Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Advaitavedānta has a unique position among the philosophical traditions in India, for its intellectual rigor and its influence on succeeding schools of thinking. Advaitins advocate that empirical knowledge based on our knowing faculties is not capable of providing us the knowledge of the transcendental reality. Cognitive faculties at the best can provide us knowledge about empirical realities. Šabda, scriptural revelation, becomes efficacious in removing the ignorance of the seeker and even illumining the reality, Brahman. In spite of the limitations of the empirical means of knowledge, Advaita’s basic concern is not metaphysics, viz. abstract intellectual constructions about the ultimate Reality. The Advaitic inquiry after truth, is primarily based on the analysis of the empirical (vyāvahārika) experience, leading to the understanding of one’s own self as identical with the supreme self, Brahman.

Philosophy, in the Advaitic tradition, is an expression of the self-disclosure of the Ultimate, through human media. As an expression, the inquirer has to resort to empirical means of communication. This expression is about the Ultimate Reality, which is the foundation (adhiṣṭhāna) of everything. In this sense, Advaita darśana\(^1\) may be called fundamental ontology. Advaitavedānta
propagated by Śaṅkarācārya² presents a systematic method of inquiry. In Adhyāsabhāṣya, which is a preface to his commentaries on the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara makes a claim for a true method³ of philosophical inquiry called Adhyāropa-apavāda⁴.

In this method of inquiry, features are attributed to reality, which do not really belong to it and therefore, it suffers subsequent sublation. Once the superimposed characteristics are sublated, what remains is the Reality. Among the six pramāṇas⁵ Advaitins accept, Śruti alone is better equipped in carrying us closer to the truth but not competent enough in giving the anubhava⁶ of the Ultimate reality. In order to have this anubhava one has to start with the empirical means of knowledge,⁷ follow certain clearly articulated method of inquiry and with the help of Śruti one has to transcend the empirical realm.

Edmund Husserl,⁸ in the West, presented a unique method of inquiry known as ‘Phenomenological epoché. Natural sciences became prominent and assertive at a time when philosophy’s creative power was at its lowest ebb. They unsuccessfully attempted to take up the role of philosophy. Husserl was one among those who desperately tried to find a way out. His attempt resulted in the development of phenomenology as the foundational science and Phenomenological
epoche as 'the only real method' of reaching the essence of reality. Husserl claimed that phenomenology is a pre-suppositionless science. ‘Object outside’ was the starting point of this inquiry. Using this method, he could enter into the realm of essence, the ‘Pure Ego’. Husserl considered ‘pure ego’ as an ‘all embracing totality into which nothing can enter and from which nothing can escape’.

An attempt is made in this thesis to understand phenomenological epoche and adhyāropa-apavāda in a critical manner. These two methods of inquiry are approached from their respective philosophical backgrounds. A dialogical approach is taken in this study in order to highlight the points of convergence like bracketing of fact-world in phenomenology and sublation of vyāvahārika experience in Advaitavedānta. Pure ego and Consciousness are the two culminating points in these two methods of inquiry. Adhyāropa is used as a synonym to superimposition and apavāda as de-superimposition. Adhyāsa and adhyāropa are mostly used in the same sense in this thesis, though there is a little difference. Adhyāsa refers to the act of superimposing as mentioned in Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya whereas adhyāropa refers to the method of inquiry, adopted in the search after truth. This thesis focuses more on adhyāropa as a method of inquiry as presented in Śaṅkarabhāṣya.
Phenomenology is the foundational science, the science of essence. It is a pre-suppositionless philosophy. Husserl, in order to reach the essence of objects, made use of phenomenological *epoche* (bracketing or reductions) as a method. *Epoche* is a way of seeing and grasping things clearly. Phenomenological *epoche* is used in this thesis as the name of the method of inquiry as well as one of its stages.  

1.0 Presentation of the problem

Edmund Husserl started his inquiry from things around and the experience of the subject. After going through phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental reductions, finally he reached consciousness and pure ego. Intuition played an important role in this program of philosophy. Through his phenomenological bracketing and intentionality of consciousness, Husserl opened up an entirely new way of inquiry, which influenced a number of succeeding philosophers and gave rise to different systems of philosophical thinking. But he was reluctant to speak about the metaphysical realm and about the concept of God. Husserl strongly advocated that the governing principle of the Absolute must be found in the Absolute itself and through pure and
profound reflection. The existence of the 'divine' not only transcends the world but also the 'absolute' consciousness. Husserl came to a point where he could not proceed or did not want to proceed further.

