CHAPTER II

WORDS AND MEANINGS, THEIR TYPES, INDICATION (LAKŚANA) AND SUGGESTION (VYĀŚJANA), CONVENTIONAL DENOTATION

There is enough matter in the Ullāsa II on which the commentators do not have unanimity of views. Just like first chapter, it contains some basic queries on which the body and main theories of poetics have been built, for instance the acceptance of various kinds of meaning will show, whether the commentator will accept Dhvani or not and so on. Those who have done away with the theory of suggestion in favour of Indication, vehemently putforth their views in this very chapter. On the other hand the question of conventional denotation’s appertaining shows the philosophical background and attachment of the commentators with various philosophical schools. The judgement of words and their powers is a noteworthy mootable point in this Ullāsa.

Words and Meanings

Māṇḍavyacandra has accepted the nature of words and sense as given by Mammata. But he has explained the views of Prabhākara and Kumārila on the disputed 'Import' (Tātparya) meaning; with little bit of elaboration. His own view which has not been distinctly stated seems to be similar to that of Prabhākaras, who hold that the meaning of sentence is the expressed meaning of the words themselves. Māṇḍavyacandra

1Samketa, p. 11. 'Padānyeva vākyam padārtha eva tadartha na tu padārtthebhyo vākyārthah'.
saying that the words are the sentence and their meaning is the meaning of the sentence and no meaning different from this is not possible. He feels that the suggestiveness of all the meanings is there, it is in addition to the suffixical meaning. He has interpreted 'Upādi' as 'Vyakti Viśeṣaṇa' or adjectives of the person.

He supports Mammaṭa by saying that qualities, actions and proper names are in reality one thing, but their diversity is because of their subsisting in diverse individuals. He has pointed out that the Vaiśeṣakas accept the appertainment of the conventional denotation, to 'Jātivisistavyakti' while Bāuddhas accept it as appertaining to 'Apoha' in community.

Bhāṭtāgopāla the writer of the commentary Sāhityacudāmani seems to be a staunch supporter of suggestion and points out its significance in the poetry. He asserts that the use of word 'Atra' in the first of Karika of Ullāsa II signifies that the acceptance of suggesting words is most essential in the poetry, it may not be there in other Sastras. He has even quoted Bhoja to support his assertion. He

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\item Samketa, p. 11. 'Nakevalam pratyevatvam kintu vyākajakatvamityapi sābdārthah'.
\item Ibid., p. 13.
\item Ibid., p. 14. 'Gūpa ...... parmārthatāh ekatvameva, yastu bhedah pratiyate sa ārya bhedānna vastutah'.
\item Ibid., p. 15.
\item Sāhityacudāmani, p. 30.
\item Ibid., pp. 30-31.
\end{enumerate}
takes a double sided view about the acceptance of 'Import meaning' (Tatparyārtha), which he says is both good and bad, without giving any reasons for either. He is neutral on the point of 'Import meaning' on which there is a diversification of views among Anvitābhidhānavādins and Abhihitāhvyavādins. He has however accepted the suggestiveness of all the meanings, which he says is eternal because of community, and hence cannot pertain only to these three types of meanings; but to all type of meanings.

He has accepted the view of Mammatā about the appertainment of the Conventional Denotation. He feels that if we accept the conventional Denotation as appertaining to a person then this convention will be either indefinite or wrong. He has laid more stress on the third defect i.e. that no such distinction will be possible as we have in Expression and Suggestion. So the Conventional Denotation can appertain only to the characteristic of appartmant to the individual. He has given the definitions of Jati etc. in verse form. He touches briefly the viewpoints of Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas and Baudhāyas.

Śrīvidyācakravartin the writer of the commentary

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1 Sāhityacuḍāmaṇi, p. 31.
2 Ibid., p. 33.
3 Ibid., p. 40.
Sampradāyaprakāśinī asserts¹ that the acceptance of suggestive
words is most essential in the poetry. He seems to be accept­
ing the view of Abhīhitānvyavādins about the acceptance of
'Import meaning'. He asserts that the simple meaning of a
word is known by conventional denotation only, while to have
the 'Import meaning' the help of 'Akaṅkṣā' etc. is essential.
He calls the view of the Abhīhitānvyavādins² as the view of
minority. This shows his bend of mind towards the earlier.
Likewise Mammaṭa he says that the suggestiveness of all the
meanings is often there but it is not always there, without³
exception. The expressive word according to him is different
from the Indicative and Suggestive words, and is dependent on
process of expression.

The commentator has pointed two more view points
about conventional denotation i.e. one of the Naiyāyikas and
the other of Grammarians. The first believe in the non­
eternity of the words and say that the Sanketagraha is divinely.
The grammarians on the other hand believe in the eternity of
the words and hence say that the conventional denotation
appertains to all the four namely Guṇa, Kriyā etc. The
present commentator also supports⁴ the above view, which he
says is justified because that will generate the applicability

¹Sampradāyaprakāśinī, p. 32.
²Ibid., p. 33.
³Ibid., p. 33.
⁴Ibid., p. 38.
and non-applicability of the words. He does not attach any importance to the view of Vaisēsakas and Bauddhas on this point. 

Candidāsa one of the severest critics amongst earlier commentators is less harsh towards Māmāṭa in this chapter. On the division of words he says that basically all words are one but their many varieties are only because of Upādhi. 1 He has clarified why Māmāṭa has not given the definitions of the words first and why he has given the division first. He says that it has been done to make the division portion more compatible. According to him Import meaning's acceptance, 2 is the view of Māmāṁsakas. But he does not attach any importance to this meaning, which he says cannot be given the status of other meanings. On the import meaning he has noted more clearly the views of Abhihitānvyavādins and Anvībhidhānava¬vādins. A noteworthy point here is his refutation of the argument in favour of Import meaning. The argument put forward in favour of Import meaning is that if Import meaning is not general then the suggestive meaning also cannot be general, because of similarity of their process of manifestation. Candidāsa replies that it is not so, because the suggested meaning follows expressed meaning and the Import meaning (Tātparyārtha) does not. 3

1Dīpikā, p. 28. 'Sabdaprakāśa pārthakyānadarā iti bhāvah'.
2Ibid., p. 28.
3Ibid., p. 29. 'Vyañgyaśākṣarameva bhidheyaśādinā¬manuvācyatvāt'.

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He says that the suggestiveness of all the meanings is not possible that is why Mammaṭa uses the word 'Pryāśo' which signifies non-universal prevasion of the suggestiveness of words. He disagrees with those who say that the power of words exhausts, after they had expressed one meaning that is main or expressed. He argues that such power does not get exhausted but is further augmented by contextual and other powers.

Śridhara the writer of Kav. Pr. Viveka, says in clearcut terms that there can be only three varieties and not four; that is why Mammaṭa has used word 'Tridha' in the Kārikā while agreeing that the Import meaning is not universally pervasive, he shows how it differs from the expressed variety of meaning. He is almost silence about the dispute of Import meaning amongst Abhihitānyavādins and Anvīlābhidhānavādins. He says that almost all the words have suggestiveness, but there may be rare exceptions at some places, of some meanings.

The conventional denotation cannot be regarded as pertaining to Individual, because then the word 'Ghaṭa' would also mean 'Paṭa' which would mean indefiniteness of the meanings.

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1Dīpikā, p. 30. 'Prayāśā iti avyāpti sūcanam'.
2Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 19. 'Caturtha prakāro na sambhavatityāveditum tridheti'.
3Ibid., p. 19.
4Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 21. 'Kvacit Kasyacinteyarthah'.
5Ibid., p. 24.
This view\(^1\) is similar to Mahimbhaṭṭa’s view on the topic. This defect also cannot be avoided. If we accept it as pertaining to community or Jāti, Naiyāyikas or those who believe in the non-eternity of words feel that the conventional denotation is divine, because it suits all the dealing of the world and has been accepted universally. Grammarians\(^2\) or those who believe in the eternal nature of the words say that the derivation or the origin of the words itself has been termed as Saṃketa. Upādhi according to him is the Vṛtti originating from the property of the matter.

