CHAPTER - III
DECONSTRUCTION
AS PHENOMENOLOGY OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Introduction

"Post" paradigms dominate the intellectual horizon of the contemporary academia all over the world. They are multiple and sprawling rhizomatically post-modern, post-structuralist, post-metaphysical, post-western, post-marxist, post-colonial, even post-philosophical and now inevitably post-phenomenological. Out of these, postmodernism is of paramount importance, which accrue currency in "post-ism". Phenomenology and postmodernism are directly intersected. The post paradigm of phenomenology is not an abandonment of phenomenology as a philosophy but, as Jean Francois Lyotard has rightly called phenomenology of phenomenology. In other words, it was post-phenomenology that gave the crucial jerk at the very root of modernism. Hence, phenomenology is not concerned with an 'of in postmodernity. If the notion of "identity" was central to modernity, then the notion of "differance" is central to postmodernity. Derrida coined the term "difference" in 1967 in the light of his researches into the Husserlian phenomenology. These are the two notions that make the crucial difference between modernism and postmodernism. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was centred on the very height of modern metaphysics focussing on the principle of identity. Phenomenology of
Phenomenology of Phenomenology as Post-Phenomenology

Phenomenological philosophy is neither a school of thought, nor a fixed set of dogmas or not even a metaphysical or idealistic conception of Philosophy. It is a philosophical movement that advanced through several phases which was dynamic and never stagnant. It's vitality is preserved in its capacity to transform itself. Phenomenology has gone through several phases such as realistic, genetic, constitutive, existential, hermeneutical and deconstructive. The eminent leaders of this movement were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone De Beauvoir, Alfred schutz, Paul Ricoeur, Levinas, Lyotard and Derrida.

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty a phenomenologist is a perpetual beginner. He is always with a constant vigilance over the source of knowledge. According to him, the end of phenomenology is the account of its beginning.

Such a beginning of phenomenology is radically visible and thus exhibited in post-phenomenological period. Post-phenomenology is not the end of phenomenology but a systematic search that amounts to the phenomenology of phenomenology. It tries to account for the source of knowledge which provides a post turn to modernity and deconstruction is counted as the latest phase in the movement of phenomenology as a philosophy.

*The idea is the basis on which a phenomenology is set up in order to achieve the final intention of philosophy. That a phenomenological determination of the idea itself may be
radically impossible from then on signifies perhaps that phenomenology cannot be reflected in a phenomenology of phenomenology, and that is *Logos* can never appear as such, can never be given in a philosophy of seeing, but (like all Speech) can only be heard or understood through the visible."¹

**The Origin of Deconstruction**

**Buddhistic Basis of Deconstruction**

Buddhism and Deconstruction are related in a number of ways. In India Buddha had a deconstructive mission as far as Indian Vedantic metaphysics is concerned. Against Vedantic metaphysics, Buddha argued that there is no permanent eternal entity both in individual self and external world. Buddha's treatment of 'time' is quite crucial to this anti-metaphysical standpoint. The time-points, 'dhammas' make everything transient in nature having nothing inherent in it as an eternal presence. In phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, however, we can see that, Husserl argues for the original presence in the intuitive-now point. It might be considered as the antithesis of the temporal presence of Husserl against temporal absence of Buddha. Anyway, in Husserl, the presence is intuitive, but in Buddha the absence is objective, which leads to the absence of eternal presence in the transient phenomena of change. Against the privileged position of the present, Heidegger argues that present is a mixture of both past and future which are ultimately an absence and hence present too is an absence. Derrida advocates this Heideggerian standpoint and argues against the presence of present as well as presence in present. This treatment of time

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leading to absence is somehow related to Buddha's treatment of time that leads to absence or sunya but only, as far as, the resultant concept of absence or ‘sunya’ is concerned. Otherwise what in absent to Buddha as permanent reality is different from what is absent is post-phenomenology as presence of present and presence in present with reference to phenomenological both intuitive and intentional presence. After deconstructing this phenomenological presence, anyway, Derrida reaches to deconstruct the objective presence of meaning, which Heidegger had managed to postulate in his Hermeneutics.

Deconstruction is generally considered and argued for its relationship to Buddha's doctrine of ‘Sunya’. For Buddha, Sunya means absence of permanent eternal reality in transient. In Buddhism, as far as Language is concerned, there is close similarity to deconstruction. Meaning is only a supplement as an addition to what is already ‘is’ and a replacement of what is not. In Buddhism the meaning of sunya is sunya itself.

Buddha was rejecting permanent reality in self and the world. Then the remaining area is language or meaning in or through which such eternity can be established or expressed. Derrida deconstructs the very medium as an impossibility of capturing the present, presence or being. Any effort to theorize the transcendental eternity will necessarily collapse into the entrapment of linguistic differential structure. The transcendental can only be experienced as the pure experience, where the pure experienced is the other. The prophetic experience of Light, Sound are such that. The transcendental speaks – it is the other of logocentric language.
Madhyamika Buddhism questions the seeming thingness of things, of people and of places. They avoid words and concepts as though they are expressions that are transcendentally signified. They aim at deconstructing the intellectual structures. They also aim at deconstructing the emotional basis of clinging. It also aims at deconstructing metaphysical ideas that underlie established institutions.