Śaṅkarācārya had his inquiry into the Ultimate reality starting from the vyāvahārika experience. He used the method of adhyāropa-apavāda (superimposition and subsequent sublation) in order to realize the ultimate reality. Śaṅkara's inquiry was aimed at the realization of one's own real nature (svarūpa) that is Brahmasākṣātkāra. For him, knowledge is the only means for this self-realization; Brahman, which is beyond all names and forms, is falsely attributed with characteristics which do not belong to it. False attribution and subsequent sublation are the special features of Śaṅkara's method of inquiry. This inquiry does not stop at the vyāvahārika world of experience. It enables the inquirer to realize another realm of experience, that is the pāramārthika. The pāramārthika is a state from where words return, the Śruti loses its validity even as pramāṇa, and the inquirer remains in the state of absolute bliss.

These two great philosophers belonging to different cultural milieus and traditions made inquiries after truth in their own unique
ways. Their methods of inquiry widely vary. Both Śaṅkara and Husserl addressed the different philosophical situations of their times. Though the content and method of both these thinkers are different, there are striking similarities and parallels. Both aim at the unravelling of truth and both follow clearly articulated methods. A critical analysis of these two methods with the focus on the dialogical approach will bring out new insights and broaden our understanding of both of them. Dialogical analysis will help us to unravel the hidden truths in both traditions and their common source. Dialogical interaction will enhance a collective inquiry by supporting and challenging each other with a view to strengthening the commonalities and parallels.

In a dialogical interaction, the partners along with their respective traditions partake in the universe of meaning. This partaking will widen the horizon of understanding and will enrich the universe of meaning with new insights and ideas. In a comparative dialogical analysis there is fusion of eisegetical and exegetical approaches. In an eisegetical approach, a dialogue partner reflects his universe of meaning on the other tradition. At the same time, by the exegetical approach the same partner opens up himself to the other’s universe of meaning. Understanding a text is equal to interpreting a
text, which is done always within a tradition. Hence understanding and interpretation of text vary according to different traditions.

Upāniṣadic seers made use of the dialogical method in teaching about the absolute reality. Dialogue between Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī, Uddalakā Aruṇī and Naciketas, and Naciketas and Yama are classical examples of dialogical inquiry after truth. Buddha made use of dialogical method (samvāda) in teaching his disciples. In most cases, in the instance of interaction between two traditions or systems, dialogue was mainly used to demolish the opponent’s view and to assert one’s own position. Plato made use of dialogue as a philosophical method by which truth is sought after and ascertained. Platonic dialogue is a dialectical process about the presupposition that all truths are innate. Plato's distinction between the real world and the world of appearance was a new discovery. His discovery of truth through the dialogical method was a new insight. Plato affirmed that dialogue has a prominent role to play in realizing truth.

This thesis is a critical study of the concept of adhyāropapavāda in Advaitavedānta and epoche in phenomenology, from a dialogical perspective. The method of dialogue employed in this thesis, envisages an in-depth interaction between two traditions, accepting
their inherent limitations with the idea of corroborating content and method to enrich each other in their search for truth. The dialogical analysis aims at the enhancement of collective inquiry by means of challenging and supporting each other. Since two methods of philosophical inquiry are brought face to face, this study undertakes a certain amount of critical comparison with a sense of indifference to any value judgement. The dialogical approach adopted here is an attempt at understanding each method of inquiry and the system it belongs to, from its respective background. The focus is on the points of convergence and difference that will lead to a better understanding of both method as well as content in the process of philosophizing.

A dialogical study through the analysis of ideas and insights will contribute to a solidarity in thinking and will be efficacious in promoting a ‘unity in philosophy’, which might lead to a better understanding and collaboration among thinkers cutting across cultures and traditions. Dialogical analysis opens up one’s own universe of meaning to the other culture and opens up oneself to the other’s meaning system. In this process both the partners are supposed to maintain openness in their thinking in order to enter into the meaning pattern of the other without losing or denigrating the views of one’s own school through the interaction with the other. The purpose of
critical dialogical study is definitely not to show whether one system is superior or inferior to the other; rather, it is to bring out the salient features and commonalities in these methods leading to a fusion of ideas. In this attempt points of convergence and divergence are highlighted with a view to understanding each other in an interactive way.

