grammarians) have accepted the suggestion because they do take into account the words and meanings of words. This also clearly shows that the meaning of individual words is not the meaning of sentence. The Inference theory is also not acceptable to Māṇikyaścandra.

Śridhara accepts the three types of suggestion based on charm. Devoid of figure of speech and expressing fact through several types of affirmation and negation, is Avicītra and that exactly opposite to it is called Vicītra. Rasa can never be expressed through Indication, this can only be suggested. In any case the meaning of the Padas cannot be meaning of the sentence, because after giving the traditional meaning another meaning different from this is manifested

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1Saṃketa, p. 117. 'Yeāpti vaiyākaraṇāh'.
2Ibid., p. 119.
3Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. El. 'Vastumatrālaṃkāra Rasāyātmakataya vyāhgyastridhā'. 
which is suggestive. The various factors like time, verb, environment, reference etc. are factors due to which a meaning different from the Denoted one is known. It is beyond doubt that according to Anvitābhidhānāvināṅas as well as Abhīhitānvyāvādins the meaning of the sentence is different from the verbal meaning of the words. The theory of cause and effect can also not hold good here because in the process of suggestive and suggested the Saṃketa, is not fixed for meaning but on the other hand it is the other way round. The process of understanding meaning of the sentences is also not like the action of an arrow, as the action is primary because it is to be accomplished and the Kāraṅkas are secondary because of having been accomplished. The acceptance of suggestion has been shown by the Anvitābhidhānāvināṅins in connection with the Rasa. If the Denotation is accepted as conveying all the meanings then the gradually descending authority attached to Direct Vedic Declaration, Indicative power, Syntactical connection, context, position and name would not be there. Similarly non-acceptance of Indication is also not correct, because then the proofs like verbal presumption and pure presumption will also have to be discarded. Hence the assertion that Denotation manifests all the meanings cannot be accepted.

2. Ibid., p. 162.
The power of some of words to produce charm in a particular context and not in other context shows that they are suggestive of a particular Rasa and not of all other Rasas. Hence the relationship of suggestive and to be suggested between the words and the Rasa is established. The Denoted meaning can pertain to only one subject while there can be several subjects of a suggested meaning. There are other factors also which prove the difference between the Denoted and the Suggested sense. Because of different formation also, the Denoted and the Suggested senses are two separate entities. The Akhandavādins have also accepted the word and meaning as the 'Brahman' cannot expressed or told through words, because it is not under the purview of Samketa. So it is clear that Akhandavādins (Grammarians or Vedāntins) also accept the suggestion. The Inference can also not serve the purpose of suggestion, because even the manifestation of the Denoted sense is not through Inference. That is why the followers of the Prabhākara have accepted the power of the subject of the meaning of the sentence as continuing for the sake of knowledge of the speaker. Śrīdhara clearly states towards the end that suggestion is something different from Inference.

Sampradāyaprakāśini of Śrīvidvācakravartin is simple

1 Kavya Pr. Vivesa, p. 165. 'Evaṃ ca śabda viśeṣaḥ kvacidviṣaye cāravāh kvacidacāravā'.

2 Ibid., p. 170. 'Tatas ca khandapakṣa ivākhandā pakṣe-āpi vyañgyeva vidhyadi:itiyadi tatpakte-āpīti'.

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and running on this chapter, he puts forward the arguments in a more explicit and understandable way. He has described three types of suggestive sense of Dhvani after describing the various types of subordinate suggestion. All the three types of Dhvani namely, 'Vicitra' or 'Alaṅkāra', 'Avicitra' or 'Vastu' and Rasa have undoubtedly the suggested sense. Of these Rasa can never be expressed or Denoted through words. Hence the suggestiveness of Rasa etc. is established beyond doubt.¹ For the two varieties of Dhvani namely Arthantarasaṃkramita and Atyantaraskṛta Indication is the base. In Indication too the severing of relationship with the primary meaning and connection with the secondary meaning is consistent with some purpose and that purpose is nothing but suggestion of fact without which there is no validity of Indication. Hence it is clear that the above mentioned two varieties of Dhvani have suggestion. Dhvani where the suggestion arises from the power of word and where order of sequence is perceptible, the denotation being restricted, any other that may be denoted, as also the Simile or any other figure of speech that may be perceptible must be regarded undoubtedly suggestive.² Here the suggestive sense from the fact is proved because the Denotation being restricted and the essentials of Indication being absent it is only the suggestion which works. Similarly because of 'Sadṛṣṭyaklyptatva' of the Denoted and the suggested,

