Introduction

According to Derrida western thought as represented by Platonism, Romanticism and Structuralism is founded on the metaphysics of presence. His critique of presence is surprisingly evident on the works of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and in contemporary structuralism. Derrida's study on structuralism demonstrates that the principle of presence still rules over structuralism. Structuralism is concerned with the form and function of language and is different from metaphysics. The analysis of Derrida proves that even structuralism has not abandoned the commitment to an unproblematic ontology. Although Derrida inherited from structuralism that meaning is the function of differences of contrasts within a network of terms, yet he criticizes Saussure and Levi-Strauss for retaining the determinate relation between signifier and the signified and the idea of determinate meaning and reference. For Derrida, there are no test origins, or natural guide posts or determinate meaning; there is only the infinite play of signifiers in a text.

According to Structuralism, there is an abstract structure for a system. This structure is like rules of the system. The rules determine all concrete moves within the system. The abstract structure determines the concrete manifestation of the system. If in the case of language, the rules of grammar is
the abstract structure then in the case of culture we find myth, kinship etc. as its abstract structures.

In every system, the abstract structures determine the relationship between parts. The inter relationship among parts is more important than the individual meaning of parts. The meaning of the individual parts is determined as the parts of the system. To be a part means to be in relationship with other parts in that system. The parts can replace each other yet the system will have the same meaning, like for example, in a traffic signal system, red light stops in relation to other lights which can be replaced by purple light etc.

Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction

According to Derrida Structuralism depends upon structures. Structures depend upon centers. Derrida questions the very idea of a stable center which gave rise to the era of post-structuralism. Deconstruction aims at decentering the so-called center, which is the process of unmasking the problematic nature of centre. According to Derrida, all Western thought is based on the idea of a centre. The centre is the fundamental presence that sustains the system. "All the names related to fundamentals, to Principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence". The centre is denoted by several capitalized terms that guarantee meaning. Some of them are an Origin, a Truth, an Ideal form, a Fixed Point, an Immovable Mover, an Essence, a God, a Presence etc.
Problematic of Centre

All forms of culture have their central symbols. For instance, much of Western Culture has been centered on the symbol of Christ for the last 2000 years. According to structuralism any system ultimately depends on binary opposition and post-structuralism considers the structure of binary opposites as depending on a centre. Hence, one oppositional term becomes the centre. Automatically the other becomes marginal. Centres are of the nature of fixidity. When the centre wants to be fixed, it freezes the play of binary opposites. Centre has a dynamic nature by virtue of its binary opposites. When one aspect drives the other to the outside, it freezes the dynamic nature of center and it becomes the problematic. Hence, centre is the only reality.

In a society dominated by a culture which has Christ in the centre of its icon, Christians will become central in the society. It freezes the play of opposites. The others like Buddhists, Muslims and Jews will be pushed to the margins. In male-centered societies man is dominated and woman is repressed. The icons are just one of the social practices. There are several icons such as advertising, social codes, taboos, conventions, categories, rituals etc. One icon cannot claim the total reality. Reality is not as simple as an icon. It is ambiguous. After all, we have access to reality only through concepts, codes and categories. Those concepts are dependent contrasts. They operate through their nature of dichotomical aspects. Human mind functions through such conceptual pairs. If one member of the pair is privileged, then the other member will get marginalized. Hence our access to reality will be at stake. Human desire for a
fixed centre gives rise to the tendency of privileging one permanent perspective. Out of anxiety, we always associate ourselves with the centre and repress the other from central values. Hence, the play of the system will get arrested. The other, in turn, get marginalized, repressed and even oppressed or persecuted.

"It is an experience that leaves nothing intact, an atmosphere that one goes on breathing forever. Jewish children expelled from school. The principal's office: You are going to go home, your parents will explain. Then the Allies landed, it was the period of the so-called two-headed government (de Gaulle-Giraud): racial laws maintained for almost six months, under a 'free' French government. Friends who no longer new you, insults, the Jewish high school with its expelled teachers and never a whisper of protest from their colleagues. I was enrolled there but I cut school for a year..."²

It was the experience of Derrida himself of marginalization in society. Most probably the childhood life situation of Derrida that paved the germs of deconstruction in his mind.

Application of Deconstruction

Reality is ambiguous with its free play of differences. Due to the fixation of the center, a hierarchy is formed for the privileged or the unprivileged. The privileged member becomes instituted as Real, Good, and even God. Due to institutionalization, the system changes into a violent hierarchy. Deconstruction aims at decentering the centrality of the central member of the pair. Accordingly,
it attempts to subvert the central in order to make the other as central through the hierarchy.

"To deconstruct is a structuralist and anti-structuralist gesture at the same time: an edification, an artifact is taken apart in order to make the structures, the nerves or as you say the skeleton appear, but also, simultaneously, the ruinous precariousness of a formal structure that explained nothing, since it is neither a center, a principle, a force, nor even the law of events, in the most general sense of this word."³

This is applied to language, literature, reading, politics, culture etc. Deconstruction in literature subverts the privileged meaning by centralizing the repressed or marginalized meaning. Derrida claims that deconstruction is a political practice. It is not just to institute a new centre. There is no question of neutralizing the phase of subversion. There is no permanent fixed centre. The phase of reversal is to subvert the hierarchy. The reversed new hierarchy is also equally unstable and works as a complete free play of the oppositional binary system. In other words, it is the system of difference in a non-hierarchical way.

In literature several ways of readings are equally possible. It is to deconstruct any fixed, authoritarian, dogmatic or orthodox reading. Deconstruction is possible not only in language but in human thought also, since thought is always made of language. If deconstruction is possible in thought, it is possible in human activities too. Hence, Derrida claims that deconstruction is a political activity. It can be carried out as well to cultural practices, from thought,
to text and to society and also from meaning system to political and cultural systems. It is an activity against fixity, institutionalization, centralisation, and totalitarianism.

In the system of dialectical logic, by means of deconstruction, we can see the dance of thought on the playground of knowledge. It is playful dance, waltzing between extremes such as absolute certainty and absolute doubt. In language system, post structuralists tend to visualize knowledge as textual. Textuality means that knowledge is not just composed of concepts, but of words. A single word can mean different meanings. In a cultural system it is shown that there is no central rule nor even a central myth.

"A deconstruction cannot be "theoretical," beginning with its very principle. It is not limited to concepts, top thought content, or to discourses. That has been clear since the beginning. If the deconstruction of intuitional structures [for example, those that contain the academic discourse, or rather discourses wherever they set the norm and the rules—and it goes without saying that this occurs not only in the university, but most often outside the university, given the nature of the university or the educational apparatus: they set the rules therefore, sometimes in all-powerful fashion, for those who occasionally represent themselves as anti-university; but this representation does not prevent them from dreaming of an index, theses, archives, and other academic celebrations of yesterday's avant-gardes; here and there this dream
becomes (is there anything more comical today?) compulsive, feverish, hyperactive management], if, then, this political deconstruction is indispensable, one must not overlook certain gaps but attempt to reduce them even though it is, for essential reasons, impossible to erase them."

Steps of Deconstruction

1. To start with, deconstruction focuses on the binary opposites within a system.

2. It shows as to how the opposites are related—the hierarchical relation of central/marginal.

3. It subverts the hierarchy of making the marginalized as central.

4. Finally, both the opposites are shown dancing in a free play of non-hierarchical and non-stable system.

Strategy of Non-Concepts

Differance: difay RAHNS

Derrida makes use of a number of non-concepts in his enterprise of deconstruction. Their meaning is at least double, if not manifold, such as pharmakon, poison/antidote—in Plato; hymen, virginity/consummation, inner/outer—in Mallarme; supplement, surplus/necessary addition—in Rousseau. His most famous non-concept is differance which he formulated in 1968. The concept ‘difference’ was found in Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger and Saussure who had influenced Derrida to a great extent. According to Saussure
language is a system of differences. It means that there is no positive element in the system of language. No element has meaning in and of itself. Meaning depends on its differential relationship among elements. Since it is a difference to itself. Derrida agrees with Saussure that meaning is a system of differences but at the same time goes beyond. According to Derrida, meaning depends upon its relationship to what it is not. It means that meaning is deferred. It is delayed in space and time. Since it is a difference to itself, it is both deferring and differing.

"The sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, the present thing, "thing" here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign presents the present in its absence. It takes the place of the present. When we cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign. We take or give signs. We signal. The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence."

It shows that meaning is deferred endlessly. Meaning defers within a system of differences.

Derrida combines both 'to differ' and 'to defer' and coins the non-concept 'differance'. 'To differ' means to be different from something else. 'To defer' means to delay or to put off. Each element emerges from the trace of a past and is always dissolving into a future 'trace'. It leaves only a trace of itself. There is never anything present but only trace of traces. 'Differance' is a non-concept
whoiv; definition itself is a logical contradiction. It is ambiguous in character and is suspended between at least two meanings. It cannot get settled into one or the other. It is always an either/or and a neither/nor. There is no stable meaning that can ground it in the present. It can never be reduced to a single meaning at a given time.