1.1 An Overview of past attempts

An attempt is made here to introduce some of the major works in the field of phenomenology and Advaita. *Phenomenology & Indian Philosophy*, is a masterly presentation of the East-West dialogue. A few of the articles like “Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of Rationality” (J. N. Mohanty), “Husserl and Indian Thought” (Karl Schuhmann), “Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy” (Sibajiban Bhattacharyya) focus their attention on Indian Philosophy and Phenomenology in general. In the same work R. Balasubramanian, in his article, “Advaita Vedānta on the Problem of Enworlded Subjectivity”, presented Advaitavedānta as transcendental phenomenology. His focus was more on topics like the distinction between the self and the ego, Intentionality of consciousness and Sartre’s theory of non-egological consciousness.
Debabrata Sinha in his monograph *The Metaphysic of Experience in Advaita Vedānta*, combines both phenomenology and Advaita Vedanta in his *Cit* centric critique of experience. In the traditional Advaitic approach the Brahman as a metaphysical entity and the world as an indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*) phenomena have been highlighted preponderantly given undue importance. Sinha re-focusses his attention on Pure Consciousness as the central theme of Sankara’s Advaitavedānta. His epistemological inquiry from *vyāvahārika* experience proceeds through phenomenological modes of analysis. Sinha integrates classical Advaitic thought and Phenomenological insights. He does not pay much attention to the methods of inquiry. Consciousness is his focus of study. Pravas Jivan Chaudhary in his article "Vedānta as Transcendental Phenomenology" gives an Advaitic analysis of reality starting from the dream state, and going through waking, deep sleep and *turīya*. Metaphysical knowledge for him is the unity with the core 'Being.' Chaudhary tries to apply the phenomenological method in the Vedāntic inquiry. His point of reference is more on Kant.

R. Puligandala in his illuminating article "Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation" brings out some of the parallels
between Husserl's Phenomenological reduction and Yogic techniques of meditation as propounded by Patāñjali. Puligandala is of the opinion that Patāñjali has provided clear procedures for performing the *epoche* and other phenomenological reductions. Ramakant Sinari has made a comparative study between Phenomenological reduction and Yoga\(^{20}\) as methods of inquiry in two different traditions.

T.M.P. Mahadevan, in his book, *Superimposition in Advaita Vedānta*\(^{21}\) analyses the different views on nescience and presents a contrast between *avidya* and *māyā*. At the end, he explains how the removal of *avidya* is possible. Swami Sachidanandendra \(^{22}\) has a scholarly work to his credit in this line, titled *Vedānta-Praṇāyāma-pratyābhyāmāṇa*. This work was later translated into English by A. J. Alston, *The Method of the Vedānta*. In this work, the author analytically presents all the major methods in pre-Śaṅkara and post Śaṅkara traditions. *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, (ed. Graham Parkes) is a scholarly study of East-West philosophies.\(^{23}\) In this work J. L. Mehta's article "Heidegger and Vedānta: Reflections on a Questionable Theme," is a comparative study between Heidegger's phenomenology and Śaṅkara's Advaitavedānta. Srinivasa Rao in his work *Perceptual Error: The Indian Theories*, gives a scholarly presentation of various *Khyātivādās* in Indian philosophy.
Some of the above mentioned works are general in their approach to Indian Philosophy and Phenomenology. None of them deal with Adhyāropa-apavāda and phenomenological epoche. Hence a critical study of these two methods of inquiry is relevant and this study is a fresh attempt to look into the dialogical perspectives inherent in the above mentioned schools.

1.2 Method of study

In the recent years there were notable attempts made by philosophers to understand the eastern philosophies (Japanese, Chinese, and Indian) in terms of western understanding. Critical and comparative appraisals\textsuperscript{24} of different philosophies and traditions have enlarged the horizon of our understanding about them. Instead of translating Eastern thinking into Western paradigms, an assimilation of insights in various parts of the world leading to a world philosophy\textsuperscript{25} and unity in thinking is to be evolved. Through the process of assimilation one philosophical tradition can incorporate into itself insights from another tradition. There is a danger of being judgmental towards other traditions and philosophers in a comparative study. Sometimes comparisons can be superfluous. The critical method
adopted in this study is with a view to assessing the strength and weakness of *epoche* and *adhyāropa-apavāda*. A realistic understanding of these methods will enable one to have closer interaction for a fusion of ideas and insights. Dialogical analysis is used in this thesis to enhance a critical appraisal. Dialogical analysis is an in-depth interaction between two partners (cultures, traditions, systems, or persons) in opening up the universe of meaning of both, thus ensuring common insights and points of convergence.

