CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND DEMOCRACY

The existing state of violence, terrorism and communalism reveals that men in society do not know what precisely they are for or against. It is possibly both the diversified nature of social expectation and the ineffective social process of imparting value education which have made them feel less estranged from others and even from themselves without being sure about their identity. In a highly traditional and even then so called modern (mainly rural but fast urbanised) country like India, one can easily notice dichotomous contradictions in norms and practices such as, pleading for instruction in mother tongue from the public forum and sending their own children to the posh English medium schools. The self-contradictory behaviour in public life made Indian youth suffer from identity crisis and move like Bruno's philosophical horse not knowing clearly the direction of their goal.

The peculiarity of double-standards in public life may be ascribed to massive landslide in the traditional value system. The National Policy on Education (1986) states: "India's political and social life is passing through a phase which poses the danger of erosion to long accepted values. The goal of secularism, socialism, democracy and professional ethics are coming under increasing strain".

The existing scenario indicates that it is not only the ineffective social process but also the lack of opportunities for getting value education pertaining to the democratic way of life
which have left generations starved for democratic values and floundered in existential vacuums of ignorance and blind belief. They have equally shaken the foundation of the society in general and made impossible the existence of the dignity of man and the sanctity of life in particular. Men in society have not understood the importance of their inter-relationship with each other as their brothers at local, regional or national levels. They are not yet aware of their own rights and responsibilities. It reveals that democratisation at the Government level would not ensure the creation of a free democratic society unless people get education on democratic values and commit to be abided by them in a responsible manner.

In a developing country like India multiple pressures and fast changes in family patterns and standards of living have become stumbling-blocks in the potential of home imparting education on democratic values. It is, thus, the responsibility of the educational system to concentrate its attention on adequate education of students, especially adolescent boys and girls, for democratic values. In the era of transition, the prevailing democratic values should be induced through different strategies so that democracy may survive well.

1.2 DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES

An effective and efficient democratic nation depends upon the realization of its ideals by its people in general. It is conceptual framework of democracy that reveals its ideals and indicates how essential these ideals are for its success.

Social scientists believed that the term "democracy" is difficult to define (Benn, 1972 and Sartori, 1972). However,
etymologically it may be defined as "... a by-product of the entire development of Western civilization" (Sartori, 1972). This etymological explanation does not serve much of the purpose of the present investigation, because it raises a number of questions in the present world where the concept of democracy is completely changed. Mill (1956) said: "Democracy is not simply a concept of political philosophy. As part and parcel of the progressive ascendancy of mankind from primitive force to rational persuasion, it is a way of life worth living and worth believing ". In the words of Shah (1977): "Democracy is not merely a system of Government, it is also a philosophy of life". Eliot (1978) viewed democracy as "not merely a form of government, but a common ethos" (code of values by which a society lives), "a common way of responding emotionally, even common standards of conduct in private life".

Democracy as a concept of political philosophy needs much description as in most of the countries all over the world, democracy exists in some forms or the other. But it is a fact that the common men of the twentieth century understand the word "democracy" very much in the same way as did the citizens of ancient Athens; its utterance elicits similar behaviour, similar expectations and similar demands. It has gained acceptance because of its attractive and desirable ideals. Democracy, thus, sticks much to ideals which refer to philosophy relating to a highly desirable and possible state of affairs. In the words of Sartori (1972) "...`democracy' ... does not describe a thing, it prescribes an ideal ". Clarifying the prescriptive nature of democracy, Sartori viewed that no where democracy has been identified as a body of teaching of any religious, political or
philosophical group.

In the study, the term "democracy" has been used in the prescriptive terms. It prescribes ideals for the society, makes provisions for participation of all its members in the matters of their welfare and secures flexible readjustments of its institutions through the interaction among different forms of associated life.

There are many democratic nations, big or small, old or new. Though everyone of these nations institutionalizes democratic polity around different integrated sets of values, some of them are more or less comparable on certain values others are not. Through a comparative analysis of the four largest English-speaking democratic nations (the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada), Lipset (1963) powerfully illuminated the peculiarities over their value systems. His case study showed that the United States emphasized achievement, equalitarianism, universalism and specificity whereas, Great Britain emphasized ascription, elitism, particularism and diffuseness. Australia appeared different from the United States in its higher emphasis on equalitarianism but less on characteristics like achievement, universalism and specificity. But Canada was lower than the United States on all the four dimensions of democracy e.g. equalitarianism, achievement, universalism and specificity. He summarised that democracy in English-speaking Canada differs from Australia and the United States in the way that places it nearer to Britain, while democracy in Australia is more comparable to the United States. He (1963) concluded with a remark cited by Mackenzie (1962) which
In England the average man feels he is inferior, in America he feels superior; in Australia he feels equal.

India, the largest democratic nation in the world, institutionalized its democratic polity around an integrated set of ideals in 1950. The ideals of our democratic society reflect the spirit and the basic tenets of democracy which revolve around the ideals of the Indian Constitution i.e. to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. It is the democracy that claims to prevent and cure poverty, cruelty, ignorance, corruption, oppression, cannibalism, blood-sacrifice and bigamy. It claims to exterminate kings, rajas, sultans and nawabs. It claims to bring equality, fraternity, justice, prosperity, security, leisure, peace, freedom and right to love. It is based on certain fundamental principles viz., the greatest good of the largest number; equal opportunities for all; each for the good of all and all for the good of each; all command each and each in turn all as well as live and let live. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution clearly affirms these ideals.

The above stated ideals of the Indian democracy reflect certain values. The realization of these values brings success to democracy, because these values have universal appeal. These are the basic values common to all religious and nonreligious concepts. They help in eliminating obscurantism, religious fanaticism, violence, superstition and fatalism by creating better, fuller and purposeful life for sustaining democratic society.

The theoretical rationale of democracy and its ideals revealed that the success of democracy lies in human dignity and freedom.
1.3 EDUCATION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES

This section deals with theoretical structure and contains the concept of values, operationalization of democratic values and value education.

1.3.1. Concept Of Values

It is a matter of general agreement that values are essentially philosophical in nature. The numerous connotations of the term "value" in different philosophical writings have made it more complex. The legacy of this complexity has been inherited by its concept in social sciences. Perhaps this complex nature has made the thinkers to believe sometimes that the term "value" is indefinable (Moore, 1951 and Morris, 1956) or at least by no means clear (Macmillan & Kneller, 1964 and Superka et al., 1976). Even then, various attempts have been made by philosophers and social scientists to develop more precise conceptual structure in the context of their respective areas of work. The outcome of the continuous efforts was precisely commented upon by Rescher (1969) who viewed that "Nevertheless, all their positive efforts have failed, no proposal for a delineation of value terminology has been able to generate any significant degree of concurrence, let alone become a focus of settled consensus". However, the present investigator attempted to develop a sound theoretical framework of value concept in order to undertake his study. This framework was organised on the basis of value definitions given by different scholars over the decades.
1.3.1.1 Value As An Independent Validity:

Interpreting values as kinds in themselves, Adler (1956) supported strongly the views of Furfey and Sorokin. To speak formally with him, "Values are considered as absolutes, existing in the mind of God as eternal ideas, as independent validities...". This value concept implicates that values can be recognised only by faith, speculation, revelation or enlightened reason. As such this kind of value-analysis is nonempirical and in consequence, incapable of being established as truths. Thus, values as absolutes elude measurement or identification methods at the disposal of behavioural or social sciences.

