THE ROLE OF NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

In the United Nations, the initiative to ban the testing of nuclear weapons was spearheaded by the late Prime Minister of India, Jawahar Lal Nehru, who in April, 1954 - barely a month after the ill-fated Bikini test, asked for a standstill agreement in respect to the tests, even if the discontinuance of nuclear-weapons production was not immediately possible.

A sustained effort during the period was kept up by the countries then taking on the label "Non-aligned". They raised the demand in the United Nations that nuclear testing be dealt with as an urgent (although partial) measure, separate from General and Complete Disarmament. Their draft resolution could not be adopted for several years. The western powers, who then commanded the world Organization, resisted vigorously, more so, when countries like Australia, Japan and Sweden joined the chorus demanding a ban, or at least a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. In May 1955, Soviet Union borrowed a leaf from the non-aligned book and included demands for the discontinuance of nuclear

2. Ibid.
testing in its disarmament plan. This posture adopted by the former Soviet Union turned away American interest on disarmament for several years. Rita Putins writes:

... the interest of the non-aligned states in an immediate test ban came to coincide with the tactical position on disarmament priorities of the Soviet Union placed the nonaligned states, politically and diplomatically, on the defensive to the extent that test-ban initiatives appear suspect from the American point of view as manifestations of a pro-Soviet bias or even merely of naivete.

A second unfortunate development was that the issue of disarmament and prohibition of production of nuclear weapons was de-emphasised, while the effect of nuclear tests, increasing radio-activity in the atmosphere became the main issue. At that time almost all tests were atmospheric and the radioactive fallout from them was on every body's mind. Following great public outcry, a Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation was set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1955. After a resolution had been passed by acclamation, its preamble referred to "the importance of, and the widespread attention given to, problems relating to the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environment". However, it was disappointing when

nothing was mentioned about nuclear bombs or test, the danger of wider issue of which India had underscored when proposing that this very item be placed on the agenda.

Concern over radioactive fallout from the test helped to broadly mobilize public opinion against nuclear bombs. This was in consonance with the initiative of Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1954. From then on a veritable public uproar swept over all parts of the world. Agitation for ending the nuclear tests because of possible harm through radiation was mixed with revulsion against the bomb. In Japan, the protest movement had a particular appeal to people for obvious reasons. In large parts of Europe, both East and West, there arose a strong popular movement for banning the nuclear bomb. In Britain, there was a strong protest leading to the Aldermaston Easter march in 1960 which showed alertness in the people. The protest movement was a success in Sweden. Military planners in Sweden during the early 1950s advocated acquisition of nuclear weapons as part of the strong defense system which they deemed necessary to Sweden's decision to stand outside military alliances. But in 1955 a disturbed debate gripped Sweden and the cabinet was divided. There was strong mass support organized by an

5. N. l. p. 86.
indefatigable campaign of the Social Democratic Women's Union, under the leadership of its then chairperson Inga Thorson.

Slowly the nuclear weapon powers began to respond to the protests against the testing of nuclear weapons. In 1958, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain agreed to bring together a group of experts, called the Geneva Experts Conference on Nuclear Tests. Scientists from East and West worked out a detailed scheme for a world-watch system to monitor possible violations, if a test ban agreement were achieved. This resulted in extensive negotiations that followed between government representatives of the three powers concerned (USSR, USA, GREAT BRITAIN); staff regulations for personnel and many other details were discussed at great length. The experts also recommended a strong and powerful international Control Commission, to have the authority to send an inspection group to the site of any unidentified and suspected event. Between 1958 and 1962, the Conference devoted some one hundred meetings to the issue of Control Commission, and its power, composition and administration

6. Ibid.

A voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons' testing was observed by the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain from 1958 to 1961. This served as a more substantial response to the mounting popular pressure from the non-aligned nations and the general public opinion. But on 30 August 1961, the Soviet Union shocked the world with its announcement that testing would be resumed, crowning the new series of atomic weapons with a fifty-megaton blast, soon thereafter, in Novaya Zemlya on 31 August 1963, the United States resumed testing, first underground from 15 September 1961, and then atmospheric testing, officially declared on 2 March 1962.

After the first complacent decade of the 1950s, the 1960s ushered in considerable activity, centered on the issue of banning nuclear tests. This upward trend of concern was carried forward both by the general public and, in the United Nations, by the nonaligned and other non-nuclear-weapon powers, led by India. With the wave of decolonization in Asia and Africa the number of the nonaligned countries and non-nuclear weapon states increased.

As a result, joint consultations among delegations from specific regions and other non-aligned nations brought about a perceptible change in the balance of moral opinion between the super-powers and the majority, which consisted of lesser powers. The first trail of this moral opinion strength culminated in the issue of banning nuclear-weapons' test.

(I) NON-ALIGNMENT AND NUCLEAR TEST BAN

The protracted negotiations produced a limited agreement in 1963. This was the American British-Soviet Treaty signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 by the foreign ministers of the three powers. The treaty sought to prohibit nuclear tests, hence, it has come to be known as the Test Ban Treaty. Apart from the three major powers, India was among the first countries to sign the Treaty. The preamble of the Test Ban Treaty, acknowledged the fact that nuclear tests contaminate man's environment by radioactivity. Before the signing of the Treaty, the United Nations General Assembly had been adopting in its successive sessions resolutions calling upon states to refrain from conducting nuclear tests, as demanded by Nehru in 1954. Non-aligned countries were mainly instrumental in getting

the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The eight non-aligned countries on the Disarmament Commission made notable contribution to the conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty. On 16 April 1962, they submitted a joint memorandum to the nuclear powers, containing suggestions for negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This memorandum merits special mention in view of its subsequent approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The eight non-aligned nations appealed through this memorandum to the nuclear powers to come as soon as possible to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests for all time. In addition, they said that their appeal was made not merely on their own behalf but that it represented an overwhelming world opinion against nuclear tests.

