Chapter 2
STYLISTIC APPROACH AND THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Ideologies are of special interest to politically oriented critics, to feminist critics, to new historicists, to students of language and linguistics, and to discourse analysts “because of the way in which authors reflect or resist prevailing views in their texts”. As Frederic Jameson shows, “literature often tries to repress historical truth, but analysis can reveal its underlying ideology” (Barry 2002, 166). But the researcher always takes a position in relation to the field of study, and “that position plays a part in the determination of what he or she can see and can present as results”. The present study agrees with Jørgensen and Phillips in that “it is the stringent application of theory and method that legitimizes scientifically produced knowledge”. It is by “seeing the world through a particular theory that we can distance ourselves from some of our taken-for-granted understandings and subject our material to other questions than we would be able to do from everyday perspective” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 22-23).

2.1. METHODS AND APPROACHES: STYLISTICS:

Currently, several different approaches are available to the analyst for the study of ideology and power relations as they are represented in discourse, some of which were discussed in section 1.3 of Chapter 1. A particular approach to discourse analysis that claims to be “critical” and that has become prominent and influential over recent years is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This approach has its origins in the work of Roger Fowler and his colleagues—Kress, Hodge and Trew—and was subsequently developed by others, notably Norman Fairclough, its most impressive and influential practitioner. In this approach to CDA, the linguistic model that is generally invoked as particularly appropriate to the purpose is that of Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (S/F).

In CDA, discourse functions ideologically. It is claimed that discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups—for example, between social classes, women and men, ethnic minorities and the majority. CDA is critical in the sense that “it aims to reveal the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of the social world, including those relations that involve unequal relations of power” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 63). It is quite explicitly directed at revealing “how language is used for the exercise of socio-political control” (Widdowson 2004, 89). As van Dijk puts it,
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality (van Dijk 2001, 352; quoted by Widdowson 2004, 89).

Fairclough (1993) defines CDA as an approach which seeks to investigate systematically “how discursive practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by power and struggles over power” and “how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough 1993, 135; Quoted by Gorgensen and Phillips, 63). Ideology for Fairclough is “meaning in the service of power” (Fairclough 1995b, 14; quoted by Gorgensen and Phillips, 75). More precisely, he understands ideologies as constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination (Gorgensen and Phillips, 75).

Widdowson (2004), however, is critical of CDA. He recognizes that CDA, to its great credit has no doubt alerted us to “the need to demonstrate how discourse analysis can contribute to a critical awareness of the ways in which language is used, and abused, to exercise control and practise deception”, and that CDA “has the effect of giving point and purpose to discourse analysis by giving prominence to crucial questions about its socio-political significance which might otherwise have been marginalized”. Therefore, where he takes issue with CDA is not in its “cause” but in “the mode of analysis and interpretation it adopts by way of promoting this cause” (IX). As Widdowson argues, CDA is ideologically committed and it selects those features of the text which supports its preferred interpretation. CDA interpretations are “pretextually motivated”. CDA does not involve “the systematic application of S/F taken as a whole, but the expedient picking and choosing of whatever aspect of it seems useful for its purposes” (97). As he puts,

What we find frequently in CDA work, then, is essentially a pretextual partiality of interpretation which is given the appearance of analytic rigour. Although S/F grammar is invoked as the informing model for analysis, it is not systematically applied, but simply drawn upon as a post hoc expedient whenever it seems convenient to the pretextual purpose. It may well be that this is the only way in which this grammar can be used... But it would be of
interest to put the claims [of S/F] to test by attempting text analysis by means of a thorough and systematic application of S/F grammar (2004, 109).

The present study analyses Mistry’s novels by means of stylistic approach. The study derives its impetus from Halliday’s S/F model of grammar. But Widdowson’s criticism of CDA will be kept in mind and “a thorough and systematic application of S/F grammar” will be attempted throughout the analysis and interpretation of Mistry’s novels. Talking about the current preoccupation of the analysts with “discourse analysis” or “text linguistics” Halliday says, “it is sometimes assumed that it can be carried on without grammar or even that it is an alternative to grammar. But it is an illusion”. A discourse analysis that is not based on grammar “is not an analysis at all, but simply a running commentary on a text”: either an appeal has to be made to some set of “non-linguistic conventions” or to some “linguistic features that are trivial enough to be accessible without grammar”, or else the exercise remains a private one in which “one explanation is as good or as bad as another” (Halliday 1994, XVI-XVII).

As far as the purpose of studying style and the nature of stylistics is concerned, Leech and Short (1981) say:

Style being a relational concept, the aim of literary stylistics is to be relational…: to relate the critic’s concern of aesthetic appreciation with linguist’s concern of linguistic description (13).

However, stylistics, as the study of the relation between linguistic form and literary function can not be reduced to “mechanical objectivity”. Linguistic analysis does not replace the reader’s intuition (Leech and Short, 5). Fowler, like Chomsky, also insists that linguistics is not a discovery procedure: not an automatic machine which, fed a text at one end, delivers at the other end some significant generalizations about the character of the text…. linguistics as such is not a discovery procedure and not a critical procedure: therefore it needs to be guided by some working hypotheses which will be checked against the linguistic evidence, and progressively modified and confirmed, as the analysis proceeds (1986, 6-7).

On the role of linguistics in literary analysis, Halliday concludes that linguistics is not and will never be the whole of literary analysis, and the literary analyst – not the linguist – can determine the place of linguistics in literary studies. But if a text is to be described at all then, it should be described properly; and this means “by the theories and methods developed in linguistics, the subject whose task is precisely to show how language works” (Halliday 1964, 19).
But linguistic analysis is not “just” a neutral method of analysis compatible with any theoretical framework. “A model of analysis is a model of language”, that is to say, it essentially implies “a theory of the nature of language in the process of describing it”, (Fowler 1986, 7). The model of Transformational Grammar (TG) sees language as a capability of the human mind, and therefore, highlights the formal and the cognitive aspects of language (Leech and Short 1981, 4-5). However, Chomskyan linguistics “does not concern itself with considerations of function” and it “makes no offer to relate linguistic structure to social context” (Fowler 1981, 13-14). Halliday’s Systemic-Functional model of grammar, on the other hand, emphasizes the social role of language. It sees language as a “social semiotic”, and so diverts attention particularly to the “communicative and socially expressive functions of language” (Leech and Short, 5). As the present study is based mainly on Halliday’s linguistic theory, it will receive extensive discussion below in this chapter.

In fact, as Simpson (2004) says, it is part of natural development of modern Stylistics constantly “to enrich and update its methods of analysis” (38). During the 1980s, under the influence of pragmatics and discourse analysis, ideas about dialogue, discourse and social interaction found their way into stylistics. But stylistics had so far been “writerly” in its general theoretical orientation. In the last decade of the 20th Century, the focus shifted “away from models of text and composition towards models that make explicit the links between human mind and the process of reading”. This “cognitive turn” in stylistics has added a new “readerly” dimension to stylistic methods. Thus moving away from, and going beyond even the models of pragmatics and discourse analysis of 1980s, the cognitive models try to account for “the stores of knowledge which readers bring into play when they read” and “how these knowledge stores are modified or enriched as reading progresses” (39). Cook (1994), for example, has assimilated “schema theory” with Formalist and Structuralist concepts like deviation and foregrounding. Cook’s general point is that

because literary texts affect our schemata in special ways and on a number of levels, traditional stylistic concepts like foregrounding and defamiliarization are better located in a framework of cognition than in a framework of language (Simpson, 90).

Finally, contemporary stylistics, in Simpson’s view, ultimately looks towards language as discourse, “towards text’s status as discourse, a writer’s deployment of discourse strategies and towards the way text ‘means’ as a function of language in context” (Simpson, 8).

2.2. LITERATURE AS SOCIAL DISCOURSE:
Following Fowler (1981), the present study regards literature as social discourse. Fowler
argues that “first and foremost, literature is a kind of discourse, a language activity like any other discourse” (1981, 7).

To treat literature as discourse is to see the text as mediating relationships between language users: not only relationships of speech, but also of consciousness, ideology, role and class. The text ceases to be an object and becomes an action or process (80).

To see literary texts as discourses means “to interpret and describe them in terms of their vital cultural functions”. From this perspective, “literature is, like all language, interaction between people and between institutions and people”. To regard it as social discourse is to stress its interpersonal and institutional dimensions, “concentrating on those parts of textual structure which reflect and which influence relations within society”. And a study of literary styles which concentrates on such matters requires methodological and theoretical underpinnings “which are more sophisticated and more ambitious than those usually presupposed in linguistic stylistics” (1981, 7).

Fowler argues that the theory of literature announced or implied by the practitioners of formalist linguistic stylistics is inadequate. First, they argue that all literature is a special kind of entity distinct from ordinary communication. Linguistic structuralists such as Roman Jakobson and Tzvetan Todorov then go in pursuit of some quality of ‘literariness’ which is presumed to characterize this entity and which is supposed to find its expression in ‘literary language’ which is opposed to ‘ordinary language’. Second, these “apologists for literature, including conventional stylisticians, are preoccupied with the formal structures of texts to the neglect of semantic interpretation and of historical context and social function”. However competent formal description is, “the neglect of interpretation and of functional explanation is highly regrettable” (1981, 20).

Fowler thus argues against the “special status (and value) of literature” claimed by literary critics like David Lodge who treat language in literature “as a medium through which literature is transmitted” (Fowler 1984, 73). As a result of this attitude to language, “the substance of literature is shifted into some obscure, undefined, sphere of existence which is somehow beyond language”. But for linguistics, Fowler argues, “literature is language, to be theorized just like any other discourse”. As he says,

We want to show that a novel or a poem is a complexly structured text; that its structural form, by social semiotic processes, constitutes a representation of a world, characterized by activities and states and values; that this text is a communicative interaction between its producer and its consumers within relevant social and institutional contexts (1986, 10).
These characteristics of the novel or poem are no more than what functional linguistics is looking for in studying, say, conversation or letters or official documents. Thus no abstract literary properties “beyond” need to be postulated, for “the rhetorical and semiotic properties in question should appear within an ordinary linguistic characterization unless linguistics is conceived in too restricted a way” (1986, 11).

Fowler, thus, proposes a positive replacement theory of literature, “a descriptive sociolinguistic stylistics”, which would be “a radical alternative to the formalist premises” (1981, 20). “The solution is”, he says, “to simply theorise literature as language, and to do this using the richest and most suitable linguistic model”. To be adequate to this task, a linguistic model should be “comprehensive in accounting for the whole range of dimensions of linguistic structure, particularly pragmatic dimensions”. It should be capable of providing an account of “the functions of given linguistic constructions (in real texts), particularly the thought-shaping (Halliday’s ‘ideational’) function”. And it should acknowledge “the social basis of the formation of meanings (Halliday’s ‘social semiotic’)” (Fowler 1984, 74). The requisite theory would, therefore, have to integrate formal linguistics, sociolinguistics and cognitive semantics. And the only theory, in Fowler’s opinion, which acknowledges the responsibility to cover and integrate these areas of communicative knowledge and behaviour is M.A.K. Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics developed from the British tradition of Firth and Malinowsky and from Prague School of linguistics (Fowler 1981, 189).

2.3. SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS:

In Halliday’s own words,

Systemic grammar is an analysis-synthesis grammar based on the paradigmatic notion of choice. It is built on the work of Saussure, Malinowski and Firth, Hjelmslev, Prague school, and the American anthropological linguists Boas Sapir, and Whorf; the main inspiration being J.R. Firth. It is a tristratal construct of semantics (meaning), lexicogrammar (wording), and phonology (sound) (Halliday 1985, 262).

Halliday regards language as a social semiotic—“a stratified, or stratal, system, in which the output of one coding process becomes the output to another” (1979, 196). Thus,

- Meaning semantics
- Encoded in realized1 as lexicogrammar (‘syntax’)
- Wording
- Recorded in realized2 as phonology

Sound (or writing)
The semantic system itself can be regarded as “the realization of some higher level semiotic”. Thus, as far as the elements of a semiotic system are concerned, we may in principle consider the organization of any one part of the system from three different aspects: (1) at its own level, (2) from below and (3) from above. The description of any part of the system involves an interpretation of all three sets of relations into which it enters, “upward”, “downward” and “across”. Whatever is said in interpretation of one level has implications not only for what is above and what is below (1979, 197-198).

2.3.1. Functional components / modes of meaning:

At its own level, the semantic system of a natural language is organized to perform three broad functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual. These are to be interpreted not as functions in the sense of “uses of language”, but as functional components of the semantic system—“metafunctions” as Halliday calls them.

The ideational function represents the speaker’s meaning potential “as an observer”. It is the content function of the language, language as “about something”. This is the function through which the language encodes the cultural experience, and the speaker encodes his individual experience as a member of the culture (Halliday 1978, 112). It is through this function that the speaker or writer embodies in language his experience of the phenomena of the real world, including his experience of the internal world of his own consciousness—“his reactions, cognitions, and perceptions, and also his linguistic acts of speaking and understanding”. In serving this function, language lends structure to his experience and helps to determine his way of looking at things. “The speaker can see through and around the settings of his semantic system; but he is aware that, in doing so, he is seeing reality in a new light”. Another component of ideational meaning is “the expression of certain fundamental logical relations such as are encoded in language in the form of co-ordination, apposition, modification, and the like” (Halliday 1971, 91). Thus, there are two subcategories: an experiential, where we represent experience “directly” in terms of happenings (actions, events, states, relations), entities that participate in these happenings (persons, animate and inanimate objects, institutions, abstractions) and circumstantial features (extent, location, time and space, cause, manner and so on); and a logical, where we represent experience “indirectly” in terms of certain fundamental logical relations in natural language—“and”, “namely”, “says”, “is subcategorized as”, etc. These two, the logical and the experiential, together make up the ideational component in the semantic system: “that of meaning in the reflective mode” (Halliday 1979, 199).
The **interpersonal component** represents the speaker’s meaning potential “as an intruder”. It is participatory function of language, language as doing something. This is the component through which the speaker intrudes himself into the context of situation, both expressing his own attitudes and judgements and seeking to influence the attitudes and behaviour of others. It expresses the role relationships associated with the situation, including those that are defined by language itself, relationships of questioner-respondent, informer-doubter and the like (Halliday 1978, 112).

The **textual component** represents “the speaker’s text-forming potential”; it is that which makes language relevant. This is the component that provides the texture; that which makes the difference between language that is suspended “in vacuo” and language that is operational in a context of situation. It expresses the relation of the language to its environment, including both the verbal environment—what has been said or written before—and the nonverbal, situational environment. Hence the textual component has “an enabling function” with respect to the other two; it is only in combination with textual meanings that ideational and interpersonal meanings are actualized (1978, 112). The textual function “is concerned with the creation of text”. It is a function internal to language (Halliday 1971, 92).

### 2.3.2. Functional components and grammatical structure:

Seen from a lexicogrammatical point of view—“from below”, the semantic components are realized as lexicogrammatical structures (Halliday 1978, 188). These components are reflected in the lexicogrammatical system in the form of discrete network of options. In the clause, for example, the ideational function is represented by transitivity, the interpersonal by mood and modality, and the textual by a set of systems that have been referred to collectively as “theme”. Typically, each sentence embodies all functions, though one or another function may be more prominent; and most constituents of sentences also embody more than one function, through their ability to combine two or more syntactic roles (Halliday 1971, 93).

### 2.3.3. Functional components and social context:

Thirdly, we may approach the question “from above”, from the perspective of language and the social order—at the social semiotic level (1978, 188). Halliday (1978) interprets “the social system as a social semiotic: a system of meanings that constitutes the ‘reality’ of the culture” (123). This is the higher-level system to which language is related. There are many other forms of its symbolic realizations besides language which include both art forms such as painting, sculpture, music, the dance, and so forth, and other modes of cultural behaviour that are not classified under the heading of forms of art, such as modes of
exchange, modes of dress, structures of the family, and so forth. These are all bearers of meaning in the culture. Language is one among a number of systems of meaning that, taken together, constitute human culture. Language in this sense is a social semiotic (Halliday and Hasan 1989, 4). But it is unique in having its own semantic stratum (Halliday 1978, 123).

