CHAPTER VII
PROBLEM OF INDUCTION AND MATERIAL VALIDITY OF INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA)

I
THE THREE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION.

We have seen that according to the Indian Logicians inference (anumāna) is inductive-deductive in nature. They formulated syllogism which expresses the inductive and the deductive aspects of inference. Regarding the nature of Indian syllogism Faddegon observes that "the Indian syllogism (Anumāna) combines a deduction with a superficial induction." Concluding his discussion on the merits and demerits of the Indian syllogism as compared to those of the western Logic, he says, "The (Indian Logicians) have insufficient knowledge of the way in which general propositions should be obtained." Such remarks regarding the Indian logic are misleading. A reader of Feddegon's work which treats of the Indian theory of Anumāṇa very scantily is likely to believe that the Indian Logicians did not recognise the importance of induction in logic.

An attempt is made here to reconstruct the approaches of the Indian logicians to the problem of induction. Though each system of Indian philosophy treats of the problem of induction in its own way, yet there are three basically different approaches to this problem which I would like to refer to. These are the approaches of the Čārvākas, the Buddhist logicians of Dignāga school and the Naiyāyikas.

The Čārvākas have a negative approach to the problems of logic. For them empirical verification is the only test of truth; knowledge must be verified by sense-experience. Some Čārvākas hold that sense-perception is the only source of certain knowledge. For them the knowledge obtained by inference has an element of uncertainty about it. Some Čārvākas, who are more critical in their analysis of knowledge, hold that all knowledge is probable. The knowledge obtained through sense-perception also cannot be regarded as true till
it is proved to be so. Udayanaçırya states the āśāvāka’s fundamental epistemological dictum in the following way: "Whatever cannot be verified by sense-perception does not exist; whatever can be verified by sense-perception exists." The existence of God, soul etc. cannot be verified by sense-perception. Therefore it should not be held that they exist.

All the āśāvākas reject inference as a source of indubitably true knowledge. They think that the knowledge obtained by inference cannot be indubitably true as it is supposed to be derived from the cognition of a universal and necessary connection between two phenomena which it is not possible to prove beyond the possibility of doubts for knowledge regarding the universal and necessary connection of one phenomenon with another phenomenon can never be certain. It will always remain probable. Therefore, the conclusion of inference will always be probable. No universal and necessary proposition can be based on sense-experience. All the empirical propositions are probable in nature and all the human activities are based on the probable propositions. Probability is the guide of human activities. The āśāvākas do not deny that the human activities are guided by inference. But they do not regard it as infallible guide. The material validity of the conclusion of inference is only probable as the material validity of the major premise (vyāpti) can be only probable.

The material validity of the conclusion of inference depends upon the material validity of the 'vyāpti', the necessary law of invariable concomitance between two phenomena. How can this law be ascertained? Buddhist Logicians and the Naiyāyikas offer different solutions to this problem.

The Buddhist logicians agree with the āśāvākas in holding that a universal and necessary proposition cannot be established on the basis of sense-perception. According to them, sense-perception is indeterminate in nature. It is inarticulate and unintelligible. It is through perception
alone that the knower comes in close touch with the reality which according to the Buddhists is a fleeting moment or a unique particular. But, sense-perception as such is blind. The Buddhist logicians, therefore, hold that there is another source of cognition which they call 'kalpam' the function of which is to provide intelligibility to knowledge. The determinate perception is the result of the function of the 'kalpam' which is stimulated by sense-perception.

The Naiyāyikas are the empiricists. They do not accept any a priori law or concept. All knowledge according to the Naiyāyikas, is directly or indirectly based upon sense-perception. This is in opposition to the Buddhists theory of the 'a priori' grounds of cognition. They side with the Čārvākakas in holding that sense-experience is the basis of all knowledge. Though the Naiyāyikas do not accept the Čārvākakas proposition that perception alone is the source of valid cognition, they hold that perception is the most important source of cognition as all the rest of the sources of cognition (pramāṇas) depend upon it.

There is direct clash between the Čārvākakas and the Naiyāyikas as both of them take empirical standpoint in logic but arrive at different conclusions. While the Čārvākakas feel fully convinced that no universal and necessary proposition can be established on the basis of experience, the Naiyāyikas, like the western empiricists Bain and Mill, try to show how such propositions can be established by induction.