This memorandum also outlined a plan for a continuous observation and effective control of a test ban agreement on a purely "Scientific and non-political basis". It suggested an international Commission of Scientists, "possibly from non-aligned countries" to report "on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event", and process all data received from an agreed system of observation - posts.

10. Ibid.

The General Assembly of the United Nations in a resolution of 6 November 1962 recommended to the nuclear powers that the eight nation memorandum could be accepted as "a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations". The recommendation of the General Assembly met with some success as, the United States the former Soviet Union and United Kingdom were able to conclude an interim agreement regarding the banning of nuclear tests in certain specified environments, namely: atmosphere, outer-space and under-water-territorial waters, and high seas. Unlike normal international treaties, the Test Ban Treaty is a very short document containing only five articles.

Before the resolve by the three powers to reach an agreement on the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, a promising juncture occurred in 1962 when a chain of events seemed to place agreement on a test ban within reach. One such event was the inclusion of nonaligned members in the newly formed Geneva Committee for disarmament negotiations. The other was a period of relative détente between President Kennedy of the USA and Premier Khrushchev of USSR, which remained at a promising high level until Kennedy's death in 1963.


irrespective of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which in a way strained their relation.

The political auguries thus seemed fairly favourable. Nevertheless, endeavors to stop nuclear testing which after the break in the moratorium went on unabated, were unsuccessful.¹⁴

The Geneva Disarmament Committee, then called the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), opened a new phase in disarmament negotiations. Eight nonaligned countries namely, (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and Egypt) were included, this group of newcomers actively seized the initiative in the first week. There was strong public resistance to nuclear bombs in the nonaligned countries. In Asia, what happened in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was never forgotten, and was sometimes expressed publicly by the Asians and their African counterparts, that the bombs had been used against a non-white country.¹⁵

The super powers talked of the broad issue of prohibiting manufacture of atomic weapons and this went on as part of their parallel proposals about general and complete disarmament, while the nonaligned countries included in the Geneva Disarmament Committee upheld to try

¹⁴ N. 1. p. 88.
¹⁵ Ibid.
to stop the testing of nuclear weapons immediately. They argued that agreement on a test ban could curb the further development of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. These important goals could obtain only, if the test ban was comprehensive and included under-ground tests, which had then increasingly been used. The danger of augmenting radioactivity by atmospheric testing which was the principal issue, could not be left behind.

The first action by the nonaligned countries after the committee convened in March 1962 was to press the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain to change their attitudes on the test ban-issue, which since the breaking of the moratorium by the Soviet Union had been deadlocked. The then three nuclear powers were made accountable to the ENDC through a Sub-Committee whose specific mandate was to produce a draft of a convention prohibiting nuclear test.

In a major move, the nonaligned delegations presented a memorandum (made within the first month) offering a new scheme for a radically simplified and effective system for the control on a technical, nonpolitical basis of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

16. R.P. Peters, The Politics of the Nonaligned States and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Boston, Boston University Graduate School, 1973), and

H.K Jacobson and E. Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians : The United States and The Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.
(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966). Whole Chapters are necessary in this regard.
On 16 April 1962, in a plenary session of the ENDC, a joint memorandum was submitted by the eight nonaligned members of the ENDC, whose names have already been given above. The joint memorandum stated that there were possibilities of establishing, by agreement, a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement, together with new posts, if necessary, also to be established by agreement.

The memorandum also referred to the possibility of setting up an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from nonaligned countries. The Commission should be entrusted with: a) processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts; and b) reporting on any nuclear explosion or "Suspicious event" on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the proposed commission with facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation, the parties to the treaty "could invite" the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which
was in doubt.

This new approach to control and verification of a ban, using inspection by initiation and verification by challenge, as suggested by the eight nonaligned countries, provided a good handle which tore to pieces the ridiculously over elaborated structure of verification agreed on by the 1958 bipolar conference of experts. In the bipolar Conference of experts, some experts had proposed grander schemes, while the joint proposal advocated was for an international network of control, including 160 to 170 landbased control posts, new and international, and about 10 ships. The spacing between the control posts was to be about 1700 kilometers in continental aseismic areas, which placed a great number in Soviet territory. About thirty specialists and auxiliary serving personnel were required at each post. In addition to the basic network, air-sampling was to be accomplished by aircraft, and special flights were to be organised to collect samples of radioactive debris if suspected clouds appeared. A central international control commission was to be authorised to send inspection groups to sites of suspected events. Though the costs were never formally summarized, they must have run into billions of dollars. The staff requirements

18. N. 1. p. 90.
alone ran into several thousand. Scientists and technicians were to be sent to isolated far away places, and were to watch day after day and night after night for some suspicious sign - a horrible thought for any academic.

On the contrary, the eight-nation proposal for verifying the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was simple, submitted in all due modesty, and wholly in constructive terms. It did not rely on obligatory inspections to prove violations but on the only possible sanction; abrogation on the Treaty by other nations, if suspicions about a member could not be dispelled. On this very point the eight nonaligned countries believed that their new scheme was workable and would deter violations of a Test Ban Treaty. However, within them there lurked suspicions that the nuclear-weapons powers had not really aimed at a cessation of testing. The scientists of the eight nations found several signs of the nuclear weapons powers' subterfuge. This was because of the methods available at that time which "made it possible within limits to detect and identify nuclear explosions including low-yield explosions (one to five kilo tons." In the follow up negotiations, however, all technical work seemed to bend on increasing the difficulties rather than surmounting them.

