Chapter- II : Alamkāras : Figurative Language

Figures of Speech, by its very nature, have been a very controversial topic since the time of Aristotle. It is an ancient and powerful interdisciplinary concept. It originated in Classical Rhetoric as a central technique in the art of persuasion and was much developed in Roman times and the European Middle Ages, and crossed the disciplinary boundary into Poetics, where it became central, from the Renaissance. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, “Speech, figure of, any intentional deviation from literal statement or common usage that emphasizes, clarifies or embellishes both written and spoken language”. The Penguin Dictionary of Language (David Crystal) defines it as: “An expressive use of language where words are used in a nonliteral way to suggest illuminating comparisons and resemblances; ... Literal language by contrast refers to the usual meaning of a word or phrase.” In a short treatise “Essay on the Origin of Languages” (1781), Jean-Jaques Rosseau said: “All language is originated in metaphor. Literal language is pruning away and a rationalization of our figurative thought” (qtd. in Kittay 5).

It is the use of this figurative language which distinguishes a literary work of art from the ordinary and also makes it fit for the hierarchical conception of styles i.e. High, Middle and Low. Puttenham’s famous definition brings out more factors and is worth quoting at length:

“Figurative speech is a novelty of language evidently (and yet not absurdly) estranged from ordinary habit and manner of our daily talk and writing and figure itself is a certain lively or good grace set upon words, speeches and sentences to some purpose and not in vain, giving them ornament or efficacy by many manner of alternation in shape, in sound, and also in sense, sometime by way of surplusage, sometime by defect, sometime by disorder, or mutation...” (Puttenham 159).

Some aesthetic effects of the figures are hinted here in the above definition: ornament is not ‘mere ornament’ but connotes ‘liveliness’, ‘good grace’; and it is
purposeful, not gratuitous. Therefore, figurative language is seen different from, and better than, ordinary speech. This belief motivates the degree given to ‘literary’ texts by such schools of criticism as Stylistics, Practical Criticism, New Criticism, Leavisism etc. Literature, therefore, of any language provides a springboard to study this area. Therefore, the intrinsic value of any work of art (literature) can be had from the usage of these figures of speech i.e. *alamkāras*.

A rhetoric figure, thus, is a situation in which language means something other than what it says, a violation of code. But lest that violation introduce a radical undecidability to linguistic situations, leading us to wonder how we could ever know whether language means what it appears to be saying. These violations are codified as a repertoire of high artificial and conventional devices which writers can draw on to produce what looks at first like an inaugural creative act and which is accounted for by the formulation of a code on which meaning is said to depend. The very notion of this rhetorical effect – the possibility of metaphorical signification requires a distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning and hence the beginning of a rhetorical code.

This proposes that there are two ideas or thoughts interacting in a single word i.e. the literal meaning which is present and the metaphorical meaning which is constructed in order to interpret and apprehend what is intended. The result is unique and hilarious. When such is the result, we must know what *alamkāras* are?

Figures of speech are deliberate local manipulations of the phonological, syntactic, semantic or pragmatic structures of texts, producing ‘extra’ patterning which are not required by the grammatical rules of the language. Many types of figure has been identified and classified, ranging from repetition of a consonant phoneme (alliteration) to a semantic contradiction in co-occurring items (oxymoron) – both of these types are illustrated in the phrase ‘friendly foe’.

The etymology of the term is Latin *figura* ‘shape’, ‘form’, or more specifically ‘attitude’. The Greek-derived general term is ‘scheme’, but this word is now used for a subdivision of figures. The fact is that the ‘figures of speech’ (unlike some other aspects of literature) are objective structures of language. These are
taken to be the facts of language that can be straightforwardly described in linguistic terms. The key idea in traditional definitions of the figure is divergence from ordinary speech or writing. The idea of deviation from ordinary language, of novelty and estrangement, resembles twentieth-century formalist theories of poetic language such as "foregrounding", and the deviation theory of style and this view of the figures is presumably the source of such theories. Figures, therefore, cause the text not merely to diverge from ordinary usage but to be superior to it.

Thus, in a broader sense, *alamkāras* can be defined: "To generate beauty and create new meaning in the word and its meaning is called *alamkāra* ."

### 2.1 Western Concept

What *alamkāras* are in Indian Poetics, "figures of speech" are in Western Poetics. Though people can and do speak figuratively, the ability to think, imagine, and speak poetically has historically been seen as a special human trait, requiring different cognitive and linguistic skills than those employed in ordinary life. Expressions used to arouse certain emotional effects are called ‘stylistic choices’. These arrest attention and produce aesthetic pleasure. These exist not only in lexis but involve phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, clauses, sentences and larger units. Rhetorical figures and syntactical patterns are considered to produce expressive or emotive experience in the West.

In European languages, Figures of Speech are generally classified in five major categories:

i) Figures of resemblance or relationship – e.g. simile, metaphor, kenning, conceit, parallelism, personification, metonymy, synecdoche and euphemism;

ii) Figures of emphasis or understatement – e.g. hyperbole, litotes, rhetorical questions, antithesis, climax, bathos, paradox, oxymoron and irony;

iii) Figures of sound – e.g. alliteration, repetition, anaphora and onomatopoeia;

iv) Verbal games and gymnastics – e.g. pun and anagram;
v) Errors — e.g. malapropism, periphrasis and spoonerism.

Figures that do not involve a change in sense are called Schemes and that which involve change in sense are called Tropes. As opposed to tropes, schemes are decorative or ornamental rather than conceptual: they are operations on the surface structure which do not change meaning. Figurative language on this basis, therefore, can be divided into two types: an effect (such as rhyme) which changes the structure of language without effecting its meaning is a scheme; one which affects the meaning (such as metaphor) is a trope.

Schemes, which roughly include figures such as alliteration, anaphora, anadiplosis, chiasmus, zeugma etc., have been described as abnormal arrangements lending themselves to the forceful and harmonious presentation of ideas. In other words, schemes are “foregrounded repetitions of expression” (Leech 74). Tropes, which include simile, metaphor, irony, synecdoche etc, are more radical in scope and powerful in effect. They have (again roughly) been identified as devices involving alteration of the normal meaning of an expression. To speak more precisely, tropes are “the foregrounded irregularities of content” (Leech 74). They are of fundamental importance in Western imaginative literature. It is also to be kept in mind that though the term ‘irregularity’ for tropes and ‘repetition’ for schemes have preferably been used, nevertheless, both constitute deviation from the normal usage. To speak semiotically, schemes focus on the signifier. If schemes work through sign-combination, tropes work through sign-mutation.

Tropes have cognitive implication: they encode ways of looking at the world. We identify them at different levels i.e. a scheme may be identified as a phonological, a graphological or a formal (i.e. grammatical and/or lexical) pattern; likewise a trope may be identified as a formal or a semantic deviation. But these identifications are not so distinct as they may seem, because there is a great deal of interdependence between the levels. Schemes fall on the syntagmatic axis while the tropes fall on the paradigmatic axis. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations are opposed to each other. “Paradigm refers to a word’s connection with other words in language as a whole outside of any particular utterance. Syntagm refers to a word’s
relation to other words (or a grammatical unit’s relation to other units) within a particular speech act or utterance. Meaning is a matter of both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations” (Scholes 149). Because paradigmatic relations exist simultaneously in the speaker’s memory and the syntagmatic in a sequential combination of signs, the two have been metaphorically called vertical and horizontal axis of language.

As a general rule, anyone who wishes to investigate the significance and value of a work of art must concentrate on the element of interest and surprise rather than on automatic patterns. It is the foregrounded figure, which is a linguistic deviation, with language in its background, that presents element of surprise. Literary theorists Kreuzer and Cogan enumerate: “... figurative language by its very definition – uses words in new and sometimes startling ways; the reader can be surprised or shocked into heightened awareness of rich meaning”(Studies 312). Therefore, figurative language is a use of language that deviates from the normal/acceptable usage but that can be assigned a sense in the context of a given speech situation. Figurative language also divides itself into two stages:

i) the rejection of the orthodox
   e.g. a traditional trope like ‘oxymoron’

ii) the discovery of the unorthodox
   e.g. metaphor.

The former leads to an unacceptable interpretation and the latter to figurative interpretation.

Traditionally viewed as the tool of poets and politicians, figurative language is found not only in the treasured pages of literature but throughout ordinary speech and writing. But the language of great poets is clearly more creative, or poetical, than employed by most ordinary speakers. In serious poetry and prose its use is more fully conscious, more artistic, and much more subtle; it thus has a strange intellectual and emotional impact, is more memorable, and sometimes contributes a range and depth of association and suggestion far beyond the scope of the casual colloquial use of imagery. According to Gibbs, “...human cognition is
fundamentally shaped by various poetic or figurative processes. Metaphor, metonymy, irony, and other tropes are not linguistic distortions of literal mental thought but constitute basic schemes by which people conceptualize their experience and the external world” (The Poetics 1).

Many beliefs about language, thought and meaning have dominated the Western intellectual tradition. Notable scholars, such as the eighteenth century rhetorician Gianbattista Vico, the eighteenth century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the nineteenth century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, the twentieth century philosophers Ernst Cassirer and Suzanne Langer, and the twentieth century literary theorists Kenneth Burke and Hayden White, have each, in their own way, argued that our construction of reality is based upon a collection of symbolic forms that are inherently figurative. In recent years, cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Eve Sweetser, cognitive rhetorician Mark Turner, philosopher Mark Johnson, and legal theorist Steven Winter, among a growing group of cognitive scientists, have provided detailed work demonstrating that metaphor, and to a lesser extent metonymy, is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning. Therefore, figuration is not merely a matter of language but provides much of the foundation for thought, reason and imagination. Figurative language is not ornamental but is ubiquitous in everyday speech.