According to Derrida, Latin *differre* has the sense of temporization. It implies spacing or distancing and otherness. In English it is ‘difference’ in its usual sense. Derrida finds out that the two French words *different* and *differends* that sounds exactly alike refer to the sense of differre. *Les differents* are different things. *Les differends* are differences of opinion. In French *differer* means temporization and spacing. Temporization is temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment. This suspension tempers its own effect. According to Derrida, this temporization is also temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time. It also means *les differends* or different things but not *les differends* or polemos. Derrida wanted to combine both *differer* as temporization and *differends* as polemical difference. The French word *difference* does not refer either to active putting off as well as active polemical difference. Therefore, he coined the term *difference* with a. Derrida derives a from the present participle *different* of the verb *differer*. Hence, the noun *difference* is brought to very close to the action of the verb. It produces the effect of deferring as it produces the effect of differing of *difference*. Curiously then, the noun *difference* suspends itself between the two senses of *different*, deferring and differing. This
is because the ending -ance remains undecided between the active and the passive. It rather recalls a middle voice, a nontransitivity. It distributes itself to both active and passive voice. By repressing the very distribution it constitutes itself.

"Now the word difference (with an e) can never refer either to differer as temporization or to differends as polemos. Thus the word difference (with an a) is to compensate—economically—this loss of meaning, for difference can refer simultaneously to the entire configuration of its meanings. It is immediately and irreducibly polysemic, which will not be indifferent to the economy of my discourse here. In its polysemy this word, of course, like any meaning, must defer to the discourse in which it occurs, its interpretive context; but in a way it defers itself, or at least does so more readily than any other word, the a immediately deriving from the present participle (different), thereby bringing us close to the very action of the verb differere, before it has even produced an effect constituted as something different or as difference (with an e). In a conceptually adhering to classical strictures "difference" would be said to designate a constitutive, productive, and original casualty, the process of scission and division which would produce or constitute different things or differences. But, because it brings us close to the infinitive and active kernel of differer, difference (with an a) neutralizes what
the infinitive denotes as simply active, just as mouvance in our language does not simply mean the fact of moving, of moving oneself or of being moved.\textsuperscript{6}

According to the non-concept of difference, Derrida demonstrates that speech/writing hierarchy can be deconstructed. The spelling ‘a’ in the non-concept cannot be recognized or heard in speech. Only in writing the spelling ‘a’ can be recognized. It is, in turn, a privilege point of writing over speech. Hence he suggests that it is the revenge of writing upon speech for centralizing speech. According to Derrida Writing is central which has deconstructed the hierarchy. In other words, writing replaces being.

The non-concept differance is so fundamental in Derrida’s deconstruction whose meaning can never be arrived at and which is suspended by the play between differing and deferring. The suspension creates a kind of interval in space and time. It underlies all cases of differing, of distinction and of writing. It adumbrates all binary opposites such as natural/cultural, man/woman, poison/cure, etc.

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not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the differance of the other, as the other different and deferred and deferred in the economy of the same ....... all the others of –tekhne, nomos, thesis, society, freedom, history, mind, etc.—as physis differing and deferring.7

Differance not only underlies differences but also produce all differences. It undermines all differences. For example, if we want to say ‘God’ we must use the word ‘God’ in a system of differences. According to Derrida, differance is older than Being or God. It is not a religious statement, not even a theological statement. It is but only a linguistic statement. Differance is older than any name of God as well as the meaning of God. Difference is not concerned about mystical or unnameable Being nor it is about a negative theology. Negative theology is always a talk about God. Logocentric metaphysical principles are such that it underlies all talk about negative theology. It does not mean that negative theology is super transcendental or a mystical essence of the ultimate or the transcendental or the Beyond. It is mere talk about God and never catching to the Being. At one time, the non-concept differance was the disruptive force in Derrida’s readings. Later he has shown it as the logocentric tendency of turning into a concept. Against this danger, time and again Derrida invented certain new non-concepts such as pharmakon, supplement, hymen, dissemination, column, theatre, castration, mimesis parergon, arche-writing etc.

Hymen

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According to Plato, Socratic dialogue posits two kinds of mimesis which are in the forms of either good or bad. For Plato, Reality exists beyond external appearance as ideal forms and wisdom requires unraveling of the Spirit as its ideal forms. Good artistic representation imitates these forms. Mallarme suggests radically different kind of mimesis in his text "Mimique" and according to Derrida mime imitates nothing but imitation.8 Mime merely mimics mimicry. It is only imitations of imitation. There is no original, ultimate point of reference in mime. It subverts Plato's classical concept of mimesis. In this way, Derrida deconstructs the binary opposition between literature/philosophy, fiction/truth. Derrida is concerned with what is between literature and philosophy. It is hymen. Hymen is an either/or between an either/or. Hymen unsettles Hegel's notion of synthesis. Hegel's synthesis lies beyond the either/or of the thesis and antithesis. Derrida's hymen is centred on another either/or which is between the last either/or. It unsettle's Clode Levi-Strauss' notion of third element. It is like, Hegel's synthesis, mediates between the two members of a binary opposition. Derrida hymen is like a supplement, like an ambigram. It is like an ambiguity of word that we can't decide as to which meaning is correct.

"Take only the term hymen in which there is a confusion or continuation of the term coitus, and from which it gets its double meaning: (1) "a membranous fold of tissue partly or completely occluding the vaginal external orifice" [from the Greek for membrane] and (2) marriage [from Greek mythology; the god of marriage]. In the first sense the hymen is that which protects
virginity, and is in front of the uterus. That is, it lies between the inside and the outside of the woman, between desire and its fulfillment. So that although (male) desire dreams of violently piercing or breaking the hymen (consummation in the second sense of the term), if that happens there is no hymen.9

But for Derrida, this undecidability is not pertaining to the various meanings. It is really due to syntax. Syntax is the placement and grammatical status of the word in a sentence. The shift of the word in the syntax causes a kind of double folding process in the sentence. It is an either/or, a hymen. It produces a kind of white, blank pause.10 It helps to experience the folding process of syntax and the undecidability. Hymen is the folds in the syntax. The fold, the hymen, the blank, the spelling, are not things or themes. It is the presence of meanings always folding over. It is the dissolving of meaning in the spacing of the syntactical shifts. Hence, it would seem that no meaning is ever fully present. By this way Derrida criticizes Platonic yearning for presence in literary critic. According to Derrida, the syntactical shifts which arouses and dissolves differences and meanings that folds in the syntax spacing and the hymen in the reading process prevent us from having single meaning. In other words, there is no way of fixing the play of meaning. Hence, no meaning is correct and all meanings practically remain empty. In a word, there is an absence of single truth as a central ultimate. It is pre-semantic and is dissemination. Hence, hymen is always another either/or or (n)either/(n)or or between the last (n)either/(n)or.

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Textuality

Derrida shakes up the stability of binary opposites. The deconstructive inversion is made possible by playing upon the double meaning of the term supplement. In French it means to add something on to a thing that is already complete in itself, or to complete a thing by adding on to it. Hence, it is like an ambigraph and cannot be defined in a single meaning. It is nothing but a play of differences. Text is like the term supplement. Text is nothing but a play of differences. There is only supplementarity without the origin.11

The supplementarity is only originary and is different from origin though originated from origin. Here the last origin, according to Derrida, is only a myth. The added myth is also supplement in the sense that there is only the structure of supplementary of originary into which the myth is added. Supplementarity as structure is the complex of presence vs absence in which the supplementarity of myth is produced or added, or dreamed. It is a fantasy experience of text which metaphysics cannot think as myth.

"The concept of origin or nature is nothing but the myth of addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary difference that is neither absence or presence, neither negative nor positive. Originary difference is supplementarity as structure. Here structure means the irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the play of presence or absence: that within
which metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics cannot think."12

The supplement or text is present in the heart of pure presence. Hence, there is nothing outside the text. Life is also like a text. Life is a play of presence and absence. The seemingly presence is dissolving into absence. It is the Textuality of life. Life is the play of textuality.13

Textuality is realizing as to how a text means. To know what a text means is not of much significance here. Textuality is the realization that a text is made up of words. Words in text can mean a different thing. It is the play of textuality. Text is never settled and can have different meanings. It is always open to the play of textuality. It is the play of differences in writing and an irresistible force that cannot be repressed. Dissemination is the play of meanings. It is ejected from the nearness of logos which is fixed, orthodox, rational, paternal, authoritative spoken word and the all knowing Light of Truth that manifests the living body. Text is a column which stands forth like the present. "The column is nothing, has no meaning in itself. A Hollow Phallus, cut off from itself, decapitated."14 One moment surface effect stands forth next moment already decapitated.

Arche-Writing

Arche-writing is an invented expression by Derrida. It shows that speaking and writing are just the spoken and written forms of the play of differences. Arche-writing is the non-existent form of writing. It is not writing, nor speaking, nor graphic marks nor sounds. It is not any kind of mark that can be
made with the voice or with the pictures or, with hieroglyphics. It is not cuneiforms, with Chinese characters or with choreography, with musical notation, or with the forms of sculpture in space. Arche-writing is not a thing. It is the pure possibility of contrast, of difference. It makes possible the play of differences. It does not exit, yet it makes all these possible. Derrida in his *Of Grammatology* expounds the science of arche-writing lucidly.

"Anterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense, the sense used in "A Writing Lesson," there is, as the space of its possibility, the violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification, and of the system of appellations".\textsuperscript{15}

According to them, it is a violence that is anterior to the violence of technology of writing invading the nature innocence of primitive speech communities.

**Examples of Metaphysics of Presence**

**Metaphysics in Ferdinand de Saussure**

The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure in his book *Course in General Linguistics,* sets up a binary opposition between speech and writing and favours speech over writing. Speech is the Saussure's version of metaphysics of presence.

Saussure defines language as made up of a system of signs. A sign is a word. Word is made up of sound. The spoken sound is the signifier. Signifier signifies a meaning. The meaning or the concept is the signified. Signifier
signifies the signified. The meaning refers to an actual corresponding object. The object is the referent.

Spoken word - the sign
Spoken sound - the signifier
Concept or meaning - the signified
Corresponding object - the referent

Saussure considers the signified as more important than the signifier. According to him, sound is outer and meaning is inner. Sound is tangible and meaning is intangible. He privileges meaning since sound is only providing an access to meaning.

Derrida argues that Saussure's standpoint is merely a repetition of western logocentric notion. God-the-Father is the real inner meaning. It is the original source and Essence of the word Christ. Hence, Derrida opines that Saussure proclaims a natural bond between inner meaning and outer sound and his linguistic science is a repetition of pre-scientific God talk.

According to Saussure, the outer speech or sound represents the inner meaning. For Derrida, it means that there is a natural correspondence between the signifier and the signified. Meaning is dependent upon this natural essential relation and the link between them is just due to chance. There is nothing essential in the sound that relates to its meaning. Then, what is the identity of sound? According to him, one signifier gets its identity from its slight differences from other signifiers. Sounds distinguish themselves from differences among
themselves. Hence, it is the horizontal difference between sound and sound that shapes the sounds of the language. There is no intimate vertical correspondence between sound and meaning. According to Saussure, language is a vast interwoven system of differences. If this is the case with the identity of signifiers, then it must be the same case with the identity of signified. The identity of the concepts is not determined by any sort of essential relationship to the signifiers. Concepts distinguish themselves through their differences from other concepts. The signified has no meaning in-and-of-itself. On the level of meaning, just like on the level of sound, there is only a system of differences. Concepts gain its being through being different from other concepts. Language is a system of difference. There is no stable foundation for such a system. If we search in a dictionary for the signified for a certain signifier, we will find only a bunch of other sounds or signifiers instead of the signified. We can never arrive at a stable signified or a stable meaning. Hence, there is no stable foundation for the entire system in meaning. Every potential meaning turns out to be just another sound. It, in turn, searches for yet another potential meaning. We are never reaching meaning. There is only an endless chain of sounds.

Derrida interrogates Saussure on the relationship between sound and meaning which change from language to language and questions the validity of the claim that there is a natural bond between them. In other words, can the meaning be present in speech?

After all, Saussure favours speech over writing. For him speech is natural, direct, immediately intimate and present to thought and meaning. According to
Saussure, but writing is artificial, perverse, pathological, evil and degenerative. Writing is used only in the absence of speech.

Saussure says that speech is the sign of inner meaning. Writing is the sign of speech. Hence, writing is twice removed from the inner meaning. Writing is also the sign of the sign. Speech represents the very inner meaning, whereas writing represents only the speech and not the inner meaning. Hence, according to Saussure, speech is privileged over writing. Writing is absent from meaning.

According to Derrida, this standpoint of Saussure is confounding since speech is only a system of difference just like writing. Speaking is like a form of writing. This is the Derridian deconstructive reversal of the hierarchy of speech/writing. Even in Saussure’s writings, writing can be seen as central but not speech.

Derrida does not stop at this new hierarchy. According to him both the word ‘speech’ and the word ‘writing’ are just a play of differences. Nevertheless, both of them are inadequate to describe the more abstract play of differences. Hence, Derrida put both the terms under erasure, which enable him to use these concepts and simultaneously indicate their highly inadequate nature. Here Derrida wanted to demonstrate that though the general play of differences are common to concepts, no concept is adequate to express the same. Putting an erasure upon them is a technique that he borrowed from Martin Heidegger. He calls it arche-writing because they express the abstract play of differences.
Metaphysics of Presence in Jean Jacques Rousseau

The 18th Century French Philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau is the father of French Romanticism. His contemporaries thought that material progress in the art and science will make human beings happy. According to Rousseau, private property, political institutions and art of writing are against original, natural and uncivilized noble source. Rousseau was of the considered view that nature is original and noble while Culture is artificial and corrupt. Nature is virtuous and present. Culture is degenerate and a supplement to nature's fullness of presence. Derrida identifies in Rousseau's writing a binary opposition of Nature/Culture.

Derrida argues that this dichotomy is fundamental to whole of Rousseau's writings. Rousseau considers writing as supplement to natural speech. In small-scale organic communities there was face-to-face presence of speech. This fullness of presence is considered to cause intimacy among the members of organic society. The natural intimacy of natural speaking societies was the ideal of communal peace. Human civilization has produced dangerous supplement in writing, which, in turn, caused the loss of the ability to speak one-on-one. It led to inequalities of power and economics.

According to Rousseau it is violence against nature and nobility. This violence can be removed by the purity of the mark of violation. The violence of equivocation can be eradicated by "vocative mark". But Derrida argues against Rousseau that this very notion of "mark" will be in a code of punctuation initiating
a violence of difference, of classification, and of the system of appellations. Hence mark is the death of proper name.

"For writing, obliteraton of the proper classed in the play of difference, is the originary violence itself: pure impossibility of the "vocative mark", impossible purity of the mark of vocation. This "equivocation," which Rousseau hoped would be "eliminated" by a "vocative mark", cannot be effaced. For the existence of such a mark in any code of punctuation would not change the problem. The death of absolutely proper naming, recognizing in a language the other as pure other, invoking it as what it is, is the death of the pure idiom reserved for the unique."¹⁶

Derrida argues that Rousseau's dream of an idyllic, intimate, primitive speaking community is an example for the desire for metaphysics of presence. It is the social and political version of logocentrism. His privileging of speech over writing is his yearning for full presence. Derrida demonstrates how Rousseau's writing deconstructs itself. After all, what remains is not presence but absence. He is not speaking but writing to communicate his thought. Writing as it under-privileges writing itself simply expresses the desire for full presence in speech.

Rousseau realizes this fact in his 'Confessions' and argues that he must rely on writing. His most intimate thoughts and feelings are communicated to him through writing. Rousseau regarded that he was dressing up the original natural truth in writing. Hence writing is a supplement for him. It is an addition. Speech is already complete and full of presence, because of the presence of meaning or
the intention of the speaker in speech. Derrida seizes the fact that supplement is like an ambigram which means not only to add but also to substitute. Derrida argues that if speech needs writing to supplement it, then speech is not already complete. It does not show full of presence; it contains absence. It is the play of presence/absence.

According to Rousseau, one begins by feeling not by reasoning. It is the principle of self-presence in figurative language. It has got the structure of passion and objectivity with immediate presence of proper meaning. For Rousseau spoken words are more intimate to self as it directly express emotions and desires than the written word. Derrida argues that, in fact Rousseau cannot allege the continuity of the language of sounds and the language of action. For Rousseau, passion is self-evident and by this he accounts for metaphor. Metaphor is the relationship between idea or meaning and thing or mental object. Proper sense or literal meaning is the relationship between idea and passion. According to Rousseau, passion affects proper meaning as self-present in figurative language. Derrida argues that the figure is only transference of the literal sense, in which case the latter cannot be immediately present in the former. In fact, the literal meaning is the starting point for Rousseau that constitutes and defines the figure. But Rousseau considers metaphor as the point of beginning in order to show the stylistic science as possible. This is his project and the original aim. But his psycholinguistic on passion starts from the literal meaning. It goes on against his own intentions. According to his psycho linguistics, the literal or proper must be both at the origin and at the end. But this
self-presence is lost in the very origin of metaphor. Rousseau agrees with this but only to contradict himself. The figure consists only of transference of meaning. An expression cannot be figurative before it has a proper meaning. According to Rousseau, passion presents to us the word that we transposed; transposing words one also transposes ideas. Hence the linguistic signifier, which is signifying the object, also signifies the affect or passion indirectly. According to Derrida, Rousseau makes use of the play of representative idea. It is both signifier and signified, at the same time, from both sides. It is a signifier from the side of mental object as it is sign for the latter. It is also a signified from the side of linguistic signifier, which signifies it. Hence both the signified meaning and proper meaning are expressed as idea and affect respectively. Derrida argues that it is possible because of the inadequacy of metaphor that has lost proper meaning.

