CHAPTER II

Analysis of Knowledge (Theory of Knowledge)

The subject of the present thesis is Inference in Indian Philosophy. The Indian Logicians regard inference as one of the sources of knowledge. The sources of knowledge are called by them as Pramāṇas. A short analysis of knowledge and its implications of the theory of inference, as given by the different schools, particularly the Buddhist and the Nāyāya would not, therefore, be out of place in this thesis. Such a discussion will help clarifying several points about Indian Logic. In fact the issue of inference is so much connected with the theory of knowledge that without discussing the nature of knowledge as analysed by the different schools, one can't, in fact, discuss the nature of inference properly. In this Chapter, therefore, I shall consider the theory of knowledge given by Buddhists and the Nāyāyikas.

I

THE NATURE OF PRAMĀṆA OR (VALID) KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO THE BUDDHISTS

The Buddhist Logicians define (valid) knowledge as the cognition which does not betray the cogniser. (Valid) knowledge leads to the realisation of a real thing, which is according to them, a thing having causal efficacy (arthakriyā samarthā vastu). Suppose, somebody is perceiving water. Then, the perception of water which is subsequently realised by voluntary action is (true) knowledge. But if we perceive water at a particular place, and proceed towards it to obtain it, but fail to get it there, our cognition of water is false. It is not knowledge. It is illusion. Like knowledge of an object, an illusion may also initiate voluntary action to attain or to avoid its object. But while the voluntary activity guided by knowledge results in success, the activity guided by illusion results in fail. According to the Buddhist Logicians, the essence of knowledge lies in its
capable of giving rise to successful activity.

The attainment of a real thing having causal efficacy is not possible without having its knowledge. But knowledge of a thing is not the direct cause of realising it. The knowledge of a thing is regarded as the means of its realisation because it reveals it and arouses volition in the cogniser to attain or to avoid it. Thus, the immediate function of knowledge of an object is to direct the attention of the cogniser to that object. The actual attainment of the object cognised is the result of the voluntary action which is aroused by the impressions left by the cognition. Explanaining the concept of knowledge of the Buddhist Logicians, Jayanta points out that it is regarded as the obtainer (Prāpaka) of a real thing only figuratively.

The Buddhist Logicians also maintain that knowledge reveals something new. Thus, according to them there are two essential characteristics of knowledge. First, it reveals something new. Secondly, it does not betray the cogniser.

The Buddhist Logicians hold that an object towards which a voluntary activity is directed is cognised as either useful or non-useful. They do not recognise any object which does not fall in either of these two classes of objects. The division being dichotomic is complete. An object is either worth obtaining or not. The Nyāya-Vaisēṣikas recognise three kinds of objects of volition: (1) useful (upādeya) (2) harmful (heya) (3) negligible (upekṣaṇīya). They think that the Buddhist's division of the objects of volition into the useful and the non-useful is not complete. There are certain objects of cognition which are neither useful nor non-useful. For example, a leaf which we happen to perceive on the roadside is considered neither useful nor harmful. Therefore, we try neither to pick it up nor to avoid it. According to this analysis of the objects of volition, the Buddhist

While the Buddhist take the terms useful and non-useful as contradictory terms, the Nāyāyikas take them as contrary meanings thereby useful and harmful.
definition of pramāṇa comes out to be too narrow as it does not apply to the true cognition of a negligible object. A person who regards the object of his cognition as negligible performs no activity towards it. Therefore, the question whether the cognition leads to a successful or unsuccessful activity does not at all arise in this case.

The Buddhists, however, hold that a negligible object belongs to the class of the objects which are to be shunned as it does not belong to the class of the objects which are considered to be worth obtaining. Jayanta thinks that this argument of the Buddhists is analogous to the argument that a eunuch is a woman because he is not a man or he is a man because he is not a woman.

II
THE BUDDHISTS' THEORY OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE AND MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

The Buddhist Logicians recognize only two kinds of knowledge - immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge. They think that a cogniser can stand only in either of the two positions with regard to the object cognised. The object is either a thing directly presented to the senses (pratyākṣa) or a thing which is not directly presented to the senses (parokṣa). We cannot conceive of any third position in which an object can stand to the cogniser. Therefore, there are only two kinds of knowledge - the immediate and the mediate. The cognition of the object which is directly presented to the senses is immediate. The cognition of the object which is not directly presented to the senses can be only mediate.