Thus, from a sociolinguistic viewpoint, the semantic system can be defined as a functional or function-oriented meaning potential: “a network of options for the projection (encoding, realization) of some extralinguistic semiotic system or systems in terms of the two basic components of meaning—the ideational and the interpersonal”. In principle this higher-level semiotic may be viewed in the tradition of humanist thought as “a conceptual or cognitive system, one of information about the real world”. But it may equally be viewed as a semiotic of some other type, “logical, ideological, aesthetic or social”. For Halliday (1978) it is the social perspective that is relevant, the semantic system as realization of a social semiotic (79). Halliday attempts to relate language primarily to one particular aspect of human experience, namely that of “social structure”. This is so because

Learning is, above all, a social process. Knowledge is transmitted in social contexts, through relationships, like those of parent and child, or teacher and pupil, or classmates, that are defined in the value systems and ideology of the culture (Halliday and Hasan 1989, 4-5).

Given this social-semiotic perspective, a social context (or situation), according to Halliday (1978), “is a temporary construct or instantiation of meanings from the social system”. A social context is a semiotic structure which Halliday interprets in terms of three variables: a “field” of social process (“what is going on”, “topic or focus of the activity”), a “tenor” of social relationships (“who are taking part”, “role relations of power and solidarity”) and a “mode” of symbolic interaction (“how are the meanings exchanged”, “amount of feedback and role of language”) (Halliday 1978, 189; Eggins 2004, 9).

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<tr>
<th>Component of social context</th>
<th>Functional-semantic component through which typically realized</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 field (social process)</td>
<td>experiential</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 tenor (social relationship)</td>
<td>interpersonal</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 mode (symbolic mode)</td>
<td>textual</td>
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Again, these components of the context are systematically related to the components of the semantic system. Thus the field is expressed through the experiential function in the semantics—that is, in transitivity, in the naming of processes and participants, in the classes of things (objects, persons, events, etc.), in quality, quantity, time, place and so on; tenor is expressed through the interpersonal function in the semantics—that is, in the systems of mood, modality, person, key, intensity, evaluation and comment and the like; and the mode is expressed through the textual function in the semantics—that is, through selections of options in theme, information and voice, and also the selection of cohesive patterns, those of reference, substitution and ellipsis, and conjunction (Halliday and Hasan 1989, 24-26; Halliday 1977, 55-57). The linguistic system, in other words, is organized in such a way that the social context is predictive of the text (1978, 189).

To summarize this discussion, the semantic system, “the meaning potential of language”, is an interface, between the (rest of the) linguistic system and some higher-level symbolic system. It is a projection, or realization, of the social system—meanings of a higher order, “not only the semiotic of the particular social context, its organization as field, tenor and mode, but also that of the total set of social contexts that constitutes the social system” (1978, 123-4). At the same time, it is projected onto, or realized by, the lexicogrammatical system (1978, 79). According to Halliday,

A ‘sociosemiotic’ perspective implies an interpretation of the shifts, the irregularities, the disharmonies and the tensions that characterize human interaction and social processes. It attempts to explain the semiotic of the social structure, in its aspects, both of persistence and of change, including the semantics of social class, of power system, of hierarchy and of social conflict. It attempts also to explain the linguistic processes whereby the members construct the social semiotic, whereby social reality is shaped, constrained and modified—processes which, far from tending towards an ideal construction, admit and even institutionalize myopia, prejudice and misunderstanding (1978, 126).

2.4. IMPLICATIONS OF SFL FOR TEXT ANALYSIS/ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY:

Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) is being recognized as a very useful descriptive and interpretive framework “for viewing language as a strategic, meaning-making resource” (Eggins 2004, 2). Halliday (1994) gives a number of possible applications of SFL underlying all of which is a common focus on the analysis of authentic products of social interaction (texts), considered in relation to the cultural and social context in which they are negotiated.
Consequently, the most generalizable application of SFL is “to understand the quality of texts: why a text means what it does, and why it is valued as it is” (Halliday 1994, xxix).

Text in SFL is essentially a semantic unit. It is both a product and a process. Text in SFL is defined as “language that is functional”, “language that is doing some job in some context” (Halliday & Hasan 1985/89, 10). A basic premise of systemic linguistics is that “language use is purposeful behaviour” (Eggins, 4). People do not ‘just talk’ or ‘just write’ in order to kill time or to display their linguistic abilities. They speak or write because they wanted to use language to achieve a purpose: “they had goals that they were using language to achieve”. Any use of language is thus motivated by a purpose (Eggins, 5). The fundamental purpose that language has evolved to serve is to enable us to make meanings with each other. People interact in order to make meanings: “to make sense of the world and of each other” (Eggins, 11). Systemic analysis seeks to demonstrate that linguistic texts are typically making not just one, but a number of meanings “simultaneously”—(i) real world or ideational meanings—meanings about how we represent experience in language; (ii) interpersonal meanings—meanings which express the writer’s/speaker’s role relationship with the reader, and the writer’s/speaker’s attitude towards the subject matter; and (iii) textual meanings--meanings about how what we’re saying hangs together and relates to the context around us (Eggins, 12).

Halliday, thus, regards text as “a metafunctional construct: a complex of ideational, interpersonal, and textual meanings” (1989, 48). He proposes that in order to understand a text, we have to be able to interpret it in terms of all these metafunctions. But all use of language has a context. The “textual” features enable the discourse to cohere not only with itself but also with its

1) context of situation: the configuration of field, tenor, and mode features that specify the register of the text;
2) context of culture: the institutional and ideological background that give value to the text and constrain its interpretation;
3) the ‘intertextual’ context: relations with other texts, and assumptions that are carried over therefrom;
4) the ‘intratextual’ context: coherence within the text, including the linguistic cohesion that embodies the internal semantic relationships (1989, 49).

In some way context is “in text”: text carries with it, as a part of it, aspects of the context in which it was produced and, presumably, within which it would be considered appropriate (Eggins, 7). The most frequently discussed levels of context in SFL, according to
Eggins, are those of **register** and **genre**. Register theory describes the impact of dimensions of the immediate context of situation (“field”, “tenor” and “mode”) of a language event on the way language is used. The concept of genre is used to describe the impact of the context of culture on language, by exploring the staged, step-by step structure cultures institutionalize as ways of achieving goals (Eggins, 9). A higher level of context to which increasing attention is being given within systemic linguistics is the level of **ideology**:

Whatever genre we are involved in, and whatever the register of the situation, our use of language will also be influenced by our ideological positions: the values we hold (consciously or unconsciously), the perspectives acquired through our path through the culture… [J]ust as no text can be ‘free’ of context (register or genre), so no text is free of ideology. In other words, to use language at all is to use it to encode particular positions and values (Eggins, 10-11).

Stylistics or “linguistic criticism”, under the influence of M.A.K. Halliday’s model of analysis, as Fowler says, “has developed sophisticated techniques for describing implicit ideology” (1986, 133). SFL also has common ground with other approaches including Critical discourse Analysis (CDA). However,

Where CDA has tended to focus on semeiosis in the service of power, and even to define its concern with language and ideology in such terms (e.g. Fairclough 1995a), SFL has tended to take a wider view which takes ideology as permeating linguistic and other semiotic systems…On the one hand this is suggesting that every choice for meaning is ideologically motivated; on the other it focuses attention on the distribution of meaning in a culture (Martin and Rose 2003, 263).

The essential distinguishing characteristic of the SFL model, says Eggins, is that it sets up a realizational relationship extending all the way from the most abstract levels of context (ideology) through to the very concrete words, structures, sounds and graphology of text. This realization relationship can be read in both a predictive and a deductive direction. That is, given the specification of context, we can predict with reasonable accuracy the linguistic choices which will characterize a text, its most typical realizational patterns. And, given a text, the actualization of linguistic choices, we can deduce the context within which it was produced and of which it is a realization (Eggins, 328).
2.5. METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND THE CHECKLIST OF FEATURES TO BE STUDIED:

The present study makes a stylistic analysis of Mistry’s three novels within the framework of SFL though the terminology and interpretation may not be exactly Hallidayan. As Halliday says, there are many different purposes for analysing a text, and the scope and direction of the analysis will vary accordingly. “The guiding principle is to select and develop whatever is needed for the practical purpose in hand” (Halliday 1985, 285). The present study is an attempt “to make explicit the ideological positions encoded” in literary texts, “how language is not just representing but actively constructing our view of the world” (Eggins, 11). The study aims to see how an analysis of the language used by a character, narrator or a writer can help us relate to his/her ideology or world view. Thus the major focus will be on

1) the representation of reality (ideation), and
2) the positioning of the character, narrator or the author towards that reality (evaluation, judgement and stance).

While the first expresses the experiential function of language, the second realizes the interpersonal function, and Fowler (1986) and Simpson (2004) have shown how these two functions work in parallel in the overall stylistic make up of a narrative text. An analysis of these two functions can reveal the explicit and implicit ideology of a narrative at the level of character, narrator and author. Eggins studies texts according to the following descriptive techniques:

(i.) grammatical analysis: the principal functional clause constituents which realize the Mood, Transitivity, Logico-semantic and Theme structures of the clause
(ii.) cohesive analysis: patterns of conjunctive relations, reference, and lexical relations.

A description of these features, according to Eggins, “provides a reasonably thorough account of how the text is structured to make meanings in context” (328). Throughout, the linguistic features identified are related to context: register, genre and ideology.

Although these distinct types of structure appear at all ranks throughout the grammar, in English at least it is at the rank of the clause that they are most clearly in evidence. As an experiential construct, the clause is the locus of transitivity: it is the representation of the processes, participants and circumstances that constitute our experience of the real world. As an interpersonal construct it is the locus of mood and modality: the speaker’s adoption and assignment of speech roles and his judgement of the validity of the proposition. As a textual construct it is the locus of theme and, typically, of information structure: the message as expression of the speaker’s concern and his presentation of what is “news”. The clause, therefore, is a multiply structured concept; it is clause as representation, clause as interaction

2.5.1. The grammar of interpersonal meaning: clause as exchange: MOOD:

The principal grammatical system that realizes the meaning of the clause as an exchange is that of MOOD. Simultaneously with its organization as a message and as a representation, the clause is also organized as an interactive event involving speaker (or writer) and audience. In the act of speaking, the speaker adopts for himself a particular speech role, and in so doing assigns the listener a complementary role which he wishes him to adopt in his turn. The most fundamental types of speech role are: (i) giving, and (ii) demanding. The speaker is not only doing something himself; he is also requiring something of the listener. Typically, therefore, an act of speaking is something that might more appropriately be called an “interact”: it is an exchange, in which giving implies receiving and demanding implies giving in response.

Cutting across this basic distinction between giving and demanding is another distinction, equally fundamental, that relates to the nature of the commodity being exchanged. This may be either (a) good-&-services or (b) information (Halliday 1994, 68). When language is used to exchange information, the clause takes on the form of a PROPOSITION. It becomes something that can be argued about—something that can be affirmed or denied, and also doubted, contradicted, insisted on, accepted with reservation, qualified, tempered, regretted and so on. The semantic function of a clause in the exchange of information is a “proposition”; the semantic function of a clause in the exchange of goods-&-services is a “proposal” (Halliday 1994, 70-71).

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<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>expected response (supporting)</th>
<th>discretionary alternative (confronting)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>give goods-&amp;-services</td>
<td>offer</td>
<td>acceptance</td>
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<td>demand</td>
<td>command</td>
<td>undertaking</td>
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<td>give information</td>
<td>statement</td>
<td>acknowledgement</td>
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<td>demand</td>
<td>question</td>
<td>answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These variables, when taken together, define the four primary speech functions of OFFER, COMMAND, STATEMENT and QUESTION. These, in turn, are matched by a set of desired responses: accepting an offer, carrying out a command, acknowledging a statement and answering a question (Halliday 1994, 69). The alternatives we face in responding can be broadly differentiated into two types: a supporting type of responding move, versus a confronting type (Table 2.1). We can also recognize a correlation between the semantic choice of speech function and the grammatical or Mood structure of the clause typically chosen to encode/realize it (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Speech function and typical mood of clause (Eggins, 147)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Function</th>
<th>Typical Mood in Clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>declarative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>interrogative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>imperative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>modulated interrogative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
<td>elliptical declarative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>elliptical declarative Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept</td>
<td>minor clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>minor clause</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typical/unmarked are not the only correlations. We need to consider the possibilities for both marked/non-typical and unmarked correlations (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 (Eggins, 148)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech function</th>
<th>typical clause Mood</th>
<th>non-typical clause Mood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>imperative</td>
<td>modulated interrogative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>modulated interrogative</td>
<td>imperative declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>declarative</td>
<td>tagged declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>interrogative</td>
<td>modulated declarative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The choice between marked and unmarked structures will be influenced by contextual demands (Eggins, 148). All these different structures and their functions are described below.
2.5.1.1. Exchanging information: the grammatical structure of PROPOSITIONS:

The clause as exchange consists of two functional components: a MOOD element, which functions to carry the argument, and a RESIDUE, which can be left out or ellipsed. Following Eggins (2004, 149), the capital letters are used to differentiate the MOOD constituent of the clause from the general term, Mood, which describes the overall structure of the clause.

(1) Structure/constituents of the MOOD:

The MOOD component consists of two essential parts: (a) the Subject, which is a nominal group, and (b) the Finite operator, which is part of a verbal group.

(a) The Subject: The Subject is something by reference to which the proposition is affirmed or denied. It provides the person in whom is vested the success or failure of the proposition, what is held responsible (Halliday 1994, 76). The subject, in a declarative clause, is that element which is picked up by the pronoun in tag. The subject may be a single word (noun or pronoun), or it may be a lengthy noun phrase or a clause itself. Words it and there can also function as Subject.

(b) The Finite: The Finite element is one of a small number of verbal operators expressing tense (e.g. is, has) or modality (e.g. can, must). The Finite has the function of making the proposition finite. It circumscribes it and brings it down to earth so that we can argue about it. It relates the proposition to its context in the speech event through two kinds of Finite Verbal Operators:

(i) Temporal Finite Verbal Operators: These words anchor the proposition “by reference to the time of speaking”. They give primary tense to Finite. Primary tense means past, present or future at the moment of speaking; it is time relative to ‘now’.

(ii) Finite Modal Operators: These words anchor the proposition by reference to Modality. Modality means the speaker’s judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations, involved in what he is saying, that is, how likely or unlikely, desirable or undesirable something is.

As well as expressing primary tense and modality, the Finite also expresses the POLARITY—the choice between positive (is) and negative (isn’t). Each of the operators appears in both positive and negative form: did/ didn’t, can/ can’t and so on (Halliday 1994, 75-76). Modality and Polarity will be discussed in detail below in this section.

(2) Structure / constituents of the RESIDUE:

The RESIDUE consists of functional elements of three kinds: Predicator, Complement and adjunct. There can be only one Predicator, one or two Complements, and
an indefinite number of Adjuncts up to, in principle, about seven (Halliday 1994, 78).

(a) **Predicator**: The Predicator is the lexical or content part of the verbal group. It is realized by a verbal group minus the temporal or modal operator, which functions as the Finite in the MOOD element. The Predicator itself is thus non-finite; and there are non-finite clauses containing a Predicator but no Finite element.

The function of the Predicator is fourfold: (i) it specifies time reference **other than** reference to the time of speaking, i.e. ‘secondary’ tense: past, present or future relative to the primary tense; (ii) it specifies various other aspects and phases: meanings such as *seeming, trying, hoping, helping*, “which colour the verbal process without changing its ideational meaning” (Eggins, 156); (iii) it specifies the voice: active or passive; and (iv) it specifies the process (action, event, mental process, relation) that is predicated of the Subject (Halliday 1994, 79).

In clauses in which there is only a single verbal constituent (i.e. the simple present and simple past tense of verbs), we have the fusion of the elements of the Finite and the Predicator, e.g. *loves*. There are two verbs in English, *be* and *have*, where strictly speaking the simple past and simple present consist of Finite element only, rather than of a fusion of Finite with Predicator. In phrasal verbs, the predicator consists of a lexical verb followed by an adverb, a preposition or both an adverb and preposition.

(b) **Complement**: A Complement is an element within the Residue that has the potential of being Subject but is not. It is typically realized by a nominal group. It may at times be a whole clause. There is a particular sub-class of Complements, Attributive Complement, where the complement is realized by an adjectival element.

(c) **Adjuncts**: An adjunct is an element within the RESIDUE that has not got the potential of being Subject. It is typically realized by an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. We can differentiate between three broad classes of Adjuncts, according to whether their contribution is to the clause is principally ideational, interpersonal or textual.