The term ‘dialogue’ originated from the Greek root ‘*Dialogein,* (διαλογεῖν) means philosophical method by which truth is sought and expressed. Dialogue has played an important role in the development of the Western philosophical thought. Dialogue can be between two persons, between two cultures, traditions, systems, or philosophers. In all these cases dialogue aims at arriving at truth. Through dialogue, the partner opens up himself; remains transparent and tries to enter into the universe of meaning of the other. In this process, both the partners undergo transformation by entering the meaning system of the other, while remain open to accept each other through interaction.

*Darśana,* in the Indian tradition, is an integral vision of reality which calls forth a harmonious approach towards it. Through his
analysis of transcendental reality, Šaṅkara united God, world and man into a single concept of non-dualism. The very existence of man is an example of constant dialogue between fellow human beings. Man is in dialogue with nature, matter, animal, technology, various traditions, cultures and with one's own experience. A harmonious blending of dialogues both within and without will make one a balanced person, with a holistic view of life.\textsuperscript{26}

In a dialogical analysis words and concepts from different traditions interact with each other at a deeper level and come out enriched with new insights. Unlike dialectical analysis, dialogue is undertaken with an open attitude. Dialectical analysis calls forth strong counter arguments to any proposition, which will lead to a fusion of ideas. In a dialogical study there is a sincere attempt to accept different traditions with their special features, but at the same time it is not a blind acceptance. Dialogical approach enhances the understanding of each of the partners.\textsuperscript{27} The partners to the dialogue, besides understanding the other's tradition, also stand to gain a greater clarity in understanding their own tradition. This leads to an inquiry within the partners, with the potentiality of transcendence. Comparison with a view to value judgements does not have any place in this scheme of inquiry.
Phenomenological *epoche* is guided by the spirit of Greek philosophical inquiry, the enlightenment; and *adhyāropa apavāda* is guided by the basic insight into human destiny. These two methods cannot simply discard their own foundations and appropriate something else from another tradition. We have to begin to understand both the methods with their past in their mutual otherness, to learn the insights of each other and try to appropriate whatever is relevant in the other method.

This thesis is a critical study centered round Consciousness—the ultimate Reality in *vedānta* and Pure ego in phenomenology. This is an attempt to understand Consciousness from the perspective of experientiality, which contextually necessitates de-superimposition. *Adhyāropa* and bracketing (*epoche*) of experience are the two important techniques used in this work. Tools and techniques are used from both traditions in the process of analysis with a view to making a comparative dialogical study. These tools and techniques are used only to show commonalities and to enhance our understanding of both traditions. It is an inward analysis leading to a deepening of experience. Here, the focus is more on the process than on the final outcome. The inquiry, after having de-superimposed experiences, goes deeper inside to reach the Consciousness. What remains after the de-
superimposition, the consciousness is svapramāśa, that is, it illumines itself and illumines other objects simultaneously.

Any serious dialogical study demands a proper understanding of the inner dynamics, world-views, approach to problems, and interconnectedness between the traditions taken for such analysis. A philosopher has to cross over the threshold of one's own limiting factors, in order to make a dialogical study. A sympathetic understanding of different traditions will open up philosophical inquiries and will help the inquirer to grow beyond parochial considerations and narrow thinking.

Philosophical thinking aiming at a world philosophy usually facilitates the assimilation of the 'other' rather than perpetuating the otherness of the other. Whereas this kind of an approach will help to illumine the hidden insights in different traditions, which is the ultimate aim of any philosophical inquiry. In a letter addressed to the organizers of a symposium, Heideggar wrote, "Again and again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take place with the thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world." A dialogical study with a critical understanding is best suited for our purpose. Dialogue starts with language and symbols and goes deeper into the inner sources of
thought and comes out as a reinvigorated spring, with new insights and findings. In order to have a self-understanding of one's own method, one need to have an open attitude towards other methods of inquiry. J. L. Mehta says,

Perhaps it is for the Oriental thinker himself to seek to achieve clarity about the obscurity and ambiguity of the situation in which he finds himself today in respect of his own tradition, however feeble its breath. We in India can begin to do this only by squarely facing the issues posed for us by the fact that for us our own tradition is no embalmed mummy, or not yet, and that it is still alive in us, for good or ill, as shaping out attitudes and ways of thinking and speaking; and that, on the other hand, we live and think in a world which is under the sway of what we still experience as an alien destiny. 31

In the process of dialogue, each system finds out the other with all its cultural and philosophical moorings, in order to lose itself. This losing of oneself in other system ensures the ground for seeing the unseen and thinking the unthought. A re-interpretation of different trends is made possible. Re-interpretation facilitates deepening of one’s own rootedness.