¹Sampradāyaprakāśini, p. 236
²Ibid., p. 237
the suggestive sense is also there in figures of speech. However, in both these cases, the Denotation is restricted and Indication impossible, it is only the suggestion which is there.\(^1\) In 'Arthaśaktimūla' also the special meaning is not conventionally there, because of the innumerability of such meanings. Moreover the special meaning of sentence being different from the literal meaning of the words there is no possibility of denoting the suggestion, because it will not fall in line with the meaning of the sentence. So according to Abhihitānyavādins also the acceptance of suggestion is essential.\(^2\) The theory propounded by the Anvitābhidhānavādins' about the process of meaning of a sentence, also shows that the general meaning of the words is not the meaning of the sentence. The various defects of the 'Anvitābhidhānavādins' have been shown and finally it is stated that according to the theory of Anvitābhidhānavādins the acceptance of the suggestive sense is without any doubt.\(^3\)

The theory that the causes are known by effect does not hold good here because potency of word as cause of the meanings has not been ascertained because the convention is there only in regard to such words as are correlated. So unrelated words cannot have convention and cannot make known the meaning because being unknown themselves. This is also

\(^1\)Sampradāyaprakāśini, p.238

\(^2\)Ibid., p.243

\(^3\)Ibid., p.245
not correct to say that the action of the word is like that of an arrow, its reach being prolonged further and further. The arguments put-forward by Mammaṭa have been well supported by the commentator.¹

It is also not correct to say that in anything perceived after the hearing of the word the action is always Denotation only, because then the Indication will also not be accepted; as in that case also it will be Denotation that will bring the perception of something after hearing. 'The poor Indication will be dead'.² Moreover the descending authority attached to Direct 'Vedic Declaration' etc. will be no more, but, that has already been accepted. Hence acceptance of suggestion is most essential. Vidyācakravartin declares that all these arguments have been given to repudiate the principle theories of 'Anvitabhīdhānavādins'.³ He is rather harsh towards the Mīmāṃsakas who uphold the above view and he goes on to the extent of calling them 'like animals'.⁴ In the field of literature the people who follow Anvitabhīdhānavādins, have also been discarded because of their opposition to the theory of suggestion.

There are also other different features of the two

¹Sampradāya-prakāśini, p.247
²Ibid., p.253
³Ibid., p.253
⁴Ibid., p.254
(Denotation and Suggestion) which clearly demarcate the positions of Denotation and Suggestion. These features are (1) The feature of character (2) The feature of time (3) The feature of conveying medium (4) The feature of means of knowing (5) The feature of their effects (6) The feature of number and lastly the feature of person addressed. Moreover, the Denotative words require the aid of an actually existent meaning while the suggestive words can even do without it in cases like 'Atyatatiraskṛtvācyā', while it does require the aid in cases like 'Abhidhānula'. Indication also cannot serve the purpose of suggestion, because the Indicated meaning is fixed like the Denoted one, while there can be several suggestive meanings. It is also not correct to say that the meaning of a sentence, when comprehended through a single indivisible cognition is what is expressed or denoted and it is the sentence alone that it Denotative. The reason for the non-correctness of the above view is that even the propagators of this view take words and meaning of words into consideration. Hence the affirmation in the examples like 'Nirmṛṭa rāga' etc. is suggestive according to them as well. The suggestion also cannot be included in the Inference because in it the 'Hetu' is invariably concomitant with effect while in suggestion it is not.