Nothing can be self-created. Nothing can be created by something other than it. Nothing can be created by both self-creation and something else. Nothing can be created by nothing i.e. neither by self-creation nor by something else. Then the something existing is nothing because of the impossibility of creation. It is emptiness and even emptiness is empty. If creation is impossible nothing can be logically located. Everything will be empty. Logically it does not exist. It is empty of inherent existence. Even the doctrine emptiness is empty. It is neither a concept nor an idea nor a thing. It is like differance, a tool to deconstruct clinging even to ‘emptiness’. Intellectual clinging is one of the worst forms of suffering. Even emptiness is empty. Hence there is no underlying basis for any emotion, experience or viewpoint. The mind is free with nothing to grasp, to cling to. Derrida was influenced by the doctrine of nothingness especially in understanding Heideggerian analysis of being and existent. He answers to the question “what is the being of the existent?” in the following way:

"It is difficult to say wherein the being of the existent consists which enables us to say each time that the existent is. That which is, as the being of existent, is not (the existent). A certain thinking, a certain experience of nothingness is
required for access to this question of the being of the existent, likewise to the difference between being and the existent. The relation which unsticks being from the existent without making something else of it, another existent, but merely a nothingness, a nonexistent which is there without being there as being present, this relation has some connivance with haunting."²

Derrida was deeply influenced by Madhyamika. Understanding of conceptual nothingness, which helped him against Heideggerian notion of 'language as the house of being' where Heidegger had taken shelter once he met with nothingness in the existent.

**Nietzschean Influence on Deconstruction**

Deconstructive movement has its origin in Nietzsche also. Nietzsche had introduced the Buddhist notion of 'Sunya' into western metaphysical tradition of self-presence. Western tradition always presupposed presence in both theology and philosophy. Nietzsche subverted the notion of presence and created a void making theology a negative theology or God-talk.

Unlike Taoists and Buddhists all other traditions bestowed presence over absence, icon over nonexistence, wholes over holes. This has become the worldview. Following this view we fill the void with God, with modernist art, with myth, with music, with poetry, with dream archetypes, etc. Every act
of filling this void is to establish a new centre. Later this centre determines our perspective. According to Nietzsche we are prisoners of our perspectives. His statement, "God is dead" exploded the very centre and created a religious void. Derrida was influenced by the Nietzschean subversive practice of reversing the perspective.

**Husserl’s ‘Abbau’ - Analyse**

Derrida introduced the term deconstruction in his book "Speech and Phenomenon" in 1967. It's historical and philosophical roots are founded in Husserl and Martin Heidegger. In early 1920's Husserl had introduced a method of unbuilding (Abbau-Analyse) in his genetic phenomenology. It is the method of structural dismantling of the intentional experiences. In constitutive phenomenology, Husserl introduced a correlative method of upbuilding (Aubbau-Analyse). Both these methods are committed to the principle of all principles, which is known as the principle of presence. Husserlian phenomenology determined being as presence and attempted to establish the way that we experience this fundamental principle. According to Husserl, this presence is regarded the source of the validity of knowledge.

**Heidegger's Critical Deconstruction**

Heidegger viewed Husserl’s explanation of being as limited to its cognitive aspects. However, Heidegger’s aim was to retrieve and restore a more fundamental dimension of the experience dimension of the being other than that of Husserl. For this, Heidegger analysed the experience of being specifically in temporal dimension. Thus, Heidegger provided a
strongly historical turn to Husserl's genetic structural approach. Accordingly he introduced the term (Abbau) 'destruction' on 'critical deconstruction' with reference to traditional concepts. He aimed at tracing them back historically to their original sources. Heidegger considered the fundamental experience of this original source as a means to re-think of being. Heidegger was in search of the proper name or the unique name of being. He expected it to recall and recollect and name the holly or primordial being. He wanted to show as to how the multiple senses of being such as being and becoming, being and Appearance, Being and thought and being and the ought derive from the common root, so to say, the primordial being.

Derrida's Criticism

Heidegger considered language as the house of being. Whereas Derrida considered language as difference and dissemination. Derrida argues that the search for a more fundamental experience conceals a commitment to presence. For Derrida, if "common root" truly accounts for the entire diversity of sense of being then it must be structured in such a way that all the aspects are combined unhierarchically or "undecidably ".

According to Derrida, the problematic of being whether in cognitive aspect or in temporal aspect or in linguistic aspect includes metaphysics of presence i.e. the illusion of presence upon absence. Derrida presented the notion of deconstruction in the introduction to his 1962 translation of Husserl's "Origin of Geometry".

Derrida's Project

Deconstruction as a philosophical trend has evolved as a radical revolt simultaneously against the two philosophical trends that were prevalent in
France in the first half of the last century. These two trends were phenomenology and structuralism. Deconstruction accounts for the foundation work of the post-modernism.

Jacques Derrida is considered to be the founder and the leading figure of the controversial enterprise, which is widely known and discussed as deconstruction. He is regarded as one of the most involuntary thinkers on the continent today. He became the centre of the French philosophical scene inaugurating the project of deconstructing western metaphysics or logocentrism. However, his critique of western metaphysics does not mean merely the western philosophical tradition but everyday thought and language as well. It is within and around the particular phenomenological framework of Husserl, Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas that his deconstructionism has evolved. Derrida starts his philosophical enterprise with a critical study of Husserlian phenomenology as an example of metaphysics of presence as its theoretical culmination.

