5.1 INTRODUCTION

War has a long history. Conflicts of the hunting and pastoral stage of human development were still remembered as martial activities. Osanka classifies wars into four types. They are total war, general war, limited war and revolutionary war. Guerrilla warfare comes under the revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary war is the struggle between a politically motivated non-governmental group and a government in which the latter attempts to destroy the former by some or all the means at its command; the non-governmental group attempts by all means at its command to replace the government in some or all of its territory. It is the war of irregulars against the regular army. It is the war of the weak against the stronger army. Since it is the war of the people and irregular, it is even older than regular warfare that required more organisational network and sophistication.

Guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but with changed minds. It is war by the people and for the people. The guerrillas depend on the people for food, information, reinforcement and funds and hence may always keep the people informed.
of the developments. Mao describes the association of the guerrilla with people as that of a fish with water.

Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfare, as stated earlier, characterised by irregular forces fighting small-scale, limited actions, generally in conjunction with a larger political military strategy, against orthodox military forces. Guerrillas are usually non-descript in dress, unconventional in weapons and equipment, lack of formal supply lines, and employ highly unorthodox tactics. In addition to extremely mobile and aggressive operations, its tactics include all aspects of psychological warfare also. Their aim is two folded; while aiming at the destruction of the enemy, they should protect their own existence also.

There are two types of guerrilla warfare: One takes arms against an alien army like Gen. Giap in Vietnam against the U.S. The other fights for his own compatriots like the Chinese Communists against Chiang-kai-shek.

In spite of being an ageless concept the doctrine of Guerrilla warfare has not been given serious attention of military thinkers and planners. Until very recently there was a widespread popular faith and belief that guerrilla warfare was of recent origin invented by communists but it is older than organised warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is basically a political conflict. A conflict between groups and nationalities mainly for attaining political supremacy and independence. Hatred and mutual mistrust lead to the eruption of
violence in any corner of the globe. In the absence of valid political views, the religious, ethnic, linguistic, economic and geographic factors provide the necessary platform for the division of the people of the same nation. Discrimination and the denial of the due opportunities to the minorities by the majorities lead to political prejudice and the affected group politicise the issues among its members and mobilise them for political violence. The sentiments of religion, language, race and ethnicity are well utilised to induce the people. In such a divided society economic and political imbalances necessarily occur and the affected group adopts political violence, revolutionary ideology and guerrilla warfare against the stronger group to safeguard its interests.

The Tamil reaction to suppression by the Sri Lankan Government can be divided into four phases. During 1947-56 it was a period of responsive co-operation. This was followed by the ideals of federalism and satyagraha from 1956 to 1972. The demand for separatist Tamil Eelam came between 1972 and 1983. During the satyagraha period Tamil youth started guerrilla type of military training in various places. The July 83 riots insist the Tamil youth to military action through guerrilla warfare from 1984 and it continues till the present day.

To begin with, in 1948, the Tamils were divided into various groups on the basis of caste and ideology. Slowly changes in leadership from high caste Hindu to low caste Hindu occurred. During the ethnic crisis period (i.e.1972-1983) the LTTE emerged as the most powerful Tamil Eelamist group. Owing to dynamic leadership, the LTTE today has achieved a good position in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The main aim of LTTE has been to consolidate the north and the east by driving off Sri Lankan forces and substituting itself for the Sri Lankan administration. The second aim of the Tiger's strategy was to install a government in Jaffna that would serve as the political base of Eelam. The first aim was achieved through hit-and-run attacks on police stations and army points. The situation in the Tamil areas was so hazardous that government forces were wary of leaving their bases. The second aim was also partially achieved by the LTTE. The opposition leader Bandaranaike informed the Sri Lankan Parliament that LTTE had parallel administration in the de facto state of Eelam, in the North. He also quoted from the island's newspaper, 'Weekend', that LTTE had set up their own police force, postal service, a television station - 'Nidarshan' (freedom). People's courts, their own banks, gramasevaka divisions in the Peninsula and Training centres to girls to serve in health centres.

The LTTE was aiming at more than mere participation in the fighting for attaining of Tamil rights. The LTTE eliminated their rival group leaders one by one, even as they carried on the fight against the Sri Lankan armed forces. The first of them Sabaratnam of TELO, who rivaled Prabhakaran in stature, was killed in May 1986, and his group decimated; Jaffna military leader, Mendis of PLOTE also suffered a similar fate at the hands of the LTTE. With the political elimination of the TULF, the Tigers achieved strong position even against the IPKF operations. Another Tamil Militant group EPRLF sought asylum in India through the IPKF. Consequently, the Sinhalese troops and the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) put up only a poor performance in the Northern and Eastern provinces, against the LTTE.

5.2 VIOLENCE IN 1984

The Tamil Militants initiated guerrilla action against the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan army from the first month of 1984. On January eleventh, 1984, militants attacked a Police patrol in Point-Pedro, north of Jaffna and killed two Tamil policemen. Fearing a similar reaction the government banned media coverage of the event. The newspaper Divaina ignored the edict, and was duly penalised. The state emergency first introduced in May 1983 was re-extended for a month from January eighteenth, 1984.

In the end of March, serious violence erupted in the northern district and continued till April. On March twenty eighth, a group of Air Force personnel were returning from depositing money at a bank in Chunnakam in the Northern Province, near Jaffna. When the Tamil Militants exchanged fire with them. In this incident seven were killed and several others were injured.

In a subsequent incident at Mallakam, several persons were reported to have been injured. Two days later, air force personnel went on a reprisal rampage, seven setting fire to Tamil shops in Apchuvelly, ten miles from Jaffna. On April nineth, Tamil Militants threw a bomb at an army truck and injured fifteen soldiers. When troops opened fire twenty seven Tamil Militants were killed. In another
incident seven militants looted a branch of the Bank of Ceylon at Point-Pedro and escaped with rupees nine lakhs and sixty five thousand. The security guard of the bank was injured.\textsuperscript{12}

In Jaffna, on April tenth Tamil guerrillas attacked an unoccupied Sinhalese school and Buddhist temple. Over the period April nineth to thirteenth, official sources reported that twenty seven Tamil guerrillas were killed. At this time an eighteen hour curfew was clamped on Jaffna town from noon on April tenth, following bombing and arson by militants. Again peace returned to the northern district on April, thirteenth as both sides observed the new year. Official statements said that more than fifty people had been killed during the latest spate of communal unrest, while unofficial estimates put the toll at more than two hundred. By the end of April, police killed Rajadurai Jayachandra, a Senior Member of PLOTE, at Batticaloa.\textsuperscript{13}

Violence between militants and police also occurred on several occasions. On June twentieth and twenty first, 1984 two students died during police firing in Colombo and Kandy. On August fourth, about sixty guerrillas attacked an isolated police station in the Mullaitivu district of the Northern Province, using grenades and powerful explosives and killing three policemen. The same day a police officer was killed and several constables were seriously injured in Valvettiturai.\textsuperscript{14} The violence was perpetrated when a passing vehicle was destroyed by a mine explosion, denoted by remote control. The Sinhalese army avenged the killing of the police officers by attacking innocent prime
people. The TULF president Sivasithamparam said, "The Sinhalese army has been on a rampage and has been killing poor, innocent Tamils"\textsuperscript{15}. As a result of the violence seventy Tamil civilians were killed, some one hundred shops and homes were destroyed in Valvettitturai, and another one hundred and six in Mannar. As the violence continued on August eleventh, six security personnel were killed when a bomb was detonated by remote control. It exploded on a road near the village of Mulankavil, forty miles south of Jaffna.