^Sampradayaprakāśini, p.2^4-
*Ibid., p.£.67

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1Sampradāyaprakāśini, p.264
2Ibid., p.267
Bhattagopala the writer of commentary Sahityacūḍāmaṇī, after defining the various types of subordinate suggestion has tried to establish Dhvani by refuting the objections of those who negate the presence of Dhvani. The pattern is similar to that of Ānandavardhanācārya who has enumerated the various opponents of Dhvani in a single Kārika. Finally, he declares that it is only Dhvani which is the foremost factor for producing charm; but by secondary application words and meanings are said Dhvani. Out of three types of Dhvani namely; 'Vicitra', 'Avicitra' and 'Rasa', none is Denoted; and particular Rasa cannot even be dreamt of being denoted. In two varieties of Dhvani namely 'Arthāntarasamkramita' and 'Atyantatirasakṛta', though the seeds of Indication and Denotation are visible but these also are possible only through suggestion. In Śabda Saktimūla Dhvani there is not even the slightest smell of Denotation, because here the function of Denotation is altogether restricted. In the variety of Alamkāra Dhvani the acceptance of suggestion is beyond any doubt, because the figure of speech is only suggestive this has been propounded by some. Similar is the case with Arthasaktimūla.

According to the theories of 'Anvītabhidhānavādins' and 'Abhīhitānvyavādins', the acceptance of the suggestion is

1Sahityacūḍāmaṇī, p.235
2Ibid., p.234
3Ibid., p.236
essential. The theory of meaning of a sentence as propounded by 'Anvitābhidhānāvādins' clearly show that it is other than the denoted meaning which is the meaning of the sentence. Similarly, according to 'Anvitābhidhānāvāda', what is denoted is something correlated in a general way with what is expressed by other words; so in this case also the meaning of the sentence can never be the object of direct verbal denotation. Few other arguments like that of Reason and Effect. And the similarity to the process of an arrow have also been refuted by the commentator.¹

Perception of anything after hearing of a word is also not the action of Denotation only; the reasons are the same as given by Mammuṭa. The classification of the Defects into permanent and impermanent will not be possible if suggestive process is not accepted as distinctive from Denotative process.² There are also seven points on which the denotative process and suggestive process differ. The suggestive meaning produces the charm which can be experienced by a few only and this charm produces a bliss unparallel. The denotative words require the aid of actually existent meaning while the suggestive words do not. The suggestion also cannot be included in the Indication because the basic pre-requisites of it are non-existent in suggestion. The view of Grammarians that the Indivisible Sphoṭa is the meaning

¹Sahityacūḍāmāṇi, p.248
²Ibid., p.256
of the sentence is also not correct because they also accept the words and their meaning for practical purposes. Because 'Hetu' is not concomitant with the effect in the suggestion hence it cannot be included in Inference as well.

Candidasa's commentary on this portion is more explanatory than in any other chapter. But fortunately enough he supports Mamma's stand on suggestion. After describing eight types of subordinate suggestion the commentator goes on to describe the three main divisions of Dhvani. 'Vicitra' according to him is possessive of Alamkaras, while the 'Avicitra' is devoid of Alamkaras and a mere 'Fact'. The importance of Rasa is underlined before it is admitted that Rasa cannot be expressed through Denotation in any case, that also cannot be perceived through Indication because of the restriction of primary meaning. Candidasa harshly criticizes the supporters of Inference. He declares that because of non-existence of invariable-concomitance with 'Vibhava' etc. Inference cannot be thought of even, in Rasa. In 'Artha-rasamkramita', 'Atyant-tiraskrta as well as in Sābda-saktimūla Dhvani the existence of Dhvani is beyond doubt. In Artha-saktimūla also, the convention does not pertain to special meaning so there is no scope either for Indication or Denotation, because the Abhihitānvyā theory says that what

1 Sahityacudāmani, p. 272
2 Dipika, p. 218.
3 Ibid., p. 219.
is expressed by a sentence is the mutual relationship among the denotative words based upon their mutual need, capability and proximity, hence it must pertain to general words only and not particular individual. Inference also cannot do this because words have different proof and the suggested meanings have different. According to 'Anvitābhidhānāvāda what is denoted is something only correlated in a general way with what is expressed by other words; so it is clear that the particular object as related to another object is never denoted. The weakness of the Prabhākara theory having been established, it is clear that suggestion is the meaning of all kinds of sentences. A further attack on the theories of followers of Prabhākara is made, by declaring their assertion that causes are known by effects; wrong. In this case the casualty of the words is not decided because these can be neither 'Kāraka' nor 'Jñāpaka'. Two more arguments of the same school are refuted. The arguments are that the action of the word is like that of an arrow, its reach being prolonged further and further, and secondly that in whatever sense a word may be used, that is the meaning expressed or denoted by it. The arguments of Mammaṭa are explained in detail by Caṇḍīḍāsa, particularly that of direction which is said to have its injunction of that particular factor only which forms its