II

PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

All the Indian logicians, who accept inference as a source of true cognition, maintain that 'vyāpti', the law of invariable concomitance between 'hetu' and 'sādhya' and 'paksadharmā' the presence of the 'hetu' in the subject (paksā), are the two essential conditions of inference.
It has also been emphasised that these two conditions of inference as such do not lead to any inference. It is the knowledge of 'vyāpti' and 'peksadharmaśā' which leads to inference.

The distinction between 'vyāpti' and 'vyāptijñāna has a great logical significance. Vyāpti is the law of invariable concomitance (sahācāraniyāna) between two phenomena. It is there in the nature prior to its being cognised by any knower. Now, there may be a law of invariable concomitance between two phenomena in nature, but it may not be possible for man to apprehend it. On the other hand, there may not be any law of invariable concomitance of one phenomenon with another phenomenon, but owing to purely psychological reasons, man may think that there is such a law in nature. The psychological law of expectancy determined by the observation of two things together or in close succession may be taken for the objective law of invariable concomitance between them. So the first important problem which arises regarding induction is: how do we know that the nature is orderly i.e. events in nature occur according to certain laws of uniformity? Unless it is proved that events in nature follow certain laws of causation and uniformity, mere observation of two events together repeatedly cannot prove that one necessarily follows or accompanies the other. But this is not enough. Even if it is accepted that the events in nature occur according to certain universal laws, it is yet to be shown that it is possible to obtain indubitable knowledge of the laws. One may accept instinctively that nature is orderly but may think it impossible to obtain definite knowledge of a particular law of uniformity in nature. The orderliness of nature means the uniformities of sequence and co-existence in nature. The uniformity of sequence is regarded as the law of universal causation. Thus, the logicians who hold that inference (anumāna) gives true cognition must prove, first, the uniformities of succession and co-existence in nature, and secondly, the methods of
obtaining indubitable cognition of such laws. It is quite obvious that the second problem presupposes the first one. But these are the two distinct, though related, problems. The first is the problem of the grounds of induction. The second is the problem of the methods of induction.

If a thinker thinks that there are no laws of the uniformity of causation and the uniformity of co-existence, he is justified in rejecting inference as a source of true cognition. Similarly, if a person thinks on certain logical grounds that even if there are uniformities in nature, it is not possible for human mind to obtain indubitable cognition of a particular uniformity, he is also justified in rejecting inference as a source of true cognition. The Carvākas in India are such thinkers as deny both these propositions. They deny that there is law of causation in nature. They also deny the possibility of obtaining indubitable cognition of such laws, even if it is presumed that they exist. They, therefore, reject inference as source of true and certain cognition.

III

CARVĀKA'S REJECTION OF THE LAW OF CAUSATION

Theory of spontaneous production (svabhāva vāda) and the theory of accidental production (ākasmikatāvāda).

The Carvākas deny the law of causation in nature. The law of causation means that an event depends upon something other than itself for its occurrence. A cause is different from its effect. The cause is the antecedent and the effect is the consequent. They cannot be identified. Though an effect cannot be identified with its cause, the former cannot be separated from the latter. The Carvākas deny that a thing depends upon something else for its occurrence. They hold that whatever exists and whatever occurs, exists and occurs by its very nature. An event occurs by the force of its inherent nature. It does not depend upon any other proceeding event. An event occurs spontaneously.
spontaneously. It is completely non-existent before it actually occurs and it may persist for any length of time without any persisting cause.

The Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist argue that as all the phenomena have a contingent existence, they are necessarily dependent upon their respective causes. The Carvākas think that this is wrong. Being contingent is not synonymous with being produced by something other than itself. They ask what is meant by the contingent nature of events and answer that it means nothing but that a thing is non-existent prior to its coming into existence. To deny it would amount to denying the production of new things which would mean that everything exists eternally. If a thing is completely non-existent prior to its coming into existence, how can its dependence upon anything other than itself be possible? The contingent character of the existent things can be understood if it is accepted that a thing arises spontaneously by the force of its very nature. So, every phenomenon is contingent because it arises spontaneously by the force of its nature. It is not contingent because it depends upon any other thing.

All things are produced without cause like sharpness of thorns and the like. Everything is produced spontaneously. Nothing is produced by volition. The run of the world is impersonal. Some existent phenomena are eternal e.g. space and time. Others have contingent nature. Still others have their own peculiar characteristics. Fire is hot, water is cool, air has a cool touch. Who has made them so different from one another?

