Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's background was that of being born in an aristocratic family, with higher education at England. He was exposed to Western Culture and Fabian Socialism. He had his political initiation under Mahatma Gandhi and therefore non-violence and peace became watchwords to live and die for. The freedom of India in 1947, was a direct result of Gandhiji's concept of Satyagraha and a disintegrating British Empire following the Second World War. In addition, he was a man with a great sense of history with world renowned works in this field. Even before independence, Nehru was the Congress Party's spokesman on foreign affairs. On Independence, he took over as the country's first Prime Minister and the guiding force behind nascent Free India's Foreign Policy. The framework Nehru designed for India's foreign policy essentially mirrored these influences, the concrete manifestations of which were anti-colonialism and non-alignment. Such a policy which constituted the two pillars of India's outlook was universally accepted by India's public opinion and by the mainstream political parties.
The main focus in this foreign policy dynamics was China, Chinese travellers and scholars established initial contact between their ancient civilization and their Indian contemporaries during Mauryan, Gupta and Kushan period. From then on, China underwent various dynastic rules when the contact was restricted to limited trade. When the British came to India, Tibet with its Chinese umbilical cord per se, was the buffer zone between Imperial British India and Czarist Russia. While India was going through the terminal phase of her freedom struggle, Chinese was experiencing its transition from Manchu Monarchy to the Civil war between its benign dictatorial nationalists (KMT) and flagrant communists. The Communists with their experience of trying times during the 'Long March Deprivation' and partial subjugation of their home land by the Japanese, emerged triumphant in 1949.

Against this background, Nehru's perspective of China which shaped the India's foreign policy in its formative years of fifties and sixties is the main theme of this research. To examine this matter in depth, the history of India's Foreign Policy towards China was traced in detail from 1947-1964. Three different hypotheses, one based on intransigence of China, the other of Nehru, and last the compelling political environment then existing, as the reason for apparent foreign policy failure on its China front were developed.
Nehru's sense of history, mentioned earlier; his faith in the tenets of the UN and the need for peace and development was the guiding force for 'Panch Sheel', which traces its roots back to Emperor Ashoka's times almost 2500 years ago. His vision of China as the friendly giant of Asia, became his unshakable dream. Panchsheel with its five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit was the foundation for the Sino-Indian agreement of April 1954. As the author of the concept, Nehru had pinned great hopes on it for the betterment of understanding between nations, with India at its helm. It found unequivocal support from as many as 29 Afro-Asian countries at the Bandung conference in April 1955. It offered a solution to lasting world peace without having to resort to violence. The concept was well received worldwide that many countries wanted it to be the basis of International Law. Besides it was in line with the UN charter. The events that followed from 1954-1962 in Sino-Indian relationship could be traced to China's violation of the principles of 'Panchsheel' and Nehru's blind love for China. However, Nehru himself was forced to admit that 'Panchsheel' towards China was a failure well before the commencement of hostilities in 1962. Aggression and occupation of large
tracts of Indian territory by the Chinese as a fallout of the war put a seal to whatever chances 'Panchsheel' had of continuing to be working principle between the two nations in the future.

Nehru's vision of China as the friendly giant of Asia, became his unshakable dream till the sixties, when it ended in a nightmare. Nehru spared no efforts to extend a friendly hand to China to the extent it became ingratiating, as some felt; but these were more or less rebuffed by the revolutionary Government of China which came to power in 1949. BY th time the Chinese Premier visited India in 1956, indicating some improvement in relations, China had already gained from the 1954 agreement on Tibet wherein India had given up its extra-territorial rights in Tibet. The border dispute which the Chinese decided to play up in 1959 burst into a full-scale aggression in 1962 and forced a change in Nehru's perspective on China.