Near the Chunnakam Police station a number of Tamil guerrillas died during an explosion on August eleventh.\textsuperscript{16} An official statement said that the guerrillas had planned to blow up the police station to release their comrades but their bomb had exploded prematurely, killing eleven terrorists and passers-by. This was one of the unsuccessful attacks made by the Tamil guerrillas.

In Point-Pedro four policemen were killed and three others seriously injured by land-mines in September 1984.\textsuperscript{17} While they were preceding to a police post in a lorry and two jeeps. Following this incident some shops were burnt in Point-Pedro including a CWE retail shop, by police. Nine soldiers were killed by a land-mine near Mullaitivu on September tenth. Again, the Sinhalese soldiers went on a rampage in Jaffna, setting fire to a number of Tamil buildings, including a college library containing a valuable collection of Tamil Literature. They killed at least eighteen people.
Subsequent to the soldiers rampage of Jaffna two more police men were killed by a land-mine near Kilinochchi about twenty miles north of Mankulam on September seventeenth. In Colombo, on eighth October, three bombs exploded, damaging crude oil pipelines running from the port. Three people were killed and ten others were injured when bombs exploded in Colombo on October twenty second. The police detained two people in Colombo and three in Vavuniya in connection with these bombings. The groups called themselves Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of students (EROS).

Security forces took certain actions against the Tamil Militants. On twenty fourth October, when Sri Lankan security forces raided Vaddukoddai, three terrorist were killed and three were arrested. When the security forces personnel were about to leave after collecting a veritable arsenal of weapons a Tamil terrorist came into the compound. After a brief exchange of fire he was rounded up and identified as the leader of the military wing of TELO. The operation yielded a large amount of arms and ammunition as well as food supplies. Among the weapons recovered were, two Indian AK-47 rifles, hand grenades, cartridges, magazines, ten foreign made grenades and thirty four rounds of 9 mm ammunition.

In Jaffna, on October twenty nineth, three militants were killed when security forces raided a camp. The security forces also found weapons arms and ammunition at the site. On November nineth, five terrorists were killed and thirty four were injured when an army patrol
was attacked. The patrol was proceeding to defuse a bomb. The terrorists attacked with bombs and gunfire from the top storey of a building on Kutchery road in Jaffna. According to reports there was exchange of fire and some soldiers were injured and received treatment at the army medical centre.

In Jaffna Col. Ariyapperuma was killed when a land-mine destroyed his jeep near Jaffna on nineteenth November. The government, fearing that these incidents would incite anti-Tamil violence, imposed a nation-wide thirty hour curfew on November twenty second.

The Tamil guerrillas assaulted the police station at Chevakachcheri on November twentieth, ten miles east of Jaffna, and at least twenty nine policemen were dead. The attack on Chevakachcheri began when a Tamil teen-ager went to the police station on the pretext of reporting a lost identity card. He entered the compound through the open gate while other groups of Tamil Militants attacked from other directions. The fighting lasted for over two hours, until a truck filled with incendiary devices exploded against the building, bringing the roof down on the occupants. Security reinforcements were delayed by landmines on the roads leading to Chevakachcheri and Tamil Tigers (LTTE) claimed that grave injuries had been inflicted upon the counter-attacking troops. Immediately after the Chavakachcheri Police Station was attacked, the army moved into the area, in spite of terrorists opposition, and maintained complete control.
Tamil Militants not only attacked the Sri Lankan Police and Sri Lankan army but they also attacked the Sinhalese civilians from Sinhalese settlements. These were two Farm rehabilitation programmes for Sinhalese known as Kent Farm and Dollar Farm which were located about twenty miles inland from Mullaitivu in the Eastern Province. Tamil rebels attacked these two farms on thirtieth November and a two-hour gun-battle ensued and over eighty Sinhalese were killed. The Sri Lankan Government had to make other arrangements as about three thousand Sinhalese settlers had left their homes in the Mullaitivu and Vavuniya areas and sought the sanctuary of schools, temples and military camps.

The attacks on Sinhalese settlements continued, nine policemen including a Muslim inspector were killed by a land-mine in the Eastern Province on eighteenth December. On the following day four soldiers were killed in similar circumstances in the Vavuniya district.

5.2.1 Naval Surveillance Zone - 1984

Sri Lankan Government ordered for the prevention and interception of Tamil guerrillas crossing the Palk strait in 1984. Sri Lankan minister Athulathmuthali declared the Lankan maritime demarcation limit to be a 'Naval Surveillance Zone' around the northern part of the island. This called forth the emergency regulations [Establishment of a prohibited zone] Regulation No.1 of 1984. The emergency regulations enforced a lot of restrictions such as National Identity Cards. Vehicle prohibition, and fuel restrictions. The regulation
act affected the day-to-day life of the Jaffna people. At the same time it was reported in April 1984 the edition of the Indian Magazine ‘India Today’, that Tamil guerrillas were being trained in India even though officials in New Delhi repeatedly denied this allegation.

5.3 JAFFNA OPERATION - JAN-MAY 1985

Sri Lankan security forces attacked the camp of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on January ninth, in the Jaffna area. On the following day Athulathmudali told in the parliament that forty four guerrillas were captured and thirteen were killed. The LTTE claimed responsibility for the damage caused at the Kopide-Haidtelli causeway, the Puthur-Samsali causeway, the Puthur-Thondamannar causeway, the Karaveddimessabi causeway and Varani North causeway in the early hours of fourteenth January. The Tigers said that it was done to restrict the free movement of the army. However, it also affected the movement of the people, foodstuff and essential commodities for the people of the Jaffna Peninsula.