1.3.1.2 Value As The Worth Of Any Object:

The objective nature of value has been emphasized by Lossky and Marshal (1935), Joad (1942), Perry (1954), Pepper (1958) and Turner (1961). To them value is independent of subject as it resides in the objects which may be concrete or abstract, material or nonmaterial and social or unsocial. Here value denotes the worth of any object representing thereby the Marxians and materialistic thinkers from their respective schools of thought.

1.3.1.3 Value As A Conception Of Desirable:

According to Kluckhohn (1951): "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action". .... "A value is not just a preference but is a preferable". This definition characterises the term "Value" as follows:
As a conception, value is a general mental notion of events arrived at a process of perceptual classification and discrimination.
- It is preferable but not merely preferred.
- It is manifested verbally and in some instances it is inferred.
- It is individual or social in character.
- It is resulted from choices among the available alternatives.

1.3.1.4 Value As A Slogan For Rationalization Of Action:

Rescher (1969) analysed the essential nature of value within a formula. According to him: "A value represents a slogan for the 'rationalization' of action (but a slogan that is positively oriented, otherwise we should speak of disvalue)". He further simplified by saying (1969): "A value represents a slogan capable of providing for the rationalization of action by encapsulating a positive attitude toward a purportedly beneficial state of affairs". His concept of value, what he called as formula for value, conveyed fundamentally ideological character of value by touching two aspects of man i.e. as a rational animal having his capacity for reason and as a goal-oriented organism having his needs and desires.

1.3.1.5 Value As Reflected Via Its Multifaceted Dimensions:

Value literature is loaded with multifaceted dimensions of the term "value". As such value has been conceptualized in terms of:
- something desired or enjoyed (Santayan, 1899; Dodd,
1951; Parker, 1957 & Brightman, 1958);
- fulfilment of goals (Murphy et al., 1937; Jones and Gerard, 1967 & Oad, 1989);
- choiced human interest (Geiger, 1950);
- socially approved desire and goal which become subjective preference, standard and aspiration (Mukerjee, 1956);
- social characteristic (Firth, 1959);
- satisfaction of human wants (Margenau, 1959);
- a psychological need (Maslow, 1959);
- personal happiness, security and existence (Woodruff, 1952);
- an individual's attribute just like motive, attitude and habit (Barton, 1962);
- social ideal, belief or norm (Kane, 1962);
- cherished idea or belief (Cuber, 1963);
- personality (Hall and Lindzey, 1964);
- preference or interest (Allport et al., 1966);
- motivation justifying thereby individual's behaviour (Jones and Gerard, 1967 and Hipple, 1968) and idea, notion and articulated feeling which enable to prefer or not to prefer events or behaviours (Ziegler, 1972).

The multifarious nature of value as cited above reflects that individuals' values represent their desires, goals, needs, happiness, interests, wants, ideals, ideas, beliefs, norms, motives, attitudes, habits, personality, preferences, aspirations, feelings and notions. These terms are different reflections of individuals' desirability, but in the true sense
these terms are not identical with values; rather, these are the value-indicators (Rokeach, 1973; Raths et al., 1978 and Gibson and Mitchell, 1981).

1.3.1.6 Value As An Enduring Belief:

Rokeach's definition of value (1973) emphasized one's durable belief. To him: "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or reverse mode of conduct or end-state of existence". More precisely his value concept includes the following:

- Value is not a vague belief but relatively a stable one.
- The enduring nature indicates that value like belief has a cognitive, an affective and a behavioural component. An individual who possesses values knows the way to believe, feels emotional about them and acts accordingly.
- It is personal or social in character.
- It is preferable than mere preferred.
- Value as preferable mode of conduct (courage, friendship, etc.) or end-state of existence (equality, salvation, etc.) from the available converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence can be treated as instrumental and terminal value respectively.
- Value results from available choices.

1.3.1.7 Value As The Result Of Valuing Process:

(The definition of value given by Raths et al. (1978)
emphasized the process of valuing rather than any identifiable institutional sense of the term. Humans who can arrive at something via the intelligent valuing process – choosing, prizing and acting – can suitably be called as a value. Formally they viewed that "Unless something satisfied the seven criteria under the valuing process, we do not call it a value, rather a 'belief', or 'attitude' or something other than value". To them persons' goals, aspirations, attitudes, interests, feelings, beliefs and convictions, activities and worries can be called value indicators if they fail to use seven criteria of valuing successfully. Values are basically personal choices.

1.3.1.8 Value Is What The Human Subject Perceives About Any Object Or Activity:

Social scientists believed that it is the human subject or valuer who provides the index of value about any object or activity. Values are, thus, manifested through the valuers' responses. Therefore, it is the valuer who is the observational target in any kind of study for discovering the true values. To speak with Lee (undated) "The subject attention to the object provides the measure for the intensity and the direction of value". Perry (1954) said : "A value is anything of interest to a human subject". Fraenkely (1973) viewed that "Values are concepts. Like all concepts they do not exist in the experience but in the minds of men. They represent the quality of worth or merit which men place on various aspects of their experience".

Smith and Peterson (1977) said : "Values are those elements that show how a person has decided to use his or her life".

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Placing operationally with the subject, value has been conceived as something personally or socially preferable (Kluckhohn, 1951 and Rokeach, 1973). Somewhat similar trend of opinion has been given by some other scholars. Parsons and Shills (1951) viewed that "Value serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation'. Emphasizing people's standard of desirability, Catton (1959) said that "the noun value has usually been used to imply some code or standard which persists through time and provides criteria by which people order their intensities of desiring various desiderate". Peterson (1970) viewed that "Value represents the desirable in the sense one 'ought' to do or what he perceives 'right' thing to do in any given circumstances".

Locating values in the valuer operationally is mostly taken care of by the subject matter of social psychology or sociological foundation of education - branches of social science. The values conceived by the valuers help not only for predicting their actions but also for understanding sound reason between the valuers' conception of desires and observable actions.

1.3.2 A Working Definition For The Study

Proliferation of value definitions clouded in the preceding pages has brought forth the complex phenomenon of value within a lucid framework of value conceptualization. The entire analysis revealed that the concept of value depends on the person who perceives it, the researcher who undertakes studies on it and the subject matter which deals with it. However, the present investigator has accepted the following definition of
Kluckhohn (1951) as an operational definition of value: "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action". This definition seems to highlight much of the functional and operational aspects. It categorically states that value is:

- a standard of desirability but not norm;
- desirable but not merely desired;
- individual or social in nature;
- manifested overtly or covertly;
- what the human subject or valuer perceives over any object or activity and
- resulted out of choices made over the available alternatives.

On the basis of the accepted operational definition, the investigator conceived value as a desirable standard overtly perceived by individuals from the available alternatives as a guiding principle of varying importance in their lives.