The experts of the nonaligned countries followed the technical discussions and realised that the delegations from the nuclear-weapons powers were not in a position to reveal the truth. Thus they knew that limits for detection and identification by seismic means were being constantly lowered. Further, according to the non-aligned experts, the United States position that teleseismic signals were not enough but that onsite inspection was needed in addition had quite early been undermined by their experts in a twofold way. The first was that other methods of monitoring test sites and activities through satellite were being developed early in the 1960s' making clandestine testing unlikely. The capabilities of these national means of verification were not openly discussed by the superpowers delegates. Secondly, the fallibility of on-site inspection was proven, which indicated the difficulty of actually obtaining radioactive debris as proof that a test was made. The representatives of the nuclear-weapons powers in Geneva did not make any mention of the test. However, the fallibility was clearly demonstrated by the United States test, code-named GNOME in 1961. Information to this was not publicized as it "would greatly complicate the problem of on-site inspection of unidentified events".


The American response to the radical proposals presented in the memorandum by nonaligned nations was negative, and that of Soviet Union lukewarm. Its success however, was not too long in following. The memorandum achieved a considerable weeding out of the technical overgrowth which covered the test ban issue.

The requirement for a colossal network of control posts was first reduced and then eliminated. The idea of using regular and open seismological observations from nationally manned stations and the idea of a scientific commission for evaluating their finding was gradually accepted. The Western position was re-examined in Washington and amended to the effect that it would respond "as closely as technical knowledge will permit to the eight-nation proposal of April 16". President Kennedy himself (1 August 1962) affirmed the assessment of the nonaligned and neutral memorandum: "new technical assessments ... give promise that we can work toward an internationally supervised system of detection and verification for underground testing which will be simpler and more economical than that contemplated in previous US proposals".


As usual, during 1962, the Geneva Committee continued to work diligently on detailed proposals, outlining rules and provisions for a comprehensive nuclear test ban as well as the structure and modalities of a control scheme. At the end of 1962, the Cuban missile Crisis brought the nuclear disarmament issue to the fore. Kennedy ordered the United States nuclear forces on red alert. Following this ultimatum, Khrushchev without delay ordered the Soviet missile shipments to Cuba to turn back and, from thence followed a lively correspondence between the two leaders which soon concentrated on what was obviously the most popular resolution, known today as ban on nuclear testing or the Test Ban Treaty (TBT), which was signed as alluded earlier by the foreign ministers of the three powers on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

The discussion on the moot issue of control focused on underground explosions. Here, the two superpowers were negotiating the conditions for a comprehensive test ban. In the winter of 1962-1963 the margin between the positions of the superpowers was narrowed down deciding upon to the number of on-site inspections, a party accused of violation of the treaty would be obliged to accept. The original minimum number acceptable to the United States was eight to ten but it was later reduced to seven. The Soviet Union suddenly and surprisingly agreed to two or three, but a final agreement was not reached. Instead, a new round in the
series of lost opportunities began. Jacobson and Stein are of the view that the United States did not grasp that the Soviet Union had "made what they considered to be a major concession: had happened the question of the actual number of inspections could have been relegated to the sphere of trivia".25

The nonaligned nations did not perceive the depth of seriousness which the refusal of United States to accept a compromise signified. Nor were they aware that, as a result, the Soviet Union would withdraw its offer to permit obligatory inspections as part of the verification system. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament continued during the spring 1963 to work in good faith, untiringly on a total test ban proposal, attempting to devise a scheme for compromise between the super-powers' positions. The Swedish delegation among the eight nonaligned nations never subscribed to the doctrine that inspections in loco were necessary or even purposeful; they stood ready to mediate on the number of such inspections in order to hasten whatever came up as attainable compromise. The delegation contributed the idea of setting up, not an annual quota for inspection, but a quota to span several years. The nonaligned countries welcomed the idea and soon, in their

private meetings, came out with a proposal for twenty to twenty five inspections over a five year period.

The Partial Test Treaty has got some credit as a public health measure. It has reduced radioactivity in the atmosphere, although the degree of such pollution had never been as dangerously high as reported sometimes.

The treaty reflected, at the same time as it encouraged, the decline of bipolarity. The two Super-Powers, decided to come to an understanding, and this took into consideration the chorus of world opinion and in particular, that of the Third World, dominated by the countries of nonaligned. The Super Powers, together with Great Britain, agreed to give up tests which, at the time, they alone were able to undertake. Between the Power-Blocs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led by the USA, and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) headed by the USSR, friction and contradictions got worse: between the United States and France to a certain extent then, between France and Germany, and between Soviet Union and China.

The Test Ban Treaty forms the first official expression of the Soviet-American agreement on the necessity of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In his


speech to the American people on 26 July 1963, President Kennedy declared: "We have a great obligation all four nuclear powers have a great obligation—to us whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer acquire, possess or produce such weapons". For his part, Mr. McNamara, Secretary for Defence to Kennedy's administration, testifying before the US Foreign Relations Committee, insisted on the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons which would (i) increase the possibility of an accidental nuclear war because of the possession of nuclear arms by nations that had neither the means nor the financial resources to apply the security safeguard and control measures taken by the Big Two; ii) increase the risk of a "Small nuclear war" capable of causing a major conflict between the Big Two; iii) introduce a factor of regional instability and upset the precarious balance of power at the regional level.