The view of the commentator about the appertainment of the conventional denotation is not clear in the commentary, because some pages of the commentary are missing as reported by Dr. S.P. Bhaṭṭācārya,\(^3\) in footnote.

Govinda Thakkura has pointed at the very outset of the commentary that the suggestive word is not famous in other Sastras but it is there in the poetry. The acceptance of ‘Import meaning’ is the view of Naiyāyikas and not of Mīmāṁsakas.\(^4\) Govinda Thakkura has explained the views of Anvīṭabhidhānāvādins with little bit more elaboration than

\(^1\)Vyaktiviveka, p.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 26. ‘Atrādarsā pustake caturaṇāṃ patraṇamābhāvo yatkrta trutih ......’.

\(^4\)Pradīpa, pp. 23-24. ‘Kesucinnyāyādinayēsu na tu mīmāṁsādimateṣvapi’.
other commentators. Govinda Thakkura himself does not accept the Import meaning. He asserts that the suggestiveness of all the meanings is there without any exception. This view seems to be contrary to the view of Mammaṭa who has purposely used the word 'Prayāśo' to show that there can be few words without suggestiveness.

He has justified with elaboration the definition of Expressive meaning. He has also justified the use of adjective 'Sāksāta Saṃketita' by many ways. Firstly, it excludes from its pervasiveness the process of direct meaning. Secondly, it excludes consonents which directly produce Mādhurya etc. It also differentiates the expressive meaning 'Abhidheyārtha' from Caitya etc. padas. Finally, it distinguishes it from the indicated meaning which is not directly understood or desired. This discussion has become unusually lengthy.

Govinda Thakkura accepts the view that the conventional denotation appertains to Upādhi or characteristic appurtenant to the individual. In addition to the defects of 'Ānāntya' and 'Vyabhicāra' a third defect namely inability to distinguish between the meanings of the words, will be there if we accept conventional meaning's appertainment to individual. All those words where there is no conventional

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1 Pradīpa, p. 25. 'Tatra naikatarasya kintu sarvasyaṣāpi'.

2 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

3 Ibid., p. 31. 'Tasmād upādhaveva saṃketah'. 
denotation will also be accepted as manifesting meaning, which is not possible; so Govinda Šhakkura says that Conventional Denotation appertains only to Upādhi. He attacks those who accept that Conventional Denotation, appertains to community. His argument is that in words like Ākāśa there can be no community and hence there will be no conventional denotation if we accept the view that it appertains to community. He offers no comments on the 'Jātivisistā Vyakti' view of Naiyāyikas and Apoha view of Bauddhas.

Bhīmasena the writer of the commentary Sudhāsāgara, has copied Govinda Šhakkura in this chapter also. He gives the commentary of Pradīpa as such in Sudhāsāgara. He says following Govinda, that acceptance of Import meaning is the view of Naiyāyikas. He feels that the acceptance of Import meaning is almost unwanted. Except the Expressed meanings all the meanings do possess suggestiveness. The use of word 'Prāyaso' by Mammata has been done to exclude Rasa meanings. He attacks the view of Naiyāyikas that Conventional Denotation appertains to Individual. Mīmāsakas view that we can know the meaning of the words without conventional denotation has also been attacked. He also does not agree with those who

1Pradīpa, p. 35. 'Ākāśadī Šabdānām katham jātāu saṃketa iti cintyam'.
2Sudhāsāgara, p. 44.
3Ibid., p. 46. 'Vastutastu Rasādeh prādhānasya vyañjaktvābhāvāt prāyasa ityuktam'.
4Ibid., p. 55.
5Ibid., p. 63.
say that conventional denotation be regarded as appertaining to 'Jātiviśiṣṭāvakti'. He says that such a thing is not possible, because we feel the negation of such a thing. For criticizing the 'Apoha' view of Bauddhas, he has used the words and arguments of Govinda Thakkura. But he adds that the view of Bauddhas is not acceptable for another reason that is, it is the view of atheists and hence against the Vedas. He finally declares that the view that the conventional denotation appertains to the characteristic appurtenant to the Individual, is the right and victorious view. He however has interpreted Upādhi as an adjective or Viśeṣaṇa.

Mahēśvara Nyāyālamkāra says that by the word 'kāvyā' Mammaṭa here means Alākārasāstra. He feels that the acceptance of 'Import meaning' (Tātparya) is the view of 'Old Naiyāyikas'. His own view is near to that of Abhihitānvyāvādins. He feels that there are few meanings which are without suggestiveness and hence all the meanings are not suggestive. He does not agree with them who interpret the Kārikā as "those which give the conventional meaning directly are expressive words", such an interpretation will overlap the definition

1 Sudhāsaṃgarṣa, p. 63.
2 Ibid., p. 63. 'Nāstikamatam tu vedaviruddham tucchameva'.
3 Ibid., p. 63. 'Upādhisaktivāda eva jayānāti dik'.
4 Adarsa, p. 31. 'Keśuciditi pracīna naiyāyika mateṣvityarthah'.
of Indicative words because they also give direct meanings. 1 He has supported the view of Mamraṭa that Conventional Denotation appertains to Upādhi, he goes on to the extent of declaring that 'Jāti' is also Upādhi 2 and nothing else. He disapproves the view of Naiyāyikas and Baudhāyas.

Nāgoji Bhatta the writer of commentary Uddyota says that the mention of varieties of word first, shows the primary importance of the words. After giving the definition of the word he shows that the expressive (Abhidheya) 3 word is a source for suggestive (Vyaṅga) and indicative (Lakṣṇika) words. He has followed Govinda Ṭhakkura in supporting Mamraṭa's view about appertainment of Conventional Denotation. He points out that some people regard it as appertaining to Inference and some to Indication and other to suggestion. But he has wrongly interpreted the attack of Govinda Ṭhakkura on Jāti view.

While Govinda Ṭhakkura favours neither Jāti nor Individual; Nāgoji Bhatta seems to be favouring 5 Individual in contrast to Jāti. However, towards the end of the discussion he has again shown his inclination towards the Upādhi view. 6

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1 Adarsa, p. 38. 'Lakṣṇika sābdeṇāpi sāksādartha pratipādanāt tatrātītyapateḥ'.
2 Ibid., p. 41. 'Tatra ca jātipadamupādhimatraparameva!
3 Uddyota, p. 23. 'Tatra Lakṣṇikavyaṅjakayorvācaka upjīvayah'.
4 Ibid., p. 36.
5 Ibid., p. 35. 'Vyaktaveva sāktaucityamiti bhāvah'.
6 Ibid., p. 36. 'Upādhisaktau hi visēṣyasya vyaṅgyatva sambhavāttat prakṛtopayogi'.
Siddhicandra Gani is precise in his comments on this portion of the chapter. He has also altered the arrangement of the subject matter of the chapter. He deals with the suggestiveness of the words towards the end of the chapter. He stresses the importance of the Divine will, in connection with the appertainment of Conventional Denotation, which he points out in the view of Maha-sakas. He however has also shown his inclination towards 'Jati-visishtha-vyakti' view on this point, but in the argument the words used are those of Nagoji Dhat. He leaves all other points uncommented.

Vamanacaryya clarifies that it is in the poetry that we have three kinds of words namely Expressive, Indicative and Suggestive. Expressive is source for Indicative and Suggestive meanings, and expressive and indicative meanings are source for suggestive meaning. His view about the Import meaning (Tatparya) is that it can be accepted for certain limited purposes. However, he has termed the view of Anvatabhidhamavadin as inferior, because Mamma uses singular for them. He has given his support to Govinda Thakkura etc. that all the meanings have suggestiveness.