There is no other way open to us in the East, but to go along with this Europeanization and modern outlook-secular, materialist- and to go through it. Only through this voyage into the foreign and the strange can we win back our own self-hood; here as elsewhere, the way to what is closest to us is the longest way back. 32

By the mere fact that two different philosophical methods begin to dialogue, they enter into an open interaction, an existential contact. In this process some statements may appear to be out of place, some
others totally strange yet others close parallels. Commonalities and points of convergence are springboards for a further leap, a further elaboration, leading to a mutual understanding and enrichment. *Epoche* and *apavāda* are two unrelated methods, which grew up independent of each other. Commonalities and differences give enough room for dialogue between these two methods.

1.3 Outline of the study

Through his brilliant exposition of *Prasthānatrayi*, Śaṅkara developed *adhyāropa-apavāda* into a systematic method of inquiry. *Adhyāropa* is the superimposing of various names and forms that seem to be considered as attributes on the formless, nameless, non-dual Brahman. *Apavāda* is the negation of these attributes so that Brahman, which is self-luminous, illumines itself for the seeker who is striving for self-realization. *Māyā-avidyā* obstructs the pure nature of Brahman-Ātman. *Adhyāropa-apavāda* as a method of inquiry aims at leading one to the *pāramārthika* state by means of *Śruti*, where empirical means of knowledge become meaningless.\(^{33}\)

The *Abheda-śruti* passages (the passages implying non-difference) present the ultimate Reality as one without a second,
whereas the perception of multiplicity is not denied. Among the various attempts made to give a satisfactory solution, *adyāropa-apavāda*, systematized by Śaṅkara, is a method logically consistent and metaphysically convincing as a tool of logical and coherent thinking. In this method of *adyāropa-apavāda*, it is *adyāropa*, which has attracted his basic attention, as he wanted to give a sustainable explanation for the appearance of the world. He terms it as *adyāsa* and offers two different definitions in the beginning of his commentary on *Brahmasūtras* which is named as *Adhyāsabhāṣya*. The first definition *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛśtavabhasah*, (appearance of something in a locus where it is not) seems to have an epistemological implication. Snake perceived in a rope is the classical example for this. Remembered snakeness is wrongly attributed on the rope. *Atasmin tad buddhiḥ*, (cognition of something as some other thing) gives us the idea of having metaphysical implication.

*Adhyāropa* is natural causation of *māyā-avidyā*, the ignorance. *Māyā-avidyā*, from the point of view of *jīva*, is ignorance which is not negative but a positive entity (*bhāvarūpam ajñānam*). It has the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). It is by *māyā-avidyā’s* power of concealment that the pristine Reality that is Brahman-Ātman is concealed and through its power of projection the
world appearance is projected to our perception. In the Śruti, māyā has been considered as the creative power of Īśvara. Śaṅkara, following the Upaniṣads, has used both māyā-avidyā interchangeably, but a subtle distinction is admitted in the tradition for the sake of conceptual analysis, that is, avidyā pertains to jīva and māyā pertains to Īśvara. Māyā-avidyā is taken to be neither real nor unreal in the Advaita tradition. It is taken to be indeterminable or anirvācaniṇya.

Husserl belonged to an alien tradition than that of Śaṅkara, but we find that there are striking similarities in their inquiry. Both started their inquiry as a challenge to the inadequate philosophical atmosphere that prevailed at their respective times. Both Husserl and Śaṅkara started their inquiry from empirical experiences and proceeded towards the final end through a process of bracketing and sublation. For Husserl, Pure ego, the phenomenological residuum, was the final end and the basis of all meaning systems; while Śaṅkara considered Consciousness as the ultimate principle underlying the world experience. Husserl was against any kind of expression of faith, including scripture, because he was of the opinion that such practices might hinder his independent philosophical inquiry. Śaṅkara upheld the supremacy of the Śruti (the scriptures) without sacrificing the rigor of logical reasoning. The former maintained a non-metaphysical
approach throughout his inquiry while the latter believed in a
transcendental entity over and above the empirical reality, thus giving
prime importance to a metaphysical approach in his inquiry.

