CHAPTER : IV

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANISATION

As mentioned in the first Chapter, the very definition of social movement includes two quintessential elements. These are ideology and organisation which give the movement its distinct character as collective action. Hence, any scientific study of social movement has to take note of both ideology and organisation. This Chapter is designed to deal with an analysis of the ideology and organisation of the particular social movement under investigation. The initial part of the ongoing discussion focuses on ideology and the latter part on organisation. Before we move to the empirical situation, it is essential to have conceptual clarity of an elusive concept as ideology.

Ideology

Ideology is, perhaps, one of the most equivocal and elusive concept one can find in the social sciences, not only because of the variety of theoretical approaches which assign different meanings and functions to it, but also because it is a concept heavily charged with political connotations and widely used in every-day life with most diverse signification (Larrain, 1979). However, ideology, notwithstanding its conceptual ambiguities, is an important analytical tool in the study of social conflict and social movement, and crucial for the sociologist's understanding of collective action (Gusfield, 1970; Oberschall, 1973).

Even though, the concept of ideology is a product of French Enlightenment, a great deal is owed to Marx for introducing the concept into the social sciences (Wilson, 1973; Bluhm, 1974). Marx's conception of ideology is a
system of ideas constructed by the bourgeoisie as superstructure which justifies the domination of bourgeoisie and perpetuates it (Larrain, 1979). As a result of the contribution of Marx and Marxism, much more is known about the use of ideas and belief systems as weapon in class struggle. Recently, however, some attempts have been made to conceptualize ideology in such a way that although the notion of the use of ideas as political weapons is preserved, the concept is not so closely tied to theories of class conflict (Wilson, 1973).

According to Wilson (1973), "Ideology is the generic name given to those beliefs which mobilize people into action in social movements. An ideology is a set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements (situations) and what action would be undertaken in the light of those statements." Gusfield (1970) also advances, more or less, a similar definition. He expounds that ideology is a "belief system" which partisans hold and that is, by and large, an orderly analysis of the present situation and prescription for its relief. However, Blumer (1969) advances a broader conceptualisation of ideology. He defines ideology as a body of doctrines, beliefs, and myths. More specifically, it seems to consist of the statement of the objectives, purpose and premises of the movement; a body of criticism and condemnation of the existing situation which the movement is attacking and seeking to change; a body of defense doctrines which serves as a justification of the movement and of its objectives; a body of belief dealing with policies, tactics, and political operation of the movement; and the myths of the movement (ibid).
The above discussion on the concept of ideology not only clarifies much of conceptual confusions but also reflects certain functions of ideology. A full-blown ideology consists of three parts each referring to certain functions that can be conveniently distinguished (Killian, 1965). First, there is the interpretation of the process that has led to the present undesirable state of affairs, and blame for it is fixed on certain individuals, groups, or institutions. Second, the ideology provides the blueprint of a desirable state of affairs that can be obtained if only the resistance of certain groups or institutions is overcome. The blueprint describes the goals of the movement and the means by which they can be achieved. Third, the ideology will have a set of moral ideas associated with it, sometimes called its social philosophy (Heberle, 1951; Blumer, 1969). These ideas express the justification for the movement and its programmes. Hence, ideology can be construed as a system of beliefs and ideas which plays a major role in intensifying and crystallizing discontent to a degree that facilitates mobilisation for action and it provides justification to such action. This system of beliefs and ideas is primarily constructed by the leaders of the movement and this has a popular character (Blumer, 1969).

Against the backdrop of the above conceptual discussion we can move to analyse the ideological component of the phenomenon under study.

Two main strands of ideology are distinct in the movement. One is advocated by the leadership which represents the combined front of the Janata Party, the Congress (I)*, the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) and others, whereas the other is articulated by

*The involvement of the Congress (I) is limited to the participation of the local community leaders of the party in the Ghati area.
the leadership from the Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist) [UCCRI (M-L)]. However, both these strands are not contradictory to each other unlike their broader political ideologies. Both these strands deal with two dimensions; micro and macro dealing with micro and macro issues respectively.

The micro issue of displacement from the prosperous *bheeta mati*, a native word which loosely denotes 'home', 'health' and the emotions that are rooted in these words, which relates to the fundamental question of survival, forms the concrete content of the micro dimension of ideology. This micro issue has economic, social, psychological, cultural and environmental aspects. Both the strands of ideology, as mentioned above, share the same contents of micro dimension. But they differ in their world view on macro issues, which are relatively abstract in nature. The macro dimension deals with the very rationality of the NMTR, India's requirement of missiles in the context of growing militarization in the region, India's foreign policy and nuclear policy in relation to the 'Super Powers'. The micro dimension is taken up first for discussion.

In order to project the cost and benefit of the NMTR in terms of tangible gain and loss, the UBKGPC computed the figures of output and turnover as well as profits accruing to the area and the people. It also calculated the gross value of the property to be lost which the people, in particular, and the State, In general, would incur. The assessment was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Value of Land</th>
<th>Rupees (in crore)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Paddy fields 25,000 acres, Rate - Rs. 50,000/acre</td>
<td>125.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Government land - 5,000 acres, Rs. 25,000/acre</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Homestead land - 10,000 acres, Rs. 20,000/acre</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Orchards, gardens - 15,000 acres, Rs. 100,000/acre 150.00

Sub Total 487.25

2. Value of Crops
a. Cost of paddy, 25,000 acres, 10 quintals/acre, Rs. 200/quintal 50.00
b. Cost of betel vine yards of 30,000 nos., Rs. 20,000/betel vine yard 60.00
c. Cost of coconut and other fruits (200,000 trees) 20.00
d. Cost of inland fishes 2.00
e. Cost of groundnuts, oilseeds and Cashewnuts, etc. 7.00
f. Cost of sea fishes 50.00
g. Cost of house building woods 10.00
h. Cost of firewoods 5.00
i. Cost of bamboos 3.00
j. Cost of high yielding 10,000 acres Paddy crops, 20 quintals/acre, Rs. 200/ quintal 4.00
k. Value of paddy straw for Sarod and Dalua about 35,000 acres, Rs. 300/ acre 1.00

Sub Total 212.00

3. Cost of Buildings and Temples, etc.
a. Private pucca buildings about 200 nos., Rs. 150,000 approx./house 3.00
b. Private semi pucca building 3,000 nos. 18.00
c. Semi permanent houses about 9,000 nos., Rs. 15,000 approx./house 13.50
d. Cost of temples, 200 nos. 2.00
e. Cost of wells, tubewells 0.05

Sub Total 36.55

4. Value of Government Properties
a. Cost of roads and bridges 200 kms., Rs. 50,000/km 1.00
b. Cost of schools and colleges buildings 2 colleges, 13 High Schools, 30 M.E. Schools, 50 Primary Schools, (approximate cost). 7.50
c. Cost of dispensary & M.A.C., etc. 1.00
d. Cost of electric line and other installations 5.00
e. Cost of G.P. houses with Grain Gola, etc. 0.24
f. Cost of library & Yuvak Sangh houses 0.25

Sub Total 14.99

5. Cost of Small & Cottage Industries
a. One choir rope industries 0.25
b. Salt factory at different localities 2.00
c. Fish depot (4 in number) 1.25
d. Bamboo basket and mat and mattress making industries 2.00
e. Huller machines and oil extraction mills 1.00

Grand Total 712.34

Source : UBKGPC, "Memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India in 1986."
The Ganatantric Adhikar Suraksha Sangathan, Orissa, also formed a Fact Finding Committee to assess the total loss to be incurred because of displacement. The fact finding mission visited 25 populous villages in the area and met about 35,000 people - men, women and children in small and big gatherings. Thus, the team claimed to have met widest cross section of people with different vocation and from different social strata. Prior to this, village-survey teams formed by the committee combed the area and prepared an inventory of productive and valuable assets.