The object of immediate knowledge is the externally real thing which is a unique - particular (svālakṣaṇa). The object of mediate knowledge is not an externally real thing. It is not a unique - particular (sva-lakṣaṇa). It is only a general concept which has no external reality. Either the unique -
particular (sva-laksana), the real thing (vastu) or the general concept can be the object of knowledge. The immediate object and the unique - particular are identical. The remote object and the general concept are identical. The dichotomous division of the objects of cognition into the direct and the remote is not different from the division of the objects into the unique - particular and the general concept. Thus, there are only two kinds of objects - the direct and the remote or the unique - particular and the general concept. Consequently, there are only two kinds of knowledge - the immediate (pratyaksa) and the mediate (anumana).

III

THE BUDDHISTS' VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE OBJECT AS DIRECTLY PRESENTED TO THE SENSES

According to Dignaga and his followers objective reality is a unique - particular. It is something of its own kind (svalakṣaṇa). It has nothing in common with anything else. To say that a real thing is of its own kind means that it is different from all things other than itself (sarvatovyāvṛttas). It is unique (asadharana) because spatially it does not belong to two points and temporally it does not belong to two moments. Actually there is no objective time or space. Therefore, the objective reality does not exist in time or space. But it does not mean that it is something eternal as the Advaitins hold. The Buddhist logicians agree with the Advaitins that the ultimate reality is unique and undifferentiated unity. But they hold completely opposite view regarding its exact nature. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality is one eternal being. For the Buddhists, ultimate reality is not being but becoming. It is not eternal but evanescent. It is a moment (kṣaṇa). It is a particular having no qualities or universal. It is not related to anything else. It is a discrete, isolated unit. Its essence lies in its being efficacious. The unique - particular has causal efficacy. The fire which burns is the particular fire. It is not universal fire. The
unique - particular (svalaksana), moment (ksana), objective thing or in Kantian terms 'the thing in itself' (vastu) and causal energy (arthakriya - karitva) are synonyms.

IV
PERCEPTION (PRATYAKSHA) AND CONCEPT DETERMINED BY MNEME (ANADIVASA NAYA VIKALPA)

If objective reality is a simple, evanescent unit having no extension, duration and attributes, then, how is it that the objects of our cognitions of which we are conscious and which we can express appear to us as having such attributes? The whole system of Buddhist Logic is erected to solve this problem.

Like Kant, Dignaga explains our determinate cognitions of objects having qualities and common characteristics by his theory of two factors of cognition, sensibility (pratyaksa) and thought (kalpana). Both of them hold that the forms of the objects which appear to us objective are subjectively determined. Dignaga holds that the forms of the determinate objects are thought-constructs (vikalpa).

V
SENSE - PERCEPTION (PRATYAKSHA)

Dignaga holds that the unique - particular or a thing-in-itself is directly grasped by sense - perception which is simply presentative in character. It is mere awareness of what is presented to the senses. He defines sense - perception as a cognition which is completely devoid of all thought - constructs. DharmaKirti defines it as a cognition which is neither thought construction nor illusion. Its object is 'svalaksana'. Just as objective reality is a particular unit of its kind, similarly its immediate cognition is its presentative cognition. It does not contain any element of memory or imagination.
This cognition is beyond thought. It is indeterminate.

When the object of perception is at a little distance from the perceiver its image is vivid. When it is placed at a greater distance, its image becomes less vivid. This shows that the object of perception is an external thing which has causal efficacy. A general concept has no causal efficacy. The vividness of a general concept remains unchanged when it is ascribed to a near or to a distant thing in imagination.

What we ordinarily regard as perceptual cognition is judgmental in nature. But according to the Buddhist Logicians a perceptual cognition is non-judgmental cognition. A determinate perception is not perception. It is a thought-construct which follows indeterminate perception.

The object of what is ordinarily known as determinate perception is not an external thing. It is simply a 'thought-form' which appears perceptual by virtue of the fact that it arises after the presentative cognition (pratyakṣa) of an external thing.

In order to understand the Buddhist explanation of what is ordinarily called as determinate perception, it is necessary to understand the Buddhist theory of the nature of thought.

VI

NATURE OF THOUGHT OR UNDERSTANDING

( KALPĀNA)

Thought (Kalpanā) is the faculty of arousing concepts which can be named. There are five kinds of concepts. Consequently there are five kinds of names: (1) name of universal (2) name of quality (3) name of activity (4) proper name (5) name of substance.

