CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE (CONTD.) NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA AND MINĀṂŚA SCHOOLS.

The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas regard knowledge as a quality of soul and is described as something analogous to light. Knowledge is an adventitious quality of the soul as it is a product. The soul is the inherent cause of knowledge. The knowledge is produced in the soul and, therefore, is conceived as its quality.

The Bṛhaṇa Mīmāṁsakas regard knowledge as an imperceptible activity produced by the collocation of several factors such as the cogniser, the object, physical conditions etc. They hold that the imperceptible subjective activity known as knowledge produces its effect in the object. It is by virtue of the imperceptible cognitive process that the thing which becomes its object gets the quality of ('cognisedness'). They think that we do not have the direct knowledge of cognition which reveals the object. We directly know the object as something cognised and infer the cognition from the consciousness of the mārgas 'cognisedness' which is an adventitious property of the object. The Prabhākaraś also distinguish between the cognitive process and its result. But they hold that the cognitive process which is imperceptible produces its result in the soul. The product of the cognitive process is called knowledge. Thus, the Prabhākaraś agree with the Naiyāyikas that knowledge is an adventitious quality of the soul. However, the former maintain that the knowledge is produced by an imperceptible cognitive process. The Naiyāyikas think that the assumption of the imperceptible cognitive process over and above the cognition which qualifies the soul is unwarranted and unnecessary. The verb 'know' in 'I know the jar' does not mean the activity of knowing. It simply means that I am qualified by the knowledge of the jar.

This difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas is rooted
in their different theories of causation. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that the collocation of the causal factors produces an imperceptible activity which produces a result. The Naiyāyikas reject the assumption of an intermediary link between the collocation of the causal factors and the production of the result. They, however, do not deny the existence of activity or movement altogether. What they contend is simply this that every 'verb' does not mean a specific activity. For example, the very 'cook' in 'Devadatta cooks rice' does not mean any specific activity over and above the movements of Devadatta's hands involved in arranging the utensils, fire etc. The statement that 'Devadatta cooks rice' means that the arrangement of certain conditions by Devadatta is followed by the softening of the rice contained in the cooking pot.

Similarly, the verb 'know' in 'I know the jar' does not mean a specific activity. The statement expresses a cognitive experience consisting of three factors - I - the subject, jar - the object, know - the knowledge. What is exactly the meaning of 'know' in this statement? It cannot mean an imperceptible activity. It is self contradictory to say that an imperceptible activity is an element in the conscious experience expressed as 'I know the jar'. 'I know the jar' means that I am qualified by the knowledge of the jar. It conveys the awareness of myself as possessing the knowledge of the jar. If knowledge were an imperceptible activity, the cognition of the self as qualified by the knowledge of an object would never be possible. It is absurd to say that A is perceived as qualified by a quality B which is imperceptible.

The Mīmāṃsakas may contend that the cognitive experience expressed as 'I know the jar' contains the result of the cognitive process which is imperceptible and not the cognitive process as such. Jayanta asks if nothing of the nature of cognitive activity is ever perceived, has the hypothesis of the imperceptible cognitive activity any plausibility? He points out that the verb 'know' here means cognition which is a product and which qualifies the
subject. As cognition is experienced as the quality of self and never as an activity, it is groundless to hold that there is an imperceptible cognitive activity.

The Bhatta Mīmāṁsāks hold that the result of the imperceptible cognitive activity qualifies the object and not the knower. The Naiyāyikas point out that it is so, then everybody should be omniscient.

The Prabhākaras hold that both the cognitive activity and the cognition—the result of the cognitive activity, belong to the knower—the self and not to the object. They maintain that while the cognitive activity is imperceptible, the cognition is self-luminous.

The Naiyāyikas think that it is redundant and groundless to assume an imperceptible cognitive activity. There is simply knowledge which is a product and which inheres in the soul. One may denote it either by the 'verb' 'know' or by the noun 'knowledge'. 'Knowing' an object means having the knowledge of an object.

**Jñātā, Tripūṭiprayakṣa and Anuvyavāsāya**

The philosophers of both the schools of Purva-Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are the staunch realists. They dismiss every 'a priori' concept or form with a contemptuous shrug. Though they have wide differences among them yet they get united in their encounter with the Buddhists, who maintain that the form of the object of cognition is 'a priori'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsāka, cognition is formless. The object is external to the cognition. The object does not transmit its form to the cognition. However, it is related to its object and can never be cognised as isolated from its object. We can never be aware of an unqualified cognition, i.e., cognition which is not qualified by its object. There is direct relation between cognition and its object. Cognition is essentially transitive. It is directed towards its object. There is no difference between the cognition
of one object and the cognition of another object. The cognition is formless and, therefore, the cognition of one object is indistinguishable from the cognition of another object. But we never know pure cognition. We apprehend the cognition only as the cognition of this or that object.

So far there is agreement between the Bhātta and the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣikas. But as to how we cognize cognition, there are basic differences between them. The Bhātta Mīmāṃsakas hold, as we have seen, that cognition is an imperceptible activity. They hold that cognition is inferred from the cognizedness of the object.

The Naiyāyikas hold that it is a matter of common experience that we are directly aware of the knowledge of an object. Unless a person is aware of his knowledge of an object he cannot say that he knows the object. Jayanta laughs at the defeatist mentality of the Mīmāṃsakas. He remarks, 'Wearing whom, alas, these Vaidikas (Mīmāṃsakas) have taken to such a defeatist mentality.' ............ Why do they fear the Buddhists so much? The Buddhist who hold that the object or the form of the object is subjective can be silenced by simply maintaining that in its first moment the cognition reveals the object only." The next moment, the self becomes aware of the fact that it possesses the knowledge of an object. The subsequent cognition (anuvyavasyā) is the cognition of the self as qualified by the cognition of an object.

