Chapter - 2

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If one had to choose the most important date of twentieth century, undoubtedly, it would have to be 14th of August 1947, the day of India’s official independence from British colonial rule. In political discourses and in literature, not just this landmark date, but the symbolic metaphor ‘midnight’ has come to denote two simultaneous, highly significant shifts in South Asia’s political configuration: British India ceased to exist, with the lowering of the British flag marking the end of a century long colonial occupation, and not one, but two new nations were established, as British India was Partitioned into the independent states of India and Pakistan.

The narratives revisiting this symbolic moment of the end of British occupation and the beginning of the newly independent nations addresses only a small part of the historical and social effects of the negotiations leading to Partition and independence. In addition to the narratives of decolonization and British India’s division into two nation-states, Partition involved the regional divisions of Punjab and Bengal, across which the borders between India and Pakistan were drawn, and divisions of communities along the lines of religious affiliation. The months preceding and following August 1947 were characterized by massive migration, riots, and horrifying violence primarily among Hindu, Sikh and Muslim communities, as Hindus and Sikhs moved to the newly defined India and Muslims to Pakistan.
Amidst severe Partition anguish, both India and Pakistan celebrated the Independence Day carnival. Nehru became the first Prime Minister of independent India and Lord Mountbatten became first Governor General of independent India. Liaquat Ali Khan became the first Prime Minister of Pakistan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) became the first Governor General of Sovereign Pakistan. Both the countries grandiloquently celebrated the Independence Day with stray instances of violence, murder, rape, arson and mass killings. The administration of both governments was a failure; the leaders became silent listeners and spectators. The piercing war cry of the city’s rival factions outrageously shouted, ‘Jo Bole So Nihal! Sat Sri Akal!’ and ‘Nara-e-Takabir! Allah-O-Akbar!’; the sinister drumbeats of the frantic Hindus and the Muslims thumping drums in the light of hostility between both the communities. The common people of both countries got bewildered because they didn’t know to which part of the country they belonged, where would they go? Which side was their country? They were completely perplexed regarding their future life and their property.

During Partition and its aftermath, the empire reached its end as the evolution of the new decolonized states carried the impetus forged from its debris. The operation, just a metaphor of dissection was far from clinical. Partition played a central role in the making of Indian and Pakistan national identities and the apparently irreconcilable differences which continue to exist today.
Partition, then, is more than hundreds of thousands of dead, the twelve million displaced. It signifies the division of territory, independence and the birth of new states, alongside distressing personal memories and fearful imaging of the 'other'. Partition itself has become a loaded word, with multiple meanings in both English and the vernaculars, triggering complex feelings with deep psychological significance (Greenberg 90).

The process of Partition remained very traumatic; invoking so many concurrent political and social shifts, and has continued to play such a dominant role in shaping the South-Asian subcontinent. There is a tendency towards compression in popular and literary treatments of this history. Partition is constructed as such a central, defining moment, despite the radical incoherence and over-determination of this moment, it has acquired a kind of coherence as a way of naming; a complex network of political and social effects to decolonization, nation-formation, and division of regional and religious communities. This compressed set of political and social effects frequently finds expression through images of wounded, ruptured and violated bodies, which become referential vehicles for articulating the simultaneous political shifts, regional divisions, and communal conflicts of the traumatic historical moment.
2.1. **Partition: The British Perspective**

Two hundred years of the British political rule in India is described as highly strategic and highly planned. They arrived in India to develop their trade, but they settled permanently and plundered raw materials and imported them to their native land Britain. The colonists spread their trade to various parts of India. They keenly observed the political, social, cultural and religious life of India. They meticulously re-examined the provincial king’s mutual hatredness, hostility and mistrust. They studied the political scenario of India spreading their envious net to all provincial kings using divide and rule policy. The provincial kings were allured by tax and other prizes paid by the British. Most of the kings declined; gradually, the British became the central power with their introduction of their own set of rules and regulations taking control of the administrative reign of the nation into its control.

The imperial discourses refute the claim of defining India as a nation before the colonial encounter; the arguments relate the national gap consisting of various differences of religions, castes, and communities. Thus, the grouping of Indian politics around the concept of an Indian nation or an Indian people or social classes was not recognized by them. Instead, they emphasized pre-existing Hindu-Muslim, Aryan etc., and other similar identities. They maintain that the prescriptive behavior of social grouping was based largely on religion, caste and varied political affiliations for advantages in the Indian society.
The British perspective re-interprets the high claims of Indian nationalism, emerging as a safety valve for the realization of homogeneous social behavior in colonized bodies. Agreeably Anil Seal adds: “What from a distance appear as their political strivings were often, on close examination, their efforts to conserve or improve the position of their own perspective groups” (Seal 351).

Seal, Gallagher and their students also extended the basis on which the elite groups were formed. They followed and added to the viewpoint of the British historian Lewis Namier contending that these groups were formed on the basis of patron-client relationships. They theorize that, as the British extended administrative, economic and political power to the localities and provinces, local potentates started organizing politics by acquiring clients and patrons whose interests they served and who in turn served their interests. Indian politics began to be formed through the links to this patron-client network. Gradually, bigger leaders emerged who undertook to act as brokers to link together the politics of the local potentates, and eventually because British rule encompassed the whole of India, all India brokers emerged. To operate successfully, these brokers at the lower levels, needed to involve clients in the national movement. The second level leaders are also described as sub-contractors. Seal says the chief political brokers were Gandhi, Nehru and Patel. And according to these historians, the people themselves, those whose fortunes were affected by all power brokering, came in only in 1918. After that, we are told, that their existential grievances such as war,
inflation, disease, drought or depression—which had nothing to do with colonization—were cleverly used to bamboozle them into participating in this factional struggles of the potentates (Chandra 19).

From the beginning of British rule till independence, the colonists imported raw material as much as they could to Britain. Their important or crucial aim was to uplift their country economically and they had a strong desire to rule the whole world. Eventually they concentrated on the Hindus and the Muslims, that these communities must not be united, if these two allied, there was no illegal activity like ‘drain of wealth’ to happen in reality. This was the main factor for which the imperialist kept an eye on both the communities and strictly endorsed the divide and rule policy on them.

The British historians mainly from Oxford and Cambridge have produced or have been producing variety of literature on India’s Partition research area. These imperial ideologues have been busy in interpreting different kinds of issues related to the Partition, since they started infiltrating the Communal phobia in the history and political history writing. It could be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century in explicit way (Hunter 108). They have touched upon countless issues in pre, during and post-Partition period possibly due to two reasons. First, the English tradition of history writing has attracted the attention of the scholars towards this high and relevant theme. Secondly, the guilt consciousness has also impelled them to interpret the topic of Partition. Clearly,
the colonial regime played the most important role in the Partition of India. The imperial ideologues have been conscious of the blunders committed by the British policy makers. Therefore, they have been busy in the face-saving and white-washing exercise. No wonder then, these scholars have shown keen interest in reconstructing India’s distant and recent past in order to absolve the colonial rule and British policy makers of all the responsibilities in an event like the Partition of India. The imperialist writers tried to expose the reality of British rule which sharply pointed defending the rise and fulfillment of British rule.

Nationalists of Indian subcontinent found its earliest echoes in the writings of the historians having imperial affiliations. Generally speaking, they have been presenting the subject in a way that could justify deliberate and/or unconscious misconceptions of the colonial regime. They have exploited the complex Indian socio-cultural history to reinforce the theory of a permanent and unbridgeable communal divide. Thus, they traced origin and development of communalism in the pre-colonial Indian milieu. It was the communalism, it has been argued, which culminated into the Partition of India. Therefore, the Partition was logical in the Indian situations.

Broadly speaking, the chief ideologues of Oxford and Cambridge school imperialist writers have highlighted the plurality and diversity of the Indian society (Philips and Wainwright 20). They almost opine unanimously that the Indian society has been a fragmented and divided society. The mechanisms of
division are manifold, the chief and most fatal being Hindu-Muslim divide (Moon, Divide 18). Contrary to the nationalist contention, the Oxford and Cambridge group argue proudly that the British tried their best to ensure communitarian unity and their efforts succeeded to some extent. However, due to socio-cultural divisions, the partition was logical and inevitable (Hodson, The Great 121).

Besides British political historiography of India’s Partition, the Indian National Congress has been held responsible for the Partition on several counts. Almost all historians of this school regard it a ‘Hindu’ organization and equate it with the Hindu Nationalism (Moore 81). Among the Indian nationalist leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru have been criticized in almost abusive language (Hodson, The Great 170). Some of the high profile scholars of this group regard the Partition as a by-product of Britain’s gradual devolution of power to the Indians (Moore 112). Some scholars of this school (Oxford and Cambridge) have raised Jinnah to a very high pedestal. So much so that they assigned higher place to him than Gandhi in the liberation movement (Bolitho 26). At the top of it, all the historians of this school defend the Muslim League in different ways.

From the beginning till the end of Partition of India, the British administrators created greater gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. The sources imported from India carried greater bulk of income of the state. So they struggled a lot to convince the Congress and League but they failed. The political scenario of India’s mini-section worsened day by day, for that reason the colonial
rulers came forward to solve the League’s demand of separate homeland. After the Second World War, the colonists decided to leave India but they did not specify the proper date, in fact their economy was crumbled due to lack of resources and raw materials they depended on.

It was, of course, naked plunder, and theories of ‘the drain of wealth’, developed by the early Indian National Congress figures, would become important to the development of a national movement against Britain. But those at the top of the British Empire were not concerned with that. They had two central imperatives: to hold together their rule, and to keep the profits flowing. That India might default on her external obligations was recurring nightmare for successive viceroys that only intensified the need to hold on to the empire. Lord Mayo summed up this dilemma in 1869 when he notes: “We hold India by a thread. At any moment a serious danger might arise. We owe now £180 million, more than 85 per cent of which is held in England. Add £100 million to this and an Indian disaster would entail consequences equal to the extinction of half the national debt. The loss of India or a portion of it would be nothing as compared, the ruin which would occur at home” (Cain and Hopkins 341).

Penderel Moon was appointed to the Indian Civil Service in 1929 who explained the Hindu and Muslim unification in the independent India. The Muslims could have been expected to divide the country but the Hindu nationalists, who dominated the Congress, led the movement for independence.
Moon observed: “To the British, dimly conscious that the unification of India was one of the greatest achievements of their rule, it was not in the least attractive. Though the multi-racial Ottoman and Austrian empires had dissolved before their eyes, they clung to the notion that their own polyglot Indian empire should survive as a unity after they themselves had quitted the throne. The backwardness of the Muslims in the matter is not so easy to explain. In part, it may be attributed to the fact that some of their most ardent leaders, including Jinnah himself, were for years in the ranks to Congress, under the influence of the common urge to shake off the British yoke, accepted readily the assumption that they would somehow be able to agree to share the throne with their Hindu friends. In addition, the inherent difficulties of division helped to keep the idea in the background” (Moon, Divide 12).

The age old rivalry and animosity of the Hindus and the Muslims was seen in the 1937 Provincial assembly elections. The Congress and the League both tried to hold political power in the country, in fact the Muslim League failed to get more seats, but Congress celebrated its victory. The Muslim League leaders dream was shattered; they just gained resentment against Congress party. Jinnah the frontline leader of Muslim League, Moon writes: “he has been described in the Congress circles as ‘the ambassador or Hindu-Muslim unity’ and had been more notable as an anti-British nationalist than as a champion of Islam. But Congress rather than the British now became his enemy number one and he embarked on a
bitter campaign of vilification. 'Muslims,' he said, 'can expect neither justice nor fair play under Congress Government' and all hope of communal peace had been wrecked 'on the rocks of Congress Fascism’” (16).

In 1936-37, the elections were held to implement the Provincial Autonomy section of the Act. In these elections, the Congress popularity resulted in massive victory. The Congress formed ministries in seven out of eleven provinces of its own. It did not form coalition government with the Muslim League especially in the United Provinces. Manserg, the Professor of the History of Commonwealth at Cambridge and Chairman of the British Commonwealth Relation at the Chattam House in 1947, argues that this decision of the Congress was ill-advised. In his words, “The way in which those governments were formed, proved to be a major source of the Muslim League’s grievances against the Congress. The nature of that grievance is not in dispute. It lay in the fact that the Congress after its massive victory in 1937 provincial elections had formed one party government in provinces, in which the Muslim League had expected coalitions in which they would be partners. This repudiation and the rejection of the League derived fundamentally from the Congress conviction that it represented all India” (Philips and Wainwright 47).

However, Mansergh asserts that the Indian social milieu was the natural fertile track for the growing breach between the Congress and the Muslim League. Manserg argues that there is a greater element of determinism or alternatively a
more limited freedom of maneuver in situation where there is latent or actual tension between communities, expressing their will through a parliamentary franchise and preoccupied with a prospective transfer of power than is apt to be allowed by contemporary observers and leaders (48).

During the World War II, the Muslim separation received active support from the colonial regime and was strengthened considerably. But Mansergh blames the Congress leaders and the pluralistic nature of the Indian society (51). He considers the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League as a definite demand for a separate sovereign Pakistan (Manserg, Prelude 27).

Further, he asks a question and then answers it. Whether the Muslims were a community, the second largest within India or they a separate nation? If they were the former then the pattern of a self protective policy might have been expected to be, as indeed, it was least down to 1940. But if the Muslims were not the second largest community in India but a separate nation then the demand for separate homeland was preliminary. On this dichotomy, he asserts that the Pakistan Resolution symbolized the conversion of a community into the nation and it led to the closing of different alternatives before the policy makers. Thus, the Pakistan Resolution was climaxing of earlier trend of Muslim separation. But, Mansergh calls it national aspiration. The process of nationalism taking a split was already altering the perception of the people on religious lines. The return to Indian freedom also meant a challenge for the Muslim imagination. The question of national liberation created a sort of mass hysteria even before the actualized
event could take place. Religious and socio-cultural factors like religious habits/differences, dress and food culture, all went different with the two communities entangled with each other.

Thus, Mansergh has tried to defend the imperial policy of appeasement towards the League, which slowly, but gradually intensified the divisive forces. It should be noted that in 1945, Jinnah and the League could have been pressurized by the government. Had the British good intension, the Wavell Plan would have been implemented. Instead, Manserg supports this action of the government and says that the imposition of any order to ensure unity could have resulted in political and social disturbances. He writes, “Had the British indeed succeeded in imposing, then the consequences, again accepting the fundamentals of Jinnah’s analysis might well have been, as he threatened in 1947, the bloodiest civil war in the history of Asia”. (Manserg, Commonwealth 124). However, the very next year, the Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah started the Direct Action from 16 August and a Civil-war kind of threat emerged. Thus, the above logic of Manserg is not satisfactory.

In the post-war period, the British Government under Attlee showed its interest in solving the Indian problems. In March 1946, the Cabinet Mission was dispatched to India for this purpose. Last six volume of the Transfer of Power series cover the period from 23 March 1946 to 15 August 1947. The documented records in these volumes unfold as to how the British policy on India was hammered out by day hour-by-hour.
Like all earlier plans and offers, the Cabinet Mission Plan, too failed to resolve the Indian problems, rather, it gave new dimensions to the Muslim separation. The Congress also made mistake. The Muslim League under Jinnah rejected the plan and started the Direct Action from August 16. The colonial governments remained mute spectators; allowing the riots to speed-up and intensify. Mansergh’s explanations were of these riots reflective of typical imperial mindset. He opined that these riots were natural in Indian situation because it was the unity of India that was artificial and imposed the division natural (Pandey, Break-up 202-03).

Mansergh justifies Partition on other grounds as well. He argues that both the British and the Congress desired a United India but to solve the Communal and Constitutional deadlock, the British had to offer the Congress and the Congress in turn had to accept the proposal of Partition. He further argues, “The Congress failed to achieve United India because activities and interests of the Congress leaders were diverse, while those of the League were concentrated wholly on the creation of Muslim state”. Thus, he holds the leaders of the Congress and the League responsible for the June Plan and the ultimate partition (Manserg, Prelude 125).

