CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Nigeria underwent a transformation. At this time her Low-Keyed Low Profile foreign policy adopted since independence was given up in favour of a policy of diversification, dynamism and action both in its domestic and foreign policies. As a consequence of this qualitative change, Nigeria sought to play a role in African affairs by virtue of its membership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This study intends to analyse Nigeria's role in OAU from 1970 to 1983.

It was during this period that, all the major foreign policy triumphs Nigeria has had since its independence in 1960 occurred. This in turn brought about a watershed in the international relations in Africa. It is, equally, during this period that Nigeria exhibited great foresight particularly in articulating its interests and prepared herself for realizing them. All this occurred after the entry of the military into the political scene of the country, especially after the emergence of Murtala Mohammed as the undisputed revolutionary and visionary leader. It was the military which brought the state to the present level of development as seen today which, would not have been possible without the new activist, positive and influential policy towards Africa and the World adopted by
the new leadership. Also, the existing unhealthy atmosphere characterized by intra-African problems in the continent afforded Nigeria the desired opportunity to play a leadership role through the OAU.

The achievements of the country within this period were remarkable. Her importance in African affairs, particularly since 1973 Arab oil embargo to all the supporters of Israel, created the impression among many Nigerians that, their country is the "Giant of Africa". This can be deduced from two illustrations. First, it is one of the few nations in the world today that fought a civil war and, not only reconciled and reunified itself but, within a decade, the members of the defeated side were well assimilated into the national mainstream. This was a great African milestone. Ojukwu, the rebel leader was pardoned and allowed to return home from exile. He is now permanently settled at home. Dr. Alexander Ekwueme, who also hailed from that Zone and a Southerner, became the vice president of the country during the Second Republic. This can be contrasted with the USA where no Southerner had become president until Jimmy Carter came to the White House in November 1976. Moreover, Gowon, the then Head of State of Nigeria, the first Christian from the minority group and implicated in the assassination of Murtala Mohammed, was pardoned and all his military titles and honours were restored back to him after the trial in absentia. He has since returned home from Britain where he
was living in exile and studying Political Science at Warwick University. Secondly, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) started in 1974 by the Gowon Administration has been a landmark for the tribalistically minded people. It serves as an important channel for bringing together this heterogeneous society. It acts as a catalyst and instrument of national integration. In recognition of the importance of this for the development of the nation, President Shehu Shagari has this to say:

"Today the number of participants in this scheme has risen to over thirty-seven thousand. Today, the NYSC scheme involves not only just university graduates, but graduates of all institutions of higher learning. Today all Nigerians recognize and uphold the invaluable role which the National Youth Service Scheme has played in the unity and progress of our nation...."

This period is important not only because of the emergence of new philosophy in the domestic and foreign policies of Nigeria, but also, because of the opportunities provided by the Nigerian external environment. The civil war period (1967-1970) and, the post-civil war era in

1. President Shehu Shagari in an address titled "Youth Service Corps has enhanced Nigeria's Social integration" at the passing out parade of the 10th Batch of Corps Members and the 10th Anniversary celebration of the establishment of the NYSC Scheme held at Tafawa Balewa square on Tuesday, 5 July 1983. Challenge of Change Collected Speeches of President Shehu Shagari, vol. 4, (Ikoyi-Lagos : Federal Department of Information, Domestic Publicity Division, 1980), pp. 93-95.
Nigeria provided it with experience and the capacity to embark on the policy of diversification. Also her all-round economic development (1973-78); the Portuguese invasion of Guinea (1970); Ethiopia-Somalia dispute (1972-74); Yom Kippur War and Egypt (1973); the oil embargo of 1973-74 against Israel and her supporters by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the Spanish Sahara War (1975-76); the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in 1974-75; and the subsequent Angolan Civil War (1975-76) culminating in the victory of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) supported by USSR and Cuba; the armed clashes between Uganda and Tanzania leading to the ouster of Idi Amin (1979), and the reinstatement of Milton Obote in 1981, and the Zimbabwe's national independence in 1980 were the events which could not be ignored by the Nigerian decision-makers. The open support given to the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) by Nigeria at a time when the OAU could not make up its mind probably proved an important input in the Nigerian foreign policy and, subsequently, compelled her to seek an active role in OAU. It was facilitated by Nigeria's substantial increase in her foreign exchange reserves; and her growing military strength offered new possibilities.