Keeping in view a critical analysis of the conceptual structure of values, the investigator operationally referred democratic values as the ideals of a democratic society which are overtly perceived by individuals (adolescent boys and girls, in our case) as desirable standards in terms of guiding principles of varying importance in their lives from the available choices or alternatives.

1.3.3 Value Education
System of values inherently exists in every society. But its acceptance is neither universal nor static, rather it is changing with times. The changes are mostly due to the influences through the informal, nonformal and formal agencies of education. The possible discrepancies between the informal and planned influences make the process of value education complex. What exactly value education means is, thus, the first thing to concentrate upon.

In the present study value education has been perceived as a learner-centered process which aims at instructing certain values in their total implications. The investigator aimed at imparting value education on the following grounds:

- Value education is a learner-centered process rather than teacher-centered.
- The process involving two-way communication makes the ideas available openly.

It is difficult for an average individual to realize depth, magnitude and significance of the values. That too in a country like India, imparting education on existing values is a prodigious task due to the diversities in the sphere of faiths and practices, cultural facets of life and social order. However, there are certain values like honesty, truthfulness in speech and conduct and helping others which are equally acceptable to all in spite of existing diversities. Similarly, the prevailing values in accordance with the democratic social order are basic to all irrespective of the caste, colour and creed. From the point of view of national integration and national development, education for democratic values is necessary. But the questions arise when should these values be
imparted? Is it possible and practicable at any period of the individual's life span? It, thus, necessitates to trace the most appropriate period for imparting value education.

1.4 STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE EDUCATION

Values can be imparted during different periods of life - childhood, adolescence and adulthood. But at no time in life, an average man or woman is likely to be concerned about values and standards as much as during adolescent period. Because adolescence is a transitional period when ideas and values consolidate.

Adolescence refers to a period in the development of the individual that is introductory to the attainment of maturity (Baldwin, 1986). Adolescence is a transitional period between the dependency of childhood and the relative autonomy of adulthood. Psychologically, it is a period of physical change and social change which distinguish between child behaviour and adult behaviour. Chronologically, it starts with the age of twelve to fourteen (Bigge and Hunt, 1962; Perkins, 1969; Hurlock, 1983 and Baldwin, 1986) and terminates at about twenty to twenty five (Bigge and Hunt, 1962; Perkins, 1969 and Baldwin, 1986). However, adolescent period represents no precise range of years because of uncertainty over the beginning and the ending of this period (Perkins, 1969). Psychologists (Eisenberg, 1965; Perkins, 1969; Powers and Goudy, 1971 and Hurlock, 1983) viewed that during this period adolescents may be classified into two groups i.e. younger adolescents and older adolescents. It is roughly at the chronological age of sixteen to seventeen when the boys and girls are treated as older adolescents (Perkins, 1969;
Keeping in view the above discussion older adolescents are referred to the boys and girls of sixteen plus age and are studying in the final year of pre-university classes. The older adolescents are characterised in different ways. Firstly, they differ from the newly emerging adolescents who have little ability to grasp the elusive concept of human and individual rights (Adelson et al., 1966 and Adelson 1975) and bend easily to the collective will (Kohlberg, 1970). Secondly, by virtue of being older they possess the qualities of those 'fourteen and fifteen years old adolescents (i) who are far more critical, tentative and pragmatic and (ii) whose values are likely to be highly differentiated and wide-ranging' (Conger, 1977). Thirdly, older adolescents' higher level of cognitive development enables them to be aware of values of the society where they live and to deal with them in more sophisticated manner than the younger ones. Fourthly, the heterogeneous world of older adolescents where the opportunities and choices are in plenty calls for taking value decision. Lastly, the social pressure of responsibility as a democratic citizen with voting right motivates older adolescents to examine the democratic values in a mature manner.

1.5 PROMINENT DETERMINANTS OF VALUE EDUCATION

Adolescents in general pass through a transitional period of their lives. But there are a few of them who are conditionable and thus, suffer from anxiety to whom Eysenck (1963b) names as introverts. There are some others who seem not to be leading value-related lives and not knowing their own minds
to whom Raths et al. (1978) call as value-related behavioural types. It is being growingly realised that these adolescents particularly need to be given value education.

1.5.1 Introversion-Extraversion

Introversion-extraversion (I/E) is one of the "Big Two" initial dimensions of personality in the personality theory advanced by Eysenck (1947). The recent research on personality structure (Digman, 1990) indicates that Eysenck's (1947) introversion-extraversion is the first dimension among the five robust-dimensions of personality (introversion-extraversion, friendliness-hostility, conscientiousness, neuroticism-emotional stability and intellect).

Eysenck gave a vivid analysis of introversion-extraversion both at causative and descriptive side. On the causative side, Eysenck traced the origin of I/E from Pavlov's (1927) excitation and inhibition balance in the central nerves, Hull's (1943) concept of reactive inhibition and Gray's (1965) level of arousal. In his review of personality, Eysenck (1967) related his conception of the physiological differences between introverts and extraverts to a distinction used by Russian researchers especially Sokolov (1963) of organisms with weak nervous system and organisms with strong nervous system (Grey, 1965). Organisms with weak nervous systems are assumed to respond at lower level of stimulation and with greater intensity to stimuli than organisms with strong nervous systems (Khanam, 1983). The physiological basis of introversion is now assumed to be different in the threshold of arousal of the reticular activation system. Introverts are assumed to have lower
threshold of reticular arousal than extraverts. But initially Eysenck traced this differentiation in individuals to the experiment with dogs by Pavlov (1927) who found that not all dogs condition alike. Eysenck (1955) extended Pavlovian views to Jungian typology. For doing this, he took the help of Hullian concept of reactive inhibition based on Hull's (1943) first submolar principle.

On the descriptive side, Eysenck (1957 and 1959) deduced the concept of I/E from nosological categories based on the views of Janet and Jung and supported by Hilderbrand's study (1958). According to Eysenck and Eysenck (1968): "The typical extravert is sociable, Likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and does not like reading or studying by himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neckout, acts on the spur of the moment and is generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready answer and generally likes changes. He is carefree, easygoing, optimistic and likes to 'Laugh and be merry'. He prefers to keep moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and to lose his temper quickly. His feelings are not kept under tight control and he is not always a reliable person. The typical introvert is quite, retiring sort of person, introspective, fond of books rather than people, is reserved and distant except to intimate friends. He tends to plan ahead, 'Looks before he leaps', and distrusts the impulse of the moment. He does not like excitement, takes matter of everyday life with proper seriousness, and likes a well-ordered mode of life. He keeps his feelings under close control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, and does not lose his temper easily. He is
reliable, somewhat pessimistic, and places great value on ethical standard”.

Introversion-extraversion as a personality dimension has appeared in many studies of personality. Positive emotionality as the first of the three trait dimensions of personality by Tellegen (1985) bears a striking content similarity to Eysenck's extraversion (1947). Most factor studies of personality characteristics also suggest that the broad trait of extraversion consists of several closely related traits including impulsivity, sociability, adventurousness enthusiasm, high activity level and boredom proneness (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1963, 1977 and 1978; Howarth & Browne, 1972; Guilford, 1975; Plomin, 1976 and Gerbing, Ahadi & Patton, 1987).