2Ibid., p. 7. 'Jativisista bodhastu jati sanktam padam jati visistam bodhyati'.
3Balabodhini, p. 25.
4Ibid., p. 26. 'Abhihitanyayadina miti bahuvacanena nyameva paksha pramanikah'.
5Ibid., p. 28. 'Arvesam...... arthananamvi yavana- katvamisyate ityarthah'.
He has quoted some earlier commentators to support his view. He has supported the view that the Conventional Denotation appertains to the characteristics appurtenant (Upādhi) to the Individual. He terms this view as that of Mahābhāṣyakāra and keeps it above all other views. His criticism of the view of Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsākās, and Baudhās etc. is mainly by quoting the view of earlier commentators.

Varieties of Indication (Laksṇā)

Mañikyaśaṅkara has given his own definition of Indication (Laksṇā). It is based on the Karikā of Māmata defining Indication. The important point to be noted here is that he has interpreted ‘Yat’ as ‘Yata’ and that it is an indirect process, and it is there in the indicative process itself, based either on usage or special purpose. Quoting Bhartṛhari he has shown five types of Indication (Laksṇā) namely based on connection with the expressive meaning, similarity, close connection, contrariety, and conjunction with action. According to him the main line of distinction between the Expression (Abhidhā) and the Indication (Laksṇā)

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1Balabodhīni, p. 39. 'Mahābhāṣyakāroktā pakṣa eva granthkṛdabhāpṛtaḥ'.

2Saṅketa, p. 16. 'Lakṣyārthanīṣṭho ākṣaṇa Sakti'.

3Ibid., p. 17. 'Abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛṣyāt samvāyatah, vaiparityāt kriyākhyogallakṣaṇa panodhā mataḥ'.

4Ibid., p. 18. 'Svam nirantarāṣṭha niṣṭho sabda-vyāpāro-abhidhā-santarartha niṣṭhastu laksṇa'.

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is that the former has direct connection with the meaning, while the later has indirect connection. About two main types of Indication namely, not requiring any auxiliary agency and requiring auxiliary agency he supports Mammaṭa. He points out that the Indication based on usage is not regular because it is just like the process of expression. When a word altogether leaves its original meaning and is used in other sense it is Indicative Indication (Lakṣaṇa Lakṣaṇā)¹; on the other hand where the word gives it own sense as well as some other sense the Indication is Inclusive. Both these types do not require any auxiliary agency and are Sudha. He also draws another line of distinction between these two types. This is on the basis of imposition and the thing to be imposed; where the difference between these two factors is visible it is Indicative Indication. The Super-imponent Indication is there wherein the imposed as well as 'that imposed upon' are both distinctly expressed. Māṇikyacandra has termed this type of Indication 'Aphnutasvarupa' and 'Sāḍrṣyahetuka'.² This has also been termed as the seed of figure Rūpaka. The Introsusceptive (Śādhyāvasāna) Indication has been called the seed of figure 'Ātīṣayokti'. The main difference³ between the two is that oneness of object compared

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¹Samketa, p. 19.
²Ibid., p. 20.
³Ibid., p. 20. 'Tatra-āsannatamatreneḥ bheda āha tvatyaśannatayā'. 
and object compared to, in the first is due to nearness while in the second it is because of being one with each other. These two varieties are based on two different factors. In the first one, it is the quality of Guṇas on which the Qualitative variety is based while in the pure varieties there are other kinds of relationships which are the basis.

On the dispute of what is the exact process of Indication in this case where word 'Gaurvāhīka' is used Maṇīkyacandra says that the first view which is 'that the latter word indicates the qualities of stupidity, dullness and the like, which belong to animal denoted by that word, and through these qualities, the word, 'ox' comes to denote the 'man' is right. Here the commentator declares that the secondary application of the word and meaning thereof is inseparable, but there are some people who only accept the secondary application of the word, and the above varieties are mixed with the secondary application of 'Upacāra' (supposed or fancied identification) and this, which is founded on resemblance variety of Indication is in the fourth place from Abhidhā or expression. Maṇīkyacandra here makes a reference to some Mukula Bhaṭṭa who is supposed to have written a treatise on poetics wherein the Indication has been dealt at length. The nonconventional Indication which has

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1Sāmketa, p. 21. 'Sabdopacāraḥ yathopacāravānābhavi-tvāttadarth-ōpi, kecchabdadopacārāmeva manyante'.

2Ibid., p. 19.
suggestion in it, is of two kinds, 'Abstruse' (Gūḍha) and 'Explicit' (Agūḍha). The 'Abstruse' in which the suggested meaning is non-explicit, is the basis of 'Atyatantatiraskṛta-vācyalakṣṇāmulā Dhvani'.

Two more examples have been cited of this kind of Indication, one from the Dhvanikāra and the other one from Kuntaka's Vakroktijīvitām. The explicit variety is a kind of Gupibhūtavyaŋya. Barring the Indication which is with purpose (Prayojana) and the 'explicit' (Agūḍha) and 'abstruse' (Gūḍha) all have suggestiveness.

The function of the Indicative word, which has Indication, is of the nature of suggestion. This function can neither be direct Denotation nor the Indication, it is only 'Dhvananātma Vyaṃpaṇa'. It is also not right to make the indicated meaning included in the intended idea, because the subject of knowledge and the resultant are two different things.

The resultant according to Bhaṭṭa is 'Apprehendedness', and 'Representative cognition' (Saṃvitti) according to Prabhākara. Manikyacandra gives importance to Representative cognition which he translates as 'soul'. As with the importance of the soul the body is denominated as living, similarly with the

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1Saṁketa, p. 24. 'Atra hi vikāsasyanupapādyamā-natrādatyant-tiraskṛta-vācyolakṣṇāmulodhvani'.

2Ibid., p. 25.

3Ibid., p. 27.

4Ibid., p. 28. 'Saṃvittistvātmanah'.

Dhvani, the beautiful words and meanings along with Guṇas and Alamkāras are poetry but not without Guṇas and Alamkāras.¹

In the example 'Bhdrātmano' etc., through the power of suggestion the words give the second meaning which has been termed by the commentator as 'Vākyaprakāśyovastudhvani'.² In as much the word is suggestive only when it has other meanings, the meaning is also held to be so by virtue of its helping the process of suggestion. Though in 'Avivakṣitavācyya',³ only the word is in the root of Indication and Denotation even then its helping power does not lessen, otherwise the unknown meaning can also be the suggestive of that suggestion. Here only the word is of primary importance. In the 'Avivakṣitavācyya' the arriving at the meaning is at fourth stage while in the 'Vivakṣitavācyya' it is the third stage because there is no indication there,⁴ hence the suggestive meaning can be there even without Indication.