In the south of the Jaffna peninsula, the Jaffna-Colombo train was blown up by Tamil Militants and it was derailed in the dense jungle near Mankulam between Killinochchi and Vavuniya on nineteenth January. Nearly twenty seven soldiers and eleven civilians were killed in the explosion and over forty others were injured. The train explosions affected rail traffic towards the north and brought it to a halt. These events affected the ordinary people of the Jaffn Peninsula. In revenge, security forces went on a ramp January thirty first.
‘Times’ report said that at least thirty two villagers were killed by
the security forces during an operation in the Mannar district.

Several controversial reports about the confrontations emerged. Tamil Militants raided an army camp on February thirteenth near Kokilai, on the south coast of Mullaitivu. The official source said thirteen militants and four soldiers were killed, although militant sources claimed later that more than sixty soldiers were killed in the attack. More than one hundred Tamil militant took part in this attack.

Security forces attacked the training camp of Tamil Militants in Mullaitivu district on February fifteenth, killing fifty eight guerrillas. Later, Tamil guerrillas attacked a police station at Kilinochchi, on March first, killing at least four soldiers in the process. The killing continued. On March sixth, the soldiers raided a separatist training camp at Point-Pedro and killed seven Tamil guerrillas.

The Land-mine tactics were utilised again by Tamil Militants, when nine policemen were killed in the Eastern Province, on April third. A land-mine destroyed an army patrol vehicle that was transporting suspected Tamil guerrillas near Mullaitivu and Nelliady on April twenty second, killing twenty four guerrillas and four soldiers. One killed in Mullaitivu and nine Tamil Guerillas were killed in Neliady. On April twenty eighth, in two separate land-mine explosions, seven soldiers were killed near Jaffna and an officer and six soldiers were killed near Trincomalee. By mid-summer 1985, the northern part of the
Jaffna peninsula, and other Tamil areas had become no-go areas for Government troops.

5.4 TAMIL 'NO-GO' AREA

The Tamil Tigers (LTTE) began to bring the Jaffna Peninsula under their control, setting up a civil administration, collecting taxes, organising schools and hospitals. However, Tamil 'no-go' areas in the north are not self-sufficient in food, and still have to rely upon the produce brought in from the south by trucks.

On Jaffna Peninsula, Colombo's garrison forces were increasingly confined to heavily defended enclaves-palali, the Karainagar naval base and in Jaffna town itself the army camps of Gurunagar and old Dutch Fort. Military movement was restricted by the mines. Brig-Gen. Nalin Senevilatne told Asia week: "But movement is slow because we have to clear roads before we can move vehicles across". But militant activities were criticised by a prominent member of Jaffna's Citizens Committee who said: 'There is a real sense of insecurity here'.

Asia week reported that the LTTE, were collecting taxes from the people in Jaffna Peninsula. The report said that the Tigers were collecting taxes from shop owners [$50-250 per month in downtown Jaffna], transport lorries [$250 per month] also for alcohol and cigarettes and all of which contribute to skyrocketing prices. Beach goers in Jaffna paid a user fee of $0.50 and received a receipt. In Jaffna and Batticaloa several prominent businessmen were kidnapped and kept under house
arrest, reportedly under good conditions, but the ransom can go as high as $100,000. An LTTE political officer said: "we are a movement and we don't get money from other governments we have to survive". Reports say that, the LTTE currently earns about $400,000 a month, all of which is kept in cash.

5.5 ANURADHAPURA MASSACRE - MAY 1985

There were fears of a repetition of the July 1983 island-wide anti-Tamil violence, in the wake of acts of violence committed against Tamils and their property in various parts of Sri Lanka. On third May, 1985 Tamil Militants attacked the Sri Lankan naval base at Karainagar in northern Jaffna when at least twenty eight militants and three naval personal were killed. Militants attacked the naval base with small cannons and guns; counterattacks were made by the gunboats of the navy.

On May eleventh security forces killed seventy Tamils in various incidents such as, in Karaitivu and Jaffna when a Tamil passenger was shot by the forces. Sri Lankan helicopter massacres occurred at Mutur resulting in the death of ten Tamils. Like in the Sri Lankan armed forces there was an open fire in Jaffna killing four innocent civilians. A bus was hijacked and burnt at Chilaw and nearly forty were killed and two girls who were travelling in the bus were raped. The bus was set on fire and completely burnt. Following these armed action by Sri Lankans the Tamil guerrillas attacked the Sinhalese community in Anuradhapura. About forty Tamil Tigers in military uniform drove into
the city in a bus, firing in the crowds with automatic weapons and throwing grenades. This was one of the most notorious incidents of the so-called "Anuradhapura Massacre" (May 14, 1985) and was reportedly led by 'Rahim' of LTTE. About one hundred and thirty eight people were killed in Anuradhapura of which thirty were women, five were childrens and five were members of the Buddhist clergy. Nearly one hundred people were wounded. The Government imposed a curfew, but on the following day forty Tamils were killed in the area, and Tamil houses were burned in a town near the site of the Anuradhapura Massacre.

It was alleged that in the town of Vavuniya upto twenty thousand Tamils were forced to leave their homes and the Sinhalese urged to move into their vacated houses and to take over the land.

In Palk Bay, on May fifteenth, a passenger boat plying between the island of Delft and Kurikadduvan was attacked by several men. They were identified as Naval personnel in civilian clothes. It resulted in the death of thirty eight Tamils civilians and also thirty Tamils were reported injured and many were feared missing. Athulathmudali, the Minister of National Security, denied that the security forces were involved in the Massacre. However, those who spoke to the survivors were convinced that the assailants were Sinhalese naval personnel carrying automatic weapons.

This was followed by the Anuradhapura Massacre. All the four Tamil separatist group [ENLF] issued joint statements denying
involvement in the massacre, which they also condemned as an act of senseless violence. On May twenty third parliament began a debate which was subjected to censorship. On the following day, the president announced special powers for the members of parliament in their respective constituencies. It was an attempt to maintain law and order.

Despite their announcement the ENLF continued guerrilla activities in various ways. In June twelfth, TELO guerrillas attacked a police station in the Eastern Province, and killed seven people. A series of violent episodes happened in the same province. On eleventh June, Colombo radio reported a plan to kill the President Jayawardene, to blowup the presidential secretariat, the Indian high commission and cause damage to the British High Commission. It was detected in time by the police. The authorities blamed EROS, but Balakumar the EROS leader denied responsibility for the plot.