However, there is a gap between these two assessments. In nutshell, the Fact Finding Team calculated the total monetary value of immovable properties such as land, houses and other constructions to be about Rs. 300 crores which was substantially lower than the Rs. 528.74 crore estimate by the UBKGPC. The Fact Finding Team calculated the loss of income to be about 150 crores of rupees per annum. It also mentioned that this figure would be much higher if the production and distribution system were taken into account. (Ganatantra Adhikar Suraksha Sangathan, 1986).

The figures computed by the UBKGPC were provided by the traders and gave indications of the actual profits of the trading community from the sale of produce of the area. While these figures were not far from reality they did, to some extent, mystify the stakes of different classes on land and also did not differentiate between varied incomes earned by different strata of the society (Patel, 1990).

In contrary to the above estimates of losses, the Government claimed that the project would usher development in the region by initiating the process
of much desired industrialisation and modernisation. A chain of industries would be set up with an I.T.I to train the local youth which would enable them to find skilled jobs in those industries. The Government further promised to provide job to at least one person from each family. Besides all these, the Government has also promised to implement a comprehensive rehabilitation programme which would provide a modern and developed context of living to the populace (Department of Public Relation, Orissa, 1986).

Refuting these claims, the leadership of the movement posits the counterclaim that the area is already a developed one. The development, experienced by the people has been initiated by people themselves and are suitable to the local socio-cultural matrix. Unemployment and starvation are unknown to the people in the area. All, from children to aged, find jobs for themselves. The leaders claim that a child who peels off groundnut earns around Rs. 15 a day and an adult or old person, who either plucks betel leaves or arranges them in the basket, earns around Rs. 15 to 20 a day. So the dependent age group are not liability either on the family or the community, as is the case in industrialised societies. Wage is not at all an issue because of the scarcity of the labour in the area. Sri Patra, the UCCRI (M-L) leader, also confessed that on the issue of wage, no mobilisation could be done.

The leaders unequivocally opine that the destruction of pana economy will render a chain of persons and artisans jobless. The reed growers, the skilled labourers who are specialised in setting up structure for the betel vine yard; the labourers engaged in plucking and arranging the betel leaves; the artisans who make bamboo baskets for the export of betel leaves, would be left...
without any viable means of livelihood. These people, even if provided with jobs in the industries, can not cope with new occupations. Even the peasants who survive on the cultivation of *pana* will find themselves in most precarious condition.

The leaders further stress that whatever may be the amount of compensation, there is no avenue and opportunity of investment where the people will get the same kind of returns as they are getting now. This is true even for those cultivators, agricultural labourers and fishermen who are not linked with *pana* economy. For them the natural endowments of the region give enough of a livelihood to make them prefer staying here rather than working as contract labour here or somewhere else in the country, as so many of their fellow Oriyas have been forced to do.

Hence, all the leaders, irrespective of their different interests and political affiliations, perceive land as an object of contention. The *swarna-prasu bheetamati*, the ancestral homeland which produces gold is called *suna ra mati*, the land of gold. All the interest constellations centred on the land have crystallised into the ideology of *bheetamati* (Patel, 1990). The struggle is, thus, for *suna ra mati*, for the protection of *mati ma*, the mother land which is the symbol of *Prakriti*, the nature. The entire community has launched a stiff resistance against the state which wanted to destroy all the three, *suna ra mati*, *ma* and *Prakriti*. The common slogan raised collectively embedding the ideology of *bheetamati* and manifesting militancy is:

*Maribu Pachhe e Mati Paain,*
*Inche Jami Chhadibu Nahin.*

(We will lay our lives for this soil but will never budge a clod of soil).
The fisherfolk, another major occupational collectivity, also articulates its interests in the context of displacement and rehabilitation. Their articulation has led to the crystallisation of cognition about their loss and future life. The process of articulation of interests and crystallisation of cognition have resulted in the formation of a ‘Front’ called *Matsya Jivi Gana Samukhya* (Fishermen’s Front) which has been representing their collective interests in every level of actions and in all forums (*Matsya Jivi Gana Samukhya*, n.d.).

Around thirty thousand fishermen are engaged in fishing in the confluences of the river Subarnarekha and Balanga and in the sea lying in between them. Around twenty thousand traditional boats ply in this zone. Besides the fishermen, around two thousand women are engaged in fish trading catering to the needs of local and nearby markets, and about one thousand men commute daily on bicycle for transporting fish to the other parts of the district (*The Prajatantra*, November 17, 1985).

The convener and executive members of the ‘Fishermen’s Front’ are aware of the Government’s plan to rehabilitate them at a place called Kasafala, another fishing zone where a fishing co-operative society has been set-up as an Indo-Norway joint-venture. As a matter of fact, an official of the same society has confessed that Kasafala fishing zone can not accommodate such a large number of fishermen (*Committee to Assist the Struggle of Bhograi and Baliapal Against Missile Base*, 1988).

The leaders ridicule the Government’s thinking that only net and boats are required for fishing, and if the fishermen are provided with these articles and settled near the sea, they can continue with their occupation. They
claim that the skill has been acquired through experiences over generations. The long acquaintance with the sea of this particular region has given them the definite knowledge about the movement of different fishes in different seasons in the year and also the movement of wind. Without this knowledge, it is practically impossible for them to fish, as they claimed.

Another advantage which the fishermen have been enjoying here in this area is the prevalence of a particular system known as 'pala system' or 'Camp system'. This, again, is a development over a period of time. This unique system provides poor fishermen who do not possess boats or nets, with the opportunity to carry on their caste occupation. This system also protects the poor fishermen from indebtedness and exploitation unlike the case in other sea beaches in coastal Orissa.

Etimologically pala means a small straw thatched cottage. This cottage represents a network of relationships. A pala is owned by a malik (owner) who invests the major amount of money in boats and nets, and is considered as the head of pala. His responsibilities are to market the catch, maintain the account and distribute the earnings as per the share of each member. This profitable occupation has lured people from upper castes such as Khandayat, Raju and Gola who have joined as malik. Other fishermen join the malik either simply as a fisherman or by paying a share in the form of net or money. The number of membership of a pala usually ranges from fifteen to thirty.