Allen Campbell Johnson was an administrator turned historian, who knew Indian politics and society. When he joined Royal Air Force and was posted in South East Asia as a Wing Commander, India-Allied Record Section. Thus, he
came into contact with India directly. When the World War II ended, he joined active politics and contested the Parliamentary elections twice. His familiarity with Indian conditions and interest in contemporary world affairs helped in his appointment at Press Attaché to the last Viceroy, Mountbatten.

Thus, he was in a clear position of being a reliable witness to the whole drama of Partition remembering the role played by different parties and personalities in it. Since, he had been trained in the historian’s craft, he could have produced an impartial and an objective account of the events just preceding and coinciding the Partition of India. But the effects of schooling and commitment to his ideology checked his pen from going much ahead against the set pattern of the imperialist or Oxford and Cambridge writings.

In this way, Johnson was particularly vital in describing the events of political historiography of Partition and the upheavals which coincided with it. He had discussed the Indian events from 19 December 1946 to 28 June 1948. As a Press Attaché to the Viceroy, he attended all the seventy staff meetings which Mountbatten convened in order to arrive at a formula in accordance with the Attlee’s Declaration of 20 February 1947 (Johnson 181). It were at these staff meetings that the fate of India and Indians was decided. In the light of this, the description of Johnson could have been of immense significance. But he does not give the details of the discussion. He prefers to mention only the decision taken or policy decided. Occasionally he comments from a historian’s angle. By and large,
he has not used the causation in his writings (356-58). However, he seems to be adept in selecting the facts for the set goal. He is very cautious in using appropriate words and phrases on the occasions. Therefore, his description is a classic memoir by an expert news-reporter.

Johnson starts his argument with the British Parliamentary debate over Attlee's Declaration (Moore 6). During this debate, he writes, "Churchill said that India was to be subjected not merely to partition but to fragmentation and to haphazard fragmentation" (Johnson 28). In fact, this was the real face of Britain’s long cherished policy towards India. Instead of highlighting this statement, Johnson emphasized the assertion of Attlee. He writes, "The definite objective of the British government is to obtain a unitary government for British India and Indian states, if possible within the British Commonwealth through the medium of Constituent Assembly set-up and run in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan" (31). At the very outset, Johnson tries to conceal the real intention of the metropolitan Government to defend the colonial policy.

Johnson, along with Mountbatten and company arrives in New Delhi on 22 March, 1947. He gives the impression that he had appropriate knowledge of the Indian situation and regards it a revolutionary condition. He further, argues, "We have inherited inter-alia communal rioting, which is spreading as though by chain reaction, the key province of the Punjab with its threelfold Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communal problem [...]. So in short we have the people rioting the princes falling out among themselves, entire Indian Civil Service and the police running down
and the British who are left sceptical and full of foreboding” (40). By explaining this way, he wants to demonstrate that in India the situation was out of control and in this situation no one but Mountbatten could succeed. This would also justify Mountbatten’s approach to Indian problems. He completely ignores the strength of the national movement at this juncture. Conscious of the fact that the British policies had been important factors in such developments, he refrains from explaining the causes of it.

Mountbatten after his arrival in India and after, started long and protected discussion with leaders from British media and Princely States including Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, Jinnah and Baldev Singh. Johnson praised this way of functioning. He writes that in Nehru’s view, Wavell had made one serious blunder by inviting the Muslim League to come into the interim Government, instead of waiting a little longer from them to ask to be brought in (44). But he does not explain as to why this blunder was not undone by Mountbatten. He argues that Lord Mountbatten had discovered from personal discussion with the leaders of the Muslim-League and the Congress that Partition was inevitable (354). In order to support this conclusion, he cites the ‘March Resolution’ of the Congress and Patel’s assertion during meeting with Mountbatten **. He further writes that


Nehru's tripartite proposals for the Punjab were first sign of the Congress acceptance of the Hindustan-Pakistan division. In this way, through generalization and distortion, he opined that the inevitability of the Partition had been accepted by the Indians as well.

Undoubtedly, the situation in India grew very grim. The colonial regime had deliberately allowed the situation to deteriorate. The authorities were not taking effective steps to check it. Johnson explains this inactivity of an imperialist tone. He writes, “Mountbatten hopes that the diplomacy of discussion will have the effect of playing down the communal tension” (Johnson 47). He also supports the deadly speed of Mountbatten in moving towards his goal on the protest that the urgency of the situation demanded it. He writes, “Mountbatten has been convinced that the June 1948 time limit far from being not long enough is already too remote a deadline; a quick political solution was needed” (56). Thus, he regards the quickness of decision as a solution to Indian problem.

Johnson provides detailed account of communal violence which accompanied the partition especially in the North-West and North-East India. He himself had witnessed the effect of violence from air while returning from Karachi to Delhi on 16 August. He writes, “As we passed over boundary areas of Punjab, we could see several large fires, beacons of ill-omen dominating the landscape for miles around” (145). But while dealing with communal violence in Bengal, he praised Gandhi for the latter's effort in checking the violence in this part. Her calls it the result of “Miracle of Gandhi’s moral influence” (357).
The partition of India, argues Hodson, was inevitable. Therefore, it could not be averted or converted into other options. He holds the Indian social milieu and the role of the Indian National Congress responsible for it and tries to give a clean chit to the colonial regime. He writes, “What happened in 1947 was nearly a by-play: that the die was cast much further back, when the Cabinet Mission persisted in seeking consent to compromise, rather than imposing compromise by arbitration, or when Lord Wavell failed to secure a national government at Shimla Conference or when the Congress rejected Cripps Offer in 1942 or when the Muslim League adopted Pakistan as its goal when they failed to admit the Muslim League ministers in 1937 or at other dates perhaps earlier” (Hodson, The Great 357). Thus, Hodson approached this issue with a predetermined conclusion producing one-sided accounts of events preceding the Partition.

Right from the beginning, Hodson liberates British from their catalytic role in Partition. He points out the short and long term British policy. “British policy aimed at leading the people of India to a condition in which they would be able to govern themselves and grow out of imperial tutelage” (The Great 03). This is the sophisticated version of civilizing mission and ‘white man’s burden’ theory (Niyogi 48-75). However, the material self-interest of British and strategic importance of India shaped the short term British policy. “Without Indian empire the concept of pax-Britannica would have been a hollow claim. So they tried to maintain its hold over India” (Hodson, The Great 03). He would like us to believe
that Britain left India on its own will. "Britain granted national independence because of the development of the public opinion along liberal lines both in Britain itself and countries whose goodwill was important to her" (Hodson, The Great 04). Thus, he negates the role of Indian national movement of India's liberation.

Pakistan's creation, Hodson regards was the result of strains in Indian Muslim attitudes, which gave the communal division a peculiar political importance and objective. "They had been settled in India as ruler and wanted to remain so. For Muslims, to roll back history by removing the European invaders could not mean a restoration of Hindu rule rather a revival of their own" (11).

Hodson pointed out that dissimilarities of Hindu-Muslim communities prove the inevitability of partition. He writes, "Hindus and Muslims lived in a village separated not only by religious creed and rituals but by whole modes of life and attitudes of mind, each a permanent hereditary group without inter-marriage or mutual absorption" (10). This explanation negates the known reality. Although, sense of social division in religious terms remains pervasive in Indian society, Hindus and Muslims belonging to the same class or locality often had more in common with each other than with their co-religionists in "sections of society" (A.I. Singh, The Origins 230).

In order to give his argument a wider horizon, Hodson compared the Hindu-Muslim conflict with the Protestant-Catholic conflict and relates that, "the
former was far deeper than the latter” (The Great 03). He further says that there was conflict between the British Government and the Indian National Congress. This conflict became triangular when the Muslim League emerged with its clear objective. And it was this triangle, which was resolved only by the Partition of India (The Great 12). He is referring that what happened in 1947 was bound to happen. “Linlithgow and Wavell, Mountbatten and Cripps, Gandhi and Jinnah, Sikandar Hyat Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru and all others were mere puppets moved by historical forces which they had no power to deflect” (The Great 13).

In a typical imperial mode, Hodson defends the British policies which let loose the divisive and separatist forces in Indian society. For example, he defends the policy of Communal representation, which is a typical example of ‘divide and Rule’ policy followed deliberately by the colonial authority. In his words, “Aware of the risk that one class or community might by virtue of its superior numbers, wealth and education come to dominate India’s nascent political life and the counsels of government, successive Viceroyys supported the policy of separate communal or class representation” (13). However, he accepts that Britain did use the Hindu-Muslim rivalry for its own interest, but says that they did not invent it. For him it was necessary and logical, if the pattern of Indian life was to be represented in the counsels of government.

Muslims, as Hodson reminds, realized their weakness-disunity and lack of mass-base. Hence, they tried to remedy it under the leadership of Mohammed Ali
Jinnah. In 1936, Jinnah talked of organizing Hindu and Muslims separately, so that they could understand each other better. In 1937, he charged the Congress of pursuing Hindu policy. Hodson holds that the religious or quasi-religious provocations now combined with political and administrative accusation resulted into Muslim apathy towards the Congress. In 1938 at Lucknow, Jinnah spoke significantly of the Muslim nation that would emerge from the struggle with majority community that had clearly indicated that Hindustan is for the Hindus (The Great 41).

“The effect of Cripps Mission says Hodson, was that it widened the gulf between the Congress and the government and created frustration among Congressmen” (The Great 105). And it was this frustration and creation which compelled the Congress to start Quit India ‘Insurrection’. It led the serious disorder and disturbance. “Nevertheless within about three weeks the situation was everywhere under control and it was clear that insurrection had failed” (The Great 107). Thus, Hodson speaks in classical imperialist tone. The movement would be suppressed only through utilizing of war preparations, but Hodson says that it proved the strength of existing authority. The movement proved that the days of the British in India were numbered. However, Hodson says that the Britain’s will to stay had gone. Hence, by denying the India national movements its due place, Hodson is interpreting political events in typical colonial model.
Hodson refutes the new Viceroy Wavell, the Secretary of State for India and leaders of main political parties of India, when he deals with Shimla Plan. "The new Viceroy tried to solve the constitutional problems of India, while the Secretary of State for India had his own formula to solve it" (The Great 116). Lord Wavell organized Shimla Conference to discuss the formation of a 'Politically representative' Council (The Great 120). Hodson calls the proposed council politically representative, which was in reality communal, because it was to include equal proportion of caste Hindus and Muslims. The plan failed because Jinnah demanded the right to nominate all the Muslim members. "If the Viceroy had been adamant as Mr. Jinnah, the latter would have obliged himself to give in" (The Great 125). Again, Hodson views it from the inevitable angle. In his words, "All this may have been inevitable because the Muslim League's demand of Pakistan and the Congress demand of untied India were incompatible" (The Great 128).

Partition of India, as Hodson concludes was compiled by political forces, not by official advice (The Great 210). "Lord Mountbatten wanted to have a United India but it was impossible" (The Great 228). Hodson says that Jinnah declared that once Partition has been decided upon, all trouble would cease and people would live happily. Jinnah called upon the Viceroy to hand over power as soon as possible" (The Great 232). Hodson further says that the Viceroy's discussion with Congress leaders other than Gandhi also tended to lead in the "same direction" (The Great 225). Mountbatten discussed the matter with other
leaders as well. After his protracted discussion Hodson opined, “Only partition into two sovereign nations was the solution; because the Congress and Muslim-League were looking in different directions. The Congress said that better partition than any dilution of the Cabinet Mission Plan and the Muslim League said that “no Cabinet Mission Plan at any price” (The Great 245). Thus, the responsibility for Partition and the speed with which it was implemented rested on Indian parties, not on the British as reflected by Hodson. Hodson had tried his best to absolve Mountbatten of his responsibility in India’s Partition. He says that it was the need of the hour which Mountbatten came to the stage. He writes, “Whatever other criticism may be made of Lord Mountbatten’s Plan for transfer of power, it certainly can’t be said that it was imposed without the fullest consultation with India’s political leaders or that it was contrary to the ultimate consensus of their views. It may certainly be said that it was not he but the Indians who divided India” (The Great 247).

Thus, while narrating the Partition of India, Hodson has followed the Partition of elite historiography, in which the task of elite is to justify the mistakes of the present by citing only suitable examples from the recent and distant past. In this intellectual pursuit, aspirations and activities of masses remain totally neglected. Hodson, being a part and parcel of regime in the last phase, has exaggerated the British rule. He goes up to the extent of saying that the British rule gave India a unity such as, it has never previously known (Hodson, Twentieth 104). He deliberates and sometimes even defends the ‘divide and rule’ policy of
the colonial regime. He also blames the Congress for the division of India, because it was the Congress which held the mainstream anti-colonial movement.

Hodson argues, “The aim and the ideal of the Indian National Congress was to unite Indians of all castes, classes and creeds for the effort of political advance but while the Congress had retained its ideals, it failed in practice because once the advance began, the conditions of the former unity disappeared. Once political power was to be had by Indians, the questions ‘which Indians?’ inflamed ambitions among majorities and jealously among minorities awakening all the dulled historical memories to conflict. It is first the prospect and now actuality of supreme power which has strived for a disunited India and will work to keep it disunited” (Twentieth 105). Therefore, his writings seem to be the political history of British India which obsessed with historical inevitability.

Penderal Moon came to India in 1929 and soon started his career as an Indian Civil Servant when he witnessed in person, the Communal riots and human sufferings before, during and after the Partition. Therefore, this administrator turned historian was in a position to explain the events of last few decades of Raj. He starts his discussion on the Partition of India from the post-World War I scenario. At the very beginning, he starts praising the British rule in India and negating India’s freedom struggle. Like other scholars of his group, he expressed that the British were on a civilizing mission. He writes, “The emergence of India as a free self-governing country had been foreseen more than a hundred years before 1947. By the turn of the present century (twentieth) it has become an
avowed object of Indian nationalists and by the World War I, it was recognized by
British statesmen as the inevitable outcome of the British Raj” (Moon, Divide 11).
Thus, he tries to justify the British domination and continuation of British rule in
India. Indeed, he presents a more sophisticated version of ‘white-man’s burden
theory’.

Moon has been an eye-witness to the nationalist challenges and the colonial
counter attack on the physical and ideological level. But instead of giving
objective description, he relies basically on the writings about India by the popular
West. This turns out to be the precise reason that he too like the other western
scholars reexamines the internal divisions within the Indian society. He comments,
“India’s divisions are many and deep. These are caste divisions, economic
divisions and political divisions. But all pale into insignificance beside the great
divisions between the Hindus and Muslims. It is the conflict between these two
communities which is the real barrier to liberation” (Moon, Future 23).

In this way, Moon delivers justification to the continuation of the British
rule. Also, due to these divisions he regards partition an inevitable necessity. He
argues, “Unification in an Indian context must be understood very loosely, as
meaning, the healing of divisions. In as much as India’s divisions are the main
obstacle to her liberation, unification in this sense is a primary political objective-
eventhough the healing of divisions may in fact only be obtainable at the unhappy
sacrifice of political unity” (22).
India’s division in Moon’s opinion was necessary also because the Muslims in India were a distinct community. He argues, “Though the groups lived side by side, the rigour of religious institutions had kept even neighbours apart with the result that Hindus and Muslims constituted two distinct and often antagonistic communities” (Moon, Future 23). While on another occasion, he comments that to a surprising degree Muslims are at once intermingled and yet separate and distinct (23). In this way, he is trying to make it clear that the Hindu-Muslim division and antagonism were almost natural and in antagonistic terms. It should be noted that the colonial regime resorted to constitutionalism and communalism, when the national movement began to take shape in the second half of the nineteenth century. The indigenous elites of both the communities fell victim of the communal trap laid down by the colonizers (Philips and Wainwright 497).