In its note of 30 July, 15 August and 1 September 1963, the government of the People's Republic of China accused the Moscow Treaty of trying to perpetuate the nuclear monopoly of the Big Three. Between 3 and 21 August, and on 21 September 1963 the Soviets replied to the Chinese

accusation. The Soviet reply showed the importance attached to non-dissemination from the peace keeping point of view. According to the note of 21 August "the danger of a nuclear war will increase with every new capitalist State that possesses nuclear weapons. But it is impossible to expect the number of Socialist Powers to increase, whilst the number of nuclear states in the Imperialist Camp remains the same. It would be, to say the least, naive to suppose that it is possible to apply one policy in the West and another in the East, that one can on the one hand struggle against the equipping of West Germany with nuclear arms, against the dissemination of nuclear arms in the world, and on the other hand give these arms to China".

The Soviet decision not to give nuclear arms to China and not to help her to manufacture them, was taken in 1959 and was therefore independent of the Treaty. In his message to the American Senate of 8 August 1963 President Kennedy expressed himself in these terms:

While the treaty cannot wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now possessing them, it prohibits assistance to testing in these environments by others; it will be signed by many other potential testers; and it is thus an important opening wedge in our effort to "get the genie back in the bottle".

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. N. 28. p. 3.
The test ban was hailed as "the first step toward testing peace and disarmament", as "a breakthrough and the dawn of a new era in international relations", and as "a pledge of harmony and promise of a more serene future." The treaty in fact represents an important advance in bringing some order to the field of disarmament negotiations.

The Test Ban Treaty was a step in the right direction. It reduced and continues to reduce to a great extent the hazards from nuclear test fall-out. However, the treaty does not fully settle all the problems relating to nuclear tests, particularly, the problems pertaining to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the perfection of anti-missile missiles, and continental armaments. It does not put a ban on under-ground explosion nor does it prohibit the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it does not prevent the nuclear powers from parting with their weapons to their allies. Further, there is no provision in the treaty for any machinery to guarantee the successful accomplishment of the agreed objective of the treaty.

As far as the Test Ban Treaty is concerned, the nonaligned nations contributed immensely towards the signing of the treaty. Although some authorities may contend that the signing of the treaty was wilfully done and concluded by the then three nuclear powers, the USA, the USSR and Britain, this was not so, as the role played by the

nonaligned nations included in the ENDC cannot be overlooked. The pressure mounted by them and their useful and plausible contributions in the committee necessitated the coming together of the two Super Powers and Britain arriving at a final decision towards the treaty. Therefore, the nonaligned role is commendable.

(II) NON-ALIGNMENT AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:

The use of the atomic bombs in August 1945 was a blow dealt to the new world organization only a few weeks after the signing of its Charter on 26 June 1945, and a few months before its first General Assembly met in session in London on January 1946. As its first resolution the Assembly by a unanimous decision established an Atomic Energy Commission with the urgent task of making specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". The Commission concentrated entirely on nuclear weapons in pursuing its work.

In the assembly, the fifty one members who made the sweeping resolution could not create possibilities for international agreement. On the issue of elimination of nuclear armaments. At that time, only three nuclear devices, of varying construction, had been produced and

34. N. 1, p. 159.
35. N. 4, p. 12.
consumed: one, in the proving grounds of Alamagordo; two, having brought death and destruction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The chance and opportunity to stop further production of the deadly weapon was never to come up again.

The Soviet Union insisted and refused when the United States, at the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946 presented a plan for the prohibition of the manufacture of atomic bombs and for placing all phases of development and use of atomic energy under an international authority. This plan is known as Baruch Plan, and contained explicit and implicit reservations which as they were revealed raised suspicions and caused resistance on the part of the Russians.

The Baruch Plan was formulated at a time when US foreign policy was moving towards a more nationalistic Realpolitik. With the death of Franklin Roosevelt on 25 April 1945 there passed from the scene an American president who, inspite of basic nationalism and considerable apprehension caused by Stalin's take over of Eastern Europe, continued to support the war time alliance with Soviet Union and to believe in the workability of the United Nations.

36. N. 1, p. 73.
38. N. 1. p. 73.
Even after his death, his farsighted views continued to be expressed, as in the memorandum of 21 September 1945 by Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War:

Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase.

Before the Cold War worsened, a preliminary version of a plan for international cooperation in the atomic field had been worked out. Robert Oppenheimer was among the participants. Later, another version, which became known as the Acheson - Lilienthal Report, made provisions to accommodate the Soviet Union. It was presented publicly over the radio on 2 April 1946. It stated that:

the extreme favored position with regard to atomic devices, which the United States enjoys at present is only temporary. It will not last. We must use that advantage now to promote international security and to carry out our policy of building a lasting peace through international agreement.


40. Ibid., p. 154.
The visionary view gradually dimmed, each succeeding draft of a proposed plan grew less generous and equitable. After the take over as president by Harry Truman, the outlook became grim and narrowed considerably.

A major change was the addition of "condign punishment", for violators of a UN treaty that would ban atomic weapons and control production and use of fissionable material by inspections. The Soviet Union distrusted any actions by the United Nations, which it regarded, then with considerable justification, as being dominated by the United States.

The nuclear explosion was brought to readiness in closely guarded secrecy. From the days when the race began secrecy was the keynote on the part of the Western allies to tame the atom before Hitler's Germany could develop it. It was in early 1939 that scientific discovery on nuclear fission became known as the threshold of war. With World War II, competition, not only for the peaceful application of fission, but for mastering the art of making nuclear

42. N. 39. p. 155.
explosives for war, became one of the fiercest, and most highly secret scientific adventure.

However, the secret was not kept for long, basic knowledge about nuclear fission was widely shared among scientists in several countries - Germany, Denmark, France, Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia. Scientists from different nations participated in the early stages of experimentation for producing the bomb. Extreme secrecy, which stemmed from the wartime fears about security, soon led to a consolidation of research that eventually left United States in sole possession of the atom bomb when it was exploded.