The Prabhākaraṇas hold that the cognition reveals three things simultaneously: the self, the object and the cognition itself. When I have the cognition of a jar, the cognition which is self-luminous reveals the jar as the object and myself as the knower.

The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika and the Bhātta Mīmāṃsaka reject this theory and maintain the transitive character of knowledge. Primarily knowledge is directed towards the object and nothing else. This is accepted by the Bhātta
Mimamsakas and the Nyaya - Vaisesikas alike. But they differently explain the cognitive relation. According to the Bhatta Mimamsakas cognition qualifies the object. But according to the Naiyayikas the cognition is qualified by its object. They regard cognition as the subject (Viṣayi) which is qualified by the thing cognised (Viṣaya). The cognition qualified by the object qualifies the self. The self is directly aware of this fact.

It should be noted that when the Naiyayikas say, "That the cognition of jar is distinct from the cognition of the self having the cognition of the jar, they do not mean that it is possible for a person to know the jar without knowing that he knows the jar. The first cognition necessarily leads to the second cognition. It is only when we analyse the cognitive experience that we make distinction between the cognition that 'this is a jar' and the cognition that 'I know that this is a jar'.

NATURE OF (VALID) KNOWLEDGE

The Mimamsakas define (Valid) knowledge as the knowledge which reveals something new, that is, which is not recollective. The Naiyayikas reject this definition of (valid) knowledge because they think that it contradicts our continuous cognition of an object (Dhārāvāhikajñāna).

The Naiyayikas define (Valid) knowledge as the experiential - knowledge which cognises an object as it is. They, thus, emphasise two characteristics of (valid) knowledge. First, it is experiential knowledge. It is different from recollection. Secondly it is the definite knowledge of an object as it is. It is not the doubtful, illusory or hypothetical cognition of an object.

(Valid) Knowledge And Instrument Of (Valid) Knowledge

The Naiyayikas distinguish between (valid) knowledge and instrument of
(valid) knowledge (pramāpa). The validity of knowledge is determined by the validity of its instrument. The instrument of cognition is defined as the most efficacious condition of (valid) knowledge.

PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

The Naiyāyikas regard perception as the primary source of knowledge because they think that the other sources of knowledge depend on it. Though the Naiyāyikas do not divide the four kinds of knowledge into immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge, yet it is quite clear from their treatment of the four kinds of knowledge that except perception every other form of knowledge is treated as mediate knowledge. Viśvanātha clearly expresses the immediate character of perception when he defines it as the knowledge which is not caused by any other knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas recognise, perhaps under the influence of the Buddhists, two stages of perception - the indeterminate perception and the determinate perception. According to the ancient Nyāya, the only difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this that while the former is not associated with a name, the latter is.

The Nyāya-Nyāya makes the distinction between indeterminate perception and determinate perception more clear. According to it the former is the non-judgmental, non-relational cognition of the elements received by the sense-organs, while the latter is the judgmental cognition made of these elements. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika metaphysics, the object of perception is an external thing which is a composite whole of substance, qualities and relations. Even such thing as a jar is the synthesis of substance, jarness and the relation of inherence. Though the external thing is a synthetic whole, yet it is not presented to the senses as a synthetic whole. The senses simply
receive information from without. They receive piece-meal information regarding an external thing. But the information of substance, jarness and inherence as isolated from each other is not the knowledge of the object as the jar. The indeterminate perception, according to the Navya-nyaya, is simply the awareness of sense-data. It is not the knowledge of an external thing. Mere awareness of the sense-data cannot be regarded as valid or invalid. In fact, it cannot be called knowledge. We are never conscious only of the awareness of sense-data. We are conscious of the judgmental cognition of an object.

The judgmental cognition of an object is the cognition of a substratum as possessed of certain qualities. The cognition that 'this is a jar' is the cognition of a substratum as qualified by jarness. The Naiyayikas think that the judgmental cognition that 'this is a jar' must be preceded by the cognition of 'jarness' as the cognition of a thing as qualified by a property is not possible without first having the cognition of the property. According to the Buddhists, perceptual judgment is not perceptual in nature. It consists in predicating a thought-form of reality on the basis of the immediate awareness of the reality in the form of sense-datum.

According to the Naiyayikas, to judge is not to ascribe any 'a priori' thought-form to the reality. There is no 'a priori' thought-form. To judge means to synthesise the material received through the senses. When the material received through the senses is synthesised by the thought in the same way in which it is synthesised in the external thing, the judgment is true, otherwise it is false.

The Naiyayikas also regard inference as mediate knowledge. But they do not agree with the Buddhists who hold that the field of perception is absolutely different from the field of inference. The Buddhists hold that what is cognised by perception can never be cognised by inference and vice-versa. But the Naiyayikas who, contrary to the Buddhists, maintain that
the external things have duration, hold that a thing which is cognised by perception may also be cognised by inference. They contend that unless it is accepted that the same object can be cognised by the different methods (pramāṇas), the Validity of inference cannot be established.

Inference is based on the prior cognition of the universal and necessary relation between the reason (hetu) and the consequence (sādhyā). The knowledge of the relation between two things is not possible without having the cognition of the things. And it can be obtained by perception and not by inference. That which is the condition of inference cannot be thought to be the result of inference. Thus, a thing is, first, known by perception as x necessarily related to another thing, afterwards, the latter is inferred from the cognition of the former.