5.6 THE THIMPU TALKS [PEACE PROPOSAL] - 1985

In the month of July, 1985 Peace proposals were made by the Indian Government. Great efforts were made by the Government of India and in particular by Romesh Bhandari, the Foreign Secretary during that time. It was at this time that Rajiv Gandhi invited Jayawardene to New Delhi. Since February 1985 the Government of India had been attempting to persuade the Government of Sri Lanka to commence direct talks with Tamil Militant groups.
Both the Sri Lankan Government and the militants accepted the goodwill of the Indian approach. On eighth July, a ten member official Sri Lankan delegation and a thirteen member Tamil delegation comprising two members from each of the major five militant group LTTE, EROS, TELO, EPRLF and PLOT, and three top representatives from the TULF and five Indian officials, were brought together and the Thimpu Talks, commenced in Bhutan.

However, the talks broke down, with Sri Lanka offering 'too little too late', and the Tamils refusing to offer an alternative proposal which in effect would have compromised their stand on 'Eelam' without getting anything substantial in return. The groups made four demands which included.

i) Recognition of the Tamils as a distinct nationality;

ii) The right of the Tamils to self-determination;

iii) Territorial integrity of the identified Tamil homeland;

iv) Recognition of the rights of the citizen and other fundamental rights to all Tamils who look upon the island as their home.

The Sri Lankan delegation was in no position to even discuss these points without clearance from Colombo. The Thimpu talks were therefore adjourned. The Thimpu talks were resumed on twelfth August
when the President rejected the demands of the Tamil force, and also refused to merge the northern and eastern province, as India would have liked.

During the second phase of the talks, on the night of August sixteenth nearly one hundred civilians were killed by the armed forces in and around Vavuniya. The Government announced later that there had been an incident in Vavuniya in which twenty one people were killed when security forces reacted to an attempted ambush. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review the incident occurred when a land-mine exploded under a military vehicle and the troops retaliated.

The talks ended abruptly, when hundreds of Tamils were killed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Mannar area, on twenty second August. The representative of the Tamil Militants walked out, accusing the Sri Lankan Government of breaking the cease-fire and no further discussions were possible.

A group of armed officers raided a training camp in Tirukkovil area during the early hours of twenty fifth August. During the raid twenty-six terrorists were killed, official sources said that it was a combined training camp for EROS and TELO groups. Armed forces recovered foodstuffs, literature, arms and ammunition from the camp.

5.6.1 Warning by LTTE

During the first phase of the Thimpu Talks, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam warned the Sri Lankan Government, that guerrilla
forces would be compelled to take defensive action, because of Sri Lankan armed forces activities against unarmed cadres and the Tamil civilian population. The army made a search-and-destroy operation on July sixteenth in the village of Kiran and Arampathi in Batticaloa district. Innocent peoples were assaulted and terrorised by the army. The press release said, that similar types of operations happened almost daily in Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan Government was accused of deliberately creating conditions of tension, turmoil and insecurity in Tamil areas.

After the failure of the Thimpu Talks, a group of Tamil militants attacked a police station in Eravur, about ten miles north of Batticaloa on September second. Rockets, RPG-7 grenades, mortars, bombs and machine guns were used by militants, in which four policemen died, eleven injured and three of them were seriously injured. Six police constables were reported missing. This attack was the work of LTTE-involving about one hundred and fifty armed militants.

5.7 OPERATION NILAVELI - SEP 1985

The Tamil people from Thirukkadaloor, Salli, Kumpurupitty, Pallathoddam, Veeranagar, Pankulam, Sambatheeva, Thuvarankadu, Kanniya, Kuchachaveli and Triyay were driven out by Sri Lankan security forces and homeguards. This happened on twelfth and thirteenth September, resulting in the death of eighty nine people including children. Most of them become refugees, and sought shelter in Nilaveli. Several thousands were temporarily accommodated in
churches and hotels at Nilaveli. Although the bridge linking Nilaveli had been blown up by the guerrillas earlier, most of the refugees entered the town through the jungle or by sea.

The security forces also reached Nilaveli, through the jungle. On the way they encountered Tamil guerrillas. The encounter however did not last long.

According to Government sources, on eighteenth september - 'D-Day'\(^5\) had started what was termed as 'Operation Nilaveli'. According to the security forces concerned, it was the biggest offensive yet because twelve armoured cars, six tanks, two helicopters and gun boats were utilised. In the operation forty six terrorist were killed and eighty four surrendered in a twelve hour offensive. Three hotels and several hundred houses were reduced to ashes. More than one hundred and fifty civilians were killed.

In operation Nilaveli the security forces killed 100 women and children, who were refugees and took away about forty youths who were killed after interrogation. Some among them were girls who were allegedly raped before being killed. The report was flashed in 'The Hindustan Times', 'Statesman' and 'Patriot'; all from India, on eighteenth september.

The Government of Sri Lanka however, categorically denied these charges and stated that the operation carried out was only against the terrorists who were clandestinely operating in Nilaveli.
5.8 OPERATION GREEN ARROW - OCTOBER 1985

The EPRLF launched 'Operation Green Arrow' on thirty first October 1985, in the Trincomalee district. The aims of the operation was to get rid of the Sinhalese, Muslims and Tamils who did not support them. The militants attacked Sinhalese and muslim villagers resulting in the brutal killing of a naval officer, his wife, their infant, two sailors and a civilian at Trincomalee.

5.9 VIOLENCES IN 1986

The TENLF began their offensive by attacking the Jaffna fort camp in large numbers, on the morning of fourteenth January during the Hindu festival of Tai-Pongal. As a result of these attacks three soldiers were seriously hurt and brought to Colombo. On January twenty sixth 1986 two policemen - a sergent and a constable - killed in a grenade attacked by Tamil militants at Oddusuddn and other policemen nearby were injured. In a reprisal police commandos, who came on the scene, and having failed to apprehend the militants responsible for the grenade attack shot down and killed five civilians who had come to the market. In the meantime the Sri Lankan Government had got into an aggressive and militant mood. President Jayawardene’s interview with ‘The Times’ on January twenty sixth, announced that he would seek a military solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka which he described as a ‘military conflict’. Simultaneously, the Sri Lankan air force undertook helicopter operations at kokkilai firing on a group of nearly twenty five armed militants. In this incident two terrorists were killed.
the meantime security forces arrested twenty five hard-core Tamil Militants in the Eastern Provinces. Security sources identified them as belonging to LTTE and EPRLF.57

On thirty first January58 the Sri Lankan security forces repulsed an attack by nine hundred terrorists, killing twenty nine of them at Dharmapuram in Kilinochchi. Security forces said that the troops were on a protective patrol along Parantan-Mullaitivu road and were compelled to occupy a temporary position at Dharmapuram, six miles away from Paranatan, when the two vehicles they were proceeding, got broke down. While the vehicle were being repaired, they were attacked by Tamil Militants. The security forces also received information that around five hundred terrorists had surrounded the area. Air support was immediately called for. In the resulting aerial attack the Government forces killed, more than one hundred Tamil civilians. The Sri Lankan security force reinforcement was stopped by PLA militants who held two hundred soldiers under siege and blasted a bridge near Dharmapuram.59 The siege was withdrawn after thirty soldiers were killed in the militants counter attack.