Jacques Derrida is one of the most involuntary thinkers working in the continent today heading the movement known as deconstruction. Jacques Derrida was born in Algeria on July 15, 1930. Derrida's philosophical thinking was evoked originally from the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas. Derrida studied Edmund Husserl and phenomenology in general under Maurice de Gandillac and Jean Hyppolite in Paris at Ecole Normale Superieure. Derrida himself had later admitted that Husserl was the philosopher whom he studied more studiously and painstakingly. According to Derrida Husserl's phenomenology is the explicit explanation of what he calls 'metaphysics of presence'. His studies
on phenomenology were formed under the influence of Tan Duc Thao and Jean Cavailles. His phenomenological reflections were in opposition to the views of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In this respect Derrida is more akin to Husserl retaining the discipline and methodological rigor of Husserlian phenomenology.

Derrida's whole enterprise of deconstruction mainly focus on the problematic of being in experiential and linguistic context. Though he was influenced by Husserl's methodical prudence, he never shared Husserl's pathos for and commitment to phenomenology of presence. It was the genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger who helped him to move beyond Husserl's phenomenology. He was constantly influenced by Martin Heidegger's project of undoing metaphysics and destruction of concepts. Heidegger's "Phenomenological destruction" of western philosophy has become one of the central concerns of postmodern theory. It was Saussure who helped Derrida to radicalise the Heideggerian project of overcoming metaphysics into its culmination. This movement of radicalisation is found in Derrida who accused Heidegger that he was unable to free himself from the metaphysics of presence, which made him consider language as the house of being. Deconstruction started as a critical engagement for both phenomenology and structuralism. These were the major oppositional philosophical discourses in the 1960's in France. Derrida's analysis shows that metaphysics of presence is still found in structuralism. Derrida's critical enterprise paved the way for post-phenomenology as well as post-structuralism combining both into deconstruction. His deconstruction is basically a critique of the
metaphysics of presence. According to Derrida, the metaphysics of presence has played a fundamental role in all philosophies. According to him, the metaphysics of presence is the illusory presence of timeless self-identity.

**Five Dimensions of Difference**

**Metaphysics of Presence**

According to Derrida, metaphysics of presence came to be articulated in different ways. It is considered as the transcendental signified that guarantees meaning for everything. Derrida calls such a signified as metaphysics of presence. It is the absolute presence. It is the phenomenological description of the original moments as in the case of intuitive now points of Hesserl which in turn rests on transcendental presence of eidos. For Derrida, metaphysics of presence also means transcendent principles, which have unarguable meanings from a divine text. It is also the meaning present in the spoken word of the speaker in specific moments and places. Spoken word comes directly from the speaker, which has a one-to-one perfect fitness of meaning. It is like Christian theological belief that Jesus as the Son is the perfect expression of God, the father. All these versions of presence privilege identity. In Derrida's deconstruction, he exposes the difference inherent in the identities such as consciousness and eidos, impression and retention, transcendental referent and term, signifier and signified and Father and Son. Derrida says that due to the inherent difference the supposed presence inevitably meets with an absence. This makes the status of presence illusory and supplementary. Precedence of difference to
identify posits the other. In turn, it is the desire for the other that argues for identity. But the identity deconstructs itself due to its inherent absence.

According to Derrida, metaphysics of presence is the direct consequence of the yearning for presence, which is directly rooted in absence. One cannot desire with which one immediately coincides. Accordingly, all names related to fundamentals and principles or to the centre have designated an invariable absence. Metaphysics of presence cherishes the idea of an inner origin as a presence within. Derrida identifies different versions of metaphysics of presence in the history of philosophy. His understanding on Husserl, Saussure, Rousseau, Plato, Levi-Strauss, Marx, Freud etc. identifies the demonstration of the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. Hence, we turn our attention towards an understanding of these philosophers as explained by Derrida.

**Difference Precedes Identity**

Husserl was the philosopher whom Derrida studied painstakingly. Derrida worked out his central notion of 'difference', a key term in deconstruction, and was coined chiefly against Husserl’s phenomenology of identity. The methodological rigour of phenomenology that influenced Derrida to a great extent made him to doubt the notion of presence. Besides, his revaluation of western thought enabled him to find out the crucial and fundamental role it has played in all philosophies. Most of the metaphysicians define being as the timeless self-identity or self-given presence. They considered the principle of presence as that which precedes difference. What Derrida wanted to show was that difference precedes presence. By means of difference, Derrida proposed to perform ultimately the task of deconstruction of metaphysics. According to him, difference as difference means both to
‘differ’ and to ‘defer’. Difference refers to the play of difference, which is both active and passive, cause and effect; it is not the product that constitutes the object. Nor does it refers to a “transcendental signified” that is present within it. His rigorous analysis was purported to center on the irreducible structure of difference that operates in: (1) human consciousness (2) temporality, (3) writings, (4) unconscious and (5) history. These are the five dimensions in which difference operates preceding the identities established in them. The first two identities, Derrida deconstructs mainly with reference to the thesis of eidos and originary present of Husserl. The third identity is deconstructed, however, with reference to both the traditions phenomenology and structuralism. The fourth identity is exclusively of Sigmund Freud that paved the way for psychoanalysis. The fifth identity is the progressive notion of historical evolution.