Now, ornamentation is no longer looked down as something superadded. It is not taken as “extravagant and absurd diction” (Enright and Chickera 187); or a mere “hubbub of words” (Enright and Chickera 188) in poetry; or as Wordsworth said: producing “a perturbed and dizzy state of mind” (Enright and Chickera 187). It has already been proved by linguists that figurative expressions have power and potential association in language. To Grierson, figures are not like sugar which you sifted into the pudding in greater or lesser quantity as you thought well:

“For figures of speech are not mere ornaments of style to be used or to dispense with at will. In their origin they are just such natural expressions of emotions as shedding of tears, or dog’s wagging of his tail. Where they differ from these indications of feelings is in a
greater distinctness, in being extensions of the articulate ... it is in the
effort to do this adequately by means of language that we extend the
range of language by using it in this figurative fashion.” (Rhetoric
55).
I.A. Richards also believes that the “command of metaphor is the command of life”
(Philosophy 189).

Figurative language obeys syntactic rules, sometimes flout semantic rules,
and most often violate pragmatic rules. And it is wiser to regard meaning as a
spectrum rather than a set of enclosed cells: figurative use does not emerge all of a
sudden but shades off, both diachronically and synchronically, from connotation.
Figurative utterances are generally known somehow to breach the norms of literal
language and yet are understood as meaningful utterances. The essence of figurative
language lies precisely in the poetic transformation of verbal material and in the
coupling of its phonetic and semantic aspects.

To the Romantics and Symbolists, as to the dhvani theorists, a figure is a
concentration of feeling. Its use in poetry is essential if poetry, to use Wordsworth’s
phrase, is to be “carried alive into the heart of passion” (Enright and Chickera 173).
Even to Coleridge, figures of speech are not “billiard balls but molecules” and are
nothing less than “the offspring of passion” (Biographia, II, 16-17). Figures,
according to Coleridge, must serve an organic purpose:

“... images however beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature,
and as accurate represented in words, do not themselves characterize
the poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as they
are modified by a predominant passion; or by associated thoughts or
images awakened by that passion; or succession to an instant; or,
lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from
the poet’s own spirit, which shoots it being through earth and sea and
air.” (Biographia, II, 16-17).
Wordsworth’s own views on (poetic diction) figurative language quite tally with those with Indian *Alankāraśāstrīs* when he asserts in the Appendix on poetic diction added to the *Preface* to *Lyrical Ballads* in 1802:

“The earliest poets of all nations generally wrote from passion excited by real events; they wrote naturally, and as men: feeling powerfully as they did, their language was daring, and figurative. In succeeding times, Poets and Men ambitious of the fame of Poets, perceiving the influence of such language, and desirous of producing the same effect without being animated by the passion, set themselves to a mechanical adoption of these Figures of Speech, and made use of them, sometimes with propriety, but much more frequently applied them to feelings of thoughts with which they had no natural connection whatsoever. A language was thus insensibly produced, differing materially from the real language of men in any situation…”

(Enright and Chickera 185).

What is being condemned, of course, is that collection of tricks of diction and not poetic diction itself. Wordsworth’s own view of poetic diction was infact, simply that poets ought once again to write ‘naturally, and as men’, and with real passion, making only those modifications of ordinary language which properly and naturally accompany real passion. Even Wordsworth is of the opinion that the language of poetry “must necessarily be dignified and variegated, and alive with metaphors and figures” (Zail 47-48). It is also to be kept in mind here that Romanticism and Symbolism, in itself, are viewed by the Prague School of linguistics as obviously metaphorical while Realism with its predilection for synecdochic details and its meticulous situational descriptions is metonymic.¹

Language, therefore, takes a life of its own in poetic/figurative language. One may state that in poetic/figurative language similarity is superimposed on contiguity, and hence, “equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence” (Jakobson, Linguistics 17). Therefore, any sensitive reader feels instinctively the poetic effect and the semantic load of these grammatical appliances
and the strikingness of these devices, without the slightest attempt at conscious analysis. To state in simple terms, figures are indispensable. Quoting Bentham, Jakobson says, “To language, then — to language alone — it is that fictitious entities owe their existence; their impossible, yet indispensable existence” (qtd. in Elmar 108). Mukarovsky adds, that selection is determined by the overall poetic intention which leads to embracing of figurative or emotive language in a particular poem. It is in the act of poetic designation that the coded features of language and the uncoded features of extra-linguistic reality, either psychic or material, interact. The use of figurative designation calls attention to the act of designating and to the relation between the sign used and the sign whose lexical meaning would normally apply in the context. He further states, “a figurative designation ... assigns the reader the task of discovering the referential relation between the designated reality and the word” (On Poetic75).

While Chomsky takes such sentences as ‘colourless green ideas sleep furiously’ as grammatical but nonsensical construction, Jakobson admits that like many figurative formulations of poetry, this sentence can also be submitted to a truth test:

“The analysis of grammatical transformations and of their import should include the poetic function of language, because the core of this function is to push transformations into the foreground. It is the purposeful poetic use of lexical and grammatical tropes and figures that brings the creative power of language to its summit.” (qtd. in Elmar 110).

2.2 Indian Theory

As far as Indian concept is concerned, the system of Alankārika is four cornered since it is based on the four fundamentals of language, thought, expressiveness and connection between sound and sense. Hence, Indian Poetics flourished into eight schools --- alankāra (figurative), rīti (style), guṇa (attribute), vakrokti (obliquity), anumāna (inference), aucitya (propriety), dhvani (suggestion) and rasa (sentiment). It is noteworthy that among them the concept of
_aučitya_ can be considered in relation to the theories of Longinus and Horace. The theory of _vakrokti_ can be fruitfully placed beside certain formulations of the New Critics as well as the Saussurean distinction of ‘_langue_’ and ‘_parole_’ and Chomsky’s notions of ‘_competence_’ and ‘_performance_’.

The principles upheld by these schools of Indian _Alośkārasastra_ were formulated independently of each other. Each concept occupies a significant place in the system, and the exponents of different theories have tried to tackle certain fundamental issues from their respective points of view. These theories are not rival stances militating against each other but complementary approaches which mutually enrich and explicate. Therefore, Indian Poetics should, in fact, be taken to be an organic whole. A study of Indian Poetics from Bharata (5th century B.C) to Pandītaraṇa Jagannātha (17th century A.D) bears witness to the existence of a highly developed poetics in ancient India, with a rigorous scientific method for description and analysis of the expressive resources of language. Since Indian intellectual tradition is language centred and the earliest most sustainable school, it studies literary language and assumes that the locus of literariness is in the figures of speech, in the mode of figurative expression, in the grammatical accuracy and pleasantness of sound. It is proposed by one school that _Alośkārasastra_, Poetics, is the seventh _vedāṅga_, as it teaches us how to interpret figurative language.

Indian Poetics gives a functional definition of figurative language – ‘whatever element imparts beauty to a discourse is figurative.’ At the same time meaning is defined in terms of three _śabdaśaktis_ (power of words) – _abhidā_, (denotative), _lakṣanā_ (connotative) and _vyānjanā_ (suggestion). In this scheme, the figures of speech are characterized either by the _lakṣanā_, or _vyānjanā_; in other words, figures are a non- _abhidā_ use of language – a concept which is co-terminus with the Western Rhetoric’s view of figurative language as non-literal use of language.

Bharata in Chapter XVII of his _Natyāsāstra_ discusses the elements of _Guṇa_ and _Alośkāra_ along with other allied topics such as _Lakṣanā_ and _Doṣa_ in dramatic presentation. The elements of _Guṇa_ and _Alośkāra_ have been given
subservient position in dramatic literature and consequently, these are to be judged according to the part they play towards producing the dramatic effect. He says that the diction of the dramatic poetry should be pleasing to the senses and capable of infecting the mind with aesthetic mood. Though he does not define Guna and differentiate its scope from that of Alamkāra, he maintains as many as ten Guṇas and four Alamkāras. In his treatment of Guṇas, though he does not differentiate between Śabdaguṇa and Arthaguṇas, he gives its exhaustive enumeration comprehending the entire concept. Regarding Alamkāras, he maintains that these are embellishments of poetry. He also gives a start to the notion that this beauty pertains to both sound and sense by mentioning three Arthālamkāra viz. Upamā, Rūpaka and Dīpaka along with one Śabdālamkāra viz. Yamaka. This inventory of figures of speech at the hands of Indian aestheticians increased from four in Bharata to one hundred and twenty-five in Appaya Dīksita. It is this endless classification which became abstruse and brought ill-repute to Indian scholars. Therefore, Indian literary theories give exhaustive enumeration and explanation of Alamkāras, the figures of speech – a subject that remains central throughout the tradition of literary thinking.

The great Russian scholar Tzvetan Todorov (1981), however, finds in these scholars’ exhaustive classifications specimens of remarkable taxonomic categorization. Daniel Ingalls is also impressed by their ingenuity. He remarks:

“In the analysis of poetic figures of speech (alamkāras) the Sanskrit critics surpass the Greeks and the Romans. They surpass them not only in the subtlety but also in understanding, for the Sanskrit analysis is based directly on poetry whereas Greco-Roman analysis was based in the first instance on oratory. Our Western rhetoric centres its attention on the manner of presentation: on words, connection of parts, emphasis, and emotional effect. The science of alamkāra is concerned rather with image-building, with the shades of similarity and with the techniques of overtone or suggestion” (Ingall 12).
Recognizing the significance of the Indian viewpoint, Philip Rawson remarked at the Annual Conference of the British Society of Aesthetics in September 1966 that a figure of speech is not “something superfluous, inessential, as trimming which adds nothing to the work but only obscures its beauty”; it is “a functional aspect of art, embedded in it, (and) not a gratuitous extra” (An Exalted 223).