The descriptive analysis of Eysenck and Eysenck (1968) was accepted as the operational concept of introversion-extraversion in the present study. In this context, it may be noted that the word "extraversion" can be used as "extroversion" and vice versa (Wolman, 1973; Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1976; Goldenson, 1984 and Bruno, 1986). The investigator uses the word "extraversion".

Certain relevant findings relating to both theoretical and practical aspects of personality and values have been reported. Stenberg (1966) found a positive and significant relation between aesthetic value and tendencies towards maladjustment. Mirachandani's (1972) study showed that delinquent girls (convicted and institutionalized) were significantly higher in religious value and simply lower in theoretical values than the girls of behavioural problems and non-delinquents in the age range of 15 to 18 years. The results
of a comparative study (Mahoney, 1977) on American and Israeli college students supported the view that values (measured by Rokeach Value Survey, 1973) associated with neuroticism are culture and gender specific.

Analysing Allport's concept of value in personality development, Wagoner (1985) concluded that values are central to the development of personality. Conducting a study on Jungian personality typology and values (Rokeach Value Survey), Snyder (1988) suggested that the personality contributes to the individual's value-set.

Personality is influenced by heredity (Eysenck, 1967 and Henderson, 1982). The Minnesota twin study (Tellegen et al., 1988) showed a strong genetic effect on positive emotionality (extraversion), constraint (conscientiousness) and negative emotionality (neuroticism). Digman (1990) viewed that the genetic contribution to the personality seems to be about 50 percent, with trivial amounts attributable to shared (family) environment. These studies revealed that introversion-extraversion is not assumed to be genetically based completely. This I/E dimension, therefore, seems to reflect both genetic and dynamic qualities of individuals.

Studies (Eysenck, 1963a; Child, 1964 and Bendig, 1957) revealed that anxiety was not only related to neuroticism positively but also significantly negatively with extraversion. This implies that individuals with high scores on extraversion will have less of anxiety whereas, those low on extraversion will have high anxiety. Eysenck (1963b) too viewed that anxiety is a conditioned fear and since introverts are more conditionable,
they would show more anxiety.

1.5.2 Value-related Behavioural Types

According to Raths et al. (1978) value-related behavioural types refer to some student types whose behaviour patterns signal high probability of value confusion. These student types who flounder in confusion and indecision are in lack of valuing ability and seem not to be knowing their own minds and not living integrated and value-related lives. Raths and his fellow researchers identified a list consisting of eight value-related behavioural types: the apathetic child, the flighty child, the very uncertain child, the very inconsistent child, the drifting child, the overconforming child, the overdissenting child and the role-playing child. These categories seem dissimilar groups in many ways exhibiting different eight types of behaviours: "apathy, flightiness, uncertainty, inconsistency, drifting, conformity, dissension and role-playing. They all are alike in the difficulties they represent in leading thoughtful, intelligent, integrated, self-directed and value-directed lives.

Studies (Brown, undated.; Jonas, 1960; Machnits, 1960; Martin, 1960; Lang, 1961; Covault, 1973 and Guziak, 1974) reported by Raths et al. (1978) revealed that the positive effects of value-clarifying techniques in reducing behaviour patterns like apathy, flightiness, dissension, drifting, overconformity, role-playing, inconsistency and underachievement which are displayed by the value-related behavioural types. The results obtained by Simon (1958) and Clarke et al. (1974) were very much inconsistent with regard to different behaviour patterns. In the absence of even one direct study within the
reach of the investigator, it was not practicable to comment on the nature of value-related behavioural types in relation to values in general and democratic values in particular. To begin with a kind of exploration, then, the current investigation arbitrarily undertook only the overconforming and inconsistent students to examine precisely the just said lacuna.

The study, thus, aimed at investigating only two types of value-related behavioural types i.e. overconforming and inconsistent students. These two student-types were selected on the basis of non-value-based behaviour, but they have been referred to as value-related behavioural types simply because they lack in valuing ability, their behaviour patterns indicate high probability of value confusion and they seem not knowing their own minds.

1.5.2.1 The Overconforming Students:

Overconforming students try to agree to what they perceive to be the norms with maximum efforts. Sometimes they say or write what the teachers or parents or other grownups want them to say or write, but sometimes they do just the opposite when the peer group is perceived as dominant.

Overconformers seem to have no positions or ideas of their own. They take their cues from others. They need to get directions from others. Left alone, they feel lost and anxious. In nutshell, overconforming students are those who seem not to know their own minds and continually conform.

1.5.2.2 The Inconsistent Students:
Inconsistent students involve in many things that are mutually inconsistent, if not mutually destructive. Students who, for example, support academics and at the same time contradict it, belong to this type. They support one thing today and support just the reverse tomorrow. Sometimes they say onething but do something altogether different. They are for integration here and now, and will likely to be for segregation there and then. They talk for peace in one context and war in some other context. They are alternatively generous and selfish or hardworking this week and totally without energy next week. They seem regularly, persistently and consistently to take position and engage in behaviour that is inconsistent.

They are students whose full and all-unwrinkled faces sink and swim with time or place. In nutshell, inconsistent students are those who seem not to know their own minds and behave inconsistently.

The ideas reflected over the pages of this section reveal that like introversion-extraversion, overconformity and inconsistency are dimensions of the individual's personality structure. Studies indicate that individuals with distinct personality structure display distinct type of value. It, thus, suggests that individuals with various personality dimensions like introversion-extraversion, overconformity and inconsistency are no exceptions to it. The introverts and extraverts with overconforming and inconsistent temperaments display behaviour which signal high probability of value confusion. In order to lead a healthy democratic life, education on democratic values must be imparted to them. But how to impart value education to those who show high degree of value conflict? Hence, it calls
for to identify suitable strategies for imparting education on democratic values in an effective and efficient manner.

1.6 Strategies For Value Education

According to Page and Thomas (1979) strategies are "Techniques used in learning and thinking". Accordingly, strategy may refer to a planned instructional exercise designed with a standard frame of reference either for eliciting desired responses or for stimulating one's thought process.

The traditional strategies like setting a good example and inspiring through emotional appeal aim at eliciting desired responses and thus, suffer from air of indoctrination. With recognition of this weakness of traditional strategies, various schools of thought developed some newer strategic measures of value: value analysis of Coombs (1971), Rokeach's self-confrontation (1973), Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach (1975), consideration approach of McPhail at al. (1975), social action model of Newmann (1975), Shaver and Strong's rational building approach (1976) and values clarification approach of Raths et al. (1978). These strategic approaches are mutually complementary as each one of them provides an essential part of the larger unit of value education. But each of them varies from one another to a greater extent in terms of their philosophical bases, procedural manifestations and the objectives they aim at.

Keeping in mind the democratic value education, the value self-confrontation strategy based upon Rokeach's (1973) Belief System Theory and the clarifying-response strategy based upon the Values Clarification Theory of Raths et al. (1978) were
selected to be used. Because both the strategies suited ideally to impart education on democratic values keeping the learner in the centre. The suitability of the clarifying-response was preferred because as a strategy it undergirds all other values clarification classroom techniques (Hersh et al., 1980).