A name does not mean a real thing. Its use is not determined by an external real thing. Its use is determined by thought the function of which is to superimpose difference upon non-difference in some cases, and
From the ultimate point of view, a thing which is regarded as possessed of a 'universal' and the 'universal' are not two real entities. But the use of a general term depends upon the thought of the difference between a particular thing possessed of a universal and the universal. The particular alone is a reality. The 'universal' is not a reality. Therefore, there is no real difference between the 'particular' and the 'universal'. But when we use a general term we create such a difference. For example, when we state that 'this is cow', we make distinction between the notion of 'this' and the notion of 'cowness'. Thus, a general term does not denote any thing real because its use is determined by thought which creates a difference between the notion of 'universal' and that of the 'substratum' of the universal.

Similarly, the use of the name of a 'quality' depends upon the constructed difference between 'quality' and the 'substratum' of quality. In reality, there is no such difference. The 'substratum' of 'qualities', e.g. colour etc. is never presented to our senses. But we cannot think of qualities, without some 'substratum' in which they reside. This distinction between quality and quality-possessor is only a thought-construct. It is not real. Similarly, the distinction between 'movement' and the thing which is regarded as moving is also a thought-construct. There is no movement apart from the thing which is regarded moving. When we say that Devadatta is moving, we make a distinction between Devadatta and his movement. But in reality there is no such thing as movement over and above Devadatta. Thus, the use of these three kinds of names, name of universal, name of quality, and name of movement depends upon the difference constructed by thought between a 'substratum' of universal and the universal, a substratum of quality and the quality, and a 'substratum' of movement and the movement.

The use of proper name depends upon taking two different things as...
non-different from each other. We use proper name as a predicate in such propositions as 'this is Caitra.' The term 'this' used in this proposition refers to the real thing. The name 'Caitra' is also used for the same thing. The use implies identity between the thing and its name. But how can a 'thing' be identical with its name? A thing is an objective reality. But a name is just a word. Similarly, the use of the name of a substance also depends upon constructed non-difference. 'Devadatta is the possessor of a staff'. In this judgment, there is identity between the subject and the predicate. But in reality, there is no such relation as the relation of 'substratum' and property.

These five kinds of names are five kinds of predicates. They are not five kinds of real entities. They are mere names which are predicated of reality. What they mean is not something externally real. What they mean is simply a concept, a thought-construct.

VII

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JUDGMENTAL COGNITION AND ILLUSION

The above account shows that all judgments are 'distortions' of reality. A judgmental knowledge does not grasp reality as it is. It is not the cognition of a thing as it is. Thought superimposes difference on non-difference and non-difference on difference in judgment.

But it may be asserted that if a cognition does not give a thing as it is but 'distorts' it, it is contradicted by another cognition which cognises it as it is. For example, a person perceives silver in place of conchshell. But later on, he realises that the object which he took for silver is, in reality, a conchshell. His first judgment that 'this is silver' is contradicted by his second judgment that 'this is a conch-shell'. But all the judgments are not contradicted by other judgments. Then, how can we say that every judgment distorts reality?
The Buddhists point out that to say that thought distorts reality does not mean that all our judgments are illusory in the same sense in which the silver which appears in place of conch-shell is illusory. In the ordinary cases of illusion, one thing is mistaken for another thing. Both Silver and conch-shell are real things. Here we are taking one real thing for another real thing. Therefore, this cognition that 'this is silver' is contradicted when we come to perceive a conchshell as conch-shell. But none of the five names mentioned above means a real thing. The cowness which is a predicate in the judgment 'this is a cow' is not a real thing. Therefore, there is no question of its being replaced by the cognition of another thing. All these concepts ultimately, refer to a real thing which is a unique-particular. But thought by its very nature is incapable of grasping reality as it is (svalakṣaṇa) which is a complete unity having no difference within it and being completely cut off from everything else. Referring to the reality, thought creates difference and identity within itself which appear to us as the qualifications of the reality, which, 'in fact, is beyond them all. As a concept is not the thought of some real thing in place of another real thing, it cannot be contradicted. The concepts are the *a priori* thought-forms which are the universal conditions of our knowledge. How can, then, they are contradicted? Therefore, a conceptual cognition is not something illusory. Nor is it true cognition. It is not true cognition because it does not reveal a thing as it is. A conceptual cognition is not the cognition of a thing as it is. It is untrue to the real thing as it is not directly determined by an external thing. There is no real entity corresponding to a general term, a name of quality etc. What else is it then? It is something different both from a true cognition and an illusory cognition; It is simply a conceptual cognition - cognition of a concept - an *a priori* thought-form**. 

If the predicate of a judgment is not determined by some real property
of a thing, how, then, is its use determined? The Buddhists reply that the use of these five kinds of names is determined by the beginningness ōpmēme.