Moreover, 1970's also saw "the externalization of African conflicts resulting in the growing number of interventions in the internal and regional disputes. For
example, the 1975-76 Angolan crisis; the 1977-78 sharba problem; the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78, the 1975 to the present day crisis in the Western Sahara and Chadian misunderstanding. Nigeria could not have overlooked these happenings in the continent.

As a consequence of its active involvement with OAU, Nigeria was no longer the "Golden Voice" of the West it used to be. This was perceived to be an important development in Nigeria and Africa.

Some studies were undertaken to explain this phenomenon. But these studies are mainly concerned with Nigeria's relations with other African countries. So far no major work has appeared on Nigeria and OAU. This is a serious gap in view of Nigeria's contributions to the formation and achievements of OAU. This study is a moderate attempt to fill that gap.

In order to understand this shift in the Nigerian foreign policy one has to briefly go into the period during which Nigeria followed a Low-keyed Low-Profile foreign policy.

Soon after independence, the country did not actively play the required leadership role in the continent commensurate with its size, population, and wealth. This was due to her economic alignment emanating from her economic dependence on the western industrialized states. This was in contrast to her professed political non-alignment. This contradictory situation was the aftermath of foreign domination and colonialism. This legacy led her to pursue a Low-Profile, Low-keyed foreign policy, thus, earning the "nickname" the 'Golden Voice' of the West in the continent. The situation was such that the leadership at that time was mainly interested in satisfying the interests of the former colonial masters and other western states rather than pursuing the interests of Nigeria and the continent at large for the development and welfare of its peoples. Domestically, least attention was paid to the solution of the problems that beset the populace. Moreover, the powers that be, were only working out the strategies for maintaining the domination and hegemony of their tribes to the disadvantage of the rest of the country. These tribalistic-minded leaders and their sycophants, in the name of administering the affairs of the state, were abundantly enriching themselves thereby undermining the credibility of the government and the country before the outside world.
As time passed by, it became known that, the government of the day had become insensitive to the yearnings of the people. The country reeled under decadence of corruption, favouritism, tribalism, nepotism, and other vices detrimental to the survival of the state as a unit. This resulted in the military take over that brought to an end the first unholy coalition democratic government. Major Nzeogwu the leader of the coup had in an interview this to say as to why they struck:

"(A) It was necessary to purge the country of its social evils—bribery, tribalism, bureaucracy, nepotism, feudalism and other social injustices. (B) Simpering under foreign eulogies on its democracy and stability, the civilian rulers had let the domestic affairs, of the country come under the remote control of imperialists. In external affairs, the leaders sought to play to the tune of foreign flatteries resulting in lack of coherence in the country's policy statements. (C) The civilian leaders had proved completely incapable of managing the affairs of the country...."

On the continental scene, Africa had complex problems, despite the fact that it is one of the richest in the world in terms of mineral resources which may be inexhaustible. Political independence in Africa at the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s was of historical significance in the light of many years of colonial domination. The independence

brought high hopes, great expectations and confidence to the millions of people. Africans were expected to direct and control their political and economic destinies for generating self-sustaining growth and development for improved standards of living. The situation called for unity of action and purpose by the independent African states to achieve these objectives. Instead, the self-seeking leaders came in the way of the realization of this dream. Their only interests were to enrich themselves, fortify their positions and pursue those policies that would jeopardize the security of the states, enhance internal dichotomies and bring to the continent too many untold hardships. And despite some concerted efforts by some well meaning leaders, the continent remained largely infested with many problems like the debt issue, "which are both internal and external emanating from inadequate economic infrastructure and unacceptable levels of health and literacy, shortage of people possessing the skills needed to enable the economy to function normally, natural disasters and external factors relating to the international Monetary System and falling commodity prices". Any surprise therefore that, out of the world's poorest and least


developed countries, twenty-six are from Africa. This view is supported by the study carried out by UNCTAD which shows them as clustering on the last third of the UNCTAD scale of development. The data confirm Fanon's thesis that the "damned of the earth" are to be found only in Africa. (See appendices 1 and 2). Detailed analysis of the problems of the continent shall be dealt with in a later chapter in the present study. This unhealthy environment existing in Africa portends some unavoidable consequences for the continent. And the real gravity of the economic situation could well be understood from the words of Professor Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa when he said that,

7. In this study UNCTAD developed a composite level of development index derived from the following social and economic indicators: (1) Gross domestic product per capita at factor cost; (2) percentage of gross domestic product originating from manufacturing; (3) combined Primary and Secondary Education School enrolment ratio for the population between 5 and 19; (4) percentage of manufacturers in total exports; (5) number of doctors per 1,00,000 inhabitants. UNCTAD Secretariat: Identification of the Least Developed Among the Developing Countries (TD/B/269, July 1969), cited in Dharm P. Ghai, "Africa, the Third World and the Strategy for International Development", in Ali Mazrui and Hasu H. Patel (eds), Africa in World Affairs (New York: The Third Press, 1973), p. 239.