1.6.1 The Clarifying-response strategy

The clarifying-response strategy communicates the style of values clarification theory of Raths et al. (1978) in action. As a theory, values clarification (Raths et al. 1978) consists of four key elements: a focus on life, an acceptance of what is, an invitation to reflect further and a nourishment of personal powers. This theory of value education as a point of view operates through various strategies: dialogue strategy, writing strategy, discussion strategy, strategies to expand awareness of consequences and nineteen other strategies. As a theoretical approach it aims at increasing one's ability to clarify one's value issues via the valuing process.

The clarifying-response is essentially a dialogue strategy where the responses are geared directly to any one or more of the seven components of the valuing process. This process (Raths et al. 1978) consisting of seven components under three main categories is given below.

Choosing
1. freely
2. from alternatives
3. after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative

Prizing
4. cherishing, being happy with the choice
5. enough to be willing to affirm the choice of others
Acting (6) or doing something with the choice (7) repeatedly in some pattern of life.

The valuing process which gives the concrete shape to the clarifying-response strategy neither involves persuasion nor aims at indoctrination. Rather, it carries the spirit of free inquiry and aims at increasing the likelihood that confusion, conflict, etc. will turn into decisions and living that are both personally satisfying and socially constructive (Krischenbaum et al., 1975); helping children to develop clear values (Raths et al. 1978); promoting intelligent value choices (Hersh et al., 1980) and resulting something called values (Raths, et al., 1978).

According to Raths et al. (1978) any clarifying-response refers to "... a response teacher makes to something student has said or done when the purpose is to encourage that student to do some extra thinking". In the present investigation, the clarifying-response is a classroom teaching strategy in which the researcher aims at making certain clarifying responses to something (assignment of ranks to the values by the students) through the valuing process in the realm of values.

Significant impact of value-clarifying strategies were observed on attitudinal change in social context (Rogers, 1983 and Lassiter, 1984) but not in the context of academic pursuits (Berman, 1974). Value-clarifying strategies revealed changes not only in attitudes but also related behaviours especially in classroom setting (Raths, 1962 and Covault, 1973). They were successful in behavioural changes concerning reduction in the use

Change in one's self-conception following the value-clarifying strategies was observed by Covault (1973), Wilgoren (1973), Ashford (1984) and Setian (1990) except in some cases particularly in the study of Gillispie (1983). Of course, the positive change in one's self-concept does not necessarily mean that a person has become more clarified about a specific issue (Kinnier, 1983).

The therapeutic nature of values clarification enables the individual to differentiate situations requiring high personal involvement and those which do not (Kelly and Stone, 1987), reduces in the intake of drugs (Krishchenbaum, 1974; Clarke et al., 1974 and Gorsuch et al., 1976) and alcohol (Clarke et al., 1974). These findings strongly supported the idea of Simon (Martin, 1985) who observed that values clarification as a therapeutic approach is in perfect harmony with Glasser's Reality Therapy and Ellis's Rational Emotive Therapy.

Studies showed that value-clarifying strategies are more effective than traditional strategies. Little (1975) reported values clarification was more successful than lecture method for imparting driver education in terms of student's attitude towards course, attendance and grade. Similarly, Singh and Singh (1986) showed how value-clarifying strategy was more effective than the conventional method for teaching values: co-

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operation, dedication to teaching profession, scientific outlook, nationalism and perseverance. It is interesting to note that values clarification was equally successful, efficient and effective like Donald Oliver approach (it uses more of a cognitive confrontational values model) by indicating positive change in self-concept (Wilgoren, 1973); and cognitive behaviour modification model by showing a gain of one grade level in reading (Gillispie, 1983). Kelly and Stone (1987) showed that Type-A individuals (individuals unable to differentiate between those situations that require a high degree of personal involvement in responding to the environment and those that do not) appeared to be able to use Anxiety Management Training (AMT), Cognitive-Behavioural Treatment/AMT and Values Clarification Treatment/AMT equally well in reducing Type-A behavioural pattern, but the reduction was not statistically significant.

The study (Kinnier, 1987) showed that different distinct approaches (values clarification, value analysis, rational model and decision-making strategy) with their typical criteria (rational, emotional, ethical and behavioural criteria) were put together to form a single approach of Value Conflict Resolution Assessment (V.C.R.A.). This V.C.R.A. can be used for clarifying values. This study revealed that how values clarification is becoming integrated with other approaches of value education.

The study of Safrit (1990) led to an inference that values clarification could help in identifying 13 values of professional employees in the North Carolina Agricultural
Extension Service which were related significantly to the curriculum.

The findings of all the above cited studies tend to reveal that changes are inevitable following value-clarifying strategies. It was reflectively pointed out by Simon in an interview (Martin, 1985). Review of various studies revealed that value-clarifying strategies were successfully employed for reduction of any kind of habitual behaviour like that of self-confrontation strategy. But interestingly it was observed that unlike self-confrontation strategy the effect of values clarification on behavioural change was more successful.

1.6.2 Value Self-confrontation Strategy

Rokeach's (1973) value self-confrontation strategy is based on his belief system theory what he categorically said as a theory of cognitive and behavioural change. This theory basically moves around the most fundamental class of beliefs i.e. the many conceptions or cognitions that a person has about himself which have been identified as self or self-concept by many psychologists or philosophers (Mead, 1934; Hilgard, 1949; Dymond, 1954; Cooley, 1956; Akeret, 1959; Allport, 1960; Rainy, 1975; Hermans, 1987 and Swami Sivananda, 1989). According to Rokeach (1973) "All such self-cognitions can reasonably be represented at the innermost core of the total belief system and all remaining beliefs, attitudes and values can be conceived of as functionally organised around this innermost core". Diagramatically his belief system has been presented in the Fig. 1.1.

The Fig. 1.1. shows that in the core of this functionally interconnected and hierarchically ordered belief
Fig. 1.1: ROKEACH BELIEF SYSTEM AND CHANGE (1973)
system, self-conceptions is the most central element. The terminal (end-state) values are nearer to the centre of the belief system than the instrumental (behavioural) values. Attitudes and beliefs as peripheral elements in the belief system hold still less central positions than values. Any induced inconsistency or contradiction between one's values or value and any other cognitive component which implicates self-conceptions may lead the individual to a state of self-satisfaction-dissatisfaction. This affective state is postulated to be the basic motivation for change in values, behaviour, attitudes or beliefs in order to make the belief system consistent. Value self-confrontation strategy transforms the belief system theory into action.

In the present study, value self-confrontation is a laboratory teaching strategy in which certain conditions are created to enable the individual (student, in our case) to become consciously aware of the existing contradictions in the belief system of the comparison group (implied to be consisted of individuals of greater integrity i.e. teachers found to be democratic in their attitude and behaviour); and also of the discrepancy between the importance he/she placed on the values and the emphasis placed on the same values by the comparison group.