Outline of Five Differential Domains

Derridian attempt is to un bracket what is said to be bracketed in Husserlian Phenomenology. Deconstruction, as the phenomenology of phenomenology, penetrates into the fissured solidarity of being showing the difference that precedes identity in consciousness, time, writing, the unconscious and history. According to Husserl, there is no epistemological opening in consciousness causing Cartesian problematic but the intentional entities fill up the opening as epistemological equipments of all experience and knowledge. The same provides ontological foundation as well as they are identified with transcendental consciousness. As consciousness is of the nature of presenting to itself it solves the epistemological dualism providing ontological foundation in itself.
Derridian difference in consciousness, however, interrogates the transcendental identity demonstrating consciousness as a medium of knowledge process and not as metaphysics of self-presence. This deconstructive approach can be proved by means of the results in scientific investigations in Neurobiology, Cognitive psychology etc. The discovery of the double locus of double notions of consciousness such as access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness goes against the homogeneous concept of consciousness showing a difference within consciousness where the access-consciousness functions as a mediatory principle experiencing the latter. However, in Husserlian phenomenology, the eidos identified with consciousness is not of the status of phenomenal consciousness of qualia which can well be equated with noema or intuitive entities which are purely abstract essences with semi platonic characteristics per deconstructive analysis eidos cannot be without sign. Husserlian originary presence in the present (now-point) is deconstructed as a trace or mark or erasure demonstrating the difference in time showing the status of origin as non-origin having the basis of past which is an absence. Difference in writing is demonstrated against both phenomenology and structuralism. Derrida shows that meaning cannot be identified with internal language of thought and intention. Since there is no anchor point of meaning or signification in consciousness, it is nothing but a stream of differential structure of linguistic network rather than immediate expression of magical thought terms in which sense and referent are intrinsically identified. This Derridian standpoint made a shift of focus from consciousness to language leading to post-modernism. Against structuralism, Derrida argues that the
structure of fundamental contrasts depends on a center which marginalize the other. Deconstructive task is to show the reality of a non-centre, i.e. a free play of contrasts. According to Derrida, like signifier, signified also depends for its existence on the differential structure among them. Sign is absolutely a different element from the mental experiential qualities to which it is applied. Above all, the meaning as such is supplemented to the experiential aspects as well as to the extra-linguistic objects. Meaning of sense being a supplement as part of convention is not a genuinely experienced entity. So we might turn to the prophetic language in which the sense is experienced as the other of logocentric language. According to Derrida, as far as the Freudian fundamental of psychoanalysis is concerned, human unconscious is also a linguistic structure of difference and since there is no origin in it as Sigmund Freud had claimed.

According to Derrida, history is not a continuous programme of linear evolution; rather it includes both continuity and rupture exhibiting difference in history. In the period of rupture of hidden or forgotten archieves emerge as prophetic experiences and deconstruct the constructed signs which in turn conceal the emerged archieves in history in the time of continuity. [In the last part of our thesis, the deconstructive strategy is applied in the field of Indian Philosophy in order to reach its genuine experiential prophetic aspects beyond mere metaphysics of consciousness and language.]

1. Difference in Consciousness

Dual Identities

Derrida moved beyond phenomenology in his task of deconstruction in order to achieve a more radical and non-philosophical questioning. His discovery of genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and Freud helped
him in this task. Husserl's phenomenology of presence defines consciousness in terms of intentional experience. It means that consciousness provides the ontological foundation of experience intending its own object within it. For him, the intentional objects are ego-body or conscious content. Having established the reality of meaning-giving entities through the transcendental identification with the transcendental consciousness, Husserl brings forth a linguistic identity between meaning and term. If the former identity is the net result of transcendental phenomenology of the condition of being, the latter points to a descriptive phenomenology of the condition of knowledge. The former is ontological and the latter is epistemological in nature. The transcendental identity constitutes the reality of eidetic entities and is regarded as the ontological foundation for the logical concepts. Thus the universal logical entities are intrinsically connected with the thought-terms that constitute the internal language of thought and intention. Both of these identities serve as the purpose of presenting self presence of meaning which Derrida calls the phenomenology of presence. Transcendental identity posits presence in consciousness whereas linguistic identity posits presence in language.

Medium of Knowledge and Process of Knowledge

Regarding transcendental identity, Derrida differs from Husserl despite his agreement with him in its inevitable dependence of knowledge on consciousness pointing out a difference between the medium of knowledge and the process of knowledge. Bereft of consciousness, knowledge is impossible since knowledge requires a medium. But the process of knowledge is entirely independent of consciousness, for, it is not involved in
knowledge process. Derrida argues that transcendental phenomenology through its transcendental identification mistakes the medium of knowledge as involved in the process of knowledge, and consciousness thus becomes a kind of self-identical presence which guarantees the reality of absolute being as present in intentional entities.

According to Derrida, Husserl makes a confusion of mediatory act of consciousness as the species of consciousness. But consciousness being a mere medium, there is functional difference with this medium that makes identity as a repeatable identity. Hence meaning as such is impossible to be fully present in consciousness.