But all the imperial ideologues including Moon have denied the divisive roles played by the British. However, sometimes Moon blamed some Englishmen for this. It is an open secret that the British provided moral and material support to Syed Ahmed Khan. But Moon denies it simply. He opines that under the influence of their great leader Syed Ahmed Khan, Muslims held aloof from political organizations, believing that their welfare was better protected under British rule than it would be if the Hindu-dominated Congress achieved political influence (Moon, Liberalism 89). Thus, speaking in an imperialist tone, he tries to impress due that the Muslims sided with the British due to their own interest. The Muslim
fear of Hindu domination was further enlarged when the nationalist movement took extremist from which took recourse to glorify India’s past. This fear, he argues manifested in abstention of Muslims from the Congress.*

By 1930, Moon suggests the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims had considerably widened. He assigns different contributing factors. Like the policy of congressmen, Indian socio-cultural milieu and Gandhian leadership. Moon argues that even by 1930, the Pakistan idea was not thought of (Moon, Divide 11). However, he traced the origin of two nation theory from Syed Khan and says that the latter by implication had limited at possible division (12). But he nowhere mentioned the role of the colonial regime in it.

The British policy of divide and rule got definite manifestation in the Government of India Act, 1935. This Act provided for, among many things, the provincial autonomy for the British Indian provinces and proposed for an All India Federation comprising of the British India and willing Native states. Moon provides clean chit to the British policy makers on the ground that this act took no account of the Pakistan chimera (13). But he argues that due to Congress policy,

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* Moon says that between 1895 and 1905 some 10 per cent of the delegates to the Annual Session of the Congress and two of the presidents were Muslims. But considering the level of consciousness along the Muslims in view of educational backwardness and the percentage of their population in India, it is not a small figure. Therefore, it does not reflect the Muslims attitude towards the Congress and the national movement.
this act changed the attitude of the Muslims and position of the League and proved decisions in the form of Indian Partition (14). Like other historians of his school and Pakistani historians, Moon too, considers the failure of the Congress in forming the coalition governments with the League in provinces especially in the Untied Provinces, the prime cause of the creation of Pakistan (15). It should be noted that the coalition government between the Congress and the League was not possible because both had different objectives. Secondly, there was no pre-poll agreement between these parties. Therefore, to blame the Congress for disappointing the Muslims on that basis can not be logical. Thus, we find a big gap in the Moon’s writings as well.

In this way, Moon holds the Congress responsible for the rejection of the federal section of the Act by the Muslim League and the native states. Moon writes that the Congress policies had scared the Muslims and the Princes onto opposition to the proposed federal scheme (Moon, Gandhi 199). He also holds the Congress responsible for not recognizing Jinnah’s legitimate claim that the League represented All India Muslims. Thus, the rift between the Congress and the League could not be healed (Moon, Gandhi 198). In this situation, the launching of mass contact programme among the Muslims by the Congress further worsened the condition (Moon, Divide 17-18). Therefore, the gulf widened and culminated into the Partition. He also gives supernatural reason which made the Partition inevitable (14).
Thus, it became clear that while interpreting the Partition of the Indian subcontinent, Moon blames the different parties at different points of time. He writes, “The Congress must share the blame and, of course, blame also attached to the Muslim politicians and to some extent to the British who at a critical time showed little interest in bringing the parties together. But the largest share of responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement that could have preserved Indian unity appears to fall on Gandhi and the Congress though it were they who desired to prevent it” (Moon, Gandhi 277). He too, like other scholars of Oxford and Cambridge school, sees partition from necessary and inevitable angle (Moon, Divide 63-64).

On the basis of foregoing discussion, it may be said that the British historians approached the theme of Partition with a set goal and reacted it on the basis of the predominant model. Thus, they were in perfect agreement on several issues. They unanimously declared that the Indian society had been divided in mutually antagonistic blocks. They refute the charge that the colonial regime adopted and promoted the policy of divide and rule. They endorse the motif of civilizing mission and the notion of white man’s burden. They regarded the Congress as a Hindu nationalist body and the Muslim League as a nationalist organization representing only the Muslim community. They completely negate the role of national movement for India’s freedom. Although, the neo-imperial trend is at times distinctly of critical to the British policies; in the last years of the
Raj and its defense, by and large, religious hostility runs as a common theme in the whole gamut of British writings of the Partition. However, in the light of new research and in the opening up of vast range of primary sources, the British political historiography in recent times has been showing signs of a shift in a new and more pragmatic direction.

Politicization of the Partition motif has presented the problems of not considering the British role in the development of Partition. Politics of Indian nationalism did create a sense of ‘mutual distrust’ and ‘unwilling acceptance’ of a common culture in resisting the colonial domination. The British historiography revives the tradition of change and the religious equation challenging the political stances of the Congress and the Muslim League. There are plenty of instances to suggest that Partition cannot be taken as the sole British responsibility. Even the opposing claims of the Congress and the Muslim League seem inadequate in explaining the intensity and gravity of the situation in the form of Indian Partition.

Politicization of the complexity of Partition in literature, culture and cinema possesses tremendous research potential for adequately decoding the relevance of the issue revisiting the contemporary reality for the nations involved in a crisis that revisits our contemporary reality.
2.2. Partition: The Pakistani Perspective

The idea of Pakistan, as is well known, had little support in the areas that
now comprise that country. Its demand was fought essentially by those Muslims
who lived in the Hindu majority areas, which remained a part of India. Iqbal, who
is credited with the authorship of the idea, wanted to apply it to the Muslim
majority areas of the subcontinent. In a letter to M.A. Jinnah, dated June 17, 1937,
he asked, “why should not the Muslims of NW India and Bengal be considered as
nations entitled to self-determination?” (Puri 15). But while suggesting
establishment of Islamic state through the division of the country, he categorically
advised Jinnah “to ignore Muslim minority provinces” (Puri 15). He further urged
him to concentrate on the Muslims of the North and West of India (Puri 15). But
the Muslim League leadership ignored this advice and found it easier to work
upon the sense of fear and insecurity of Muslim in the Hindu majority areas. It was
able to persuade the Muslims that a separate state on either side of India would be
a better guarantee of their rights.

Muslims of India since Mughal period to the Partition of India had tried to
avoid Hindus and aspired to create their homeland in India. The idea of separate
and sovereign Pakistan was given by Bambooque (1913), Khaire Brothers (1917),
Bilgrami (1920), Gul Khan (1923), Maikash (1928), Zulfiquar (1929), Chaudhury
Rahamat Ali (1933), Iqbal (1937), Sind Muslim League (1938), Yusuf Yaqub
(1938), Khaliquzzaman (1939), Kafayet Ali (1939), Aligarh Dons (1939).
These social leaders were frustrated with Hindu domination in India resulting in their production of their independent separate ideology indicative of a separate, independent homeland for Muslims. (Aziz, Vol. 3, 763). Before the All India Muslim League passed its historical Lahore (for Pakistan) Resolution in March 1940, the establishment of a separate Muslim state or states in the subcontinent had been advocated by some public figures like Saiyed Jamaluddin Afghani, Abdul Jabbar Khaire and Abdul Sattar Khaire, the later two known as the Khaire brothers. In 1928, at the Calcutta meeting of the All Parties Convention, the Aga Khan had advocated independence for each province (Sitaramayya 334).

However, Sir Mohammed Iqbal was the first important public figure to propound the idea of Pakistan from the political platform of the Muslim League. In his presidential address to the Muslim League’s annual session at Allahabad in 1930, he said: “I would like to see Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British empire or without it, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India” (Iqbal 11-12). At the third Round Table Conference, Iqbal had pleaded that there should be no central government in the subcontinent and that the provinces should be autonomous and independent dominions (Ambedkar, Thoughts 336). During the pre-independence days, the Muslim League started as a political organization exclusively formed to protect, the religious, social and
political interests of the Muslim community of British India, therefore, its policies revolved around communalism. The main objective of Muslim leaders was, to maintain the distinctive nature of their community by building-up a fence of political safeguards. The Muslim leaders suspected that when democratic institutions were established in India, the majority community would get all the advantages with more political advantages. Hence, the Muslim League, as a political organization of the Muslim minority, targeted the Congress, which demanded a representative form of Government, as their centre of attack, and not the establishment of League Party that coincided with the evolution of the Congress Party as a political organization, which bore extreme anti-British feelings.

Like the Congress, in the initial formative years, the Muslim League too expressed its loyalty and faith in the British Government. Otherwise, there was a bundle of differences between the two parties remained. While the National Congress stood for a Secularist ideology, the Muslim League stood for protecting a religious ideology. While, the Congress demanded the introduction of representative institutions, the Muslim League demanded a protective safeguard in the form of separate electorates, offering weightages for the Muslim minority. Even when the League was ready to give up these concessions, it laid down other conditions based on a separatist ideology. Thus, the Congress with a different outlook was considered by the Muslim League as a prominent Hindu body.
The Muslim nationalist Khawaja Abdur Rahim (R. Gandhi 153) first used the term “Pakistan”. Its meaning “Land of the Pure” its abbreviation derived by Chaudhury Rahamat Ali, who was a student at Cambridge, and presented a Pamphlet, in which he used particular states, where Muslims remained in majority. The abbreviation located P(unjab), A(fghanistan = NWFP), K(ashmir), S(ind) and (Baluchis)TAN (Naqvi 81). He coined the word Pakistan wonderfully enough meaning the Land of the pure. Incidentally, the word itself is not pure; half of it “PAK’ in Urdu with Persian antecedents and the other half “ISTAN” is from Hindi with roots in Sanskrit (R. Gandhi 81). The Muslim League rejected Rahamat Ali’s concept of Pakistan and called it some sort of a Walt Disney’s Dreamland or a Wellsian Nightmare and dismissed it as nonsense. Others were to describe it, variously, as a “student scheme”, a “lunatics dream”, “impracticable proposition”, and “childish” (R. Gandhi 82).

Thus, the above described Muslim leaders had seen the socio-cultural, religious and political scenario in India and then tried to reclaim their ideology but many opposition forces within the Muslim community, hindered the progress of separate homeland for the Muslims. Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the staunch and stalwart supporter of the Congress strived for “Hindu-Muslim unity”. (Zakariya, The Price 11), finally turned to the Muslim League to create an independent state. The Congress frontline leaders didn’t give priority to Muslim rights; hence, the Muslim leaders vehemently opposed the ideology of the Congress and vigorously stepped forward for the Partition of India.
The Partition of India and the foundation of Pakistan was an event of significant historical importance with far-reaching consequences for India and Pakistan. It has, thus, attracted the attention of historical writings. However, to begin with the political and social climate of India and Pakistan remained non-conducive enough to undertake an analytical and scholarly pursuit with historical relevance. The popular political historiography of India and Pakistan has analyzed the Partition of India on the basis of the Two-nation theory. According to this, the Muslims have always maintained their separate homogenous identity, distinct from the Hindus since the medieval times; the politics and policies of the colonial state provided an opportunity to the Muslims to organize themselves politically which, as a result, strengthened their cause and subsequently led to the establishment of the sovereign state of Pakistan. It has been further argued that the leadership and writings of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah at the platform of All India Muslun League further assisted the Muslims to achieve their aspirations and goal. I.H. Qureshi, Aziz Ahmad, K.K. Aziz and Hafeez Malik are some prominent historians who have subscribed to the Two-nation theory.

The Indian political historiography on the Partition has been enriched with writings by many Muslim writers. Those writers focused their views on communal politics, socio-cultural differences between the Hindus and Muslims and the high politics played during, before and after the Partition. Mushirul Hassan rejects the
idea that the Muslims of India prior to 1947 remained a monolithic community with common interests and aspirations. According to him, the Muslims constituted a desperate, differentiated and stratified segment of Indian society. The Muslims of India were encouraged to develop separately by the British colonial authorities. In his view, the colonial government created a community in its own image and the latter allowed its war time ally, the League, to transform a segmented population into a nation or judicial entity. He also accepts the ground that the separatist Muslim thinking had already been made fertile by Muslim thinkers and religious leaders (Hasan, Legacy 98). Mushirul Hassan further argues that the Hindu-Muslim partnership exploded in the 1940s and the weakness of the secular ideology became all too clear to that generation.

Their association with the majoritarianism and minority-ism discredited it, they were badly led and, at the moment of great peril, the Hindu, the Muslim and the Sikh organizations proved more than a match for the less enthusiasm of Congress-backed secular wing. The Communist Party of India not only acknowledged the importance of the national question for politics, but also unequivocally embraced the principle of national self determination. Finally, the colonial government’s conciliatory policy towards the Muslim League bore fruit during the Second Word War, and stiffened M.A. Jinnah’s resolves to achieve his Muslim homeland. When the war ended, the engine of communal politics could no longer be put in reserve. The League, the Akali Dal and the Hindu Maha Sabha rejected the once seemingly unassailable pluralist paradigm, while religious
fundamentalists turned to the creation of a Hindu state or an Islamic theocracy. The outcome was a cataclysmic event, that is, India’s bloody vivisection. (Hasan, Partition 359-360). Mushirul Hasan, thus, examines the Partition of India in terms of the outcome of the weaknesses within the Indian nationalism and its secular ideology.

Paul Brass, Farzana Shaikh and Ayesha Jalal have further enriched the political historiography on the Partition of India. These scholars have discussed at length the Congress-League relations, growth of the demand for Pakistan and have apportioned the responsibility of the Partition to the Congress, League, British and to the individual leaders.

Paul Bras observes that the growth of the Muslim separatism in India was determined and manipulated by elites whose propaganda based on communal identification was responded by the Muslims of India. Brass further, argues that the ideology of Muslim separateness did not emerge out of the objective differences between Hindus and Muslims but out of the use made of those differences through a conscious process of symbolic selection. Nor was it the consequence of the objective circumstances of Muslims in United Provinces, who were better placed than Hindus in urbanization, literary, English education, social communications and government employment. Brass takes the view that the Muslim political elite played a significant role in winning support for separation and that provided less importance to the part played by the religious institutions in arousing the thought of separatism (Brass 178).
Farzana Shaikh, on the other hand argues that the Muslims of colonial India were anxious to maintain their special social and political status and distinction as they were keeping with them a sense of Muslim Community. She is of the opinion that the Muslim elite, while trying to obtain the special social status, was making efforts to maintain its antique traditions. For however diverse their political choices, these Muslims, reformist or modernist, nationalist or separatist, practising or not, shared a common consciousness, a feeling shaped not only by a specifically Indo-Muslim Mughal Tradition but also by a faith which stressed a community bound in service to some higher end.

There was across the political spectrum, an unmistakable awareness of the ideal Muslim brotherhood, a belief in the superiority of Muslim culture and a recognition of the belief that the Muslims ought to live under Muslim governments (Shaikh 288-330). Such a thinking on the part of the Muslim elite led to the demand of separate electorates and they secured it with the support of the British.

Farzana Shaikh, further, argues that the victories of the Provincial Muslim Parties in the elections of 1937 was achieved at the expense of the Indo-Muslim tradition and at the cost of the Muslim nationhood. After the elections of 1937, the Muslim elite came out with the demand and ideology of Pakistan which was effectively based on the Muslim traditions and a sense of homogeneous community. However, it was only after the support and the conversion of the Provincial Muslim Parties and the provincial leadership that the ideology and the
demand of Pakistan turned into a territorial reality, even if the demand was more elsewhere (10-224). The interpretation of Farzana Shaikh can be placed, more or less, near to the nationalist historiography of Pakistan on the Partition of India.

Ayesha Jalal has further enriched the political historiography on the Partition of India and has initiated a scholarly discussion regarding the role of Jinnah and the Muslim League in the foundation of the sovereign state of Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal elaborates that the Lahore resolution became a bargaining counter, which had the merit of being acceptable to the majority province Muslims, and of being totally unacceptable to the Congress and in the resort to the British also. This in turn provided the best assurance that the League would not be given what it now apparently was asking for, but which Jinnah in fact did not really want. She further argues that the Lahore resolution made no mention of Partition, certainly none of Pakistan. In the League’s considered view, the Muslim majority provinces were to be grouped to constitute Independent states in which the constituent unit would be autonomous and the independent states was something for future (Jalal, The Sole 57-58).

Contrary to the conventional historiography on Jinnah and Muslim League, Ayesha Jalal suggests that the demand of Pakistan, for Muslim League, and Jinnah, was a bargaining counter till 1947. She continues to defend that Jinnah’s Pakistan did not entail the Partition of India, rather it meant its regeneration into a union where Pakistan and Hindustan would join to stand together proudly against
the hostile world without. This was no clarion call of pan-Islam, this was not pitting Muslim India against Hindustan, and rather, it was a secular vision of a polity where there was real political choice and safeguards, the India of Jinnah’s dreams, a vision unfulfilled but noble nonetheless (122).