The "moral responsibility for creating the atom bomb must be shared by several government". Britain, during her Prime Minister Churchill's historic memo of August 1941, was the first to make the decision to try for an atom bomb. United States took the official decision a day before Pearl Harbour was attacked on 7 December 1941. Most scientists who worked in France were brought to England after France fell to Nazi Germany. In the company of an important group of British colleagues they moved to Canada, where they agreed and cooperated with an American team, which before then was already fortified by a scientific elite made up of escapes from totalitarian Germany and Italy, "many of Nobel laureate calibre".


45. N. 1. p. 160.

46. Ibid.
After World War II, those scientists, who began as colleagues in joint allied endeavour, went to their different ways. Many returned to England and France, well equipped with their knowledge.

According to Myrdal, "commentators may have overestimated the contributions of non-US Scientists, but their early insight had considerable value as seed capital for ensuring developments, leading to nuclear reactors in Canada, England, and France and to proliferation of nuclear weapons". Britain produced its first atomic bomb in 1952; France, in 1960.

England and France were told to maintain secrecy, just like the United States. But this could not be kept for long, especially when it related to a knowledge that rested on the basic scientific discovery. United States objective to maintain secrecy was first and foremost to move ahead of Nazi Germany, again to keep the secret from the Soviet Union. This policy by US only delayed the appearance of the first Soviet atomic bomb for about four years (1949) contrary to US calculation of about twenty years.

The idea of containment and massive retaliation originated in the interval when United States relied on its monopoly of nuclear weapons. Misunderstanding between the two Super Powers led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons

47. Ibid., p. 161.
and that was one of the roots of the cold war. The United States apprehended that the Soviet would make open the secrets of the fission and on the part of the Soviets, there were resentment that they were kept at bay by a former ally that considered herself to be omnipotent.

This game by the Super Powers made it impossible for them to arrive at a cooperation internationally by burying all plans for future production of nuclear weapons and sharing the knowledge of nuclear energy for the benefit of all nations. The failure by the Super-Powers led to the proliferation or spread of atom bomb production in Britain, France and China, respectively. Had they cooperated, the World would have been left with two nuclear powers. The world might have learned to live with what has been called two scorpions in a bottle as well as with one. For fifteen long years, until the early 1960s, there was lack of concern which was manifested by the negligence of action at the UN.

Thus, secrecy played a major role in the proliferation until the nuclear-weapon powers became five. In Britain


* See Myrdal's comment on page 162, "The Game of Disarmament", were she comments that although Eisenhower's Atom-for-Peace plan of December 1953 and the establishment of IAEA in 1956 were implicitly antiproliferation, yet there was no sign of seriousness among members in the UN.
and France, the decisions to go ahead with research and take steps towards manufacture of nuclear arms were taken without public debate or public knowledge. In 1946, the Prime Minister of Britain Atlee and his cabinet placed all nuclear activities under government control and proceeded to erect a plutonium separation plant and a gas diffusion plant for enriching uranium. The concern with secrecy kept public discussion subdued. No mention of the dangerous decisions to produce atom bomb was made in Britain. Parliamentary debates on the strategy and meaningfulness of an independent British nuclear force occurred only in the period 1957-1964, "The Great Nuclear Debate".

In 1952, France decided to produce plutonium as part of five year plan, nothing was immediately said about its military utilization, but Bertrand Goldschmidt was of the view that it was "undoubtedly predominant in the minds of those responsible". In 1960 France exploded her first nuclear weapon.

In fact the delay in acquisition of nuclear power by Britain and France was due to France's lack of technological knowledge and supplies of fissionable material. United


States refused all cooperation towards French development of nuclear energy, which was begun by a nationalization act of 18 October 1945 just like England's. Since early in the war, the French were not an official part of the United States - British - Canadian Cooperation, and were not constrained by their being together and policy of secrecy, and hence, always revealed about their nuclear research and description of their reactors respectively. Indirectly, this served to break up American secrecy.

Secrecy has writ large in the history of proliferation and was to no avail. The policy of secrecy and the resentment it caused acted to spur others' nuclear ambitions. Prestige became more and more involved. Secrecy was at that time combined with political fumbling.

Non-Proliferation debate began during the 1960s. Following the demand by the non-aligned countries. The debate resulted in two different solutions that were proposed in the form of draft resolution in the General Assembly. One was an Irish plan to prevent all options for additional countries to join the nuclear club. Another was a Swedish proposal for voluntary self-organisation of a nuclear free-club, or a nuclear free zone. The plan stressed the idea of self determination for a group of

51. Ibid., p. 96.
52. N. l. p. 163.
countries and emphasized that renunciations would be tied to distinctly state conditions.

The Irish proposal was based on the concept that nuclear weapons could be a national asset, but that they should be compulsorily abjured in the broad international interest, by new comers. The Swedish idea was much more akin to the spirit that had animated the 'ban the bomb' movement, which received political expression in the British Labour Party proposal of 1959 for a voluntary non-nuclear-weapons club. Its pamphlet, "Disarmament and Nuclear War: The Next Step", was a good attempt to persuade Britain to renounce becoming a nuclear-weapons power. The proposal was never followed up in actual policy.