Some Carvākas may accept at the most that an event is caused by some antecedent conditions. But they will not accept the law of the uniformity of causation. The Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists accept the law of causation to account for the occasional production of phenomena. The Carvākas may argue that the occasional character of the phenomena may at the most prove that an event depends upon some other antecedent conditions, but it does not necessarily
imply that the same event will be produced by the same conditions invariably.
The occasional character of an event can be explained by the theory of accidentalism. Accidentalism is not the denial of causation. It is the denial of the uniformity of causation. It may be accepted that in certain instances smoke is caused by fire. But there is no proof to show that smoke will invariably be produced by fire.

The Carvākas, thus, hold that it is nothing but delusion to think that the occurrence of one phenomenon is necessarily and universally connected with the occurrence of another phenomenon. Even when we have observed two phenomena occurring simultaneously or in close succession hundred times, it is still possible that either of them may occur without the other.

The invariable concomitance of two phenomena is impossible by the very nature of the phenomena. Every event has its peculiar characteristics which are determined by its spatial and temporal circumstances. There is no repetition of an identical event in nature. In view of the unique character of every event, how can we hold that in nature one event is so connected with the other that the former cannot occur without the latter in future?

IV

Some one may suggest that faith in the orderliness of nature is instinctive. Therefore, it should not be a subject of any intellectual dispute. To this, the Carvāka replies that even if it is taken for granted that there are uniformities in nature, it is not possible to prove a particular law of uniformity to such an extent of conviction that it may be impossible to doubt its truth. It is quite possible that what has been regarded by the human mind as invariable concomitance of one phenomenon with another phenomenon may be, in fact, only variable concomitance and their having
been observed together without any exception may be nothing but accidental. Unless all that exists and happens in all times and at all places is cognised, nobody can prove that a particular event, A, necessarily depends for its occurrence upon another event, B. Unless all the cases of smoke and fire are observed, the doubt that probably smoke may occur in the absence of fire will ever remain. If a person has power to perceive all the events pertaining to all times and all places, for him there is no problem of induction and inference.

Some may hold that the repeated observation of one thing with another thing proves the invariable concomitance between them. The Carvakas refute it. They point out that by repeated observation we determine that such and such is the nature of a particular thing. But owing to the change in its spatiotemporal circumstances, it also changes its form. Moreover, by repeated observation of smoke and fire together, one can establish at the most that the occurrence of smoke is connected with the occurrence of fire. But it cannot establish that wheresoever there is no fire, there is no smoke.

In order to infer one thing, A, from the observation of another thing B, it is essential that the latter should be known with definiteness as necessarily dependent on A. Necessarily dependence of B on A cannot be established unless it is proved that B cannot be produced by anything other than A.

More existence of the law of necessary dependence of B on A is not sufficient to justify the inference of the latter on perceiving the former. It is the cognition that A is really dependent on B for its occurrence which is the logical ground for inferring A from B. This cognition cannot be considered reliable unless it is proved that B cannot be produced without A.

If it is held that the 'method of double agreement' (agreement in presence and agreement in absence) is sufficient for establishing necessary relation of B to A, then it is essential to ascertain that there is
non-perception of \( B \) in all those places where there is absence of \( A \). In order to establish that smoke necessarily depends on fire for its occurrence, it is essential to prove that smoke cannot be produced without fire, and for that the ascertainment of non-perception of smoke at all those places where there is absence of fire is necessary. First, it is impossible to ascertain how much part of the universe is devoid of fire. Secondly, it is also not possible to ascertain if the smoke exists or does not exist at the places where there is no fire. The Carvakas, thus, conclude that as all the instances of a particular event spreading over all the places and times cannot be perceived, the relation of invariable concomitance of one phenomenon with the other cannot be established. Consequently, in the absence of any certain and universal proposition, inference cannot be accepted as the source of true cognition.