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1 Dipikā, p. 232. 'Vyaṅgya eva sarvo vākyānamartha'.
2 Ibid., pp. 234-35.
direct objective. This view also cannot be accepted that perception of anything after hearing certain words, is always action of word called denotative because then the acceptance of Indication will be useless and also the descending authority attached to 'Smṛti' etc. will be proved wrong. The division of defects into permanent and impermanent categories is possible only because of suggestion; moreover some thing correct in one language and unwanted in other is possible only on the basis of suggestion. While the denoted meaning of a word is one, the suggested meaning varies with the variation in such accessory conditions as the context, the character of the speaker etc. Besides this there are seven other points as well which clearly differentiate between Denotation and Suggestion. While the denotative words require the aid\(^2\) of actually existent meaning for the manifestation of the meaning of the sentence; the suggestive words do not need any such aid. They simply suggest the manifestation of Rasa through dance, song etc. in drama and also in poetry through 'Vibhāva' etc. It is also correct to say that a meaning which is not denoted by the words and does not fall within their import is cognized through the operation of suggestion only. Though a Indicative word may have several Indicated meanings, yet their number is limited as compared with the suggestive meanings of a word. Moreover the Indicated meaning must have definite

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\(^1\)Dīpīka, p. 238. 'So-āyam ityādi parihṛtprayāyamāpi prakāramtareṇa pariḥmaṭi'.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 246. 'Vacakāṇām ..... padānāmarthapekṣā, .....vyāṅjakāṇām ..... natathātvam'.

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connection with the primary meaning, while the suggested may not have any connection, or may have indirect connection. In suggestive meanings the primary meaning may not be barred sometimes as in 'Vivakṣītyanyaparāvācyā' Dhvani but it is barred essentially in Indication. The view of 'Vedāntins',\(^1\) that the meaning of the sentence which is comprehended through a single indivisible cognition, is what is expressed or denoted, and it is the sentence alone that is denotative; is also not correct. The reasons are that in 'Akhāṇḍa Bhāraṁa' no Saṁketa is possible because it is not within one's reach, hence there has been no Denotation, secondly the pre-requisites of Indication are also not found, because the Indicated meaning must have connection with the primary meaning of the word; while the 'Akhāndartha' is something different from it. Thirdly, there can be no Inference as well because, Invariable concomitance is not possible. So it is proved that suggestion must be accepted in this case also.\(^2\) The commentator also clearly brings out the difference between Inference and suggestion towards the end.

Govinda Thakkura is the most enthusiastic supporter of Dhvani. After declaring that suggestion is inevitable in 'Arthāntarsaṁkramita' and 'Atyaṁtiraskṛta Dhvani', Govinda shows how it is also there in Arthaśaktimūla. Firstly, the

\(^1\)Dīpīka, p. 253.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 252. 'Asmābhista vyaṅjanādi vyapades'yaṁti sadeva tat'.

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meaning of the words is known, then the special meaning of the words is known because of special syntax and other factors; through this meaning is cognized the meaning of the sentence. Hence the suggested meaning is known in the third stage; where there can be no Denotation. ¹ According to 'Abhihitänvavyavădins' the meaning denoted by words; unrelated with anything is the meaning of the sentence. According to 'Anvētābhidhānavădins' denoted is something correlated in a general way with what is expressed by words and hence in both cases something other than the denoted is the meaning of the sentence. ² The assertion that, whatever meaning is cognized after hearing of the word, the word is the cause for that is not correct. Because the causality of the word is not proved anyway. It neither produces the meaning, nor makes it known. Its inability to make known the word is proved by the fact that it, is itself not known and the Saṃketa also is not placed on it. The argument that the action of word is like an arrow, also does not hold good, because then the Indication will be uprooted and the descending authority attached to 'Sruti' etc. by Jaimini shall be disproved, because if Denotation is everywhere then there is no scope for descending authority. The descending authority of 'Sruti' etc. has been described in detail by the commentator, with quotations and examples from

1Pradīpa, p. 209. 'Trtiyakaksāyām kuto-abhidhāyāh prasānam'.
2Ibid., p. 212. 'Evetyāvacya eva vākyārthah'.
Various works. The acceptance of suggestion is all the more essential from the viewpoint of a person who knows the poetry, because otherwise there would be no classification of defects into permanent and non-permanent.