Ayesha Jalal asserts that Jinnah did not want Pakistan nor did he will it, however, lastly he had to yield to it, because he had no control over the other forces, thus the creation of Pakistan was the tragic collapse of Jinnah’s strategy (260-287). V.N. Datta, in his general presidential address, at the Indian History Congress, has said that Ayesha Jalal tells us what Jinnah did not want but she does tell us what he did want. Thus the conclusion drawn in Jalal’s study is invalid (Datta 10). Mushirul Hasan also suggests that perhaps Ayesha Jalal would change her perspective after examining the vast collection of private papers and newspapers in Indian libraries and archives, since her early thesis has been overpowered by the *Transfer of Power Volume* (Hasan, Partition 40). The need for understanding the relevance of partition from the religious perspective requires a rethinking over the varied tradition in India and it should not be forgotten that both the Hindus and Muslims shared common tradition with the Indian Hindustan.

Asim Roy in his scholarly essay groups the writings of Farzana Shaikh in the category of the orthodox historiography whereas he regards the work of Ayesha Jalal as a valuable contribution in terms of the study of Jinnah and the Muslim League and has placed it in the revisionist historiography. According to
Asim Roy the traditional understanding of the political process leading to the Partition of India and establishment of Pakistan has remained strongly rooted in two unquestionable and popular assumptions, that is, the Muslim League for the Partition and Congress for unity of India. He further argues that Ayesha Jalal has initiated the much needed task of historical reconstruction by taking upon herself the challenge of demolishing the first of the twin myths which concerns Jinnah and the Muslim League’s actual role in the making of Pakistan or the Partition of India (Hasan, Partition 103-105). Ayesha Jalal’s historiographical reconstruction does provide into the substantial realms of the need for arguing the centrality of knowing the actual responsible human agency for the Partition of India. Asim Roy suggests that on both thematic and chronological grounds, the Lahore resolution of 1940 clearly emerges as the divide between the two distinct interpretative approaches. The dividing line is crucial for knowing the difference between the orthodox view and the revisionist analysis of Muslim polity between the two World Wars.

In the orthodox view, the resolution adopted at the annual session of the League at Lahore in March 1940 was the first official pronouncement of the Pakistan or Partition demand by the party. Whereas the revisionist analysis at the Lahore resolution was not meant to be the Pakistan demand but a tactical move and a bargaining counter (Hasan, Partition 106). Asim Roy has taken-up the task to challenge, the second myth of the orthodox historiography that is, the Congress
for unity, and has gathered ample evidence to prove that the Congress commitment to freedom with unity begun to lose its fervor since the later 1920s and continued up to March 1947 (Hasan, Partition 122-132).

Mohammed Reza Kazimi’s work is an evolution of the role of Jinnah in the growth of Muslim League and the formation of Pakistan. It is an edited work and is a fine example to assert that Jinnah as well as the socio-cultural forces both, contributed significantly towards the emergence of the sovereign state of Pakistan. It has been suggested in this work that Jinnah was the right man at the right place and right time but the place and time, the political situation in British India and the historical conjuncture he faced were not of his making. However, whatever the strength, the momentum and intensity of historical forces working towards Pakistan, without the matching of the character, in this case that of Jinnah, with the circumstances, it could not have come the way, nor at the time it did (Kazimi 150).

This work also throws light on the trends in the revisionist historiography on the Partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan. It has been argued that while the assistance on national status of Indian Muslim became a non negotiable issue after 1940, the demand for a wholly separate and sovereign state of Pakistan remained open to negotiation as late as the summer of 1946. A refusal to acknowledge this is a result of the failure to draw an analytical distinction between nation and state (Kazimi 120). Regarding the role of Jinnah, it has been argued in
this work that many of those who had voted for the Muslim League in the election of 1946 had done so more out of personal loyalty to its candidates than out of support for Pakistan. However, it was Jinnah’s confidence trick which he declared that the election victory of 1946 was a valid mandate for Pakistan (Kazimi 87-88).

Aziz K.K. has focused his four volumes of *History of Partition of India, Origin and Development of the Idea of Pakistan*, in a Pakistan perspective. He has used ample of documents and sources to prove that Partition was inevitable. He remarks: “The feeling of separateness was perhaps older, but now it gained in significance in order to fortify the Muslim’s resolve to remain an entity to himself... Muslims were themselves strangers about their own identity. This was a fear as hateful as that of a Hindu rule. Therefore, the differences must be emphasized. The separate feeling must be made conspicuous” (Vol. 1, 1-2). And he again remarks: “The play of these two factors upon each other was destined to create Pakistan. In separate analysis, the fear of Hindu rule inspired the demand for a Partition of India, and the feeling of separateness led to the development of a separate nationalism” (02). He vehemently, argues, that when Jinnah came to construct the ultimate argument on which the creation of Pakistan was demanded and won, he combined the concept of territory and the factor of religion so closely as to give a new theory of nationalism to the historical development of Islam (207). He postulates that the role of British and the Congress and the aversion of Jinnah towards their manipulation in the creation of separate homeland for Muslims.
Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada editor of *Foundations of Pakistan*, provides more details about the idea of Pakistan and Partition. He explains, Jinnah's Presidential address to the Muslim League in October 1937 was, in fact, a declaration of war against the Congress. His political strategy began to crystallize. It consisted of attacking the Congress, and of equating Congress governments with 'Hindu' Raj. Jinnah alleged that the Congress was pursuing a policy which was exclusively 'Hindu', that it was imposing ‘Hindu Bande Mataram’ and the national flag on ‘all and sundry’. By identifying the Congress with majority community, Jinnah sought to create Muslim apprehensions against the Congress. It was made to appear that the ‘sectarianism’ of the Congress, and not the League’s own lack of popular support, was responsible for the fact that it had been ‘deprived’ of political power in the provinces, even as Jinnah acknowledged that Congress leadership did not have a very high opinion of the Muslim League. ‘No settlement with the majority is possible, as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it’ (Pirzada, Vol. II, 369).

In fact, Jinnah explains in a vehement manner, that the Hindu-Muslim unity was impossible because they held different religious socio-cultural practices, so that these communities must have separate homeland. He further argues that the colonists used divide and rule policy to divide Hindu and Muslim unity. Further the Congress and Muslim League leaders created gulf between them (Vol. II, 401-03). The separate homeland for Muslims, Ali Jawwad (1937) reflected:
“Partition of India on Hindu-Muslim lines” (Vol. II, 321). Azad Subhani said:

Letter from Jinnah to Mahatma Gandhi and Mahatma Gandhi to Jinnah reveal that the nature of Hindu-Muslim political scenario necessitated the implementation of the Two-nation theory propagated and strengthened by Jinnah. He (Jinnah) wrote a letter to Gandhi about the Muslim entity and division of India that was essential for both the religious communities for the decolonization process. Jinnah wrote in reply, “Dear Mr. Gandhi, I’m in the receipt of your letter of September 24th and I thank you for it. You have already rejected the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore resolution. You do not accept that the Musalmans of India are a nation. You do not accept that the Musalmans have an inherent right of self-determination. You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise the right of self-determination. You do not accept that Pakistan is composed by two zones, North-East, comprising six provinces, namely Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam subject to territorial adjustments that they may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore resolution” (Pirzada, Vol. I, 122-125). Jinnah sarcastically commented on Gandhi’s
lip-sympathy on the Partition in the same letter. Jinnah wrote in reply, “As a result to our correspondence and discussions, I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and it does not come form your heart, and suddenly at the eleventh hour you put forward a few suggestions consisting only of two sentences...” (Vol. I, 122-125). This correspondence reveals the innate desire of Jinnah to divide the country. Jinnah was averted by the Congress political activities and its support to the Hindus that marginalized the Muslims becoming the strong reason to divide India into two.

While discussing the role of the Indian leaders, Pirzada elaborates that the responsibility for first putting forward Pakistan as the well high unanimous demand of the Muslims rests squarely on Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It is he who transformed it from an ‘esoteric fancy’ into a powerful ‘political slogan’ bringing it closer to actuality. Even if, originally, he made the demand only as a tactical move, he stuck to it, thereafter, so uncompromisingly that a settlement on any other basis became virtually impossible. By his full effort, steadfastness and refusal to negotiate with anyone except on his own terms; he made sure of getting Pakistan, but also getting in the worst possible form, a truncated, moth-infested Pakistan. Gandhi’s responsibility, though less direct and less deliberate than Jinnah’s was nevertheless very considerable. The mistakes committed by Congress under Gandhi’s leadership were due basically to the Gandhian facility for self-deception, over confidence of his own good intentions, he clung, till too late, to the fallacy that Congress could and did present all Indians including Muslims.
Obsessed by the supposedly evil intentions of the British and unaware that his own methods of appeal were calculated to provoke Muslim antipathy, he shut his eyes, till too late to the menace of Muslim separatism (Pirzada, Vol. II, 418). Pirzada in his two volumes greatly focused on the origin and development of Muslim politics and the political adjustment with British rule. Communal violence blamed the growing Hindu nationalism and increasing Muslim violence creating the urge to have their own separate homeland.

The Partition of Punjab: A compilation of Official Documents on Punjab deals with the formation of the socio-cultural identity of the Muslim’s communitarian politics and the emergence of the sovereign state of Pakistan. It argues that in the case of pre-1947 Punjab, one notices the salience of religion based idiom resulting not necessarily out of religious reasons par excellence but simply to augment the communitarian definition. The entry of religion into mainstream politics, like the issue of language or rural or urban chasms, only lays threadbare, the comparative weakness of the mundane elements leading communitarian politics.

During the pre-Partition Punjab, one finds an explicit transformation of cultural nationalism into presumably full-fledged nationalism seeking complete political sovereignty. By the time of independence, the Punjab Muslims had largely begun to espouse the case for Pakistan, the way the Hindus and Sikhs had aligned themselves with all India politics (The Partition 148-163).
The document also acknowledges the central position of Punjab in the formation of Pakistan and the important role of Jinnah. It argues that without the crucial support for Muslim Punjab, there would have been no break-through for Jinnah had given the limited following of the Muslim League in the province all through the 1930s. It also comes out as a proof of his astute statesmanship that he struck a deal with Sir Sikander Hayat Khan in 1937 through Sikander-Jinnah Pact which proved to be the launching pad for the League’s entry and then its subsequent conquest of Provincial party politics for the cause of the League (210-241).

The Partition of Punjab was the deciding factor in the political history. It involved imperialists tactics to divide the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. Fundamentalists from both the communities created communal violence increasing profound animosity and retaliation on each other. The political historiography elucidates the birth of Congress and the Muslim League. Then, both Congress and Muslim League branded the Congress as a Hindu party and Muslim League for only Muslims. The frustrated Muslim leaders like Jinnah and his followers totally rejected the idea of Congress for the Muslims. Finally, Jinnah and League demanded the separate sovereign state. Indeed, it was inevitable for them because Hindu fundamentalism and nationalism day-by-day hardened and threatened Muslims existence (268-289). To establish their own independent Muslim state and demand to bifurcate Hindu ideology, it was inevitable for them to divide from India.
West Punjab Government’s Note on the Sikh Plan, explores how Punjabi Muslims did not flock to the Muslim League’s banner from 1944 onwards either because of a sense of separation or because it offered them Pakistan. They entered its ranks because of local factional rivalries and changes brought about by the Second World War. The strains of the war efforts compelled the Government of India to desert its allies in the West Punjab. The British thus destroyed the political system which they had so carefully built-up in their earlier years in West Punjab. The Unionist Party lost much of its influence and was pushed into the background. Its members decided that the best method of maintaining their local power in the changed national and provincial context was to seek accommodation with the Muslim League. Jinnah also allowed his former opponents to enter the Muslim League, as he needed their influence in mobilizing support for Pakistan. As desired, the support of the rural landed elite clan leaders, Pir, Sufis and Sujjada Nashins led to the victory of the Muslim League in the elections of 1946 and the emergence of Pakistan (West 12-58).

This document argues that the Pakistan movement in the West Punjab was shaped by the institutional structures of the British Colonial State. It is of the opinion that the Pakistani sentiment in Punjab can only be understood after fully comprehending the relationship between Islam and Empire. However, the religion or Islam played a significant role in growth of the movement for Pakistan in West Punjab. The Punjabi Muslims were exhorted to support Pakistan, identifying
themselves with the prophet and the Quran, in a struggle between *din* and *dunia*. In the West Punjab, the Sikh community held a great urge to have their own separate state Khalistan. For that, the Sikh leaders started agitation against British and started violence against Muslims but their effort proved futile. In fact the Sikh leaders continued their effort to have a separate state. In West Punjab, both the communities disrupted peace, communal violence fanned every nook and corner of West Punjab and the British government kept quite. The Sikh leader Baldev Singh ultimately agreed on the Partition of Punjab, he did not think that after Partition Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims could have gone mad. (180-206).

This shows that Jinnah and the Punjab Muslim League had been successful enough in mobilizing strong support of the *Sajjada-Nashins* and *Pirs* who subsequently won over the Muslims of West Punjab for the cause of the Muslim League and Pakistan. It further, argues that in building its base for Pakistan in rural West Punjab, the League dramatized its claim to speak for a self conscious Muslim community that transcended the local identities about which rural politics had been built. The *Pirs* played a vital role in the process. Religious intermediaries remained embedded in a world of local identities and their influence yet stressed their commitment to community symbols that bound them and all Muslims to the concept of the perfect community led by the prophet. Many rural Muslims looked to the *Pirs* for religious leadership and found also a powerful political model in this context. The colonial system established by the British, got involved in the creation of Pakistan and giving independence to India (219-243).
In the conclusion, it has been argued that the Pakistan movement destroyed the ideological foundations on which the British colonial government had held its authority to West Punjab society. With the collapse of the Unionist party, the state could no longer claim legitimacy as merely the organizer and protector of a system of local power in the Punjab. The Pakistan movement held out the vision of a popular Muslim community that could claim legitimate state authority. With its roots in the communal rhetoric of the press and urban politics, this ideal community found a broad public expression in the League's successful election campaign and the emergence of Pakistan. It is a known fact all that the Sikhs of Punjab wanted to have an independent Punjab. Sikhs of Punjab were incited to stand against the Muslims and they were instigated that they would become the slaves of the Muslims, if they would side with the Muslims for an independent sovereign Punjab, as the Muslims have slight majority over the Sikhs in Punjab. The Hindus joined hand with the Sikhs in anti-Muslim riot in West Punjab. In this way, division of Punjab was made inevitable (259-306).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that a lot has been written on the Muslim politics and Partition of India by ardent historians and scholars. Regional studies and the growth of the Muslim communal politics in the Muslim majority provinces have also attracted the attention of the historians. Needless to say, it has produced a very valuable body of the literature of listing politico-historical importance. However, as is the case with the aspect in the study of the political and social history of the Indian subcontinent, the availability of new and classical
sources, access to more private papers, documents and the ever evolving tools of historical research provide exciting ventures to focus attention on the hitherto neglected aspects of the remarked phase of the Indian national movement; the growth of the Muslim politics and their demand to have their own sovereign state of free Pakistan. The perspective has taken limited arguments and debates that proved central for the creation of Pakistan from the Pakistani perspective.

Many writers and authors have produced written narratives, with the Muslim perspective with Pakistani authors and Indian historiographical scenario introspecting on the need for Partition and its consequences at the national scale. The creation of Pakistan is not the handiwork of some political personalities as it gets discussed in the historiographical tradition of both the countries. It is more of a social production caused through regular interaction of contradictory religious forces operating at the national scale. The ideological forces of separation that remained clearly indicative of the rifting forces contested and resisted the idea of a united India. Religious healing was of no use and that proved detrimental for pacifying the groups aspiring for a separate identity for their nationhood. Pakistan stood for the invention of an idea that could solve the crisis of the embittered Muslims of India. Some had faith and confidence in the idea of Pakistan, turning into a reality and some believed in the plurality of Indian nationalism. The contradictions prevail in the daily routines of the customs and cultures of both sides of the sub-continent, never ceasing to stop but ongoing and flourishing with venomous tendencies for both the nations.
2.3. Partition: The Indian Perspective

Clearly, the historical event of the Partition of 1947 into national sovereignties of India and Pakistan turns into a landmark event of the histories of the nationhood. The anti-colonial resistances that shaped and culminated in a series of anti-British struggles, also reflected on the development and the gradual evolution of the colonized resistances and the concept of national unity. Nationalism became, strictly, complex for the disciplined colonized bodies resisting the colonial domination. Nationalism, thus, includes the centrality of the well-entrenched religious and cultural differences acting as a boundary for Hindu-Muslim schism. The Partition of India with the Indian perspective provides a rich focus on Pakistan movement or Partition of India. The dominant Indian perspective led by the Congress and other dominant class-groups were of the opinion that Pakistani Movement was the result of the deep-seated communal gap and the imperial diplomacy of the British divide and rule.