This means that the ordinary expression communicates simply the fact of expression where as the poetic expression transfers the experience itself. Secondly, the ordinary expression stands substitution of synonyms while the poetic expression is irreplaceable, and when attempted to replace it, it makes the poet say something different from what he actually intends to express. Thirdly, the ordinary expression simply presents the explicit which is more or less fixed by nature while the poetic expression introduces the implicit which differs from person to person according to the difference in nature of the latent expression deposited in readers. But inspite of this difference between these two types of expression, it is not possible for the poet to avoid the ordinary grammatical connection between language and thought, -- to avoid the cold touch of the ordinary expression which, of course, is transformed into the flower of poetic expression, by the golden touch of the poet’s intuition which is by nature figurative.

In the Indian *Ālāmkāraśāstra*, these *Ālāmkāras* have been classified into three categories namely: -

a) *Śabdālāmkāra* (based on phonetic form)

b) *Arthālāmkāra* (based on meaning)

c) *Ubhyālāmkāra* (based on phonetic form and meaning both)

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Sanskrit Poeticians opine that texture of poetry is comprised of the expression and the expressed: the verbal beautifies the expressed, because the relation existing between the two is one of identity: the ideational also augments the charm of the expression for the same. For them, figurative language, therefore, transgresses all mundane experience and consists in the striking manner of putting a striking idea in equally striking words.

Originally, the concept of *alamkāras* was very comprehensive and comprehended within its fold all factors that contributed to poetic beauty (*kāvya-śobha*). By the time of Dandin the term had come to designate any factor that produced beauty in poetry. Vāmana also used the term 'alamkāra' as synonymous with beauty in poetry. Indian *Alamkārasāstries* are thorough, rigorous and systematic. They took impressive strides in the direction of erecting a structure in which a place would be assigned to each literary piece from the point of view of the casual factors behind its beauty. This system built by Indian scholars emphasizes at every point that the linguistic approach is the only approach with a potential to lead us to a determination of the patterns of literary beauty.

As poets, gifted with the power to realize the poetic truth, find new types of relation existing between the language and the idea, new poetic figures crop up, donating all the time inexplicable beauty to the poetry concerned. It is equally significant that a section of the *Alamkārikas* explain word-powers in terms of a relation linking the word to its corresponding concept. As this relation develops stage by stage, new poetic figures possessed of greater charm are created automatically. The figure based on similarity thus starts from the portico of Simile, and passing through many phases reaches the gateway of Hyperbole, in which the object of description is completely swallowed up by the standard of comparison: and in course of this journey through many phases, it brings in its tail a number of poetic figures viz. *Rūpaka*, *Utpreksā* and so on.

Though in Bhāmaha we find for the first time a systematized discussion on *Alamkārāsāstra*, yet he is not only a harsh logician but has also a deep insight into the characteristic of good literary style. He has, therefore, been able to unfold the
process of poetic creation step by step and in a convincing manner, explaining simultaneously how words are gradually changed, replaced and transformed before they are finally selected and used in a piece of writing. He speaks that deviated expression is the natural language of poetry. Descriptions such as “The sun has gone down”, “The moon is shining”, “The birds are returning to their nests”, are, in the opinion of some theorists, pieces of good poetry. Bhāmaha, however, thinks otherwise. He poses a question: “What kind of poetry is this?” In his view such descriptions are mere sentences (Vārtas) bereft of poetic beauty. They are as good as bits of news.

In his Kavyālāmkāra, though he never tries to give a formal definition of poetry, yet rests content with the mention of what may be called Kavyasūrīra, which, according to him, is nothing but the combination of word and sense giving equal prominence to both word and meaning. He says that when the sound-effect unites with sublimity of thought, both conjointly produce charm in the minds of refined readers. In other words, poetry is not only fact or feeling, but a beautiful form also. This beauty is introduced by certain modes of expression which may be called Alāmkāra. This Alāmkāra makes a piece of poetic composition charming. This beautifying element, Alāmkāra can be divided into two distinct groups: beautifying the form or the content. At the root of these figures, Bhāmaha maintains, there lies Atisāyokti or Vakrakoti invariably. It is vakrakoti which raises a linguistic composition to a status of Kavya. Without these elements, a composition is sure to lose strikingness and consequently no poetic figure will evolve; because poetic figures are brought into being when a thing is described in terms of other, or, when an attribute is ascribed to one, to which it does not really belong. A peculiar way of expression constitutes the life-breath of poetic figure which again in its turn accounts for the ultimate charm in poetry and basis of all poetic figures.

Bhāmaha recognizes Rasa as a particular poetic figure named Rasavat. He says that when Rasa like Śṛngāra and the like are manifested through words, it is called Rasavat Alāmkāra. Hence, the word Alāmkāra is used in a broader sense which means vakrata (metaphoric or oblique expression) i.e. poetic beauty itself and
also a device to be used to achieve this vakrata on different levels. Vakrokti, considered from this point of view, is deemed to be the essential principle of an Alamkāra or more broadly, of any poetic composition since Vakrokti is the fundamental principle of the poetic expression and distinguishes it from usual expression of everyday life. Therefore, the word Alamkāra, according to him, signifies an extraordinary turn given to ordinary speech, which converts the ordinary expression into a poetic expression. It is not the poetic figure but something of a wider denotation, the beautifying principal in general. Thus, it is a fundamental principal of figurative expression.

At the same time, Rudraṭa is of the view that the poet puts extra force into his language and in order to do so, inasmuch as the force of language consists in its representative character, he augments the representation by multiplying his comparisons, and his language becomes figurative. Ruyyaka also in the beginning of Alamkārasarvasvam gives a resume of the view-points of different theoreticians from Bhamaha to Kuntaka. In tune with Bhāmaha, in whose system the Alamkāra is of paramount importance, Ruyyaka regards the implicit content as comprehensible under the poetic figures since poetic figures comprehend the concept of Dhvani. It is in them that the unexpressed goes to embellish the expressed, which shines in its undimmed splendour and consequently captivates the minds of the connoisseurs. Ruyyaka also explains the viewpoint of Rudraṭa and says that in the view of this learned Alamkarika, the poetic figures of Rūpaka, Dīpaka, Apahnuti, Tulyayogita etc. are marked by the manifestation of the implied simile which goes to augment beauty of the expressed content. In the poetic figure Rūpaka, the comprehension of suggested simile in the background gives rise to charm; in the Dīpaka the understanding of the unexpressed sense of similarity as existing between the contextual and the non-contextual justifies the mode of expression comprised of connection between the two (the contextual and the non-contextual), and thereby goes to heighten the beauty of the explicit. And what is true of the poetic figures Rūpaka and Dīpaka, is true of the other poetic figures as well.
Kṣemendra, another notable personality from Kashmir, who flourished in the later half of the Eleventh Century and entered the realm of poetic criticism with a new outlook of Propriety, also deals with the problem of poetic expression. In his *Kavikanṭhābharaṇa*, Kṣemendra maintains that ‘Čamatkāra’, constitutes the very life of poetry. No poetry is worth the name without Čamatkāra. A composition devoid of Čamatkāra, is like a youth without grace and gold without any precious gem to illuminate it. This doctrine of Čamatkāra demands that a composition in order to be artistic must be charming to a reader of refined taste, — the charm may be due to diction or sublimity of sense or due to its appeal to the intellect or emotional mood or for its imaginative pursuit. At any rate, it has got to be charming.

Strikingness in poetry is, therefore, taken to be the *sine quo non* of poetic expression. Mammata goes on to the extent of maintaining that a figure of speech is strikingness itself. Raghvan succinctly emphasizes the value of strikingness when he remarks: “Wonder is an invariable element in all enjoyment, mundane or artistic. In art and literature, the element of surprise, extraordinariness, wonder is present everywhere” (Raghvan, Rasas 194). T.S. Eliot also agrees with this view when he says that the element of surprise or wonder is “essential to poetry” (Selected Essays 308). In Indian concept, the essence of poetic creation is a sense of wonder, the characteristic feature that enables an expression to reach the poetic heights. When Sanskrit Aesthetics regards *Rasadhvani* as the be-all and end-all of poetry, it certainly puts the greatest premium on experience which is transferred to the mind of the connoisseur through literary excellence and poetic diction. Dhvanikāra establishes the point that the suggested emotional mood constitutes the secret of poetry. The metamorphosis of the unpleasant feelings into the pleasant one is brought into being by the magic of Suggestion, which is of paramount importance in poetic creation. The function of Suggestion, Sanskrit poetics says, helps the poet to recreate his experience. While ordinary expression presents facts with the help of Denotation, the poetic expression creates facts, and that, too, with the help of the function of Suggestion. The observation of Ānandavardhana that Rasa is necessarily ‘Vyaṅga’, therefore, is surcharged with profound truth.
Kuntaka, the founder of *Vakrokti-vāda* and an ardent exponent of the concept given by Bhāmaha, formulates that it is *vakrokti* which is the essence of figurative expression i.e. poetry. In his *Vakroktijīvitam*, he explains that *Vakrokti* is nothing but a striking mode of expression completely different from the common usage or established mode of expression; and this strikingness (*Vićitrya*) due to a peculiar turn of expression is infused by the peculiar skill of the poet (*Vaidagdhyā-bhaṅgi-bhanītiḥ*). The strikingness meant by him in words and ideas is peculiar to poetry and is caused only by the imagination of the poet and hence is not seen in words and ideas used in Śastras or in common parlance. This peculiar turn of expression brings to comprehension a specific charm (*Vicchitti*) or strikingness (*Vaicitrya*) imparted by the conception of the poet (*Kavipratibhā*). He cites examples to show that it is poverty in poetic intuition that prompts the poet to take recourse to the figure like alliteration for creating charmingness. Similarly, he also cites illustration where sense-unit is striking with a very hopeless mode of expression. Kuntaka says that strikingness is there both in language and in thought, as oil in each seed, and the function of the poet is to harmonise the two in one stream of charming sensibility. He establishes that it is the skill of the poet which constitutes the essence of *Rasālankāras* which are nothing but striking expressions, the charm being caused by the presence of Rasa. In his scheme, it is *Vakratva* (metaphoricity) which turns a mode of expression into a poetic figure. Therefore, he implies that even when Rasa is primarily developed, it is *Vakrokti* which should be considered as being the life-giving principal.