VIII

THE BUDDHISTS' THEORY OF UNIVERSAL

APOHĀVĀDA

It is held by the Buddhists that the object of perception, which for them always means indeterminate presentative cognition, is a unique particular. But the object of what is ordinarily known as the determinate perception always appears to have a universal form which is denoted by a general term e.g. cow. But according to the Buddhists, the universal has no reality over and above the particulars. If the thought-form which appears to be the form of the external thing is not, in fact, the form of the external thing, then what is it?

NEGATIVE CHARACTER OF THOUGHT-FORM

We have seen that according to the Buddhists the essence of thought-form is its capability of being expressed in words. But again the question arises: What is that which is expressed by a term? Is it some external reality? Or, is it some positive content of mind which is superimposed upon the external thing? The Buddhists reply that the meaning of a term is not a positive entity, external or internal, objective or subjective, physical or mental. The essence of the meaning of a term which is called thought or thought-form (vikalpa or vikalpākara) is negative. The term 'cow' does not mean a 'universal' cow which inheres in the particular cows. Nor does it mean any positive mental content. The meaning of the term 'cow' is simply the negation of 'non-cows'.

What is the nature of the thought-form which is regarded as the negation of the other (apoha)? Some think that as by a term the Buddhists do not mean any external thing, they must mean by it some positive mental content. Thus, for them the meaning of a term is something positive. How can, then, the Buddhists hold that the meaning of a term is only the negation of the other?
These thinkers do not rightly understand the Buddhist "theory of apoha.* According to the Buddhists the meaning of a term is neither something external nor something internal. It is something different both from mental content and the external thing.

That which exists neither in the external thing world nor in the mind does not exist at all. How can a completely non-existent thing be regarded as the meaning of a term? The Buddhists reply that the opponent starts with a wrong assumption regarding the problem of meaning. It is a wrong assumption that a term can mean only some thing which is ultimately real. They point out that as they think that the form of the object of determinate cognition is neither external nor internal, they call it imaginary, a mere thought-construct. But what, then, after all, is it? It is a bare form which is taken to be the form of the cognition.

But what form except the form of an external object can colour cognition and can appear as the form of the object of cognition? The thought-form appears as the form of the external thing. But the Buddhists hold that the external thing is devoid of definite form. The external thing which is presented to senses is a discrete unit, completely cut off from every thing else. The thought-form does not at all touch the external thing. How, does it then appear to be objective and how does the Buddhists account for the negative nature?

The Buddhists reply that the thought-form does not at all touch the external thing. The external thing which is completely cut off from every thing else is grasped by sense-perception which leaves its impressions in the continuum of consciousness. The thought-form which arises in the wake of sense-perception takes the shadow i.e. the memory impressions, of the sense-perception as the basis of its objectivity and it is for this reason that the thought-form is nothing but the negation of what is other than, the thing apprehended by sense-perception.
The Buddhist*have maintained that the external thing grasped by sense-perception is a discrete thing completely different from every thing else. It must, then, possess some characteristic by virtue of which it excludes every thing else. Now, the characteristic of a thing by virtue of which it excludes every thing else cannot be separated from the thing possessing that characteristic. The thought-form which is taken as the form of the object of determinate cognition is also nothing but the negation of what is other than the thing cognised by sense-perception. Thus, as the essence of the external thing and the essence of the thought-form is the same, how can it be denied that the form of the object of determinate cognition is identical with the external thing, the unique-particular (svalakṣaṇa).

In reply, the Buddhists point out that the above analysis of their theory is not correct (naitadevam). The thought form does not grasp the discrete thing, the thing-in-itself. Nor is there any character of excluding others in the thing-in-itself. The notion that a real thing possesses the characteristic of excluding others is nothing but a thought construction.

The Buddhists, further contend that this analysis also disproves the following argument advanced by some against their theory: The cognition of a thing as a discrete thing involves the cognition of three factors: (1) that which is discrete, i.e., differentiated (2) that by virtue of which it is differentiated (3) that from which it is differentiated. As all these factors do not really exist in relation to the unique-particular (sva-lakṣaṇa), how can it be maintained that sense-perception grasps a discrete thing? When a practical man thinks that he actually cognises a thing which is discrete, i.e., which is distinguished from the other things, he is not actually cognising an external thing as a discrete thing. All this is a thought-construction which follows sense-perception of an external thing, a thing-in-itself.