The Swedish proposal was based upon the notion that nuclear weapons could not enhance national security, especially that of the lesser powers. The proposal stressed

53. N. 49, p. 180. quoted Disarmament and Nuclear War: The Next Step: Declaration by Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress, Transport House, 24 June 1959: Noting that Britain had a special responsibility as the third nuclear power and that it was in unique position to persuade the nations not yet in possession of nuclear weapons to desist from acquiring them; Labour Party proposed that every nation with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union sign an agreement, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations, pledging itself not to test, manufacture or possess nuclear weapons. This agreement would be subject to full and effective international controls. If such an agreement could be negotiated, Britain would not only have to stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons but would also have to give up those in possession. Also see N. 1 p. 167.

that by having nuclear arsenals, necessarily small and weak, might risk drawing fire onto themselves. National self-interest was seen in the Swedish viewpoint, to be one with international security. This reasoning however, did not lead the nuclear powers into logical conclusion to divest themselves of their grant powder kegs and not to crave and race for more, to discontinue all nuclear tests.

Both resolutions were accepted on 4 December 1961, the Irish one 1665 (XVI), unanimously and the Swedish one, 1664, (XVI), with a majority of fifty-eight votes against ten, with twenty-three abstentions, the Eastern bloc voting for and the Western against.

Years rolled over before action was attempted to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. By 1965, the United States and the Soviet Union had become Super Powers, because they were the only ones who could destroy the whole world anytime, because of the pilation of nuclear weapons within their reach. They were strongly entangled in their lock-horn position of struggle to out-do each other by increasing their nuclear arsenals. Trusting their power, they attempted to hold unrestricted rights to possess, deploy, and develop nuclear arms quantitatively showing great disregard for the three minor nuclear-weapons powers, and resolutely closing the options for all other nations to go nuclear.
Meanwhile, Non-aligned countries became impatient and asked for some disarmament measure. The Super Powers responded with a very inequitable model. India, prominent among the nonaligned countries, was very active all these years and submitted to the General Assembly in 1964 a proposal for a special agenda item "Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons". India along with Sweden joined forces which demanded "as more equitable and practical basis of agreement... a package or integrated approach consisting of a nonproliferation agreement and some other measures affecting directly the nuclear weapons capability of nuclear powers". All the nonaligned members of the Geneva Disarmament Committee joined in the memorandum and stressed inter alia "measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should... be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear weapons and the means to their delivery".

To retain the initiative, in the fall of 1965, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly draft treaties designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Both favoured the Irish solution, which made way for discriminatory distinctions to be established

55. Ibid., p. 167.
57. Ibid. p. 275. Also see Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee Document ENDC 158.
between nations possessing nuclear weapons and those without the weapon. The Non-proliferation Treaty has been actively negotiated in the Geneva Committee all the time, in the General Assembly, and finally, in 1968 in a special spring session of the General Assembly, improvements were suggested and some warned that a treaty according to Super Powers' design might not attract those countries whose aspirations would be stymied and whose activities would be controlled. This notwithstanding, the basic construction was retained. Obligations were laid on the non-nuclear-weapons countries, and only on them, to accept international control over nuclear installations. At the final point, they were able to extract only a promise, from the Super Powers to negotiate in good faith the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

There was no balance no mutuality of obligations and benefits. Alva Myrdal then said in the Disarmament Committee, that it was necessary to emphasize "the reluctance of the non-nuclear powers to shoulder a particular and, as a matter of fact, a solitary obligation to make renunciatory decisions in regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons". To place the major responsibility on the non-nuclear weapons countries amounted to a clever design to get the NPT to function as a seal on the Super Powers' hegemonic world policy.

An immediate outcome of the shortcomings of the NPT was that when the UN General Assembly (June 1968) voted to recommend the conclusion of NPT, a number of important countries abstained - Argentina, Brazil, France, India, and several African states. India's refusal to join the NPT had been clearly stated during the negotiations, the argument advanced had been that the Treaty was discriminatory. The valuable contribution of the non-aligned in the Disarmament Committee cannot be denigrated to the background. The initiative is credited to them.

In August 1959, a Conference of the Foreign Minister of the Big Four was held in Geneva and it established outside the UN, a ten - Nation Committee for negotiations, consisting of 5 members of NATO (USA, UK, France, Canada and Italy) and 5 members of WTO (USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania).

The Ten Nation Committee met for the first time on 15 March 1960 in Geneva to consider all the proposals submitted to the General Assembly session of the year before. The Western proposal was for disarmament in three stages, with an international disarmament organisation to be established in the first stage to verify observance of second stage measures, such as prevention of surprise attacks, halt in the production of fissionable materials for

weapons, and reduction of forces to 2.1 million men each for USA and USSR.

In September 1961, a set of principles that should govern disarmament negotiations was announced, known as the McCloy Zorim Principles and were hailed as an important stage in the game of disarmament. Shortly after the circulation of the Principles on 20 September 1961, the USA presented five days later its own programmes for general and complete disarmament, and on the next day the USSR offered its different programme.

India then proposed that what was needed was a new negotiation forum to consider the programmes and plans that had been submitted, and requested the USA and the USSR to reach agreement on its composition. This initiative was unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly session of 1961, and in quick response the two Powers reported on December 1961 their intention and resolve to establish a 18 Nation Committee for undertaking disarmament negotiations on the basis of the McCloy Zorim Principles. This Committee consisted of the members of the 10 Nation Committee plus 8 non-aligned and neutral countries - Brazil, Burma, Egypt,

60. Ibid., p. 153.

61. The establishment of ENDC was possible due to India's proposal for a new negotiation forum to make the atmosphere for disarmament negotiation conducive.
The 18 Nation Committee, commenced its work on 14 March 1962 with the objective of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union and the USA presented to the Committee their separate drafts of proposals for disarmament (ENDC - 2 and ENDC - 30) on 14 March 1962. The Soviet draft was a complete text in a treaty language. It provided for disarmament in three stages and over a four year period, and the USA submitted an outline of the basic provisions of a draft treaty in three stages and over an unspecified period. However, there was consensus between them. They tabled detailed ideas in draft form and showed high spirits to begin negotiations at a high level.

The concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was considered at several General Assembly Sessions of the UN and in the ENDC, where the nonaligned and neutral states made known their different concept of nonproliferation.

The nonaligned members of the ENDC did not regard a non-proliferation treaty as an end in itself, but they...
considered that it should be coupled with certain immediate measures of disarmament, such as a comprehensive test ban, a halt in the nuclear arms race by stopping nuclear weapons' production and reducing their stockpiles, a halt in the manufacture of the means of their delivery, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and security assurance for non-nuclear states.

During the 1965 session of the General Assembly, the eight non-aligned nations in the Geneva Disarmament Committee, presented a draft resolution which set out the basic principles to be followed by the ENDC in drafting a non-proliferation treaty. The General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) was adopted on 23 November 1965 without a single negative vote. The five principles mentioned in it were the following:

(a) the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers:

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63. N. 59, p. 175.
(c) the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and more particularly nuclear disarmament;

(d) they should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

The application of these principles to the Treaty was advocated in the ENDC by the non-aligned members, particularly Brazil, India, Egypt, Mexico and Sweden. The final outcome was the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty failed to observe the first three principles outlined by the nonaligned countries. This was so because the final negotiations were conducted privately between the USA, the USSR and their respective allies. As a result of inter-alliance understandings, the two Super Powers presented identical texts of a draft treaty to the ENDC on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/192 and ENDC/193). Several amendments were proposed by the non-aligned members reflecting their particular concerns but only some of them which were of no significance to the heart of the treaty.

64. UN General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) November 1965.
were accepted. The final version of the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly on the June 1968 and commended to the Member States for signature.

India refused to join the NPT treaty, and this looks contrary to Nehru's articulate proposal to ban all nuclear testing. It looks as a tragic reflection on history.

Just recently on 9 March 1992 China signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Chinese foreign Minister Qian Qichen formerly turned over the "instrument of accession" - or the original copy of a treaty to Britain which is one of the depository powers of the treaty. This was stated by a spokesman of the British Prime Minister John Major. It must be recalled that China was the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council not to have signed the treaty.

The British Premier John Major called the move a "dramatic step forward".

65. N. 59, p. 176.

* It is not in any way a tragic reflection on history, as the condition of things in the Asian Region by the time Nehru made the proposal to ban nuclear weapons in the United Nations were no longer same by the time of non-proliferation negotiations, bearing in mind that China an aggressive neighbour of India had already exploded their first nuclear weapon in 1964. Therefore India's decision cannot be criticised.

The Chinese parliament approved its ratification in December after the government made its decision last summer. "China does not advocate, encourage or engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor does it help other countries to develop nuclear weapons, "Mr Qian said, calling for complete and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons in the world".

China according to Mr. Qian Qichen, will contribute to realizing the npt's three objectives, namely prevention of proliferation, acceleration of disarmament and use of nuclear energy which are interrelated and inseparable.

The role played by the non-aligned nations in the negotiations to non-proliferation was a reflection of their commitment to the continued survival of man on earth. Although the Super Powers betrayed their trust the treaty signed by majority of the members of the UN still restrain proliferation but the nuclear powers keep increasing the weapons.

(III) NON-ALIGNMENT AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS :

From the period of the formation of non-aligned movement, the elimination of nuclear weapons has been at the fore-front of the deliberations of the various gatherings and summits of the movement. The survival of man and
The political skill of man has been far outstripped by his technical skill, and what he has made he cannot be sure
of controlling. With the elimination of nuclear weapons in mind president Sukarno reminded the audience of the importance of peace, and said, "How can any of us be disinterested about peace"? Emphasising on the need for the elimination of weapons of horror, especially the nuclear weapons, he said:

And do not think that the oceans and seas will protect us. The food that we eat, the water that we drink, yes even the very air that we breathe can be contaminated by poisons originating from thousand of miles away. And it could be that, even if we ourselves escaped lightly, the unborn generations of our children would bear on their distorted bodies the mark of our failure to control the forces which have been released on the world. The forces of nuclear weapons.

At the end of the Bandung Conference, the participants totalling 29 countries released the 'Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference' in which they stressed that the Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. The Conference considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring

70. Ibid., p. 22-21.
about such disarmament and prohibition. The Conference considered that effective international Control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this conference, they stated appealed to all the powers concerned to reach an agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned to speedily bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

Also in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, December 26, 1957- January 1, 1958, they made a resolution on 'Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament'. In their appeal to the governments of USA, USSR and UK they said.

71. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
The Afro-Asian People's Conference regards the continuing test of nuclear weapons as a serious menace to humanity.

We demand an immediate and unconditional banning of tests, as a first step towards the complete prohibition of the manufacture, the stockpiling and the use of these weapons of mass destruction, and a step towards universal disarmament.

As the USSR Government has declared its readiness to stop nuclear weapons tests beginning from January 1958, we appeal to the USA and UK governments to take the same attitude. In the name of peace and happiness of all peoples, an agreement on this problem must be reached.

Secondly, in the resolution they appealed to 'Scientists of all countries':

Scientists of the World. The Afro-Asian People's Conference appeals to you, who know more than anybody else the real destructive power of the atrocious nuclear weapons, and who well realize what humanity might suffer from such an atomic war. The threat to make use of atomic weapons in a new war will indeed bring the world to a general catastrophe. This makes it incumbent on you, shapers of the future, to prevent this calamity by every possible means.