In Vavuniya, the PLOTE leader was shot dead by the security forces.60 On March twelfth and fourteenth, 1986, New Delhi radio reported two separate Air Force attacks on areas near Jaffna. A railway line was sabotaged on March sixteenth near Kilinochchi, killing five people. Officials blamed the 'terrorists' for the sabotage, but reports from Jaffna confirmed that the attack was carried out by Sri
Lankan armed forces. Upt to eighty people were killed in the northern town of Akkaraipattu due to landmine explosions, on the same day.

5.9.1 Operation Short-Shift May-June 1986

The Joint Operation Command [JOC] decided to make a positive effort to breakout from siege-type situations to scatter the insurgent forces and secure the roads between the main bases in the Jaffna peninsula, so that garrisons could be reinforced by road. This plan was code-named ‘Operation Short-Shrift’ [officially described as a troop rotation].

Hence Sri Lankan Armed forces moved into Pallai air field Kayts naval base, elephant pass and Jaffna fort. Approximately two thousand soldiers were stationed in camps throughout the northern Jaffna peninsula and attempts were made to control Jaffna town, the Tamil heartland of the guerrillas, who had controlled it for the past one year.

The security forces began the operation on May seventeenth, 1986. On the following day five army camps, including Jaffna fort were attacked. On May, nineteenth two of the Sri Lankan air force bombers made a rocket attack on Jaffna and hit the general hospital and bus station, causing civilian casualties. At least fifty two people were killed and over two hundred were injured. However, the Government claimed that the major damage in Jaffna town had been caused by malfunctioning rockets fired by Tamil guerrillas. Velvettiturai was also attacked with rockets from air crafts and shelling from naval Points at sea.
Conflicting statements were issued subsequently. On May twenty third the Government and army announced that all camps of armed forces were secured with the exception of Jaffna fort. But the LTTE claimed on twenty fifth May, that it had regained control of the whole peninsula. Tamil sources claimed that in a village near Trincomalee, on May twenty third, security forces had killed nineteen Tamils and destroyed forty houses.

On twenty fifth May several bombs were exploded in the Eastern Province to commemorate the death of a LTTE leader known as Aruna insurgents attacked Siripura, a village twenty five kilometres west of Trincomalee. Twenty Sinhalese settlers including ten children were killed. On thirtieth May an army vehicle hit a land-mine at a village situated twelve kilometres from Muthur, south of Trincomalee, killing eighteen soldiers and wounding fourteen. The next day twelve Sri Lankans were killed and forty were wounded by the explosion on a passenger train forty kilometres from colombo. EROS claimed responsibility for the explosion.

On fourth June, the Tamil guerrillas, mounted a four day sustained offensive, deploying upto four hundred guerrillas. They attacked the strategically important armed forces camp at Kilinochchi in the Northern Province, just south of Elephant pass. In mid June, the LTTE spokesman in Madras announced that the attack on the Kilinochchi camp was still in progress and two air-force helicopters had been shot down. The Hindu reported on June fourteenth, that
Tamil Militants in Jaffna had for the first time displayed anti-aircraft weaponry on the streets.

EROS, on eleventh June claimed to have killed nineteen Sri Lankan naval personnel in reprisal for what they described as the massacre of thirty seven Tamil fishermen during security force operations on Mandaitivu, an island of the Jaffna peninsula. The ‘Guardian’ of June thirteenth reported that the armed forces had on June tenth resumed the military operations on the Jaffna peninsula to move fresh troops into army camps there, but no visible progress was made and it died down by the end of the month.

India charged that the campaign included “Indiscriminate aerial bombings and strafing of Jaffna city”.

Sri Lanka retorted that it had merely provided air cover for the army base in the centre of the rebel-held city.

5.10 OPERATION LIBERATION - 1987

Operation Liberation began on twenty sixth may 1987. It was Sri Lankan military’s most ambitious offensive yet, in the northern Jaffna peninsula where Tamil separatist guerrillas had kept the army under siege for more than two years. This operation was followed by the air-force dropping leaflets warning inhabitants to seek shelter in designated Government buildings, temples and military camps.

According to military sources, Gen. Cyril Ranatunga head of the Joint Operation Command, personally directed the operation from Palali
army base. Asia week maintained that the intent of the operation was three fold: to capture LTTE leader Prabhakaran, to secure a large section of the Jaffna peninsula; and to deliver a pointed message to the rebels that they could not win a military victory.

The plan of the Sri Lankan army was initiated accordingly. Birg Denzil Kobbekaduwa led a column of troops from Tondaimannar army base, about thirty kilometres north of Jaffna city, in northeast towards guerrilla bases in Velvettiturai and Point-Pedro. Col. Sathis Jayasundera was in charge of house search on the outskirts of Valvettiturai, a major guerrilla stronghold. At the same time another column led by col. Wijaya Wimalaratne, pushed southeast towards Nelliadi. The first objective of the operation was designated to Lt. Col. Sunil Peiris, who headed Sri Lanka’s British-trained commando regiment. The regiment had been on stand-by for weeks to move out at an instant notice to capture the Tamil leader.

Operation Liberation had two distinct phases. In the first phase from May twenty sixth to June first, a successful assault took place in the Vadamarachchi area of Jaffna peninsula— the peninsula’s northeastern coastal strip is largely separated from the rest of the peninsula by a stretch of water—which had long been a principle stronghold of the LTTE. In the second phase, from June first to June tenth, the security forces consolidated their hold on the Vadamarachchi strip and pushed in a westerly direction along the coast, capturing further strategic towns and bases.
In the first phase two hours after dropping leaflets, aircrafts commenced bombing the strongholds of Tamil Tigers in the northern part of the Vada strip, while Navy shelled other areas. The Vada strip is a narrow strip near the wide Jaffna lagoon, which opens out at its northern end to embrace the town of Point-Pedro, Puloli, Kareveddi, Tumpalai and Valvettiturai. Navy began attacking with support of the eight thousand troops in armed columns who had moved out of the nine army camps situated on the peninsula.