Kuntaka’s doctrine also reinstates the speculation of the learned Dhvanikāra, who regards the true poetic figure as one originally related to poetic art. The image rushes forth spontaneously from the mental plane of the poet as he keeps him concentrated on contemplation of the feeling, and for its creation, no separate effort is necessary on the part of the poet. Kuntaka agrees with Ānandavardhana in recognizing the fact that in the process of expressing its own self, the feeling introduces the image of its own accord. Consequently, the image becomes a
constituent of the poetic texture itself, and accordingly, is incapable of being dissociated from the body of poetry.

Thus, *Vakrokti*, to Kuntaka, is a vast concept which owes its origin to the *Kavivyāpāra* and underlies the whole poetic creation. Kuntaka has also affirmed that poetry and its figures have got no separate entities. It is for the sake or convenience that we speak of poetry and its figures but in fact, these two cannot be differentiated and one cannot exist without the other. And when *Vakrokti* implies a departure from common and ordinary usage and is peculiar to the imagination of the poet, it naturally becomes the only possible synonym of beauty in poetry. It is a part and parcel of the poetic tissue itself. As a principle, it underlies all poetic figures which are nothing but different aspects of *Vakrokti* (metaphoric expression). That is why, *Vakrokti* has been used as identical with the generic term *Aloka* and *Rasa* under its very wide, and elastic all-embracing scope.

Ruyyaka has pointed out that the idea of Dhvani has been incorporated in the special form of *Vakrokti*, called *Upačara-vakrata*, which consists in supposed or fancied identification of two objects. It lies, therefore, at the roots of figures like *Rūpaka* etc. and generally speaking, forms the basis of metaphorical expression. Rājaśekhara also maintains that things described in poetry do not delight us and that it is the poetic expression only which delights or disturbs us. Abhinavagupta also believes that poetic beauty ensues from formal and structural features of a poetic composition.

An interesting story recorded by Rājaśekhara in his *Kavya-mimamsa* as to the birth of *Kavyapuruṣa* brings into light the paramount importance attached to metaphoric expression in poetry. Poetry, Rājaśekhara records, is created first by the supreme creator for causing delight to the issueless Goddess of Speech, engaged in deep meditation in a lofty snow-clad peak. As the child is fondled first by the nursing mother, it bursts forth into metrical expression and introducing itself says that it is no other than the supreme expression, the Eternal Verbum, which alone is absolute reality, the universe being the illusionary manifestation of it.19
The very fact that the child identifies with the Eternal Verbum shows that it owes its origin to the rarified speech which lies hidden in the seat of consciousness. When the whole consciousness of the poet becomes captivated by a strong emotional impulse, -- when his mind becomes completely absorbed in contemplation of the emotional mood, the expression rushes forth from his mental plane; and consequently poetry is brought into being. Another notable feature in the introductory speech of Poetry is his identification with the human being. By describing poetry as Kāvyapurūṣa, Rājaśekhara gives expression to the belief that the chief action of the poet consists in giving a new name to a theme, -- in describing one thing in terms of other. This tendency to find out the attributes of one in other, or to state precisely, to ascribe the attributes of one to another, gives rise to the poetic figure of metaphor, which is so important in the realm of poetry. The concept of Kāvyapurūsa, therefore, emphasizes the importance of Metaphor in poetry. The poetic figure gives rise to profound astonishment in the mind of the refined reader through the abruptness of the procedure adopted in bringing disconnected things and images. The dexterity of the poet is adjudged in the introduction of chiselled expressions. All poetical expressions are metaphorical expressions inasmuch as the poet finds out new qualities or actions in the old and the common.

2.3 Simile and Metaphor

It is always the pride of the poet to describe one thing in terms of another, -- to superimpose the attribute belonging to one on another. The ordinary man sees the flowing of the stream as a river and describes it exactly in the same way in which it appears to him to be: the poet however traces the girdle in the rows of birds reclining in its bank and the navel in the whirlpool and accordingly paints the river as a lovely damsel. To describe the river as it is, falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary expression of the common man: to describe the river as it appears to the poet to be on the other hand falls under the ken of poetic experience. Accordingly, the poet is inaccurate both in perception and statement, but nevertheless his inaccuracy is relished, because that is brought into being by exuberance of emotion, which kindles the light of emotion in the mind of the appreciator as well, enabling him to swallow
the charming inaccuracy without any question. Metaphor (taking the term broadly), therefore, is of prime importance in poetry, and it is because of this that Western Aesthetics and Linguistics regard the poetic figure of Metaphor as the fundamental principle underlying all poetical embellishments and poetic language itself. Therefore, to create poetry is to create Metaphor and to create Metaphor is to employ the figurative expression.

Since tropes have cognitive implication — metaphor and metonymy are two major figurative modes (according to Western Aesthetics) whereby people conceptualize their experience. Metonymy, for eg.: ‘Washington has started negotiating with Moscow’, involves only one conceptual domain, in that the mapping or connection between two things is done within the same domain whereas in metaphor, for eg.: ‘He is a lion’ as well as simile, for eg.: ‘He fought like a lion’, there are two conceptual domains, and one is understood in terms of other. Therefore the question is — do metaphors create new insights into the human experience? Or is it more accurate to say that metaphors reflect underlying schemes of thought that themselves are based on fundamental process of figuration?

It is quite testified in our daily experiences that metaphors are used extensively in both literary and non-literary discourse. Similes and metaphors, we realize, are not to be understood in isolation as simple linguistically deviant structures or logical absurdities but as part of a conceptual universe. For example:

i) You are wasting my time.

ii) This gadget will save you hours.

iii) I don’t have time to give you.

In all these three sentences ‘Time is Money’ is the central metaphor and according to Lakoff and Johnson (1981) reflects the notion of time in the Western culture in which it stands as a valuable commodity. In contrast to the Western concept, the Indian concept of time is interestingly different. For example (some metaphors from Hindi):

iv) samaya burā balwāna hai (Time is very powerful.)

v) uskā samaya ā gayā (His time has come = He died.)
The [+ concrete] transformation in the English examples (i – iii) are in contrast to the first two examples (iv - v) in Hindi which transform ‘time’ into [+ supernatural] and the next two (vi - vii) conceiving ‘time’ as something [+ concrete], precious and useful but not valuable as money. Therefore, these examples suggest that metaphors exist in languages and across different cultures. They are a fruitful source of discovering not only the functional aspect of languages but also to capture contrasting attitudes of different speech communities to things around them.

It is also to be kept in mind that in literary (and especially poetic) discourse, “metaphors stress both specificity and colour” whereas in non-literary discourse, “metaphors, even when a novel creation, stress only specificity” (Sapir 10). As stated earlier -- all poetry is figurative. In other words all poetry is metaphorical. What metaphor is in Western thought – a root of all figures and mode of conceptualization, simile is the same in Indian *Alaṃkāraśāstra*. Though simile in Western thought and linguistics has not received the same attention as metaphor, Indian Poetics in fact lists a whole range of similarity figures based on simile (*upamā*).

Hence, before concentrating and discussing metaphoricity/ornamentation of poetic language, one cannot escape from discussing simile as Danḍin says that simile is the mother of all figures (*arthālaṃkāras*) based on similarity. Vāmana also agrees with this view and maintains that *Rūpaka*, *Utpreśā*, *Anavyaya Upameyāpāmā*, *Prativastūpamā*, *Pratipa*, *Parināma*, *Tulyogita*, *Drśānta*, *Nidarsanā*, *Vyatireka* etc. have *upamā* at their roots. Borrowing a term from Rudraṭa, the figures of this category may be called *Aupamamālaka*, which can be further divided into four classes – figures with difference, those involving superimposition, those indicative of superiority, and those which convey parallelism. The scope of this figure is so vast that Appaya Dīkṣita maintains “The same *upamā*, like an actress decked in various garbs, performs on the stage of poesy, capturing thereby the hearts of those readers who are well-versed in poetry.”

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vi) *samaya lagōna*  
(to plant time = to devote time)  

vii) *samaya kātana*  
(to cut time = to pass time)
can be poetry only when the thoughts be transmuted into images with the help of similes and metaphors and sensibility be produced in them.

According to the indigenous view, simile (upamā) is the source of all, or most of the figures of speech. Simile is a figure of speech involving a comparison between two unlike entities. A simile unlike the metaphor compares two things through the use of words such as 'like', 'as', 'as though' to draw attention to similarities about things that are seemingly dissimilar. At times, similes may have about the same effect as a metaphor but similes often focus on a single characteristic of comparison, while metaphors imply a broader scope of equation between the two objects being compared. A simile in literature may be specific and direct or more lengthy and complex.

In Sanskrit poetry, for the production of any imagery, there must be Bimba Pratibimbabhāva or also called Bimbānubimbabhāva i.e. the relation of the reflected (bimba) and the reflecting element (prijabinha) between the thing compared and the standard of comparison. In the thing compared (upameya) the standard of similitude (upamāna) is mirrored or focussed and an image is produced. In technical language, this might be called tinging (rañjana) of the former by the latter. In other words, upameya is tinged with the colour of upamāna and becomes one with it. This is often possible through the process of merging of the latter in the former. In the figure metaphor (Rūpaka), there is seldom this merging or identification between the aforesaid two objects. On the other hand, in the majority of cases, the nature or properties of one object are attributed to another. In the former situation, the soul of one object is transmuted or mirrored into the other, while in the latter there is superimposition or placement of the form of one object on to the other, as if from outside. Therefore, the identification is intrinsic and complete in the former, whereas, if it is identification, it is exterior and superficial in the latter.