Four pages from Śrīdharasena's commentary are missing, after the missing portion the commentary starts with the support of Mammaṭa on the issue whether 'Gauranubandhayah' ¹Saṅketa, p. 28. 'Yathā-ātmāntvam śrīrameva jīvavāditī vyaptiṣyate na ghaṭādi tathā dhvaninapi ..... kāvymiti vyapadesyau'.
²Ibid., p. 30.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid., 'Tenātrabhīdhā tātparyalakṣaṇā dhvanādvya-sctvāro vyāpārāh vivakṣitavācyeyu tu tryah'. 
can be an example of Inclusive Indication. Quoting from other works, he supports Māmaṭa that the assertion "That the denotation of a word having its force spent up in the qualifying adjunct, is unable to proceed to the qualified"; is wrong in the present context,¹ to prove the above words as an example of Inclusive Indication. Cognition through verbal presumption can also not work,² because it is not indicated by the words at all. He also feels³ that the view of Mukula Bhaṭṭa about the pure varieties of Indication as being the result of aloofness of difference between indicated and Indicative meanings is incorrect. The discussion about Equal-correlation or 'Śamānādhiśkarṇa' has become unusually long. The 'Mukhyātā' or 'Amukhyātā' of the correlations has been discussed.⁴ Primary or 'Mukhya' is cognized directly from the word while the 'Gaṇa' is cognized with a media in between. Quite off the track the Sabda-Brahma is discussed⁵ along with its four varieties, definitions of Vākyapadīya are produced, Ṛgveda is also quoted to justify the four fold division of the Sabda Brahma. The Introsusceptive Indication⁶

¹Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 29.
²Ibid., p. 29.
³Ibid., p. 30.
⁴Ibid., p. 30. 'Yah sākṣādeva sābdāt pratiyate sa mukhamiva bhavaṭīti mukhyah'.
⁵Ibid., p. 31. 'Sabda brahmaśasya catasro-āvasthā vaikharī, madhyāmā, paśyanti sukṣmāti'.
⁶Ibid., p. 33.
is there when only Viṣāyi or Imposed is used, without mentioning Imposed upon. The relation of Indication is not union or inseparable inherence (Sānyoga, Samaṇvaya) but of the regulating Indication 'Nīvāmaka Upādhisākaṇa'. He quotes Bhṛtrmitra¹ to show five types of Indication based on connection with Denotation. These are the same as quoted by Māṇikya i.e. Similarity, Inseparable Inherence, Opposition and Connection with verb. Vāmana has also been quoted to show this.

About the dispute of exact process of Indication in case of two examples of Qualitative and Pure varieties of Introsusceptive Indication; the commentator feels that the third view,² is of Māmata. But according to the commentator all the three views cited by Māmata are correct³ in the present context. While describing the verse 'Abhidheya' etc. It is pointed out clearly that Invariable concomittance here means only relationship, but there are others who hold a view contrary to this. There is difference of opinion between the commentator and Māmata on the number of varieties of Indication. Māmata has originally enumerated six but Śrīdhara has counted sixteen.⁴ Of all the first four varieties each is said to have two sub-varieties namely the super-imponent and the Introsusceptive

¹Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 33.
²Ibid., p. 34. 'Atah svamatamāha-sādhiḥraṇetī'.
³Ibid., p. 35. 'Prakṛte tu pakṣatryokte-api na kācit kṣati'.
⁴Ibid., p. 36. '......... Tatrāpi sādṛṣyasambandham trābhyaṃ šoḍaṇetī'.

making the number swell to eight. All these eight varieties again have two varieties, each based on similitude and other qualities, thus the number is counted as sixteen. The Indication based on usage and devoid of suggestion is termed as lower quality. The Indication based on purpose can be with suggestion and Indication as well, the first is termed as Gūḍha and the second Agūḍha. With these two varieties the Guṇībhūtavyāṅgya will be discussed. The word Dhvani is used where there is ability of inhibiting charming words and meanings, just like the denomination of body is done as lifeful only when it possess certain qualities similar to this view is of Māṇikyaśandra. The assertion of the Hṛdaya Darpaṇa that poetry is possible everywhere is proved baseless, by the above explanation. While discussing the example of Gūḍha the explanation of Hṛdaya Darpaṇa of the verse 'Rāmoāśmi' etc. has been criticized in the words of Abhinavagupta's Locana commentary on Dhvanyāloka.

That the function of the Indicative word can be none other but suggestion has been vehemently supported. Explaining the process with an example from Kālidāsa's

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1Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 36. 'Rūḍhi Lakaṇṭa Ṛṣyakoṭīḥ'.
2Ibid., p. 37. 'Hṛdayadarpaṇe yaduktam sarvatra kāvyavyavahāra, syāditi tadvahastitaṁ'.
3Ibid., p. 37.
4Ibid., p. 39. 'Sa ca vyāpāro vyāṅjanameva'.
Sākuntalam, all other functions such as inference, verbal presumption and Indication etc. have been ruled out; the assertion of Mammaṭa that no other function but process of suggestion, is that of Indicative word gets support from the commentator. He outrightly rejects the idea that Denotation, and Indication may be the functions; because there can be purpose of the subject and not the subject as purpose, so it is only the process of suggestion which is possible here.

Hence the Indicated meaning cannot include the intended idea. The writer of the work 'Dhvanidhvansa' has come in for a severe criticism, when two types of resultant namely apprehendedness and representative cognition have been defined and justified. The stress on suggestion has again been laid and comparatively lesser importance of indication shown.

The Indication cannot apply to the thing with its qualities, so the use of suggestion with the words intimating Dhvani is made. The cognition of Dhvani comes later than the Indication and Denotation. The description of the suggestion based upon Denotation is made for the purpose of preparing a background for the larger canvas of Dhvani while the Denotation and Indication are restricted from having multifarious meanings it is only the suggestion which can have several meanings.

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2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Ibid., p. 43. 'Tatraiva dhvananādi śabdānām Samketah'.
This power of suggestion is there not only in words but also in meaning.

Candīdāsa has time and often used different words for the writer of the Kārikās and Vyṛtti, while the first one is 'Sūtrakṛta' the second is Vyṛttikṛta. Hence he regards this work as an attempt of two persons. Candīdāsa interprets Yat as Yayā thereby accepting Indication as 'Āropitadharma'. The primary meaning is derived from the root itself. The Indicative meaning is something different from it. In fact the derivation is for manifestation otherwise the derivation of the word 'Gau' as meaning something going would be Indication. It may be pointed out here that these arguments of Candīdāsa have been copied down in toto by Viśvanātha. He has supported Mammaṭa in his first division of Indication. Pure Indication is of two kinds while the 'Gauṇi' has other varieties also. 'Gauranubandhya' cannot be the example of Inclusive Indication for the arguments put forth by Mammaṭa hold good. The cognition of Individual is implied by the community. For two additional reasons the above mentioned words cannot be example of Inclusive Indication. These are incompatibility of word to convey 'Sabānvyā' and the non-existence of purpose. The hint of Qualitative Indication's

1Dīpikā, p. 27, 41.
2Ibid., p. 41. 'Yat, Yayā bādha prasarādevakāryakārī'.
3Compare Dīpikā, p. 42 with Sāhitya-Darpana, p. 31.
example is given which is to be seen later on. Auxiliary agency is that which is one with what is to be said or their (the thing and what is to be said) non-different nature seems to be so. The difference between the pure and qualitative varieties is based on relation and character and not on the grounds told by Mammaṭa, simply following the old poeticians. This view of Caṇḍīḍaśa is in the nature of Māmāṃśaka thought which was later on followed by Mukulabhaṭṭa etc. The definitions of super imponent and introsusceptive are supported by Mammaṭa. It is also clearly stated that qualitative is not different from Indication it is in fact Indication though having little variation from Indication. Caṇḍīḍaśa has regarded 'Sāropa' different from the pure varieties of Indication. The Indication is the name given to the cognition of what is invariably concomitant with what is directly expressed by the word. This is only relationship and not concomittance.

The purpose of Indication cannot be served by inference because that is possible only when there is actual concomittance. The number of varieties of Indication cannot be restricted to only six in any case. The number of basic varieties only come to thirty-two, twice the number of Śrīdhara, all sixteen having two more varieties based on Resultant and Intended idea, which again can be raised to any number with

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1 Dipika, p. 49. 'Prācīna ticāṇurodhaṇa draṣṭvyam'.
2 Dipika, p. 51.
sub-varieties. Only the foremost varieties are six which are in tally with Mammaṭa, otherwise it has innumerable varieties. The Indication based on purpose and possessing suggestive sense is though of higher quality, still the other based on convention and without suggestive sense is easier for understanding. The apparent suggestion of Mammaṭa is nothing but Guṇībhūtavyaṅga.