The available evidence revealed that the basic psychological mechanism underlying the value self-confrontation strategy is the affective state of self-dissatisfaction that generates durable changes in values (Hollen, 1972; Hamid and Flay, 1974; Rokeach, 1979; Rokeach and Grube, 1979 and Sanders 30
and Atwood, 1979) and in some cases induces enduring changes in values subsequently leading to long-term changes in related behaviour (Rokeach, 1971; Conroy, Katkin and Barnette, 1973; Greenstein, 1976; Conroy, 1979; Thouasarond, 1987; Sawa & Sawa, 1988 and Schwartz, 1988). These studies indicate that the strategic effect of self-confrontation on durable behaviour change has been less successful as compared to value change. It has also been observed that long-term value change is not bounded with deliberately pre-selected target values (Rokeach, 1979). The unidirectional nature of value change following self-confrontation has been proved time and again (Rokeach, 1973; Campbell & Hannah, 1976 and Rokeach and Grube, 1979). Above stated studies except those of Thouasarond (1987) and Sawa & Sawa (1988) demonstrated durable cognitive and behavioural changes under a specific condition i.e. following feedback about values and attitudes of others and attitudes and values of treatment subjects. A few instances showed these changes under some other distinct conditions, namely, following feedback under private self-confrontation and self-confrontation with significant others (Rokeach and Cochrane, 1972); about other's values and attitudes even when subjects are not given feedback before hand about their own values and attitudes (Rokeach and McLellan, 1972); about certain interpretations of the data offered to the experimental subjects (McLellan, 1974) and about the treatment subjects' salient value of health and its current logically related overt behaviour (Sawa & Sawa, 1988).

Channel of interpersonal communication along with television and print has been used successfully for presenting information about self-confrontation by Sanders & Atwood (1979).
They concluded that inducement of self-dissatisfaction is channel free. Similarly, Rokeach (1979) used computer in place of human experimenter and found computer as an effective channel.

The research findings revealed that Rokeach's self-confrontation treatment did not have only dramatic implications for communication theory and practice but it was suitably used for psychotherapy in general and the cessation of any habitual behaviour or addiction to smoking in particular (Conroy et al., 1973 & Conroy, 1979). Hermans's (1987) dialogical self-confrontation strategy is meant only for the people who have identity problem. Employing this strategy over a longitudinal case study of a person, JOKE, with and identity problem he found that JOKE changed her name to YOKA. This new name represented a new self-representation - "Here I am". The theoretical considerations and empirical evidences indicated strongly the brevity and effectiveness of value self-confrontation as a strategy of long-term change.

A comparative analysis on the basis of both empirical evidences and intuitive understanding revealed that the selected two strategies viz, value self-confrontation and clarifying-response differ from each other as stated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1</th>
<th>Comparative Analysis between Value Self-confrontation (SC) and Clarifying-response (CR) Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>A self awareness model based on Rokeach's (1973) Belief system Theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Laboratory teaching Strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very much formal in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employs print as a channel of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A classroom teaching strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invariably informal in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employs dialogue as a channel of communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite of the above stated discrepancies, study (Wilgoren, 1973) indicated that values clarification (a theory from which clarifying-response strategy is derived) is equally effective like that of Donald Oliver approach (it uses cognitive confrontational values model) in resulting positive change in self-concept.

1.7 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES

The current section aims at dealing exclusively with the literature on the democratic values.

Dave and Srivastava (1958) studied democratic attitudes among students belonging to two different types of schools. The main finding revealed that there was a significant difference in students' attitudes of the two schools under investigation in the area of Understanding and tolerance, Creative participation and Respect for higher values of life. There was little difference in attitudes towards the value of Respect for individuality.

Carrying out an exploratory study on "Democracy and Higher Secondary Education in Uttar Pradesh", Singh (1960) observed that the Indian democracy, a product of her own soil, is characterised by Freedom and dignity of the individual, Peace and co-operation among all mankind. The study revealed that ninety-two percent of ninth and twelfth graders showed their awareness of a democratic order in the country and eighty percent of them were in favour of it. Pupils were very much caste conscious and only sixty percent of them regarded India as the homeland of all the religious communities.

Shakeela Begum and Hafeez (1964) found significant sex
differences in value preferences of final year degree class students of certain colleges in Mysore city. Power, Wealth, Ambition, Courage, Adventure, Initiative and Tolerance were emphasized more by the boys than the girls whereas, girls emphasized Love, Peace, Sympathy and Perseverance more than the boys. The researchers concluded that the very difference may be explained on the basis of culture of males and females in the society.

The investigation carried out by Ahluwalia (1965) aimed at examining the impact of democracy on Indian secondary schools with special reference to Madhya Pradesh. The findings showed that policies, plans and programmes of secondary education had undergone a democratic orientation. Introduction of diversified courses of study, provision of subject choice on the basis of aptitude and interest, the methods of activity-centered teaching, enhanced opportunities of scholarship, emphasis on cocurricular activities, upgrading of teachers pay scales, sponsoring of other benefit schemes for teachers and honouring them with national awards speak of the impact of democracy on Indian education in general and secondary education in particular.

Dennis and his fellow investigators (1968) investigated the development of "democratic orientations" among 9-16 year olds in America, Germany, England and Italy. They found a general across-age increase in Sense of political efficiency, Tolerance for minority dissent, Support for a competitive party system and General support for democracy (with some slight differences among countries).

According to Krause (1970) Representation, Assertion and Compromise are the key components of a democratic value
system. Notions of equality of opportunity to share social responsibilities and benefits also appear to be the basis of the ideal (if not always the practice) of the American democracy.

The study of Solomon and other investigators in his team (1972) basically concentrated on the development of democratic values and behaviours - Equality of representation, Equality of participation, Equality of resource distribution, Assertion responsibility and Compromise - in Mexican-American children in second, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth grades. The main findings are as follows: (i) Four of the five verbally expressed democratic values (all except Equality of resource distribution) showed clear and significant increase with increasing grade. Surprisingly, in reverse the behavioural index of Equality of resource distribution excluding other four democratic behaviours was the only group variable to show a clear evidence of a grade trend. Resource distribution equality also showed a significant main effect for sex (girls were more equalitarian). (ii) The correlations between the grade and the verbal expressions of democratic value measures were substantial ranging from .68 to .81, P's < .001, with the exception of the resource distribution value, r = .06. These results were consistent with the grade relationships presented earlier. The correlations between the behavioural measures and grade showed a greater degree of relationship than appeared in earlier analyses. The correlations between the behavioural representation of democratic value measures (especially values like Equality of representation and Equality of participation in addition to Equality of resource distribution) and grade showed a greater degree of significant relationship. (iii) Partial correlations
(with the effect of grade removed) between the five verbal and five behavioural measures of democratic values demonstrated significant relationship within, but not across types of measures. Among the value indices, Assertion was significantly correlated with Equality of resource distribution (P < .01) and with the Compromise (P < .05). Among the behavioural indices, Participation was significantly correlated with Assertion (P < .001) and Equality of representation (P < .05). But none of the correlations between the verbal and behavioural measures of the same value was significant (in fact, four of the five such correlations were negative). It was concluded that if the present findings do represent true differences in trends for verbal and behavioural democratic values, they can be most plausibly explained by assuming that the two reflect the products of distinct and separate learning processes. Democratic forms of behaviour may be learned relatively early for a variety of pragmatic reasons, this learning in some cases may occur long before the value-related verbal justifications for the same type of behaviours are acquired.