This perspective provides an interesting observation that some of the Congress leaders did admit of the 'errors' and 'weaknesses' of communal treatment to the problems of religious differences in the Provincial governments. The confidence of the Congress in restoring a non-conflicting communal framework after freedom got achieved from the Raj was, indeed, a very idealistic assumption for the active and powerful Nationalism of the Indian kind. The
practical and reasonable basis for the Partition of India happens to be the Lahore Resolution of 1940; articulating a division based on two-nation theory, India’s Partition becomes the inevitable outcome of a complex process involving the alien state, the nationalist political initiative and the fast changing socio-economic fabric. It is easier to locate the blame of Partition on the articulation of the Muslim-League’s adamant demand for Pakistan, probably entrenched in the logic of age old communal disharmony. This flared-up riots and similar types of skirmishes in the pre-1947 India. An explanation of the process of Partition requires an in-depth study of both the imperial design of divide and rule and its application to a reality, ridden with various kinds of contradictions which allowed the fissiparous tendencies to grow and proliferate over time. As in the case of Pakistan Movement, Muslim separatism was not therefore, always a cohesive ideology. It instead, paved the ground, on occasions, for the consolidation of political forces championing the clamor for division of India.

V.P. Menon arguing writes, the Muslim League held its annual session in Lahore towards the end of March. Jinnah in his presidential address replied that: “Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality” (V.P. Menon 82-83). He declared that Democracy was unsuited to India ; that “the Muslims are a nation, according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their
territory and their state”. In the following resolution, which came to be known as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’ (82-83). Jinnah steadfastly stood for the division of India but he did not have a definite idea of what he really wanted (106). Gandhi said: “...If vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation having nothing in common with the Hindus and others, no power on earth can compel them to think otherwise. And if they want to Partition India on that basis, they must have the Partition, unless, the Hindus want to fight against such a division…” (136-37).

The Muslim League’s leader Jinnah adamantly and adroitly proposed Two-nation theory before the British and the Congress. The League condemned that the Congress is a Hindu body and he (Gandhi) called the British, ‘Divide and Quit’ but All India Hindu Mahasabha demanded the preservation of the united integrity of India (V.P. Menon 153-155). Gandhiji pacified Jinnah that the Partition of India could create great untoward hostility and antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. Gandhiji rejected the fundamental basis of the Lahore resolution, since he did not accept that the Mussalmans of India were a nation, nor that they had an inherent right of self-determination; that they alone were entitled to exercise their right of self-determination, and that Pakistan was composed to two zones, North-West and North-East, comprising six provinces namely Sind, Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam subject to terrestrial adjustments that might be agreed upon as indicated in the Lahore
resolution. (V.P. Menon 165). Thus, Gandhi and Jinnah talks failed, Jinnah was reluctant towards Gandhi’s opinion about a separate Muslim homeland.

Menon shocked by Jinnah’s adamant nature to have separate homeland for Muslims, writes: “I personally was terribly disappointed, for I had been pressing consistently to the viceroy that Jinnah’s claim that the Muslim League represented the will of the Muslims of India...” (207). The alternative nationalism that was appropriated and widely diffused from the mainstream Hindu polity was a severe jolt to the dominant confidence in the commonness of Indian nationalism altered through religious indifferences and communal consciousness.

In the general elections, Muslim League won the majority of Muslim seats, it was able to form ministries only in two of the five provinces claimed for Pakistan, namely Bengal and Sind (V.P. Menon 232). Abul Kalam Azad refused to agree to the Partition and Azad remarked that Congress could never agree to the Partition of India. The kind of “Pakistan” about which Muslims spoke (V.P. Menon 134-137), Menon writes: “In Gandhiji’s view the two-nation theory was most dangerous. The Muslim population, but for a microscopic minority, was a population of converts. They were all descendants of India-born people. Gandhiji opposed to the two-nation theory, or to two constitution-making bodies” (239).

And writes: “Jinnah was interviewed by the Mission on 4th April. He was invited to give his reasons for thinking for the future of India that there should be a separate Pakistan. Jinnah replied that throughout the history, from the days of
Chandragupta, there had never been any Government of India in the sense of a single government. After the British had come, they had gradually established their rule in a large part of India, but even then, the country had only been partly united. The Indian States had been separate and sovereign. It was said that India was one, but this was not so. "India was really many and was held by the British as one" (240). Jinnah's justification for the Pakistan case evolves as a counter-argument for the dominant notion of a united India, reversing the ideology of the majority, sliding away from the realistic and practical understanding of the evolution of Indian nationalism with deeper roots in Indian culture and tradition.

The Congress ambition for a 'United India'; the rulers prepared to join an all-India federation; but Jinnah insisted on two-nations with nothing more than treaties and agreements between them (V.P. Menon 241). In fact, the Sikh community leaders like Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh and Baldev Singh, were interviewed by Mission. They said that transfer of power to a single body, or to more than one body; if power were to be transferred to two bodies, which would the Sikh community wish to join; and if such a thing were practicable and could be arranged, would the Sikhs wish to have a separate autonomous State of their own (V.P. Menon 242). Sikhs were vehemently opposed to the Partition, because if it could happen, Sikhs could be unsafe. Partition as a realistic, practical realization could also be a threat to the minority politics and other religious groups during the colonial domination. Minority fear and the
trauma faced by the Sikhs, is evident in many narrative accounts about the Partition of India. They were right to foresee the strategic challenge to the smaller states on the frontier making the case for Pakistan a defensive challenge for India in the long run. Dalits and the minorities also sensed a similar warning with the case of Pakistan also posing an immanent threat to the deprived national groups, instead of perceiving the Partition of India as a solution to the Indian problem, for the Dalits became a problem of the deprived in all forms with shared loyalties to the contesting nationalities.

The Sikh leaders view the best solution was a United India. Menon writes; “Jagajivan Ram, Radhanath Das and Prithvi Singh Azad attended together as representatives of the All India Depressed Classes’ League. They said that League was opposed to any proposal which would impair the integrity of the country; that, in its view, the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan would not provide a solution to the minority problem but would produce fresh problems; that it was also opposed to the setting up of more than one constituent assembly” (244).

The Hindu Mahasabha leaders strongly opposed the Partition that it would be economically unsound, disastrous, politically unwise and suicidal (V.P. Menon 245). Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar, the Liberal leaders were also interviewed by Mission. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru said, “always recognized that the Muslims should be given a satisfactory measure power, but he saw grave risks in Partition” (V.P. Menon 145-46). The Mahasabha termed the idea of Partition
suicidal because it paved the way for further miseries in the days to come after independence. In line with the arguments of the dominant majority groups of the country, it stood for a united India, registering the fear and threat felt by the Muslim groups in a majoritarian Hindu world.

Menon eventually reminds that the Cabinet Mission also refused to accept the League's demand for a separate homeland for Muslims. Jinnah described the Cabinet Mission’s Statements as “Cryptic with several lacunas” (269). Jinnah accused the Cabinet Mission of bad faith and of having “Played into the hands of the Congress” (283). Moreover, the politics and contesting argument on both the sides of the Congress and the Muslim league worsened the case for a united India. Accusations and politics of blame even brought greater consequences on the religious identities of both the groups; making the case for Pakistan more self-evident and justificatory.

With the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan the Muslim League called for Direct Action Day on 15 August 1946. Menon writes: “The sequel to all this was the unprecedented communal riots in Calcutta, where for four or five days beginning from 16 August, riot, murder, arson and pillage were rampant, involving very heavy damage to life and property. The bleakness of unity was getting continuously added through communal flames, charging religious metaphors worsening the communal existent equilibrium to a greater extent. The rift (political) distancing between the Congress and the Muslim League
strengthened the case for Pakistan providing a justifiable legitimacy to the religious differences and cultural variations creating space for separate nationalities. Politics of Partition took every microscopic event into religious contestations operating and constructing the dichotomies for voicing religiocultural dissent ignoring the claims of a spontaneous nationalism for united India. According to a rough official estimate at the time, nearly 5000 lives were lost, over 15000 persons were injured and about one hundred thousand were rendered homeless…” (274).

In fact the Congress leaders, Nehru, Patel, Gandhi and others showed contempt towards Jinnah’s act. Even after accepting the Interim Government, the League leaders provoked the goondas to stir the atmosphere on October 1946 (V.P. Menon 318). The great efforts of Pandit Nehru and Azad could not pull-off the fears and desperate claims for a distinct nationalism based purely on religious differences and cultural variations, as hinted under the auspices of the Muslim League led by Jinnah. The interim isolation of the Muslim League can be interpreted as a failure of the Muslim League to trust the Nehruvian confidence in the collective responsibility that the Interim Government under Nehru’s leadership was a blow to the Hindu-Muslim unification. The League’s distrust of the Congress leadership, took broader dimensions in the popular imagination that understood clearly the failure of the dissenting parties to embrace the common national question intensifying the problematic of Indian nationalism.
Interim Government, as Liaqat Ali Khan described it, “consisted of a Congress block and a Muslim bloc, each functioning under separate leadership” (V.P. Menon 320-321). Both Congress and League leaders created a gap between them, Menon observes that, the British Government had been exploiting the position for its own purposes. Nehru added that, there was a mental alliance between the League and the senior British officials (326). The disillusioned mindset of the British in India can be seen with conflicting resistances developing along with the line of resentment against the British in India. The withdrawal for the British was unique with a resolution to the Hindu and Muslim alternative nationalism to be resolved and amicably settled. The fundamental problem of Partition was drawing closer into a reality. Nehru saw the issue as a devastating threat to national integrity and national conscience with the demands of the League’s growing power.

Nehru strongly opposed the division of Punjab and Bengal into two parts, the Congress leaders showed contempt towards this plan. Menon writes: “The Congress felt that the suggested way out would be fair to all parties, if the League accepted the British Cabinet Mission’s scheme of 16 May and cooperated in the Constituent Assembly, the question did not arise in this form. But even so, it was worth considering whether Bengal and the Punjab should not both be divided into smaller provinces. In the event of the Muslim League not accepting the Cabinet Mission’s scheme and not coming into the Constituent Assembly, the division of
the Muslims—a demand in which the League had the sympathy, if not the support, of a large section of British opinion and, what was even more important from our point of view, the sympathy of most of the British element in the services. My personal view was that it was better that the country should be divided, rather than that it should gravitate towards civil war. If we agreed to Partition, Jinnah obviously could not ask for those Partitions of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam which were predominantly non-Muslim” (358). The idea of Pakistan got entangled with the dominant framework of the states with varied ethnographic details coupled with religious participation of the nationalist elements participating and prevailing within a nationalist body. The discourses of Partition got combined with the state relations and its religious population getting politicized into varied groups both Hindu and Muslim contesting their postcolonial nationalist claims.

Mountbatten met all the top leaders as well as the British statesmen concerned with India at all stages of the formulation of the Partition plan. Also, all of them, Jinnah as the President of the Muslim League, Nehru and Patel as top leaders of Congress, Sardar Baldev Singh on behalf of Sikhs, and Attlee and Listowell as representatives of the British Government, said they accepted the plan. Mountbatten had himself gone to London and the (Muslims) got to know that he had taken V.P. Menon with him, the Muslim League leadership was confused about Mountbatten’s departure and most unhappy with Menon going with him. Mountbatten came back from London, announced his Partition plan, which was
popularly known as 3rd June plan. The British government passed the Indian Independence Bill on 18th July 1947 and fixed the date of 15th August 1947 for setting the two Dominion States (361-380).

The 3rd June statement in its appendix had specified the provincial boundaries of the Muslim majority districts of Punjab according to the 1941 census figures that were to be used until the report of a Bombay Commission became available (V.P. Menon 511). The Muslim majority areas comprised the whole of Rawalpindi and Multan divisions with districts of Gujranwala, Gurudaspur, Lahore, Shaikhupura and Sialkot of Lahore division (515). In his broadcast of 3rd June, 1947, Mountbatten made it clear that: “The ultimate boundary will be settled by the Boundary Commission and will certainly not be identical with those which have been provisionally adopted” (380-381).

Menon argues, the Congress had worked hard and sacrificed everything for the sake of Indian unity. The choice today was “between accepting the June 3rd plan or committing suicide” (385). Azad disagrees with Pant that June 3rd plan was better than the Cabinet Mission Plan. Azad said: “The division is only of the map of the country and not in the hearts of the people, and I am sure it is going to be a short-lived Partition” (385). In accordance with the June 3rd plan, it was decided to set up two Boundary Commissions, one to deal with the Partition of Bengal, as also the separation of Sylhet from Assam, and the other to deal with the Partition of Punjab. Each Boundary Commission would consist of a Chairman and four
members, two nominated by the Congress and two by the Muslim League. With the consent of both parties Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed the Chairman of both the Commissions. Menon addressed that Jinnah’s adamancy and steadfastness made Pakistan’s case more inevitable (401).

Menon lamented Partition violence and its impact on Hindu-Muslim communities. Refugee resettlement and rehabilitation remained negligent by both the governments of India and Pakistan. Adding to the climax of the population, displacement and the tragedies heaped on the population, bewildered and castrated was the fatal destruction of the economies of the newly independent states of India and Pakistan. The enormous and unsolvable refugee problems about their lost parents, sons, daughters and their movable or immovable properties hindered both the governments (404-442). The effect of the Partition on both the sides are plenty—both visual and narrative evidence indicates the foul play of political systematic silencing or the inability of the political leaders on both the sides to intervene on behalf of the public, making the politics of Partition a complex study.

Kripal Singh’s collection of documents, concerning the *Partition of Punjab --- 1947*, through his choice of documents and from the stray remarks in the introductory chapter; it is obvious that he was one of those many optimists who entertained hopes that the Indian National Congress would honour the trust bestowed on them by the Sikhs. Thus, in spite of the efforts of many British politicians like Sir Stafford Cripps (1889-1952), to encourage the Sikhs to come to
an understanding with the Muslim League, the Sikhs remained steadfast in their commitment to the Congress. The Sikh faith in the Hindus created enormous difficulties for the comprehension of the religious hatred and antagonism between the Sikhs and the Muslims.

Although, there were brief interludes of divergence, as during the Quit India Movement of 1942, when the Sikhs constituted the Khasla Defence of India League to protect their (Sikh) material tradition in the army, they were the main backbone of the Congress and Civil disobedience movements, arrest, imprisonment, deportation and execution in large numbers (K. Singh 4-16).

The Sikhs bore the major blame of the Partition syndrome. The post-colonial political order in India was thus, in a sense, a product of the martyrdom of the Sikhs for the cause of freedom from the British rule. Just as Punjab had shielded the rest of India from all external onslaughts, since time immemorial, though its frontier-land position, similar at the time of transfer of power, too, it is this province and its valiant inhabitants who had to suffer the most painful pangs of Partition (K. Singh, Doc. 36, 130-141).

Punjab represented a far-flung frontier region of India judging by its geographical location, but so far as its geopolitical location was concerned, it occupied the centre stage of Indian politics during the high-tide of colonial regime. To the British, Punjab was the core region of their imperial possessions in the
sub-continent, as this was the region which had given the British a fresh lease of life in 1857, by providing them with the military recruits which helped them to meet the change from their rebellious subjects in the heartland (K. Singh, Doc. 41, 166-168). The resulting effect of the hatred and the deeper animosity between the mutually antagonistic sides of the Sikhs and the Muslims added fresh fuel to the fire of communal hatred. British reliance on the Sikhs was also a consequence for the deeper communal animosities; altering the scale of violence, affecting the populace of Punjab and the prosperous parts of the imperial supporters.