"Phenomenologically, the transcendental we is not something other than the transcendental Ego. The latter's acts, even when they seem mandated by an ideal community, do not cease to be irreducibly those of a monadic "I think" --to which it suffices to reduce the empirical egological content of the ego in order to discover the dimension of the "we" as a moment of the eidos "ego". One would indeed be tempted to think that it is the we that makes possible the reduction of the empirical ego and the emergence of the eidos "ego", if such a hypothesis did not lead, against Husserl's most explicit intentions, to placing the egological monad in abstract relation to the total subjectivity. In any case, if there is a history of truth, it can only be this concrete implication and this reciprocal envelopment of totalities and absolutes. This is possible only because we are dealing with ideal and spiritual implications. The description of these two characteristics, ideality
and spirituality, so frequently evoked in the *Origin*, does not correspond, as we know, to any metaphysical assertions".\(^3\)

It is true neurobiologically as well. It proves scientifically the difference in consciousness by means of the two types of phenomena of consciousness. (i) Access consciousness i.e. the capacity for consciousness which can be considered as similar to pure consciousness in philosophical speculation or transcendental consciousness as per the traditional understanding of consciousness both in Indian as well as Western. In scientific explanation of access consciousness, it is devoid of any content of consciousness. It means that there is consciousness devoid of contents. It goes against Husserl’s phenomenology as science of consciousness in two ways. Firstly the ontological identity by which consciousness provides ontological foundation for experience. Because of the identity between consciousness and eidos as essential structure of consciousness, it experiences its own immanent entities. For this self experience or immediate experience there should not be any mediation between consciousness and its so-called contents. This problem we can see well in the Aristotelian logic of identity as explained in the next sub topic titled "difference in laws of thought". Husserl in order to solve the problem of mediation established an identity. This identity solves the double edged demerit of mediation established. If the content becomes the other, then ontological foundation would not become sure valid and evident as Husserl seeks. Consequently, it will create the epistemological Cartesian crisis of duality. However, irrespective of all Husserlian attempt there is a difference in consciousness, so to say, as per scientific investigation. For Husserl, consciousness is presented to itself, by this way the immanent
entities are immediately present to consciousness. This solves the epistemological crisis of Cartesian dualism. This solution is made possible because of the identity thesis i.e. whatever is immanent in consciousness will be immediately accessible to consciousness since consciousness is presented to itself. What goes against scientific study in Husserlian phenomenology is obviously the same identity. Neurobiological observation shows that there are two types of consciousness such as access and phenomenal. The former is the capacity to become conscious of something and the latter is the phenomenal content of consciousness. This scientific study secondly goes against Husserl's homogeneous definition of consciousness.

For Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of something. It is the epistemological identity that makes consciousness and its contents essentially one and the same. But scientific observation shows that the contents are not identified with access consciousness. The contents or phenomenal consciousness is different from the former with its different location of origin. However, phenomenal contents are different from eidos though they may match with noema. However, the difference is scientifically proved. In neurobiology, the access consciousness can be considered only as an explanatory construct or as a medium to be conscious of the phenomenal content. It is similar to Derridian standpoint of consciousness as a medium of knowledge and is different from the process of knowledge. Sartrean division of pre-reflexive and reflexive consciousness matches well with scientific study of consciousness. However, Derrida was influenced by Heideggerian epoch of metaphysics where he goes against such an
unshakable rock of presence. In this case, Derrida brings Heidegger in contrast to Schapiro interrogating the consonance between them.

"—The consonance is interrupted every time Schapiro says “self,” “self-conscious,” “self-awareness,” “own,” “potrait” he puts everything down to a self-consciousness, to a subjectivity to which Heidegger never trusts himself without question, and which he always interrogates as an epoch of metaphysics; the one that, since Descartes, tries to secure for itself, in subjectivity, a ground of certainty (an unshakable rock or pedestal on which this time the adhering sole no longer slips).4

The neurobiological access consciousness, can never become the speaking subject or signifying subject or even the cognizing subject. Such a subject becomes subject only inscribing itself in the system of difference. There cannot be a presence of subject or presence to itself prior to signifying or cognizing.

*One might be tempted by an objection certainly the subject becomes a speaking subject only in its commerce with the system of linguistic differences, or yet, the subject becomes a signifying (signifying in general, by means of speech or any other sign) subject only by inscribing itself in the system of differences. Certainly in this sense the speaking or signifying subject could not be present to itself, as speaking or signifying, without the play of linguistic or semiological difference. But can one not conceive of a presence, and of a

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presence to itself of the subject before speech or signs, a
presence to itself of the subject in a silent and intuitive
consciousness?"5

Obviously Derrida’s answer is “no”. According to him, the self-gathering
consciousness is nothing but perception of self in presence. It can be
considered as the subjective existence in general. It is an offering to thought
as self-presence. It is not self-manifestation as such. In effect it is the
medium of synthesizing the very process of offering a self-present to thought.
It is a “living present” that guarantees a metaphysics of presence suppressing
the difference.

"Such a question (of presence) therefore supposes that,
prior to the sign and outside it, excluding any trace and any
difference, something like consciousness is possible...Most
often, in the very form of meaning, in all its modifications,
consciousness offers itself to thought only as self-presence, as
the perception of self in presence. And what holds for
consciousness hold here for so-called subjective existence in
general. Just as the category of the subject cannot be, and
never has been, thought without the reference to presence as
hupokeimenon or as ousia etc., so the subject as
consciousness has never manifested itself except as self-
presence. The privilege granted to consciousness therefore
signifies the privilege granted to the present; and even if one
describes the transcendental temporality of consciousness, and
at the depth at which Husserl does so, one grants to the “living-
present" the power of synthesizing trace and of incessantly reassembling them.\(^6\)

This power of synthesis once caught into the elements of our thought becomes the metaphysical self-presence. Here the medium is confused with the elements of process. Hence consciousness becomes self-presence of meaning of eidos.