Operating with extreme caution the move was slow due to numerous land-mines along roadways, and body-traps in buildings. Indeed ninety percent of the army's casualties were caused by these mines. On the whole little serious opposition was encountered, as Tamil Tigers, in the face of superior numbers and fire-power, withdrew rapidly after firing a few shots and detonating a few land-mines. The column was supported by aerial bombing and rockets fired from helicopters. Government forces moved toward Valvettithurai which they captured on May twenty ninth. Moving further east, the army captured point Pedro on May thirty first - June first. Finally they were possession of Prabhakaran's town. They also claimed to have effectively isolated the Vadamarachchi area. Thus ended the first phase of Operation Liberation.

During second phase there was less action. On June third, Tamil Tigers (LTTE) attacked the two communications building with explosives killing three soldiers and wounding over forty. According
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to Mc Donald, LTTE claimed to have blown up the Sri Lankan broadcasting commission office. On the same day at one in the morning in downtown Jaffna, a seventeen year-old boy named Dilip crashed a blue one-and-a-half ton Toyota truck with over thousand kilograms of high explosives into the broadcasting office, triggered a fuse and then fled. Eight seconds later most of the building collapsed, Dilip survived.

On June sixth and seventh the army captured the area around Atcheveli. Troops also crawled, in a westernly direction towards Kankesanturai, from where a large number of Tamils fled to Vavuniya in the Northern Province. Troops had seized two villages Keerimalai, on the coast and Maviddapurais further in the island. On seventh June, the LTTE fired mortars at the Kankesanturai harbour in northern Sri Lanka, impeding the unloading of foodstuffs and also the unloading of fuel and their storage to the nearby fuel dumps. The LTTE were obviously attempting to disturb the food and fuel supplies to Jaffna to justify the propaganda regarding a so-called economic embargo to Jaffna which constituted the major platform of the militants lobby in Tamil Nadu and the Central Government. The Sri Lankan claimed complete control of Keerimalai and Maviddapurais in a limited operation that ended on ninth June. India Today a news magazine described 'Operation Liberation' Vadamarachchi as intense and bloody. Entire buildings were razed to the ground and rockets, bombs from overhead fell on a number of churches and temples. Most people preferred
to take shelter in the bankers built by the Tigers. Colombo described the offensive as a 'fight to the finish' against Tamil guerrillas.

The LTTE had in a press release issued in Madras on twenty ninth May stated that five hundred Tamil civilians were killed in Vadamarachchi. The Government claimed that two thousand six hundred and seventy seven Tamils had been detained during Operation Liberation (of whom at least one thousand five hundred and forty were subsequently released) and that one hundred and one militants, forty seven soldiers and twenty eight members of the security forces had been killed, as a result of 'carpet bombing' carried out by the Air force.

Tamil Eelam Information Service alleged that the army dropped bombs like unrolling a carpet over an area. The six single-propeller Machetti aircraft, Chinese yak-12 aircraft, another Avros and two Dc-3s were used mainly to transport supplies and personnel, the twelve Bell-212 helicopters and four Bell-4123 were used for command, and reconnaissance purposes. A Sri Lankan army authority said, that all aircraft were kept busy during operation liberation.

5.11 INDIAN RELIEF MISSION

The Government of India sent a relief mission to Jaffna through the Red Cross Society on humanitarian grounds. The relief items consisted of kerosene, bread, match-sticks, tamarind, vegetables, milk powder and salt. But the main article was rice, twenty seven tonnes were sent by boats. These boats were escorted by offshore patrol
vessel ‘Vikram’ and ‘O.P. Srivastava’ a search and rescue vessel with Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India and two Indian Coast Guard planes and navy helicopters that circled overhead. But relief measures were stopped by a Sri Lankan naval gun boats and they were not allowed to enter the Sri Lankan territory. On June fourth, 1987, India authorities demonstrated to the world that they were rabid over Sri Lanka situation. Four French-Built Mirage Fighters planes escorted by time gariet built An-32 transport planes left Bangalore at 3.55 pm that day and entered Sri Lankan’s Airspace at 4.55 pm they dropped twenty five metric tonnes of food as medicine over Jaffna, from above one thousand five hundred feet and returned to the Indian air base. These operations were called ‘Operation Poomalai’ [Garland]. Due to the Indian intervention through the relief mission the Sri Lankan forces became cautious and stopped ‘Operation Liberation’ against Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamil Militants in the Jaffna peninsula.

5.12 INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD

Operation Liberation was an extreme step. The indiscriminate bombing of Tamil civilians and residential areas gave the Sri Lankan security forces a very negative image. The Jayawardene Government changed its stance overnight to agree to serious negotiations for finding a political solution. The result was the eventual emergence of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of July twenty ninth, 1987.

The drawback of the accord was that it was signed by the Government of India and Sri Lanka although the Government of
India was not the party to the disputes, which had led to violence in the island republic. Ideally it should have been signed by the Jayawardene's administration on the one hand and the Tamil militant groups on the other with the Government of India acting as the guarantor. That was a major diplomatic failure on the part of New Delhi.

After signing of the accord the deadline for the surrender of arms was decided as seventy two hours but it had to be extended. With the exception of LTTE other militants handed over its arms to IPKF. This was because, the LTTE leader was being kept in New Delhi. Prabhakaran returned from India to Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka on August second 1987. He decided to make a token gesture on fourth August a small amount of weapons, like homemade mortars, rockets-launchers and machine-guns were surrendered. Yogi himself handed over his personal pistol. Prabhakaran was expected to announce in public meeting at Suthumalai the movement's decision on the surrender of arms.

However, a statement was issued by Sivasubramaniam Kanagaratnam alias Capt.Raheem, the close lieutenant of the LTTE leader, in Asia Week: circumstances have forced us to lay down our arms. But remember that we haven't signed any pact, either with the Indian Government or the Sri Lankan Government. The war has ended, but the struggle will continue.
The Accord collapsed primarily because of two incidents. The first involved the LTTE propaganda chief Thileepan, who went on a fast on fifteenth September 1987 in Nallur Temple in Jaffna putting forward five demands, two of which dealt with colonisation and the release of prisoners. As a prominent Tiger leader, he sacrificed his life tragically on twenty sixth September. To the LTTE, his death confirmed India’s insensitivity to the Tamil cause. Secondly, on third October 1987 the Sri Lankan navy apprehended seventeen persons on the high seas which included some prominent leaders of LTTE. The Sri Lankan navy wanted to take the prisoners to Colombo for interrogation to ascertain LTTE activities. The LTTE demanded their release and wanted the IPKF to take over the prisoners and not allow them to be taken to Colombo. Ultimately, due to a gross mishandling of the situation all seventeen swallowed cyanide capsules, when they were being escorted to a waiting air craft. Among the dead was the infamous Pulendran and Kumarappa the Jaffna Regional Commander. Thereafter, the Tigers (LTTE) and the IPKF came into open confrontation. In fact New Delhi’s dealing with the LTTE has been a series of grievous blunders.