"Metaphor must therefore, be understood as the process of the idea or meaning (of the signified, if one wishes) before being understood as the play of signifiers. The idea is the signified meaning, that which the word expresses. But it is also a sign of the thing, a representation of the object within my mind. Finally, this representation of the object, signifying the object and signified by the word or by the linguistic signifier in general, may also indirectly signify an affect or a passion. It is in this play of the representative idea (which is signifier or signified according to the particular relationship) that Rousseau lodges his explanation. Before it allows
itself to be caught by verbal signs, metaphor is the relation between signifier and signified within the order of ideas and things, according to what links the idea with that of which it is the idea, that which it is the idea, that is to say, of which it is already the representative sign. Then, the literal or proper meaning will be the relationship of the idea to the affect that it expresses. And it is the *inadequation of the designation* (metaphor) which properly expresses the passion.”17

According to Rousseau, melody is central and is present to natural voice. It is the pure, spontaneous impulse to singing. Harmony, Rousseau says, is unnatural. It is the arrangement of multiple voice in concert. Harmony depends upon notation, which is a form of writing. Written harmonies replaced the natural speech-song melody because of civilization. Rousseau privileges melody over harmony.

Derrida shows as to how this binary opposition deconstructs itself. Derrida’s point of argument is that we always sing a melody in a certain key. To sing in a certain scale is nothing but harmony. Rousseau also recognizes this fact. He says that melody ‘has its principle in harmony, since it is a harmonic analysis that gives degrees of the scale, and the chords of the mode, and the laws of modulation, the only elements of singing.” Hence, melody is already a form of harmony as is a supplement. The privileging of melody over harmony is another example of the desire for metaphysics of presence.
According to Rousseau, masturbation is supplement substituting natural sexual intercourse. In natural intercourse there is a natural presence of erotic experience with the lover. In masturbation it is a solitary and weakening pleasure which has fantasies about beauties. They are imaginary supplement for the real sex. According to Derrida, this is another form of yearning for full presence. In 'confessions' Rousseau admits that there is absence at the very core of natural sexual desire. Rousseau's personal experience revealed that sex cannot live up to fantasy. The natural erotic experience has never been as exciting as erotic dreams. His sexual experiences with woman have never been as passionate as his daytime fantasies. He declares that sex cannot live up to the fullness of presence of the one that he felt with his foster mother who was his original object of desire. Derrida points out that this is just another form of yearning for full presence. The natural sexual desire as such is haunted by an absence, so to say, a deficit or shortcoming. It is filled with a dangerous supplement-fantasy.

According to Derrida, both speech and sex have auto-affection. It is to put the presence of present into play. It leads to make the distinction between speech and writing as well as sex and masturbation. In this sense the auto-affection of presence of present with its inherent absence precedes the logocentric hierarchy of presence/absence.

"In as much as it puts into play the presence of the present and the life of the living, the movement of language does not, one suspects, have only an analogical relationship with "sexual: auto-affection. It is totally indistinguishable from it, even if that totality is
severely articulated and differentiated. The logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish one from the other. Its last resort would be to dissolve sexuality within the transcendental generality of the structure “touched-touched,” as a certain phenomenology might describe it. That dissociation is the very one by which one wishes to distinguish speech from writing. In the same way that the “fatal advantage” of sexual auto-affection begins well before what is thought to be circumscribed by the name of masturbation (organization of so-called wrong and pathological gestures, confined of some children or adolescents), the supplementary menace of writing is older than what some think to exalt by the name of “speech”.18

According to Rousseau, nature, speech, melody and sex are pure presences and he, thereby, marginalized civilization, writing, harmony and masturbation as supplement. Accordingly, Derrida shows that the marginalized terms can be made central by the deconstructive reversal. Deconstruction demonstrates that the pure presence is inherently inhabited by absence. The need of supplement to presence shows that something is lacking in it which is an original absence or a deficit at work.

**Metaphysics of Presence in Claude Levi-Strauss**

Levi-Strauss applied Saussure’s structural linguistics to the study of anthropology in general and myth in particular. Derrida finds the same binary opposition in Levi-Strauss as in Rousseau’s – nature/culture. Both are longing
for a lost innocence. Levi-Strauss expresses such a yearning for presence in his book "Tristes Tropiques" (Sad Tropics). The dream of purity, innocence and presence is present in the chapter, "The writing Lesson". Derrida deconstructs this text by showing that such a desire is present even in modern science like anthropology.

Levi-Strauss sees the perfect example of primitive naturalness in the tribe Nambikwara in the wilds of Brazil. The tribe knows no writing but only speaking. Levi-Strauss exemplifies it as the pure communal innocence of a primitive culture which is close to nature. They share open communal sexuality. They acquired knowledge through myth rather than science. Levi-Strauss privileges this noble savagism to civilization. Derrida says that Levi-Strauss’s argument deconstructs itself. Though the tribe cannot write, they use some form of marking without an alphabet. The tribe leader knows this art and has power upon other tribe members through which he maintains the unequal distribution of goods in his favour. He is like the Brahmin or the Pundit in the primitive Indian societies who centralized themselves by means of their art of writing in a community which was illiterate and exploited. Derrida illustrates that the tribes’ unequal relations are in fact already indicated and maintained by various taboos, myths, codes and customs. In effect, it is a system of writing which is the privilege point of tribe leader.

"How can access to writing in general be refused to the Nambikwara except by determining writing according to a model? Later on we shall ask, confronting many passages in Levi-Strauss,
up to what point it is legitimate or not to call by the name of writing those “few dots” and “zigzags” on their calabashes, so briefly evoked in *Tristes Tropiques*. But above all, how we can deny the practice of writing in general to a society capable of obliterating the proper, that is to say a violent society?”19

According to Levi-Strauss, the Nambikwara has the proper name unproblematized, simple and manageable as an evidence of the original innocence. Levi-Strauss argues that this is revealed by the fact that they were prohibited to use proper names. For Levi-Strauss, it is the original purity of “vocative mark” that makes absolute proper naming. Derrida contradicts Levi-Strauss’ standpoint that the Nambikwara were prohibited only the uttering of common names. But it does not make the proper names to have the dreamed purity. They function like a linguistic-social classification by the very fact that they recall it. When some little girls disobeyed the rule Levi-Strauss considered it as the great exhibition of the “proper”. Derrida says that the act is nothing but tearing the veil that hides a system of linguistic-social differences.

"We cannot enter here into difficulties of an empirical deduction of this prohibition, but we know a priori that the “proper names” whose interdiction and revelation Levi-Strauss describes here are not proper names. The expression “proper name” is improper, for the very reason that The *Savage Mind* will recall. What the interdict is laid upon is the uttering of what functions as the proper name. And this function is consciousness it-self. The
proper name in the colloquial sense, in the sense of consciousness, is (I should say "in truth" were it not necessary to be wary of that phrase) only a designation of appurtenance and a linguistico-social classification.\textsuperscript{20}

Hence, the Nambikwara were already engaged in a system of differences were there was inequalities in the distribution of goods and power. Hence Levi-Strauss's centralization of savage nobility may be regarded only as a dream. His fantasy shows that he yearns for a kind of logocentric presence.

**Metaphysics of Presence in Socrates and Plato**

Derrida deconstructs the foundation of Western Philosophy in his article "Plato's Pharmacy" in the book *Dissemination*. According to Plato, writing is an art of repetition and exhibits fake wisdom. It is full of nothing original and illusory. Derrida contradicts this position by arguing that writing is the Being written in the very soul. It is the voice of Truth.

Socrates and Plato are seminal indicating that they are the fathers of meaning in western thought. They have used the binary opposition of speaking/writing. Plato calls writing a pharmakon. Derrida follows the thread of pharmakon in Plato's dialogue with Phaedrus which means, poison, drug, allurement and medicine. According to Derrida, dialogue is woven together like a tapestry. By the thread of writing, Derrida demonstrates Plato's own argument that unravels itself. According to Derrida, Socrates and Plato attempted to illustrate the meaning of Pharmakon only on one of its many meanings.
According to Socrates, myth and writing are not based on real thinking but merely repeating without knowing. Myth is only the empty repetition of fabulous stories, which have been handed down for ages.\textsuperscript{21} Logos stands in sharp contrast to the use of myths. Logos is pervaded with well-reasoned arguments. Socrates used myth of Truth in order to illustrate the truth about writing. Derrida argues that mythology is like a tapestry woven of the threads of binary opposites and identified some of the binary opposites such as Ra/Theuth, speech/writing, logos/mythos, King/subject, inside/outside, son/orphan, sun/moon, life/death, good memory/evil memory etc. According to him, Plato's dialogues are woven of a series of opposites such as speech/writing, philosopher/sophist, citizen/scapegoat, good seed/bad seed etc. The thread of good member is privileged and the other thread is repressed. Writing is a repressed thread like other repressed threads. Writing is akin to evil memory, a bastard, an orphan, a bad seed, a sophist and a scapegoat. They are all pharmakons – poisons.

