In the present work, I have made an attempt to interpret some of the logical theories that had taken shape in India during the period between 500 A.D. and 1200 A.D. I have concentrated mainly on the logical theories of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. References have been made at some places to the logical theories of Advaita Vedānta and the Mīmāṃsā. My aim is to present a comparative study of some of the logical theories of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas.

Eminent scholars have done pioneering work in this field. However, there remains enough scope of making a new approach to the old problems and that of exploring new material on the topics on which some studies have done already. I have made efforts to present new material on the theories of the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas with regard to three logical problems: (1) problem of knowledge (2) Problem of inference (Anumāna) and (3) Problem of Induction.

When inference is regarded as only a formal process, it has little relation to the problem of knowledge. But the Indian Logicians do not regard inference as merely a formal process. They regard it as a source of knowledge (anumāna). Therefore, while presenting a comparative study of the Buddhist and the Nyāya theories of inferences (Anumāna), the exposition of the Buddhist and Nyāya theories of knowledge seems to be necessary. Therefore, I have devoted two chapters, II and III for the theories of knowledge of the Buddhists and the Nyāya. The first chapter is a summary sketch of the historical development of the logical theories connected with the problem of inference.

The fourth chapter deals with the structural and the functional conditions of inference. I have tried to bring out the logical significance of such concepts as 'vyāpti' 'paksadharmatā' and 'prāmāṇa'.

The fifth chapter deals with the problem of 'vyāpti'. I think that there are three questions with regard to 'vyāpti': (1) What is the form of
"Vyāpti", (2) What is the material basis of vyāpti? (3) How is the basis of vyāpti determined in a particular case of inference? The Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas differ on all these questions. Only the first two questions are discussed in this Chapter. The last question forms the problem of Induction and is taken up in the last four chapters.

The different kinds of inference which have been recognised in the Nyāya are discussed in the sixth chapter. I think that the 'Kevalānvayi' and 'Kevalavyntireki' kinds of inference (anumāna) recognised by the Nyāya are only the forms of inference. These are not kinds of 'anumāna' - inference as a source of knowledge.

The seventh chapter is devoted to the exposition of the problem of Induction. I here refer to the views of Cārvakas, Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas.

In the eighth chapter the proofs of the law of causation given by Dharmakīrti and Udayanad have been discussed.

The Ninth Chapter is devoted to the study of the Inductive method of the Buddhists.

In the tenth Chapter the views of the different Naiyāyikas, on the problem of Induction have been discussed.

By giving a detailed account of the Indian theories of induction, I intend to refute Faddegon's following observation regarding Indian Logicians: "They (Indian Logicians) have insufficient knowledge of the way in which general propositions would be obtained".

The material presented here is derived from the original sanskrit books, such as Nyāya-vārtika-Tatparyatika, Nyāyamanjary, Pramanavārtika, Nyāya-bindu, Nyāya Kusumānja-li and Siddhāntamukta-vali. References have been made to these books by page and line, and they are given in the end.

I acknowledge my indebtedness to Stcherbatsky, H.N.Randle, Gangānātha Jhā, Phanibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, Pañcāśhāma Tarkavāgīśa, A.B.Keith,
D.U.H.Ingalls, Jadunatha Sinha, D.S. Gupta, and Satîśa Chandra Vidya Bhūṣāṇa whose works helped me in comprehending the Buddhist and the Nyāya theories of Logic.

Dr. Jadunātha Sinhā, my revered teacher has been a source of inspiration to me. He has been helping me through correspondence. Inspite of his being extremely busy, and also of his indifferent health in old age, he took the trouble of going through the last four chapter of this work. It is really beyond the power of my work words to express my gratefulness to him.

I am immensely grateful to Dr. N. S. S. Raman of Panjab University who supervised my work for three years. He has been a dear friend and a guide to me. I am very much indebted to Dr. S. S. Barlingay of the University of Delhi, who supervised my work for the last two years. Without his guidance the work would have been much more imperfect than what it is.

My thanks are due to Pt. Satyavrat, Nyāya-Vyākaraṇa-Vedantācārya, the Radhānācārya, Bhagirathi Śanskrit Vidyālaya, Garhmuktesvara, with whom I studied Nyāya-siddhānta-Muktāvali and Nyāya-Nanjary.

I am also thankful to Dr. Potter of Minnesota University. I had an opportunity of meeting him in the session of the Indian Philosophical congress held at Chandigarh in 1963. He gave me a few valuable hints. He advised me to emphasise the inductive aspect of Indian Logic. Without his suggestion, perhaps, I could not think of studying the Inductive aspect of Indian Logic to the extent to which I have done now.

My thanks are due to Dr. B. Bhattacharya of Reerut College, Dr. D. N. Shastri, retired Director Indic studies, Kuruksetra University, and Dr. Sivaraja Cāstri, and H. S. Sinha of the same University for their help rendered to me.

I am very much grateful to my friends, R. C. Nagpal, D. C. Puṣkara, Pyarelal Jain and Jagir Singh who helped me in correcting the typographical mistakes.
I am immensely grateful to my student, Sukhdeva, who typed the earlier proofs of the thesis for me. My thanks are also due to Sh. Durga Dass Jindal, Principal, Jindal Commercial College, Bhatinda who took great pains in typing the whole of the thesis with a great care and in a very short time.

December, 1966

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