There is a 'patron-client' relationship between the malik and the members. It is obligatory for the malik to help other members at the time of their
need. He thinks himself responsible for the well being of the camp members. In case of dislocation, the leaders perceive, this system can never be reinstituted which will consequently render the fishermen jobless making them vulnerable to exploitation and indebtedness.

In nutshell, the articulation of fishermen leadership has added another dimension to the ideology of bheetamati. Sea is ma who feeds them. Their notion of bheetamati embeds sea also. Their sense of belongingness to the sea and land is manifested through their activism directed against the state, which is symbolised in the following slogan.

"E Mati Amara, 
E Samudra Amara, 
Sarakar Tume Hati Jao."

(The land is ours, The Sea is ours, Government! You retreat).

Source - Matsya Jivi Gana Samukhy. n.d. (leaflet)

The Nari Samukhya or the ‘Women’s Front’ has added another dimension to the ideology of bheetamati. For the womenfolk, the issue of contention is the home, the sweet home which is the women’s creation. Home is the symbol of love and affection, compassion, sympathy and security. For a woman, home connotes life, togetherness and security.

The front appeals to the expressive qualities of women. Nari is symbolised as the mystique image of Laxmi and Durga, the Goddesses of wealth and fortune, and prowess respectively. It is the woman, who is responsible for the maintenance of home, handed over to her by her ancestors. For her, home is the tradition which she is to preserve and protect, being Laxmi and Durga [Nari Samukhy, n.d.(leaflet)].
They view displacement as destruction of everything. Uprooting from the 'home' will render them destitute aliens, as hatred objects on their own land. She will be deprived of her privacy, rights and tradition.

This articulation has made them to come out of their homes and participate in resistance activities in public. They have become the frontline agitators and protesters. Their articulation and activism have been conscientized in the following slogan:

"Ghati Nuhein, Mati Chahun,
Juddha Nuhein, Santi Chahun,
Dhwansa Nuhein, Srushti Chahun,
Marana Nuhein, Jibana Chahun."

(We want land, not missile base, We want peace, not war,
We want creation, not destruction, We want life, not death).

(Quoted from a leaflet issued by Nari Samukhya, n.d.).

The Chhatra Samukhya or 'Students' Front', though critical of the leadership of the UBKGPC, shares its ideological cognition. The student leaders view this project as a politically motivated one which will affect, not only, the people of Baliapal-Bhograi area, but also, the people of the whole of Balasore district and the adjacent district of Mayurbhanj. The project will draw the innocent people into the danger orbit of nuclear wars. Explosion of rockets and missiles will pollute the environment leading to climatic change.

Regarding the issue of displacement, the leaders of the 'Students' Front' hold the strong belief that uprooting will destroy the affluent agro-based economy of the area, age-old culture and tradition, and the social base of the communities which the so-called modern rehabilitation programme can not
reconstitute. The glaring examples they refer to are the Rengali dam, Hirakud multipurpose project, and Rourkela Steel Plant, all situated in Orissa only.

A leaflet issued by the ‘Students’ Front’ assesses that the NMTR will deprive around fifteen thousand students who are enrolled in one hundred and thirty-four existing educational institutions. The leaflet describes the problem as a rare one which has no parallel in the history of the country either before and after Independence (Chhatra Samukhya, n.d.).

Thus, the ‘Students’ Front’, going out of the periphery of the ideology of bheetamati, articulates the belief system in a broader perspective of nuclearization of the country and the consequent pollution and problematics. This refers to the macro dimension of the ideology.

The belief system advocated by the leaders at all levels contradicts the Government’s proclamation that the project will generate development for the people of the area, in particular, and the State, in general. The claim that the comprehensive rehabilitation programme with an alternative industrial occupation system will provide a modern context, a more affluent environment to the people is strongly contested. The leaders cite the tragic fate of the oustees of Rengali dam project, Rourkela Steel Plant and Hirakud multipurpose dam. Another case they cite to show the callousness of the Government in implementing rehabilitation programme is that of Badkhanpur, a village in Baliapal block itself. In 1985, a flash flood in the river Subarnarekha washed away around fifty houses of Badkhanpur. The Government promised to rehabilitate them with adequate compensation. In the name of rehabilitation, each family was given a small pucca house, but all the structures crumbled in the
very first rain that followed. So the leaders argue that if the Government could not rehabilitate only fifty households, how could it resettle thousands.

The project and the concomitant modernisation and development, thrust from above, are perceived as detrimental to development and disastrous for the communities. This exposes the very contradiction between the intention of the planners and the articulation on the effect of the plan and policy by the target groups. Another contradiction which the ideology surfaces is between the ‘National interests’ and ‘people interests’ (Deshingkar, 1989). This contradiction addresses itself to the ethical question as to what should be given priority? The present endeavour is not aimed at dealing with this issue.

Hence, the articulation of the ideology of bheetamati brings out the economic, political, social, cultural and environmental dimensions of the struggle. However, it should be noted that the ideology, as articulated by the leaders of the UBKGPC and the Fronts during the struggle, emphasize economic issues more than the cultural and environmental issues. The concept of the use of land for peaceful purposes remains a weak impulse in the agitation (Patel, 1990).

The macro dimension of the ideology, as already outlined above, deals with the very concept of such a project; it’s need for the Nation within the context of India’s foreign policy, nuclear policy and the ‘Super Power’ rivalry. The Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist- Leninist) and Fronts’ leadership strongly emphasize this macro dimension, whereas the other block does not.
The UBKGPC leadership questions the very rationality of setting up of such a huge project in thickly populated area, and, therefore, demands its shifting to a site where it will involve less human displacement. In their interviews, the leaders of the Steering Committee were categorical on the need of such a project for the country in view of threats from the neighbouring countries. Initially, the advisor of the UBKGPC, Sri Biju Pattnaik did question the efforts of India to possess long range missiles which might be used for launching nuclear warheads. But later, Sri Pattnaik and the UBKGPC leadership confined their demand to that of shifting the site. Probably for this reason, the movement could not be linked with the peace movement and the macro dimension could not acquire prominence.

The UCCRI(M-L) ranks, in contrary, question the very rationality of constructing such a project which is aimed at furthering the nuclear arms race in the world and make India a pawn in the ‘Super Powers’ war politics. To them, this agitation launched by the people of Baliapal-Bhograi area is a movement. To quote a leaflet issued by Sri Patra dated April 14, 1986, "Although they (the people of Baliapal-Bhograi area) have started the struggle to defend their homes and hearths, their struggle is also a struggle in defence of world peace and opposed to war preparations of Indian ruling class and their treaty-bound master Soviet Union. Today the Baliapal people are in a just struggle which is not only in their own interests, but also in the interests of all peace-loving people through out Orissa and our country as a whole".