First, a thing-in-itself is directly grasped by sense-perception. This
is, then, immediately followed by a thought-form e.g. the thought-form of a cow. This thought-form of a cow is in the form of the exclusion of all those things which do not produce such effects as is produced by a cow e.g. giving milk etc. The thought-form of cow does not negate such specific forms as a horse etc. which are different from cows. The generalised form of cow, the essence of which is the negation of non-cow, does not touch the thing-in-itself grasped by sense-perception. In fact, it is not real. Therefore, there is no possibility of its touching the reality. It is simply the interpretation of the indeterminate sense-perception. Thus, a thought-form of cow, means the negation of the things which do not produce the effect which is produced by a cow. It means the negation of non-cows. Thus, a thought-form which is taken as the object of determinate cognition is nothing but the negation of the other. It does not acquire its negative meaning by virtue of cognising a discrete thing which is different from everything else. The thought-form does not grasp a thing-in-itself.

The opponent may point out another difficulty in the Buddhists' theory of 'Apoha'. A thing-in-itself which is grasped by sense-perception is different from everything else. It is cut off from the things which are similar to it i.e. which produce similar results. It is also cut off from the things which are different from it i.e. which produce different results. But the thought-form (vikalpaḥ) which arises after the sense-perception of a specific cow is the same as the thought-form which arises after the sense-perception of any other specific cow though one specific cow is as much different from any other cow as it is different from the things which are non-cows, e.g. horse etc. When one specific cow is absolutely different from another specific cow, how is it that the thought-form which arises after the sense-perception of one specific cow is the same as the thought-form which arises after the sense-perception of another specific cow?
To this, the Buddhists reply that a thought - form which arises after the sense - perception of a thing is nothing but the interpretation of the sense-perception as 'so' and 'so'. The judgmental cognition of a thing is possible only when the thing is definitely grasped by sense-perception.

How can thought interpret the 'sense-datum' of a patch of blue? The Buddhists reply that thought interprets the 'sense-datum' of a patch of blue only by realising that what is presented to the senses is not non-blue. The 'sense-datum' of every patch of blue is interpreted by thought in the same way, i.e. by realising that what is presented is not non-blue. There is no common element between one patch of blue and the other patch of blue except that both of them produce similar results. The general term 'blue' which we use as the predicate in the case of every judgment which arises after the sense-datum of blue - patch, should not be taken to mean that there is some common element among all the blue patches. A general term means nothing but the negation of its contradictory. The term blue means the negation of non-blue. Similarly, the term 'cow' means the negation of non-cow. Thought interprets what is presented to the senses by negating what is not presented to the senses.

What is presented to the senses is always something positive. But it is a unique-particular. It does not share any quality with anything else. What is presented to the senses is not negative. But thought can interpret what is presented to the senses only negatively. The 'sense-datum' is indeterminate. It has no form. But the thought which arises in its wake assimilates its shadow and creates the dichotomy between what is given and what is not given and determines the form of what is given by negating what is not given.

The term 'cow' does not represent the thing which is presented to the senses. It has meaning and significance only in relation to non-cow. The 'cow' means the negation of non-cow. The term 'cow' and the term
'non-cow' are relative to each other. What we think to be a positive term, (cow) is positive only by virtue of negating its contradictory negative term (non-cow). The term 'cow' does not mean any thing positive.

Though there is no positive quality which is commonly shared by all the specific cows, yet all of them are thought to be of the same kind (sajātiya) in view of their common contradictory viz: non-cow. Thus, the term 'cow' used with reference to a particular cow does not mean the negation of other cows. It simply means the negation of non-cow.

Thus, the thought-form which appears to be the form of the object of determinate cognition is neither an external reality nor a positive thought-content. In fact, it is nothing. To call it negative does not mean that it is the absence of something. It is called negative by virtue of its function of negating its contradictory.

THREE REASONS FOR THE NEGATIVE NATURE OF THE THOUGHT-FORM - THE UNIVERSAL CONCEPT

The Buddhists give three reasons to prove the negative nature of thought form:

1. It is commonly applied to existence and non-existence.
2. It is experienced as having the nature of negating its contradictory.
3. It brings about similarity between what are absolutely dissimilar.

The three reasons are explained below:

(1) Whatever is applied equally to the existent and the non-existent has no existence of its own. It can be conceived only as the negation of others. For example, incorporeality (amūrtatva) which is predicated of 'knowledge' (existent) and of the hare's horn (non-existent) has no existence of its own.

We make such statements as 'a jar exists' and 'a jar does not exist'. If the jar were a positive entity like 'sva-laksana', non-existence would not be predicated of it as it would involve contradiction. Nor could 'existence'
be predicated of it as it would mean unnecessary repetition. The thing-in-itself (sva-laksana) is entirely grasped by sense-perception. When it is grasped by sense-perception, there is left nothing more to be cognised by the thought-form or judgmental cognition.