Some of the rhetoricians, to name only the representative ones, like Dandin among the old and Mammaṭa among the new have, from different points of view, conceived several varieties of it. Dandin has classified it on the basis of various forms and grades of similitude, subsisting between the standard and the object of
comparison, while the latter has done it from the viewpoint of how this similitude is expressed. Mammata’s *modus operandi* is grammatical, and he has made divisions of simile, as expressed through various primary and secondary suffixes and in compound etc.

In the figure simile, of course, there is numerical difference between the standard of comparison and the object so far as their generic features are concerned, but there is also identity through the medium of common properties. But metaphor is distinguishable from simile, and no word is used expressive of the similitude between the object and the standard. If in the former, it is similitude that charms us, here it is the undivided superimposition of the attributes. But it must be remembered that in metaphor, this superimposition of the standard on the object of similitude, must be based on similarity alone and should only be intentional or simulated and not genuine.

Simile, therefore, is the root-notion of tropes: comparison derived from likeness perceived between two referents. There is clearly a very wide range of choice here, and a successful literary simile will point a likeness not usually discerned yet not so far-reaching as to be purely subjective and therefore uncommunicative. At least, one item generally refers to something perceptible by the senses which foregrounds the other item by its actuality. The comparison may be directly between noun and noun as:

“Thy soul was like a star, and dwelt apart:
Thou hadst a voice whose sound was like the sea.”

*(Wordsworth, ‘London, 1802’)*

“*Rājīvamiva te vakram netre nīlotpale iva*”

*(Your face is like a lotus; two eyes are like two blue lilies)*

*(Dandin Kāvyādarśa, II/16)*

or between a quality shared by two items:

“His legions, angel forms, who lay entranced
I think as autumn leaves that strow the brooks
In Vallombrosa.”

*(Milton, ‘Paradise Lost’, Bk-I)*
In the Western theory, classical rhetoric took the view that metaphor is a kind of abridged simile, a view favoured by literary theories even now (Murray 1931; Nowotny 1962 etc.) and subscribed to by some linguists as well (Abraham 1975; Ortony 1980). Philosophy has generally tend to assign an independent status to metaphor and simile (Cohen 1976; Ricoeur 1978; Davidson 1984). The Indian \textit{Alamkāra} tradition also holds the same view. Now, in the first view, simile is an explicit statement of resemblance between two terms and metaphor a statement of implicit similarity between the two terms; simile and metaphor differ in predication, ‘to be like’ in the former and ‘to be’ in the latter. This notion is behind the view that metaphor is an elliptical simile. Resemblance enforces a comparison between the two terms, and as far as comparison is concerned metaphor is more concise than simile because of the superimposition of the tenor over the vehicle. In Indian Poetics, it may be pointed out, \textit{nīpaka} is defined in terms of \textit{nīgarāṇa} (superimposition) of \textit{upamāṇa} (vehicle) over \textit{upameya} (tenor).

Aristotle was the first to talk of metaphor as “the greatest thing” in poetry and “the mark of genius” (Poetics, 1459a). He defines metaphor as: “Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy” (Poetics, 1457b). Metaphor imparts liveliness by surprising the listener, like a well-constructed “riddle” (Poetics, 1458a), it attracts by conveying a new idea different from the one the hearer expected. Two important ideas spring from his definition:

a) metaphor is a matter of words, because metaphoric transference takes place at the level of words, not sentences.

b) metaphor is viewed as deviant from literal usage because it involves the transfer of a name to some object to which that name does not properly belong.

Aristotle establishes that metaphor is based on the similarity between two things. He articulates the \textit{Elliptical Simile Theory of Metaphor}, in which a metaphor is taken as being a comparison abbreviated by dropping the word ‘like’. Hence, metaphors are implied analogies or elliptical similes. He says that only that poet is great who is a
master of metaphor. It is one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilar (Poetics, 1459a). Aristotle’s treatment of metaphor set the tone for Classical and Renaissance texts. From Locke to Bachelard, thinkers took it mere decorative and a mere distraction which in Bachelard’s phrase, ‘seduces the Reason’.

Twentieth century has witnessed an explosion of theories of metaphor. I.A. Richards (1936) who studied metaphoric language closely and first gave the idea that metaphor is composed of two components -- ‘vehicle’ (now also called ‘source’ or ‘base’) and ‘tenor’ (now also called ‘topic’ or ‘target’), contends that a metaphor not only consists of the words used but a ‘transaction between the contexts’. He says: “In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is the resultant of their interaction” (Philosophy 93). The co-presence of the tenor and vehicle results in the meaning which is not attainable without their interaction. Repudiating the traditional (eighteenth-century) concept of metaphor, he maintains that “the vehicle is not merely an embellishment of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged by it” and that “vehicle and tenor in cooperation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either” of them (Philosophy 100).

Max Black25 (1962) elaborating on Aristotle and building on Richards’ (1962) work takes metaphor as a predication whose expression is a sentence. He proposes an Interaction Theory, stressing the conceptual role of metaphor. Mary Hesse (1966), Nelson Goodman (1968), Donald Davidson (1978) also contributed in the study of metaphoric language with their theories.

The Experimentalist Theory of Metaphor of Lakoff and Johnson (1981) stresses the systematic coherence of metaphor and its role grounding the human conceptual system. The conceptual view of metaphor also explains why people find such great beauty and power in poetry and literary prose. It also establishes that verse embellishes the more mundane ways of thinking about our worldly
experiences. Dedre Gentner (1982) proposes evaluative procedures by which to determine what makes some metaphor better than others in serving cognitive ends. *The Semantic Field Theory of Metaphor* of Kittay (1987) implores the linguistic tools of semantic field theory showing how metaphor transfers the semantic structures and relations from the semantic domain of the source to that of the topic. However, this view also assumes that the second-order-meanings peculiar to metaphor arise only when selection restriction rules have been violated or when some pragmatic anomaly is noted. Winifred Nowottny (1962), Alexander Bain (1988), R. Levin (1980) have also furnished the study of metaphoric language with their insights. Literary critics such as Christine Brooke-Rose (1958) and Wheelwright (1962) have also given sufficient indications of the direction, the study of metaphoric language is likely to follow in the Western world.

Though certain educational theorists like R. Miller in “The dubious case of metaphors in educational writings” in *Educational Theory*, Vol-26 (1976): 174-181 adopt the position that metaphoric expressions/metaphors should be avoided for they are merely stylistic devices that tend to hide the real meaning of a message, an idea that has roots in the writings of Aristotle, yet the use of metaphor does not lead to the loss of precision and clarity, because many metaphors do not allow for literal paraphrase. In such cases there is no loss, for either a metaphor is used or nothing at all is said. “One cannot blame language literal or figurative for the misdeeds of those charlatans who abuse it!” (Ortony, On Nature 398).

Even in the Romantic period, when poetry gained a new ascendancy as the paradigm of literature itself, the Romantics, reacting against the rhetoric of the Augustan Rome and reaching back to Aristotle and Plato, as Vico had done, gave an enormous impetus to metaphor as the dynamic founding trope of poetry and literary culture. Two views are to be distinguished here, which ultimately influence the modern tradition in different ways — the Organicism of S.T.Coleridge (1772-1834) and the Romantic Platonism of P.B.Shelley (1792-1822), both of which make equally far reaching claims for metaphor but by different routes.
Metaphor, for Coleridge, is a part of the interanimation of words and his view is neither that of 'simple replacement' nor 'substitution' nor 'comparison' but of 'organic unity'. His view is anti-empiricist as metaphor has the form of a duality but is always surmounted by a unity by the mind of the perceiver. For Coleridge, language is not a conduit but an expressive medium for the artist and thinker alike, the ground for the work of imagination. For Coleridge, the imagination is: “The power by which one image or feeling is made to modify many others and by sort of fusion to force many into one... combining many circumstances into one moment of thought to produce that ultimate end of human thought and human feeling, unity” (Biographia Ch.2). Metaphor is the linguistic realization of this unity. It is the linguistic means by which we bring together and fuse into a unity diverse thoughts and thereby re-form our perception of the world. In his ‘Lectures On Shakespeare’ (1808, pub.1836.), Coleridge closely analyses how metaphors reveal an inexhaustible mutual reactiveness amongst their elements which create an unparaphrasable richness of meaning.

It will not be out of place to mention here that Coleridge’s view of ‘organic form’ has been heavily influential in the modern period, developed, transformed and hardened into the loose collection of doctrines known as Anglo-American Formalism. The notion that a metaphor is a vital part of language’s power to generate new meaning is an assumption which underlies three or more different movements in poetry and in this tradition, the Romantic view of metaphor is preserved but renamed as assimilated into certain other related terms, for example, ‘image’ and ‘symbol’.

Shelley in “A Defence of Poetry” argues that language was in its beginning not a set of atomic labels, of names, as the empiricists would argue, but “the chaos of a cyclic poem” (Defence 228). Shelley is of the opinion that in the infancy of society every author is necessarily a poet, because language itself is poetry. A defence of poetry amounts to a defence of metaphor, which is the agent by which language produces new meaning. “Their language (i.e. the poets) is vitally metaphorical” (Defence 227). Metaphor for Shelley is the un-perception of analogy
and hence the governing trope of language and poetic art and therefore the language of poetry.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that a language without metaphor and metonymy is inconceivable: these two forces are inherent in the basic structure of human speech. Metaphor creates new reality from which the original appears to be unreal. For Richards, metaphor is the "constitutive form" of language and not merely "a grace or ornament or added power of language" or "a sort of happy extra trick with words" (Philosophy 90). Again, I.A. Richards in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* speaks of metaphor as: "That Metaphor is the most omnipresent principle of language can be shown by more observation, we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it." (92).