Pure Ego and consciousness are two of the central themes in
Husserl’s phenomenology and Śaṅkara’s Advaitavedānta respectively.
Pure Ego, is an all-embracing totality. It is transcendence in
immanence, which gives meaning to everything in this universe.
Consciousness (Cit) in Advaitavedānta is the ultimate reality, which is
the adhiṣṭhāna of everything. Consciousness is svaprakāśa; it illumines
itself and other objects. Phenomenological *epoche* unravels Pure Ego
as the ultimate reality through bracketing. According to Husserl
bracketing is the only method for reaching pure ego. Śaṅkara
advocated jñāna as the sole means of realizing Consciousness. So long
as it is covered by Avidyā-māyā, consciousness cannot reveal itself.
Adhyāropa- apavāda envisages a method for the removal of ignorance
and the realization of the original nature of the self.

Phenomenological *epoche* starts its inquiry from the things
around in the world; adhyāropa-apavāda starts its inquiry from
empirical (*vyāvahārika*) experience. While *epoche* brackets out things,
fact world and essences in order to reach the pure ego,
adhyāropa-apavāda sublates the world of empirical reality (vyāvahārika) and goes to the pāramārthika level, that is Consciousness. Both methods of inquiry assert the need to leave behind the empirical experience, which is a sine qua non for the progress of the inquiry. These two methods differ with regard to the final outcome, that is pure ego and consciousness. Consciousness in phenomenology is always intentional and inseparably associated with object, whereas Consciousness (Cit) in Advaitavedānta is beyond all kinds of names, forms and relations, it is Svaprapkāśa; and it does not need any other objects for its illumination.

Husserl made a distinction between pure ego and intentional consciousness. Pure ego, for him is an all-inclusive meaning system, which is a stream of logically analyzable experience. It is an all-pervading reality, a transcendance in immanence. When everything else is bracketed what remains is pure ego, the phenomenological residuum. According to Advaita, the ultimate Reality is veiled by māyā. Because of māya-avidyā the ultimate Reality is presented as many. Characteristics are attributed on the Consciousness with a view to sublating them so that the foundational principle is realized. Śaṅkara advocated jñāna as the only way for this final realization. Consciousness in Advaita can be approached through its various states of existence, like jāgrat, svapna, susūpti and turiya, (the fourth). The fourth state is equated with consciousness or Brahman. Similarly, an analysis of different levels of reality—
pratibhasika, vyavaharika and paramarthika will aid the understanding of immanence of the transcendent principle i.e. the Brahman.

The Advaitic concept of Consciousness has metaphysical as well as epistemological implications, whereas Husserl’s analysis of pure ego is purely phenomenological. It is intended not to have any metaphysical bearings. Husserl’s distinction between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego as well as the way to reach the pure ego involves his complexity of thinking. Śaṅkara makes a clear distinction between consciousness and antahkarana (internal organ). Consciousness is the all-pervading, self-luminous principle which is the foundation of all existence, whereas (antahkarana) mind is the internal organ, the seat of all feelings and emotions and the instrument through which consciousness comes into contact with objects outside. Intentionality is only an adventitious (aupadhika) quality of consciousness. Phenomenological consciousness is always intentional. Advaitic consciousness is unrelated and unrelatable, whereas pure consciousness in phenomenology is always related with the world of objects through its intentional acts.
1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis has been divided into Seven Chapters as follows:

Chapter: 1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the topic of research i.e. a critical analysis of *adhhyāropa-apavāda* and phenomenological *epoche*. It discusses the problem of research, its relevance and some of the terms used. The critical method of analysis with its focus on dialogue, adopted in this thesis, is briefly explained along with its relevance. The present chapter gives a brief account of the past attempts of critical study involving Advaitavedānta and phenomenology and comes to an end with a brief outline of the thesis. Focus of this study is on the points of convergence and parallels, which will lead to a better understanding of method and content.

Chapter: 2 The Search for a Foundational Science

Phenomenological Epoche-Its Background

The second chapter discusses the late 19th century situation in Western philosophy, along with the attempts made by Mathematics, Logic, Psychologism, Historicism, Life-world philosophies and Empiricism to substitute philosophy as the foundational science. Edmund Husserl's search for a pre-suppositionless, foundational
science, factors that influenced his philosophical thinking, his presentation of phenomenology as a pure descriptive science, and his approach towards philosophy as the mission of his life, are also discussed.