According to Socrates, the good kind of memory is the recognition of the ideal forms, which are the spiritual Truths. This kind of memory is unfolded by logos – the rational method of Socrates' dialogue. It illuminates the soul. We have forgotten the spiritual Truths caught up in the shadow of mere sensory perception. The evil kind of memory is mere reminding. It is like learning something by heart. Writing encourages mere reminding.

Writing is like an orphan and a bastard son. Speech is like a good son who enjoys the presence of a living father. In speech, the originator, so to say, the speaker is present, whereas in writing, the speaker or author is absent. It
has no intimate contact with any paternal or living origin. Hence, writing is away from the logos.

According to Socrates, speech is a fertile seed whereas writing is sterile and is scattered wastefully outside. Speech is the fruit bearing seeds. Myth identifies speech with life and the King. It is in contact with the living father, i.e. the living voice. Writing is dead letters, hieroglyphics and the breathless lifeless signifier.

According to Socrates, writing is like a sophist. Sophists are fake wise men. Sophists simply repeat genealogies, histories, myths, fables etc. They are mere repetitions without knowing. They are the self-proclaimed wise men and merely imitate. They are incapable of giving true remembrance of the ideal forms. They are just mere memorials. With their art of repetition they satisfy their simple-minded clients. It is just like writing – graphics marks, hieroglyphics, cuneiforms, alphabets – that can simply be repeated mechanically. According to Socrates, writing is like a scapegoat that is to be pushed outside from the vicinity of logos and truth.

Derrida argues that the whole Socratic dialogues depends on binary opposition between speech/writing. Socrates considered writing as Pharmakon. But Derrida points out that pharmakon does not simply mean just poison. It can mean also the exact opposite – a healing remedy or medicine. It also means philter, charm, spell, etc. The possibility of many meanings makes possible the process of reversing and unravelling the entire tapestry of woven binary opposites. These binary opposites are the fundamental contrasts upon which the
whole dialogue is built. The instability of pharmakon puts the play of difference into dialogue. Thus, the dialogue become instable and unravels itself and this process cannot be stopped or frozen.\textsuperscript{22}

Plato tries to stop this force of difference by insisting on one meaning. But his attempts became in vain as there is no fixed meaning in anything. All marginalized meanings attain its force to play in the centre. One can never draw a dividing line between poison and remedy. Accordingly, the whole binary opposites become undividable too as privileged terms are defined in terms of marginalized terms. Derrida demonstrates that the privileged terms are already penetrated by the marginalized terms. Socrates used the marginalized term 'myth' to tell the truth or logos about writing.\textsuperscript{23} Hence, the central terms like truth or logos is penetrated by the marginalized term 'myth'. According to Derrida, speech is already a form of writing and aims this viewpoint against the argument of Thamus, the King of Egypt who argues against Theuth the inventor of writing.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, Derrida argues that Plato and Socrates are akin to mere sophists, wizards, magicians, poets etc. Sophists cause sophistries or false wisdom. The meaningless repetition of sophists penetrates the wisdom and the method of philosophers.

Socrates calls evil memory as the mere learning by heart. Good memory is revealed by logos. It is the limitless memory. According to Derrida, memory would have to be contaminated with contrasts and limits in order to remember anything. Something is remembered as distinct from other things. Hence, there
is a play of difference. It is an infinite play. It is not to centralize the marginalized forever. Hence, pharmakon is both poison and cure and neither poison nor cure.

According to Derrida, writing is a form of trace. This differential structure of movement of effacement has been undermined throughout history. Suppression of writing is the evidence of the historical suppression of trace. Presence of fixed identity has been always posited upon the trace. Moreover, the trace as such does not exist as an entity.

"This movement of the effacement of the trace has been, from Plato to Rousseau to Hegel, imposed upon writing in the narrow sense, the necessity of such a displacement may now be apparent. Writing is one of the representatives of the trace in general; it is not the trace itself. The trace itself does not exist. (To exist to be, to be an entity, a being-present, to on) In a way, this displacement leaves the place of the decision hidden but is also indicates it unmistakably."25

What Derrida does is to destabilize hierarchy of the existence of present upon the non-existence of trace demonstrating the differential play of trace as illusory presence and inherent absence.

Metaphysics of Marx

Many Marxists viewed Derrida as non-historical and non-political. In Spectres of Marx Derrida coined a term ‘Hauntology’. It sounds in French as ‘ontology’. According to Derrida, the worth of ontology takes place when a
philosopher sets around wondering about being. In other words, it is the result of wondering about the rock bottom Reality that is postulated as the very foundation of existence from which every thing arises. On the other hand, hauntology does not deal with Being or Ultimate Reality but involves company with Non-Reality. It deals with non-being. Non-beings are not the space between being and non-being or between life and death. Non-beings are fantasies, ghosts, spirits, spectres and traces of traces. They are with the appearance and disappearance of apparitions. They fleetingly appear but flicker before the vision and dissolve, and are/not. It goes beyond the logic of binary opposition such as to be/not to be and life/death. According to Derrida, hauntology is the logic of ghost. For Derrida, to keep company with them is political. Attending to them means attending to the ‘other’.²⁶ Attending to the other is political as it is done in the name of justice and entails responsibility.

Derrida admits that he is not a Marxist though he was inspired by Marxism. It insists on self-questioning. This spirit is distinct from its spirit to bind it to a doctrine and to a history of totalitarian repression. Derrida sees deconstruction as a more radical form of Marxism.²⁷ According to him, deconstruction is not even thinkable in a pre-Marxist space.

According to Karl Marx, an ordinary thing, first and foremost has a kind of Natural use-value. It is the real being of the thing. According to Marx, it is the ontological Rock Bottom Reality of the thing. When a thing becomes as something to be sold it becomes a commodity. Hence, it is haunted by a ghost or a spectre. A ghost is a thing, which is not a thing. It is a (no)thing in its
commodity aspect. It haunts the thing and levitates to market. It converses in ghostly communion with other commodities in the market and flaunts its exchange-value.

Use-value is the original, ontological being. Exchange-value is the hauntological being. It's commodity form is phantasmagoric. Marx conjured up both the ghostly commodity-form and exchange-value in order to exorcise them. Marx wanted to exorcise the spell of the hauntological from the ontological. He wanted to get back the pure natural use-value. Here, Derrida argues that Marx suddenly wanted to be an ontologist and not a hauntologist. Derrida questions the purity of use-value. If it is pure, it should be ontologically fundamental and primary. According to Derrida, the original ontological purity of use-value is haunted by the possibility of commodity-form and exchange-value. Hauntology will have already haunted ontology. Hence, one should doubt about the purity of use-value. Derrida argues that Marx's ontology is the spell of hauntology. It is the difference, which has been haunting difference. According to Derrida, we are never finished with hauntology and are never through with conjuring. The haunting spell is the spirit of the other. It is always there, even if they do not exist.

"I do not think that there are "the-Marxist-texts" and "the-metaphysical-texts". The unity of metaphysics or of the "sequence called "Western metaphysics"" belongs to a representation, to an auto-representation of something that one then continues to call metaphysics only by invoking the name this thing calls itself and the form of circular closure it wants to give itself. What has always
interested me (as I have said elsewhere) is the paradoxes of this closure and its margins—a closure that does not surround a circular field, but works on it otherwise. Otherwise, from then on, is posed the question of whether or not one includes in this sequence Marxist texts or work whose unequal development, here and there, is made possible by these texts. These texts—which are themselves in constant transformation—are not limited to writings that have to be deciphered, even if, as writings, they assume a variety of forms, statuses, models of intervention (scientific or philosophical utterance, manifesto, declaration of position, watchword, 'performatives,' "imperatives," and so on which should not be hastily reduced to homogeneity. And even supposing that Marxism presented itself as a "philosophical system" (a too-simple hypothesis), it would, like any system, carry with it possibilities of deconstruction that must be taken into account practically and politically.  

In 'Manifesto' Marx wishes this original purity to be regarded as the living reality. It is the incarnation of the spectre of communism. He calls for to present itself as the real and final incarnation. It is the presence of the spectre. According to Derrida, this is another form of metaphysics of presence. It is a yearning for a natural primitive pure society.

Nevertheless, Derrida finds another current in Marxian thought. Marx envisions the history of Europe as a museum of spectres which embodies the
spirit of revolution. To conjure them is to call them into presence in order to get rid of them. Hence, Marx's conjuring up has a double sense, presence and exorcise, to conjure up and to conjure away. At the end Marx feels that all the spectres are mere poetic phantasms. They are the real living presence of revolution. According to Marx, it is the living reality that is better than phantasms. Hence, to conjure up is only to conjure away.

According to Derrida, the living presence of revolution has an ontological value. For Marx, the presence of revolution is the Rock Bottom Reality and did not want it to be frequented by hauntology. But Derrida argues that Marxian ontology was always haunted by the spell of hauntology. The spirit of revolution is not a pure presence. The presence of the living reality of revolution is haunted by the spirit of the revolutions of the past. The pure living presence of revolutions is always haunted by impure spectres.