Whether occupied with metaphors novel or commonplace, theorists of language and of cognition have come to recognize that no understanding of language and linguistic capacities is complete without an adequate account of metaphor. Similes and metaphors provide expression for experiences and concepts for which literal language seems insufficient, thereby increasing the range of articulation possible within language. Metaphor, therefore, is not just a mode of language but a mode of thought. It is the fundamental language of poetry, although it is common on all levels and in all kinds of language. Metaphor and other tropes also provide much of the foundation for understanding of cultures.

2.3.1 **Laksanā as Metaphor**

Kittay (1987) has discussed metaphor as second-order discourse. It has a linguistic structure and cognitive force which will not submit to the logical form of first-order discourse. It is an indirect speech act which has a second-order meaning which is "obtained when features of the utterance and its context indicate to the hearer or reader that the first-order meaning of the expression is either unavailable or is not appropriate — but when the first order meaning of the words of the utterance are none the less relevant to its proper interpretation" (Metaphor 144). This is what makes the second-order meaning *second-order* and not simply another, alternative meaning.
It is also noteworthy that the concept of metaphor of the West is treated as *Laksanā* in the Indian *Alamkāraśāstra*. The poetic figures of metonymy and synecdoche – from the Indian Rhetoric point of view are also the cases of *Lakṣanā* – (Ruyyaka) (qtd. in Giri 28). Abhinavagupta, the learned commentator of the *Nātyaśāstra*, throws floodlight on the concept of *Lakṣanā* in his *Abhinavabhārtī*. He incorporates in his magnanimous commentary in this connection as many as ten views held by his predecessors and remarks, “*idam tu dasapakṣyam vastu*” (Tarapada 51). Each of them refers to at least a particular novel feature of the *Laksanā* and some of them are for special consideration.

In the opinion of the upholder of the first view, Abhinavagupta says, *Lakṣanā* is that which gives rise to the beauty of the body of Poetry. Moreover, *Lakṣanā* can be distinguished from the *Alamkāra* (taking the term in a restricted sense), another beautifying principle, due to the fact that the former belongs to the body of Poetry in an unseparable relation (*aprthaksiddha*) while the latter resides there in a separable relation (*prthaksiddha*).²⁶

Advocates of the third view take *Lakṣanā* in a different light. They prove their novelty in their speculation of three different activities (*Vyāpāras*) corresponding to the three vibrations (*Parispandas*) of the poet’s genius. They maintain that when the poet’s imagination starts functioning, the feeling and the feeling tone are brought into being: when the poet desires to describe something with the help of words, the second vibration acts and the wealth of imagery pours in: when again the poet resolves to combine words with other words and also ideas with other ideas, the third vibration is called into play. This time, the sound and sense that constitutes the body of Poetry and those elements which reveal *Guṇas* like Ślesa etc., manifest themselves. The elements that reveal *Guṇas*, as is pointed out elsewhere, are *Lakṣanas*. The *Lakṣana*, again, is like a pleasant touch in the body consisting of sound and sense. Considered in the light of this third view, thus, the *Lakṣanā* is the result of the third vibration of the poet’s imagination and adds grace to the body of Poetry, while the *Guṇa* and the *Alamkāra* are the effects of the first and the second vibrations respectively.
According to the adherents of the seventh view, Abhinavagupta points out, the *Lakṣaṇa* is an attribute causing the beauty of poetry and since it consists in the natural beauty of Poetry, it is competent enough to make Poetry appreciative even if poetry is not adorned with *Ālanīkāra*. Again, the *Lakṣaṇa*, in their opinion, is poetry itself. Thus, the literary critics holding this view make the remarkable improvement in ascribing a special power to *Lakṣaṇa* — the power which exclusively can create beauty.  

Therefore, metaphor, which is the underlying principle of poetic language according to the West, is a case of *Lakṣaṇa* according the viewpoint of the East. But, though the Indian poetic tradition takes metaphor a step ahead from *lakṣaṇa* i.e. towards suggestion yet both the occidental and the oriental viewpoint agree on this point that metaphoric language is poetic language.

### 2.3.2 Analyzing Simile and Metaphor

Most linguistic theories presuppose that literal meaning serves as the foundation for figurative language interpretation, with figurative meanings being parasitic upon literal ones. Scholars look to literal meaning to clarify muddles and confusions of meaning and as a starting point for all considerations of figurative language. Literal meanings are thought to provide the answer to the riddle of how one state of intersubjectivity or shared meaning can be attained by linguistic means between people with different subjective worlds. One way to begin seeking the literal meaning of a word or concept is to consult the dictionary. Lexicographers work hard to pin down the meaning of words, and so the dictionary is a good place to begin the search for literal meaning.

Webster’s Third International Dictionary defines the word *literal* as having the following senses: (a) according to the letter of the scriptures, (b) adhering to fact or to the ordinary construction or primary meaning of a term or expression (c) being without exaggeration or embellishment, plain, unadorned, or unimaginative, (d) characterized by a concern mainly with facts, and (e) represented word by word. These different but related senses of the word *literal* capture some of the ideals of
language and meaning that have been implicitly used in understanding what appears to be the special or unique about figurative language.

Figurative expressions, therefore, are “non-literal utterances” (Searle in Ortony, Metaphor 96). In a literal utterance, the speaker means what he says; that is, literal sentence meaning and the speaker’s utterance meaning are the same whereas in a non-literal utterance they are different. The difference between propositional meaning and intended meaning may be manifested in different ways in different contexts. Therefore, literal expression is an unmotivated sign whereas a metaphorical expression is a motivated sign. As Guiraud points out, “Motivation frees the sign from convention ... new meanings are created by an open poetic system.” (Semiology 26).

Figurative language, in contrast to the literal, is multi-dimensional. Different kinds of meanings are recovered during the interpretation of figurative language. Speakers/Readers may be able to state the set of conditions under which ‘literal’ sentences such as ‘Coal is black’, are true or false, but this seems practically impossible to do for figurative expressions, such as ‘Marriage is like a furnace’ which may possess many potential meanings and a paradigm of metaphoric relations. Therefore, it is the indeterminate nature of much figurative language that makes its meaning seem special and, by contrast, literal meaning so ordinary and primary. This figurative language is the product which is obtained by processing poetic vision.

Metaphors and similes are figurative language itself. Peirce talks of similes and metaphors as qualisigns—a sign which signifies through its abstract quality independent of any spatio-temporal relations. But in Henle’s view, the explicit character of simile robs it of its figurativeness:

“Simile contains no terms with figurative sense ... both sides of the comparison are overtly stated instead of being symbolized through the other. Similarity is explicitly mentioned not used symbolically” (Henle 181).
Dropping of comparative particle (like) affects the process of comprehension in metaphor more fundamentally than is apparent in implicit and explicit character of metaphor and simile respectively. And as Beardsley puts it,

“once the grounds of a simile are known the enigma of the metaphor is dissipated and all problems of explanation vanish” (qtd. in Ricoeur, Rule 94).

Bit a basic difference is that whereas simile, because of the comparative particle in its structure, is committed to a point-by-point comparison, metaphor with its equivalence between two semantically incompatible terms points to both resemblance and difference, generating a tension between literal and figurative meaning. A metaphor rationalizes the semantic incompatibility by interaction between the two terms, a simile simply focusses on similarities and ignores the dissimilarities.

Even structurally all similes are not easily reducible to metaphors; for example:

“Thou, from whose unseen presence the leaves dead
Are driven, like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing”

(Shelley’s: Ode to the West Wind)

Nor can metaphors be always expanded to similes. This is especially true of analogical metaphors, for example, “creeping disease” analogical to “creeping child” and “sowing dissension” analogical to “sowing seeds”. Similarity, therefore, has a different role in metaphor and simile. In other words, simile projects pre-existing similarities, metaphor creates similarities. Black has also emphasized the superiority of metaphor over simile:

“Literal comparison lacks the ambience, and suggestiveness, and the imposed ‘view’ of the primary subject upon which a metaphor’s power to illumine depends.”

But this does not detract from the intrinsic but distinct merit of simile itself. Nowottny says in this connection:
“Suggestion, then, is one potentiality of metaphor. It may, however, well be true that suggestion is usually better done by simile … It says the things alike; it is up to us to see why; the things may be alike in a number of ways … just because simile is not so peculiar in form as metaphor is, it leaves open a much wider range of ways of comparing one thing to another.” (Nowotny 66-67).

2.3.2.1 A Case of Deviation

It is also to be considered that Metaphor is a deviation at the level of selection. (Jakobson)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axis of combination</th>
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<tr>
<td>Axis of selection</td>
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It is a semantic mapping from one conceptual domain to another, often using anomalous or deviant language. There is not perhaps any figure of speech so pleasing as a metaphor – wrote the eighteenth century linguistic thinker, James Harris. A metaphor involves simultaneously a paradigmatic relation between the literal element it replaces and the figurative one it introduces, and a syntagmatic relation between the literal and metaphorical elements in the linguistic environment.

What makes particular metaphors noticeable and memorable – for example, particularly apt scientific and literary metaphors – is the special, non-automatic use to which ordinary, automatic thoughts are put. Many linguists, literary theorists, and psychologists miss this important point because they fail to acknowledge the systematic conceptual underpinning of the vast number of linguistic expressions that are metaphorical and creative. What is frequently seen as a creative metaphorical expression of some idea is often only a spectacular instantiation of specific metaphorical entailments that arise from a small set of conceptual metaphors shared by many individuals within a culture. Although poets may present novel
instantiations for these preexisting metaphorical mappings, readers/appreciators do not necessarily have to draw novel mappings in any algorithmic sense in order to understand poetic instantiations of conventional metaphors. Poets do on occasion create entirely novel metaphors that demand new mappings from the source domain to target domains, but these are relatively rare.