V

PROBABILITY AS THE BASIS OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES

The Carvakas recognise sense-perception alone as the source of obtaining (true) knowledge. We can cognise only the present object \( x \) by means of perception. The objects and the events which are remote in time and place cannot be cognised by perception. But human activities are directed to achieve distant goals. If a person is not sure of the existence of a particular thing at a remote place or the occurrence of an event in future, how then does he indulge in performing such activities as have reference to them? In order to achieve a particular goal, it is necessary to have some knowledge about it. Man feels sure of the existence of certain things in a distant place and the occurrence of certain events in future. He is sure that water is cool, fire is hot, the sun is bright, water quenches thirst, fire burns, the sun dispels darkness. He is also sure of the necessary connections between certain
events. He is sure that an act of drinking water is necessarily followed by quenching of thirst, taking of food by the satisfaction of appetite. If he were not sure of these connections he would not search for water when thirsty and for food when hungry. The denial of the existence of certain things which are not being perceived at a particular moment, would paralyse the whole human behaviour. But the existence of a particular thing at a distant place or the occurrence of an event in future can be cognised by means of inference and not by means of perception. Thus, in order to account for human activities it is essential to accept the inference as a source of knowledge.

The Cārvākas reject this argument and maintain that in order to account for the activities of man, it is not necessary to accept inference as the source of valid knowledge. The activities of man are not determined by definite knowledge of the existence of the objects which are not directly perceived but by the probability of their existence. The Cārvākas think that those who accept inference as a 'pramāṇa' confuse man's psychological conviction in a particular belief with its logical certainty. The psychological problems should clearly be distinguished from the logical ones. The Cārvākas urge that from the logical point of view we cannot be sure of the existence of the things which are not being perceived. Though there is no logical proof for the existence of the objects not being perceived, yet owing to the practical urgency of life man thinks that they exist. Man suspends his philosophic doubt while dealing with the practical problems of life and the psychological belief in their existence determined by past experience is taken for the necessary truth.

Man anticipates the existence of fire at a place wherefrom smoke is perceived to be rising. This anticipation is determined by the association of their ideas determined by their having been observed together repeatedly
in the past. It is not due to the discovery of some necessary relation between the occurrence of smoke and the occurrence of fire. The repeated observation of the occurrence of two events together can at the most suggest the probability of their occurring together in future and can account for man's anticipation to perceive one when the other is perceived.

But the anticipation of the occurrence of an event determined by psychological reasons does not carry any necessity with regard to the occurrence of that event. All the expectations of man do not come out to be true. Many of them are belied. Some of them are belied, sooner than the others. Some expectations come out to be true many a time and get psychologically reinforced. But the experience that the expectation to see A on seeing B has come out to be true several times in the past does not prove that A is necessarily related to B. Whatever may be the degree of the psychological certainty of our expectation which has repeatedly, come out to be true in the past, logically, its coming out to be true in the future is just a matter of probability.

The Carvakas maintain that no proposition, no belief regarding the future events is necessarily true. The truth of a particular belief which guides man to realise a distant goal cannot be determined before the goal is actually realised. It is only when the activity of man guided by his knowledge of the existence of a thing at a particular place comes out to be fruitful that the person realises that his knowledge of the existence of the object was true. Thus, the Carvakas hold that the acceptance of inference as a source of knowledge is not essential to account for the practical activities of a man, as these can be explained on the basis of man's psychological belief in the probable existence of the future events and the objects which are not being perceived.
The Carvakas' fundamental epistemological dictum upon which their criticism of induction and inference is based is, to repeat it again, the following: 'Whatever cannot be verified by sense-perception does not exist, whatever can be verified by sense-perception exists.' They also maintain that the practical activities of man are determined by his belief in the probable existence of the things and the events which are not perceived.

In his Nyāyakusumānjali Udayanacārya tries to show that the Carvakas' acceptance of the probable existence of the objects which are not perceived is not consistent with their fundamental dictum of epistemology. While criticising Carvāka's dictum, he takes it to mean that when a thing is not perceived, it does not exist. This, of course, is the distortion of Carvāka's position. He asks what is the nature of probability which the Carvakas regard as the basis of human activities. He thinks that probability is nothing but doubt regarding the events which are not being perceived. When we say that an event may probably occur in future, we are not sure regarding its occurrence in future. Udayanacārya points out that according to the Carvāka's dictum, there remains no possibility of the doubtful cognition of any phenomenon. It means that when a person perceives a thing he is sure that it exists and when he does not perceive it, he is sure that it does not exist. As a person either perceives a thing or does not perceive it, on no occasion, he may be in doubt regarding its existence or non-existence.