Nehru's handling of the occupation of Tibet by China was dictated by the political environment then prevailing and the military weakness of India. The Chinese were not ready to consider India as an independent entity in the fifties, but only as a semi-Anglo-American colony. China which had maintained suzerainty over Tibet went ahead to
annex it militarily in 1950. While the world watched the annexation of Tibet passively, Nehru's India watched it actively. A helpless India saw the collapse of an old cultural friend which was brought to submission and incorporated into China. Nehru's handling of the affair was in no way helpful to Tibet as he was under a misunderstanding created by China, to the affect that there was no border dispute between China and India. China hid its expansionist designs well and precipitated the border problem when the time was 'ripe'. Nehru also spurned American help for Indian intervention in the Tibetan affair and feared that it would and up in a long drawn out global war. The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 was considered as incongruous by many because of the vast difference between the political philosophy of these two countries. The only reason for China signing the Agreement was for not having two enemies on two fronts.

Chinese hegemonism, if any, was well cloaked that even Nehru's or his favourite the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon's incisive minds did not recognise till matters had come to the head. Lebensraum in Tibet was required for the overflowing Chinese population. India on its part was thought of as on Anglo-American Colony ever after independence and the freedom struggle as that of Indian reactionary bourgeois. Cartographic invasions, the effort
to somehow neutralise its Cultural Revolution, ideological big brother attitude in Asia, thirst to acquire third world leadership, intrigues in Tibet demonstrate silently but effectively the disguised and well orchestrated Chinese grand strategy. From 1948, itself, India's potentiality, as a great nation was a warning to Chinese communists. The two giants (sulking boys with their backs to each other) suddenly found themselves in the same game with the decision to make whether they were on the same side or not. India's mild criticism of the so-called Chinese liberation of Tibet, her forward policy in response to China's patrolling deep insider her territory do not suggest Nehru's foreign policy had any rapid bite. It was more a friendly and widely applauded bark.

The flight of the present Dalai Lama with thousands of followers into India in 1959, and harsh tones of Chou-En-Lai's letters to Nehru thereafter marked the year 1959. Cartographic invasions, the construction of the Aksai Chin road, non-recognition of the McMahon line (reason that China was not party to it) was finally followed by territorial claims. All this occurred to the sounds of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai (brotherhood). Hiuen-Tsang had recorded centuries ago that Ladakh, Kashmir and Assam were part of India. The 1914, Simla agreement for the McMahon Line was initialed by the Chinese representative, Ivan
Chen. The situation was set for the 1962 war and when the curtains went up October 20, India was taken by complete surprise, diplomatically and strategically. While expressing the military debacle, Nehru described this as, "a stab in the back". Perhaps Nehru was wrong. It was a stab from the front. Nehru failed to visualise Chinese threat against territorial integrity of India. It is evident from the various development which preceded the war. As India faced military defeat, the Indian people relived the days of the freedom struggle and rose as one man to support the national cause in the best way they could. No disintegration of the country took place and its inner strength was displayed once again. A month later, the Chinese withdrew after making a point, with whatever area vacated becoming a demilitarised zone. Nehru refused the trade off of territory, east for west, which Chou-En-Lai offered.

The Sino-Indian border dispute brought to light the fact that in such situations the side that is militarily stronger and takes the initiative wins. Justification that exists on one side or the other matters little. This means that the occupation of Indian territory by China is a permanent fact and nothing that India could do short of forcible recapture can get it back for her. The China calling was a blessing in disguise, awakening both foreign
and defence policy planners to ground realities. Even Nehru's multi-dimentioned genius had to acknowledge that foreign policy needs punch and shield also and not 'Panchsheel' alone.

In the light of the above, test of hypotheses will bear out the following conclusions:—

a. H1. This hypothesis stands disproved to the extent that the expansionist policy of China was cleverly disguised and Nehru was helpless to do anything with insufficient military strength and the doctrine of non-violence weighing India down.

b. H2. This is also disproved by the sequence of events which led to the overt act of violence by China, which abandoned all avenues of compromise or discussions and annexed vast area of China territory by military action.

c. H3. This hypothesis stands substantiated by the facts brought out by the study. The dictates of the political environment forced even a seasoned statesman like Nehru to follow the course of action in foreign policy as he did.