It is precisely for these reasons that the Afro-Asian Conference, assembled in Cairo, appeals to you, who are responsible for the invention of this


73. Ibid.
destructive weapon, to take every possible step to bring pressure upon governments concerned to prohibit the use of the nuclear weapons, and to destroy those in stock. Let the Scientists all over the world compete, not in the invention of new mass destructive weapons in disclosing secrets of nature, and new discoveries that would serve the cause of nations and peoples.

Thirdly, they made resolution 'On Disarmament and Elimination' of the menace of Atomic War. They declared that the Afro-Asian People's Conference regards with regret:
That a renewed attempt is being made to speed up the armament race on a larger scale, to make new schedules for nuclear weapons tests, to set up atomic bases in Europe, Asia, Africa and the rest of the world and to reinforce military blocs.

That the decision of the recent NATO session to supply its member countries with nuclear and rocket weapons has accentuated the cold war.

That the carrying of nuclear bombs continuously by aeroplanes may result in break out of atomic war even by any mischance.

Thus, the menace of atomic weapon tests as a dangerous expression of preparations for atomic war. We demand the immediate and unconditional banning of such tests, as a first step towards the complete prohibition of the

74. Ibid., pp. 220-221.
manufacture, the stockpiling and the use of nuclear weapons and towards universal disarmament.

We oppose the introduction of nuclear and rocket weapons into foreign countries and the establishment and expansion of military bases, especially of atomic war bases in foreign countries.

We demand that a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of Great Powers must be carried at first, and we appeal to the UN to take decisive measures in this respect.

We firmly believe that Asia and Africa should be a peace zone where no nuclear and rocket weapons should exist.

We Afro-Asian peoples appeal to the peoples of the whole world to unite in support of these resolutions. In these world-wide efforts, the common action of peoples can play a decisive role.

The power of the people is stronger than that of nuclear weapons and can eliminate the menace of atomic war.

And finally, the political resolution made Recommendations on 'The Common Action Against Nuclear Weapons'. In their recommendation they outlined the following:

75. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
The Conference has made important decisions on the prohibition of nuclear tests. It recommends the following in order to materialize the decisions quickly into actions.

1. The Conference supports and expresses its full cooperation with the 4th World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen bombs which is to be in August, 1958.

2. The Afro-Asian People's Conference recommends the people of Asia and Africa to take common action on March 1st, 1958, in order to prevent the nuclear test at the Eniwetok Atoll by the USA.

3. The Afro-Asia People's Conference supports the idea of calling in 1958 of a World Congress of Peoples for Disarmament and Peaceful Coexistence.

In Belgrade the heads of State and government of non-aligned countries pointed out the necessity of general and complete disarmament to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources spent on armaments for peaceful economic and social development of all mankind.

76. Ibid., p. 222.

* Disarmament especially nuclear disarmament is necessary for the whole world, that is what the non-aligned countries aspire for. For this reason there is reoccurrence of non-aligned summit meeting declarations in this thesis.
They consider disarmament an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind.

In Lusaka summit they reaffirmed that nuclear weapons threaten mankind. Conscious of the threat to mankind, they declared that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the most imperative and urgent need of the international community. Algiers summit addressed itself to universal and complete disarmament and, in particular, for a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the production of atomic weapons and warheads and destruction of existing stockpiles, as well as for a complete prohibition of all nuclear tests in all environments and in all parts of the world. They demanded a halt to the nuclear tests which were being carried out at Mururoa in the South Pacific.

The summit in Colombo expressed its conviction that universal peace and security can be assured only by general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear tests pending the conclusion of a test ban.

treaty. They also declared that the arms race is inconsistent with the efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order.

Havana Conference noted with concern the continuation of the arms race, mainly by the nuclear weapon States, in particular the nuclear arms race, the development, manufacture and the increasing stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. It expressed its confidence that peace and security on a lasting basis can only be ensured by halting this process and through immediate and resolute implementation of disarmament and disarmament measures with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament.

Non-aligned declaration in New Delhi considered that the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. They emphasised that disarmament, in particular, nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue; rather an issue of human survival. They were apprehensive of the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which in their opinion, heightened the risk of

the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations.

Reiterating the need for peace through disarmament, they reaffirmed in Harare that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right of self-determination and natural independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are closely related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres they stressed has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn failure in one sphere has a negative effect on others. They noted that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

In Belgrade 1989 the non-aligned countries repeated their demand for complete elimination of nuclear weapons. With what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 following the dropping of atom bomb on both cities, it is not therefore surprising to read through the declarations made by the governments of the non-aligned countries at different summits pointing out the dangers of a continuous production and proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was and is still their believe that a nuclear war can cause the extermination of man and civilization on earth. Again

nuclear weapons countries can use the weapon as an intimidating weapon against the non-nuclear states. With this disparity the world can hardly be in peace because of inequality and injustice which stems from power. The continuous existence of man on earth, to the concern for peace, justice and equality among nations and the need for world order aroused the feeling of the non-aligned countries to raise in the United Nations the ban on testing of nuclear weapons and its production.

No wonder then the movement played remarkable roles during negotiations on Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties respectively. Today the world has come to realise the importance of these demands by the non-aligned countries as individuals and different organisations have stood up against the production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Peace on earth, equality, justice and peaceful co-existence among nations has become the demand of all nations as this will lead to world order. Complete elimination of nuclear weapons is what non-aligned countries demand.

The elimination of nuclear weapons has always been a major concern to non-aligned countries. The continuous existence of man and other living things and preservation of civilization continues to haunt the mind of the non-aligned. This strengthens their moral force.