The UCCRI(M-L) leadership holds that in the present day world, the Soviet Union and the U.S. have come up as the two ‘Super Powers’, contending
for world hegemony by means of their military supremacy. The ‘Third World’, at present, is the bone of contention for establishing hegemony. The Super Powers have their own strategies to pursue hegemonic tendencies. Building military bases in other countries and roping them into war strategies form an important part of this strategy. The National Missile Testing Range proposed to be set up in Baliapal-Bhograi area is nothing but an extension of such a strategy by the Soviet Union which has bound this country by a so-called friendship treaty (Call of Baliapal, 1986; Patra, 1987).

The countries of the ‘Third World’, according to Sri Patra, have every right to strengthen their national security to defend their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against the coercive bullying, interventionist and aggressive moves of the imperialist powers, particularly the two ‘Super Powers’ in the present world. They must not play as instruments of expansionism either of the ruling class of the concerned country or that of one or the other imperialist ‘Super Power’. But those defence endeavours must rely on the strength of the country’s own resources, people and must be free from the imperialist influence or control. They must not become a burden on the people or alienated from them (Call of Baliapal, 1986; Patra, 1987).

But the Indian defence which is built on colonial tradition and heavily depends upon the imperialist powers, particularly the Soviet Union, proves to be contrary. It is neither directed against imperialist powers nor used for the people’s interests. India falls prey to military alignment in the from the depending under the cover of ‘non-alignment foreign policy’. In this context, the
NMTR is a part of the Soviet strategy in collaboration with the Indian ruling class to establish its hegemony over the South and South East Asia (Patra, 1986).

The UCCRI(M-L) leadership further maintains that Orissa has been turned into a biggest armoury in India. Besides, the proposed NMTR in Baliapal-Bhograi area, already ten vast areas, mostly along the east coast, are under the control and use of the defence department. The extent of land these unproductive projects have swallowed, the amount of natural and people’s wealth they have devoured, the total number of people they have displaced and the magnitude of the burden they have brought for a backward, draught-stricken state like Orissa are beyond assessment (ibid).

In nutshell, the UCCRI(M-L) leaders believe that the NMTR is a part of Soviet strategy in collaboration with the Indian ruling class for world hegemony, in general, and supremacy in South and South-East Asia, in particular. The very project is a contradiction between the Non-alignment policy and nuclear policy, that India advocates and practises. The project, if debunked, is meant to serve neither the national nor the people’s interests, rather it is designed to serve the interests of the imperialist power and the ruling class of the country. The expenditure of the people’s resources on such design for imperialist expansionism is borne by the poor people in the name of sacrifice for the larger interests, or in other words, national interest. So the movement by the local people is a struggle for the macro cause of peace, anti-imperialism and anti-nuclearization as asserted by the UCCRI (M-L) (Rao, 1986). In order to substantiate the above ideological propositions propounded by the UCCRI (M-L) leadership, a relevant portion of a documented literature is quoted.
which also reveals their characterisation of the movement, "........ the struggle being waged by the people of Baliapal-Bhograi area is of immense political significance. They are waging struggles against evictions - which, in essence, is a struggle to defend their right to live. They are waging struggle against the destruction of rich natural productive resources which, in essence, is a struggle to defend the wealth of our country and people as a whole. They are waging struggle against the danger of nuclear holocaust which, in essence, is a struggle against production and use of most destructive weapons in the modern world which destroy natural as well as human wealth on a massive scale. They are waging the struggle against the attempts of 'Super Powers' to drag India into their war preparations which in essence, is a struggle against war and for world peace. Thus, the struggle for life and the struggle for world peace are closely and inseparably linked and merged into one here" (Call of Baliapal, 1986, pp. 15-16).

In the context of the above belief system, the UCCRI(M-L) leadership has formulated certain slogans which have been the chief mechanism to transmit the articulation to the people and to concretise their demands. The slogans are as follow:

"Baliapal re Kshepanastra Ghati Banda Kara,
Bharata Sagar Santi Anchala Ghosana Kara."

(Stop missile base at Baliapal, Declare Indian ocean as peace zone)
Source - Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India(M-L), 1988.

"Bharata matti re Russ Kshepanastra Chaliba Nahin,
Amari Rakte Tuma Hori Khela Chaliba Nahin."

(We won't tolerate soviet missiles on our soil,
We won't tolerate your playing holi with our blood).

Source-Patra,1986.
"Bharata Sagaru Bidesi Shakti Hatai Dia,
Bharata-Russ Samarika Chukti Batil Kara".

(Remove foreign powers from the Indian ocean,
Annul the Indo-Soviet Treaty)

"Nakali Nuheirt Prakruta Gosthi Nirapeksha Niti, Amara Dabi,
Yuddha Nuheirt, Padosi Sahita Anakramanara Chukti, Amara Dabi".

(Not superficial but real non-alignment, we want,
Not war, but no-war pact with neighbours, we want)


The above discussion clearly brings out the two strands of ideology based on micro and macro dimensional issues. While the micro dimension of the ideology, i.e. the ideology of bheetamati permeates all the political groups and Fronts, the macro dimension of the ideology reflecting upon wider abstract issues has remained confined to the articulation of the UCCRI(M-L) leadership and the leaders of 'Students' Front'. Further more, different articulations by various Fronts and collectivities emphasize more upon the concrete economic issues rather than the socio-cultural and environmental issues.

Organisation

As pointed out in the beginning, both ideology and organisation are the quintessential elements of social movements. Without organisation, no movement can take shape and no ideology can be translated into action. The following discussion focuses on the organisational aspect of the movement under study.

While dealing with conceptual issues in the first chapter it is pointed out; what characterizes a social movement as a particular genre of collective
action is the emergence of an organisational structure. It is this development of a formal structure that turns a sporadic demonstration, an angry crowd or an aggregate of individual dissents into collective action of significance for social change or resisting any change (Gusfield, 1970). To the extent, it is stressed that movement must evolve an organisation which will work out ways to regulate interaction among rank and file and establish some form of leadership which will devise strategy and tactics for bringing about change in the "situation" or otherwise (Banks, 1972; Perry, et al., 1976; Perry, et al., 1978).

There is a notable absence of cumulative research concerning the make-up of social movements (Wilson, 1973; Rao, 1978). But more recently social scientists have begun to devote attention to the organisation and structure of social movements (Perry, et al., 1976). Though, sociology of social movement has been enriched by considerable empirical studies and also abstract theoretical formulation, yet there is no generalisation on the aspect of organisational structure. A wide variety of definitions of social movement has made the task of such generalisation all but impossible (Wilson, 1973). Even scholars differ on the very issue of definition of organisation of social movement.

Wilson (1973) prefers the concept of structure to organisation because the former is more inclusive than that of the latter, which is usually taken to mean a concrete goal-oriented system in such features as a division of labour, a hierarchy of leaders and functionaries, and a system of disciplines have been consciously devised and area explicitly recognised and legitimated. He further argues, "...... the appearance of a structured, coordinated collectivity is the hall-mark of a social movement, then, but the extent to which a bureaucracy
emerges to do the coordinating is always problematic, especially while the collectivity's self-definition is tentative and changing".