Carvāka's dictum that when a thing is not perceived it does not exist is in direct clash with the mode of human conduct. When a Carvāka is away from his home he feels the desire to see his wife and return home. But when he is away from his home, he does not perceive his wife and
children. Therefore, instead of making arrangement to return home to see the members of his family, he should mourn and weep at the idea of complete extinction of the house and all the members of his family as proved by their non-perception. The Čārvāka may reply that though he does not perceive the members of his family when he is away from them yet he remembers them and it is the memory of his children and wife etc., which causes a desire to see them. The Naiyāyikas would urge that all this is true. But it is not consistent with the Čārvāka's 'dictum'. Recollection and perception of an identical thing are not possible at the same time. To recall a thing means not to perceive it. And to realise that a thing is not perceived is to realise, according to the Čārvāka, that it is non-existent.

Moreover, the recollection of the children etc., may at the most account for his longing to see them. But it cannot account for perceiving them on returning home. If they were non-existent for him, because they were not perceived by him while he was out, he could not see them again. To hold that for him they are produced again, would involve the same absurdity. They cannot be produced without some cause. But no cause of their production is perceived. If an imperceptible cause is accepted, then the 'dictum' that the thing which is not perceived is non-existent is given up.

The Čārvāka's 'dictum' that 'whatever is not perceived does not exist' is not only inconsistent with the practical behaviour of man, but self-contradictory also. It cuts at the very root of perception which it embodies and which is accepted by its author as a means of true cognition. The sense-organs which are the instruments of perceptual cognition cannot be perceived. Therefore, the Čārvākas cannot explain perception which they accept as the only source of true cognition.

Gangeśa tries to show that the acceptance of perception as a 'pramāṇa' presupposes the acceptance of inference as 'pramāṇa'. He points
out that the truth of a perception cannot be ascertained by the perception itself. In order to ascertain the truth of perception, it is necessary to recognise inference as a 'pramāṇa'. It cannot be held that the truth of a perception is known by the perception itself, because if it were so, nobody would ever feel doubt regarding a perception. But it is a fact that we, often, experience doubt regarding many of our perceptions.

Udayanācārya argues that one cannot consistently doubt the existence of every unobserved thing. The Cārvāka maintains that nothing can be said with certainty regarding a future event. All the unobserved instances of the events are doubtful. The unobserved instances of a particular event may or may not resemble its known instances. One can raise a doubt only regarding the unobserved events which have reference to the future time or the remote places. But such a doubt presupposes the knowledge that there are future moments and remote places. The future moments and the remote places cannot be cognised by perception, which by its very nature is limited to the present things and events. Inference is the only means by which the future moments and the remote places can be cognised. Thus, if a person doubts the occurrence of every observed event in the future, he cannot consistently refuse to accept inference as a source of knowledge (pramāṇa). One cannot have the idea of the future time on the basis of memory as what is not perceived cannot be recalled. The future time can never be perceived. Therefore, it cannot be recalled.

The Cārvāka may argue that the Naiyāyikas hold that when an individual perceives a particular thing e.g. a particular cow, he also knows that there is an indefinite number of cows. Then, why does he not hold that when a person perceives the present moment, he also knows that there is an indefinite number of moments? Thus, the cognition that there are moments other than the present one can be obtained by means of the 'sāmānya-laksāna pratyāsāti.'
In reply, the Naiyāyikas would say that the thing which cannot be perceived by ordinary sense-perception, cannot be perceived on the basis of 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāśattā'. If the Carvāka denies this, he would be obliged to accept that God which is imperceptible can also be cognised by perception involving 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāśattā'. If he holds that God does not exist because he cannot be perceived, he should also admit that there is no future time as it cannot be perceived. If he does not accept that there is future time, he has no basis to raise a doubt regarding future event. Thus, if he doubts that the smoke is invariably accompanied by fire, he has to accept inference in order to account for his doubt. And, if he does not doubt it, the possibility of having the definite knowledge of invariable concomitance between two phenomena, e.g., smoke and fire, remains unassailed.

Vardhamāna, the author of Prakāṣa, a commentary on Naiyāya-kusumāṅjali, shows contradiction involved in the Carvāka's argument in a different way. The Carvāka argues that as there is no method of knowledge by which 'vyāpti' can be obtained, there would arise doubt regarding the validity of reason in every case of inference. Vardhamāna points out that here the Carvāka is holding that there is invariable concomitance between 'the doubt that the reason may be variable' and 'the absence of the means of establishing vyāpti'. Thus he is sure at least in one case, regarding the truth of 'vyāpti'.