(i) **Adding ideational meaning**: **Circumstantial Adjuncts**: Circumstantial Adjuncts add ideational content to the clause, by expressing some circumstance relating to the process represented in the clause. Circumstantial meanings may refer to time (*when*), place (*where*), cause (*why*), matter (*about what*), accompaniment (*with whom*), beneficiary (*to whom*), agent (*by whom*). Circumstantial Adjuncts are usually expressed by either prepositional phrases or by an adverb of time, manner, place, etc (Eggins, 159).
(ii) Adding interpersonal meaning: Modal adjuncts: Modal Adjuncts express the speaker’s judgement regarding the relevance of the message (Halliday 1994, 49). They add interpersonal meanings to the clause. There are four main types:

1. **Mood Adjuncts**: categories of items used to express
   a. probability: e.g. perhaps, maybe, probably
   b. usuality: e.g. sometimes, usually, always, never
   c. intensification or minimization: e.g. really, absolutely, just, somewhat
   d. presumption: e.g. evidently, presumably, obviously
   e. inclination: happily, willingly (Eggins, 160; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 126-9; Halliday 1994, 82-83).

2. **Polarity Adjuncts**: yes or no, when they are standing in for an ellipsed clause.

3. **Comment Adjuncts**: While Mood and Polarity Adjuncts express meanings which are directly related to the MOOD constituent, Comment Adjuncts function to express an assessment about the clause as a whole. Comment Adjuncts typically occur in the clause initial position, or directly after the subject, and are realized by adverbs. Halliday (1994, 49) identifies the following meanings as expressed by Comment Adjuncts:
   - admission: frankly
   - asertion: honestly, really
   - how desirable: luckily, hopefully
   - how constant: tentatively, provisionally
   - how valid: broadly speaking, generally
   - how sensible: understandably, wisely
   - how expected: as expected, amazingly

   Comment Adjuncts are considered interpersonal elements in the clause, since they add an expression of attitude and evaluation. However, because the scope of a Comment Adjunct is the entire clause (not just the Finite element), they should be seen to operate outside the MOOD/RESIDUE structure altogether (Eggins, 161).

4. **Vocative Adjuncts**: They are names, where they are used to directly address the person named. Like comment Adjuncts, Vocative Adjuncts impact the clause as a whole. Thus they are shown as belonging to neither the MOOD nor the RESIDUE. Similarly, Expletives tend to occur in the same places as Vocatives, and are likewise outside the scope of MOOD and RESIDUE (Halliday 1994, 85).
(iii) Adding textual meanings: Textual Adjuncts: Textual meanings are meanings to do with the organization of the message itself. There are two main types of textual Adjuncts: Conjunctive Adjuncts and Continuity Adjuncts.

The Conjunctive Adjuncts are expressed by cohesive conjunctions (which link sentences). Whereas structural or tactic conjunctions (which link clauses within clause complexes) add logical meaning, cohesive conjunctions add textual meaning. Thus only cohesive conjunctions are labelled as Conjunctive Adjuncts in the MOOD analysis. But tactic conjunctions can be left unlabelled (Eggins, 164). In written texts, Conjunctive Adjuncts are words like however, moreover, nevertheless, in other words. In conversation, however, speakers often use informal conjunctions, such as so, like, I mean. Because these cohesive conjunctions are adding textual meaning but not interpersonal meaning, Conjunctive Adjuncts belong neither in the MOOD, nor in the RESIDUE box (Eggins, 162).

Continuity Adjuncts include the continuative and continuity items, particularly frequent in casual talk, such as well, yea, oh, where these items occur to introduce a clause, and signal that a response to prior talk is about to be provided. Again, these Continuity Adjuncts do not belong in either the MOOD or the RESIDUE boxes, as they contribute to the textual organization of the clause.

(3) Summary: the Mood structure of different clauses:

Subject and Finite are closely linked together, and combine to form one constituent—the MOOD. Halliday describes the MOOD element as carrying “burden of the clause as an interactive event”. So it remains constant, “as the nub of the proposition” (Halliday 1994, 77).

The MOOD is the element that realizes the selection of Mood in the clause. The general principle behind the expression of Mood in the clause is as follows. The grammatical category that is characteristically used to exchange information is the indicative; within the category of indicative, the characteristic expression of a statement is the declarative, that of a question is the interrogative; and within the category of interrogative, there is a further distinction between polar interrogatives (yes/no questions), and WH-interrogatives, for content questions (questions using who, what, which, where, when, why, how). These features are typically expressed as follows:

1. The presence of the MOOD element, consisting of Subject plus Finite, realizes the feature ‘indicative’.
2. Within the indicative, what is significant is the order of Subject and Finite:
   a. The order subject before finite realizes ‘declarative’;
   b. The order Finite before Subject realizes ‘yes-no interrogative’;
(c) In a ‘WH-interrogative’ the order is:

(i) Subject before Finite if WH-element is the Subject;
(ii) Finite before Subject otherwise (Halliday 1994, 74).

The WH-element is a distinct element in the interpersonal structure of the clause. Its function is to specify the entity that the questioner wishes to have supplied. It typically takes a thematic position in the clause. The WH-element is always conflated with one or another of the three functions Subject, Complement or adjunct. If it is conflated with the Subject, it is part of the MOOD element, and the order within the MOOD element must therefore be Subject \(^\wedge\) Finite. If on the other hand the WH-element is conflated with a Complement or Adjunct, it is part of the RESIDUE; and in that case the typical interrogative ordering within the MOOD element reasserts itself, and we have Finite preceding Subject.

There is “one sub-category of declarative clause” which has a special thematic structure, namely **exclamative** (Halliday 1994, 45). Eggins regards exclamative structures, which are used in interaction to express emotions such as surprise, disgust, worry, etc., as “a blend of interrogative and declarative patterns” (Eggins, 171). These clauses have the WH-element what or how, in nominal or adverbial group. What conflates with a Complement. How conflates with an Adjunct or with an attributive Complement. In earlier English the Finite in these clauses preceded the Subject; but since the Finite \(^\wedge\) Subject sequence became specifically associated with interrogative Mood, the normal order in exclamatives has become Subject \(^\wedge\) Finite (Halliday 1994, 86).

The constituents we have identified and labeled in the Mood structure of a declarative clause also allow us to make an important distinction between **major** and **minor** clauses. A major clause is a clause which has a MOOD component, even though that MOOD component may sometime be ellipsed. In an elliptical major clause, we know that a MOOD component has been selected because we can fill in the subject and Finite. Minor clauses, on the other hand, are clauses which have never had a MOOD component, e.g. Oh dear!, Well!, Eh?, OK. Minor clauses are typically brief, but their brevity is not the result of ellipsis. We cannot fill out a Subject and a Finite for a minor clause, for the simple reason that “such clauses have never selected a Subject or Finite” (Eggins, 166).

**2.5.1.2. Exchanging goods and services: the grammar of proposal:**

As Table 2.3 above shows, while commands are typically expressed by imperative clauses, they can be expressed (non-typically) by declaratives, or modulated interrogatives. And while offers are typically expressed by modulated interrogatives, they can be expressed by imperatives or declaratives.
(1) Demanding goods-&-services: the structure of imperatives:
Since the imperative is the Mood for exchanging goods-&-services, its Subject is ‘you’ or ‘me’ or ‘you and me’. If we take the second person ‘you’, as the base form, an imperative clause, according to Halliday (1994, 87), displays the following paradigm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>look</td>
<td>DON’T look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOU look</td>
<td>DON’T YOU look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO look</td>
<td>DO NOT look</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the analysis, the unmarked positive has no MOOD element, the verb form (e.g. look) is Predicator only, with no Finite in it. The other forms have a MOOD element; this consists of Subject only (you), Finite only (do, don’t), or Finite followed by Subject (don’t you). Any of these can be followed by a MOOD tag.

Corresponding forms of the imperative with ‘you and me’ are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>let’s look</td>
<td>DON’T let’s look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LET’S look</td>
<td>DON’T LET’S look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO let’s look</td>
<td>LET’S NOT look</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above types of imperative belong to the sub-type JUSSIVE, meaning ‘ordering’. In contrast with this is the OPTATIVE, or ‘wishing’, sub-type. These are ‘third person’ imperative forms, like Lord save me! Intermediate between the jussive and the optative are the first and third person forms with let: let me look, let them beware; these are best analysed as causatives.

(2) Giving goods and services: the grammar of offers/ modulated interrogatives:
Modulation is a dimension of modality which will be considered in detail below. Modulation in an “offer” clause can be expressed

(i.) in the Finite: the Finite will or shall expresses a meaning of willingness, i.e. positive inclination viewed from the speaker’s perspective (Subject: I);

(ii.) in the Predicator: the lexical verb is a verb of liking or desiring and the clause addresses inclination from the addressee’s perspective (Subject: you). The finite element typically expresses a meaning of modalization (probability);

(iii.) in a complex Predicator, i.e. a Predicator involving a verb such as like, desire, need followed by a second verb in the infinitive form (e.g. like to borrow).

2.5.1.3. Polarity and modality:
POLARITY is the choice between positive and negative, as in is / isn’t, do / don’t. Typically in English, polarity is expressed in the Finite element. The Finite element is
inherently either positive or negative; its polarity does not figure as a separate constituent. However, the possibilities are not limited to a choice between “yes” and “no”. There are intermediate degrees between the positive and the negative poles. These intermediate degrees are known collectively as MODALITY (Halliday 1994, 88). When modality is used to argue about the probability or frequency of propositions, it is referred to as MODALIZATION. When modality is used to argue about the obligation or inclination of proposals, it is referred to as MODULATION (Eggins, 172).

(1) Modalization: In a proposition, the meaning of the positive and negative poles is asserting and denying: positive ‘it is so’, negative ‘it isn’t so’. Modalization involves two intermediate kinds of meanings:

(a) degrees of probability: ‘possibly / probably/ certainly’;

(b) degrees of usuality: ‘sometimes / usually/ always’.

Both probability and usuality can be expressed in the same three ways: (i) by a finite modal operator, e.g. will, might; (ii) by a modal Adjunct of (a) probability or (b) usuality; (iii) by both together (Halliday 1994, 89). Both Modal operator and Modal Adjuncts can be classified according to the degree of certainty or usuality they express, i.e., the VALUE that is attached to the modal judgement: high (must, certainly, always), median (may, probably, usually) or low (might, possibly, sometimes). Thus, the same meanings can be realized in two ways: to each modal operator corresponds typically a modal adjunct which captures the same meaning (Eggins, 173).

Modalization is the expression of the speaker’s attitude toward what s/he is saying. It is the way the speaker gets into the text, expressing a judgement about the certainty, likelihood or frequency of something happening or being. Modalization is always expressing the “implicit judgement” of the speaker. But, because people play with language, modalization can also be realized “explicitly”. Speakers can make it quite obvious that it is “their subjective judgement” that is being expressed. Halliday points out that this can be done by using a particular type of Mood Adjunct: low: I reckon, I guess; median: I think, I suppose; high: I’m sure.

Mood Adjuncts like these are examples of what Halliday calls “grammatical metaphor”, in this case metaphors of modality (Halliday 1994, 354-367; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 626-30). They are classified as metaphorical because a Modality that would usually be realized either as Finite modal operator or as an Adjunct in fact gets realized “as a clause” (Eggins, 174). Because these pseudo-clauses are actually functioning as Adjuncts, we can also combine them with our other ways expressing modalization in the
clause, so that we can stack up the expression of modalization through (i) clause-type Adjuncts, (ii) standard Mood Adjuncts and (iii) modal Finite operators (Eggins, 175). These clause-like Adjuncts make explicit the ownership or source of the modalization through the pronoun ‘I’ (subjective expression). However, speakers can also pretend that the judgement they are expressing is not ‘just their own’ but has some “objective status”. The use of ‘it is...that’ structure allows the speaker to hide behind an ostensibly objective formulation. Again, these objective expressions of modalization may be reinforced by the use of finite modal operators and ordinary Mood Adjuncts.

Modalization is a very rich area of the grammar, allowing great subtlety in the expression of judgement of certainty and usuality. Paradoxically, however, it turns out that the more we say something is certain, the less certain it is. If we are sure we do not use any modality (Eggins, 175). Thus the use of any modality at all, however strong it appears, makes our proposition more tentative than it would be without any modality.

Our analysis of how the clause is structured to enable interaction, then, needs to capture the fact that giving and demanding information involves (i) the choice of clause Mood (interrogative, declarative, exclamatory) (ii) the choice to express or not to express modalization. If the speaker chooses to express modalization, this may be achieved grammatically in a number of ways: “internally” in the main clause through the choice of a Finite modal operator and/or one or more Mood Adjuncts; and/or “externally” by adding a pseudo-clause which may be phrased “subjectively” or “objectively” (Eggins, 175-6).

(2) Modulation: In a proposal, the meaning of the positive and negative poles is prescribing and proscribing: positive ‘do it’, negative ‘don’t do it’. Here also there are two kinds of intermediate possibility, in this case depending on the speech function, whether command or offer. (i) In a command, the intermediate points represent degrees of obligation: ‘allowed to/ supposed to/ required to’; (ii) in an offer, they represent degrees of inclination: ‘willing to/ anxious to/ determined to’. Halliday (1994, 89) refers to the scales of obligation and inclination as MODULATION.

Again, both obligation and inclination can be expressed in either of two ways, though not, in this case, by both together: (a) by a finite modal operator, called modulated Finite (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 147; Eggins, 179), e.g. should, must; (b) by an expansion of the Predicator, (i) typically by a passive verb, e.g. you are supposed to, you are required to, (ii) typically by an adjective, e.g. I’m anxious to help them. Thus, as with modalization, meanings of obligation and necessity may be expressed objectively through a passive expansion of the predicator as in (i) and meanings of inclination may be expressed
subjectively by making the speaker’s inclination an adjectival element, which is then
followed by an infinitive clause as in (ii). And again, we can recognize degrees of
modulation: high (*must/required to*); median (*should/ supposed to*); low (*may/allowed to*).

Thus the basic distinction that determines how each type of modality will be realized
is the ORIENTATION: that is, the distinction between “subjective” and “objective”
modality, and between “explicit” and “implicit” variants. Another variable in modality is “the
value” that is attached to the modal judgement: high, median or low (Halliday 1994, 357-8).

2.5.1.4. The meaning of Mood and Modality:

As Eggins (2004) says, it is by looking at how people use these systems of Mood and
Modality in the clauses they exchange with each other that we can see speakers making
meanings about such interpersonal dimensions as: power and solidarity of their relationships;
the extent of their intimacy; their level of familiarity with each other; their attitudes and
judgements. The systemic model claims that we can trace a direct link from the grammatical
patterns of Mood in the clause, up to the semantics of interpersonal meanings, and out into
context to the register variable of tenor (184).

The systems of Mood and Modality are the keys to understanding the
interpersonal relationships between interactants. By looking at the
grammatical choices speakers make, the role they play in the discourse, we
have a way of uncovering and studying the social creation and maintenance of
hierarchic, socio-cultural roles (187).

2.5.2. The grammar of experiential meaning: Clause as Representation:

TRANSITIVITY:

When we look at the experiential metafunction, we are looking at the grammar of the
clause as representation. And one major system of grammatical choice for capturing
experience in language is the system of TRANSITIVITY, or process types. Halliday uses the
concept of ‘transitivity’ in an expanded semantic sense to refer to “the way meanings are
encoded in the clause and to the way different types of process are represented in language”
(Simpson 2004, 22). The analysis of transitivity structure in a clause involves describing
three aspects of the clause:

1. the process itself, typically realized by the verbal group/ verb phrase,
2. the participant(s) associated with the process, typically realized by the nominal
groups/ noun phrases, and
3. the circumstances (circumstantial elements) associated with the process, typically expressed through adverbial groups or prepositional phrases (Simpson 2004, 22; Eggins, 214-5; Halliday 1994, 109).

Halliday identifies six basic types of processes: Material, Mental, Relational, Behavioral, Verbal and Existential.

2.5.2.1. Material processes:

Material processes are the processes of ‘doing’. They express the notion that some entity ‘does’ something, which may be done ‘to’ some other entity (Halliday 1994, 110).

Halliday makes a distinction between:

i) middle or intransitive processes—processes in which there’s only one participant. These are clauses in which ‘someone’ does something’, and are probed by asking ‘what did x do?’

ii) effective or transitive processes—processes in which there are two (or more) participants. These are clauses in which ‘someone does something and the doing involves another entity’. Transitive clauses are probed by ‘what did x do to y?’

Some effective or transitive processes seem obligatorily to involve three participants. They are probed by ‘what did x do to y to z?’ Effective clauses can be either active or passive (Eggins, 216).