5.12.1 Operation Pawan - October 1987

Subsequently the IPKF was sucked into a full-scale battle against the LTTE, the most dominant militant Tamil group in the island. The IPKF’s objective was to capture the LTTE leaders, seize their arms and demolish the opposition to the accord. The army tried to enter Jaffna town from three axes. The southwest, northwest and west of the town.
However, the initial assessment that the action would be over in five days was later revised to ten days.

The assessment of action against LTTE by IPKF in Sri Lanka-coded named ‘Operation Pawan’, was a chapter of Indian military history that will contain none of the honour and glory of a victorious campaign. Not withstanding the fact that the IPKF fought against daunting odds and severe constraints for the ‘Liberation of Jaffna’.

The operation was divided into two sectors Northern and Eastern sectors. Northern sector consisting of north of elephant pass [Jaffna peninsula] which was under the fifty fourth infantry division. The Eastern sector called the Trincomalee sector was under the thirty sixth infantry division.

To liberate Jaffna, the IPKF formulated the following concepts:

i) Employing multiple thrust lines including air and sea borne landing;

ii) Opening at least one axis of maintenance behind the advancing troops to ensure continuous supply;

iii) Troops not dependent on this axis of maintenance to be supplied by air till supply by road could be commenced;
iv) Air, naval and artillery support to be confined to confirmed target only; and

v) The navy to establish a sea blockade.

The first plan to be executed by IPKF was establishment of defence tiers along Sandpai - Chunnakam - Puttur. Secondly Kopai North - Urumparai - Kondvil - Manipai- Arali. The third tier was in Navalkuli-kopai south and on the coast. Jaffna town provided the fourth tier.

According to Lt.Gen. Singh the liberation of Jaffna would be carried out through eighteenth Infantry Brigade from the east and seventy two and ninety one Infantry Brigade from the north. One Infantry Battalion exninty one Infantry Brigades to embark in naval assault craft at Kankesanturai and land west of Jaffna fort and link up with it. The link up was to be affected by ninety one Infantry Brigade and seventy two Infantry Brigade within twenty four hours. Forty one and one hundred and fifteen Infantry Brigade, which were expected later would be employed to either reinforce existing thrust lines or developed new ones. The plan, also specified that Jaffna was to be captured within four days.

The operation was started against LTTE on tenth October 1987. With in three days of 'Full-Hedged Operation', some five hundred suspected LTTE members were taken into custody and two ordnance factories of the tigers were destroyed. They recovered arms as well as ammunition and over four hundred kilogram of explosives in the
Eastern Province. Moreover, the media of the LTTE, press, two newspapers - Eelamurasu and Murasoli - which Tamil tigers were running in Jaffna, were also blown up by the IPKF.

After the search and raid operation by IPKF on LTTE offices was launched, the IPKF engaged in a concentrated man hunt for the senior LTTE leader: Military Commander Prabhakaran. But it was not easily accomplished. The LTTE leaders have many hide-outs in the peninsula which they switch and can count on the locals, to give them sanctuary.

After about a week the Indian columns were still at the city's municipal limits despite the dual advantage of superior firepower and numbers. An elaborate network of mines and booby-traps set by the LTTE hampered the progress of the Indian forces as did the unexpected strength of LTTE resistance. The IPKF however had made some progress by October twentieth and on October twenty fifth, the IPKF declared Jaffna a ‘free city’, a large proportion of one lakh thirty thousand inhabitants had, however, fled to outlying districts. In the operation 'free city' more than six hundred Tamil rebels had been killed by IPKF on October, tenth to twenty second on hearing fighting in and around the northern city of Jaffna. Indian military officials claimed seventeen officers twenty six Junior Commissioned Officer's and two hundred and seventy six soldiers were killed.
Major Anil Kaul, of the armoured regiment, was the first officer to be wounded during the extensive deployment of tanks to rescue IPKF personnel who were concerned by the LTTE guerrillas. When he was interviewed by ‘India Today’ he said: ‘The Tigers had a contradictory approach. Their movements, the way they took fire, showed professional training. But their tactics were not those of a professional army—we were fighting a uninformed enemy equipped with the same kind of weapon’s.

5.12.2 LTTE Peace Proposal

Meanwhile, LTTE in a conciliatory mood, sent a letter dated on fourteenth November 1987, to Brigadier Kahlon, Jaffna commandant, making the following points:

(a) The IPKF should move back to its position period to tenth october 1987;

(b) Search and raid operation should be stopped;

(c) LTTE members to be allowed to live a normal life in dignity, and rights of the Tamil people to be restored;

(d) The functioning of hospitals, food supplies and transport should be handed over to the civilians authorities;

(e) Establishment of a Tamil Police Force for the northern and Eastern Province;
(f) On declaration of cease-fire by the IPKF, the LTTE will immediately lay down arms;

(g) The LTTE is prepared for resumption of negotiations immediately;

(h) The Rupees One million price on Prabhakaran's head to be cancelled;

(i) The LTTE is not against the accord as long as it safeguards the rights and interest of the Tamil speaking people; and

(j) The LTTE looks to India, for a solution of the problems of the Tamils.

However, New Delhi rejected the offer and insisted that any terms of surrender must be unconditional; and it must come directly from Prabhakaran and carry assurance that all arms will be laid down; and must fully support the accord. It was a well known fact that no solution was possible without the LTTE.

In the meantime the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka was becoming a big problem on the part of Indian Government. No solution was at hand because there was no direct or open channel of communication between the Indian Government and LTTE.
5.12.3 Operation Checkmate

After gaining control of Jaffna the IPKF succeeded in driving the Tamil guerrillas to the jungles of Vavuniya and Mannar districts. The control of Jaffna could not step-up the morale of the Indian soldiers, since the guerrillas were never bothered about the control of territory. The demographic cover enjoyed by the Tamil guerrillas in the urban areas puzzled the Indian soldier and they could not identify the enemy. By the end of 1987, two hundred and seventy Indian soldiers had lost their lives in the intense campaign to wrest Jaffna from the LTTE. In 1987, they lost five hundred and thirty men and officers. The operation checkmate was carried out in three phases. It killed forty four Tamil guerrillas in the Nittikaikulam area. Intensive tightenings took place near Nayaru lagoon. Since July twenty nineth 1987 the Indian Air Force had flown forty five thousand sorties and carried some three lakhs troops to and fro.