2) When we judge a thing to be cow, we know that it is not horse etc. Without realising that it is not horse etc., we cannot be sure that it is a cow. Definite knowledge of an object is not possible without realising what it is not. Thus, to know that an object is cow is to know that it is not non-cow. The uniformity of a judgment e.g. this is cow, with reference to different particular cows which have no common attribute can be explained only by holding that the term 'cow' means simply the negation of non-cow. Thus, it is a matter of logical necessity to hold that a thought-form on the object of determinate cognition which is denoted by a general term is nothing but the negation of its contradictory.

(3) Though the thought form does not correspond to any external thing, it appears objective owing to its similarity with the external thing. But how can we account for the similarity between the thought-form and the external thing that which are absolutely dissimilar. The Buddhists reply/the similarity between the absolutely dissimilar things can be conceived only with respect to what they commonly exclude. Similarity may be said to be there even between a cow, a horse, a buffalo and even an elephant with respect to their common differences with a lion. Likewise there is similarity between an external thing and a thought-form. An external thing e.g. a specific cow is a unique-particular. It means that it is different from every thing else. The thought-form which is denoted by the term 'cow' is nothing but the negation of non-cows! Thus, a specific cow, the external thing, and the thought-form denoted by the term 'cow' are similar with respect to their common negation of non-cows. It is only in this way that the similarity between a thing and a thought-form which are absolutely different from each other can be conceived.
A thing-in-itself presented as 'sense-datum' is completely different from everything else. The 'shadow' of the 'sense-datum' left in the form of memory impressions records this character of the external thing. Except this shadow of the character of excluding others, there is no similarity between the object of thought, the thought-form, and the external thing.

Thus, it is established that the nature of the object of thought is regarded as the exclusion of others owing to the function of thought to negate others and not owing to its cognising the absence of any external thing. Negation is a function of thought. It does not correspond to any external thing or the absence of a thing.

PHILOSOPHIC ANALYSIS AND COMMON-SENSE JUDGMENT

It is true that when a practical man forms such judgments as 'this is cow', 'this is horse', etc., he thinks that the object which he is cognising and which he is calling by such names as, 'cow' 'horse' etc., is an external thing. He does not think that the object of his determinate cognition is simply a thought-construct the essence of which is nothing but negation. But a practical man does not bother about the logical meaning of the terms which he uses. It is only the philosopher who analyses the meaning of the terms and proves that they mean nothing but the negation of the other. It is said, 'the philosopher analyses the meaning of terms and not a practical man.'

Thus, it is concluded that an object of thought is neither some thing external nor internal. It is some superimposed form which is neither a mental content nor an external reality. Owing to its relation with the 'shadow' left over by 'sense-datum', it is called 'apoha'. This is the analysis of the nature of the object of thought according to the theory of the 'non-apprehension of the difference between 'sense-datum' and thought determination.' This theory has been advocated by Dignāga and his followers.
THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS' EXPLANATION OF THOUGHT-FORM OR THE OBJECT OF DETERMINATE COGNITION.

The Vijnānavādins explain the nature of thought-form in a different way. They hold that the object of thought is nothing but a form of cognition. Though it is not any thing external to cognition it appears to be objective. It is determined by mnemonic impressions. All the activities of man are determined by taking a mental content for an external object. This is the analysis of the object of thought according to the theory which holds that the thought-form and the object of cognition are identical.

HOW PERCEPTION AROUSES VOLITION AND LEADS MAN TO PERFORM SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITIES

Mere 'sense-datum' which is indeterminate cannot arouse volition. Nor can it lead to any successful activity. It is only a judgmental cognition, the cognition of an object as 'so and so' that can arouse volition. But according to the Buddhists the object of judgmental cognition is not a real thing. It is simply a thought-construct a thought-determination which is taken for an external thing.