Deconstruction of the Unconscious

4. Difference in the Unconscious

Both Edmund Husserl and Sigmund Freud were the students Franciz Brentano. Obviously, both of them were greatly influenced by the intentionality thesis of Brentano. By means of this thesis, Husserl sets out to discover the original objects of experience within consciousness. However, Sigmund Freud never confined himself to the domain of consciousness alone. His project went beyond consciousness to the unknown regions of unconscious. He did not find the intentionality of consciousness as determining the final ground of experience.
Rather, Freud considered that human conscious experience is influenced by unconscious intentional aspects. Mere rational network cannot give full structure to human experience as a whole. Moreover, Freud was of the opinion that systematic philosophisation is a paranoid mania.

We have already seen that how Derrida's project deconstructs the phenomenology of presence built up by Husserl especially in consciousness. Then it would be quite interesting to see, how Derrida uses the same project against Freud also in order to deconstruct the presence established in unconscious by him. For this, let us see Derridian evaluation of Freud's analysis of unconscious, description of dream theory, handling of conceptual apparatus for theorization etc.

Sigmund Freud who was the originator of psychoanalysis questioned the unity of human psyche. He fissured the psyche mainly into two domains such as conscious and unconscious. According to Freud, the conscious is always haunted by subconscious or unconscious. By this way, Freud's psychoanalysis undermined the privilege point of consciousness and ego. Hence, he subjected the binary opposition of conscious/unconscious into a radical subversion. Derrida was very much influenced by this psychoanalytic reversal, which helped him to move beyond Husserl's science of consciousness. For Derrida, Freudian standpoint includes an implicit notion of deconstruction. The psychoanalytic subversion of conscious/unconscious hierarchy has the characteristic of deconstructive reversal. It deconstructs the presence that was taken granted to be present in consciousness. Freudian analysis shows that human psyche is
haunted by past experience. It amounts to deconstruction of presence in the present. Hence, experience differs from itself being influenced by the past experience. It means that human psyche is always haunted by difference. This gave Freud an insight of the non-original nature of the present. He felt the present as supplement. He considered the present as always haunted by the past. One of the major direct consequences of this standpoint was that he had to take conceptual apparatus as necessary for analysis. Though Freud gave prime importance to observation for investigation he had to depend upon conceptual apparatus for theorization.

Derrida deconstructs both of these aspects of psychoanalysis of Freud. In the case of conceptual apparatus, according to Derrida, Freudian concepts show that they suffer from internal contradiction. In the case of psychoanalytic subversion the unconscious attains the central position marginalizing consciousness. Hence, according to Derrida, though Freud deconstructed the presence in consciousness, he established the same in the unconscious. Derrida's deconstruction does not stop at mere reversal. It goes beyond the subversion to the play of difference. Nothing is permanently present in the play. In order to make this play possible, Derrida deconstructs the unconscious. It is the deconstruction of the origin in unconscious that the Freudian metaphysics of presence is visible.

In Derridian strategy of deconstructing the unconscious presence there is influence of Nietzsche. Nietzsche considered that consciousness is the results of unconscious forces. Still, For Nietzsche, the force itself is never present.
Derrida considers Nietzsche's standpoint as critique of philosophy, which is a system of reduction or repression.

"I will only recall that for Nietzsche "the great principal activity is unconscious," and that consciousness is the effect of forces whose essence, by ways, and modalities are not proper to it. Force is never present, it is only a play of differences and quantities. There would be no force in general without the difference between forces; and here the difference of quantity counts more than the content of the quantity, more than absolute size itself. The difference of quantity is the essence of force, the relation of force to force. The dream of two equal forces, even if they are granted an opposition of meaning, is an approximate and crude dream, a statistical dream, plunged into by the living but dispelled by chemistry." Is not all of Nietzsche's thought a critique of philosophy as an active indifference to difference, as the system of adiaphorisitic reduction or repression?"\(^{29}\)

Derrida finds the same kind of repression in Freudian unconscious. It is the Freudian psychoanalytical indifference to difference in unconscious repressing which the metaphysical presence is posited within unconscious.

**Deconstruction as Critical view of Psychoanalysis**

Derrida in his book *Writing and Difference* critically wrote about psychoanalysis for the first time in his essay *Freud: The Scene of Writing*. According to Freud, 'the scene of writing' means the stage where the inscription
of the unconscious is performed. Freud uses in his text concepts like 'presence', 'perception', 'reality', the 'conscious'/unconscious' opposition, etc. According to Derrida, these concepts express 'logophonicism' of the human sciences. It posits the principle of presence in the unconscious. According to Derrida, it is the psychoanalytic version of the metaphysics of presence. It is the Freudian yearning for presence, which is found in Plato, Rousseau, Levi-Strauss, etc. Derrida identifies certain aspects that go against this metaphysical claim in Freudian text itself. They are supplementarity, trace, and the repression of writing. They do not fit easily with the tacit logocentric premises. Derrida isolates them from the psychoanalytic theory and he creates an unsettling effect on metaphysical Freudian concepts. Towards this end, Derrida focused on Freud's metaphors of writing. In Freud's text they are the representatives of the unconscious. Derrida demonstrates that how such metaphors gradually take over the whole of Freud's representation of psyche.

Deconstruction demonstrates a gap within the text. It is the gap between what is claimed in the text and what is described in the text. Obviously, it is the same gap that Derrida finds within the text of psychoanalysis. Derrida identifies a totalitarian explanatory claim in psychoanalysis. He demonstrates as to how such a claim is impossible. His view on psychoanalysis is critical of the institutions of psychoanalysis.

"... but deconstruction is not a critical operation; it takes critique as its object; deconstruction, at one moment or another, always aims at the trust confided in the critical, critico-theoretical agency, that is,
Relationship between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

It is argued that deconstruction is the psychoanalysis of philosophy. Derrida does not deny such an argument. Instead, he considers it as one of the aspects of it. Deconstruction resists all sorts of exactness. It can be viewed that deconstruction and psychoanalysis are analytical. According to Derrida, that they are different modes of analysis. It is true that psychoanalysis have a view that what is most essential may not be recounted at the centre of discourse. Derrida also notices such marginalization in writing. He calls them supplements such as footnotes, apparent after thoughts, prefaces, postscripts, etc. Derrida demonstrates how they become vital even to contradict or undermine the claims of the text. Derrida argues that this marginalization is analogous to psychoanalytic repression. Derrida calls it repression of writing or logocentric writing. Derrida says, that this repression is a failure. He shows that it is manifested symptomatically in the metaphors of language. Deconstruction demonstrates how these metaphors haunt discourse. According to Derrida, logocentric repression enables us to understand psychoanalytic repression and not vice versa.

Derrida provides a detailed account of relationship between psychoanalysis and deconstruction in his book, "Resistances". According to him both the projects suffer from the aporias and double binds. But the effect of this entrapment differs in both the cases. The aporias and double binds are
expressed in the way concepts are exemplified in the case of psychoanalysis. Since the mode of analysis differs in deconstruction they are expressed in a different way. According to Derrida, deconstruction is a hyperanalytisme. It uses non-concepts unlike in psychoanalysis. Despite this difference, both suffers from what he calls double bind, which is the condition of all analysis. It is said to be the transcendental sickness of the analytic. Double bind is not simple but multiple and disseminated in infinite divisible knots. It is the search for the origin combined with a perpetual deferring and dissociation. The perpetual deferring and dissociation is the ultimate resistance to analysis. Paradoxically, it emanates from analysis itself. It is the double bind of two mutually contradictory imperatives. It is one and the same both with psychoanalysis and deconstruction.

In psychoanalysis, resistance to analysis is produced by the double bind. Hence, resistance is internal rather than external. The double bind destroys its unitary nature. Hence, the source of resistance to analysis is also not unitary. Instead of unified nature, it is heterogeneous.

According to Derrida, psychoanalysis is both archaeological and eschatological. In archaeological sense it seeks an origin and is expected to provide a simple and indecomposable ground for explanation. In eschatological sense it seeks an ultimate solution. Both are oppositional to each other. It makes analysis non-unified. Hence, the source of the resistance is also not unified. According to Derrida, there are at least five types of resistance to analysis out of which three emanate from ego, one from the id and the other from
superego. The first three types emanate from repression, from transference and from the benefit derived from illness. The resistance from superego opposes guilt to the possibility of cure. The most irreducible type of resistance comes from it. It is the compulsion to repeat. It is a resistance without meaning. It is linked to death drive. Yet, it is analytical in the eschatological sense. Eschatological analysis aims at ultimate dissolution.