The function of the Indicative word is of the nature of suggestion, because the simple word cannot convey the meaning other than the derivative or intended and it is only with this, function that a different kind of meaning is cognized. It is also not Denotation and Indication because it lacks certain qualities of these two. He has supported Śrīdhara's line of demarcation between Denotation and Indication in connection with the two essentials of Indication. The purpose to be accepted in the Indication is only 'Pratīyamāna' of suggestive so only the valid purposes can be accepted and not others. The need for acceptance of suggestion is imperative because it cannot give comprehension of a notion which cannot be known through its process. Because by expressing an object all its qualities cannot be conveyed by that word itself. He has criticized the arguments of Śrīdhara given

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1Dīpikā, p. 56. 'Na ca dvātrimśat svamandhavaividhyayojanatve ānantaḥ eva laksṇāḥ'.
2Ibid., p. 59.
3Ibid., p. 61. 'Prayojanam pratīyamānevaṅgikāryam tasya tanmatrapramāṇaktvāt'.
in favour of above argument. Candīḍāsa feels that the process of Indication cannot be 'Vigayaniṣṭha' or pertaining to the object, because it is only in the process, hence the argument of Śrīdhara does not hold good. He accepts the essentiality of Indication being at the root of suggestion at some places.

Govinda Thakkura is more clear than anyone else in his commentary on this portion. The word 'Yat' has been interpreted as 'Yat' or that. The definition of Indication\(^1\) is accepted as correct and the use of word 'Tadyoga' has been described as used for distinguishing Indication from suggestion and memory. The indication cannot be 'Sakyasambandha' because Mammaṭa's Kārikā means otherwise and also then the three prerequisites described by Mammaṭa will not be there, hence Indication can only be 'Āropitadharma'.\(^2\) All the six kinds of Indication have been given in a very short sentence. The Pure Indication is said to have two attributes, one, the implication of other meaning for the purpose of completing the primary meaning itself; and the second surrendering of primary meaning itself for the sake of secondary meaning. These two attributes are not of qualitative.\(^3\) The qualitative has other attribute namely similarity and hence it is different from

\(^1\) Pradīpa, p. 37. 'Vyaṁjanayāṁ saktī smṛtaṁ cativyāpti vāraṇāya tadyoga iti laksna-āpi pravesanīyam'.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 38. 'Āropita eva sa vyāpārah'.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 40. 'Etābhayaṁ upādhībhyaṁ sūddhaiva dvividhokta na tu gaṇvyapityarthah'.
the first one. 'Gauranubandhyah' cannot be an example of Inclusive Indication, because there is not usage in this case, which may imply the individual. The other example 'Pīno' etc. is also an example of Pure Presumption or verbal presumption and not of Inclusive Indication. The Pure varieties do not require any auxiliary agency in the shape of similitude between the primary and secondary meanings, but the qualitative varieties do need such an agency. Tatsthya cannot be the basis of differentiation between Qualitative and Pure varieties. In the Introsusceptive type of Indication only the object or 'Imposed upon' is mentioned and not imposed. The Introsusceptive and Superimponent varieties can be both Pure and Qualitative.

In the dispute of what is the exact process of Indication in the example Gaurvāhīka, the third view that the word 'ox' indicates the man himself as being the substratum of those same qualities that belong to the ox alone has been supported. An extra quotation has been cited in support of this view. The six varieties of Indication have been supported. Though the varieties from usage and purpose are also possible, but they have not been included in enumeration, because these

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1 Pradīpa, p. 42.
2 Ibid., p. 43. 'Jābdādhvāhārāttenaye śrutārthapatteh arthādhvyāhāra naye arthāpatterevalaksṇānaṅgikārāt'.
3 Ibid., p. 43.
4 Ibid., p. 47. 'Sādhāraṇām jādyamāndvādi laksyata-vacchedakamaśrītya vāhikādir laksyāt'.

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two things are only causes\(^1\) of Indication. However, besides these six varieties of Imposition, there are three varieties due to suggestion. The explanation of Candīdāsa\(^2\) of six varieties including purpose and usage has been discarded on the basis of above argument. The abstruse type\(^3\) of suggestive sense can only be known by those who have the perfection in appreciating the poetry. He has cited his own verse as an extra example for this type of suggested sense.

The function of the Indicative word cannot be anything else but like that of suggestion, because it cannot be conveyed by other things like memory, denotation and Indication. Intended idea cannot be included in the Indicated meaning,\(^4\) because the object of a thing is something and the resultant is something different because there is difference of time between the cause and resultant. The argument of Candīdāsa that because of the difference in time and sameness of process the resultant and cause are same and hence the suggestion does not prove, cannot hold good, because the difference in time only proves their differentiation.\(^5\) Hence a function named as 'Vyanjna' etc. must be accepted which is different from

\(^{1}\) Pradīpa, p. 52.
\(^{2}\) Ibid., p. 52. 'Candīda svākhayānam ..... śabdyorahālocana vijyambhitatvādanādeyam'.
\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 53. 'Kāvyabhavanā pariṇakvabuddhisa-hṛdayaḥ tanmātrāvedyam gūdham'.
\(^{4}\) Ibid., p. 59.
\(^{5}\) Ibid., p. 60.
Indication and Denotation. The suggestive meaning based on Indication is controlled by some particular conditions like connection etc. This is different from Artha-śleṣa, because in 'Śleṣa' both the meanings have purpose while in this type of meaning only one meaning has.

Vidyācakravartin has accepted Indication as 'Āropitadharma'. The use of word 'Yat' has been interpreted as meaning 'Yata' the indeclinable particle. Hence the meaning being which indicates word from the function, that is Indication. The three essential of Indication enumerated by Mammaṭa have been supported. The Inclusive Indication is there where there is implication of the other meaning for the purpose of completing primary meaning. 'Gauranubandhyah' cannot be example of Inclusive Indication, because here there is neither purpose nor usage. Because the attributes of the primary meaning to be implied by Indication is the purpose in it which is lacking in the present example. In usage the primary meaning is altogether left or denied. This is also not there in the present case. In other example also there is verbal or pure presumption and not Indication. Because of Implication 'Upalakṣaṇa' the Indicative Indication is called so. The Pure varieties are called so because the imposition of two implied is not done on one.

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1Sampradāyaprakāśini, p. 37.
2Ibid. p. 52.
The Introsusceptive and Superimponent are both pure and qualitative, when based on similarity these are qualitative, when based on other relations these are Pure.\(^1\) In the dispute of the exact process of Indication in the sentence 'Gaurvāhīka' the third view has been termed as true logical conclusion in this dispute. The six varieties of the Indication have been accepted. Here the commentator tells that this matter has been dealt in detail in his short commentary. Out of the two types of Indication based on usage and purpose the first has been termed as of lower quality.\(^2\) The suggestion based on Indication is described first because its knowledge is more subtle than the Indication based on Expression. The resultant of cognition according to Bhattas (Mīmāṃsakas) is apprehendedness and representative cognition according to Vaiśeṣikas. The object and resultant of cognition can never be one. Because the suggestion or purpose of the speaker is cognized in the fourth stage so there is no chance of being one, of the resultant and object of cognition.\(^3\) Where the suggestion is cognized mainly by word it is called Sabdasaktimūla, where it is cognized mainly due to meaning it is called Arthaśaktimūla.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\)Sampradāyapraśāminī, p. 57
\(^{2}\)Ibid., p. 63.
\(^{3}\)Ibid., p. 72.
\(^{4}\)Ibid., p. 79.
the meaning intended, which must have connection with the main meaning. Indication has been regarded as imposed attribute 'Āropitākriyā' function of the word. The word having some special meaning due to usage cannot be included in suggestion, hence only the Indication based on purpose is said to have suggestion.¹ In the Inclusive Indication where the primary meaning surrenders itself for the other, it does so for the sake of producing purpose. The sentence 'Gauranubandhya' cannot be example of Indication because both purpose and usage are missing. 'Pīna Devḍatta' etc. also cannot be the example of Indication because in this cognition is through verbal presumption and not through Indication.² In the Indicative and Inclusive varieties of Indication there cannot be any aloofness between the Indicated and the Indicative, because that would mean a difference between the two, which in fact is not there. In the Introsusceptive Indication the Imposed is swallowed by the Imposed upon. Because of similarity the Super-imponent and Introsusceptive varieties are qualitative.³ The exact process in the example of Introsusceptive Indication is what has been expressed by Mammaṭa in the third view⁴ because everywhere in poetry words and meanings remain inseparable. He has quoted Locana of Abhinavagupta for his support. In all,