5.12.4 Operation Massive Clearing-Up

On April eighth, 1988, the IPKF engaged in a ‘Massive Clearing-up Operation’ against LTTE. At least twenty three guerrillas and eight Indians soldiers were killed on May twenty sixth. The failure of India to persuade the Tamil guerrillas to lay down arms and the success of two thousand odd cadres of the guerrillas caused a dent on whatever image India might have wanted to create for itself as a regional power. Even among pro-Indian sections of society, Indian policy was seen as weak and inconsistent.
In the North and East, thousands of people were detained without charge or trial, and dozens ‘disappeared’ following arrests by the Sri Lankan security forces and by the Indian Peace Keeping Force deployed in the northeast. LTTE suspects were also arrested by the IPKF, were alleged. Members of other militant Tamil groups were detained. It was not clear under what legal provision these prisoners were held. There were no reports of charges being brought against them nor of any trials. There were many allegations of torture. Emergency Regulations were amended to permit the disposal of bodies by the police. There were widespread reports of extra-judicial executions by Sri Lankan security forces, who were among those granted immunity from prosecution retroactively for offenses committed ‘in good faith’.

5.13 THE POLITICAL SCENARIO

While India was propagating that she was attempting to bring peace to the Tamil area of Sri Lanka, the accord has led to an explosion of support for the extreme anti-Government and anti-Indian organisation known as Janatha Vimukthi Peramune (JVP) amongst the Sinhalese. On October nineteen, 1988 around five thousand people took to the streets of Colombo and other towns calling for the end to the Indian ‘invasions’.

The election of Premadasa to the office of the President in Sri Lanka in December 1988 further complicated the issue. Colombo refused to play a secondary role, to India. One of the Premadasa’s
electoral promises was the sending back of the Indian forces from Sri Lanka. On June first, he demanded for the withdrawal of Indian soldiers by the end of July 1989. The throwing of a bomb into the Indian High Commission in Colombo on June second, is an emancipation for the growing anti-Indian feeling in Sri Lanka. President Premadasa warned the Indian Government that if New Delhi failed to heed his request for withdrawal, Indian troops in Sri Lanka would be confined to their barracks. By mistake four Indian soldiers were shot dead by the Sri Lankan army on July fourteenth. Simultaneously the Sri Lanka President Premadasa's made a surprise gamble in holding peace talks with LTTE leaders. It had put an uncomfortable question mark over the continuing presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. The talks were held in Colombo on January 1988.

There were complaints from the LTTE that the Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence agency of India) was helping to build-up the other militant groups, TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF etc. and made them to fight with the LTTE. The new militant groups were called Tamil National Army [TNA]. The LTTE clashed with the new force in Eastern Ampara district and dozens were killed in these incidents. But with Indian troops going home, the TNA was to keep the Tigers at bay.

The IPKF troops began withdrawing from the island from October seventeenth, 1989. The Indian National Press had kept up a steady drum beat of criticism against Rajiv Gandhi's ill-conceived
military adventure. Simultaneously Rajiv Gandhi's defeat at the polls occurred as did Karunanidhi's ascendancy in Tamil Nadu. Visvanath Pratap Singh, who took over from Rajiv Gandhi, had no sympathy whatsoever for the latter's Sri Lankan adventure; and forty eight hours of being sworn in as Prime Minister, he announced his decision to bring the IPKF back at the earliest opportunity. Karunanidhi, the former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, had likewise never concealed his hostility to the presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. He accused the Indian Army of killing more than five thousand Tamils in Jaffna, and refused even to meet the final contingent of the returning IPKF as it ceremoniously disembarked in Madras. So, the internal dynamics of Indian politics had already set the scene for the withdrawal of its troops from Sri Lanka. The event of the IPKF withdrawal was completed by March 1990.

According to the report of a Fact-Finding Mission Commissioned by International Peace Research Institute, Oslo¹⁰³: "The IPKF adventure has been extremely high. In terms of lives, it is said to have cost India between one thousand two hundred and one thousand five hundred men dead and another three thousand injured. It cost the LTTE between six hundred and eight hundred dead and another three hundred injured and the Tamil Civilians in the North and East Province over five thousand dead. In money terms it is said to the cost Delhi around US$ 925 million - nearly a billion dollars - and the Tamil People over US$ 52 million in infra-structure damage".
The Government of India absolved itself of its responsibility for the sorry state of affairs in Sri Lanka. Official estimates reveal, as many as five hundred and thirty five IPKF personnel have been killed one thousand five hundred and thirty five injured and six were missing; while in the LTTE camp, according to the Government of India there were one thousand five hundred casualties.

There can be no doubt about the heroic image that the LTTE now enjoys, at least among the people of the Jaffna peninsula. This image had grown out of a number of factors: the LTTE fought against their own other militant groups and showed who were militarily powerful; the protracted war waged on behalf of the ‘people’, firstly against the Sri Lankan army and later against the Indian Army (IPKF); the great sacrifices made in the course of these struggles; the fact they emerged from these encounters seemingly undefeated; the invincible personality of their leader of Prabhakaran and his process as a military commander; and not least the ‘cyanide pill’ commitment of their fighters.

LTTE has been fighting a guerrilla war against two armies which are known to have inflicted some horrible brutalities against the Tamils. In an uneven encounter between a regular army on one side and a small guerrilla force on the other side, it is not unusual for guerrilla fighters to resort to tactics which are totally unacceptable to any society. Instances of such kind are the guerrilla fighters of Cyprus and Israel, the Irish in their struggle for Independence in the early part of this century and the vietnamese against Americans. The LTTE has thus proved itself as
a fighting force. It has proved its capacity for durability, commitment and heroism.

The LTTE has proved because they were well-organised attack in formation and moved by trucks from place to place as needed. Tigers to revert to guerrilla tactics are return to the jungles. The people of Jaffna peninsula also have more sympathize with LTTE. In fact, the LTTE cadres seem to have taken to civilian life quite easily.

The main weakness of Indian policy which became apparent in the crisis situation were lack of diplomatic finesse, lack of a coherent response, a frequent drift in policies due to inadequate background study or a well-defined foreign policy.

The Government of India was underestimated as a brigand with a mixture of bluff and bravado leader of the LTTE Mr. Prabhakaran. His influence over the Tamil masses in the north-east was not properly gauged. His capability to fight a protracted guerrilla war with India was not properly appreciated. This was a major cause of the IPKF failures.

The question also arises that why could not India bring the LTTE to the negotiating table. Because India followed an arrogant and one-track policy. The only mantra her spokesmen kept on repeating was no talks till LTTE surrenders arms and abides by the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.
America had its Vietnam. The Soviet Union its Afganistan. The current indications, there will be are more diplomatic and military disaster to add to that ignominious list India’s Sri Lanka.