Chapter: 3 Phenomenological Bracketing:

Invoking a Method of Intuitive Inquiry

This chapter explains method as the prime concern of Husserl’s Phenomenology. It deals with primordial givenness as the starting point, the natural stand-point, suspension of thesis, phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, transcendental reduction, the role of intuition in reaching pure ego, intentionality of consciousness, and pure ego as the phenomenological residuum. Husserl’s slogan, ‘get down to things,’ (zu den sachen), epoche as the only correct way of reaching the primordial essence of things and Pure Ego as an all-embracing totality which gives meaning to everything in this universe, are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter: 4 Adhyāropa-apavāda – An Analysis

An attempt is made here to give an exposition of adhyāropa-apavāda as presented in the Upaniṣadic philosophies along with its definitions. An Analysis of multiplicity of beings based on māyā-avidyā is presented here. Śaṅkara refuted Buddhist, Sāmkhya,
and Mimāmsaka theories of the multiplicity of beings based on Avidyā-māyā. His attempt at the restoration of the supremacy of the Vedās and Upaniṣads and the presentation of Jñāna as the only way to realize one’s original nature and the systematic presentation of adhyāropa-apavāda are analyzed here.

Chapter: 5 De-superimposition of Experience:

An Inward Inquiry into Being

This chapter is on adhyāropa-apavāda as a method of inquiry in Advaitavedānta, different stages and role of Avidyā-māyā, and the different approaches to the problem. It also discusses experience in dream, waking and deep sleep states, and analyzes reality in three different levels, viz, prātibhāsika, vyāvahārika and pāramārthika. Brahman as the transfigurative cause of the world, the world as immanence of Brahman, sublatory experience leads to Brahmajñāna, Brahmajñāni in the world but not of the world, are discussed in this chapter. This method of inquiry leads one to the pāramāarthika level where empirical means of knowledge, including Śruti, become ineffective.
Chapter: 6 Consciousness and Pure Ego:
An Analysis of Being in Advaitavedānta and Phenomenology

This chapter is a study of Pure Ego in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Consciousness in Śaṅkara's Advaitavedānta. Pure Ego (the all-embracing totality, the transcendence in immanence, the meaning system for everything in this universe) and Consciousness (the ultimate reality, the adhisthāna of everything, the self-illuminating principle) offer many parallels and points of convergence. Commonalities as well as points of disagreement are brought out in a dialogical spirit.

Chapter: 7 A Critical Evaluation

This chapter is a comparative dialogical study of the two methods of inquiry. The exclusive status of both methods, the similarities in their contents i.e. bracketing and sublation, their assertion of the need to leave behind the empirical experiences which is a sine qua non for the progress of inquiry, are analyzed in this chapter. Differences with regard to the perspectives - phenomenological and metaphysical- of inquiry, different approaches to scripture, different perceptions about God, etc., are also discussed. The concluding section of this thesis highlights some of the insights and areas for further research.
Notes and references

1. Darśana comes from the Sanskrit root ārś-pasyati which means to see, to look into. It also means a stand-point in philosophy or a school of philosophy eg., śaḍ-darśana.

2. Śankarācārya’s time is accepted as 788-820 C. E. (Common Era) There are differences of opinion about this date. This work does not aim at having any detailed inquiry into this problem. For further understanding of this issue refer, Hajme Nakamura’s A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1983 pp.48ff. Sangam Lal Pandey, in his scholary article “Pre-Śamkara Advaita” fixed up the pre-Śaṅkara period from 1st Century to 8th Century A.D. Cf. Sangam Lal Pandey, “Pre-Śamkara Advaita”, Indian Philosophical Annual, Vol. 21, 1989-90 pp. 63ff.

3. See Bhagavadgītā Śaṅkarabhāṣya, 13.13 tatha hi sampradāyavidam vacanam-adhyāropāpavādābhvāṁ nisprapañcam prapañcate; Śaṅkara further elaborates this idea in his Brhadāraṇyka-upaniṣad bhāṣya 4.4.25; also see Māṇḍūkyakārika-bhāṣya.

4. Adhyāropa-apavāda is usually translated as false attribution and subsequent sublation, the commonly used term is de-superimposition. Accurate translation of philosophical terms is a problem. However, the nearest possible translation is made use of in this thesis. As Datta says, “It is highly difficult to translate a word of one language by a word of some other language, because in spite of the general conformity in meaning the two words have different associations, which cannot be preserved in translation. In spite of this difficulty translation becomes inevitable, and for literary purposes it may not be of great harm.” See D. M. Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, A Critical Study of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972, p.34

5. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi are the six pramāṇas the Advaitins accept. Among these six, Śabda is given more importance because it is considered Apauruṣeya.

6. Anubhava is experiential knowledge in Advaitic tradition in that sense it is different from the intellectual knowledge.