However, many other scholars have used the concept of organisation, of course, without advancing any explanation for the preference (Turner and Killian, 1961; Zald and Ash, 1966; Wilkinson, 1971; Gusfield, 1973; Touraine, 1985). In spite of such difference, all these scholars hold the view that social movements are organised, but not in the same way as highly bureaucratic systems are. They are in a state of flux. While attempting to identify quintessential characteristics, Wilkinson (1971) spells out that a social movement must evince a minimal degree of organisation, though this may range from a loose, informal and partial level of organisation to a highly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and a corporate group. To him, organisation is a structure which is not a highly formalised and static entity rather marked by variability as far as formalisation is concerned.

Inspite of the conceptual confusion, the commonness among all is that organisation is essentially based on division of labour which, in effect, is also a division of authority, and also based on the growth and development of leadership on a 'regular basis'.

Formation of organisation as an essential characteristic of social movement is not the mark of the beginning of a movement and dissolution of organisation is also not the end of a movement. The process of formalisation starts much before it crystallises into organisation. Perhaps, it is the existential conditions and compulsions which determine the point of time in the history of the life-cycle of the movement, as to when the process of formalisation
crystallises. So, the crucial issues involved in sociological analysis of social movement are as follow. How does the process of formalisation start? Under what existential conditions do organisations come into being? What is the structure and functions of such organisations? What is the linkage among various levels of organisation?

As it is pointed out earlier, organisation is inextricably linked with leadership. The leaders assume legitimacy through organisation to decide on strategy and tactics of collective actions for goal-achievement. But this does not lead to a conclusion that the social movements are the handiwork of the leaders (Oommen, 1977). The process of formalisation has a corollary process of routinization of charisma. Here certain questions come to mind. They are; how does leadership emerge, and what is the structure and social composition of leadership?

In this part we tend to discuss the organisational structure of the movement under study. While the first part has been devoted to ideology, the ongoing one takes up organisation. This categorisation is done for the convenience of analysis. It should not be understood that ideology and organisation are disjointed. The leadership articulates ideology which is transmitted to the bottom and translated into action through organisation.

Since no written document, published or unpublished, is available explaining emergence, growth and decay of the organisations which emerged at different points of time, the discussion is based on the information collected through interviews with various leaders, ‘important persons’ and other resource persons.
While delineating history of the movement in the previous chapter it has been mentioned that on December 25th, 1985, the Uttar Balasore Kshepanastra Ghati Pratirodh Committee (UBKGPC) was formed. But, the period prior to the day of launching of the UBKGPC was not free from protest and resistance activities. Even mobilisation was not erratic and the collective actions were neither sporadic nor mobbing in nature. The leaders informed that organisation was existent prior to the formation of the UBKGPC.

From sociological point of view, it is important to find out the difference between the nature of these organisations and to trace the process of emergence of a more formal organisational structure supported by a legitimised leadership. It is also important to pore over the nature of leadership, the process of routinization of leadership and its social composition. The following attempt is aimed at grappling with these issues.

After the official announcement by the Chief Minister of Orissa in July 1984 regarding the site of the NMTR, it was the educated people in the area, consisting of students and teachers, who perceived the threat first. The youth clubs of the villages which were meant for entertainment turned into the centres of discussion on the issue. The students and teachers soon realised the immediate need of an organisation and organised efforts through which they could ventilate their resentment and pursue their actions collectively to force the Government to withdraw such a ‘disastrous plan’. Then emerged the "Dakshin Bialiapal Kshepanastra Ghati Birodhi Samiti” (South Bialiapal Missile Opposition Samiti). The General Secretary of the present UBKGPC confirmed that in the beginning some students, teachers and youths formed this organisation.
The emergence of the "Dakshin Baliapal Kshepanastra Ghati Birodhi Samiti" (DBKGBS) was undoubtedly the inception of organisation, the initial rudimentary crystallisation of the process of formalisation. As its very name suggested, the DBKGBS was confined to the southern part of Baliapal block with jurisdiction restricted to few villages without wider representation and localised function. Only teachers, students and a handful of youth constituted the rank and file of DBKGBS. The leaders were neither the community heads nor widely known persons. So, even though, they articulated the consequences, they could not transmit it to other groups and categories. They also failed in establishing an effective communication system between the leaders and the people. Hence, mobilisation was confined to certain sections of people only. The strategies adopted by them were mainly petition, appeal and negotiation. Sri Gananath Patra, the UCCRI (M-L) leader said that the activities of this organisation were confined to baithaki meeting (refer to glossary) and petitioning the Government to withdraw the proposal.

On the one hand, the leaders of the DBKGBS realised that without a broad-based organisation, sustained mobilisation and radical action, it would not be possible to avert the threat. On the other hand, the dominant interest groups such as the upper and middle peasantry, and the traders of betel leaves also articulated their interests which convinced them of their loss and a gloomy future in case the NMTR was set up. The realisation of the leaders of the DBKGBS and articulation of dominant interest groups got combined to broaden the base of the organisation in a more formal way.
Subsequently, a General Committee of fifty-five members was formed. Besides the General Committee, a Central Committee called 'Steering Committee' was constituted with eleven members. Both these committees were formed through nomination and co-option.

The Joint Secretary of the General Committee revealed that no special attention was paid to a representative social composition of the committee. So, almost all the members were from the upper castes and upper and middle classes. Moreover, all those villages which were to be displaced did not find representation. The important common feature of these committees was that they were formed by the people with the congress (I) affiliation. The reason being the upper castes and upper class are traditional Congress (I) followers in Baliapal-Bhograi area (Patel, 1990).

The basic aim and objective of this organisation was again neither to mobilise the masses nor to build up a mass movement against the project. It kept itself aloof from the grass roots. So the cognitive articulation did not percolate down to the bottom, and the linkage between the organisation and the people could not be established. Besides this, the leadership mostly with congress (I) affiliation could not also establish linkage with the majority of the local leaders, who belonged to the Janata Party. This also contributed in a significant way to distancing the masses from the organisation.

The members of these committees thought that the problem could be averted by themselves by means of their own resources; mainly the political contact, personal influence and financial power. Therefore, the strategy was not much different from that of the earlier DBKGBS formed by teachers and
students. Petition, discussions and negotiations were retained as the means of achieving the goals. The only difference between the earlier DBKGBS and the later DBKGBS was that the leadership of the later DBKGBS endeavoured to create a sympathetic pressure group at the state level by mobilising the eminent political leaders, social activists, intelligentsia and higher administrative functionaries.

The failure of all the strategies adopted by the DBKGBS to avert the imminent displacement and at the same time the growing threat posed by the State to go ahead with the project made the erstwhile leaders of the DBKGBS realise that the threat was of no minor nature and it had to be countered from below with a strong leadership with persistent mobilisation as well as collective action. The leaders also understood that a mass movement could not be mobilised by the present organisation with most of the local Janata Party leaders remaining out of its fold.