¹Sāhityacudāmaṇi, p. 51.
²Ibid., p. 54.
³Ibid., p. 57.
⁴Ibid., p. 58.
six varieties of Indication have been accepted. The resultant of Indication can be known only through suggestion. Hence suggestion is essential for all varieties of Indication, except those which are based on usage. The function of the Indicative word is none else but suggestion.\(^1\) Indication cannot be here because of lack of essential attributes in the process. If the indication is no more after giving the resultant then there is no infinite regress and this resultant is not something included in the Indicated meaning hence it is only cognized through Suggestion. Suggestion is known by the cognizer after it is vaguely made cognizable by three powers of Indication. The meaning, like the word plays an important role in the cognition of suggestion, that is why the suggestion based on it is regarded equally important.\(^2\)

Bhīmasena the writer of Sudhāsāgara commentary as usual has copied down\(^3\) extensively from Govinda Ṭhakkura. Most of the time commentary is reproduced with addition of few grammatical and other explanatory notes. Material of some other commentators like Čaṇḍīdāsa and Cakravartī has also been used. It is distressing to note that Bhīmasena takes no pains to explain the theoretical portion of the treatise, this is copied down in same words from Govinda Ṭhakkura. There is hardly anything worth mentioning of his own. A few verses left unexplained by Govinda Ṭhakkura have been explained in detail Mammaṭa gets unstinted support from him.

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\(^1\) Sāhityacudāmanī, p. 66.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 79.
\(^3\) Sudhāsāgara, pp. 50-83; Pradīpa, pp. 40-70.
Mahesvara Nyāyalakāra has gone into useless details about the words of Karikas. The Indication according to him is the function of the word from which the meaning other than the primary one is Indicated.¹ 'Yat' of Kārikā has been interpreted as 'Yaya'. Thus Indication has been termed as 'Svatātparyatmākāvṛtti'. An attempt to distinguish, Indication from suggestive meaning, Denotation, and Neyāratha has been made. Following Viśvanātha² he feels that 'Karmani Kuśalah' as the example of Indication based on usage is not correct, because here it has both etymological and conventional meanings. The function by which the secondary meaning is imposed for the sake of completion of primary meaning is Imposed Indication. Unlike others, the commentator lays stress on Indication as an instrument³ for completing the primary meaning through Imposition. This very indication is called 'Arthāntarasamākramita Vācyā'. In the Indication based on usage, only usage is not enough but the infinite use of expressed meaning, independent of Indicative meaning for the used Expression is essential, hence 'Gauranubandhyah' cannot be appropriate example of the Indication based on usage. The use of word

¹ Ādava, p. 47. 'Yaye vṛttya anyo mukhya bhinnārtho lakṣyate pratipādyate'.
³Ibid., p. 51. 'Ākṣepah pratyayānam yayā iti sēṣah'.
'Va' in between two presumptions in connection with discussing 'Pīna' etc. is to show two different schools of thinking on the subject. Where the Expressive and Indicative words are denoted by the same case-termination, there firstly the indifference of expressed meaning is imposed, here the expressed meaning becomes imposed-upon and the Indicative meaning imposed, and when both of these are stated in a Indication it is 'Super Imponent' Indication. This however is different from Rūpakā. Only the explanation is done, and no view expressed about what is the exact process of Indication in 'Gaurvāhika', while only six varieties have been enumerated here, Maheśvara seems to have counted the number eight in some other work named 'Sresthini'. He agrees that the function of the Indicative word is none but suggestion. It has also been accepted that the cognition and the resultant are two different things. The other points have been explained as such.

Siddhācandra Gānī has made ample changes in the Kārika text of the Kāvyaprakāśa in this chapter. The original Karikas are quite a bit different from those found in this commentary. The Indication has been accepted by him as 'Sākyasambandhah', or the relation with the expressed, while

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1 Adarsā, p. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 58. 'Na ca rūpake-api sāropa lakṣṇāiviti-vācyam'.
3 Ibid., pp. 63-65.
4 Ibid., p. 72.
5 Kav. Pr. Khaṇḍana, pp. 7-12.
the Indication based on usage is explained, the other based on purpose has not been touched even. The exact process of Indication in the words 'Gaurvāhīka' etc. is what has been explained by Mammaṭa in third view. The acceptance of suggestive word is unappropriate according to the commentator. Where there is 'Lakṣṇāṁula Dhvani', the purpose being nulled there a special meaning is known through Indication. Where there is absence of one connection of expressed meaning with the special one, there it is usage without purpose which is Indication. Hence there is need of accepting anything like suggestion. Where there is double meaning of the same word, it is because of Import and hence not by suggestion. The power of the particular syllables to produce particular Rasa is also not suggestion, but because of direct apprehension, and mention of Rasa.

Nāgoḷiḥṭaḥ shows that Navyas regard Indication as 'Sākyasambandha'. He regards it as Imposed function, which is in the form of 'Sāktatva' connection, and because of traditionally vested in word it is called like this. Though

1Kav. Pr. Ḍhanḍana, p. 7.
2Ibid., p. 8. 'Vyaṛjanāḥyām pramāṇabhāvāt'.
3Ibid., p. 9. 'Rūḍhirīva prayojanām vinā lakṣṇētyayadheyaṁ'.
4Ibid., p. 9. 'Tātparyagrahādubhaya pratītir bhavisyati kim vyaṛjanayāṁ'.
5Ibid., p. 9.
the connection with the expressed 'Sakyasarabandha' is the Indicativeness, even then because of the tradition it is vested in the word. ¹ The cognition of this connection is the cognition of Indication, because that is the media of knowledge of word. 'Gauranubandhyah' cannot be example of Inclusive Indication, the essential attributes of Indication being missing² there. While the view of the Navyas has been often quoted, the commentators' view on the other varieties of Indication is the same, that Govinda Thakkura holds. The qualitative is not independent function, it is part and parcel of Indication.³ The cognition being the producer of Indication⁴ based on suggestion, the preculsion or debarring is not known, hence the similarity between the two things comes to knowledge without any hitch. The line of demarcation between 'Atisyokti' and Indication is that in the former there is sameness with the Denoted, which is over expressed, while in Indication it is the similarity with the Denoted which is over expressed. Only the six varieties of the Indication have been accepted. The possibility of Indicative Indication

¹Uddyota, p. 39. 'Sākya sambandhasyaiva lakṣaṇatve-apī tasyāpi pramparayā 'sabdaniṣṭhatvam bodhyam'
²Ibid., p. 42.
³Ibid., p. 48. 'Etena gaunāl atirikta vṛttiriyapastam'.
⁴Ibid., p. 48.
⁵Ibid., p. 51. 'Lakṣaṇayāsca na sākyabheda buddhiphalam'.
as being the qualitative and hence the seventh variety, has
been ruled out.\(^1\) The division based on suggestive sense is
also acceptable to the commentator. On all other points Govinda
has been supported.