9. See infra pl15.
"underlying Africa's current crisis, is Africa's under-development and economic backwardness, its failure to achieve a clear break-through from its economic dependent inheritance. With a production structure ... fractured and only minimally linked with the regional natural resource base... the most open and exposed economy in the world".

Thus, with the underdevelopment glaring in the face of the continent, the inception of the OAU in 1963 brought about great expectations as hopes went high that most of the problems of the continent if not solved will be minimized.

Regrettably, Nigeria around this time was inactive, and insensitive to the African situation. It did not play any effective role in OAU in finding ways and means for overcoming this existing ugly environment in the continent. It relied on consensus on African matters instead of pursuing a more progressive course during the meetings of the organization. It allowed small countries like Ghana to steal the limelight so much so that its well-wishers were flabbergasted over its reluctance to use its abundant resources effectively to clinch a better deal for the continent. There were cases, for example, whereby her officials refused to see the leaders of liberation movements, or, where some of them were arrested and detained for entering the country without valid documents when they

should have realized that these people came to the country for either aid or refuge, and that, they had left their countries under abnormal circumstances. While Ghana allowed its territory to be used to train these freedom fighters, in addition to the financial and material aids it provided to them. At that time, even Ghana's policy became synonymous with Africa and for what it stood. It was surprising therefore how Nigerian leaders allowed the initiatives to slip out of their hands. Therefore from 1960, to 1966 (the civil war period excluded) Nigeria unfortunately took a lukewarm attitude to the developments in the continent, and when attempts were made, they were half-hearted.

According to Gambari, the reasons for the Low-keyed Low-profile domestic and foreign policy of the country from independence to the civil war are, "the government at independence was a coalition of regionally-based political parties which reflected the country's disunity and failed to promote a strong and disciplined government and country. Faced with powerful regions and ideological groups in the country, the Prime Minister's constitutional authority was not always matched by the political power to override the former's encroachments upon Nigeria's foreign relations. Nigeria's economy was clearly dependent on the Western industrialized states, who were courted and favoured whereas the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were repelled and mistrusted. The absence of an articulated national
ideology, or even nation-wide political consciousness, rendered the formulation and execution of foreign policy susceptible to confrontation between radical and conservative elements in the country; confrontations which were frequently followed by tentative and uneasy compromise solutions. Since the Prime Minister himself was not averse to the compromise approach and policies, Nigerian foreign-policy tended towards deliberate vagueness, timidity and vacillation". However, this policy underwent a qualitative transformation after 1970.

THE SHIFT

The shift occurred due to many factors. Firstly, it was the awareness and understanding that the low-keyed and low-profile pro-western policy of the Balewa Government of 1960-66, and that of Gowon mainly from 1970 to mid 1975 (when he was ousted from power in a bloodless coup) had not helped the country as it did not achieve its foreign policy objectives. Throughout this period, the government was sympathetic to Britain over her colonial interests in Africa. Moreover, a wrong interpretation was given to non-alignment as not implying the reduction of her dependency on the western powers, and the non-diversification of its external links.

Secondly, Nigeria began to cherish the desire to be the heart of Africa economically, industrially, and technologically whereby, other African states would accept what was available within. By so doing, the continent would become self-sufficient and less dependent on the developed western nations like France, the USA, Britain and others. In this way their domination and influence in the continent would decline. This was not borne out of hatred nor was it the case of replacing the western states with their communist counterparts. Rather, it was for more functional cooperation aimed at achieving a better life for the totality of the Africans. This was also expected to help the continent to develop in its own way. Conversely, how could this be a reality when the country and the rest of Africa were dependent on the industrialized states? The shortcomings in the policy of Nigeria had to be revised after a soberly reassessment.

Thirdly, the new found oil wealth of the country from 1973 changed her economic fortunes, which changed dramatically for the better in October 1973 with her joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the world energy crisis as the Arab States imposed oil embargo on the western nations and others who were supporting Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Nigeria capitalized on this to increase her sales and production. In the process, she became world's seventh
largest producer of oil replacing some of the Islamic states like Libya as America's foremost supplier. It also captured markets traditionally monopolized by the Middle-East oil exporting countries. The huge surpluses of 1974 and 1975 led to a ten-fold increase in the foreign exchange reserves during those two years.