The denotative meaning is one everywhere, while the suggestive meanings are innumerable; because of speaker, context etc. Like this there are other seven points of difference which show that they have different qualities. While the indicated meaning can also have more than one meanings, but unlike suggestion all these meanings must be connected with the expressed one. While the suggestion may have and may not have any connection with Expressed. And in Indication also suggestion must be accepted because of Import. Suggestion is not exactly of the nature of Indication because in some cases suggestion follows on the wake of Indication, in others it does not, but on the contrary is based upon Denotation.

But there are other cases as well in which suggestion is not based on any of the two, but is found to emanate even from mere letters and syllables, which do not denote anything. Sometimes the suggestion emanates only from gestures, hence it is surely different from Indication. The view of the Vedantins that the meaning of the sentence comprehended

1 Pradipa, p. 217.
2 Ibid., p. 226. 'Vyaṅgyastu vaktprakaraṇādi vasadaniyataḥ'.
3 Ibid., p. 234.
through a single indivisible cognition is Expressed or Denoted because Brahman have no qualities 'Dharmasunya', has been forcibly repudiated by the commentator. The Vedantins have also accepted the words and their meanings, and the meaning of the sentence cannot be accepted as 'Āśya' for 'Saṃkṣetagraha', because the meanings of sentence can be many. The suggestive sense also cannot be inferred and hence included in Inference, because in suggestion there is no invariable concomitance and also no 'Pakṣa Dharmata'.

Mahesvara Bhattacharya unlike other commentators is less expressive in this chapter. He comments in this chapter are in a sense of routine formality. Only rarely the theories are discussed in detail. No deep understanding is shown of the philosophical texts. Abhītanvāvādins mentioned as Naiyāyikās by the commentators accept the meaning of the sentence other than the literal meaning of the words. The Mīmāṃsakas also accept that what is not correlated in general way with what is expressed by other words is the meaning of the sentence. All other arguments of Mammaṭa for establishing Dhvani have been explained and supported. No where the subject has been dealt with depth. The commentator seldom bothers to define the various view-points fully.

Bhimasena in his Sudhāsāgara has given the total number of varieties of Subordinate Suggestion 340623900.

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1 Pradīpa, p. 236. 'Tasmāttanmate-āpi vidhyādir-vyanyatvam eva.'

2 Sudhāsāgara, p. 257.
The varieties include pure and commixture varieties. This seems to be the only original contribution of the commentator in this chapter. On rest of the portion the commentary is almost word to word copy of the commentary of Govinda Thakkura. However, occasionally some other commentators are also quoted, for purpose of refutation and support. But the commentator very rarely adds a line or two of his own to supplement the original of Kavyaprādīpa of Govinda Thakkura. He however has declared that sub-varieties of Dhvani are like the various forms of 'Brahma Who' in fact is only one.

Siddhācandra Gani the Jaina commentator of more recent times explains only the varieties of subordinate suggestion. This also by mentioning that this is according to the view of some of Prācinas. As he does not accept suggestion as an independent force for the cognition of meaning, so he does not offer any comments on the rest of the portion of the text in this chapter.

Nāgoji Bhattachāri's approach to the problems discussed in this chapter is deep. The commentary on this part is not mere formality. After describing the various types of subordinate suggestion he declares that by Saṃkalana there are only three types of Dhvani. Of these varieties in some the suggestive sense is 'Vācyatāsaha' and in some it is 'Vācyatāsaha'.

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¹Compare Sudhāsagara, pp-268-279 Vs. Prādīpa, pp. 212-221.

²Uddyota, p. 207.
Out of these two, the first is either mere fact or Aṣṭākāra. Passion and the rest however can never be directly expressed. If the Rasa etc. are directly expressed then these loose charm. Though Vastu and Aṣṭākāra are also not charming when expressed directly even then there can be some charm due to the force of Syntax of the words (Padasamanvaya). Rasa etc. can produce charm only when these are manifested through ‘Vibhava’ etc. The force which manifests Rasa is none else but suggestion because the essential pre-requisites of Indication are missing here.  