As opined by Singh, the effective influence of Congress in the provincial politics also contributed the communal outburst contaminating the communal differences to the worst possibility. Arguably, the 1916 Congress provided a special status to the representation on the U.P. Muslims that was out of tune with the proportion to their numbers. Such miscalculated Congress treatment of the Muslim factor through garnering support for the anti-Partition rallies and demonstrations did not completely prove useful for those aspiring for the need for Pakistan. When one religious community was pacified for political participation; the other homogenous religious group like the Sikh got tensed and rejected its ties with the Muslims complicating the participation of the democratic nationalities into a unified Indian struggle. The increase in the Sikh participation for political rights when the relationship between the Hindus and Muslims remained more or less ruptured makes the Sikh case more interesting because they suspected of the
rift between the dominant power-struggles between the Congress and the Muslim league ignoring the greater claims of the Sikhs. Thus the Sikhs launched their own organization. The Central Sikh League to carry on the struggles for the rights of the Sikhs (Doc. 63, 191-194).

The Congress party’s apathy to Sikh fears of Muslim domination in the Punjab were evinced often and again in the Nehru Report (1928) which had proposed to concede separate constituencies for a majority community (the Muslims were about 51% of the population of the Punjab at this time). Congress passively to the Communal Award of 1932; conceding Muslims a statutory majority in the Punjab, Congress enthusiasm for the federal scheme of 1935 and their astounding performance at the ballot box in relating to, the non-Muslim provinces in 1937, in accordance with the provisions of the Act 1935 (K. Singh, Doc. 66, 209-211).

The Lahore Resolution of 1940 as his starting point, leading to the chain of events that went into the making of the Partition of the Punjab; Singh’s documents display a special concern for the role of the Sikhs in these events. The tension between the Hindu and Sikh moneylenders and the Muslim peasants was often brought to the fore during the plague in Multan in 1922 when Hindu grain dealers’ shops were looted and records were burnt, and it was again during the Hindu-Muslim riot at Kohat in 1923-24 (Doc. 79, 230-236).
The plan finding a solution to the communal tangle through some sort of a division of the province had long been in the air. Lala Lajpat Rai had envisaged a division of the Eastern part of the province from the Western. This idea was probably promoted by his realization that the Congress could never make much headway in the rural constituencies of Western Punjab, which always swayed to the dictates of their Pirs and Sajjada nashins, who happened also to be big owners of land (K. Singh, Doc. 84, 274-281).

Muslim leaders like Iqbal also thought that the Ambala Division was queering the pitch for the Muslims in the Punjab and Iqbal would like it to be separated from the rest of Punjab, so that the Muslims could dominate it without any restraint. Shah Nawaz Khan too thought the same (K. Singh, Doc. 88, 306-314). During the Round Table Conference of 1931, the Sikhs too had asked for drawing up the frontiers of Punjab anew, leaving out Ranjit Singh’s acquisitions in the West Punjab. The Lahore Resolution’s suggestion for a “grouping of geographically contiguous units” (K. Singh, Doc. 96, 341) was in the same tradition.

Many Sikh leaders were unable to tolerate the idea of the Partition of the province. Cripps proposal to allow provinces the right to secede from the Indian Union was not welcomed by the non-Muslims. Master Tara Singh’s suggestion for a Partition of the Punjab and the Shiromani Akali Dal’s Azad Punjab scheme were all designed to pressurize the Muslim League to soften their stand.
Rajagopalachari’s idea of allowing the right of self-determination to the Muslim majority areas roused all Congressmen into fury. Sikander Hayat Khan, who had written to Governor Glancy to allow non-Muslims to break away from Punjab, had to retrace his stand in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and declare in 1941 that: “We do not ask for the freedom where there may be Muslim Raj here and Hindu Raj elsewhere. If that is what Pakistan means, I will have nothing to do with it” (K. Singh, Doc. 118, 371). Gandhi would not agree to the Partition of the Punjab and would permit plebiscites only in the North-West, Bengal and Assam.

Jinnah did not envisage the Partition of provinces when he wanted a “settlement between two major nations” (K. Singh, Doc. 121, 389) and not secession from an existing union. Besides all misgivings and doubts, the idea of a Partition of the province was forced on by the Congress because of the terrible riots of March 1947, in Multan and Rawalpindi. Once Partition was decided upon, the population should have been gradually and peacefully phased out of their respective areas to the areas of their stronghold. However, the government and the political leaders had been dragging their feet till the Partition tragedy took place on both sides of the border suddenly, engulfing all civilized norms of behaviour and reducing human beings to participate and instigate monstrous atrocities. In fact, the area of Sikh stronghold should create the East Punjab, bringing Sikhs from West Punjab to it and leaving out Rohtak, Hissar, Gurgaon and Karnal out of it. If this plan had been heeded, the experience of Partition would have been much more tolerable for all three communities that were concerned (K. Singh, Doc. 162, 409).
All the three communities agreed the June 3rd Plan, Baldev Singh, on behalf of the Sikhs, accepted the fundamentals of Partition as laid down in the plan, but stressed that care should be taken to meet their demands when framing the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. On the evening of 3rd June, 1947 the Viceroy broadcasted over All India Radio. He gave a short account of his discussions with the leaders of the political parties. He said that it had always been his firm opinion that, with a reasonable measure, a good-will between the communities, a unified India would be, by far, the best solution, but it had been impossible to obtain agreement on the Cabinet Mission Plan or on any other plan that would preserve the unity of India. The Muslim League had demanded the Partition of India, and the Congress had used the same argument for demanding in that event, the Partition of certain Provinces became clear. It was necessary, in order to ascertain the will of the people of Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam, to lay down boundaries between the Muslim majority and remaining areas, but by a Boundary Commission and would certainly not be identical with those which had been provisionally adopted (K. Singh, Doc. 206, 680-82).

Indicative to the status of the Sikhs, the Viceroy remarked that they were so distributed that any Partition of the Punjab would be inevitably dividing them. It was sad to think that the Partition of the Punjab, which the Sikhs themselves desired, could not avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser degree. The exact degree of split would be left to the Boundary Commission, on which they would
of course be represented. In the joint conference of various Sikh organizations held in Lahore, was the welcoming of the division of Punjab, the Conference placed on record its view that no Partition of the province which did not preserve the solidarity and integrity of the Sikh community would be acceptable to the Sikhs (K. Singh, Doc. 261, 701-704).

Singh's documents of Partition of Punjab deliver broader informative referents for the Sikh participation in the Nationalism, Independence and the Partition of India. The documents do reveal better insights into the nature and consequences of Sikh participation in the politics of Partition and its results in the division of India. Singh's documents disclose the popular apprehensions and actualities of the Partition of Punjab. It shows the indignation of the Sikhs at the indecisiveness of the British, the intransigence of the Congress leaders, the singular determination of the Muslim leaders and the despair of the Sikh leaders in the wilderness.

P.S. Gupta's Part-I Towards Freedom document opens with the aftermath of the 'Quit India Movement'. Jayaprakash Narayan's appeal to freedom fighters, he said: "those who are running after the slogan of Congress-League unity are merely serving the ends of imperialist propaganda. It is not the lack of unity that is obstructing the formation of a national government, but the natural unwillingness of imperialism to liquidate itself" (Part I, 2). And said: "The traditional rivalry of the imperialistic concerns that were at the most felt both by
the Hindus and the Muslims can be witnessed in the breakage of relationships between the Congress and the Muslim League. Thus, both the Congress and the Muslim League failed in understanding the core realities of the imperial domination and the force of power held by the British over various contradictory colonized subjectivities. Unity between the League and the Congress does not foreshadow the growth of these forces but their absolute relation for the League cannot conceivably tread the path of revolution and freedom” (Part I, 2).

To all fighters of freedom, Jayaprakash Narayan’s Letter No. 2, dated 1st September 1943, endorses the fact of future homeland for Muslims which J.P. Narayan notes: “Mr. Jinnah wants his Pakistan. But if he is serious about it, he must fight for it, he must make sacrifices for it, possibly die for it. But, there is the rub: it is exactly these things which Mr. Jinnah and his followers are never prepared to do. Therefore, Mr. Jinnah shrieks his demand for Pakistan in the face of Mahatma Gandhi. But poor Gandhi is not in possession trample upon them that defile and desecrate them. The Congress’ have no objection if Mr. Jinnah takes his ‘homelands’ from the British at least a part of India would then be free. But he will not take them, for he is not prepared to pay the price. He further wants to get along by blackmailing the Congress. But, in the end it will be Churchill who will have blackmailed Jinnah. If India is ever Partitioned under the auspices of the Mother Parliaments, it would be in the interest of imperialism not to bestow separate freedom upon the so-called Muslim nation of Hindustan …” (Part I, 146).
The Part-II, *Towards Freedom* deals with the 'struggle in the Law of Courts', with various cases lodged against British government by Indians. Some cases deal about freedom movement, its prisoners and Partition of India cases. Gandhian charisma focuses Gandhi's past and the follower's struggle to release Gandhi from the Jail. Ram Krishan Dalmia writes a letter to the President and the leaders of the Conference at Delhi on 20th February, 1943, referring about Gandhiji's fast and Hindu-Muslim relation as: “If Gandhiji passes away, the gulf of differences between Hindus and Muslims will be further widened. Those who consider the nationalism will be weakened are mistaken. The hope of Pakistan if not vanished away, will be impossible to realize for a hundred years...” (Gupta, Part II, 1501). And again: “…It is our fault or that of the bureaucratic Government which has dragged him to the point of death. Now my request is either to take action with a bold heart or please command Gandhiji to stop this calamity. If really we feel that the life of Gandhiji is an asset for us, we had better hand over a blank cheque to Mr. Jinnah and let him have a Pakistan to which on principle, I am deadly against as I have a dream of seeing one day the abolition of all territorial system, with the various nations of the world, welded into one unit, owing allegiance to one flag, using one currency and ultimately one language” (Part II, 1502). The British government of India and many Hindu and Muslim leaders opposed the idea of Indian Partition.

*Towards Freedom: 1943-1944*, Part-III, exclusively discusses 'Labour Movement' and their struggle to get freedom. ‘The increasing student movement, their urge to have freedom and desired for a strong unity with Muslims’. ‘The
Role of Business Community and their struggle for India’s Independence’ is also addressed. Thus, business community provided financial support to the freedom fighters (Part III, 2443-2550). Narayan’s assessment about the class-relations and the struggle for economic interdependence gathers attention in his writings offering a critique of the imperialistic hegemonization of the colonized economy altering the equation between communities with respective religions.

Gandhiji forced the British Government to transfer of power to Indians immediately (Part III, 2816) Louis Fischer* explains the views of Gandhi towards the British, “... And Gandhi said, ‘I cannot ask the British to quit India during the war that would mean making a present of India to the Axis’, Gandhi has said from that day to this, ‘The British and Americans can stay in India. They can reinforce the armed services in India. They can use India as a base for military operations against the Axis Powers’...” (Part III, 2821).

Fischer providence the evidence of the: “...objection of Indian independence, namely the Hindu-Muslim question. Here, it is important to remember this central factor one is always told of fights about cows and music, etc. But all British officials, all Muslim leaders, all Hindu leaders, all unanimously said to me: There is no friction between Hindus and Muslims in the villages of India. But the village of India is 90 per cent of India. In other words, the conflict

* Louis Fischer, the well known American Journalist and author, who visited India in 1942, delivered a lecture on India to a packed audience on February 23 last in the town hall at San Francisco. Fischer surveys in it the recent events of India-Gandhiji’s Fast, the failure of British statesmanship the Quit India Campaign and so on.
between Hindus and Muslims is man made, city political affair. In this connection, it is significant that Sir Stafford Cripps, by his own admission in the House of Commons, did not while he was in India discuss the Hindu-Muslim problem with Indian leaders. That seems strange, doesn’t it? Here he was in India to settle the Indian problem. ... Gandhi has said repeatedly. You will find it in print, that the Indian Congress Party of which he is the leader and which contains chiefly Hindus, but consists of many Muslims, would enter an Indian National Government with the Muslims. Mr. Jinnah, the President of Muslim League said that he would form an Indian National Government with the Muslims. Mr. Jinnah, the President of Muslim League said that he would form an Indian National Government with the Hindus. In other words, the Hindus will enter an Indian National Government with the Muslims. The Muslim will enter in Indian National Government with the Hindus. The only thing missing is the Indian National Government” (Part III, 2823).

Mrs. Frances Gunther’s article quoted in the Hindu Official Notings on it (Govt. of Madras Pub Press Dept. 1943-File G.O. No. 2761) wrote on the Pakistan issue. She believed that: “Pakistan’ the imaginary name for two imaginary separate Muslim States in India, is the peak of the British-Jinnah interplay. The rest of India would lie, like a gigantic Polish Corridor, between them. So for responsible Muslim opinion has repudiated ‘Pakistan’, but the plan, if carried through, would lead to the Balkanization of India, and to unending civil wars.
What has been the Congress attitude on this English-Hindu-Muslim problem? Congress believes that whatever tension actually exists between Hindus and Muslims is due to poverty and economic maladjustment and not to religion. To the Congress, the Muslims are not 'a minority'; they are 'brother Indians'. Yet every conceivable guarantee of equality for all nationals, regardless of creed, has been made by the Indian Congress" (Part III, 2829-2830). The Congress prospected on the Muslim factor-not really as a problem, which the Muslim League had understood and sensed deeper anxieties coupled with a historicized reality, reshaped through political harnessing and fear of the dominant rule turned the Muslims believing in a separate state.

B.J. Glancy wrote a letter to Lord Linlithgow, about the political scenario of Muslim League and Congress: "Khizar is not so sanguine as to the result of a battle with Jinnah unless the point of difference can be narrowed down to a war issue. There is no doubt that the 'Pakistan' slogan is gaining in volume, and I fear that there are a fair number of politicians in the Province who would sell the Unionist Fort for their own personal advantage. One of the difficulties, as have mentioned in my last letter, is the loose wording of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact; are more I study this document the less, I like it. Unfortunately it is easier for Jinnah to twist the pact to suit his own convenience than for the Unionist Party; it contains no satisfactory enunciation of the doctrine that the Central Muslim League authorities are expected to refrain from interference in Punjab Politics” (Part III, 2906).
V.D. Savarkar’s statement on India’s unity* Savarkar in the Press Conference held at Nagpur on 15th August 1943, stated that: “For the last 30 years, we have been accustomed to the ideology of geographical unity of India and the Congress has been the strongest advocate of that unity but suddenly, the Muslim majority, which has been asking one concession after another, has after the Communal Award come forward with the claim that it is a separate. I have no quarrel with Mr. Jinnah’s two-nation theory. We Hindus are a nation by ourselves and it is a historical fact that Hindus and Muslims are two nations...” (Part III, 2976).

The paradoxical statement given by V.D. Savarkar, was discussed thoroughly by B.S. Moonje and wrote a letter to Bhapatkars / Gogte/ Tahmankar on September 9th 1943. Moonje writes, it is a wrong reporting conversation of V.D. Savarkar in the Press Conference. Bhapatkar drafted a resolution regarding Monje’s draft and D.V. Tahmankar wrote a letter to B.S. Moonje regarding the same matter. In fact, Savarkar’s statement was widely discussed in the Hindu nationalist organizations like, the R.S.S. and Hindu Mahasabha (Part III, 2977-2987).

* Report in the Hindu, dt 17-8-43, The Hindu (IC WA Library). There can be 2 nations but only one State-Nagpur August 15.
B.S. Moonje, the acclaimed leader of the Hindu Mahaśabha, frequently visited the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh volunteers and repeatedly told them that India (Hindustan) belonged to the Hindus and that it should be retaken from the British (Part III, 3004). The Hindu organizations actively participated in the freedom struggle. The Hindu organizations were against both the British and the Muslim organizations. The R.S.S. widely spread across North part of every district of India to strengthen Hindu power against Muslims. The leaders of Hindu organizations took precaution to make India as a Hindu dominated nation and the activities of the organizations were conducted with great secrecy that no matter should leak outside (Part III, 3093), V.D. Savarkar, President of Hindu Sabha forwarded circular on 16-07-1944. In that circular he said: “I call every provincial and local Hindu Sabhas under its jurisdiction to observe the first week in August 1944 as an ‘Akhand Hindustan and Anti-Pakistan Week’”. He gave 5 points instruction to strengthen all Hindu organizations (Part III, 3211).