Alternatively, the other entity may be one that is brought into being by the process, not pre-existing; as building a house, writing a letter. We can distinguish between a ‘doing to’, or DISPOTIVE type and a ‘bringing about’, or CREATIVE type of material process. Material processes are not necessarily concrete, physical events; they may be abstract doings and happenings (Halliday 1994, 111).

Associated with material processes are two inherent participant roles: the Actor, an obligatory role in the process, and a Goal, a role which may or may not be involved.

(i.) the Actor means “the one that does the deed” (Halliday 1994, 109). When the clause has only one participant and is active, the participant will be Actor. In the active, thus, the role of Actor and Subject are mapped on to the same constituent. In the passive, however, the Subject is not also the Actor.

(ii.) the Goal is the participant at whom the process is “directed”, to whom the action is “extended”. It is the participant treated in the traditional grammar as the Direct Object, and it usually maps on to the Complement participant in the Mood analysis. The Goal is usually what becomes Subject in the passive.
Halliday (1994, 146-9) makes an important, if sometimes difficult, distinction between a Goal and a Participant called a Range—the element that specifies the range or scope of the process, e.g., a song in *sing a song of sixpence*. A Range may occur in material, behavioural, mental and verbal processes. In a material or behavioural process,

(i.) The Range may be an entity which exists independently of the process but which indicates the domain over which the process takes place, e.g., *the mountain in Mary climbed the mountain*, or

(ii.) The Range may not be an entity at all but rather another name for the process, e.g., *the race in they ran the race*.

Halliday finds it useful to label the Range in a material or behavioural process more specifically as either ‘Range: entity’ or ‘Range: process’.

Another participant that appears in material and verbal processes, and occasionally in relational processes, is the Beneficiary. The Beneficiary is the one to whom or for whom the process is said to take place. In a material process, the Beneficiary is either Recipient (one that goods are given to) or Client (one that services are done for). Either may appear with or without a preposition, depending on its position in the clause; the preposition is to with Recipient, for with Client. Normally the Recipient occurs in a clause which is ‘effective’ (has two direct participants).

**2.5.2.2. Mental processes:**

Mental processes are the processes of ‘sensing’. They encode meanings of feeling, thinking and seeing/perceiving. Halliday (1994) thus divides mental processes into three sub-types: (i) PERCEPTION (seeing, hearing etc.), (ii) AFFECTION (liking, fearing etc.) and (iii) COGNITION (thinking, knowing, understanding etc.) (118).

In a clause of mental process, there is always one participant who is human, or more accurately human-like, ‘endowed with consciousness’; this is the one that ‘senses’—feels, thinks or perceives, and is called the Senser. The other main element in a clause of mental process is called the Phenomenon, the one that is ‘sensed’—felt, thought or perceived/ seen. It may not only be a ‘thing’ but also a ‘fact’. Thus, as well as the simple Phenomena of the type represented by, e.g., ‘his excuses’, ‘more soup’, Halliday also identifies two types of embedded Phenomena: (a) Acts: An Act is realized by an imperfective non-finite acting as if it were a simple noun, e.g., ‘the operation taking place’, and (b) Facts: A Fact is an embedded clause, usually finite and usually introduced by a ‘that’, functioning as if it were a simple noun. It can be identified as a Fact-embedding because a Fact-noun can be inserted before the (explicit or implicit) that which introduces it e.g., ‘(the fact) that it was a bomb’ (Eggins, 227-
Halliday (1994, 266-7) identifies four sub-classes of Fact-nouns: 1) ‘case’, e.g. fact, case, point, rule…; 2) ‘chances’, e.g. chance, possibility, likelihood, probability, certainty…; 3) ‘proofs’, e.g. proof, indication, implication, confirmation, demonstration…; 4) ‘needs’, e.g. requirement, need, rule, obligation.

The term ‘fact’ is being used here, not in its exact technical sense…but as an informal equivalent to the term METAPHENOMENON. A metaphenomenon is something that is constructed as a participant by projection—that is, as indirect or ‘reported’ discourse, typically in the form of a that clause, if the underlying mood is declarative (Halliday 1994, 115).

However, for most analytical purposes it is sufficient to label the constituent as ‘Phenomenon’ (Eggins, 229).

There is no such thing as an intransitive mental process; all mental processes potentially involve both a Senser and a Phenomenon. This does not mean that both must always be present in the clause. (a) There can be a Senser and no Phenomenon. In reality, there is something seen or felt but it is not made explicit. Most common among those with the Phenomenon implicit are passives of the please type. (b) There can be a Phenomenon and no Senser. The Senser may only be implied.

In a Mental process, the unmarked present tense is the simple present, whereas in Material processes, the unmarked present tense is the present continuous. The choice of another, marked present tense carries an extra dimension of meaning. Mental processes are represented in the language as two-way processes. They can be realized in either direction—either the Senser or the Phenomenon that is being sensed can be the Subject, still keeping the clause in the active voice (Halliday 1994, 116-7). And most mental processes (except those of perception) can project. Material processes cannot project.

2.5.2.3. Relational processes:

Relational processes are the processes of being. As the term ‘relational’ suggests, this is not ‘being’ in the sense of existing. In relational clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is being said to ‘be’ something else. In other words, a relation is being set up between two separate entities. Halliday (1994) identifies three main types of relational processes in English:

1. intensive ‘x is a’
2. circumstantial ‘x is at x’
3. possessive ‘x has a’
Each of these comes in two distinct modes:

(a.) attributive ‘a is an attribute of x’
(b.) identifying ‘a is the identity of x’

This gives us six categories of relational process (119).

1. **Intensive processes: attributive:** An intensive relational process involves establishing a relationship between two terms, where the relationship is expressed most commonly by the verb *be* or a synonym, e.g. *become, turn, grow,* etc.

   In the Attributive mode, an entity (Carrier) has some quality, classification or descriptive epithet (Attribute), ascribed or attributed to it. The Carrier is always realized by a noun or nominal group.

   The meaning of an Attribute is that ‘x is a member of the class a’. In this classification kind of attributive intensive, the attribute is also a nominal group, typically an indefinite nominal (introduced by *a/an*). In the descriptive attributive intensive, the Attribute is a quality or epithet, typically an adjective, ascribed to the Carrier, i.e. ‘x carries the attribute a’ (Eggins, 240; Halliday 1994, 120). An Attributive intensive clause is not reversible. This means that there is no passive form of the clause.

2. **Intensive processes: identifying:** In the identifying mode, something has an identity assigned to it, i.e. one entity is being used to identify another: ‘x is identified by a’ or ‘a serves to define the identity of x’. Semantically, an Identifying clause is not about ascribing or classifying, but about defining. Structurally we label the x-element, that which is to identified, as the Identified, and the a-element, that which serves as identity, as the Identifier.

   Grammatically, defining involves two participants; a Token (that which stands for what is being defined) and a Value (that which defines). The Token will be a ‘sign, name, form, holder or occupant’ of a Value, which gives the ‘meaning, referent, function, status or role’ of the Token. The Token, then, is the nominal group which contains the ‘name’, and the Value is the nominal group which gives the classification. Both the Token and the Value are realized by nominal groups.

   While the most frequently used Identifying intensive verb is *be*, other synonymous intensives are also used, e.g. *equal, make signify, mean,* etc. (Eggins, 242; Halliday 1994, 123). Because the Identifying clause contains two autonomous nominal participants, all Identifying clauses are reversible, i.e. they can form passives. The Subject is always Token in the active, Value in the passive (Halliday, 129).
3. **Circumstantial relational processes**: In the circumstantial type, the relationship between the two terms is one of time, manner, cause, accompaniment, role, matter or angle. These are the circumstantial elements in the English clause. These will be discussed in detail later in this chapter below.

(i) **Attributive**: In the attributive mode, the circumstantial element is an attribute that is being ascribed to some entity. These take two forms:

(a) **Circumstance as attribute**: Here the circumstance is expressed in the form of the attribute. The attribute is a prepositional phrase and the circumstantial relation is expressed by the preposition, e.g. *about, in, like, etc.*

(b) **Circumstance as process**: Here the circumstance is expressed in the form of the process. The Attribute is a nominal group and the circumstance is expressed by the verb. The verb expresses a circumstantial relation such as ‘be + matter’ = *concerns*, ‘be + extent in time’ = *lasted*, etc. Being Attributive, these are non-reversible; there are no passive equivalents.

In (b), therefore, the Process is circumstantial; whereas in (a) it is the Attribute that is circumstantial, the Process being the same as in the intensive type.

(ii) **Identifying**: In the identifying mode, the circumstance takes the form of a relationship between two entities; one entity is being related to another by a feature of time, or place or manner, etc. As with the circumstantial attributive, it is also possible with Identifying Circumstantials to encode the circumstantial meaning within either (a) the participants or (b) the process.

(a) **Circumstance as participant**: When the circumstantial meaning is encoded through the participants, both the Token and the Value, or Identified and Identifier, will be circumstantial elements of time, place, etc., while the verb remains intensive, e.g. in *tomorrow is the tenth, tomorrow and the tenth* are both time elements. Like other identifying clauses, these are reversible.

(b) **Circumstance as process**: In this type, time, place or other circumstantial features are expressed through the process, using verbs such as *take up, follow, cross, accompany, resemble*, etc. In these cases, the processes are labeled as ‘circumstantial verb’. They encode the circumstance of time place, accompaniment, manner, etc. as a relationship between the participants. Thus *take up* means ‘be + for (extent in time)’; *follow* means ‘be + after (location in time)’; *cross* means ‘be + across (extent in place)’; *accompany* means ‘be + with’;
resemble means ‘be + like”. All these are examples of ‘grammatical metaphor’.

Being identifying, these verbs form passives.

4. Possessive relational processes: In the possessive type, the relationship between the two terms is one of ownership; one entity possesses another.

(i) In the attributive mode, the possessive relationship may again be expressed either as attribute or as process.

(a) If the relationship of possession is encoded as the attribute, then it takes the form of a possessive nominal group, e.g. Peter’s; the thing possessed is the Carrier and the Possessor is the Attribute.

(b) If the relationship of possession is encoded as the Process, then two further possibilities arise. Either the possessor is the Carrier and the possessed is the attribute, as in Peter has a piano. Or the possessed is the Carrier and the possessor is the Attribute, as in the piano belongs to Peter.

The commonest Attributive verbs are to have and to belong to. Attributive possessive processes are not reversible.

(ii) In the identifying mode, the possession takes the form of a relationship between two entities. Possession may again be expressed either (a) through the participants, or (b) through the process.

(a) Possession as participants: When possession is expressed through the participants, the intensive verb to be is used, with the Token and Value encoding the possessor and possessed, e.g. the piano is Peter’s.

(b) Possession as process: Here the possession is encoded as a process, typically realized by the verb own as in Peter owns the piano. The participants are possessor Peter and possessed the piano; in this case Peter is Token and the piano is Value.

In addition to possession in the usual sense of ‘owning’, this category includes abstract relations of containment, involvement and the like. Among the verbs commonly occurring in this function are include, involve, contain, comprise, consist of, provide.

Relational processes, in Halliday’s view, are critical in many types of text; the ‘circumstantial identifying’ ones, for example, figure centrally in the kind of grammatical metaphor that is characteristic of scientific discourse. More than other process types, the relationals have a rich potential for ambiguity, which is exploited in many registers from technocratic and political rhetoric to the discourse of poetry and folk saying.
2.5.2.4. Behavioural processes:

Halliday describes these processes as a ‘half-way house’ between mental and material processes. They are partly like the material and partly like the mental. These are processes of (typically human) physiological and psychological behaviour, e.g. breathe, cough, smile, dream, stare, dream, frown, etc. The one obligatory participant who is ‘behaving’, labelled Behaver, is typically a conscious being, like the Senser; but the process is grammatically more like one of ‘doing’. The unmarked present tense for behavioural processes is present continuous.

Behavioural processes are almost always middle; the most typical pattern is a clause consisting of Behaver and Process only. Behaviourals can contain a second participant that is like a Range: a restatement of the process. This participant is called the Behaviour, e.g. she sang a song. If there is another participant which is not a restatement of the process, it is called a Phenomenon (Eggins, 234). Also like Material, Behavioural processes cannot project.

2.5.2.5. Verbal processes:

These are processes of saying. ‘Saying’ here includes any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning. The participant responsible for the verbal process, called Sayer, does not have to be a conscious being. The Sayer can be anything that puts out a signal, like the notice, my watch, the guidebook. The verbal processes accommodate three further participant functions in addition to the Sayer:

(i) Receiver: the one to whom the saying is directed, the Beneficiary of a verbal message, occurring with or without a preposition depending on position in the clause.

(ii) Verbiage: the function that corresponds to what is said. This may mean one of the two things: (a) the content of what is said, or (b) the name of the saying (Halliday, 141). ‘What is said’ in the sense of the wording in quoted or reported form (‘direct or indirect speech’) is not Verbiage. Such projected matter is not a constituent of the projecting verbal process clause. The verbiage is a nominalized statement of the verbal process: a noun expressing some kind of verbal behaviour (e.g. statement, questions, retort, answer, story).

(iii) Target: the entity that is targeted by the process of saying, e.g. him in she always praised him to her friends.
Although many verbal processes occur with a nominal element, a Verbiage, it is a distinctive feature of verbal processes that they project, i.e., quote or report speech.

2.5.2.6. Existential processes:

These represent something that exists or happens. Existentials are easy to identify as the structure involves the use of the word *there*, as in *there seems to be a problem*. The word *there*, when used in existential processes, has no representational meaning: it does not refer to a location. It is present in the clause merely because all English clauses require a Subject. Phonologically it is non-salient. The structural *there* in an existential process does not receive any functional label, as it is not encoding any representational meaning. It is left unanalyzed for Transitivity, although in Mood analysis it is of course assigned the Subject role.

Existential processes typically employ the verb *be* or synonyms such as *exist, arise, occur*. That object or event which is being said to exist is labelled, simply, *Existent*. In principle, there can ‘exist’ any kind of phenomenon that can be construed as a ‘thing’: person, object, institution, abstraction; but also any action or event.

2.5.2.7 Circumstantial Elements:

As it was said above, the analysis of transitivity structure in a clause involves describing (1) the process itself, (2) the participant(s) associated with the process and (3) the circumstances (circumstantial elements) associated with the process. The processes and the participants were discussed above. This section discusses the circumstances.

Halliday (1994, 149-61) looks at the notion of ‘circumstance’ from the usual three perspectives. As far as the meaning is concerned, he uses the expression ‘circumstances associated with’ or ‘attendant on the process’, referring to examples such as the location of an event in time or space, its manner, or its cause. These notions ‘when, where, how and why’ the thing happens provide the traditional explanation, by linking the circumstances to the four WH- forms that are adverbs rather than nouns. Second, from the perspective of the clause itself, whereas participants function in the Mood grammar as Subject or Complement, circumstances map onto adjuncts; in other words, they have not got the potential of becoming Subjects, of taking over the modal responsibility for the clause as exchange. Thirdly, looked at from below, they are typically expressed not as nominal groups but as either adverbial groups or prepositional phrases (150).
Table 2.4 Types of Circumstantial Element

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Specific categories (subtypes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Extent</td>
<td>distance, duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Location</td>
<td>place, time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Manner</td>
<td>means, quality, comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cause</td>
<td>reason, purpose, behalf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Contingency</td>
<td>condition, concession, default</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Accompaniment</td>
<td>comitiation, addition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Role</td>
<td>guise, product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Matter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Angle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Halliday thinks of ‘circumstantial’ as a general concept, in the context of the overall interpretation of Transitivity as the grammar of experience. A circumstantial element is itself, from this point of view, a minor process that has become parasitic on or subsidiary to the main one, but embodying some of the features of a relational or verbal process, and so introducing a further entity as an indirect participant (152). The preposition is a kind of intermediary, a mini verb, whereby a nominal element can be introduced as an ‘indirect’ participant in the main process (158). Whereas DIRECT PARTICIPANT is a nominal group functioning directly as participant in a clause, INDIRECT PARTICIPANT refers to the status of a nominal group that is inside a prepositional phrase. The elements Halliday is treating as ‘circumstantial’ are “those in which the participant typically—and in many cases obligatorily—is indirect, being linked into the process via some preposition or other” (150). Table 2.4 lists the main types of circumstance that Halliday recognizes. They are briefly discussed below:

1. **Extent**: The interrogative forms for Extent are *how far?* (duration); *how long?* (spatial distance); *how many, how many times?* (frequency). The typical structure is a nominal group with quantifier, either definite, e.g. *five days*, or indefinite, e.g. *many miles, a long way to*.