The oil boom resulted in huge capital expenditure for development purposes. Enormous outlays were made for housing, road building and other infrastructures. There were very large imports also at this period and all from the industrialized West and Japan (See appendices 3, 4 and 5). With a stable economy came the Third National Development Plan of 1975-80. It was by far the most ambitious plan which was estimated to cost 32.8 billions (naira). It started on 1 April 1975 devoting $ 10 billion for the development of industries. And, it was for the first time that Nigeria started planning in billions of naira in her Annual Plans and the Five Year Plans. This brought about the emergence of many new projects like the twelve new universities, the construction of new airports, harbours, road network, telecommunications and others. Most of these were completed by 1980. And by 1982, a multi-million dollar iron and steel industry went into production at Ajaokuta. The Plan therefore achieved a great deal, and "inspite of the many failures to achieve its high targets, advances were made towards all of them. The 1970s as a whole effected
major transformation in every aspect of Nigerian economy". This development enabled Nigeria to play an activist, positive and influential role in Africa during the 1970s.

Fourthly, it was felt necessary to wrest the control of African affairs from the hands of outside powers especially the former colonial masters who still felt that it was their birth right to continue to maintain large pockets of influence in the internal affairs of these states even after their national independence. These interventionist activities did not augur well for the development of Africa. Nigeria and Africa had become aware of the harm done to the sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, due to the super-power proxy wars which, "have become a common occurrence in Sub-Saharan Africa, which continues to reel under the critical economic crises".

Fifthly, the continental leadership vacuum created by the demise of revolutionary and charismatic leaders like Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (the lion of Judea), Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of


Mali, etc. gave Nigeria the opportunity to assume leadership of Africa. Further, the leverage accorded to Nigeria by other African states, particularly those belonging to the Monrovia group and ECOWAS, in matters like the fight against apartheid and racial discrimination, maintenance of peace, created the apparent belief that, Nigeria is the country which can help bail out the continent from its problems.

Sixthly, there was the realization that the UNO was ineffective in dealing with the racist South African regime. The UN Resolution 435 on Namibian independence seemed to be a dead letter largely because of the USA and the South African Governments' insistence on Linkage Politics of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before accepting any reforms in preparation for the independence of Namibia. The militarist activities of the racist regime against its neighbours in the form of destabilization and aggression in violation of the territorial integrity of Mozambique continued despite the Nkomati Agreement, and Angola etc.

Thus, the impotence of the UNO to effectively carry out any policy that would prevent or restrain South African government's acts of aggression and terrorism did not enhance the cause of liberation in that sub-region.

Finally, the complications of the security problems of the Front-line states and other OAU members due to the injection of East/West conflict into Southern Africa, which obscured the real issues of self-determination versus the continued oppression of Africans by the white racist administration, made peaceful solution of the problems a remote possibility. Added to this was "the expected possibility of the failure of the negotiations with South Africa engaged in by the so called Western Contact Group". These developments, domestic and external, called for reappraisals if its African foreign policy objectives had to be realized. She was left with no other alternative than to go in for a policy shift in the form of a new policy philosophy of equal friendship with all, using tact and aggressive diplomacy at times where necessary, to achieve a particular target as was witnessed in the matter of according recognition to the 'Angolan Liberation Movements' and for a seat in the OAU.

Another reason for the qualitative change in Nigerian foreign policy was the emergence of Murtala Mohammed and Obasanjo in the national scene after the bloodless military coup of 29 May 1975. Murtala Mohammed was the only Nigerian leader whose ethnic identity Nigerians were not prepared to

bother about, because he proved himself to be above ethnicity and tribalism. He brought with him an unusual sense of belongingness and direction to the country. His regime of two hundred and one days was characterized by diversification, dynamism, and action. The government became pragmatic and progressive, and was guided during the period by an overall concern for national interests and consideration for justice, peace and stability. The country for the first time since independence became a nation with a mission to be fulfilled. From the drift and chaos of pre-29 July 1975, the government was determined to cleanse the body politic while at the same time providing guidelines and enunciating policies that would direct national aspirations, and the attainment of national objectives.