In poetry, a metaphor may perform varied functions, from the mere noting of a likeness to the evocation of a swarm of associations; it may exist as a minor beauty or it may be the central concept or controlling image of the poem. In the uncommonness of expression lies the beauty of the poetry. To make his meaning perfectly clear, the poet has often to make use of comparisons and especially when abstract ideas are to be expressed. Therefore, metaphors are well known as a stylistic feature of literature, but in fact are found in almost all language use, other than simple explanation of physical events in the material world. All abstract vocabulary is metaphorical. The chief idea at the root of using metaphorical language is to explain the unfamiliar through the familiar and the composition will undoubtedly turn out to be an efficient, effective and elegant piece of creative writing.

The communicative function of metaphoric language is traditionally focused on three grounds:

a) It provides a way of expressing ideas that would be extremely difficult to convey using literal language.

b) It provides a particular means of communication.

c) It helps to capture the vividness of our phenomenological experience.

Researchers have also noted the high incidence of metaphoric language when speakers/poets talked about emotions. It is also observed that metaphoric language is more prevalent in description of intense as compared with mild emotional states. This also stands true for Wordsworth and Kālidāsa since the similes and metaphors used by them furnish conceptually rich, image evoking conceptualizations.

Besides, extensive psychological research demonstrates that topics and vehicles play different roles in metaphor comprehension. For example, properties of the vehicle are better cues for recall of metaphors than properties of the topic.
Metaphors are also rated more comprehensible when the metaphoric grounds are properties of the vehicle rather than the topic (Malgady & Johnson, 1980). The vehicle's imageability correlates more highly with metaphor's aptness and comprehension than does imageability of a metaphor's topic (Marschark, Katz, & Paivio, 1983). Several series of studies showed that judgements of both goodness and comprehension for metaphors could reliably be predicted from knowledge of the relationship between the topic and the vehicle. Good metaphors, ones that were also easily interpretable, were those in which the topic and the vehicle terms shared a number of common properties and had a number of salient high frequency common properties. These results support a perceptual account of metaphoric comprehension suggesting that metaphoric interpretation involve experiencing an essentially perceptual context in which a metaphor makes sense. However, context can equally change the quality of figurative language. Many theorists in linguistic and philosophy suggest that if a metaphor were interpreted literally, it would be grammatically deviant, semantically anomalous, conceptually absurd, or simply false.

Speech act theorists like Searle (1979), Cohen (1976), Loewenberg (1973), Mack (1975) propose and suggest that metaphoric utterance is a particular type of speech act, with its own illocutionary force and accompanying set of felicity conditions. Words always retain their locutionary meaning, but when they are used to request, warn or make metaphors, the listener notices that there is something odd about them and infers unstated suggestion or meanings i.e. illocutions. Therefore, it is an indirect speech act. In indirect speech acts:

'...one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another ... the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their shared background information both linguistic and non-linguistic together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.'
Hence, understanding metaphor starts at the earliest moments of sentence processing, where the literal meaning of a sentence is analyzed, and proceeds to the later moments, when the speaker's meaning is grasped. Metaphor is born at the temporal point at which a speaker's metaphoric meaning is recovered \(^{36}\) i.e. to use Indian terminology, starting at \textit{abhidhā}, then processing the literal meaning to have \textit{laks\=anā}, and then proceeding to grasp the speaker’s metaphoric meaning – \textit{vyāñjanā}.

Searle also talks about those figurative expressions in which the consciousness of deviation has vanished. Such expressions are called frozen figures or dead metaphors because formally they are figurative expressions but functionally they are literal expressions. He says that a figure has three stages in its life: live, stale and frozen. A fresh figure is a truly live figure and shows maximum semantic deviation. A graphical representation for the literal, metaphoric (simple), metaphoric (open-ended) utterance would be:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Literal utterance:} \\
\text{\includegraphics{diagram}} \\
\end{array}
\]
A speaker says that S is P and means it. Therefore, the sentence meaning and the utterance meaning is the same. There is no deviation of any kind.

Metaphoric Utterance (Simple):

\[ S = R \]

\textbf{(Connotative Sense)}

eg. : My wife is a cow.

A speaker says S is P but means metaphorically that S is R. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through literal sentence meaning.
Metaphoric Utterance (open-ended):

(Suggestive Sense) eg.: The hamlet is on the Ganges.

Here, a speaker says S is P but means metaphorically and indefinite range of meanings, S is R₁, S is R₂, etc...

Patañjali, the father of the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, refers to four causes which lie behind the secret of transference viz. a relation between the container and the contained, a relation between the imitator and the imitated, relation of proximity and finally the relation of association. While discussing the relation between the imitator and the imitated, he says that ascription of a new tribute to an old thing is caused through the relation existing between the imitator and the
imitated, or in other words, the relation of similarity. Commenting on this observation of Patañjali, Kaiyata cites familiar examples like ‘The boy is a lion’ and ‘The carrier is a bull’ and says that in these cases the relation of similarity leads to the application of the term ‘lion’ to the boy and that of the term ‘cow’ to the carrier individual. Like the relation of similarity, that of proximity leads to employment of the figurative to signify a thing other than that which is actually conveyed by it. As an example of this case, Patañjali cites the oft-quoted illustration, ‘The hamlet on the Ganges’, where the salient trait of the flowing stream is superimposed on the bank on account of its proximity to the gliding river. By explaining the process involved in the conceptual cognition ensuing from such expressions, Patañjali and his successors recognize the process of comprehension as characterized by the peculiar feature. This fundamental principle receives further treatment at the hands of Bhartrhari and Nāgeśa.

Nāgeśa, the great polymath of the eighteenth century, defines the secondary power of signification as the function which leads to understanding other than that conveyed by the primary function of denotation. In the expression, ‘A hamlet on the Ganges’, the generality Gangeshood or the salient trait belonging to the celestial river is ascribed to the bank lying close to it thereby making superimposition. Nāgeśa accepts this process of conceptual cognition and says that as the bank is not identical with the flowing stream, its knowledge as a flowing stream is erroneous in character and when this is so, the understanding of the excess of coolness and purity is not likely to take place. In controverting this contention, Nāgeśa introduces the operation of the supernormal function of suggestion, and says that the absolute identity of the bank and the flowing stream is comprehended through the process of Vyañjanā, which appears in the wake of the secondary power of signification. And the knowledge caused through the transcendental function of suggestion is incapable of being challenged or controverted by ordinary instruments of cognition, since the poetic function of suggestion does not follow the path of reason or logic.

It is because of this that in this attempt to refute the viewpoint of Mukula Bhaṭṭa that while in the case of the qualitative secondary power, the secondary is
experienced as distinct from the primary – the Sanskrit theoretician maintains that in all cases of indication, there arises the comprehension of the sense of identity between the literal and the non-literal, and this comprehension is caused through the function of suggestion.\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, this helps the literary critic to cherish his fondness for the poetic figure Metaphor which does not tax the intelligence of the appreciator, but rather appeals to his aesthetic instinct, being created by the artist’s upsurge of emotional mood.

The Interaction view is perhaps the dominant theory in the multidisciplinary study of metaphor which also corresponds to the \textit{Dhvani} theory in Indian Poetics to a certain degree. According to the Interaction view, at the earliest moment of comprehension of a metaphorical utterance, listeners project two conceptual domains, linguistically represented by the topic and vehicle terms, onto one other (an early comprehension \textit{process}) to arrive at the metaphorical meaning or meanings that highlight the emergent similarity between the two terms (a later interpretation \textit{product}). The contrast of the two domains to which the topic and the vehicle refer results in a ‘parallel implication complex’ that produces emergent meanings not directly limited to speakers’ or writers’ communicative intentions. These later products of metaphoric understanding seem open-ended, extended beyond the immediate first-time understanding of a metaphor. Therefore, \textit{dhvani} keeps on reverberating which is suggestive of numerous meanings.

Provided with the new ways of looking at metaphor by recent studies --- metaphor is itself a creative act. New meanings are made possible by the interaction of terms in a metaphor and not as a result of shifting attention to marginal aspects of meaning or of highlighting accidental properties of things. But the fundamental conceptualization of experience that provides the ground for these creative acts reflect the conventional metaphors we have been and we ordinary live by. And what do poets do? They, again, do not create new conceptualizations of experience but talk about the metaphorical entailments of ordinary conceptual mapping in new ways. This figurative discourse is suggestive of the poetic mind and the present study tries to find out the suggestiveness of selected metaphoric/figurative expressions created
by Wordsworth and Kālidāsa which again provides an opportunity to see the stylistic functioning of the poetic imagination encapsulated in their poetic minds expressed though their words. In short, generally speaking, simile and metaphor can be characteristically distinguished as under:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Characteristics that distinguish Metaphor and Simile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connector/Indicator (As or Like)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can specify the ground of comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground of comparison is spelt out in succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of equality and inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal meaning is clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenor and vehicle are non-identical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not such but simile can be proved out of a metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concise and immediate because of superimposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inexplicit with regards to both the ground of comparison and the things compared, hence ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context and the logical principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary meaning is always basic and the figurative meaning is desired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenor and vehicle are identical (Hypothesis is created from &quot;what is there&quot; in the text.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also remarkable that simile and metaphor serve to express different types of metaphorical comparisons. The differences can be felt in relation to their function in the context of a text. The linguistic discourse function of metaphor is to:
i) express meanings – i.e. abhidhā (denotation)

ii) embody ideas – i.e. laksanā (indication)

iii) convey a message – i.e. vyavājanā (suggestion)

So similes and metaphors must be analyzed as:

i) expression – by investigating their vocabulary and grammar

ii) ideas – by analyzing their propositional content and knowledge structure.

iii) messages – by explaining their pragmatic structure and functions in terms of co-text and context.