“This privilege is the ether of metaphysics, the element of our thought that is caught in the language of metaphysics. One can delimit such a closure today only by soliciting the value of presence that Heidegger has shown to be the ontotheological determination of Being... A determination of an effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but of difference, a system that no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, not that of cause and effect, or of indetermination and determination, etc, such that in designating consciousness as an effect or a determination, one continues—for strategic reasons that can be more or less lucidly deliberated and systematically calculated—to operate according to the lexicon of that which one is de-limiting.”\(^7\)

Husserl's eidos that is identified with consciousness is quite different kind of entity of abstraction. It has only philosophical speculative validity. Husserl himself considered it as a matter of fiction. Nothing can be identified with something that is nothing.

“It is naturally important, on the other hand (once again as in geometry, which has recently and not idly been attaching great

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value to collections of models and the like), to make rich use of fancy... of the abundance of detailed feature, and the systematic continuity of the motive forces involves, they greatly excel the performances of our own fancy, and moreover, given the understanding grasp, pass through the suggestive power of the media of artistic presentation with quite special ease into perfectly clear fancies......that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetical science is "fiction", that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of "eternal truths" its sustenance.8

Derrida may find well advancement upon this Husserlian position. The fictitious eidos can never become a presence in consciousness. Because of its ideal nature it depends for its existence upon the signifier. It is the signifier that makes it possible to be repeated. According to Derrida, the process of repetition in turn idealizes the consciousness. Process of repeatability submits to the power of repetition of subjectivity. Hence for-itself gains power in mastering to project the illusory presence.

"... the as-for-itself or for-itself—subjectivity—gains in power and in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself. Here idealization is the movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects me or serves me as signifier, submits itself to my power of repetition, to what thenceforward appears to me as my spontaneity and escapes me less and less."
According to Derrida, interability of signifier is not an essential presence. It’s universality is quite abstract. There is no abstract content identified with the repeatable abstract. By this way, Derrida deconstructs, what is still platonic or at least semi platonic in Husserl. This deconstruction, leads to explore the phenomenology of phenomenology reducting what is not phenomenological or non-experiential in phenomenology.

**Difference in Laws of Thought**

Rejecting the phenomenology of presence by means of ‘difference’, Derrida attempted to find out the origin of the principle of presence in the traditional linguistic theory of phonocentrism and its logical establishment in the Aristotelian logic of identity.

Derrida began a fundamental investigation into the nature of the western metaphysical tradition and its basis in the law of identity through the approach called ‘deconstruction’. According to him the tradition of thought depends on the logic of identity. Aristotle has earlier explained the triple aspect of this principle of identity in his laws of thought, which is based on the presupposition of logical coherence. Such a presupposition is directly proportional to what the laws refer to. Logic of identity refers to an essential reality so as to say an origin. In order to sustain the presupposition of logical coherence this origin must be simple, homogeneous and present. These are the consequent pre-determined characteristics of origin. It means that origin should be free from contradiction. The law of contradiction states that nothing can both be and not be. It excludes the feature of complexity. Becoming is the complex nature of both be and not be. The homogeneous nature of origin means that it should be of the same substance or order. The law of excluded
middle states that everything must be or not be and hence establishes only one original being and undervalue the other as non-being. It formulates a hierarchy of being over non-being. Being is equated to existence and non-being to non-existence. It also established the existence of being of homogeneous nature excluding all sorts of complexity and difference. The law of identity states that whatever is, is. It shows the nature of origin as present.

According to the law of identity the essential entity is the same as itself. It excludes the feature of mediation. It is separate and distinct from any mediation. Since it excludes mediation it should be conscious of itself. There cannot be any gap of mediation between the origin and consciousness. Accordingly, Derrida makes a difference between the process of knowledge and the medium of knowledge. The process of knowledge includes features such as mediation, difference and complexity. According to him consciousness is the medium through which knowledge is possible. The medium of knowledge is not involved in the knowledge process. Once this medium is mistaken as involved in knowledge process it gives rise to a sort of self-presence. Thus the laws of thought, in effect, gives rise to the self-presence of consciousness as identified with the phenomenological objects. According to Derrida, consciousness as medium cannot give rise to such self-presence. It cannot identify with the objects, which are merely an absence or trace. In the case of language too, it will give rise to identical self-presence if we take it as involved in knowledge process.

Logic and Logos

The logical establishment of self-presence can be illustrated following Russerl's analysis of Aristotelian logic, which reveals the nature of logic of
identity. Aristotelian laws of thought refers to an origin which is the self presence of being. Derrida's exploration of western thought indicates that the tradition of thought depends on the laws of thought. Russell's analysis on the nature of its origin referred by logic of identity explains it as free from contradiction and as homogeneous, i.e. present to itself without any mediation. There is no gap between the origin and consciousness. According to Derrida, this origin as conscious of itself is the being of presence. The self-presence of being is identified with consciousness in Aristotle's logic of identity. Derrida adds that this is the origin with which the term, which is known as 'logos' is identified. All logi which explain presence have an opposite term as the absence of presence. Such oppositional dichotomies formulate a hierarchy where the logos are privileged and the opposite term is unprivileged. Laws of thought that refers to the origin establishes the oppositional concepts of hierarchy. These are the fundamental concepts that operate every thought process. Without these thought terms, the operation of thought cannot be governed because of the ultimate dependence on the presence of identity and the resultant opposition embedded in it. Derrida's analysis shows that the dependent dichotomy is the fundamentals of hermeneutic circle. To engage oneself in this vicious circle is a craft, an experience of feast and closure as well. It is "necessary" within language. His further analysis of conceptual contrasts shows a deconstructive phase of hermeneutics.