The Buddhists reply that though the 'sense-datum' is given from without it is indeterminate in nature, stripped of all qualifications and determinations, it is followed by thought-determinations which present a definite form of the object. The sense-perception fulfils its function as a 'pramāṇa' by virtue of its serving as a vehicle of thought-determinations which present a definite image of the object and lead man to the point of efficient activity. Though the thought-form is not the form of an external real thing which has causal efficacy, yet owing to the memory impressions left by the preceding sense-perception and assimilated by it, it has an indirect relation with the external thing. It has been already noted that it is owing to these memory-impressions,
the 'shadow' of the 'sense-datum,' assimilated by thought that the thought-form assumes similarity with the external thing and is not distinguished from the sense-perception of the thing. Thus, the thought-form which arises after sense-perception obscures its difference, from the sense-perception and appears perceptual. In this way the thought-form, the determinate cognition, arouses volition and lead man to the successful voluntary activity and does not deceive him. Just as a person who perceives only the glow of a glittering stone kept under a cover takes it for the stone, and being guided by this cognition, succeeds in attaining the stone; similarly being guided by the determinate cognition a man succeeds in attaining a real thing, the point of efficient activity. But when a thought-form does not have even indirect relation with the real thing, it does not lead to successful activity, in the same way in which a person who actually perceives the light of a lamp but thinks that he perceives a glittering stone, cannot succeed in attaining the stone. Thus, as the cogniser fails to grasp the difference between thought-form and percept, he comes to have such beliefs as 'I cognise an external thing,' 'I am set to achieve a real external thing,' 'I have attained the same thing which I thought to have cognised and which I willed to attain'. It is said, "The form of the object of determinate cognition is not born out by a real thing and it is because of the natural incapability of thought to realise this that a thought-form is taken for the form of a real thing."

There cannot be identity between the thought-form and the 'sense-datum' as they are not co-existent. When a person thinks that he is perceiving silver where, in fact, there is only conch-shell, that which is given and that which is taken to be the object of cognition are not identical. Only one is a real thing presented from without. The other is simply an a priori thought-form. Similarly an object of sense-perception and an object of thought are absolutely different and separate from each other. The reason is this that the object of thought is not anything beyond it. It is not a thing co-existing with the thing
Thus, what is here called as 'identity' (ekākāraṇa) between the thought-form and the 'sense-datum,' in fact, is not identity. Determinate cognition is the result of the process of cognition. It is the cognition of an object having determinate form. But the object having determinate form is not directly apprehended by the senses as the realists hold. It is simply a thought-construct. The vividness of the thought-form is determined by the fact that it arises after the sense-perception. The thought-form is determined by the memory impressions left by the preceding sense-perception.

THE IDENTITY OF THE ACT OF COGNITION, CONTENT OF COGNITION AND THE INTENT OF COGNITION.

The determinate cognition is regarded both as the instrument of cognition and the result of cognition. So far as it is the cognition of an object having determinate form, it is the result of the process of cognition. The object of the determinate cognition is not an external thing. But it appears to be so. The thought-form which arises after sense-perception is coordinated with the thing grasped in sense-perception. The act of coordinating the thought-form with the external thing is regarded as the source of cognition. There is no difference between a thought-form and its coordination with the external thing. There is no difference between 'mental act and mental content.' The thought-form, when viewed as the product of sense-perception which simply means an event arising after sense-perception, is regarded as the result of cognition. But, so far as it is referred to the external thing, owing to the similarity between them, it is regarded as the source of cognition. Thus, the act of cognition, content of cognition and the intent of cognition are identical. The similarity between thought-form and an external thing is possible, as already explained, due to the negative nature of the thought-form.

The above discussion proves that there is no generic character or 'universal' over and above the particulars. The unique particulars (svalaksanās) only are real. The notion of community which a common man
entertains can be explained without accepting the reality of 'universal' over and above the particulars. The basis of a class-concept is only the similarity of the results produced by the different particulars. The medicine pills which cure a particular kind of fever are thought to be belonging to the same class not because they possess any generic character but simply because they produce similar results. Logically the notion of community means common negation (apoha).

PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENT NOT KNOWLEDGE AS DISTINCT FROM SENSE-DATUM

We have seen that for the Buddhists the term 'perceptual judgement' is a misnomer. Perception is only indeterminate. The indeterminate perception is followed by judgemental cognition which arouses volition and guides a man to perform a successful activity. Then, why not the judgemental cognition which arises after the sense-perception be regarded as knowledge distinct from sense-perception? The Buddhists reply that a judgement is not knowledge distinct from sense-perception because it does not reveal anything new. The external thing which is a simple entity is grasped fully by sense-perception. There remains nothing more to be cognised by any other form of knowledge. The judgement is simply an interpretation of sense perception.

INFERENCE (MEDITATE KNOWLEDGE (ANUMANA))

The Buddhists think that from the epistemological point of view all the things in the universe can be divided into two categories: (1) the thing which is presented to the senses (pratyakṣa) (2) the things which are not presented to the senses (parākṣa). The cognition of the thing presented to the senses is immediate. It is indeterminate as the thing presented to the senses is a unique-particular devoid of qualities. The indeterminate cognition of an external thing is followed by the judgemental form which is regarded as perceptual simply because it is elicited by the direct cognition of an external thing. A judgement consists in predicing a concept, a thought-form (vikalpakarā) of the reality. When the real thing of which a concept is predicated is directly
grasped by the senses, the judgement is called perceptual (pratyakṣa-pratyaksha-vikalpa)

The cognition of the thing which is not directly presented to the senses arises only in the form of judgement; it can never be non-judgemental.