The resistance to analysis as internal is archaeological. It is related with the question of origin. The problem of the origin emerges from the desire for origin. Unlike psychoanalysis, deconstruction questions the possibility of origin and even the desire for origin. It is opposed to the very notion of simple origin or end. Deconstruction affirms an ultimate irreducibility. It is critical and analytical about the irreducible ultimate. It decomposes and deconstruct the ultimate and believes in ultimate irreducibility. It is the double motif of deconstruction that it shares with psychoanalysis. The double motif is the search for the origin deferring and dissociating. Deconstruction is the deconstruction of the principle that it explores and makes use of the very laws that it has deconstructed. In order to make use of them, Derrida coins non-concepts and it demonstrates the non-originality of the origin. This is a kind of double bind. The double bind underlies all the undecidables and suffers from internal self-contradiction. The mode of analysis with the undecidables is a sort of hyper analysis. Hence, it is an endless analysis. It questions not only the possibility of origin but even the desire for origin too. The analysis, which does not have an origin and end and yet suffering from its non-existence is paradoxical in nature. However, the
deconstructive project doesn’t include the desire for origin and end. Yet it does not make the analysis immune from it. This paradox is uncomfortable but unavoidable. The paradox makes analysis interminable. The paradox is the result of the absence of such element of origin or end. There is no indivisible simple origin or end. There is only divisible difference. This is the sole thesis of deconstruction.

Mechanism of Perception

By psychoanalysis Freud attempts to reach out to the depth in experience. He found the realm of truth not as conscious mind but unconscious. According to him the lived experiences are mere conscious version of the unconscious. It is the same case with both waking state experiences and dream state experience. Past experiences play an important role as unconscious aspect in waking period experience. In dream state the suppressed desires especially in its sexual form has the unconscious influence.

Freud attempted to visualise how the psyche operates. Perception itself has no means of retaining impression. Freud wanted to explain how perception and memory functions. Our past experiences influence our present perceptions. Yet we seem to see things afresh. For example, the atomic scientists visualised atom as a miniature solar system. Memory supplements perception even before perception perceives. Perception itself needs, supplement from memory to perceive. Something needs to sustain memory. Freud regarded that the nervous responsible for memory would have to be simultaneously influenced and unprejudiced.
In 1895 Freud proposed a neurological model in his “Project for a Scientific Psychology”. He postulated two types of neurons such as permeable neurons and memory neurons. Traces of past experience are recorded in memory neurons. Permeable neurons are virginal and open to perception. Freud's neurological model of memory explains how experience traces a permanent impression in the psyche while leaving it intact. Later this model proved inadequate and wanted to develop it. He abandoned this model. Yet he never gave up the concept of location. He proposed psyche as a space of writing. Freud like, Plato, thought that writing functions like a tool to assist memory. For this he took the help of a metaphor or model. He considered the psyche as a mystic writing pad.

In 1925, Freud explained the image of memory in his “Note on the Mystic Writing Pad”. It shows how a pure virginal surface or substance can harbour permanent traces. Derrida finds it quite meaningful. According to this description, no perception is unpolluted. Pure perception does not exist. The perceiving self appears to perceive in the present. But the perception is given meaning by the previous experiences. The previous experiences are like writing in the unconscious. They themselves are influenced by still previous writing. According to Derrida, this writing is a writing that existed before speech. Hence, Derrida does not agree with Freud that there are permanent traces.

According to Freud, unconscious functions like a writing pad. Permanent traces are inscribed in the unconscious from the experience. Experience leaves permanent traces in the unconscious that forms memories. In this sense, writing
is a tool that assists memory. Later writing itself became model for memory itself. Freud used the image of writing pad since it has improvement upon paper and slate. Nevertheless, later Freud found that the pad does not really account for the spontaneity of psyche. The pad cannot function without aid. Hence, the pad does not truly resemble memory. Memory can't be represented mechanically. Freud, like Plato, thought that mechanical representation is to deny life to memory. Derrida argues about the exactness of the image of writing pad to represent memory. He reverses the sense of metaphor. For him, the pad is not limited to represent memory. Rather the memory itself is limited. Hence, it can be exactly represented by the mechanism of writing pad. Memory needs external supplement to function. Memory is subject to censor-mechanism. The pad reveals the truth of the psyche. The limitation of the memory directly points to the limitations of the subject. Hence, Derrida contradicts the profundity of unconscious. According to him, the unconscious is constituted by infinite regress. The depth of the unconscious envisaged by Freud is illusory. Unconscious is perfectly superficial. Freud also had confirmed the subjectivity as limited in its nature. It is related to its surroundings and situations. It makes it a limited entity. It is not an independent classical individual. The subject functions in a system of relations. The system includes the network of the interrelations between the pad, the psyche, the society and the world.

Deconstruction of Dream Theory

In 'The interpretation of Dream', Freud explained that dream images and symbols are a kind of non-phonetic writing. Freud says that Egyptian priests
were the first interpreters of dreams. They believed that the dreams and hieroglyphs were given by gods. Hence, they considered that both of them are basically the same mode of expression.

Freud in his theory of dream claims that dream has an underlying meaning. This Freudian standpoint makes dream interpretable. According to Freud, the truth from unconscious is distorted in the scattered structure of the dream. Interpretation unravels the suppressed and distorted truth. Interpretation is the translation of the unconscious meaning in conscious terms. It draws the truth from unconscious into the realm of consciousness as it is. The dream symbols, images or the structures are the sings to be interpreted. Here Derrida intervenes with certain questions. What is the nature of the sign conceived by Freud? What is the code that is used to translate? What is the status of the unconscious truth? Derrida's deconstructive analysis identifies the paradoxes created by Freudian dream theory. According to Freud the sign is original and individual. It implies that they are theoretically untranslatable. Still Freud interprets them constantly. According to Derrida Freud does not provide any reliable code to interpret. In the absence of a fixed code the difference between signifier and the signified is eroded. This makes translation impossible. Freud believes in the interpretative power of psychoanalysis. At the same time Freud speaks about a certain nodal point of dreams. According to him it is the core that will not provide any meaning. At this naval point the interpretation is at stake. For example, one of such nodal points is the symbolic non-substantiality. One
such instance Derrida points out in the case of symbolic representation of female and masculine sexual organs where Freud contradicts himself in his standpoint.

"— In any case the shoe, for Freud, is no more the penis than it is a vagina. Of course he recalls, against Steckel, the certain symbols cannot be at the same time both masculine and feminine. Of course he specifies that long, firm objects (weapons, for example) could not symbolize female genital organs, nor hollow objects (cases, boxes, coffers) masculine organs. But he does so only to admit immediately afterwards that bisexual symbolization remains an irrepressible, archaic tendency, going back to childhood which is ignorant of the difference of the sexes (Traumdeutung, VI, V) "Let us add here that most dream-symbols are bisexual and can, according to the circumstance, be referred to the organs of both sexes" (Uber den Traum). According to the circumstances, in other words also according to a syntax, irreducible to any semantic or "symbolic" substantiability"\textsuperscript{31}

Irreducibility of a dream-symbol into a particular semantic substantiality leads to excess interpretation. This supplement becomes decisive to tell the truth. In effect, it becomes a deviation without an essential norm and a network of differential traces.

Freud suggests the necessity of untying the knot if it is not so much a scar where the cord has been served. Derrida asks the question whether Freud is an optimist or pessimist? Is the naval uninterpretable is provisional or permanent?
If he is optimistic the naval is uninterpretable in provisional sense. Still, Freud can't avoid the problem of the paradox involved in sign, and the absence of code, etc. If it is permanently impossible then it will imply that unconscious is too deep for conscious access. It can even be considered that they in fact have no meaning. It is the fundamental nature of unconscious. It will make psychoanalytic investigation fictitious about its truth claims. It will make signification nihilistic. Hence, the unconscious truth and meaning are at stake.

Besides, Derrida says that translation will imply the existence of an unconscious text or truth. Derrida contradicts this aspect. It is the very process of deconstructing the unconscious because the unconscious itself is a region of reproduced archives. Hence, there is no original text in the unconscious. They are only belated traces. Hence, unconscious is not a realm of presence. They are only transcriptions and differences.

**Freudian Metaphysics of Unconscious Presence**

According to Freud the permanent presence in the unconscious is getting repeated. It is the origin of the memory and the necessary foundation of experience. Derrida argues that it is sheer postulation. There is no such necessary registration in the unconscious. There is no such permanent presence in the unconscious that gets repeated. It is postulated due to desire for presence. Freudian psychoanalysis expresses a desire for origin. It is nostalgia to return to the absolute beginning. Freud considers this absolute presence as prior to division and repetition. It is the unique moment of inception. It is the moment of truth just prior to the separation of origin and impression. It is the
moment of absolute beginning. It is the archive that records the original experience. It is the presence in unconscious that can be returned to which is the haunting specter of original plenitude. Derrida says that it is the psychoanalytical version of metaphysics of presence. It is the Freudian yearning for presence. According to Derrida, the origin in the unconscious is already self-divided. The archive does not record any original experience. It is already marked by difference. It is only the constructed archive. Archive records the past. It points to the future. Hence, Derrida argues that the tense of the archive is future perfect. It is not in present tense. It is not a presence in the present nor a presence that was present in the past. It itself is a past which was never present and never will be. It is not a hidden virtual, potential self-presence. It is already self-divided. It has no original plenitude. It does not record any original experience.