Gandhi and Jinnah corresponded many letters regarding C. Rajagopalachari formula but Jinnah rejected the formula that it was against the Pakistan Resolution. ‘Gandhi to Jinnah’ correspondence on September 15, 1944, Gandhi declares: “The Formula was framed by Rajaji in Good Faith. I accepted it in equal good faith. The hope was that you would look at it with favour. We still think it to be the best in circumstances” (Part III, 3242). ‘Gandhi to M.A. Jinnah’ corresponds in response to Jinnah’s letter, Gandhi writes on September 15, 1944.
1. Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does it bear the original meaning Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan out of which the name was formed? If not, what it is?

2. Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islam?

3. What is the connotation of the word ‘Muslims’ in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of the India of geography or of the Pakistan to be? (Part III, 3241).

Gandhi wrote 15 points to clarify Jinnah’s doubts regarding Rajaji’s formula. In return, Jinnah wrote a lengthy letter to answer those 15 questions written by Gandhi. Jinnah writes: “There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you to judge finally, when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in this subcontinent. For the movement I would refer you to two publications although there are many more, Dr. Ambedkar’s book and M.R.T.’s Nationalism in conflict in India. We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, reuse of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions-in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we
are a nation” (Part III, 3248). In return to this letter Gandhi wrote on September 22, 1944, that: “I am unable to accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted, there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions which would spell India’s ruin” (Part III, 3256).

Muslim National Guards Organization of ‘Pakistan Day’ on 23-3-1944, the volunteers went round Muslim Localities in Bombay and sold Pakistan flags which brought about Rs. 2,500. A flag salutation ceremony in the morning was performed by both Muslim League and Muslim National Guards. Those organization spread the news of ‘Pakistan Day’ everywhere, the big cities like, Bihar, Delhi, Madras, Punjab, Sind, Uttar Pradesh, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Bengal, Assam and other major cities and grandly celebrated ‘Pakistan Day’ (Part III, 3284-88).

The strong Hindu revolutionary organizations like RSSS, Hindu Mahasabha and etc., opposed the division of the nation. Jinnah and other Muslim organizations severely opposed the way Congress and other revolutionary organizations ill-treating in the name of religion and caste. Jinnah’s stubborn nature to have separate homeland for Muslims made Congress leaders great impediment and hindrance to fight against the imperialists. So that was the reason,
the frontline leaders Nehru and Patel look into Jinnah’s demand for separate homeland for Muslims and painfully agreed the partition of India. Nehru, Patel and other Congress leaders thought that Jinnah, after Partition might return to re-join India. But their prediction failed. The antagonism spread out permanently in both the communities.

India’s march towards freedom is manifestation of both the wider worldwide human upsurge of modern times for national liberation and the inner urge of a great people for self assertion and rise. From its conceptual genesis to its triumphant culmination, the national movement presented an ethos, at once universal in character and indigenous in content.

For the first twenty years since its emergence, the Congress, as a political party, regarded itself more or less as a moderate constitutional body, even though many among Congress gradually came to the conclusion during that period the extremist approach and means were imperative in order to attain the birthright of the Indians. The Swadeshi Movement, which began in 1905, opened a new phase in Indo-British relations signifying determined confrontation and organized agitation on the part of the people. For fifteen years thereafter, till the advent of Mahatma Gandhi as a supreme leader, India’s freedom urge ranged in varying degrees from the earlier cult of constitutionalism to extremism and terrorism for the cause of political advance and national honour. To the revolutionary youth, desire for martyrdom became a matter of faith and an obligatory impulse (Chopra, viii).
Between 1937 and 1947 was the decade of destiny for the political India. Politics, having assumed a crystal shape, developed around three distinct forces that is, nationalism preparing for its ultimate onslaught against the British to win independence, imperialism struggling for its last game of survival through divide and rule as well as brute force and communalism trying to take the best advantage of the situation by aligning itself with colonial imperialism. The hectic politics of the decade at last culminated with the end of the Raj, together with independence and Partition of India. Politics of separation and political isolation of the much abhorred Muslim element resulted in the inevitability of Partition causing a permanent rift in identities of the religious communities contesting for a nationalism of India.

P.N. Chopra edited, *Towards Freedom 1937-47*, Vol. I, unravels the upheavals of Indian national movement, independence and the element of Partition. The year 1937 reveals the distinctive traits in political situation which continued to influence the course of events till independence arrived. “Let there be no mistake about my complete economic independence”. (Gandhiji’s concept of Swaraj, Doc. 1, 1) declared Gandhi while referring to the Parliamentary programmes which was in the air. “It has come to stay and rightly. But it cannot bring us independence”, he reminded the nation (Doc. 1, 2.). To Jawaharlal Nehru: “The hatred which the Congress has fixed for April 1st is intimately connected with our agitation against the new Act. It should therefore be made a part of our election campaign and the country should be fully prepared for it” (Doc. 2, 6).
In the new atmosphere of confrontation with the British, Nehru in his robust optimism, felt that there were only two parties in India, the government and the Congress, and others must line-up. This conformist attitude of the Congress resulted in creating waves of apathy towards the Congress and the resulting ignoring of the Muslim League.

But, reacting against such claims, Muhammad Ali Jinnah showed up his fast developing political metamorphosis by declaring that “Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have said that there are only two parties in India—the Government and the Congress—and others must line-up. I refuse to line-up with the Congress. I refuse to accept this proposition. There is a third party in this country and that is Muslim India…” (Doc. 7, 14, Speech delivered in Calcutta on 3 January, 1937). In order to satisfy his own solution, as well as to serve the interest of his party, he expressed desire at this stage to be treated “as equal partners to come to a settlement with our sister communities in the interest of India…” (Doc. 7, 14). But the communal implications of such a suggestion being apparent, it did not create an iota of impression in nationalist quarters.

Rejecting Jinnah’s concept of third party as, “medieval and out of date” politics on communal lines, Nehru in his rejoinder remarked: “carried to a logical conclusion, Mr. Jinnah’s statement means that in no department of Public activity, must non-Muslims have anything to do with Muslim affairs. In politics social and economic matters, the Muslim must function separately as a group and counter
with other groups, as one nation deals with another. So also in trade unions, peasant unions, business, chambers of commerce and like organizations and activities, Muslims in India are indeed a nation apart and those who forget the fact commit a sin against the Holy Ghost and offend Mr. Jinnah” (Doc. 12, 24, Nehru, Rebuttal of Jinnah’s Concept of Third Party, Nehru Papers).

While the Congress and the League began to delve apart, the nationalist Muslims as well as the masses of Muslim population found themselves in a state of perplexity on the occasion of elections. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad appeared to be his co-religionists: “Even if Muslims wish to view the situation from the point of view of their own collective interest, the only right path of success for them is that with increasing enthusiasm they should support the Congress and not keep aloof from it. Muslims cannot do anything keeping aloof from the majority” (Doc. 43, 80, Maulana Azad’s Appeal to Muslims).

The election campaign surcharged the atmosphere with political militancy, combativeness, controversies and rivalry. For the nationalist forces, the election was a weapon for ‘strengthening the national movement’. The electoral confidence with the Congress and the Muslim League further intensified the difficulty of the problem of Partition. For communal forces, it was a gamble with calculated self-interest. “There are Muslims in the Congress”, said Nehru, “Who can provide inspiration to a thousand Jinnah’s. Let not Mr. Jinnah pour ridicule on the Muslims in the Congress... Mr. Jinnah speaks in sarcastic terms about
independence. He does not realize that the course of events in the work and the very spirit of the times are going to vote for India’s freedom” (Doc. 58, 119, Nehru on Importance of Voting for the Congress, The Bombay Chronicle, 10 February, 1937).

Imperialistic Britain noticed the mandate governed through the electoral process as filled with misapprehensions and discord within the nationalities contesting for independence. The Viceroy, Linlithgow, in his assessment, realized that both Gandhi and Nehru were concerned to prevent provincial autonomy breaking up the all India unity and discipline of the Congress so as to preserve the organization as an effective instrument for ‘the prosecution of anti-British and revolutionary politics’. “I have the instinct”, he reported to Zetland, “that Nehru is asking himself whether the election ferment along with the expectations aroused amongst the peasantry by the election using promises of Congress do not together present an opportunity for a policy of non cooperation as regards office acceptance and at the same time a ‘no rent and no land revenue’ campaign, opening with civil disobedience and proceeding to mass agrarian mischief on the grand scale” (Doc. 66, 139-40, Linlithgow to Zetland on the Congress). Some other among the top administrators came nearly to the similar conclusions. “The Congress have presumably two lines of policy which they will pursue : (1) To make spectacular concessions to the tenants and establish their influence with them (2) To pursue more vigorously the whole programme of attack on the constitution and the British
connection”, reported Haig from UP to Viceroy (Doc. 69, 144, Linlithgow Papers, 17 February, 1937). The Congress were less willing to sever their connection with the imperial Britain going in accordance with the Gandhian reliance of the civilizing mission of the British in India.

The electorate was reminded during the campaign on behalf of the Congress that “The real fight for swaraj will begin after the elections” (Doc. 69, 146, Enclosure). After its spectacular victory, the Congress felt reassured of its pronounced policy of fighting the new Act and the Federation, and working for the Constituent Assembly of the people of India. “The elections have taught us a fresh old lesson—that our strength comes from the masses and from mass organization and the facing of problems affecting the masses”, said Nehru in his circular on Mass Contact and Anti-Constitution Day (Doc. 72, 151). The resultant confidence that occurred in the Nehruvian faith in the Gandhian value of the masses of India is certainly commendable as it is the faith that the Congress had on the masses in India brought it closer to the public audience making it revert the consequences of the Partition of India.

With the election results touching and alarming the Government and the Conservative circles in Britain, the Labour Party somehow accepted it in a different spirit. In his cable to Nehru, Cripps said: “I send you and Congress the very heartiest congratulations of myself and my friends upon your magnificent victories and your splendid success in arousing the united spirit of India against
continued imperialist domination. We trust that the Indian people will not be led into any compromise over the new Constitution and that the elected representatives will use the power entrusted to them by the people to work for the establishment of freedom by refusing to partake of the empty fruits of office which can do nothing but poison the pure and free spirit of Congress. We salute you as brothers and sisters in the common cause of freedom” (Doc. 111, 231, Cripps’ Cable to Nehru on Victory in Elections).

Socialists of the Congress led by Jayaprakash Nayayan felt that the acceptance of Ministerial offices by Congressmen was more likely to weaken the struggle for Indian independence. The mass mandate in favour of the struggle called for an appropriate response, more particularly in view of the fact that the elections had created a new wave of expectations for more revolutionary politics. Though the electorate was confined only to a bare ten per cent of the population, it was the remaining ninety per cent which had been seen as ‘Even more solidly for the Congress’ than the voting population. The elections swept away the representatives of the beg vested interests who opposed the Congress; and, even if the whole machinery of election was designed to weaken the party under the presence of a autocratic and entrenched government, behind which were ranged all the reactionaries and obscurantist who flourished under shadow of imperialism, the Congress won the battle in a resounding manner. In the wake of victory, the Congress decided not to revert to the ‘discredited policy’ of pacts and
compromises with the communal leaders as had been desired on earlier occasions (Doc. 120, 251-260, Nehru’s Address to All India Convention of Congress Legislators).

The political deadlock was on the anvil because of the uncompromising attitude on part of the ‘Provincial Satraps’ regarding their share of power. “It was rather naive”, said M.N. Roy, “to expect from the Governors the assurance that they would not exercise the autocratic powers vested in them by the Government of India Act” (Doc. 165, 331-32, M.N. Roy on Constitution Deadlock). Since the rulers did not hesitate to flout the modest demand of Congressmen commanding clear majorities in the legislatures on the issue, the radical sections in the movement took it as a ‘Insolent Challenge of Imperialism’ which the Congress was not in a position to fight back. Such ‘regrettable’ weaknesses could be removed, it was thought, by giving an organizational form to the political awakening and social unrest of the masses that looked upon the Congress as their deliverer. With gathering storms of war on the horizon of the West, and in the respective of wider mass awakening everywhere, Subhas Chandra Bose felt: “The strategy and tactics of the Indian movement should, therefore, be determined after a full comprehension of the world situation of today and tomorrow (Doc. 171, 339-40, Subhas Chandra Bose’s Speak after Released from Detention (Extract).

As the Congress demanded assurances on non-interference of the Governors in the works of responsible ministers, the Government exposed its
intention by forming bogus governments styled as Interim Ministries in the Congress majority province. This was, yet, a further challenge thrown at the face of the Congress. Announcing a plan of action in this respect, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel ordered the Congress legislators: “Provincial Conventions of Congress members in the Legislature may be organized and there also resolutions expressing a vote of no-confidence and a demand for calling a meeting of the Assembly should be passed…” (Doc. 235, 469, Patel on Congress Plan of Action in Congress Majority Provinces). A constitutional crisis, thus, became inevitable. The need for rectification of the Congress Plan was keeping in view the resentment of the Congress against the Muslim League that as making strong inlays into the dominant power structure. On the popular front, the Congress went ahead to stir up the nation for a future upsurge by enunciating new economic doctrines for the welfare of the masses. In this venture, it wanted to bring the Muslims out of their narrow communal fold to the mainstream of national life.

To the orthodox among the Muslims, this caused grave alarm. The Congress approach to the common Mussalman was considered by them as ‘a political calamity of the first magnitude’. The pro-Congress learning of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and of the Majlis-i-Ahrar got viewed with considerable anxiety since they strengthened the hands of the Congress party. “The time has therefore come for a united effort to protect the national solidarity of Mussalmans from the great danger of that lies ahead…” Zafar Ali Khan advised Jinnah (Vol.1, Doc. 240, 481).
The real inspiration to Jinnah, however, came from the prominent Muhammad Iqbal. Presenting his line of argument regarding the future of the Indian Muslims, he advised the League leader that: “The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty?... But as I have said above in order to make to possible for Muslim India to solve the problems, it is necessary to redistribute the county and provide one or more Muslim states absolute majorities. Don’t you think the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru” (Doc. 282, Vol. I, 613-14).

Inspiring Jinnah that Muslim India looked to him at that critical picture for discovering some way out, Iqbal further instructed: “To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces... is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?” (Doc. 282, Vol. I, 665-66). When a new political horizon was slowly unfolding itself before the mental vision of a frustrated Jinnah after his debacle in the elections, Nehru adopted a more determined policy against the Muslim League to curb its communal mischief. “Is the League”, he asked Khaliq-uz-Zaman, “a
democratic organization or is it not just a close preserve of certain individuals? Why should I accept it as the representative of the Muslims of India when I know it represents the handful of Muslims at the top who deliberately seek refuge in the name of religion to avoid discussing mass problems ?...” (Doc. 340, 703). And, then a desperate Jinnah advanced his plea for forming League-Congress Ministries at a few places, particularly in UP, to save his face as also to revive the prestige of the League, the Congress High Command asked for “the winding up of the Muslim League group in the UP and its absorption in the Congress” (Doc. 376, 766), in the hope that this would have great effect not only in the UP but also all over India, and would mean a free field for the Congress work without communal troubles. This would also “knock over the British Government which relied so much on these troubles” (Doc. 376, Vol. I, 767, Nehru to Rajendra Prasad) Jinnah’s cup of humiliation was full.

The Government, in order to evade an absolute constitutional failure as well as a mass uprising, decided to bow down tactfully. Declarations were made by Zetland, the Secretary of State, Lord Stanley, the Under Secretary of State, and the Viceroy in order to remove the doubts from the Congress mind with respect to the use of their special power by the Governors. The Congress, therefore, decided to accept office, while making it clear at the same time that: “Office is to be accepted and utilized for the purpose of working in accordance with the lines laid down in the Congress election manifesto, and to further in every possible way the Congress
Policy of Combating the new Act on the one hand and prosecuting a comprehensive programme on the other” (Doc. 347, Vol. I, 718, Congress Working Committee’s Decision for Office Acceptance).