The investigation was carried out to examine the value systems of teachers and students of secondary schools by Verma (1972). Results showed that the value systems of teachers and students were quite different. Teachers as a whole group were high in family prestige, power and religious values and low in Health, knowledge and social values. Students as a whole group were high in knowledge, democratic and social values and low in religious, economic and power values.

Shoemaker and Bolt (1977) in their study on students
enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Calvin College with Conservative Protestant background found that relatively low rankings were given to Equality along with 'A world of beauty' and 'A world at peace' in comparison to other terminal values as assessed by the instructional modified version of Rokeach Value Survey (1969).

Following Rokeach's proposition, Hogan and Mookherjee (1981) studied the dependent nature of values - a shift in research trend on values - by administering Rokeach's Survey of Value to 316 white male and female students in a public high school in a rural region of middle Tennessee. They found that students having better educated parents prize more to Equality along with some other values than the students having less well-educated parents.

Katiyar (1982) conducted his study on intermediate students of seven cities in Uttar Pradesh. The main findings pertaining to democratic value revealed that it was held highest in the value hierarchy by the students of all groups belonging to the courses of study, religion, caste, parents' income, fathers' education and fathers' profession. Muslim students were significantly higher than Christian students in their ranking for democratic value. There was negative and significant relationship at the .01 level of democratic value with business and artistic fields. Of course, democratic value was not related with executive, persuasive, Linguistic and musical fields.

The elementary school teachers can be trained to make their classrooms democratic. Conducting a study, Thompson (1982) viewed that a democratic classroom is characterised by a
governance structure which reflects shared-decision making and shared-responsibilities between teachers and students; class meetings or discussion to promote resolution of ongoing concerns, build community and stimulate thinking; co-operative and caring climate; students' assumption of responsibility for learning and behaviour and a system of discipline which encourages children to act within the Limits of reality and social order.

Investigating about citizenship as an important aspect of democratic values, Varshney (1983) found that there was no significant difference between civics urban students and civics non-urban students in respect of citizenship, egoism and democracy. More boys than girls had a favorable attitude towards elections and franchise; but in respect of law, sense of duty, equalization, political optimism and social sensitivity, the position was quite reverse.

Conflict between Christians and Muslims over ages in Lebanon prompted Wolfe and Mourribi (1985) to conduct a study on Lebanese students belonging to these two religions at Beirut University College to study the differences in their values by administering Rokeach Value Survey (1979). The analysis of results showed that the similarities among the values of Christians and Muslims in Lebanon were greater than the differences among their values. Though the Terminal Value "Equality" was ranked fourteenth for Christians and third for Muslims, this difference was not significant for the groups as a whole. However, Christian women placed a significant lower value on Equality than did Muslim men (P < .05) and Muslim women (P < .05).

The study (Lewis, 1988) examined five general areas of
concern which the literature indicated were basic democratic values essential to the democratic way of life: voting, forming and expressing opinions, taxes, upholding laws and government and defence of country. Both teachers and students saw voting as a privilege. Both the groups strongly felt that teachers were obligated to teach the principles of democracy.

The studies relating to democratic values, directly and indirectly revealed that researches are highly fragmentary with very little cohesion. However, the review of the studies developed a curiosity to know about the democratic values of the students who are Indians geographically but not culturally or socially, because, living in one of the remotest corner of the country, they lead a unique style of dominant Western-Christian life.

1.8 EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM

The value literature reflected over various studies in the preceding pages conveyed a synoptic glimpse of the nature of work done in the field of democratic value education. Researches relating to different ideals in any democratic society have received little attention. As revealed from a cross-section of the published literature, a little attention is paid to the education of democratic values through two different strategies in relation to different variables: introversion - extraversion, overconformity - nonconformity and consistency-inconsistency.

It is a recognised fact that democracy cannot be sustained by mere governmental decrees. So, any nation pledged to democracy may assert to need analysis: how and in what way the
values twined with the democratic social order can be imparted. The present study concentrates on how the democratic value education can be imparted among adolescents.

The above cited literature is replete with varieties of theoretical approaches to value education which suitably answer to the question raised above. The same is true for both the value education strategies of self-confrontation and clarifying-response based on Belief System Theory and Values Clarification Theory. Studies revealed that the value-clarifying strategies were more effective on behaviour change as compared to attitudinal change, value change and change in self-concept. In order to further strengthen its stand on value change, the study aims at investigating exclusively the democratic value change following the clarifying-response - a unique strategy of values clarification. Rokeach's Belief System Theory is widely known for long-term changes in values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. It is the value self-confrontation strategy which activates this theory. A question, thus, arises as to how does this strategy work while dealing with short-term value change.

The review of literature indicates that values clarification is becoming equally effective like that of Donald Oliver approach which uses cognitive confrontational values model (Wilgoren, 1973). This concluding remark over these two strategies was derived on the basis of self-concept rather than the democratic values. The discussion, therefore, raised a basic issue: Would these two key theoretical processes of Belief System as well as Values clarification in general and the value self-confrontation and the clarifying-response strategies in particular presume to underlie the democratic value change?
The adolescent introverts and extraverts with their overconforming and inconsistent behaviours suffer from high probability of value confusion. They need to be helped in order to bring them into the main stream of democratic life. Raths et al. (1978) clearly pointed out that students with these behaviour patterns can be assumed to reflect unclear values only in the absence of severe emotional disturbances. The emotionally disturbed individuals are assumed not to be free from anxiety. The present investigation deals with the introverts who are more prone to anxiety and extraverts who are comparatively less. The investigator, thus, aims at examining as to how effective both the strategies in general and the clarifying-response in particular would be for these adolescent introverts and their counterparts.

1.9 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of the present investigation has been formulated as follow:

"EFFECT OF STRATEGIES FOR INCULCATION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AMONG ADOLESCENTS IN RELATION TO INTROVERSION-EXTRAVERSION AND VALUE-RELATED BEHAVIOURAL TYPES"

1.10 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

India is a democratic country with diversification in respect of caste, colour, creed, race, region and religion. Its survival mostly depends upon its unity in spite of diversities. In order to enhance unity, democratic values among the youngsters should be developed through the process of education. Because it will enable them to suitably occupy the positions of authority
and make the democratic soil fertile for success, progress and prosperity in life.

Education basically is manpower planning. It is, therefore, an important determinant not only in achieving progress in different spheres of life but also in creating a social order based on democratic values such as Freedom, Responsibility, Equality, Liberty, Fraternity and Social Justice. If India is to advance as a nation, it is necessary that these values must be inculcated among its youth. The Review Committee (1991) on National Policy On Education-1986 affirmed this idea. It says that "Inculcation of values are indispensable for creation of an enlightened and humane society".

It appears that the entire educational set-up has an academic bias, catering to a great extent the intellectual needs of the learners and by-passing the basic components of present day life i.e. democratic values. These values aim at influencing the students' attitudes, feelings, thoughts and behaviour in life. But are the students really aware of that there are certain things like rights and responsibilities binding with certain ideals of life like brotherhood, equal treatment in equal circumstances and the individual dignity? It is true that majority of the total population irrespective of age and education are not aware of their own rights, responsibilities and obligations. It is through the education of the democratic values that the real change can be brought about in their lives to this effect.