It was for the first time also that Nigeria had an administration working to a time table; understanding the mood of the people for urgency and precision, he gave them

16. Murtala Mohammed, in an address to the nation on 30 July 1975 soon after assuming office said, "Fellow Nigerians, events of the past few years have indicated that despite our great human and material resources, the government has not been able to fulfill the legitimate expectations of our people. Nigeria has been left to drift. This situation, if not arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed. The armed forces having examined the situation, came to the conclusion that certain changes were inevitable. This change in government has been accomplished without shedding any blood; and we intend to keep so...." Murtala Mohammed, Collected Speeches (Lagos: Department of Information, Office of the President, Federal Government of Nigeria, 1980), pp. 1-6.
what they needed without hesitation, unlike his predecessors. The masses on their own part gave him their support for whatever reforms and policies he pursued. On any national or international issue the people were well aware of the line their government may adopt even before it was made public. There was not much gap between the government and the people. This had never been witnessed before.

As a consequence of this support, the Murtala government could set up a Committee comprising of persons drawn from the universities, the armed forces, and the career diplomats from the ministry of External Affairs to review the whole basis of Nigerian foreign policy and, to formulate new guidelines. By so doing, it acknowledged the obsolescence of the Low-profile policies of the former regimes. It was Murtala who led the country to its first foreign policy triumph when he decided to back and support the MPLA diplomatically and financially to the tune of 13.5 million (naira). In this way, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria acted in total opposition to the western powers who regard Africa as their area of influence, and supplier of raw materials to their industries and buyer of finished goods at exhorbitant rates. This step therefore, signified an overall commitment to the African

interests and also not to tolerate any situation again whereby Africans would be used for the advancement of racist policies in Africa.

It was for the first time that a country in Africa dared such a venture and survived. In the words of Akinyemi,

"the recognition of the MPLA led Nigeria to a bruising confrontation with the United States, which was the first time in the history of Nigerian foreign policy (the period of the civil war was being regarded as an exceptional one) that Nigeria could confront an Anglo-Saxon super-power. It also marked the first time that, in a basic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Nigeria and the Soviet Union took their positions on the same side...."

Thus, Nigeria emerged under his administration as a medium power not only in Africa but in the world also. It prompted her to act and behave like a leader setting standards which other African states followed in due course. The Nigerians found the fulfilment of their long cherished expectations, which the former regimes could not achieve in the Murtala/Obasanjo ascendency. Their presence at that point in time ushered in new hopes and expectations for the


In the words of Gambari, three major factors were responsible for Nigeria's shift from the "Moderate and rather timid foreign policy approach to a more activist and more influential role especially on African affairs". They are: "first, thirteen years of military rule which followed Balewa's regime redressed the balance of political and economic power in favour of Central Government vis-a-vis the regions and, later, states. The centralized and hierarchical nature of military command helped to end


regional challenges to federally directed foreign policy. Second, the civil war and the expenses of the Federal government in dealing with the major world powers and also those African states which recognized 'Biafra' made a post civil war re-assessment of Nigeria's African policy essential. The previously low keyed and often apologetic approach to African affairs needed a change. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant of all, there was increased wealth, brought about by oil revenues and OPEC membership, which strengthened Nigeria's capability to pursue a more active and effective politics towards Africa and the world as a whole".

To sum up the aforesaid, it may be argued that, with the cumulative impact of the coups of 15 January 1966, 29 July 1966, 29 July 1975; the lessons of the country's three year Civil War (where by four African states recognized Biafra), the relative peace and stability from 1970s, the increasing revenue from oil production and aiming at high economic growth, experience and new awareness, capability and leadership and the willingness and desire to speak freely for herself as well as the whole of the continent and the blacks in diaspora, led to the reassessment of the timid, Low-profile Low-Keyed policy. The resultant effect of the re-evaluation brought about the qualitative changes

and great transformation in its domestic and foreign policy, manifesting itself in the new policy of diversification, dynamism and action.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND THE LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN IT

The study intends to cover the period of Nigeria - OAU relations from 1970 - 1983.

It was immediately after the civil war in 1970 that, noticeably, Nigeria started pursuing the policy of diversification, dynamism and action. It was during this period that Nigeria, moved away from the policy of special relation "with the West; the low profile stance, and the policy of consensus in OAU and African affairs and, followed it with the policy of "Equal Friendship" with all countries and sought economic aid from any state, Eastern or Western for nation building, it is worthy of mention that, Nigeria's chances of emerging as a leader in Africa started from this period. The period 1975-76 is a watershed in Nigerian and African affairs. Because, in Nigeria, General Murtala Mohammed emerged as a dynamic and undisputedly far-sighted revolutionary leader giving Nigerians a sense of belonging with the country emerging as a nation with a "mission". The recognition of the MPLA by OAU as the legitimate representative of Angolans also occurred during this period. As a consequence of this development, Nigeria abandoned the "Low-profile Low-Keyed" policy and followed a policy of
diversification. The death of Murtala Mohammed on 13 February 1976 did not bring to an abrupt end the policy of diversification, dynamism, pragmatism and action.