2. **Location**: The general interrogatives of location are *where?* (Place/spatial), *when?* (time/temporal). The typical structure is an adverbial group or prepositional phrase. Location may be definite or indefinite, absolute or relative. A distinction is also made between rest and motion (towards or away from).
3. **Manner**: The circumstantial element of Manner comprises three subcategories: Means, quality, Comparison.

   (a) Means refers to the means whereby a process takes place; it is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with the preposition *by* or *with*. The interrogative forms are *how?* and *what with?* In addition to generalized expressions of means as *by train, by chance*, the category includes, in principle, the concepts of both agency (*by the stick*) and instrumentality (*with the stick*).

   (b) Quality is typically expressed by an adverbial group, with *-ly* adverb as Head, e.g. *heavily*, the interrogative is *how?* Or *how...?* Plus appropriate adverb.

   (c) Comparison is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with *like* or *unlike*, or an adverbial group of similarity or difference. The interrogative is *what... like?*

4. **Cause**: The circumstantial element of Cause also comprises three subcategories: Reason, Purpose, Behalf.

   (a) A circumstantial expression of Reason represents the reason for which a process takes place—what causes it. It is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with *through* or a complex preposition such as *because of, as a result*, etc. The corresponding WH-forms are *why?* or *how?*.

   (b) Circumstantials of Purpose represent the purpose for which an action takes place—the intention behind it. They are typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with *for* or with a complex preposition such as *in the hope of, for the purpose of*. The interrogative corresponding is *what for?*.

   The semantic relations of reason and purpose tend to be realized as separate clauses rather than as phrases within the clause.

   (c) Expressions of behalf represent the entity, typically a person, on whose behalf or for whose sake the action is undertaken—who it is for. They are expressed by a prepositional phrase with *for* or with a complex preposition such as *for the sake of, in favour of, on behalf of*. The usual interrogative is *who for?*.

5. **Contingency**: Again, there are three subtypes: Condition, Concession, Default.

   (a) Circumstantials of condition are expressed by *in case of, in the event of*.

   (b) Concession circumstantials are expressed by *in spite of or despite*.

   (c) Expressions of default have *in the absence of, in default of*.

6. **Accompaniment**: This element represents the meanings ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ as circumstantials; it corresponds to the interrogatives *and who/what else?, but not who/what?*. It is expressed by prepositional phrases with prepositions such as *with, without,*
besides, instead of. Halliday (1994, 156) distinguishes two subcategories: (a) comitative and (b) additive.

7. Role: This category includes the subcategories of Guise and Product.
   (a) Guise corresponds to the interrogative what as? and construes the meaning of ‘be’ (attribute or identity) in the form of a circumstance. The usual preposition is as; other, complex prepositions with this function are by way of, in the role/shape/guise/form of.
   (b) Product corresponds to the interrogative what into?, with the meaning of ‘become’, likewise as attribute or identity.

8. Matter: Matter is related to verbal processes; it is the circumstantial equivalent of the verbiage, ‘that which is described, referred to, narrated, etc’. The interrogative is what about?. Matter is expressed by prepositions such as about, concerning, with reference to and sometimes simply of.

9. Angle: Angle is also related to verbal processes, but in this case to the Sayer; it is like ‘as … says’. The simple preposition used in this function is to; but, like Matter, it is often expressed by a more complex form such as according to, in the view/opinion of, from the standpoint of.

2.5.2.8. Transitivity and Voice: Another Interpretation (Halliday 1994, 161-75; Toolan 1996, 73-104):

   As Halliday says, from one point of view, all the process types described above are different. At the same time, looked at from another point of view they are all alike. In a more abstract sense, every process is structured in the same way, on the basis of just one variable. This variable relates to the source of the process: what it is that brought it about, that is, whether the process is brought about from within, or from outside.

   In the intransitive/transitive distinction, the variable is one of “extension”. The Actor is engaged in a process; does the process extend beyond the Actor, to some other entity, or not? But in the second interpretation, the variable is not one of extension but one of “causation”. Some participant is engaged in a process; is the process brought about by that participant or by some other entity? The pattern yielded by this second interpretation is known as the ‘ergative’ pattern (Halliday, 163).

   Looked at from this point of view, every process has associated with it one participant that is the key figure in that process; this is the one through which the process is actualized, and without which there would be no process at all. Halliday calls it the Medium, since it is the entity through the medium of which the process comes into existence.
Except in the special case of the mediopassive voice, the Medium is obligatory in all processes; and it is the only element that is, other than the process itself. The Process and the Medium together form the nucleus of an English clause; and this nucleus then determines the range of options that are available to the rest of the clause. The most general of these further options, ‘most general’ because it turns up in all process types, is the ergative one whereby, in addition to the Medium, there may be another participant functioning as an external cause –the Agent. Either the process is represented as self-engendering, in which case there is no separate Agent; or it is represented as engendered from outside, in which case there is another participant functioning as Agent. A large number of processes may be represented either way: either as involving Medium only, or as involving Medium plus Agent. By using the ergative standpoint to complement the transitive one in our interpretation of English, Halliday matches up the function in the various process types (Halliday 1994, 165-6). For example, the ergative function Medium is equivalent:

- In material process to Actor (middle), Goal (effective)
- In behavioural process to Behaver
- In mental process to Senser
- In verbal process to Sayer (middle), Target (effective)
- In attributive process to Carrier
- In identifying process to Identified
- In existential process to Existent

Thus the Medium is the nodal participant throughout the system. It is not the doer, nor the causer, but the one that is critically involved, in some way or other according to the particular nature of the process (Halliday 1994, 165).

In Halliday’s view, probably all transitivity systems, in all languages, are some blend of these two semantic models of processes, the transitive and the ergative. The transitive is a linear interpretation; and since the only function defined by extension in this way is that of the Goa, systems which are predominantly transitive in character tend to emphasize the distinction between participants (i.e. direct participants, Actor and goal only) and circumstances (all other functions). But the ergative is a nuclear rather than a linear interpretation; and if this component is to the fore, there may be a whole cluster of participant-like functions in the clause: not only Agent but also Beneficiary and range. These, seen from a transitive point of view, are circumstantial: agent is a kind of Manner, Beneficiary a kind of cause and Range a kind of Extent; and they can all be expressed as minor processes. But from an ergative point of view they are additional participants in the
major process: the nucleus of ‘Process + Medium’ has an inner ring of additional participants as well as an outer ring of circumstances surrounding it. Semantically, therefore, Agent, Beneficiary and Range have some features of participants and some of circumstances (Halliday 1994 168).

The same tendency away from purely transitive type of semantic organization can be seen in the system of voice. In a transitive pattern the participants are obligatory actor and optional Goal; if there is Actor only, the verb is intransitive and active in voice, while if both are present the verb is transitive and may be either active or passive. The way the voice system works is as follows. A clause with no feature of ‘agency’ is neither active nor passive but Middle. One with agency is non-middle, or Effective, in voice. An effective clause is then either active or passive: active if Agent/Subject, passive if Medium/Subject.

Strictly speaking an effective clause has the feature ‘agency’ rather than the structural function Agent, because this may be left implicit. If the clause is effective, since either participant can then become subject there is a choice between active and passive. The reasons for choosing passive are as fellows: (1) to get the Medium as Subject, and therefore as unmarked theme; and (2) to make the Agent either (i) late news, by putting it last, or (ii) implicit, by leaving it out. The speaker leaves the listener to locate the source (169).

According to Halliday, by interpreting the process ergatively as well as transitively we are able to understand many features of English grammar which otherwise remain arbitrary or obscure.

2.5.2.9. Powerful versus powerless in material processes:

Drawing upon Halliday, Toolan (1996) identifies five major types of participant-role in material process clauses:

Medium: (‘done-to’ participant, entity that is acted upon), e.g. Mary ate the tofu, Bill groaned.

Affected Medium: (rare subtype, where the Medium comes into existence in the course of the process), e.g. Kim painted a beautiful landscape.

Agent: (a human intentional actor who acts upon a given Medium), e.g. Mary ate the tofu.

Beneficiary: (often preceded –or ‘preceadable’ –by for), e.g. Mary bought that TV for me.

Recipient: (often preceded by to), e.g. The store delivered the TV to me.

Instrument: (often preceded by with), e.g. Mary ate the tofu with a knife and fork.

Force: (often preceded by by), e.g. The forest was scarred by acid rain (80-81)

Toolan identifies two subtypes of human Medium—process-initiating human Mediums and target-denoting ones. Medium thus would be of three kinds:
Medium: nonhuman Medium, e.g. The tree fell down.

Medium-i: human Medium, and volitional initiator of the process, e.g. John dived to the floor.

Medium-t: human Medium, and the target of the process, e.g. Bill kicked John. (88)

All of these are ranked in terms of the degree of active, powerful, controlling engagement that the role implicitly ascribes to the individual. The ranking is as follows, going from the material process participant that is most active and in control to that participant that is most acted upon, controlled, and objectified:

Kinds of do-er:
- Agent
- Force
- Instrument
- Medium-initiator

Kinds of done-to individuals:
- Beneficiary or recipient
- Medium-target
- Medium (Toolan 1996, 89).

Evidently an Agent is most powerful and a Medium-t is least powerful among specifically human participants. All of this classifying becomes useful when we look closely at particular pieces of language, and the representation of particular discourses which involve them (Ref. Toolan 1996, 90-97 for Body parts as Agent metonyms and nominalization).

2.5.3. The Grammar of Textual Meaning: Clause as Message: Theme:

Two key systems that enter into the expression of textual meaning in the clause are the system of Theme, and the system of Information Structure. Since the Information Structure (with its constituents of Given and New) is realized through intonation choices, the only textual system examined here is that of Theme.

Of the various structures which, when mapped on to each other, make up a clause, the one which gives the clause its character as a message is known as Thematic structure (Halliday 1994, 37). The system of theme is realized through a structure in which the clause falls into two main constituents: a Theme and a Rheme (Eggins, 298).

2.5.3.1. Theme-Rheme system:

The Theme is one element in a particular structural configuration which, taken as a whole, organizes the clause as a message; this is the configuration Theme + Rheme. A message consists of a Theme combined with a Rheme (Halliday 1994, 38).
Within that configuration, the Theme is the element which serves as the starting-point, the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the clause is concerned, the ground from which the clause is taking off. So part of the meaning of any clause lies in which element is chosen as its Theme (Halliday 1994, 38; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 64). As a general guide, the theme can be identified as that element which comes in first position in the clause. The Theme typically contains familiar, or ‘given, information, i.e. information which has already been mentioned somewhere in the text or is familiar from the context (Eggins, 299).

The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called in Prague school terminology the Rheme. The Rheme typically contains unfamiliar, or ‘new’, information. The Rheme can be identified as “everything that is not the Theme” (Eggins, 300). As a message structure, therefore, a clause consists of a theme accompanied by a Rheme; and the structure is expressed by the order—whatever is chosen as the Theme is put first (Halliday 1994, 37).

The analysis of Theme involves three major systems: choice of type of Theme, choice of marked or unmarked Theme, and choice of predicated or unpredicated Theme. The type of Theme is realized by the insertion of a particular type of constituent in Thematic position. Theme markedness depends on the conflation (mapping together) of the Theme constituent with different Mood and Transitivity constituents. And Theme predication involves the use of an additional clausal element.

2.5.3.2. Types of Theme and Theme boundary:

Reflecting the three-dimensional metafunctional structure of the clause, Halliday identifies three different types of elements of clause structure that can get to be Theme: topical (or experiential) elements, interpersonal elements and textual elements.

1) **Topical Theme**: when an element of a clause to which a Transitivity function can be assigned—participant, circumstance, or process—occurs in first position in a clause, we describe it as a topical theme. Every clause must contain one and only one topical Theme. Once we have identified a topical theme in a clause, we can consign all the remaining clause constituents to the Rheme role (Eggins, 302).

2) **Interpersonal Theme**: when a constituent to which we would assign a Mood label (but not a Transitivity label) occurs at the beginning of a clause, we call it an interpersonal Theme. The constituents which can function as interpersonal Themes are the unfused Finite (in interrogative structures) and all four categories of Modal Adjuncts: Mood, Vocative, Polarity and Comment.
(3) **Textual Theme:** The Textual Theme is any combination of (i) continuative, (ii) structural and (iii) conjunctive, in that order.

(i) A Continuative (or Continuity Adjunct) is one of a small set of discourse signalers, *yes, no, well, oh, now,* which signal that a new move is beginning: a response, in dialogue, or a move to the next point if the same speaker is continuing.

(ii) A structural Theme is any of the obligatorily thematic elements: (a) conjunctions and (b) Wh-relatives. (a) Conjunctions (also called tactic conjunctions) are items which relate the clause to a preceding clause in the same sentence (the same clause complex), e.g. *and, or, when, in case,* etc. (b) Relatives are also items which relate the clause in which they occur to another, in a structural relationship, e.g. *which, whose, when,* etc.

(iii) A conjunctive Theme is one of the conjunctive Adjuncts (or cohesive conjunctions), wherever such an Adjunct occurs preceding the topical Theme (Halliday 1994, 49-54). Both tactic and cohesive conjunctions are described as textual Themes when they occur before the first topical Theme in a clause (Eggins, 306).

While it is possible for a clause to realize only one Thematic element (in which case it must be a topical Theme), it is far more common for clauses to contain a sequences of Themes, with often several textual and/or interpersonal Themes occurring before the obligatory topical Theme. In the former case, the clause has a ‘simple’ Theme, whereas in the latter the clause contains ‘multiple’ Themes (Halliday 1994, 39-42, 52-54). The Theme extends from the beginning of the clause up to (and including) the first element that has a function in transitivity. So we can say that the Theme of the clause consists of the topical Theme with anything else that comes before it. The **typical** ordering is textual ^ interpersonal ^ experiential; in any case, the experiential element (the topical Theme) comes last—anything following this is part of the Rheme (Halliday 1994, 53). It is this principle which allows us to determine the Theme/Rheme boundary.

2.5.3.3. **THEME and MOOD:** analyzing Theme in different Mood classes:

The element that is typically chosen as Theme in an English clause depends on the choice of Mood.

(1) **Declaratives:** In a declarative clause, the typical pattern is one in which Theme is conflated with subject. The mapping of Theme on to Subject is referred to as the **UNMARKED THEME.** A Theme that is something other than the subject, in a declarative clause, is called a **MARKED THEME.** The most usual form of marked Theme is an adverbial group, e.g. *today, suddenly,* or prepositional phrase, e.g. *at
night, in the corner, functioning as ADJUNCT in the clause. Least likely, thus the ‘most marked’ type of Theme in a declarative clause, is a COMPLEMENT, which is a nominal group that is not functioning as subject—something that could have been a Subject but is not (Halliday 1994, 44).

There is one sub-category of declarative clause which has a special thematic structure, namely the exclamative. These typically have an exclamatory WH-element as theme, e.g. how cheerfully, what tremendously easy question (45).

(2) Interrogatives: In a yes/no interrogative, the Theme includes the Finite Verbal Operator; but it extends over the Subject as well. In a Wh-interrogative, the Theme is constituted solely by the WH-element: that is, the group or phrase in which the WH-word occurs, e.g. who, how many miles, with what, which house.

(3) Imperatives: with imperatives, the Mood demands mean that often the Subject and Finite elements do not appear in the clause, which often begins with the Predicator. Therefore, it is the Predicator that is the unmarked Theme here. Where ‘you’ is made explicit as a Theme, it is clearly a marked choice. In let’s imperative, let’s is the unmarked choice of Theme.

In negative imperatives, such as don’t argue with me, don’t let’s quarrel about it, the unmarked Theme is don’t plus the following element, either Subject or the Predicator. Again there is a marked form with “you”, e.g. don’t you argue with me, where the Theme is don’t + you. There is also a marked contrastive form of the positive, such as do take care, where the Theme is do plus the Predicator take.

The pattern is summarized below;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mood of clause</th>
<th>Typical (‘unmarked’) Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declarative</td>
<td>-nominal group functioning as Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogative: yes/no</td>
<td>-first word (finite operator) of verbal group, () plus nominal group functioning as Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogative: WH-</td>
<td>-nominal group, adverbial group or prepositional phrase functioning as interrogative (WH-) element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperative: ‘you’</td>
<td>-verbal group functioning as Predicator, plus () preceding don’t if negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperative: ‘you and me’</td>
<td>-let’s, plus preceding don’t if negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclamative</td>
<td>-nominal group or adverbial group functioning as exclamative (WH-) element (Halliday 1994, 47-8).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When some other element comes first, it constitutes a ‘marked’ choice of Theme; such marked Themes usually either express some kind of setting for the clause or express a feature of contrast. In such instances the element that would have been the unmarked choice as Theme is now a part of the Rheme (Halliday 1994, 48). Marked Theme, then, is when Theme conflates with any other constituent from the Mood system (Eggins, 318).