Vāmanācārya has interpreted 'Yat' as 'Yaya' thereby
meaning that Indication is a function of the word by which a
meaning different from the expressed is known but this meaning
is connected with the denoted one. It is imposing by character\(^2\)
and can be having three characteristics namely 'Sakýtavacche-
dakāroparūpa', 'Sakya sambandharūpa', 'Vakytātparyarūpa'. Though
it is the function of meaning, but as the attribute of the
denoted it is in the word, that is why the word itself is
called Indicative. With the support of the earlier commenta-
tors it is established that 'Gauranubandhayah' cannot be the
example of Inclusive Indication, hence the assertion of
'Maṇḍana Misra' is nullified.\(^3\) Also the second meaning in
'Pīno Devadatta' etc. is known by verbal presumption and not
by Indication. Out of the six varieties of Indication four
are pure and two qualitative.\(^4\) Only Introsusceptive and super-
imponent varieties have qualitative character. The use of
Inclusive Indication is for 'Arthāntara Saṃkramitavācya Dhvani',
the use of Indicative Indication is for 'Atyanttiraskytavācya

\(^1\)Uddyota, p. 52. 'Sadabheda kathānameva safalam'
gauḱya ........ na tadbhāvanmiti bhāvah'.

\(^2\)Bālabodhinī, p. 40.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 44. 'Maṇḍanaśśrastu ...... sanmatamdu-
ṣayitumanuvadati'.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 55.
Dhvani*. The use of Super imponent qualitative is for Rūpaka, Intrósusceptive qualitative for 'Atisyokti' figure of speech. Thirteen varieties \(^1\) of Indication have been accepted. The six original varieties of Mammaṭa are multiplied by two (Abstruse and Explicit Suggestive varieties). The thirteenth being the variety based on usage. It is only Vāmācārya who counts 13 varieties. The function \(^2\) of the Indicative word is none but suggestive, because there is not convention, hence Denotation is ruled out and because of absence of essential attributes Indication is also ruled out. As the object and resultant are distinctly different things; similarly the cognition coming out of Indication, and its resultant are different things. The suggestiveness is not only of Indication but also of Expression. The suggestiveness \(^3\) of expression is based on many factors like 'Samyoga' etc. Not only the words but meanings also have suggestiveness.

Suggestion Based on Meaning

The Ullāsa III of Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa is less controversial than others. Commentators have not gone into long discussions in this Ullāsa. In this chapter the suggestion based on meaning has been discussed.

\(^1\)Balabodhinī, p. 55, last line. 'Lakṣṇā tryodāśa vidhā bodhyeti'.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 58.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 63.
Manikyacandra the oldest commentator has suggested one amendment in the Kārika text itself. He suggests the variant 'Atha' in place of word 'Artha'; implying thereby that the suggestiveness is being described henceforth and not the suggestiveness of the meaning as is generally interpreted and accepted by other writers. This seems to be simply contradicting because Mammaṭa himself has laid in the very first line that he has described meaning of three kinds and then he goes on to discuss the suggestiveness of all these meanings.

Manikyacandra in his usual way has also pointed out two reasons for unappropriateness of the example cited by Mammaṭa as an example of suggestiveness of meaning based on change of voice. He has pointed out one of these two reasons but has not given the second. On all other verses he has practically given nothing of importance. Only explanation of the verses is given. However in the end he has clarified the Kārika in a simpler method, there he views that the suggestiveness of the meaning is main thing but the suggestiveness of the words is also there, which is secondary and helps the suggestiveness of the meaning.

Govinda Thakkura first of all raises the question that when already it has been said that all the meanings have

1Samketa, p. 31. 'Vyam tvasya ślokasya dvīṭīyam padam atha vyaṇjaktocyate iti paṭhāmah'.
2Ibid., p. 33.
3Ibid., p. 36.
suggestiveness then why should there be separate enumeration of the suggestiveness of the meanings of three kinds.\(^1\) He has himself given the answer that there are other factors which matter in knowing the suggestiveness, i.e. the (1) Speaker (2) The person spoken to (3) Intonation (Kāku) (4) Sentence (5) The expressed meaning (6) The presence of another person (7) Context (8) Place (9) Time and so forth. This in fact is the explanation of the Kārikā of Mammaṭa.\(^2\) But he has laid considerable emphasis on 'Pratibhā' or imaginative intuition. He has stated clearly that without 'Pratibhā' the enjoyment of Rasa is not possible. Here he casts a sarcastic remark on the Grammarians\(^3\) that the Grammarians are without Vāsaṇā or Pratibhā that is why they cannot enjoy the Rasa fully. He has supported fully Mammaṭa in his assertion that the example given by him of the suggested meaning by Intonation cannot be of the suggested meaning being subservient to the expressed meaning. Govinda Thakkura says that in a sentence where the meaning is not possible without Intonation, there the suggested meaning is subservient to expressed meaning (Abhidheyaṛtha), but here in the present context, it is otherwise.\(^4\) So it can be surely said to be an example of Suggested meaning based on Intonation. He has also supported Mammaṭa in his assertion

\(^{1}\) Pradīpa, p. 71.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp. 71-72.

\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 72. 'Ata eva vaiyākaranādinaṁ na tathā rasa pratīti'.

\(^{4}\) Ibid., p. 75.
that suggestiveness of the meaning is main thing and of the word auxiliary and secondary; but both do possess suggestiveness.

Nāgojī Bhatta the commentator on Govinda Thakkura while explaining him has avoided the satire which Govinda Thakkura had presented on grammarians in connection with Vāsanā; because Nāgojī Bhatta (as has been shown in his biographical sketch) was primarily a Grammarian. Nowhere otherwise he has expressed anything significant in this chapter, which may be different in view from Govinda Thakkura. Only he while interpreting the verse ‘Dwāropāntre’ etc. termed the closing of knees as ‘Sprāṭaka’ which is not given by others.

Canditāsa in more clear terms has explained Mammaṭa in this chapter. In the very beginning he has said what Mammaṭa purposes to say, in the chapter i.e. ‘Arthasyamukhyato vyānjakatvam nirvāṇikartumarthānttramārabhate’ meaning thereby that Mammaṭa now goes on to explain that the suggestiveness of the meaning is the main thing. He has supported Mammaṭa on almost all the points in this chapter. But he has avoided explanations. In the end he asserts that it is not only the meaning but the word also which is important for its

1 Pradīpa, p. 82. ‘Nanvarthamātrasya vyānjakatve sabdārtha yugalarūpasya vyānjakatva na siddhamityatah-sabdapramāṇa’.

2 Uddyota, p. 81.

3 Dipikā, p. 75.
suggestiveness 'Tasmādanvavyatirekābhīyām Saṃbasyāpisamar-
thyām Kalpniyāh'. Hence his tone is clearly that of those
supporting the word as only constituent of poetry.

As far as the theory of Mammaṭa in connection with
the word as valid proof of Suggestiveness is concerned; he
says that as Rasa itself is self-luminated 'Sva-prakāśa' so
there is no need of proofs. He adds that he has explained
this thing in his separate book 'Siddhānta-saṃgraha'.

Srividyācakravartin the writer of commentary
Sampradāyaprakāśinī has first of all given the appropriateness
of the subjects to be discussed. He argues that after dis­
cussing the word, the meaning is being discussed and hence
its suggestiveness also. Except for, in the end where he
says that for suggestiveness of the meaning, no valid proof
is there except the word. Other proofs such as 'Pratyakṣa'
should not be accepted as valid proofs. Nothing significant
he has contributed in this chapter.