These present groundwork for a conceptual taxonomy of metaphor.

2.4 Analytical Apparatus

Unlike most linguistic analysis, stylistics is essentially evaluative and therefore comparative – an assessment of the effectiveness of linguistic choices, relative to certain aesthetic intentions and within the constraints of certain expressive means. As a result, stylistics can never be purely objective or descriptive. Both in matters of details and general conclusions, all stylistic analysis depend heavily on the aesthetic judgement of the stylistician and the theoretical assumptions of the analysis. For this judgement, one needs an analytical apparatus or a model. It defines, shapes and analyzes text to provide a better understanding. It saves style-analysis from acting at random and provides it originality, reality and objectivity.

Model is that technique or frame-work on the basis of which analysis of a work of art is possible. Besides, it can facilitate the analysis by focusing on specific points and structures. In order to establish a model, four basic requirements are to be taken into consideration to make it objective, systematic, orderly and methodical:

1. A model should be capable to underline the linguistic variation. It should classify the provided systematic description and contextual quality.

2. It should have a cohesion and coherence for critical appreciation and evaluation of the text.
2. It must have the adequacy i.e. it should have the potentiality to ascertain and represent the style-marker.

3. It should have the comprehensiveness so to explain the categorical and probabilistic rules.

Model, thus, enables us to know the specialty and significance of a text.

No single Western theory provides comprehensive account of how people understand all kinds of metaphorical language, given all the temporal moments of understanding that are discussed by metaphor scholars. Some theories best explain aspects of metaphor recognition (the anomaly and speech act views); others best account for metaphor interpretation (the domains interaction, salience imbalance, structure mapping, and the class inclusion models). Among them, the conceptual structure view, taking the term in a broader sense, is best to explain many aspects of metaphor understanding, including some parts of comprehension, interpretation, and appreciation. On the basis of the above, I have evolved the nature of the model of the stylistic process on which the work is based as stylistics is the study of what is extra-logical in language.

The metaphoric language is deviant and "semantically dense"; it works as under:

```
| Background ----------------► Idea ◄---------------- Conceptual Structure |
| Foreground ----------------► Utterance ◄---------------- Metaphoric Structure |
```

To accomplish the task of a comparative stylistic analysis of ornamentation, an analytical apparatus is required to testify, analyze and evaluate the selected works of both the writers. Since no one befitting model/analytical apparatus is available either in English or in Sanskrit alone, which would analyze both these languages in one, a new model is evolved and designed in the given perspective:
Thus, I have taken a four dimensional approach based on six steps analytical apparatus to analyze metaphor/simile (metaphoric language) in the pretext of comprehension, recognition, interpretation and appreciation (emotive value).

Figuring out speaker’s attitudes and beliefs is the key aspect of metaphoric understanding. It is the recovery of these nonpropositional affective and sometimes poetic effects that make figurative language so different from the so-called literal speech. All language interpretation takes place in real time ranging from the first milliseconds of processing to the long-term reflective analysis. This temporal continuum may roughly be divided into moments corresponding to linguistic comprehension, recognition, interpretation and appreciation.

Comprehension refers to the immediate moment-by-moment process of creating meaning for utterances. These moment-by-moment processes are mostly unconscious and involve the analysis of various linguistic information for eg:
phonology, lexical access, syntax, which in combination with context and real-world knowledge, allows listeners/readers to figure out what an utterance means or speaker/poet intends. Recognition refers to the conscious identification of the products of comprehension as types and in the present study as metaphorical. Interpretation refers to the analysis of the products of comprehension as tokens which include a particular set of entailments that can be drawn from metaphoric expressions. It presents the conscious reflection about what a text or speaker/poet means. Finally, Appreciation refers to some aesthetic judgement given to the product as either a type or token. This is not an obligatory part of understanding linguistic meaning because listeners/readers can easily comprehend utterances or texts without automatically making an aesthetic judgement about what has been understood. Psychological evidences have shown that comprehension and appreciation refer to distinct types of mental processes.

Hence, the present study analyzes the selected verses making three heads with two sub-heads each i.e. six steps analysis and then adding the aesthetic dimension through appreciation which is one basic characteristic of stylistic analysis. The first head is labeled as Expression which presents the linguistic structure. Phonology is not taken into account since it is not possible to encompass it in the present study. The present analysis would take into account Syntax and Lexis as two sub-heads. The second head is labelled as Proposition which would try to encapture the Propositional content (proposition can be regarded as the bridge between language and thought) and the Conceptual structure of an utterance. The third head is termed as Message which is based on the co-text and the context, and which would take into account the Pragmatic content as well as the Emotive and Cognitive content.

Besides, the structural difference of English and Sanskrit has also been kept in mind. Sanskrit is an inflectional language. An inflexion (vibhakti) is the name of that suffix (pratyaya) which informs about case and number. Therefore, the meaning of a sentence depends upon an inflexion instead word order (śabda-krama). There are three numbers (vaćan) and seven inflexions in Sanskrit. These seven inflexions
interact with numbers and become twenty-one. It has three genders (liṅga) and six cases (kāraka). Verbs in Sanskrit are of two kinds: primitive and derivative. There are six tenses (kāla) and four moods (vṛtytīyān). It has three voices (vaṭya) and three persons (purūṣa).

Syntax deals with the mode of arranging words in sentences. Of the three divisions of syntax—Concord, Government and Order, the Syntax of Sanskrit is mainly concerned with the first two; Syntax in English depends principally upon the last. In Sanskrit, which is rich in inflexion, the relation, which one word bears to another in a sentence is determined by its grammatical form, and no change occurs in the meaning of the sentences, how-so-ever the order of words be changed. But in English, deficient in inflexion, ‘order’ is everything. Change the order of words and there is a corresponding change in the meaning. Sanskrit syntax also takes further into account the meaning and use of participles; the various tenses and moods and participles.

Keeping this in view, the metaphoric structures in English are analysed according to the correct syntactic order if syntactic deviance is located whereas in the examples of Sanskrit, I have tried to maintain the order of items as given in the text.

Notes

1. The term refers to specific linguistic devices, i.e., deviation and parallelism, that are used in literary texts in a functional and condensed way to enhance the meaning potential of the text. This device also provides the reader with the possibility of aesthetic experience. For details see Jan Mukarovsky, 1970. This theory was further refined in British stylistics, most notably by Geoffrey Leech.

2. Deviation corresponds to the traditional idea of poetic license: the writer of literature is allowed— in contrast to the everyday speaker—to deviate from rules, maxims, or conventions. These may involve the language, as well as literary traditions or expectations set up by the text itself which results in
some degree of surprise in the reader. Cases of neologism, live metaphor, or ungrammatical sentences etc. are clear examples of deviation.


8. a) *Niyatikē taniyamaraḥhitām hlaḍāikamayā mananyaparatantrām / Navarasaručirām nirmitim ādadhaibhārati kaverjayati // – Kavyaprakasā, l/1.*

(b) *Prabhusammitaśabḍa-pradhānavedādīśastre bhyaḥ*

*Suḥr sammitārthatatparyavav purāṇā di tihasēbhyaścā Saṃdārthayorgunabhāvena rasāṅgabhūtatavyāpārapraṃ - Vaṇatayā vilakṣanām yat kāvyam lokottaravarnana-nipuṇakavikarṇa... – Kavyaprakāśa, Vṛtti on l/2.*


10. *Śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam – Kavyālaṃkāra l/16.*

11. *Śabda-bhidhey alamkāra-bhedāḥ īṣṭam dvayam tu naḥ – Kavyālaṃkāra ll/15.*


19. *Yad-etat vānmayam viśvam-arthāmūrtya vivarttaḥ / So 'ṣmī kāvyapumānum-anma pādaun vandeyā tāvakau // – Kāvyamāṁsā, III.*


21. Metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is not a matter of Language but thought process. They have ensued this point in “Conceptual Metaphors in Everyday Language” in M. Johnson, ed. (1981): 286-328.

22. *upmaikā śaivalaśi saṃprāpta ēitrabhūmikā bhedaḥ / rāja-yati kāvyavatge nirvānā tadvidāṃ cetaḥ // – Kuvalayananda, p. 2*

23. Simile is seen as a mother of all figures. For further details see Appaya Dīksiṭā Cītramāṁśā ed. K. P. Sukla (New Delhi: Vani Vihara, 1965) 43.


25. Black’s initial formulation appears in “Metaphor” proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S. 55 (1954-55): 273-294. He has discussed that a metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the “primary” subject and the “secondary” one. The duality of reference is marked by the contrast between the metaphorical statement’s focus (the word or words used nonliterally) and the surrounding literal frame.


28. The term from Searle has been valuably discussed in D. Savan *An Introduction to C. S. Peirce’s “Semiotics”,* Part-I, (Victoria University Press, Toronto: 1976) 11.


37. ‘Simho māṇavakah ‘gaurvāhīkaḥ ’ ityādāvapi tāḍādharmyāttād-rūpyāropattacch abdapravṛttiḥ – Pradīpa , Mahābhāṣya , p. 503.

38. Pare tu āropitaśakatāvacchada rūpena śakyaiva tatpadavācyatvena prasiddhānyavaktitbodhe vyaktivīsesabodhe vā lākṣneti vyavahāraḥ. – Nāgēsa, Vaiyākarasiddhāntalaghumaṇiṣu, p. 133.