At this point, the movement turned towards mass mobilisation instead of the earlier mobilisation which was confined to certain levels and categories. It was also realised by the leadership that mass mobilisation would necessitate a hierarchical leadership structure situated at various structural levels, representing different interest constellations. On the whole, 'people's power' had to be built on a strong edifice with deep foundation which could be able to counter 'State power'.

With these understandings, efforts were set forth by mainly two local level congress (I) leaders, Sri X (name withheld), a big trader of pana and Sri Y (name withheld), a freedom fighter, to persuade the local Janata Party leaders to
join the movement. Persuasion was done through appeal to save both the land and life, and in addition, kinship affiliation was also used to elicit response. As revealed by Sri X, Sri Y was asked to impress upon Sri Z (name withheld), another freedom fighter and an influential local Janata Party leader who happened to be his Samundhi (refer to glossary).

As unequivocally revealed by all the leaders interviewed, it was decided in an informal meeting by some of the local Janata Party leaders including Sri Gadadhar Giri and Congress (I) leaders, to assemble on 25th December, 1986, to form an organisation, irrespective of their different political affiliations and electoral interests. On that day, fifteen leaders each from the Janata Party and the Congress (I) met at Sri X's residence in Jamatkula, a core village. There the historic event took place when consensually the Congress (I) and the Janata Party leaders jointly launched the "Uttar Balasore Kshepanastra Ghati Pratirodh Committee" (UBKGPC). The DBKGBS was henceforth dissolved and was replaced by UBKGPC, a broader organisation.

In the same meeting, the structure of the UBKGPC was formed. It was decided that the UBKGPC would have two bodies, i.e. a Zonal Council and a Steering Committee. Zonal Council would function as general body giving representation to all classes and social categories as well as the villages. The Steering Committee consisting of thirteen members who would be nominated by the Zonal Council, would function as the central body managing day-to-day affairs and tackling immediate problems.

Then and there, the UBKGPC adopted the constitution of the erstwhile DBKGBS with certain modifications. The constitution spelt out the
details of the structure, power and functions of the organisation and membership recruitment. This written document symbolising formalisation, provided a framework of operation on the basis of division of labour. The following is a brief extraction from the written but unpublished constitution.

A. The function to be discharged by the UBKGPC are:

(1) "----to oppose the proposed missile testing range in peaceful way and to demand for its shift from such an agriculturally prosperous area of Baliapal and Bhograi;

(2) to work towards social, cultural and economic development, and to create good will among the people irrespective of caste, creed, religion and political affiliations;

(3) to develop the area through creative activities;

(4) to oppose the proposed missile testing range in peaceful way as shown by Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Jayaprakash;

(5) to fulfill the above objectives, the committee will publish and distribute leaflets, pamphlets, books and undertake other means of propaganda.

B. In the fifteen Gram Panchayats any person—either male and female above eighteen years of age can become the member of the committee by paying two rupees as membership fee.

C. The structure of the UBKGPC will be as following:

(1) Mahala or ward will be taken as the smallest unit. At this level, Mahala Ghati Committee or "Ward Ghati Committee" will be formed with a minimum of hundred members. This "Ward Ghati Committee" will be
headed by a core committee consisting of eleven members duly elected from among them.

   Every "Ward Ghati Committee" will elect one member each to the Zonal Council. All these elected members from the wards will form the Zonal Council. This shall be vested with the power and responsibilities to organise and lead the movement. The council shall meet at least twelve times in a year.

(2) The members of the Zonal Council shall elect thirteen members from among themselves who will constitute the Steering Committee, the apex body. The Steering Committee shall have the full power to manage the organisational activities, day-to-day affairs and shall be vested with the responsibilities of mobilising the mass.

(3) The council shall elect the President and the Chief-Advisor.

(4) The President shall be the supreme leader and shall preside over all the meetings including those held in public. He will guide others, both leaders and participants.

(5) The President and the Chief Advisor shall nominate other office bearers.

D. The UBKGPC shall have the following functionaries besides the President.

   (i) Two Vice-Presidents.

   (ii) One General Secretary.

   (iii) Two Joint Secretaries.
(iv) One Office Secretary and
(v) One Treasurer.

E. Besides the membership fees the committee is empowered to raise funds from the people and those who will donate a sum of Rs. 500/- or more will be enrolled as special members of the council.

F. A detail account will be maintained which will have to be presented before the council once in a year.

G. The Steering Committee shall appoint a "Disciplinary Committee" consisting of three members. This "Disciplinary Committee" will be vested with the power to resolve civil disputes and recommend and implement sanctions against the erring parties. But the final decision regarding the sanctions will rest with the Steering Committee. However, the aggrieved party can apply to the council for reconsideration.

H. The Steering Committee will review the shape as well as line of the organisation from time to time and will take steps to form the following bodies:

   (i) Women’s Front,
   (ii) Student’s Front,
   (iii) *Marana Sena* (Suicide Squad).

Regarding the organisational matter, whatever problems will crop up in future, will be tackled by the Steering Committee with endorsement by the Zonal Council.
I. The constitution can be amended by the Zonal Council with two-third majority" (UBKGPC, 1985).

As prescribed by the constitution, the organisation is to have a three-tier structure with mahala or ward as the smallest unit. The structure is schematically presented as diagram-'A'.

Ideally, the constitution provided ground for a democratic organisational set up for the movement. Election was the sanctioned method for constituting the committees, starting from Ward Ghati Committee to the Steering Committee. The advantage of taking ward as unit was to provide opportunity of participation in the committees to the people belonging to the lower strata of the society including Scheduled Castes and Tribes. As mentioned in the second chapter, the Schedules Castes and Scheduled tribes population form separate wards, since their dwellings are clustered in the periphery of the village. Besides, ward unit was assumed to have provided scope for representation of all castes, classes and categories.

However, in reality, these ideal constitutional prescriptions were not adhered to. In the meeting held on December 25, 1985, both the Zonal Council and the Steering Committee were constituted. All the thirteen members of the Steering Committee were nominated consensually, so also the office bearers. Names were invited for the Zonal Council. As office-bearers of the Steering Committee one President, one Vice-President, One General Secretary, one Office-Secretary, One Joint Secretary and eight others as Zonal Secretaries were consensually nominated.
Diagram A

Steering Committee
11 members

Zonal Council

Ward Ghati Committee
11 members

Ward Ghati Committee
11 members

Ward Ghati Committee
11 members

Ward Ghati Committee
11 members

Ward Unit
minimum 100 members

Ward Unit
minimum 100 members

Ward Unit
minimum 100 members

Ward Unit
minimum 100 members

↑ - indicates structural hierarchy
↓ - indicates the line of exercise of authority
Instead of ward, village was taken as the smallest unit for organisation and panchayat was considered as a zone. One Zonal Secretary was given the charge of a zone. The Zonal Secretaries were vested with the responsibilities to go to every village for forming village committee at village level and Zonal Committee at Panchayat level. The Zonal Committees nominated members to the Zonal Council which consisted of two hundred and twenty nine members. The structure which emerged later is schematically presented as diagram-'B'.