Bhattagopāla the writer of the commentary Sāhitya-
cudāmaṇi, while defining the word 'Pratibhājuṣaṁ' in the
Kārikā says that there are only few who are capable of

1Dīpikā, p. 86.
2Ibid.
3Sampradāyaprakāśīnī, p. 92. 'Sa hi sābdaika
pramaṇakah'.
understanding the meaning through suggestion. He has also given a novel definition of 'Kāku'. He has derived it in two ways, one from the root 'Kak -Laulya' meaning the variation in meaning because of Intonation and secondly from word 'Ku' meaning 'Īsat' and finally meaning, after 'Ādeśa', 'Bhūmi'. The meaning in the context is 'Hṛdayasthavastupriterīṣidbhūmi'.

He also supports Mammata in his assertion that the example given by him of Intonation is not that of suggestive meaning becoming subordinate to the expressed one. Bhattagopāla has given examples of the suggestiveness of the Indicative meaning also, which Mammata himself has not given. So it is an addition by the commentator to the original text.

Bhīmasena the writer of the commentary Sudhāsāgara has almost copied Govinda Thakkura while explaining the Kārikā portion of the Chapter III. So much so he has even given the same words while explaining the words 'Pratibhā-juśām' etc. The lack of originality in this chapter is further shown when the commentator passes the same sacrastic remarks on Grammarians in same words as has been done by Govinda Thakkura. He has also copies down the discussion

1Sāhityacuḍāmaṇi, p. 82.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 91.
4Sudhāsāgara, p. 88.
on the other mutable point in the chapter i.e. whether the example is of Dhvani or 'Gunjibhūtavyaṅgya'. Here also Govinda Ṭhakkura has been copied down. However, he has criticized Govinda Ṭhakkura also when in connection with the example of suggestiveness of the meaning because of the peculiarity of place is given. While Govinda Ṭhakkura has said that in this passage suggestiveness is that the woman asks her friend to send his beloved, Bhīmasena feels that it is not so, but the woman wants to enjoy with her lover at that very place; this is the suggestiveness. This seems to be more accurate. Towards the end of the chapter he asserts that Mammaṭa is right when he says that the meaning depends upon words for suggestiveness. But he adds that similarly the word also needs the help of the meaning hence the suggestiveness of both the word and the meaning which constitute the poetry; is obvious.

Mahēśvarā has explained intonation or 'Kāku' as 'Vikāra vallakṣayam yatra śīrasacāti' meaning thereby that moving of the head is also there when there is a change of voice which may be a factor for suggestiveness. This is the original idea of the commentator, which may be pointed

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1 Sudhāsāgaṇa, p. 88.
2 Ibid., p. 97.
3 Ibid., p. 102. 'Evam śabdo-apyarthamapekṣe-iti sābdārthā yugalarūpa kāvyasya vyañjakatvam nirbādhām'.
4 Adarsa, p. 79.
out as not quite relevant here. About the example of intonation¹ his view is that it is not pure example of Dhvani but a mixture of 'Guṇībhūtavyāṅgya' and 'Svatah Sambhavi Vastu Vyaṅgya'. In the part where the question is put it is 'Guṇībhūtavyāṅgya' but where 'Mayina Yogyā' etc. is said it is 'Svatah Sambhavivastuvyāṅgya Vastu Dhvani' hence 'Ubbhayasaṃkara'. This in fact seems to be a following of middle path by the commentator. Towards the end he clarifies the stand of Mammaṭa in more unambiguous terms when he says that the word should be considered as valid proof of the suggestiveness of the meaning only² in poetry where the importance of the both is an agreed fact. But in Drama there can be other proofs of suggestiveness, such as seeing etc. 'Pratyakṣa Drṣṭo-apyārtha Vyaṅjaka iti bodhayam'.

Sridhara has given altogether new reason for appropriateness of the chapter. He says that the chapter is there to nullify the claim of 'Anumānavādins'³ who says that more meanings can be found from the original meanings and hence and no need of Dhvani and so on. He enumerates different varieties of Kāku,⁴ which has not been given by anyone else. It is clear that he has followed Śrṅgāraprakāśa while doing

¹Adarsa, p. 82.
²Ibid., p. 88.
³Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 49.
⁴Ibid., p. 50, quoting Śrṅgāra Prakāśa Chapter VII.
so. In context of example of particular action as producing suggestiveness he has quoted Rasārṇavaṇṇamkāra, Dasārūpaka, and Nāṭyaśāstra to show how various movements of the limbs of the body help in expressing different suggestive meanings.

Towards the end he has refuted the claim of Bhaṭṭanāyaka that by the movement of limbs a meaning which is produced is 'śabda' or springing forth from word. Śrīdhara's assertion is that it springs forth from meaning with the help of intonation etc. He is outrightly a Dhvanivādin which is clear from his explanation of the text towards end.

Siddhīcandra Gāṇi differs in this chapter from Mammaṭa in case of Mammaṭa's example of 'Kāku-dhvanī' only. Gāṇi feels that both Guṇibhūtavyaṅga and Dhvani are there in the verse. Otherwise he has given very short explanation of the verses; though he leaves some of these.

Vāmancārya the latest commentator has derived 'Kāku' from the word 'Kai' and has quoted Amarakoṣa to show that intonation is a change of voice. He also feels that in the verse 'Tathābhūta' etc. both Guṇibhūtavyaṅga and Dhvani are there. He mainly quotes Govinda Ṭhakkura and Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa for the stand he takes, which is in line with the

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1Kav. Pr. Viveka, p. 55.
2 Ibid., p. 56. 'Kākvādī sahakaritaye tu dhvananmeva vyāpara iti'.
3Kav. Pr. Khandana, p. 13. 'Mayi na yogah kheda ityānse dhvanītvameva'.
4Balabodhini, p. 72.
5Ibid., p. 74.
stand taken by Mammaṭa on all the issues. He has quoted Uddyota and Sudhāsāgara for his support on the point that meaning needs the help of word for suggestiveness and the word also is dependent upon the meaning, hence suggestiveness of both is clear.

Conclusion

In this chapter of the dissertation, there have been three major points of discussion. (1) The Conventional Denotation (2) Number of Varieties of Indication (3) The Suggestion based on meaning.

On first two points commentators have differed greatly. Out of four schools of thought about conventional Denotation which are mentioned by Mammaṭa, the one termed correct by him is the 'Upādhi' school. The commentators, without exception have discussed the merits and demerits of all these varying thoughts. A majority from amongst the selected commentators supports the view of Mammaṭa. Each of them has forwarded his own arguments to show the superiority of the view, which he deems correct. But there are others too, who do not go all out to support the assertion of Mammaṭa. Prominent amongst these are Caṇḍīdāsa and Siddhicandra Gani. The 'Upādhi' view of 'Mahābhaṣya' gets heighest support.

The commentators also differ about acceptance of 'Import meaning' (Tātparyārtha). While Mammaṭa seems to be

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1Balabodhini, p. 81.
accepting it for a limited purpose the majority of the commentators do not accept this type of meaning. Śrīvidyā-cakravartin and Maheśvara and to some extent Maṇikyacandra accept such a meaning.

Both, Abhihitānyavādins and Anvitābhidhānāvādins have their supporters amongst the commentators, where the exact process of meaning in a sentence has been discussed.

Commentators also differ about the nature of Indication. Some of them like Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa, Siddhacandra, Maṇikya and Vāmana accept it as 'Sakyasambandha'. The other commentators regard the nature of Indication as imposing and call it 'Aropita-dharma'.

Commentators have also given different views about the exact number of varieties of Indication. According to Maṇikyacandra these are sixteen, and according to Caṇḍīdāsa thirty-two and Vāmanacārtya fixes the number as thirteen.

There is a single commentator who does not accept the suggestivesense. This is the view of Siddhacandra Gaṇī.

On some other minor points the commentators have also differed.