7. Athato brahmajijñāsa, (B. S. B 1.1.1.) Inquiry after Brahman is to be started only after the preliminary requisites are fulfilled. They are nityānityavasthuviveka, ihāmutradiphalabhogavirāgah, śamadamādisampsattī and mumukṣatva. After these, the sādhaka gets immersed in Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana.

8. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is the propounder of Phenomenology which he claimed to be a presuppositionless science. His search for a foundational science brought out a number of scholarly philosophical works. The Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), Logical Investigations
(1901), *Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (1913), *Phenomenology of the inner Time-consciousness* (1928), *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), *Cartesian Meditations* (1931) are his important works. Phenomenology is the science of essence. It is more a method of Inquiry than a system of philosophy.


10. Phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction are the three different stages of 'phenomenological epoche'

11. Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur, Romain Ingarden, Gunther Anders, Rudolf Carnap, Marvin Farber, Aron Gurwitsch, Charles Hartshorne, William Kneale, Aurel Kolanai, Emmanuel Levinas, Herbet Marcuse and Arnold Metzger are some of the philosophers influenced by Husserl.


13. *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvarāśāvabhāsaḥ ; atasmin tad bhuddhiḥ*, Both are Śaṅkara's definitions for *adhyaśa* given in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Essentially both of these terms are used in the same sense in the Śaṅkarabhāṣya, but for our purpose of analysis we point out a subtle distinction.

14. *yato vaco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*, from which mind and words return without getting access to; *yatra vedāḥ avedāḥ bhavanti*, the author accepts the limitations of human words in describing the ultimate reality.

15. Semiotics interprets the code system, semantic interprets the meaning system, and hermeneutics interprets the word of the text. Śaṅkara had given six rules in interpreting a text: *utpatti, āpti, abhyāsa, arthavāda* and *phala*.


24. *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, ed., by Mervyn Sprung, Holland: Reidal, 1973, consists of scholarly papers both from Buddhism and Advaitavedānta. We have two clear cases of comparative study. Richard Books, presents the Vedānta concept of māyā and the Buddhist concept of *samvrti* as parallels; T. R. V. Murti adopted a gnoseological approach in analyzing the two problems, that is, *Samvrti* and *Paramārtha* in Madhyamika and Advaitavedanta. Mervyn Sprung in his article took a complementary approach. He says that relationship between two realities is more transformational in nature. Mervyn Sprung in his introduction gives ample scope for parallels between the West and the East.

Another similar work is *The Tao of Physics*, by Fritjof Capra, London: Flemingo, 1991. The author presents a depth level dialogue between two branches of knowledge, that is modern physics and Eastern Mysticism (Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese Thought, Taoism and Zen). He approaches the hidden mysteries of Eastern mysticism with an open heart.


"Comparative philosophy, if we still retain the name, would then be a name for the task, infinitely open, of setting free, bringing into view and articulating in contemporary ways of speaking, in new ways of speaking, the matter of thinking which, in what has actually been realized in thought, still remains unsaid and so unthought in the traditions of the East. Otherwise, comparative philosophy will amount to no more than an unthinking attempt at perpetuating Western "philosophy" by translating Eastern thinking into the language of Western metaphysics, taken as the universal valid paradigm."

26. Paul Ricoeur presents dialogue as "a third way of approach in the form of a limit idea, by opposing the two sides of a polarity by a philosophy of hope postponing a synthesis between them, thus limiting philosophy itself." Quoted by J.B.Chettimattam in his article, "Philosophical Hermeneutics" in *The Journal of Dharma*, Vol.5, 1980, p. 74

28. Mark Mac Dowell, has made a comparative study between the teachings of Don Juan and Madhyamika Buddhism. Through his monograph he tries to bring out the insights and universality of both teachings. This study gives a good example of the author's open approach. Against the usual categorization of 'nihilism' and 'death,' the author tries to prove that there is more to the self than nihilistic thought and more to life than death. Mark Mac Dowell. A Comparative Study of the Teachings of Don Juan and Madhyamika Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1991.

29. Graham Parkes, in his introduction to Heidegger and Asian Thought, quotes from "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer." "Western European and East Asian saying can enter into dialogue in such a way that there sings something that wells up from a single source." This quotation points to the fact that traditions are different only in appearance but in essence they are one. Graham Parkes, ed., Heidegger and Asian Thought, op. cit., p. 1


33. Adhyāropa-apavāda can be analyzed from the following perspectives: the ultimate associated with cause and effect, the ultimate associated with creation, the ultimate associated with the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, the ultimate associated with the distinction between five sheaths and the ultimate associated with three states.