One way of creating a marked Theme is to move a circumstantial element to Thematic position. Another common strategy is to repackage a constituent (e.g. an Actor) as a circumstantial element (typically of matter), e.g. As for the queen, ... Theme predication is another strategy for producing marked Themes. Skilful writers and speakers choose marked Themes to add coherence and emphasis to their text.

2.5.3.4. Theme in dependent, embedded, minor and elliptical clauses:

(1) Dependent clauses.

(i) If finite, these typically have a conjunction as structural Theme, e.g. because, that, whether, followed by a topical Theme. If the dependent clause begins with a WH-element, on the other hand, that element constitutes the topical Theme.

(ii) If non-finite, there may be a conjunction or preposition as structural Theme, which may be followed by a Subject as topical Theme; but many non-finite clauses have neither, in which case they consist of Rheme only.

(2) Embedded clauses. These are clauses which function inside the structure of a nominal, as ‘defining relative’ clauses. The thematic structure of such clauses is the same as that of dependent clauses. However, because of their down-ranking, the fact that they do not function as constituents of a sentence, their thematic contribution to the discourse is minimal, and for practical purposes can be ignored.

(3) Minor clauses. These are clauses with no Mood or transitivity structure, typically functioning as calls, greetings and exclamations, like Mary!, Good night, Well done! They have no thematic structure either. They can therefore be left unanalysed for Theme.

(4) Elliptical clauses. (i) Anaphoric elliptical clauses have no thematic structure. (ii) Exophoric elliptical clauses, e.g. Thirsty? (‘are you thirsty?’), have in fact a thematic structure; but it consists of Rheme only. The Theme is (part of) what is omitted in the ellipsis.

2.5.3.5. Theme in clause complexes:

In clause complexes, each clause will of course have its own thematic structure, but Theme analysis is affected by the tactic status of each clause.
(i) In paratactic clause complexes, where we have two independent clauses, each clause is given an individual Thematic analysis. One common occurrence with paratactically related clauses is the omission of the subject in the second and subsequent clause(s). In these cases, the ellipsed subject is considered to have filled the role of topical Theme. The second clause is therefore shown as having no topical Theme.

(ii) In a hypotactic clause complex, the typical order is the one with the Modifying/dependent clause following the Head/Main/independent clause. In such cases, the Thematic structure of each clause is analysed separately. However, when the dependent/modifying clause comes before the main clause, the motive is thematic. We consider that there are two levels of Thematic structure operating. Firstly, each of the constituent clauses has its own Thematic structure. At a second level, however, the entire dependent clause can be seen as acting as Theme to the sentence (Eggins, 315).

Above the clause, the same principle lies behind the organization of paragraphs in written discourse; the ‘topic sentence’ of a paragraph is nothing other than its Theme (Halliday 1994, 54).

2.5.3.6. Contribution of Thematic structure to text:
Thematic choices realize meanings about (i) the organization of the communicative event (how the text hangs together, internal cohesion of the text), and (ii) the experiential and interpersonal distance involved (how the text relates to its context) (Eggins, 320). We can uncover the contribution of Thematic choice to both the cohesion and the coherence of the text by examining the following points:

1. **What gets to be Theme, i.e. what kinds of Themes get used**: Texts vary in the extent to which they contain multiple themes (textual and/or interpersonal and topical) or single themes (topical only). This variation relates to the mode values of the text.

2. **Choice of topical Theme**: Since there will (always) be a topical Theme present in a clause, it is useful to look at what it is.

3. **Markedness of Theme choices**: As with other systems of Thematic choice, the decision to make a marked element theme frequently relates to Mode dimensions.

4. **Method of development**: The choice of clause Themes plays a fundamental part in the way discourse is organized; it is this, in fact, which constitutes what has been called the ‘method of development’ of the text. In this process, the main contribution comes from the thematic structure of independent clauses. But other clauses also come into picture, and need to be taken account of in Theme-Rheme analysis (Halliday 1994, 61; Eggins, 320-6).
In the theme-Rheme structure, it is the Theme that is the prominent element. By analyzing the thematic structure of a text clause by clause, we can gain an insight into its texture and understand “how the writer made clear to us his underlying concerns” (Halliday 1994, 67). Three main patterns of Thematic development can be observed: (i) Theme reiteration, (ii) the zig-zag pattern, and (iii) the multiple-Rheme pattern. The essential contribution made by textual meaning is to actualize a range of different structures which operate at all levels of the text, at the level of micro Theme, hyper Theme, and macro Theme (Martin and Rose 2003), and “whose function is to enable the ideational and interpersonal meanings we have chosen to make to be realized in a cohesive and coherent text” (Eggins, 326).

The choice of Theme, clause by clause, is what carries forward the development of the text as a whole. The patterning of clause Themes throughout a text tends to differ from one register to another. In narrative and expository texts it is quite likely for the same participant to remain as topical Theme for a certain stretch of discourse: either a protagonist in the tale, if it is narrative, or that which is being expounded, in an expository context. In texts with a more stepwise structure, involving sequences of instructions or logical argument, one is more likely to find the Theme of one clause selected from within the Rheme of the clause preceding; and there are likely to be conjunctive Themes. In dialogue, there may be alternation of Themes, especially between I and you representing speaker and listener; and Finite and WH-Themes, in interrogative clauses (Halliday, 1994, 336).

2.5.4. Above the Clause: The Grammar of Logical Meaning: THE CLAUSE COMPLEX:

Clause complex is the term systemicists use for the grammatical and semantic unit formed when two or more clauses are linked together in certain systematic and meaningful ways. In other words, while the sentence is an orthographic unit of written language, the clause complex is a grammatical and semantic unit, a unit that occurs in both spoken and written language (Eggins, 255). Halliday recognizes the clause complex as “the only grammatical unit...above the clause” (1994, 216).

Clause complex systems provide language users with structural resources to construe logical connections between experiential events. The logical systems of the clause complex complement transitivity choices. Together, the logical and the experiential functions allow us to express ideational meanings as we turn life into text (Eggins, 256).

Whereas the clause is a multivariate structure, the clause complex is a univariate one. Univariate structures are defined as iterative, recursive structures: the same type of unit
simply gets repeated indefinitely. Clause complexes thus involve the logical chaining together of experientially related meanings.

There are two systems involved in the formation of clause complexes: (1) the system of interdependency, or ‘tactic’ system, parataxis and hypotaxis, which is general to all complexes—word, group, phrase and clause alike, and (2) the logicosemantic system of expansion and projection, which is specifically an inter-clausal relation—or rather, a relation between processes, usually (but not always) expressed in the grammar as a complex of clauses. These two together provide the functional framework for describing the clause complex. In the analysis of a written text each sentence can be treated as one clause complex (Halliday 1994, 216).

2.5.4.1. The tactic system:

The system of taxis captures the dependency, or interdependency, relationship between adjacent clauses linked into a clause complex. There are two options (1) parataxis and (2) hypotaxis. Very roughly this corresponds to what some conventional grammars refer to as ‘co-ordination’ versus ‘subordination’ relationships.

(1) Parataxis: Parataxis is the binding of elements (e.g. clauses) of equal status. Both the initiating and the continuing clauses are free or independent. Each clause could stand alone as a complete sentence.Clauses in a paratactic clause complex may be linked to each other simply by adjacency and punctuation, a comma, colon or semi-colon may be the only marker of the structural boundary between clauses. However, in spontaneous speech and less crafted prose, parataxis is commonly signaled also by an accompanying linking word or conjunction. The commonest paratactic conjunctions are and, or, so, yet, neither...nor, either...or, etc. Since each clause in a paratactic clause complex is of equal status, the only variable is which occurs first. Structurally, there is no difference. But of course “there is a slight difference of meaning simply because the choice of the other order was always available” (Eggins, 263-5).

(2) Hypotaxis: Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status. The clauses relate to each other in a modifying or dependency relationship. One clause called the main, dominant or Head clause is free; it can stand alone as a sentence. But the other clause (the modifying or dependent clause) cannot stand alone as a sentence. Hence it is not free. Almost all hypotactically dependent clauses are linked to the Head clause with explicit structural markers, either hypotactic conjunctions (if, while, because, when) or relative pronouns (who, which, that) (Eggins, 266).
Halliday uses Greek letters (α, β, γ…) to label hypotactic clauses, with alpha reserved for the Head clause. The other Greek letters are then attached in sequential order. Each paratactic clause in a complex is labelled with an ordinary number: 1, 2, 3… (1994, 218). A typical clause complex is a mixture of paratactic and hypotactic sequences, either of which may be nested inside the other. While all non-finite clauses are by definition hypotactic, a finite clause may be either paratatic or hypotactic.

3. **Clause Nexus**: Halliday refers to any one pair of clauses related by interdependency, or taxis, as a Clause Nexus. The clauses making up such a nexus are Primary and Secondary (Table 2.5). The primary is the initiating clause in a paratactic nexus, and the dominant clause in a hypotactic; the secondary is the continuing clause in a paratactic nexus and the dependent clause in a hypotactic (1994, 218).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause Nexus</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parataxis</td>
<td>1 (initiating)</td>
<td>2 (continuing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotaxis</td>
<td>alpha (dominant)</td>
<td>beta (dependent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Taxis vs embedding**: Taxis, however, contrasts with embedding, also called rank shift. Embedding allows us to pack more meaning into units, usually by packing a whole clause into a unit of a lower rank. While the principle behind taxis or complexing is expansion, the principle behind embedding is compression. Complexing is more dynamic: it requires little forward planning. Embedding is more static: it requires some forethought in the construction of the clause. Complexing is thus more characteristic of spontaneous, spoken language or informal written texts, while embedding associates with formal, careful written text (Eggins, 269-70).

2.5.4.2. **The logico-semantic system**:

The logico-semantic system describes the specific type of meaning relationship between linked clauses, the ways in which clauses that are either independent or dependent build on the experiential meanings of the clauses they relate to. The system offers a choice between (1) expansion and (2) projection. Expansion is the logico-semantics of developing on previous meanings: the secondary clause builds on the meanings of the primary clause, whereas Projection is the logico-semantics of quoting and reporting speech or thoughts. The projecting relationship is very often indicated by a verb of saying or thinking (or any of their many synonyms) (Eggins, 271).
1. **Expansion**: Halliday recognizes essentially three ways in which the secondary clause expands the primary clause:

   (a) elaborating = ('equal')
   (b) extending + (‘is added to’)
   (c) enhancing x (‘is multiplied by’) (1994, 219).

(a) **Elaboration**: In elaboration, one clause elaborates the meaning of another by further specifying or describing it. The secondary clause does not introduce a new element of meaning but rather provides a further characterization of a meaning that is already there, restating it, clarifying it, refining it, or adding a descriptive attribute or comment. The thing that is elaborated may be the primary clause as a whole, or it may be just some part of it—one or more of its constituents (Halliday 1994, 225).

   The combination of elaboration with parataxis yields three types: (i) Exposition: ‘in other words’, (ii) Exemplification: ‘for example’ and (iii) Clarification: ‘to be precise’. Hypotactic elaboration gives the category of non-defining relative clause, which may be either finite or non-finite (Halliday 1994, 225-9; Eggins 279-82).

(b) **Extension**: In extension, one clause extends the meaning of another by adding something new to it. What is added may be just an addition, or replacement, or alternative. Halliday identifies two main categories (i) addition and (ii) variation

   Combination of extension with parataxis (notation 1+2) yields what is known as coordination between clauses. It is typically expressed by and, nor, or, but. Paratactic additions are often accompanied by cohesive expressions such as too, in addition, also, moreover, on the other hand. In variation, the meaning and common conjunctions are instead, on the contrary, or, except for.

   Hypotactic extension (alpha+ beta) expresses the same two meanings of either addition or variation, but the extending clause is dependent and may be finite or non-finite. If finite, hypotactic clauses of addition are introduced by whereas, while. Non-finite hypotactic extension is often introduced by a preposition or preposition group functioning conjunctively, e.g. besides, apart from, instead of, other than, without (Halliday 1994, 230-32; Eggins 282-83).

(c) **Enhancement**: In enhancement one clause enhances the meaning of another by qualifying it in one of a number of possible ways: by reference to time, place, manner, cause or condition (Halliday 1994, 232). These meanings are similar to those expressed by Circumstances in the transitivity structure of the clause. If the circumstantial information
is sufficiently important, it may be taken out of a single clause and expanded into an enhancing clause complex (Eggins, 283).

Enhancement can be either paratactic or hypotactic, either finite or non-finite. Halliday (1994, 232-9) and Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, 410-22) provide extensive examples and discussion of all the sub-types. The principal categories are

(i) temporal: when? at what time?
   (a) Same time, (b) Different time: later/ earlier

(ii) spatial: where? whereabouts?
    Same place.

    (a) means, (b) comparison

(iv) causal-conditional:
    (a) cause: reason/ purpose
    (b) condition: positive/ negative/ concessive.

The combination of enhancement with parataxis yields what is also a kind of co-ordination but with a circumstantial feature incorporated into it. The combination of enhancement with hypotaxis gives what are known in traditional formal grammar as ‘adverbial clauses’.

2. The system of projection: When people write or talk, particularly when they are telling stories, they frequently want to tell what someone said or thought during the events they are relating. The system of projection involves the attribution of either (i) locution (what someone said) or (ii) ideas (what someone thought). Projection is thus “a resource the grammar offers us for attributing words and ideas to their sources” (Eggins, 271). In projection, one clause (primary/projecting) indicates that someone or something said or thought something; any other clauses (secondary/projected) in the complex then express what the person or phenomenon said or thought (Eggins, 270).

Projection combines with the same set of interdependencies that have been shown to occur with expansion: parataxis, hypotaxis and embedding. In paratactic projection what someone thought or said is presented as if it were exactly their words or thoughts. Traditional grammars usually refer to this as direct speech, but in the systemic analysis paratactic projection also includes direct thought. In hypotactic projection, what someone thought or said is re-packaged into an indirect form. This is the indirect speech of traditional grammar, but must also include indirect thought (Eggins, 272-3).
(i) Projection of locution:
(a) Quoting (‘direct speech’): verbal process, parataxis: The simplest form of projection is ‘direct’ (quoted) speech. In paratactic projection of locution, the projecting clause is a verbal process, one of saying, and the projected clause represents that which is said. The main function of the projecting clause is simply to show that the other one is projected: someone said it. The projected clause here stands for a ‘wording’, a lexicogrammatical phenomenon. The total structure, therefore, is that of a paratactic clause complex in which the logical-semantic relationship is one of projection. The two parts have equal status. In written English, the projection is signaled by quotation marks.

Verbs used in quoting clauses include

1. *say*, the general member of this class;
2. verbs specific to (a) statements, e.g. *tell, remark, observe, report*, and (b) questions, e.g. *ask, demand, inquire*;
3. Verbs combining ‘say’ with some circumstantial element, e.g. *reply, explain, protest, interrupt*;
4. Verbs having connotations of various kinds, e.g. *insist, complain, cry, shout, boast*.

A wide range of different verbs can be pressed into service under this last heading, verbs which are not verbs of saying at all but serve, especially in fictional narrative, to suggest attitudes, emotions or expressive gestures that accompanied the act of speaking, e.g. *sob, snort, twinkle, breathe* (Halliday 1994, 252).

Paratactic projection of locution is common in fictional narratives, where characters must usually engage in dialogue with each other (Eggins, 273).

(b) Reporting (‘indirect speech’): Hypotaxis: It is also possible to ‘report’ a saying by representing it as a meaning. This is the ‘reported speech’, or ‘indirect speech’, of traditional western grammars. The principle behind this hypotactic representation of a verbal event is that it is not, in fact, being represented as true to the wording; the speaker is reporting the gist of what was said, and the wording may be quite different from the original (Halliday 1994, 254). The idealized function of the paratactic structure is to represent the wording; whereas with hypotaxis the idealized function is to represent the sense, or gist. Thus parataxis is naturally associated with verbal projections and hypotaxis with mental ones. But the pattern can be inverted. We can choose to report a verbal act, presenting a locution as a meaning; and we can choose to quote a mental act, presenting an idea as a wording (Halliday 1994, 269).
Verbs used in reporting statements and questions are often the same as those used in quoting; but there is one significant difference. In quoting, the independent status of the proposition, including its mood, is preserved; hence the speech function is as explicit as in the original. In reporting, on the other hand, the speech function is, or may be, obscured, and is therefore made explicit in the reporting verb. While hypotactic locution is less successful at bringing characters to life, it is more effective at summarizing the import of what someone said (Eggins 274).