Demotation is also barred here because it is restricted through context. Māmāṭa’s contention is supported that according to both Abhīhitānvyavādins and Anvītābhidhānāvādins it is other than the Expressed which is the meaning of the sentence. He attacks the people who wrongly interpret the maxim ‘Yataparah Šabdah sa śabdārthah’. The correct interpretation according to him is ‘In the portion where there is Predicate or Vidheya’ there is the real sense of the sentence and that is the meaning of the words; which is not directly expressed. Whatever meaning is cognized after the hearing of the word is not cognized with the help of the expression but with the help of ‘Akanśa’ etc. that is why the increasing force of the Sruti, Linga etc. is

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1Uddyota, p. 208. ‘Padasamanvyabalaṇa pratītanām camatkāramasteyva’.

2Ibid., p. 208. ‘Tadantaroṣa bhavati Viṣṭīstu vyaṅjanaiva’.

3Ibid., p. 213. ‘Yatrāṃse vidheyatvam tatra vākyatātparyam’.
The Nityadoṣas also prove the fact that suggestion is there, because otherwise the division between Nitya and Anitya Doṣas will be useless. There are other six points which differentiate between Denotation and Suggestion. Though the Indicative meaning may also have several meanings like suggestion but those meanings are to be directly connected with the Expressed one while the suggested meanings may not be connected with the Expressed. Moreover in Indication there must be either purpose or convention, whereas in suggestion both are not essential. The testified usage that this word is neither expressive nor Indicative be suggestive of meaning shows that Suggestion is there; otherwise only Expression will be proved and Indication uprooted. While the Indication needs restriction of the Expressed meaning etc. and manifests only uncommon meaning the suggestion manifests both common and un-common meanings. The details about the respective fields of Indication and suggestion have been given in 'Vaiyākaraṇaśiddhāntamañju'. The view of Vedāntins has also been refuted. Inference can also not include suggestion, hence it must be accepted as a separate power of word.

1Uddyota, p. 225. 'Evaṁ śabdāruter ...... na sa kevalayā-abhidhayapratipādyate kintvakaḥkṣa śāpekeṣyeti'.

2Ibid., p. 231.
Vamanacarya has interpreted Mammaṭa's word 'Asya' as meaning 'of subordinate suggestion'. He however points out that there can be other meaning of the word, interpreting three types of Dhvani itself. Quoting profusely the earlier commentators, the effort has been made to establish the theories of Mammaṭa. Pradīpa, Uddyota and Sudhāsāgara are the most quoted commentaries. Theories of both 'Anvitābhidhamavādins' as well as 'Abhīhitānvavādins' are a proof of the fact that Suggestion cannot be ruled out. Though on all other points Mammaṭa has been supported, no new arguments have been used by the present commentator.

Conclusion

Dhvani as presented by Anandavardhanacarya is a 'Mahāviśaya', under which are included all other topics like Guṇas and Alamkāras. So Mammaṭa has rightly, made its detailed presentation. Not only this, he has also tried to re-establish Dhvani, which had come under severe criticism in a span of time intervening between him and Anandavardhanacarya.

Most of the commentators have given the same number of varieties of Dhvani, as given by Mammaṭa. But there have been commentators, who by some other method of counting have given the number different from these, prominent amongst such commentators are Govinda Thakkura and Bhīmasena. Siddhicandra Gani excludes the varieties of 'Kavinibaddha
Prauḍhokti' from Dhvani varieties, hence there is difference in number of varieties. Similarly Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa gives a very large number of these varieties. Except Siddhicandra Gaṇī, all other accept the important place of Dhvani in a Kāvya. Candīḍasa, though gives due importance to Dhvani, yet he says that Rasa Dhvani must be regarded as most important of all of these. The number of Guṇibhūtavyāṅga varieties which is given by Bhimasena runs into lakhs, while other commentators have correctly avoided the counting of such varieties.

Barring Siddhicandra all other commentators have taken pains to establish Dhvani following Mammaṭa. But people like Mahesvara seem to be indifferent towards the outstanding issues. Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa who is primarily a grammarian, does not betray this influence whenever the scholars of this branch are attacked. On the whole the defence of Dhvani as put by the commentators can go to a great extent to establish Dhvani, after replying to the criticism, against it.