Each society has its own traditions, customs and values. Each expects certain amount of duties and
responsibilities to be performed efficiently by its citizens. It is, therefore, a moral obligation on the part of citizens to perform their duties before asserting for rights. Adolescents must be aware and oriented into Indian democratic values. Accordingly, every effort should be made in the schools and colleges for preparing students for democratic way of life. It can be achieved when the educational institutions become laboratories for conducting social experiments. Hence, the orientation into the democratic values may be given implicitly. It may probably be given when this implicit value education process is explicitly discussed, analysed and reflected upon. In this way, students can be led to form favourable attitudes towards democracy and be motivated to act in accordance with the democratic way of life. It is possible if the existing curriculum is modified. National Policy On Education (1986) affirms the same in the following words: "The growing concern over the erosion of values and an increasing cynicism in society has brought to focus the need for readjustment in the curriculum in order to make education a forceful tool for cultivation of social, ethical and moral values".

The curriculum should be examined in depth for the learning experiences leading to effective changes essentially required for internalization of values. This objective can only be achieved by making some changes in the existing curriculum. This idea implies two things. Firstly, both pre-service and inservice training should be given to teachers, with special references to democratic value-oriented education. Secondly, the cocurricular activities such as NCC, Sports and Games should be organised with an objective to effect internalization of the
democratic values.

The proposed study basically lays a strong foundation on the identification of content to be included in the existing curriculum i.e. education for democratic way of life, its objectives, its scope, approaches and the occasions of their exposer. Extensive scientific research in this area will contribute to the readjustment of the curriculum for value orientation.

1.11 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The present study was delimited with respect to the following aspects:

1. The final sample consisted of adolescent boys and girls belonging to only final year pre-university class.

2. Of the list of value-related behavioural types given by Raths et al. (1978) only two i.e. overconformity and inconsistency types, were taken up for the investigation.

3. The study was confined only to the following democratic values: Regards for the dignity of individual, Equality of status and opportunity, Sympathy with everyone, Openness to reason, Tolerance for differences in opinions, Responsibility and Co-operative decision-making.

4. Only two strategies were used: the value self-confrontation strategy and the clarifying-response strategy.

1.12 OBJECTIVES

The present study was designed to attain the following objectives:

1. To develop the Democratic Value Survey.
2. To adapt the instrument of self-confrontation strategy for inculcating the seven democratic values on the lines of Value Change Instrument of Rokeach (1973).

3. To adapt the clarifying-response strategy for the seven democratic values.

4. To adapt the Value-related Behaviour Problem Device in its three forms: self-rating, peer-rating and teacher-rating, in order to measure the overconforming and inconsistent behaviours.

5. To draw the democratic value preference patterns for the self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies separately for the following groups:
   i. Overconforming-inconsistent-introverts (OC - IC - I)
   ii. Overconforming-consistent-introverts (OC - CS - I)
   iii. Nonconforming-inconsistent-introverts (NC - IC - I)
   iv. Nonconforming-consistent-introverts (NC - CS - I)
   v. Overconforming-inconsistent-extraverts (OC - IC - E)
   vi. Overconforming-consistent-extraverts (OC - CS - E)
   vii. Nonconforming-inconsistent-extraverts (NC - IC - E)
   viii. Nonconforming-consistent-extraverts (NC - CS - E)

6. The study has been designed to attain the following objectives separately for each of the seven democratic values:
   i. To examine the effectiveness of the two strategies for orientating the adolescents into the democratic values.
   ii. To study the effectiveness of the two strategies separately with respect to the following:
       (a) Personality types i.e. introverts and extraverts.
(b) Overconformers and nonconformers.

(c) Inconsistent and consistent adolescents.

iii. To examine the effectiveness of both the strategies for introverts and extraverts among overconformers and nonconformers.

iv. To investigate the effectiveness of the two strategies for introverts and extraverts among inconsistent and consistent adolescents.

v. To examine the effectiveness of the two strategies for the overconformers and nonconformers among inconsistent and consistent adolescents.

vi. To study the effectiveness of both the strategies with respect to the personality types, overconformity and consistency as behavioural types.

1.13 HYPOTHESES

The present study has been designed to test the following hypotheses for each one of the seven democratic values separately:

H_{A:0} - The self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies yield equal results.

H_{A:1} - The self-confrontation strategy yields better results than the clarifying-response strategy.

H_{A:2} - The clarifying-response strategy yields better results than the self-confrontation strategy.

H_{AB:0} - Differences in the criterion scores obtained through self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies are not qualified by the personality types viz, introverts and extraverts.
The self-confrontation strategy yields better results with extraverts than with introverts.

The clarifying-response strategy yields better results with introverts than with extraverts.

The two strategies yield better results with introverts than with extraverts.

Extraverts are benefited more with the self-confrontation strategy and introverts with clarifying-response strategy.

Differences in the criterion scores obtained through the self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies are not qualified by conformity levels.

The self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies yield better results with nonconformers than with overconformers.

The self-confrontation strategy yields better results with nonconformers than with overconformers.

The clarifying-response strategy yields better results with overconformers than with nonconformers.

Differences in the criterion scores obtained through the self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies are not qualified by consistency levels.

The self-confrontation strategy yields better results with inconsistent adolescents than with consistent adolescents.

The clarifying-response strategy yields better results with consistent adolescents than with inconsistent adolescents.

The self-confrontation strategy yields better results
with consistent adolescents than with inconsistent adolescents.

**HAD**: The clarifying-response strategy yields better results with inconsistent adolescents than with consistent adolescents.

**HABC**: The two strategies yield equal results for introverts and extraverts with overconforming and nonconforming behavioural types.

**HABC**: With nonconforming-extraverts, the self-confrontation strategy yields higher results than the clarifying-response strategy.

**HABC**: With overconforming-introverts, the clarifying-response strategy yields higher results than the self-confrontation strategy.

**HABC**: The self-confrontation strategy yields higher results than the clarifying-response strategy for nonconforming-introverts as compared to overconforming-introverts.

**HABD**: The two strategies yield equal results for the two personality types with inconsistent and consistent behavioural types.

**HABD**: The performance of extraverts with consistency through the self-confrontation strategy follows same pattern as through the clarifying-response strategy.

**HACD**: The two strategies yield equal results for the two levels of conformity and the two levels of consistency.

**HACD**: The performance of overconformers with consistency through the clarifying-response strategy exceeds the same through the self-confrontation strategy.
The performance of nonconformers with consistency through the self-confrontation strategy follows a similar pattern as the same through the clarifying-response strategy.

The two strategies yield comparable results in case of introverts and extraverts with both the levels of conformity and consistency.

With those overconforming-introverts who are inconsistent, both the self-confrontation and clarifying-response strategies yield higher results.

With those nonconforming-introverts who are inconsistent, the two strategies show a similar pattern of performance.

With overconforming-extraverts, the self-confrontation strategy yields higher results than the clarifying-response strategy with increasing consistency level.

The performance of nonconforming-extraverts through the clarifying-response strategy follows a pattern similar to the one through the self-confrontation strategy.