Moreover, the Carvāka's argument presupposes his knowledge of distinction between a 'variable reason' (vyabhicārya hetu) and an 'invariable reason (avyabhicārya hetu). The Carvāka raises a doubt regarding the invariability of the concomitance between what may be taken as the reason and what may be taken as the predicate (sādhya) in an inference. But unless the invariable concomitance between 'hetu' and 'sādhya' is known definitely in some case, it is not possible to raise doubt regarding it. That which is never known with certainty can never be doubted. The Naiyāyika's contention seems to be
this that it is possible to doubt the relation of invariable concomitance
between a hetu and a sadhya in some particular case of inference, but
it is not possible to doubt the relation of invariable concomitance between
'hetu' and 'sādhyā' in every case.

It appears that the Carvaka's position has not been faithfully inter­
preted by his opponents. They have rather twisted and confused the whole
issue. The real issue which the Carvaka has raised regarding the material
validity of the knowledge obtained by means of inference has been relegated
to the background and is covered by the web of useless sophistry. The
Carvaka does not dispute over the formal ruddhapya validity of inference. He
is concerned with inference as a source of knowledge. The Indian Logicians
in general hold that inference is a source of knowledge. The Carvaka's
contention is that the knowledge obtained by means of inference is only
probable because the material validity of the vyāpti can never be proved to
be certain.

All the arguments which the Naiyāyika has advanced against the Carvaka
are of the type of wrangle having no logical significance. Udayanacārya is
imbued more with the spirit of winning a victory over his opponent than with
the spirit of sincere pursuit of truth. His interpretation of the Carvaka's
'dictum' which he has quoted perhaps rightly seems to be wrong. He interprets
the Carvaka's 'dictum' - "Whatever is not perceived does not exist, and the
opposite exists." as esse est percipi. The Carvaka seems to hold as is clear
from the context, that there cannot be any proof of the existence of a
supersensuous entity. His 'dictum' means that whatever cannot be perceived
by sense-organs does not exist, as there cannot be any proof regarding its
existence. The empirical verification is the only proof of the truth of a
particular proposition. Can the proposition that 'God exists' be verified
by sense-perception? Can we perceive God by external sense-organs? The
answer is in the negative. Therefore, the proposition that 'God exists' has no meaning. Regarding such things as are perceived at some time and are not perceived at some other time, the Carvaka would not say that the thing ceases to exist, when it is not perceived. He would simply say that the existence of such a thing, when it is not perceived, would be only probable. It may exist and may not exist. There is no logical proof of the existence of a particular thing when it is not perceived.

But why does the Carvaka not maintain that the existence of such entities as God, the soul etc. is probable? He categorically asserts that God does not exist. And the basis of the categorical denial of the existence of God is simply this that God is not perceived. Similarly, when the Carvaka does not perceive a man at a particular time he should categorically assert that the man does not exist at all. The Carvaka would say that any person who argues like this does not understand his position. To say that a thing is not perceived by the external senses does not mean that it cannot be perceived. But it is non-sensical to say that there exists a thing which by virtue of its very nature is imperceptible.

Some philosophers hold that God is imperceptible by its very nature. But they try to prove the existence of God. The Carvaka would say that all the attempts of the philosophers to prove the existence of such things as are supposed to be imperceptible by their very nature would be futile. Any thing which is not perceived because it cannot be perceived by its very nature has no existence. And all the propositions which state the existence of such things, as a matter of fact, state nothing. But when a thing which is not imperceptible by its very nature is not perceived, we cannot say categorically that it does not exist at all. Nor can we say categorically that it exists. It may exist and may not.

Thus, when such things as are not imperceptible by their very nature
are not perceived, their existence is only probable. The practical man
does not bother regarding the logical proof of the existence of a thing. He
may believe that God exists. But he does not know that he is holding
a meaningless proposition. Similarly, when a person is away from home he
may have no doubt that all the members of his family are well at home. But
does this belief carry any logical certainty? Is the belief of man
never belied? Thus, though a person may believe that a thing, which he does
not perceive at a particular moment and at a particular place, exists at
some other place or will exist in some future moments, logically the existence
of a thing at a remote place or future is nothing but probable.