Thus, we have two kinds of judgements: 1. The judgment which consists in predicating a concept of the thing which is grasped by the senses. 2. The judgment which consists in predicating a concept mediately of the thing which is not grasped by the senses. The former may be called 'direct judgment' as it is the direct interpretation of sense-datum. It simply interprets the sense-datum as 'so and so' and does not go beyond it. The latter may be called 'indirect judgment' as it consists in predicating a concept of the reality mediately. It is inference (anumāna).

The inferential judgment refers to the thing which is not grasped by the senses directly. In the case of perceptual judgment, thought simply interprets what is grasped by the senses, and does not reveal anything new. But in the case of inference, the thought does not simply interpret what is grasped by the senses but moves forward and apprehends the thing which is not given to the senses. We have seen that thought is not capable of grasping an external thing as it is. The thing-in-itself can be grasped as it is only by the senses. The object of a judgmental cognition is not the thing-in-itself. The object of a judgment cognition is simply a thought-form, a concept, which is taken by the thought as the form of the external thing, though in fact, it is not so. The object of inference, is, therefore, a thought-form which is a general form (śāmānya) and the essence of which is the negation of the other (āpoha). But inference is not the cognition of a thought-form as such. A thought-form is 'a priori.' It cannot become the object of cognition. It can be conceived as the object of cognition only when it is referred to an external reality. In inference as well as in perceptual judgement, an 'a priori' thought-form is predicated of the reality. The main difference between perceptual judgment and inference is that while in the former case a concept is predicated of the thing which is already grasped by
the senses, in the latter case the thing of which a concept is predicated is not grasped by the senses. The thing of which a concept is predicated in inference is only the imagined one.

In the case of perceptual judgment, first, an external thing is perceived and then, the perception which is indeterminate is followed by a determinate thought-form, a concept, which is predicated of the thing perceived. But in inference, first, there arises a thought-form which leads to the imagination of the thing of which it is predicated. Thus, in both the cases a thought-form is predicated of the reality. In the case of perceptual judgment, a thought-form which is predicated of the reality is directly aroused by the 'sense-datum'. But in the case of inference, the thought-form which is predicated of the thing is not aroused directly by its perception. It is aroused by the perception of something else. But how is it that the perception of one thing arouses the thought-form of something else?

The Buddhists reply that this is possible on the basis of necessary relation between the thing perceived and the thing inferred. When a thing is so related with another thing that the former is inconceivable without the latter, the former can serve as the sign (līṅga) of the latter. Such a relation between two things can be conceived only in two ways: (1) when a thing is the effect of the other thing (tadutpatti) and (2) when the essence of a thing is identical with that of another (tadātmya).

The inferential cognition which is the cognition of a remote thing is (valid) cognition (pramāṇa) as it reveals something new and does not betray the cogniser. It leads to the realisation of an external thing in the same way in which the perceptual judgment does. The perceptual judgment leads to the realisation of the external thing to which it refers by virtue of the necessary dependence of the former on the latter. Similarly, an inferential judgment leads to the realisation of an external thing by virtue of the necessary dependence of
the former on the latter. The thought-form of an inferred object is not
directly aroused by an external thing. But the former is necessarily dependent
on the latter, though the dependence is only indirect.

The concept of an inferred object (śīnī-vikalpa) cannot arise without
the concept of its sign (śīnā - vikalpa ). The concept of the sign (śīnā) can­
not be aroused without the sign. The thing which serves as the sign cannot occur
without the thing of which it is taken as the sign. Thus, though the concept
of an inferred object is not determined by the sense-perception of an external
thing directly, the former is necessarily dependent on the external thing.
Therefore, the inferential cognition of a remote thing guides the cogniser to
obtain it and does not deceive him.

The Buddhists, thus, hold that perception and inference are the only
two forms of cognition. The former is indeterminate. Its object is the
unique - particular (svalakṣaṇa). It is the immediate cognition of an external
thing. Inference is the cognition of a remote thing. It does not grasp a
thing as it is. The object of inference is only the thought - form which
is general in nature.

What is cognised by perception is never cognised by inference. What
is cognised by inference is never cognised by perception. Perception and
inference are equally important. Inference is not subordinate to perception.