Gandhi was congratulated by some British statesmen that the Congress at last agreed to accept office. But the British Cabinet read into the meaning of the Congress resolution in the specificities of that regard. The Secretary of State felt that “there were grounds for satisfaction with this latest development, which would guarantee at least some practical experience of the new constitution in all the provinces, might prove to be a turning point in the history of our dealings with Indian nationalism” (Doc. 361, Vol. I, 744-745, Cabinet Discussion).

In the second volume of *Towards Freedom 1937-47* discussed the documents of Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru, Patel Liaqat Ali Khan, Tara Singh, Mountbatten, Cripps, Wavell and Linlithgow’s opinion on Partition. Jinnah argues before Mountbatten that Partition turns more or less inevitable because their religion, socio-cultural practices, and the way they are living are entirely different from the Hindu religion (Vol. 2, Doc. 702, 1432). The evidential aspects get clearly hinted from the introspective analysis of Jinnah and the separatist demanding a safe outlet for a demand for Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten geared the meticulous influx of the attitudes of the Muslim League that accepted the differentials of both the parties but was more or less helpless in resolving the issue of the Partition of India. Jinnah was obdurate, more adamant as Indians realized
that he determinedly demanded the separate independent sovereign state for Muslims. Mountbatten struggled a lot to convince Jinnah to agree for a United India, but his negotiation with Jinnah absolutely failed. Mountbatten consulted Nehru and Patel; he expressed Jinnah’s apathetic answers on the unification of India. Mountbatten further consulted the two parties and finally disclosed his views that Partition is inevitable (Vol. II, Doc. 763, 1603-09) or that was the sensible decision that the British could handle to resolve the age-old communitarian equation more amicably.

In July 1944, Gandhi conceded the right of self-determination to the Muslim majority Provinces, partly due to C. Rajagopalachari’s persuasion. He was anxious to reach an agreement with Jinnah holding long discussions with him, which are known popular as Gandhi-Jinnah talks. After his release from prison in May 1944, Gandhi offered a formula to Jinnah, under which, after the war ended, a plebiscite of the adult population in demarcated, contiguous, majority districts in North-West and East India would be taken and if a majority voted for a separate sovereign state, it would be conceded. Accepting the principle of Pakistan, embodied in C. Rajagopalachari’s belief that it would instill a required confidence in the Muslims who would then cease demanding the creation of Pakistan, Gandhi perceived the national division (as outlined in his formula) “as between members of the same family and therefore reserving for partnership things of common interest” (Vol. II, Doc. 781, 1708-1709). Gandhi’s offer alarmed the Sikh’s, the
Mahasabha and the Unionists, while the Muslim Leaguers were jubilant at the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan. This created a deep mistrust of Gandhian faith in the minds of the Mahasabha and the prominent Hindu circles about Gandhian ideology and the creation of Pakistan in accordance with the principles responsible for the construction of Pakistan.

Communal violence spread increasingly rampant in the Northern part of India, both the Hindus and the Muslims slaughtered each other leading to further arson, rape, murder resulting in a common, becoming a normalized phenomenon everywhere. Officials of both the communities involved indirectly to protect their own people and encouraged to eliminate the other religious contesting groups. Leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League inevitably protected their own religious identities. The political scenario looking grim, with both the sides creating influx of the huge intricate and complicated problems associated with the creation of Pakistan. Rather, Muslims League’s final aim was Partition and they attained it in the process of the politics of the Partition of India. Ultimately, Congress arrived at the conclusion to accept the Partition demand of League. The imperialist historiography discovered the case for Partition that it resulted out of the immediate needs of the political incumbency felt more evidently by religious identities, communal discord, socio-cultural religious differences; congress-league feud made it almost certain that the Partition of India prolonged the incumbent civil war.
The imperialist writers did ignore the British involvement in the communal rift widening the religious harmony between the communities. The British perspective involves a total, absolute recognition of the Muslim League’s policy of difference and Partition collectively recognized and asserted in the need for the Partition of India. Jinnah has been credited solely for the creation of Pakistan and regarded as the champion of the Muslim nationalism, Spear opines that, “the differences of community and religion were elevated by the Quaid-e-Azam into the fundamental divisions of the country. As oil and water so the Hindus and Muslims can never mix” (Spear 6). The imperialists’ writer observes Jinnah on several occasions, he who consolidated the bargaining power of the Muslims and evidently the Muslim League created the idea of separate national identity. The Pakistani writers endorse and support Jinnah for instance the position taken by Ayesha Jalal in recalling the Cabinet Mission plan as a perfect example was the “way forward for ... Pakistan Jinnah was after”, for he never really wanted Partition; and the Muslim League reiterated Pakistan demand as its ultimate goal only as a face saver (Jalal, The Sole 201-02). Even for Asim Roy agrees to the resolution suggesting the fact that Jinnah was enthusiastic in approving to “accept something less than what almost everyone else knew as Pakistan” (Hasan, India’s 120).

Religion did play a predominant role; Jinnah’s speech and his way of interpretation of two-nation theory carried with it the central arguments of
religious differences. Jinnah speculated of the Hindu domination in the near future on the Muslims prospecting on the communal relations in future that might trouble the interests of the Muslims in India; which he wanted to be the central argument for the demand for the Partition of India. He felt that the Muslim must sever the connections with the Hindu dominated India; it is more central to note that majoritarian impulse of many Pakistani writers making Jinnah less (least) responsible for the creation of Pakistan.

As per the revisionist perspective—that breaks the ground with two popular myths: The Congress standing for the Unity of the nation and the League, demanding the Partition of India. Jinnah justified his claim for the Partition of India, acting as a bargaining position to register his demand for the Partition by the Congress. The orthodox view examines the staunch and firm demand of Jinnah for a divided nation where he could not rest or compromise with his unique confidence in a new nation. It would be an intentional fallacy to blame the event of Partition on Jinnah solely on his role taken for the task of blaming him for the tragedies of Partition.

Jinnah was reacting to the hard circumstances and the pace of Indian nationalism by reiterating his demand for a separate state with all the confidence and legal acumen. Indian historiography reclaims the blame of Partition on the Muslim League and elaborates their argumentative positions of holding him largely responsible for the Partition of India. Jinnah's initial love for religious
unity—prominent Indian nationalists have hailed him to the extent of calling him the ambassador and crusader of the Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah for the Indian historians turned into an anti-hero constructed in the national mainstream history. Pakistani writers maintain and deem of Jinnah as a Muslim leader who was reacting against the marginalization of the Muslim masses, opposing the political, social and economical maltreatment of the Muslims in every phase of the Hindu way of life. Ranbir Samaddar reminds that: “the British did not divide about Partition of India and evaluated who were mainly responsible for it. He argues the country; they had no alternative but to bow to the wishes of the subjects. The Muslims League did not cause it; it was forced to seek a homeland due to the Hindu Congress’s obduracy in sharing power with the Muslims. The Congress did not want it; but to avoid genocide, it was forced to accept a divided India” (Deschaumes and Rada 31).

It is further a subtlest inference that Partition was a historical blunder committed by some political leaders to satiate their infernal political grievances on their opponents with Jinnah and the Muslims already knowing that the minorities with the Muslim league felt increasingly the threat of leadership with the minority status hindering their leadership ambition. Such a fear hypnotized their minds of feeling a sense of threat inside the communities they had existed along with the Hindus since generations. The possibility of some of the Congress leaders sensing the Partition as a permanent solution with the hope of keeping the flame of united
India alive cannot be altogether ignored. This became the reason for their silence on the matter of the division of India. Dwijendra Tripathi argues: “The leadership of the Indian National Congress is often held responsible for the division of Indian subcontinent…” (Setter and Gupta Vol. I, 277). Birla met C. Rajagopalachari after the correspondence letter to Gandhi’s secretary was drafted.

Rajaji perhaps, gave Birla some idea of his thinking, for, Birla wrote to him, on 12th October 1938, commending the idea. Asserting that Kashmir would go to ‘Muslim India’ under a scheme of division, he added: “... If we want to have a peaceful India, we must encourage the division and after that we will have no reservation of states (for Muslims in the Legislature), no minority problem and no communal problem” (Setter and Gupta Vol. I, 289). After Congress rejected Rajaji’s proposal to grant the Muslim majority provinces, the option of withdrawal from a future all India federation as Cripps Mission proposals envisaged, Birla wrote to Gandhi’s secretary on 14th July 1942: “You know my view about Pakistan. I am in favour of separation and I do not think it is impractical, or against the interest of the Hindus or of India. As long as we will quarrel, there is no salvation for India. Besides, we should not forget that the Muslims – every one of them – now want it. Even the Congress Muslims are also no longer an exception” (290).

The Gandhian response to it was the characteristic blend of clarity and vagueness. ‘The question as such is not of Pakistan or separation as such; his
secretary wrote to Birla communicating Gandhi’s reply ‘lent of the real content of these conception’ (Setter and Gupta Vol. I, 290). To Jawaharlal Nehru, Birla offered the following advice, flaunting his business credentials: “If in a partnership business, one partner is discounted, he would be given the right to separate himself from the erstwhile common concern. Partition should be reasoned and reasonable, but why oppose Partition?... Had I been a Muslim, I would never have demanded Pakistan nor accepted it since, after Partition, Islamic Bharat will be a very poor state, bereft of iron and coal. This is for the Muslims to determine. I am confident that if you agree to Pakistan, the Muslims will reject it. Whether they accept it or not belongs to the future. But our opposition to Partition will intensify their desire for it” (Setter and Gupta Vol. I, 290).

The inferences of the event of Partition has attracted varied perspectives and writers reflection that do assert the validity and the seriousness of the differing perspectives and political ideologies of the Congress and the Muslim League justifying their appropriation of the need for the division of India. Subtest and the invisible realities evaporates with the demise of countless deaths afflicted and violent roots castrating the hopes of a united and sovereign India torn aside with contradictory religious hard realities. There is a systematic need for the research undertaken to respond to the arguments and set of questions that seek to realize and know the realities of Indian Partition. The Partition of India was finally agreed for by the dominant Congressmen and the Muslim league as there was series of diplomatic maneuverings to convince and agree from the side of the British
colonizers that created a solution assumedly convincing? The question that arises needs an explanation as to what compelled the nationalists to agree to the Partition or the division of India.

The solution can carry many interpretations but it can be said for sure that things moved beyond the control of the nationalists, taking critical stances whether the Congress or the Muslim league failed in preventing the tragedies of Communal disharmony. The next response comes of the lack of trust in the notion of Akhanda Bharat (United India; Undivided India) was not realized but shortened. The answer to this hard reality can be noticed in the lack of faith among religious identities in India. As B.R. Nanda reminds, that Gandhi opposed two-nation theory and the division of India but he had written as early as April 1940, “I know no non-violent method of compelling the obedience of 8 crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India, however powerful a majority, the rest may represent. The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division. This was a perfectly logical position for a leader, who was committed to non-violence to adopt, but another leader following the example of Abraham Lincoln may have insisted that there could be no compromise of the unity of the country” (Nanda, Gandhi 94).

Gandhi wanted to diffuse the communal equation for separate nationalities but his attempts went in vain. Gandhi initially opposed the Partition of India because he wanted to gather all the contradictory religious parties into a single
umbrella. Gandhian submission comes in the wake of conviction supported by Nehru, Patel and Mountbatten for a Partition. Gandhi refutably agreed but told, “when I said that the country should not be divided, I was confident that I had the support of the masses. But when the popular view is contrary to mine, should I force my own view on the people?...And today I can say with confidence that if all the non-Muslims were with me, I would not let India be divided. But I must admit that today, the general opinion is not with me and so I must step aside and stay back...No one listens to me anymore. I’m a small man. True, there was a time when mine was the big voice. Then everyone obeyed what I said; now neither Congress nor the Hindus, not the Muslims listen to me...Where is the Congress today? It is disinteresting. I’m crying in the wilderness” (Ramakanth and Rajan 215-216). This quote provides a glimpse of the Gandhian demystification with the leadership of the Congress party and the Muslim for deriving a common consensus and marginalizing the effects of Partition on the general public at large. He was in the declining phase, where the Gandhian charisma during the Partition phase that Gandhi reveals the lack of contradictory parties conjoining to form a unanimous opinion.

The retaliation of the antagonism between the Hindus and Muslim is a symptom of deep-seated misery and systematic differentiation of the mainstream nationalism that was already showing a deep-seated division with the contesting religious communities. The gap in the religious communities led to the outbreak of communal violence of the worst kind. The communal violence of the worst kind
replicated with the British taking no serious action in preventing even if it had taken it was not the moral responsibility of the British in India to govern the dissenting enemy. Aftermath of the Partition event did not resolve the communitarian difference and antagonism that prevailed between the Hindus and Muslims. The creation of Pakistan and East Bengal (now Bangladesh) did not restore the harmonious communal equation, but rather, instead of appeasing the religious fervor, intensified its claims for a national identity. Jinnah felt the fear of the gradual marginalization of the Muslim question under the preview of a united India. The solution to the aggrieved situation remained more or less with the gradual acceptance of the principle of the division of Indian and the creation of Pakistan.

Triangular contest for the Power between the British and the Congress, with the League and the Congress hardened the communal relations during the most critical phase of Indian nationalism. Jinnah saw Partition as an alternative for the long perplexing problem of Indian Partition. Gandhi witnessed the division as something that can be prevented with a friendly gesture and commitment. Jinnah reiterates the demand for the Partition calling it ‘the only practical solution of India’s political problem’. The crux of the politics of Partition issue was the leadership threat felt and internalized to a greater extent by both Jinnah and Gandhi who remained apprehensive about the slippages of law and order increasingly intensifying into violence and communal crisis (Johnson 85).
These episodes of the Partition provide reminiscences of the Partition times providing a detailed narrative account of the refugee influx that was not handled affectively leading to the spontaneous outbreak of communities thirsting for the blood of the opponents. Peaceful transfer of power was the idea for the British, the Congress and the Muslim League but situation went wrong for all of these groups as none of them had predicted, precisely, the ascendance of the violent roots of Partition. The Partition invoked the hegemonic antagonism between the communities organized communally in the social patterning; the fundamental stereotyping of the religious communities that existed in a homogeneous equation. Noticeably, India and Pakistan emerged from the colonial yoke embittered, shattered but intact with the reformed national identity with two separate nation-states at the end of the summer of 1947.

Refugee problem traumatized the Partition dilemma from a peaceful equation to the much ordained relation of the communities struggling for a peaceful rehabilitation unable to heal under any governmental interventions. Partition de-historicized the trauma and the miseries inflicted large-scale castrating the hope of the communities involved in both the sides; impacting the lives tormented, reminding and reminiscent of the daily routine of the lives affected through the violent trauma that gathered the heat of the day with a cautionary warning for the generations to come; invoking the tragedy not to be repeated at all cost. The central argument of the thesis covers various perspectives and varied
opinions that seem difficult to derive at a common ground and ascertain the
ground realities of the Partition of India. Though the arguments cannot be ignored
or untaken; the crux of the central arguments presented elaborates on the presence
of a communal gap in the indigenous communities embracing the national
question and politically reflecting their communitarian angst, often, endorsing the
tumultuous religious complexities, negating the vision of a united India that none
of the arguments held as the central deciding factor for the growing pace of Indian
nationalism.

    Politics of Partition is a summation of the varied perspectives taken for the
analysis that introspects the religious challenges and social continuity offering a
stiff resistance to the national body politic hibernating the already spoilt
communal harmony under the colonial influence. Politics is closer to the lived-
reality of the social circumstances of the people of India and Pakistan ; it is also a
matter so close and personal that embraces all other values of religion, society and
culture of the people, paving very little inference for the reader to decipher the
audiences with a reliable social modification that reverts the possibility of seeing
the political within the personal and the personal so closely infused with the
political element. Partition and the Politics on both sides remained so close to the
people realizing the violent forces of politicization in reality by the creation of
Pakistan and miseries for the creation of India.