It is because of these reasons that the period from 1970-1983 has been chosen covering a span of thirteen years.

The study investigates the policies of diversification, dynamism and action - both in the context of domestic compulsions and external environment with specific focus on Nigeria and OAU.

It also analyses the factors that forced Nigeria to abandon her Low-profile policy to follow the politics of equal friendship and as a consequence, the implications of it on Nigerian participation in OAU.

For this study, the policy of diversification, dynamism, and action stand as a policy and a technique. It is a policy when it is concerned with the formation of objectives. But, it becomes a technique when applied to achieve those objectives.

Some limitations in the study were unavoidable. First, it is a study covering a period of thirteen years out of Nigeria's twenty eight years of national sovereignty. This basically, is not to be an attempt to record case histories in Nigeria's foreign and domestic policies as such. Only

* Nigeria is now thirty-two years old.

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the historical records of the developments and happenings are extensively reviewed for purpose of illustrations regarding the policy of diversification, dynamism, and action in achieving Nigeria's African objectives.

Secondly, the study focuses only on the government of Nigeria, the OAU, and the problems of the continent. It does not focus on the reactions and behaviour of the peoples of other African states towards Nigeria or OAU.

Finally, since it is mainly a focus on Nigerian foreign policy, we have to realize that, gathering material, data or information on Nigeria's foreign policy has been difficult. The constraints were due mainly to the Official Secrets Oaths Act which imposes a moratorium of thirty years on all classified government papers. Lack of mutual trust between the top Federal Civil Servants was also encountered. Moreover, there are very few memoirs or biographies of former leaders or ambassadors from which information could be obtained. But despite all these setbacks, efforts were made to overcome this handicap.

METHODOLOGY

With a view to developing an in-sight into the intricate phenomena of the relationship between Nigeria and the OAU, the methodology used in arriving at the objectives of the work is based on a content analysis of all the relevant and important issues realized from both primary and
secondary sources. These are constitutions, charters, the proceedings of legislative bodies, courts; publications of the OAU, UNO and their agencies, the publication of the Government of Nigeria at all levels; local, state, and federal documents, reports and speeches of officials, committees, and commissions, manuscripts in private hands, archives, memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, writings of public men and special monographs, books and articles published in journals, periodicals, newspapers and magazine coverages, press clippings, advertisements, maps, diagrams, films.

In addition to the above, various historical accounts of the issues and their genesis by both local and foreign writers were also examined to get an indepth idea of them.

The socio-political contexts, the economic backdrop, and the historical legacy have been studied. The attitudes of the super-powers, the industrial west, the multinationals and institutions towards Nigeria, OAU and the shortcomings of African states/leaders have been examined.

But primary and secondary sources have been used for the explanation and analysis of the facts relating to the policy of diversification, dynanism, and action. The sources are available in English.
The information thus collected, though authentic, needed further elaboration, substantiation and even confirmation. Besides, a number of facts relating to them were such that demanded explanation and counter-explanation. With that in view, interviews with Nigerian and African leaders, Ambassadors, High Commissioners, academicians and experts of African affairs, and important personalities from Nigerian and African societies have been carried out. Unstructured interview technique was applied for the study.

SETTING

The work is divided into six chapters.

Chapter One is on the objective the study intends to achieve; which is the role the policy of diversification, dynamism, and action played in bringing about the watershed in the international politics of Africa and the increased role of Nigeria in African affairs. This includes the scope of the study and its inherent limitations.

Chapter Two deals with the foreign policy of Nigeria involving, the determinants of her foreign policy, its objectives and the policy of diversification, dynamism and action, the domestic and external compulsions involved in it.

Chapter Three is on the emergence of the OAU in 1963 and problems facing the continent.
Chapter Four constitutes the contribution made by Nigeria towards the achievement of the aims and objectives of the OAU and OAU's achievements thus far in the continent.

Chapter Five handles the issue of limitations of Nigeria and OAU regarding their roles in Africa.

Chapter Six incorporates the findings of the study.