Even though, constitutionally, the Zonal Council as the General body was supposed to be the most powerful, it was the Steering Committee which for all practical purposes wielded the power. It was revealed by the leaders of the UBKGPC that there was a ‘core committee’ consisting of four members within the Steering Committee which had the real decision making power.

With the formation of the UBKGPC, two macro level political mainstreams coalesced for the issues at the micro level. Though other macro political parties such as the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Bharatiya Janata Party also extended support to the movement, yet they did not matter much for the analysis as they did not possess political relevance in the micro context. In other words, the CPI, CPI(M) and the BJP did not have much following in Baliapal-Bhograi area to be reckoned with as political force. It is an important question to probe as to why such coalition at the micro level took place inspite of their parallel macro political interests? This will be taken up in latter discussion.

There were two political currents which were active in the movement. One was the combined current of the Janata Party and the Congress (I)
Diagram B.

Steering Committee
13 members

Zonal Council
229 members

Village Committee
Village Committee
Village Committee
Village Committee

↑ - indicates structural hierarchy
↓ - indicates the line of exercise of authority
represented under the leadership of Sri Gadadhar Giri, and the other one was the United Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist Leninist) [UCCRI(M-L)] led by Sri Gananath Patra. Immediately after the launching of the UBKGPC, these two currents also merged. Sri Patra was invited to a meeting of the Steering Committee of the UBKGPC and was co-opted to it. Sri Giri's mass appeal helped in mobilising all sections and integrating them. Sri Patra's input was in giving the formula for organising the lower classes and collectivities separately through the formation of ‘Fronts’. These two leaders were able to integrate all sections without disturbing the fine lines of caste, class, gender and political division (Patel, 1990).

The UBKGPC was formally declared to be above party politics and the members were asked to forgo their political interests and fight for the land. This was manifested in a popular slogan raised in the area. The slogan is as follows:

"Mati Paain Party Chhada"
(Forgo Party and political affiliation for land.)

The above discussion leads to focus on the social characteristics of the leaders of the movement. Before doing so, it is essential to discern and demarcate the various interest constellations and the processes which have played major role in the growth of such constellations. This will provide an analytical context for the discussion on the social characteristics of the leadership.

Cash-crop economy, in general, and pana cultivation, in particular, led to the formation of various constellations. This process was contingent upon
the integration of the local market with the national market through \textit{pana}. Patel (1990) in her study of the same movement traced two phases in the class dynamics of Baliapal which preceded the crystallisation of the agitation. First was the consolidation of upper caste peasantry by displacing the small cultivators in fifties, thereby giving rise to class tension; second was the growth of \textit{pana} cultivation which diverted the upper caste peasantry from accumulating land to \textit{pana} cultivation. This led to the creation of a constellation of interests whose main goal was the sustenance of cash-crop economy and whose main architects were the \textit{pana} traders. Since the demand for \textit{pana} exceeded the supply, the upper caste peasantry took up \textit{pana} cultivation and later its trading. Heavy demand in the national market for \textit{pana} made its trading so profitable that the upper caste peasantry-turned-traders encouraged the mobile sections of lower castes to enter into \textit{pana} cultivation.

Historically, the first process, i.e. land consolidation of the upper caste peasantry could be traced back to the early fifties. Due to regular heavy flood, the Subarnarekha river used to change its course every year claiming a sizable portion of agricultural and inhabited land. A sizable portion of land was also left with thick sand cover. This created the paucity of arable land and made paddy cultivation only a means of subsistence. During this phase, a group of people belonging to \textit{Barajia} caste whose traditional occupation was \textit{pana} cultivation migrated to the area from Midnapore and Twenty-four Parganas districts of West Bengal. They introduced \textit{pana} cultivation in this area which was a taboo for the local people. They also planted cashewnut trees. Gradually in the fifties, cash-crop cultivation was taken up by the upper caste peasantry consisting
of Khandayat, Raju and Mahes or Gola, who found it to be profitable even though it was catering to the local market only. These two factors; loss of arable land due to shifting of course by the Subarnarekha river, and extension of cash-crop economy, put pressure on land. The mobile upper castes first encroached on the common property land, displacing the cowherds, the Gaudas or Gopals (milkmen caste) and later on, fertile lands of small cultivators.

In the sixties, *pana* cultivation saw a phenomenal growth because of infiltration of outside traders. When these traders linked the outside market with the local market, the demand shot up overwhelmingly far exceeding the supply. This provided a driving force for the upper castes peasantry to enter into *pana* cultivation and trading by eliminating the outside traders, thereby establishing direct links between the national market and the local market. This transition put a curb on the earlier process of land consolidation. There were mainly two factors which were responsible for withholding land consolidation. First, *pana* needs intensive care, nurturing and constant attention. Second, *pana* can be grown on small plots of land. The landed peasantry in search of higher incomes found *pana* cultivation, which required small plot, to be much more profitable than paddy cultivation (Patel, 1989 and 1990).

With the increasing demand for *pana*, its cultivation grew in a phenomenal way which required more and more labourers. The small cultivators who used to cater to this demand gradually took to *pana* cultivation using their knowledge gained in the process. Later, in order to meet this demand a good number of Santhal tribals from the adjoining Mayurbhanj district migrated to
Baliapal-Bhograi area as labourers. But, they also settled down as *pana* cultivators leading to acute shortage of labour. As a result, wage rate increased.

At a later stage, i.e. in the early eighties, the phenomenal changes introduced by the integrated market forces opened up new avenues for the lower castes including the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The lower castes mobile sections with only a piece of homestead land, also, started growing *pana baraja* (betel vine yard) as they had come to know that a *baraja* on a meagre four decimals of land was enough to feed a family of eight persons for the whole year. Moreover, *baraja* could be set up on the homestead land itself. And *pana* cultivation yielded much more higher income with less investment and labour than paddy cultivation.

Even the artisan castes reaped the benefit of growing *pana* cultivation. The bamboo baskets made by the artisan caste *Domo* were in heavy demand since baskets were used for packaging the *pana* leaves. Many persons belonging to *Kamara* caste (Blacksmith) learnt the skill of setting up the *baraja* and, thus, were called *mistri*.

As it is clear from the above discussion, the agro-based economy, especially the *pana* cultivation has been the primary reason for the present affluence of the people in Baliapal-Bhograi area. Since all interest constellations were rooted in land, land promptly became the primary issue of contention leading to the growth of a mass movement cutting across caste, class, gender and political divisions.