(ii) Projection of ideas:

(a) Reporting ('indirect thought'): mental process, hypotaxis: Talking is not the only way of using language; we also use language to think. Hence a process of thinking also serves to project. In projection of ideas, (i) the projecting clause is typically a mental process; and (ii) the projected clause is not a wording but a meaning. When what is being projected is information (what we thought, for example), the typical verbs used are mental processes of cognition: know, believe, think, reflect, surmise, guess (in the sense of calculate mentally). But we can also project not what we know but what we want, like, hope or fear. Thus, some mental processes of reaction can also project:

Alpha I wish
'Beta it had never happened to me.

Finally, we are not always simply recording our own mental activity, but sometimes urging other people to perform mental activity. For example,

Alpha Remember
'Beta that babies get bored (Halliday 1994, 252; Eggins, 275).

The typical pattern for representing a 'thinking' is the hypotactic one (Halliday 1994, 253).

(b) Quoting ('Direct thought'): mental process, parataxis: The opposite combination, that of a mental process with 'quoting', is also found, although considerably more restricted. Here a thought is represented as if it was a wording, e.g.

I thought 'I’ll just enquire'

The implication is 'I said to myself...'. Only certain verbs are regularly used to quote in this way, such as think, wonder, reflect, surmise (Halliday 1994, 255).

(ii) Projecting offers and commands: Offers and commands, and also suggestions which are simply the combination of the two (offer 'I’ll do it', command 'you do it', suggestion 'let’s do it'), can be projected paratactically (quoted) in the same way as propositions, by means of a verbal process clause having a quoting function: as direct speech.
As with propositions, there is an extensive set of verbs used for quoting proposals, especially in narrative fiction:

1. the general verb say;
2. verbs specific to offers and commands, e.g. suggest, offer, call, order, tell, propose, decide;
3. verbs embodying some circumstantial or other semantic feature(s) such as threaten, vow, urge, plead, warn, promise, agree;
4. verbs involving some additional connotation (largely identical with those used to quote propositions), e.g. blare, thunder, moan, yell, fuss.

Proposals can be reported: projected hypotactically as ‘indirect speech’ (indirect commands, etc). With propositions, the reported clause is finite. With proposals, it may be finite or non-finite (Halliday 1994, 257-8).

(iv) Free indirect speech: As Halliday points out, ‘free indirect speech, is sometimes described as ‘intermediate between direct and indirect speech’:

Quoted (‘direct’) “Am I dreaming?” Jill wondered.
‘Free indirect’ Was she dreaming, Jill wondered.
Reported Jill wondered if she was dreaming.

Strictly speaking it is not so much intermediate as “anomalous”: it has some of the features of each of the other two types. The structure is paratactic, so the projected clause has the form of an independent clause retaining the mood of the quoted form; but it is a report and not a quote, so time and person reference are shifted—was she not am I”. Free indirect speech can be projected both verbally and mentally, and includes both propositions and proposals—everything, in fact, that can be both quoted and reported (Halliday 1994, 261).

(v) Embedded locutions and ideas: Like the three types of expansion, both locutions and ideas can be embedded. Besides entering into paratactic and hypotactic clause complexes, they can be ‘rank-shifted’ to function as Qualifiers within a nominal group, as in the assertion that Caesar was ambitious. Such instances are still projections; but here the projecting element is the noun that is functioning as Thing, in this case assertion.

Nouns that project belong to clearly defined classes, verbal process nouns (locutions) and mental process nouns (ideas); they correspond rather closely to, and in many instances are derived from, the verbs used in projecting clause, especially the reporting ones, e.g. statement, report, thought, belief, question feeling, issue, suggestion intention, instruction, fear, hope, etc (Halliday 1994, 263-4).
In all such instances the noun is the name of a locution or an idea, and the clause that projects serves to define it in exactly the same way that a ‘restrictive’ relative clause defines a noun that is expanded by it. Hence any noun that belongs to a projecting class may be defined (restricted) in either of these two ways, either by projection or by expansion (Halliday, 264).

(vi) **Projected ideas vs embedded facts:** There is one other type of projection, where the projected clause is not being projected by a verbal or mental process with Sayer or Senser, or by a verbal or mental process noun, but comes as it were ready packaged in projected form. Halliday refers to this type as a FACT (1994, 264). The embedded Fact clause looks like projection but isn’t. e.g. *That Caesar was dead was obvious to all.* Here *that Caesar was dead* is certainly a projection; but there is no process of saying or thinking which projects it. Its status is simply that of a fact; and it can indeed function as Qualifier to the noun *fact*, e.g. *the fact that Caesar was dead was obvious to all* (Halliday 1994, 266).

Whereas any clause that is projected by another process, verbal or mental, is either a quote (paratactic) or a report (hypotactic, or embedded if the process is a noun), any clause that has the status ‘projected’ but without any projecting process is a fact and is embedded, either as a nominalization or as Postmodifier to a ‘fact’ noun.

Facts are in a sense intermediate between ‘metaphenomena’ (quotes and reports) and first-order phenomena, or ‘things’. All these orders of phenomena –quotes, reports, facts and things –enter into structural relationships in the grammar. But whereas quotes and reports typically enter into clause complexes—that is, they keep their status as clauses, except when qualifying a projecting noun—facts are ‘objectified’ and enter as constituents into the structure of other clauses (Halliday 1994, 271).

(vii) **Effects and uses of projection: speech and thought presentation: some other types:**

Departing from and adding to Halliday’s account, Leech and Short (1981) and Short (1988) recognize some other modes of speech and thought presentation, and their effects and uses: free direct speech (FDS)–without quotation marks and/or the introductory reporting clause; free indirect speech (FIS)–where the reporting clause is omitted but where the tense and pronoun selection are those associated with IS; Narrative Report of Speech Act (NRSA)– sentences which report that a speech act (or number of speech acts) has occurred, but where the narrator does not have to commit himself entirely to giving the sense of what was said, let alone the form of words in which they were uttered (1981, 321-334).
As Halliday says, quoting and reporting are not simply formal variants; they differ in meaning. In quoting, the projected element has independent status; it is thus more immediate and lifelike, and this effect is enhanced by the orientation of the deixis, which is that of drama not that of narrative. Quoting is particularly associated with certain narrative registers, fictional and personal; it is used not only for sayings but also for thoughts, including third-person thoughts projected by an omniscient narrator, as in

‘And that’s the jury-box,’ thought Alice.

Reporting, on the other hand, presents the projected element as dependent. Traditional school exercises of the kind ‘turn into direct/indirect speech’ suggest that the two always match. This is true lexicogrammatically. But semantically the two do not exactly match (Halliday 1994, 256).

According to Short (1988), the usual assumptions that readers make about Direct Speech (DS) and Free Indirect Speech (FDS, without quoting clause) have to do with veracity. If someone reports the speech of another using either of these two modes, it is normally the case that the reporter (the narrator in the novel) claims to represent faithfully:

(a) the illocutionary force;
(b) the propositional content; and
(c) the words and structures used by the original speaker, exactly what the original speaker said.

In contrast, the use of indirect speech (IS), for example, only commits one to faithfulness in terms of (a) and (b) above (Short 1988, 66-7).

The effect that is produced when IS is used to report speech is one whereby the person who is reporting the conversation intervenes as an interpreter between the person he is talking to and the words of the person he is reporting, instead of merely quoting verbatim the speech that occurred. What is reported can thus become integrated into the narrative (Leech and Short 1981, 320).

Another type of projection that Eggins calls free indirect discourse (FDI) occurs in third-person narration, where one character is used to ‘focalize’ the narration or part of it. In free indirect discourse (FID), the narrator slips into what seems to be the words and tone of the character. When FID is operating, the boundary between narrator and character becomes blurred (Eggins, 275). Narratologist Rimmon-Kenan (2003, 111-17) points out that because of FID’s capacity to reproduce the idiolect of a character’s speech or thought but within the narrator’s reporting language, it is often used in stream of consciousness writing (what is
sometimes called ‘indirect interior monologue’). When FID comes into action, it is not always possible for the reader to determine who is thinking what, or what the source of the discourse is: “FID enhances the bivocality or polyvocality of the text by bringing into play a plurality of speakers and attitudes” (Rimmon-Kenan, 115). Because sourcing is ambiguous, Rimmon-Kenan argues that FID can produce a “double-edged effect”:

On the one hand, the presence of a narrator as distinct from the character may create an ironic distancing. On the other hand, the tinting of the narrator’s speech with the character’s language or mode of experience may promote an empathetic identification on the part of the reader. Perhaps most interesting are cases of ambiguity, where the reader has no means of choosing between the ironic and the empathetic (115; quoted Eggins, 276; also see Leech and Short 1981, 334-5).

Projection thus can be used for different effects and purposes. As already stated above, projection is “a resource the grammar offers us for attributing words and ideas to their sources” (Eggins, 271). And as Short (1988) and Leech and short (1981) have shown, the choice of speech-presentation category, the choice of speech act verbs (e.g. says/claims) and value-laden adjectives and adverbs are some of the ways in which a reader’s viewpoint can be controlled in a text (Short 1988, 76; Leech and short 1981, 344).

2.5.5. Around the Clause: Cohesion and Discourse:

According to Halliday, the patterns of structural relationships between clauses are what produce clause complexes. But the clause complex has certain inbuilt limitations, from the point of view of its contribution to the texture of a discourse. The things that are put together in it have to be clauses; they have to occur next to one another in the text.

But in order to construct discourse we need to be able to establish additional relations within the text that are not subject to these limitations; relations that may involve elements of any extent, both smaller and larger than clauses, from single words to lengthy passages of text; and that may hold across gaps of any extent, both within the clause and beyond it, without regard to the nature of whatever intervenes. This cannot be achieved by grammatical structure; it depends on a resource of a different kind. These non-structural resources for discourse are what are referred to by the term COHESION (1994, 309).
The term cohesion thus refers to the way we relate or tie together bits of our discourse (Eggins, 29). As Halliday and Hasan say,

Cohesion occurs where the INTERPRETATION of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one PRESUPPOSES the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by recourse to it. When this happens, a relation is set up, and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are thereby at least potentially integrated into a text (1976, 4).

Thus, “if most texts are to make sense to readers or listeners, the links between the parts have to be more easily recoverable. Making the links between the parts of a text recoverable is what the resources of cohesion enable language users to do” (Eggins, 31). The main resources of cohesion generally recognized are

1. Reference
2. Substitution
3. Ellipsis
4. Conjunction
5. Lexical organization/lexical cohesion.

However, ellipsis and substitution are more characteristically found in dialogue, while reference and referential chains are more typical of narrative (Halliday 1994, 337-8). The resources of three main types of cohesion in written language, according to Eggins, are: reference, conjunction and lexical cohesion (Eggins, 33). These will be analysed in this Thesis and only these three are discussed below.

2.5.5.1. Reference:

The cohesive resource of reference refers to how the writer/speaker introduces participants and then keeps track of them once they are in the text (Eggins, 33). A participant or a circumstantial element introduced at one place in the text can be taken as a reference point for something that follows (Halliday 1994, 309). The participants in a text may be “either presented to us (introduced as ‘new’ to the text) or presumed/presupposed”. Only presuming participants create cohesion in a text, since “ties of dependency are constructed between the presuming item and what it refers to (its referent)”. The commonest presuming reference items are:

1. the definite article: the
2. demonstrative pronouns: this, that, these, those
3. pronouns: he, she, it, they...; mine, his, hers, theirs.
When the writer uses a presuming reference, the reader needs to retrieve the identity of that item “from somewhere” in order to follow the text (Eggins, 34).

The identity of a presuming reference item may be retrievable from a number of different contexts:

1. from the general/shared context of culture (homophoric reference),
2. from the immediate context of situation (situational or exophoric reference),
3. from elsewhere within the text itself (textual or endophoric reference).

Endophoric reference can be of three main kinds:

1. anaphoric reference: pointing back to preceding text; when the referent/presupposed element has appeared at some earlier point in the text.
2. cataphoric reference: when the referent has not yet appeared, but will be provided subsequently in the following text.
3. esophoric reference: when the referent occurs in the phrase immediately following the presuming referent item (within the same nominal group/noun phrase, not in a separate clause), e.g. the storm of grief.

Only endophoric reference is cohesive, since endophoric ties create the internal texture of the text, while homophoric and exophoric reference contribute to the text’s (situational) coherence (1976, 37; Eggins, 33-35).

Halliday and Hasan (1976), thus, recognize three types of reference: personal, demonstrative, and comparative:

1. Personal Reference: Personal reference is reference by means of three classes of personal pronouns (I, we, you, he, she, they), possessive determines (my, your, etc), and possessive pronouns (mine, yours, etc). The system also includes ‘impersonal’ meanings (e.g. generalized human one) and reference to objects (e.g. it). It has the property of what Halliday and Hasan call extended reference and text reference (1976, 52).

2. Demonstrative Reference: Demonstrative reference is reference by means of location, essentially a form of verbal pointing. Demonstratives include: this/that (singular), these/those (plural); the, it (neutral, non-specific); and circumstantial (adverbial) demonstratives: locative here, there, and temporal demonstrative now, and then, which refer to the location of a process in space and time. The speaker identifies the referent by locating it on the scale of proximity, that is ‘near’ or ‘far’ (not near):

   near: this, these, here, now
   far (not near): that, those, there, then.
3. **Comparative reference**: Comparative reference is reference by means of **IDENTITY** or **SIMILARITY** (Halliday and Hasan 1976, 37). Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast (Halliday, 1994, 316). With comparative reference, the identity of the presuming item is retrieved not because it has been mentioned or will be mentioned in the text, but because an item with which it is being compared has been mentioned (Eggins, 35)—“something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less”. Any expression such as *the same, another, similar, different, as big, bigger, less big*, and related adverbs such as *likewise, differently, equally* presumes some standard of reference in the preceding text (Halliday 1994, 316). Comparative reference can be used anaphorically, cataphorically, or esphorically (Eggins, 35).

Eggins (2004), Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, 549-61), and Martin (1992a, 93-158) also mention some more types of reference such as whole text reference, bridging reference, possessive reference, locational reference. Grammatically, all reference items except the demonstrative adverbs, and some comparative adverbs, function within the nominal group (noun phrase) (Halliday and Hasan, 37).

A convenient way to capture the reference patterns in a text is simply to trace through mentions of the text’s participants. Typically in a written, fictional text, most referents are retrievable endophorically, from within the text itself. Pragmatic, non-fictional texts, however, depend much more on the exte-textual context for exophoric and homophoric retrieval. The reference chains show us who the major human participants in a text are, and their relative importance. The reference chains also contribute to the thematic and metaphorical meanings the text is making (Eggins, 37-40).

**2.5.5.2. Conjunction:**

The cohesive pattern of conjunction, or conjunctive relations, refers to how the writer creates and expresses logical relationships between the parts of a text (Eggins, 47). Halliday makes a distinction between structural (i.e. grammatical) and non-structural (i.e. cohesive) relations. As has been already discussed in sections 2.5.3.2 and 2.5.4.2, the three types of meaning (elaboration, extension and enhancement) allow us to create structural links between clauses as we chain clauses together to form clause complexes. But in the present discussion of conjunctive cohesion, we are looking how these meanings create conjunctive links between sentences (non-structural, cohesive), not between clauses (tactic). Halliday (1994,
Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, 538-49) and Eggins (2004, 47-51) recognize three main types of conjunctive relations:

1. **Elaboration**: Elaboration is a relationship of restatement or clarification, by which one sentence is (presented as) a re-saying or representation of a previous sentence. Halliday recognizes two categories of elaborating relation, (a) apposition, and (b) clarification, with their sub-categories. Some common conjunctions used to express this relation include: *in other words, that is* (to say), *I mean* (to), *for example, for instance, thus, to illustrate, to be more precise, actually, as a matter of fact, in fact* (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, 541; Eggins, 47).