The Naiyāyikas have argued that the notion of probable existence of
a thing at a remote place or in future moment, presupposes definite knowledge
of the remote places and the future moments. The definite knowledge of the
remote places and the future moments can be obtained by means of inference.
Thus, it is not true to say that the knowledge obtained by inference is only
probable.

The Naiyāyika has anticipated the Čārvāka's reply to the above
argument. The Čārvāka would say that the remote places or future moments
are known by 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti.' The Naiyāyika has wrongly argued
that if the Čārvāka accepts that the future moments and remote places which
cannot be perceived by ordinary perception are perceived by the 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa
pratyāsatti', he will have to accept that God which cannot be perceived by
ordinary perception can also be perceived by 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti.'
Regarding the 'sāmānyalakṣaṇa - pratyāsatti' the Naiyāyika maintains
that any thing which is not perceived by ordinary perception cannot be
perceived by sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti. The remote places and the future
moments cannot be perceived by ordinary perception. Therefore, by
'sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti' we cannot know that there are remote places and
future events.

The above argument is wrong. When a person perceives a particular instance of a universal, he also knows that there is an indefinite number of such instances. This is what the Naiyäyika means by saying that the remote instances of a universal are known by perceiving a concrete instance embodying that universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāśatti). The Čārvāka may also put forward a similar argument with regard to the future moments and the remote places. When a person perceives a particular instance of smoke, he also knows that there is an indefinite number of such instances of smoke. Similarly, when a person perceives a particular place or time, he also knows that there are indefinite points of space and indefinite moments of time. The remote instances of smoke are imperceptible. But the smoke as such is not imperceptible. Similarly, the future moments are imperceptible. But a moment as such is not imperceptible. So, the Čārvāka may say that it needs no inference to know that there are future moments and remote places. The occurrence of a particular event in future or the existence of a thing at some remote place is thought to be known by inference. But it should never be forgotten that what we know by means of inference is only probable.

Vardhamāna's argument that the doubt regarding the invariable concomitance between two phenomena presupposes that the doubter has the definite knowledge of an instance of invariable concomitance is hopelessly futile. The Čārvāka criticises what the Naiyäyikas propound by examining the proofs given by the Naiyäyikas to support their theory, and by showing that the proofs on which the Naiyäyikas base their theory are not so sound as they suppose them to be. The Čārvāka does not propound any logical theory. However, he analyses the conditions of knowledge in general and inference in particular, and concludes that the conditions of inference do not form the guarantee of the material truth of its conclusion. Therefore, he says that the knowledge
obtained by inference is only probable.

When Udayana says that probability (Sambhūvana) is a kind of doubt (sandeha), he is again, confusing a logical doctrine with a psychological phenomenon. The doctrine of probability is a logical doctrine. It is based on the analysis of the logical conditions of knowledge. Doubt, on the other hand, is a psychological phenomenon. There is no relation between the two.

Gangesa has pointed out that if inference is not regarded as a source of perception also cannot be regarded as a source of knowledge. The Carvāka would not hesitate to accept that even the information obtained through the senses directly is probable till it is finally verified. That all knowledge is such is probable follows from the principle of 'parataḥ prāmāṇya' which has been accepted by the Carvākas, the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists alike.

The Naiyāyikas hold that if the apparatus of perception is not defective, the perceptual knowledge would be true. Similarly, if the logical apparatus of inference is valid both formally and materially, the conclusion would be true. The Naiyāyika does not deny that there may be defect in the sense organ in the case of perception and in the premises in the case of inference. Now these defects in the sources of knowledge depend upon adventitious conditions and not upon the real nature of a source of cognition as such. Because in a particular case of inference the 'vyāpti' being materially false, the conclusion also comes out to be defective, it does not mean that the inference as such is defective. In such cases the fault lies with the cogniser and not with the logical process of inference.

It means that so far as the formal process of inference is concerned it is perfect. But the Carvāka does not dispute the validity of inference as a formal process. He thinks that inference as a formal process has
no meaning as a source of knowledge. All the Indian logicians accept inference as a source of knowledge. The Čārvāka's contention is that the conclusion of inference can be indubitably true materially only when it is certain that the 'vyaññī' on which the conclusion is based is also materially true. But he thinks that it is not at all possible to establish the material validity of 'vyaññī' beyond the possibility of doubt. Therefore, what is known by inference is only probable.