"This hermeneutic circle has only the logical, formal, (derived) appearance of a vicious circle. It is not a question of escaping from it but on the contrary of engaging in it and going
all round it. "We must therefore complete the circle (den Kreisgang Vollziehen) It is neither a stopgap measure (Notbehelf) nor a lack (Mangel) to engage upon such a road is the force of thought and to remain on it is the feast of thought, it being admitted that thinking is a craft (Handwerk)" Engaging on the circular path appears on the one hand to an artisanal, almost a manual value of the thinker's trade, on the other hand to an experience of the feast (fête) as experience of the limit of closure, of resistance, of humanity.¹⁰

Derrida's analysis of these dichotomies shows that the first term, if it is identified with the origin, need not co-exist inevitably with the second for the derivation of meaning in an oppositional relation. Accordingly, Derrida argues that identification of simple, homogeneous, self-present being with a term of structural difference is impossible. The resultant meaning is achieved not because of identity but because of its dependence on the second term. Derrida interrogates the position of self-presence by asking the question whether origin depends on non-origin. According to him origin is a mere incoherent presupposition. Derrida calls this system of dependent dichotomies as logocentricism in which the logos with which an origin is identified is nothing but a mere absence. Logocentricism is present in every human discourse with its characteristic hierarchy opposition like logos/mythos, logic/rhetoric, intelligible/sensible, speech/writing, literal/figurative, nature/culture, intuition/signification, etc. The task of deconstruction, therefore, is to bring these contradictions and paradoxes to
light and undo, rather than reverse, these hierarchies and thereby call into question the notion of being as presence to sight as eidos.

Logocentrism is the standpoint, which seeks to exile from the realm of pure reason all that which do not confirm to its centralising logic of identity and non-contradiction and claims to present us with certain certitude. Resultantly, Derrida analyse logocentrism in order to explore the nature of certitude that the traditional rational thought is said to provide. His analysis of logocentrism has enabled him to complete a process of re-evaluation in the field of western philosophy. His real object of re-evaluation was centred on the nature of thought itself. Further, Derrida’s analysis of logocentrism shows that logos can never englobe everything. There is always something, which escapes and refuses to be totalised into a homogeneous identity. Consequently, Derrida rejected the apparently self-satisfied ideals of liberalism, enlightenment and universal reason. The totalising ontology that originated from pre-Socratic philosophy to Heidegger seeks to reduce difference and otherness to the same. Derrida’s analysis poses a radical challenge to the hollowed logocentric notions such as the eternal idea of Plato, the self thinking thought of Aristotle, the cogito of Descartes, transcendental ego of Husserl, and the like.

According to Derrida, mind or consciousness is circular in its functional aspect. It clearly shows that it is a medium and it cannot break out of itself as well. This self-interpreting nature of consciousness which Husserl theorizes as constitutive nature of consciousness is, is effect, like a presupposition, which don’t include the aposteriori: process of knowledge. Hence Husserlian science doesn’t make a move beyond Hegelian presuppositions.
"Since the object of such sciences is produced by the mind, but that which knows, the mind will have to have engaged in self-knowledge, in the knowledge of what it produces, of the product of its own production. This auto determination poses singular problems of priority. The mind must put itself into its own product, produce a discourse on what it produces, introduces itself of itself into self. This circular duction, this intro-reduction to oneself, calls for what Hegel names a "presupposition" (Voraussetzung)."\textsuperscript{11}

According to Derrida, the result of the circular function of the mind is an effect of the project of mind. Every foundation, every justification is a presupposition as the result of the speculative dialectic. It is the nature of proved and demonstrated necessity within the domain of consciousness.

2. Difference in Temporality

Presence in Time

Husserl's principle of presence states that every originary intuition is a legitimising source of cognition. According to Husserl, everything originally is offered to us in intuition. The moment of intuition is the original presence of being. Husserl's phenomenology regards that which is given in intuition as being. It is the instance of pure presence in the living present. His theory of triple intentionability of consciousness states that the principle of presence is intuited in the moment of primal impression. It is the actual intentional moment of absolute flow of consciousness. It is the privileged moment of cognition because its correlative element gives rise to that of
both retention and protention. Husserl's phenomenological investigation grounds reason in the immediate presence of being. In "Formal and transcendental logic" Husserl formulated a phenomenological discipline of transcendental logic. It is the transcendental methodology for the accomplishment of self-grounding of reason. This immediate presence is the foundation of experience. It is the principle of presence that fulfils the perceptual act of consciousness and thereby verifies all other modes of consciousness.