When the proposed NMTR posed a threat to the land, people and cash-crop economy, the upper castes peasantry and *pana* traders welcomed the
move initiated by the students and teachers to confront the State. The enlarged committee, i.e. the second stage DBKGBS was dominated by big pana traders and the upper caste peasantry which had crystallised its class interest in the fifties (ibid). Out of thirteen members of the Steering Committee of the new UBKGPC, eight were pana traders and five including Sri Giri represented the upper caste peasantry. The Zonal council was predominantly represented by the upper castes with a few members belonging to lower castes. Out of two hundred and twenty-nine members, three ‘dominant’ upper castes namely Khandayat, Mahes or Gola and Raju accounted for one hundred and sixty-four members. The Scheduled Castes and the Tribes were almost non-existent in the council.

Inspite of such disparities in representation, Sri Giri, a charismatic leader of the area could rally the people for the cause. At the same time he gave the movement a ‘militant’ character by adopting the radical strategies, suggested by Sri Patra, the UCCRI (M-L) leader, in modified form as suitable to the situation. All this led to the withdrawal of legitimacy to the state by imposing ‘janata curfew’ or ‘people’s curfew’, i.e. a ban on the entry of government officials into the area and non-payment of revenue.

With the denial of legitimacy to the police and other administrative functionaries, the UBKGPC took up the responsibilities of civic administration and imparting justice in the area. Sri Giri revived the institution of Vichar (ibid). The institution of Vichar was used to resolve conflicts and, thereby, to deflect divisions through the local power structure. Under this arrangement, the aggrieved party was required to approach the village committee for justice. If the matter could not be settled by the village committee, it was referred to the Zonal
The demise of Sri Giri opened the path to schism and factionalism. This manifested in direct confrontation between Sri Patra and the rest of the members of the Steering Committee leading to his ouster from the UBKGPC. Sri Patra, in his interview regarding this project, cited six main causes contributing to his dismissal. First, his suggestion and efforts to shift the base of leadership from upper castes peasantry and *pana* traders to lower peasantry, lower castes and landless, were perceived as a threat by the traditional leadership with vested interests. Second, the Janata Party and the Congress (I) leaders became apprehensive that he might use his popularity for contesting elections. Third, his radical strategies and tactics were not acceptable to the leaders, since unlike Sri Giri, they lacked capability to modify and implement them. Fourth, Sri Patra made deliberate efforts to expose their weak leadership and vacillating stand. Fifth, the leaders groomed by him became more committed, vociferous, militant and active which made them more prominent and popular than the leadership of the UBKGPC. This also threatened the traditional leadership. Sixth, the upper castes and upper class visualised threats from the UCCRI (M-L) in future, in case of consolidation of a political force like CPI (M-L) in the area. However, these were labeled as false allegations by the leaders of the UBKGPC.

Besides the UBKGPC, there were other organisational aspects of the movement and also different levels of leadership. The Steering Committee and the Zonal Council, as the central bodies of the UBKGPC mobilised the 'civil collectivities' cutting across the caste, class and gender barriers. Subsequently,
Samukhyas or "Fronts" were formed on the basis of different collectivities such as "occupational collectivity" (fishermen, students, and farmers, etc.) and "biological collectivity" youth, women, etc.) to accelerate horizontal mobilisation and activities (Oommen, 1977), Chhatra Samukhya (Students' Front), Matshya jivi Samukhya (Fishermen's Front), Nari Samukhya (Women's Front), Yuva Samukhya (Youth Front) and the Baji Rout Banara Sena consisting of children below the age of fifteen years were formed. Each 'Front' was headed by a convener with an Executive Committee. Later on, Samukhya Samanyaya Kendra (Centre of United Front) was formed which functioned mainly as a coordinating body among all the 'Fronts'.

There were claims and counterclaims regarding the initiatives taken in forming these ‘Fronts’. While the leaders of the UBKGPC asserted that the ‘Fronts’ were their initiatives, the Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist) refuted such claims. However, it was found during the course of interviews with the conveners of these ‘Fronts’ that they had leniency towards the UCCRI (M-L) and alligence to Sri Patra. Paul Routledge (1988) in his study of the same movement reported, "Because the resistance Committees only consisted of political party representatives, the various "landless" groups (agricultural labourer, share croppers, tribals) along with the fisherfolk and some of the middle peasants formed their own resistance movement aided by activity from the Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist) in Baliapal block”.

Besides all these organisational units, what created a huge fuss in the media was the formation of the Marana Sena or "Suicide Squad" (Ahmed, 1987;
The Indian Express, April 8, 1987; The statesman, April 10, 1987; The Telegraph, April 25, 1988). The UBKGPC recruited volunteers to the "Suicide Squad" who would court death first if situation arose (Kundu, 1988). The Statesman (April 10, 1987) reported, "...swearing by the name of Late Sri Giri, who was considered a martyr after his death, young men and women rushed to register their name in the Marana Sena, whose ranks swelled to about five thousand. The key slogan they raised,

"Maribu Pachhe
Inche Mati Chhadibu Nahin"

(We will die but will not budge a clod of soil).

The same daily commented, "Though the movement has been peaceful, it is amazing how the committee has already acquired certain features of a typical guerrilla outfit?"

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the movement had also launched an offensive to seek district and state level support. A district level Coordination Committee was set up with Sri Brajanath Rath, a noted progressive Oriya poet, as its convener. Sri Patra revealed in the interview that the objective of the committee was limited to organising a public meeting and a bandh of the district. After a successful bandh, the committee was dissolved. In 1987, another District Coordination Committee was set up, the convener of which was Sri Arun Dey, the former MLA of Balasore belonging to the Communist Party of India (CPI). The function of this Coordination Committee was also limited to the organisation of public meetings and seeking support at the district level.
In a study of the same phenomenon, Almas Ali (1988) recorded that the movement was well organised under the banner of the UBKGPC. The leadership mechanism was sound, systematic and internal. It was the UBKGPC that kept the lead. It was well decentralised from block/Zonal to village level organisation. He further viewed that the movement at Baliapal was definitely a people's movement - not a political one.

The empirical experiences gained from the field study, however, did not support some of the above propositions. The leadership was sound, systematic and from among the people till Sri Giri was alive and active. After his demise, crises developed in leadership on the basis of political affiliations and alligences. All the three political mainstreams which had coalesced at one point of time trifurcated. In the Janata Party leadership, two camps, emerged, one affiliated to Sri Samarendra Kundu, and the other to Sri Biju Pattnaik. This provided a scope to outside leaders to interfere in the movement's activities leading to the dilution of the issues and ideology. So the leadership ceased to remain confined to the people of the area in reality. Even though, the structure of the organisation was decentralised, the power and the decision making process were not. The organisational structure represented the traditional authority structure of the society (Patel, 1990).

The above discussion, undoubtedly, establishes that the movement at Baliapal and Bhograi had developed an elaborate organisational structure, routinized charismatic leadership. The movement also legitimized a set of leaders who were mobilising the common people as well as organising the rank and file at different levels. The organisation assumed the responsibilities of
deciding the strategy and tactics of the movement. Even though the organisational arrangement was a reflection of the traditional authority structure of the society, it took up 'new' challenging role of confronting the State to protect its own interests.