"Contrary to metaphysical dialectical, and "Hegelian" interpretation of the economic movement of difference, we must admit a game where whoever loses wins and where one wins and loses each time, if the diverted presentation continues to be somehow definitively and irreducibly withheld, this is not because a particular present remains hidden or absent, but because difference holds us in a relation with what exceeds (though we necessarily fail to recognize this) the alternative of presence or absence. A certain alterity—Freud give it a metaphysical name, the unconscious—is
Derrida compares it with Husserl’s notion of retard originaire - the originary delay. According to Derrida, it is a matter of difference. It is not something simple delay or lateness as Husserl considered. It is never original but already repeated. There is no full presence belated or timely. Hence, there is no full original experience of life, rehearsed and echoed in memory. Even the first experience is already represented. Within a traditional logic of identity, these notions are unthinkable. However, archive is inescapable. There is no meta-archive. All discussions of the archive are fated to form part of it in the future perfect. Derrida suggests that this is the very secret that Freud protests. This is the very secret that psychoanalysis simultaneously reveals and conceals.

Freud had a notion of castration and considered it as the final signified. According to Freud, it is the final point where rationality stops. Derrida cannot accept such a Freudian teleology. Deconstruction goes beyond any type of final dissolution. Derrida with the help of his non-concept ‘dissemination’ explains castration in a different way. According to him, it is an endless substitution. In the infinite process the subjectivity is resisted to the extreme. It rejects appropriation. It reveals the internal self-division. The presence is fissured into the play of difference. Dissemination is the scattering of the unity of symbolic meaning and truth. In castration the transcendental signified is lost. Though dissemination is the nature of castration, it is not the final meaning. Deconstructive analysis is against all such types of exactness. But Freud called...
it as the final meaning, the secret in castration complex. According to deconstructive analysis the very 'transcendental signified' is contradictory to the notion of castration.

**Freudian Conceptual Contradictions**

Derrida in his essay *Specular – sur 'Freud'* focuses on Freud's beyond the pleasure principle. He examines the gap between Freud's apparent intention and the way his essay is written. One of such intentions is that he should not be influenced by speculative philosophy. He wanted that his theories should be based on observation. He privileged observation to speculation. He claimed that his methodology is clinical observation. Derrida shows one example that goes against Freud's intention in his writing. It is the notion of 'death drive'. According to Freud, death is inherent in life and is not accidental rather life is accidental. The ultimate aim of living organism is the state of inertia. According to Derrida, Freudian principle of death drive shows his connection to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger. They also considered death as integral to life. Freud denies any such influence upon him. Yet, his notion of death drive is close to their speculative view. It makes his purity of clinical observation as problematic. There is an inevitable element of speculation in his notion against his own intention.

In Freud's psychoanalysis, the notion of 'pleasure principle' is the absolute master. But there are incidents that pleasure itself may be experienced as displeasure. Reality principle explains it as deferring of pleasure. (It may be true in so far as sexual behaviour is concerned. But it cannot explain repression and
the whole gamut of experience of displeasure). Derrida finds that his pleasure principle defers through the reality principle with no fixidity. It is difference that differs and defers with ambiguity. In order to prove the sovereignty of pleasure principle Freud had to introduce a whole set of exceptions. One such step was his move from observation to speculation.

Freud wanted to go beyond pleasure principle. For this, initially, he proposed the principle of 'repetition compulsion'. Freud explained its relation to pleasure principle. According to him, it is a 'relieve' mechanism of displeasure. The classical conception of repetition is the notion of secondary rehearsal of something original that precedes it. Derrida deconstructs this view. There is nothing original to be repeated. Derrida shows that repetition confirms the mastery of pleasure principle. According to Freud, in repetitive behaviour a child seeks pleasure. Hence, Derrida argues that there is no tactics beyond pleasure principle. At the same time, Derrida points out the repetition undermines pleasure. Hence, it apparently seeks displeasure. Compulsive repetitive behaviour is regressive. Adults seek pleasure in novelty. Repetition is not a source of pleasure for adults.

Freud demands that his notion of death drive is an ethos beyond pleasure principle. In order to defend it he moves to the realm of biology. Within each cell there are two drives — life and death. Freud identifies them as heroism and narcissism in micro level. The two drives are manifested as sexual instincts and ego instincts in macro level. Freud’s theory implies that Narcissism is the libido turned on itself. Hence, Derrida argues, it annals the distinction between the two
drives. It would mean that all drives are ultimately libidinal. It raises the danger of monism. Freud wanted to avoid this Jungian position. But he is not able to prove dualism that he believed. Freud blames language for his own inability to conclude. Freud says that simple observation is distorted by translation into words. The terms are inevitably metaphorical. He finds problem of the images used in theoretical discourse. Observation is transmuted through description and theorization. Observation is inhabited by language from the outset. Observation won't be possible even without language. Hence, there is no original, pre-verbal truth. Thus he hesitates to prioritize intuition, observation and description. He doubts whether speculative theories may not have firmer grounding. Freud is uncertain of the status of even his own theorizing.

Metaphysics of Presence is Lacan

Lacan finds the fundamental aspect of Freudian psychoanalysis as linguistic. The unconscious is structured like a language. Lacan's psychoanalytic view has far reaching implications. He finds the possibility of returning to the letter itself in Freud's works. His analysis aims at establishing the indivisibility of letter. Derrida argues that his focus on letter lacks the question of the concept of writing. This leads him to consider the letter as indivisible. Derrida's deconstruction demonstrates the interminable divisibility of the letter.

Lacan considers text as primarily illustrative. For him, text illustrates the truth. Lacan is overpowered by the message carried by the literature. Hence, Derrida argues that Lacan is not concentrating on the question of the letter itself. The grammatology of writing is not analysed by him. Instead, he is possessed by
the story that is told. He lacks attention to the telling of the story. The act of narration is repressed by centralizing the narrated. He takes the signifier as having a single meaning. He does not look at the space of ambiguity. Hence, it is easy for him to consider the signifier as indivisible in its materiality. Derrida says that this is a serious misunderstanding of the structure of narration. As far as there is misunderstanding the status of text as fiction can never be revealed. Hence, he doesn't face the question of relationship between truth and fiction.

"Psychoanalysis owes to Lacan some of its most original advances. It has been taken thereby to its limits, sometimes beyond itself, and it is especially in this way that it keeps fortunately that value of provocation also for what is most vital today in philosophy as well as in literature and the human sciences. But this is why it also requires the most vigilant reading. For, it remains the case that, on the other hand, a whole systematic configuration of the Lacanian discourse (especially in the *Ecrits*, but also beyond) seemed to me to repeat or to assume a great philosophical tradition, the very tradition that called for deconstructive question (about the signifier, *logos*, truth, presence, full speech, a certain use of Hegel and Heidegger...). I proposed a reading of this repetition of logocentrism and phallocentrism in *Le facteur de la verite.*"³³
Derrida accuses Lacan that he has a naïve belief in truth. He shares it from the tradition of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis believes in exploration of hidden truth. It is concealed in the unconscious. Hence, psychoanalysis handles metaphors like unraveling or uncovering truth. It’s conception of truth is the revelation of the disguised meaning. Truth is the permanent presence in the unconscious. According to Derrida, Lacan also commits the error of metaphysics of presence. Because of the metaphysical influence his major concern is with speech. He prioritizes speech over writing. He has a militant phonocentrism. He even disqualifies the mechanical recording of speech as alienation. He has a belief in full self-present speech. According to him, speech is assimilated explicitly to truth. This makes him to the prime example of contemporary logocentric discourses. He uses Saussurian phonology. He considers truth as adequation of speech to itself and not to the object. The transcendental position of phallus is the meeting place of logos and desire. Truth is delivered by transcendental signifier. According to Derrida this is phallogocentrism. It is a bizarre kind of hermeneutic circle.

Lacan’s psychoanalysis concentrates on textuality. By this way he undermines the author. For him, the signifier is pre-eminent over the subject. According to him, language is the final agent and thereby Lacan avoids semanticism. Yet, Derrida argues that Lacan is trapped in formalism. For him, the truth of the text is unquestionable.

He questions only the sovereignty of the author. According to him, subject is only a pawn in the play of the signifier. Human autonomy is eroded extremely.
Lacan does have a split subject. Still Derrida argues that Lacan is not radical enough. Though the subject is split, the truth is not fragmented. It remains the whole. The phallus remains as untouched thought and is represented by incompleteness. According to Lacan, incompleteness is the part of transcendental topology. It has its own fixed domain. Hence, it is indivisible, and indestructible. Derrida concentrates this fixed domain of incompleteness. It is only a system of difference that differs and defers. According to Derrida, there is no fixed space for inadequacy and incompleteness.

So far, we discuss four dimensions of difference. In the coming chapter we shall discuss the fifth dimension, which is historical.
Notes and References:

3. Ibid., p. 83.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
6. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
7. Ibid., p. 17.
11. Ibid., pp. 350-51.


16. Ibid., p. 110.

17. Ibid., p. 275.

18. Ibid., p. 167.

19. Ibid., p. 110.

20. Ibid., p. 111.


22. Ibid., p. 71.

23. Ibid., p. 75.

24. Ibid., p. 102.


27. Ibid., p. 92.