2. **Extension**: Extension is a relationship of any one of the following:
   (a) addition: one sentence adds to the meanings made in another. Addition is either
      (i) positive: *and, also, moreover, in addition,* or
      (ii) negative: *nor*
   (b) adversative: *but, yet, on the other hand, however*
   (c) variation: one sentence changes the meanings of another, by contrast or by qualification. Variation includes
      (i) replacive: *on the contrary, instead*
      (ii) subtractive: *apart from, except for that*
      (iii) alternative: *or, alternatively* (Halliday 1994, 324-5).

3. **Enhancement**: Enhancement refers to ways by which one sentence can develop on the meanings of another, in terms of time, comparison, cause, condition or concession. Halliday (1994) identifies the following types of enhancement that create cohesions: (a) spatio-temporal, (b) manner, (c) causal-conditional and (d) matter.
   (a) **Spatio-temporal**: Place reference may be used conjunctively within a text, with *here and there*, spatial adverbs such as *behind* and *nearby*, and expressions containing a place noun or adverb plus reference item, e.g. *in the same place, anywhere else.* Here spatial relations are being used as text-creating cohesive devices.
   Common temporal conjunctions include *then, next, afterwards, just then, at the same time, before that, soon, after a while, meanwhile, all that time, until then, up to that point, now.*
   (b) **Manner**: Manner conjunctives create cohesion by
      (i) comparison: (a) positive: *likewise, similarly,* (b) negative: *in a different way*
      (ii) means: *thus, thereby, by such means.*
(c) **Causal-conditional**: Causal conjunctions include

(i) general: *so, then, consequently, hence, because of that, for*

(ii) specific: 
[a] result: *in consequence, as a result*
[b] reason: *on account of this, for that reason*
[c] purpose: *for that purpose, with this in view.*

Conditionals subdivide into

(i) positive: *then, in that case, in that event, under the circumstances*

(ii) negative: *otherwise, if not*

(iii) concessive: *but, yet, still, though, despite this, however, even so, all the same, nevertheless.*

(d) **Matter**: Here cohesion is established by reference to the ‘matter’ that has gone before.

Typical expressions are:

(i) positive: *here, there, as to that, in that respect*

(ii) negative: *in other respects, elsewhere.*

As a cohesive resource conjunction works in two ways, once again corresponding to the distinction between the ideational and the interpersonal metafunctions:

(a) **External (real world/ideational) conjunction**: This sets up a relationship between processes. A simple pattern of this kind is that of “a sequence of events shown as following one another in time”, e.g. *first [this happened], next [that happened], finally [the other happened].*

(b) **Internal (rhetorical/interpersonal) conjunction**: This sets up a relationship between propositions and proposal. They refer to the writer’s internal (rhetorical/interpersonal) organization of the events in his/her text (Eggins, 48). That is, “the time they refer to is the temporal unfolding of the discourse itself, not the temporal sequence of the processes referred to. In terms of the functional components of semantics, it is interpersonal not experiential” (Halliday 1994, 325); for example first [I say this], next [I say that], finally [I sat the other]. Here the semantic relations are between “the steps in an argument” and “not between phenomena of experience”.

The most common types of internal conjunctive relation are elaboration (all types discussed above) and temporal (firstly, secondly, finally) (Eggins, 49).

However, not all conjunctive categories have an ‘internal’ interpretation; and in some cases, particularly elaboration and certain types of extension, it is often hard to tell the internal and the external apart (Ref. Halliday 1994, 338; Halliday and Hasan 1976, 240-1; Martin 1992, 207-30 and Martin and Rose 2003, 120-27).
As Halliday (1994) says, a number of these different types of conjunctive relations overlap with one another. The categories given here are those which have been found most useful in the interpretation of texts, and their schematization is such as to relate to other parts of the system of the language (326-7). Most conjunctive relations operate between two adjacent sentences. However the domain of a conjunctive tie can also stretch further, with a conjunction linking one sentence back to an earlier paragraph, a pattern more common in formal written texts such as expositions and arguments (Eggins 49).

Finally, not all conjunctive relations are in fact expressed explicitly. Conjunctive relations, especially in temporal and causal sequences, can also be expressed implicitly, through, the simple juxtaposition of sentences. Halliday, however, warns us to be cautious in assigning implicit conjunction in the interpretation of a text, as “the attempt to include it in the analysis leads to a great deal of indeterminacy, both as regards whether a conjunctive relation is present or not and as regards which particular kind of relationship it is” (1994, 327).

We can capture conjunctive cohesion in a text by listing sentences which are related to each other by conjunction, linked by a symbol that describes the type of link. E.g. (=) elaboration, (+) extension, (x) enhancement. Eggins illustrates “how conjunction cohesion contributes to the successful staging of the narrative in ways that pint us toward the story’s thematic meanings” (2004, 51).

2.5.5.3. Lexical cohesion:

The cohesive resource of lexical relations refers to how the writer/speaker uses lexical items (the open-class items of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs) and event sequences (chains of clauses and sentences) to relate the text consistently to its area of focus or its field. It is a way of systematically describing how words in a text relate to each other, how they cluster to build up lexical sets or lexical strings (Eggins, 42). Eggins recognizes two main kinds of lexical relations between words: (1) taxonomic lexical relations and (2) expectancy relations.

(1) Taxonomic lexical relations: where one lexical item relates to another through either class/subclass (rodent-mouse) or part/whole (tail-mouse) relations. Although most frequently these relations link lexical items which refer to people, places, (Eggins 42) things and qualities, and so are expressed in nominal groups, taxonomic relations can also link processes (verbs) (eat-nibble). There are two subtypes: (i) classification or (ii) composition.

(i) Classification: the relationship between a superordinate term and its members, or hyponyms. The main kinds of classification relations are:
(a) **co-hyponymy**: when two (or more) lexical items used in a text are both subordinate members of a superordinate class: *influenza: pneumonia* (both terms are members of the superordinate class *illness*).

(b) **class/subclass**: when two (or more) lexical items used in a text are related through sub-classification: *illness: pneumonia* (here the relationship is superordinate term to hyponym [specific-general]).

(c) **contrast**: when two (or more) lexical items encode a contrast relationship or antonymy: *clear: blurry; wet: dry; joy: despair*.

(d) **similarity**: when two (or more) lexical items express similar meanings. There are two subtypes: *synonymy*: when two words essentially restate each other: *message: report; news: intelligence*; and *repetition*: when a lexical item is repeated: *death: death*.

(ii) **Composition**: this is the part/whole relationship between lexical items. There are two possible subtypes:

(a) **meronymy**: when two lexical items are related as whole to part (or vice versa):

(b) **co-meronymy**: when two lexical items are related by both being parts of a common whole: *heart: lungs*.

(2) **Expectancy relations**: where there is a predictable relation between a process (verb) and either the doer of that process, or the one effected by it (e.g. *mouse—squeak, nibble—cheese*). Expectancy relations link nominal elements and verbal elements. The relation may operate

(i) between an action/ a process (verb) and the typical (expected) ‘doer’ of that action: *doctor/diagnose, baby/cry, sparrows/twitter*;

(ii) between an action/process and the typical (expected) participant effected by that action: *whisper/word, break/news, play/piano*;

(iii) between an event/process and the typical location in which it takes place may also be described as an expectancy relation: *work/office*; or

(iv) between the individual lexical items and the composite, predictable, nominal group they form: *heart/disease, child/care* (Eggins, 43-4).

Sometimes two or more lexical items may be functioning to express one piece of lexical content, e.g. *human infant* (baby), *have a cuddle* (embrace), *at your wits’ end* (desperate), *from time to time* (sometime) (Martin 1992, 293). Complex lexical items operating to encode one meaning can be treated as a single item for the purposes of lexical cohesion analysis (Eggins, 44).
The lexical cohesion in a text can be captured by listing all related lexical items, showing how they form **lexical strings** that add texture to text. It often helps here to decide on the ‘head word’ for a string, and then bring together sequentially related items. Sometimes a lexical item can be linked to more than one string. In that case, it’s best to display the word in more than one string because the word is contributing texture through both semantic associations. Halliday (1994) studies expectancy relations in terms of COLLOCATION—“a tendency to co-occur” (333). The method will be applied and illustrated in the following chapters.

2.5.5.4. Cohesion and the creation of text/texture:

These resources of Reference, Conjunction and Lexical Cohesion collectively meet the text-forming requirements. They make it possible to link items of any size, whether below or above the clause; and to link items at any distance, whether structurally related or not. But they meet these requirements in different ways. And many instances of cohesion involve two or three ties of different kinds occurring in combination with one another. For example, an important characteristic of many varieties of text is the referential chain, produced by a combination of lexical cohesion (repetition and synonymy) and reference. A typical chain from the narrative, as illustrated by Halliday (1994), might be:

*A little boy called John...John...he...the lad...him...*

These are sometimes called ‘participant chains’; but, as Halliday says, they are not restricted to participants in the sense of persons—they may be objects, institutions, abstractions, passages of text: anything that can have a participant role in a transitivity structure. Similar chains, though less frequent and less extensive, can be formed with circumstantial elements, and even with the process itself, e.g. *run away... do that...do it... get away... escape altogether.*

What gives the text coherence, however, is not simply the presence of such chains but their interaction with one another (Halliday 1994, 336-7). Thus, for a text to be coherent, it must be cohesive; but it must be more besides. It must deploy the resources of cohesion in ways that are motivated by the register of which it is an instance; it must be semantically appropriate, with lexicogrammatical realizations to match (i.e. it must make sense); and it must have structure. But to say this is not in any way to imply that it must be homogenous, univocal or ‘flat’.

Discourse is a multidimensional process; ‘a text’, which is the product of that process, embodies not only the same kind of polyphonic structuring as is found in the grammar (for example in the structure of the clause, as message,
exchange and representation), but also, since it is functioning at a higher level of the code, as the realization of semiotic orders ‘above’ the language, all the inconsistencies, contradictions and conflicts that can exist within and between such higher-order semiotic systems. Because it has this potential, a text is not a mere reflection of what lies beyond; it is an active partner in the reality-making processes (Halliday 1994, 339).

Cohesion, therefore, is fundamentally about the ongoing contextualizing of meanings in terms of expectancy. As links are created through the use of cohesive resources, the text ongoingly recalibrates its context (Eggins, 51-2). This general principle is useful in exploring longer passages of discourse as Martin and Rose (2003, 145-74) have shown, “demonstrating the ongoing recontextualizing role of cohesive choices” (Eggins, 53).

2.6. INTEGRATION: IDEOLOGY IN THE TEXTS:

As Halliday (1987) says, anyone of the metafunctions—ideational, interpersonal or textual—may be foregrounded in a given text, or part of a text. What we are establishing, however, is “the metafunctional profile, or progression across a discourse”; it is the intersection of these patterns that gives a text its characteristic flavor. Having separated the metafunctional components to understand why the text means what it does, “we put them together again to explain why the text is valued as it is” (151).

Generally, in looking at style in a text, one is not interested in isolation, but rather at a pattern of choices: “something that belongs to the text as a whole”. It is not that stylistics is uninterested in this or that local features of a text; but rather that “local or specific features have to be seen in relation to other features, against the background of the pervasive tendency of preferences in the text”. The recognition of Cohesion and consistency in preference is important: “without it, one would scarcely acknowledge a style” (Leech and Short, 42). Also, as Fowler says, “Speakers constantly make ideological shifts as they change modes of discourse”. And “ideational processes” may be significant either at some specific point in a text (a local effect) or by “a cumulative building of a world view”. Local devices may suggest specific reinterpretations of experience at particular points in the text. Cumulative ideational structuring depends on regular and consistent linguistic choices which build up a continuous, pervasive representation of the world. This is the major source of point of view in fiction (Fowler 1986, 149-150).

Thus on the basis of the various analyses outlined in Section 2.5 above, we may trace certain patterns that run through the text as a whole. Halliday (1994) notes especially two pairs of intersecting patterns: “one textual, the intersection of cohesive chains with thematic
structures; the other ideational-interpersonal, the intersection of mood and transitivity (1994, 384). Cohesive chains and theme structures combine to display “the motifs” and “the thematic progression” of a text. And the patterns of mood and transitivity represent a character’s/narrator’s “point of view on the ongoing situation” (Halliday 1994, 384-391). But as ideology is a composite of many assumptions and presuppositions, and as there are multiple mediations in literature, Martin and Rose combine projection, modality, and concession to reveal “the source of attitudes: who are the evaluations coming from?” (2003, 44).

Thus, having separated the different lexicogrammatical and cohesive features for analysis and interpretation, we have to finally put them together to see their cumulative effect. Taken together, the analyses of referential and lexical cohesion, transitivity, expansion and the topical Themes reveal the ideational picture of the kind of reality that gets represented, i.e., the content of discourse: what kinds of activities are undertaken, and how participants in these activities are described, how they are classified and what they are composed of. In other words, how our experience of reality, material and symbolic, is construed in discourse (Martin and Rose 2003, 66). And mood and modality, projection, interpersonal themes, speech-introducing expressions and evaluative/attitudinal lexis indicate the positioning of the characters, narrator and the author towards that reality (evaluation, judgement and stance; the interpersonal distance involved), a character’s/narrator’s “point of view on the ongoing situation” (Halliday 1994, 384-391). And the thematic developments and conjunctive cohesion indicate the textual organization of the message that gives orientation to the reader.

Eggins (2004) relates all these patterns to the study of context--context of situation, culture (genre) and of ideology. The information obtained from the detailed lexicogrammatical and cohesive analyses is interpreted as the realization of contextual dimensions of the texts. As she says, it is at the level of ideology that the discrete findings of the various analyses can be most coherently integrated. As ideology impacts on each of the levels of context and through them is realized in linguistic choices, the linguistic evidence from all the preceding analyses can be used to make explicit “what positions, biases and interpretations are encoded in the texts” (349-50).

The ultimate goal of a functional linguistic approach, as Eggins says, is very different from that of other approaches to text. Functional linguistic analysis is not about offering a range of possible readings of texts, supported by carefully selected excerpts. It is about dealing with entire texts in their authentic form in their actual contexts of social life. And it is
about explaining them, accounting for what they are doing and how they achieve that in the culture (352). The real value of a systemic functional approach to language, Halliday suggests, is that

When we interpret language in these (functional-systemic) terms we may cast some light on the baffling problem of how it is that the most ordinary uses of language, in the most every day situations, so effectively transmit the social structure, the values, the systems of knowledge, all the deepest and most pervasive patterns of the culture. With a functional prospective of the language, we can begin to appreciate how this is done. (Halliday 1973, 45; quoted by Eggins, 352)

2.7. THE SELECTION OF PASSAGES: ITS BASIS:

In the following three chapters—Chapters 3, 4 and 5—Mistry’s three novels will be analysed by applying the method of analysis discussed in this chapter. Three passages from each chapter will be selected. As Leech and Short say, in literary stylistics, “features determined by artistic motivation are of primary interest” (1981, 14). The principle of selection of a passage, therefore, will depend upon

(1.) its thematic significance, and

(2.) the cohesion and clustering of significant stylistic features in it.

The attempt will be to link the analysis of linguistic features with the thematic concerns and ideological dimensions in order to trace the patterns of implication in the text.

According to Martin and Rose (2003), there are five main dimensions of inequality in post-colonial societies, by which we are all positioned, very early in life in the home: generation, gender, ethnicity, incapacity and class. By generation we refer to inequalities associated with maturation; gender covers sex and sexuality-based difference; ethnicity is concerned with racial, religious and other ‘cultural’ divisions; incapacity refers to disabilities of various kinds; class is based on the distribution of material resources and arguably the most fundamental dimension since it is the inequality on which our post-colonial economic order ultimately depends”. Martin and Rose understand all of these in Bernstein’s terms as “social coding orientations, which are thus materialized through both physical embodiments and semantic styles”. The ways in which they operate is of course “culturally specific”. All five dimensions “condition access to the hierarchies we encounter outside the home in education, religion, recreation and the workplace and so for most texts we have to consider power carefully in relation to field” (Martin and Rose 2003, 248). All these dimensions have been kept in mind while selecting passage for analysis in the following chapters.
The final chapter will give the conclusion of the study by comparing and compiling the results of the various linguistic analyses of the three novels made in the chapters 3, 4, and 5. As Eggins says, “detailed lexico-grammatical and cohesive analyses can shed light on how texts make meanings, where those meanings come from, and some of the implications they may carry with them”. The texts make not just meanings about what goes on and why, but also meanings about relationships and attitudes, and meanings about distance and proximity. By relating specific linguistic choices to the construction and reflection of situational, cultural and ideological contexts, the texts can be shown to encode meanings about far-reaching dimensions (Eggins, 352).