Absence in Time

According to Derrida, Husserl's theory of presence demonstrates against Husserl's own intention. For Husserl, the originary moment of impression gives rise to the self-presence of being. This pure presence is the direct givenness in the mode of now. All objects of consciousness are temporal objects and functions in temporal dimension. Temporal objects are constituted by the tripple intentionality of consciousness in the mode of past, now and future. It is the unified intentional act of retention, impression and protention at each instant as a whole. At a time such unfied now-point is the actual phase of the absolute flow. Husserl brings the theory of tripple intentionality in order to account for the awareness of objects as extended in time. By the same way his original intuition of now-point is scattered into tripple intentionality. Thus Husserl's now-point retains an element of past within it. Hence, it is not an absolute now-point. Perception is not absolutely and exclusively in the mode of now. Within the whole of intuitive unity, retention is the determining or adoring element. Consequently,
perception occurs in the mode of past. It is the element of retention that helps consciousness to cognise the primal impression.

Derrida argues that primal impression cannot give rise to an immediate presence. Primal impression is not an epistemological opening in consciousness with a presence of which consciousness becomes immediately conscious. Impression is perceived in comparison with retention.

A trait never appears, never itself, never for a first time. It begins by retrac(t)ing [se retirer]. I follow here the logical succession of what I long ago called, before getting around to the turn of painting, the broaching [entame] of the origin: that which opens, with a trace, without initiating anything.12

Hence, it is retention that makes primal impression possible. The trace of the past makes the presence of the present possible and not vice versa. Consequently, Derrida demonstrates that there is no immediate presence as well as direct perception. According to him, the immediate self-presence as being is impossible. Retention is only a trace of the past and is like a secondary memory. It is not a mere modification of primal impression or presence. It resembles a sign. It is an illusory presence. It is a type of re-presentation, which shows an absence of presence. Retention is not being but non-being. Non-being interprets being which strikes at its very heart of presence and truth with absence and illusion. Derrida destabilizes the hierarchy of being/non-being proving that being depends upon non-being.

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"We have seen how much this “activity” of consciousness was both anterior and posterior to passivity: that the movement of primordial temporalization (the ultimate ground of all constitution) was dialectical through and through; and that (as every authentic dialecticity (wants) this movement was only the dialectic between the dialectical (the indefinite mutual and irreducible implication of protentions and retentions) and the nondialectical (the absolute and concrete identity of the Living Present, the universal form of all consciousness).  

Thus he interrogates Husserl’s notion of privileged presence. According to him, absence is more fundamental than presence. Presence is a function of absence. Hence Derrida shows that reason cannot ground itself without an origin. There is no foundation for reason. Reason is versatile. In his deconstructive analyses of phenomenology, Derrida illustrates that the phenomenology of presence is merely an imaginary presence upon absence. Hence, there is no anchor point for objectivity, truth and universality within consciousness.

Epistemological Identity

The principle of presence which is an ontological foundation in Husserl’s phenomenology is made experienciable by another principle of identity. According to Husserl, principle of identity solves the epistemological problem of knowledge. Husserl’s theory of perception describes two forms of presence. One is the presence of perceptual object
to consciousness. The other is the presence of consciousness to itself. According to Husserl, perception is possible because of identity between these forms of presence. The presence of the perceptual object is identified with the presence of consciousness. Since consciousness is presented to itself, the perceptual object is also presented to it. Hence perception takes place without postulating further epistemological problems. Husserl's theory of consciousness explains it as highly complex and fully dynamic. Intentional function of consciousness is multidimensional. Its tripple intentionality constitutes the temporal objects and hence the self-presence of objects in its temporal dimension. This is the ontological dimension of consciousness in its absolute flow. At the same time, its double intentionality makes the immanent object present to it and cognises it. This is the epistemological function of consciousness that makes perceptual experience possible. This function is possible because of the identity between consciousness and its intuitive objects.

**Epistemological Difference**

Derrida formulated his central notion of *differance* in his neologism which insists that deconstruction is strictly adhering to satisfy the requirement of transcendental phenomenology. The non-concept of *differance* is opposed to all concepts, which is defined in terms of oppositional predicates. It is effectively unconceptualisable too. *Differance* is difference deferred whose structure is inexorably double. This ultra-transcendental non-principle includes two undecidables such as difference 'and' deferral. Since difference is not reducible to dialectical logic it is neither difference nor deferral but both 'difference' and 'deferral'. The non-
principle of 'difference' is opposed to the principle of 'identity'. The non-concept of 'deferral' is opposed to the principle of 'presence' and operates in temporal dimension. Difference is not an identity nor difference between two identities nor a difference between two differences. Difference is difference to itself. According to Derrida, there is indeed a difference in Husserl's phenomenology of identity.

Let us examine the status of the presence of the object to consciousness. The object in question is the temporally dispersed representations. Hence this object is not a self-identical entity. It is different from itself. It is a self-differential structure in temporal dimension. The self-differential structure is due to the endless play of deferral in temporality.

"The source of certitude in general is the primordial character of the living now, it is necessary therefore to keep retention in the sphere of primordial certitude and to shift the frontier between the primordial and the nonprimordial. The frontier much pass not between the pure present and the nonpresent, i.e., between the actuality and inactuality of a living now, but rather between two forms of the re-turn or re-situation of the present: re-tention and re-presentation."\textsuperscript{14}

Derrida explains the deferral as the play of trace displacing the trace left. It means that trace is self-erasure. At every moment the trace left is displaced by the next trace of the next moment. From moment to moment there is a perpetual deferral of what is inscribed on the sensory apparatus. Such momentary dispersed object is not perceived by consciousness.
Hence, the object in question is not present to consciousness. The object is perceived as identical to itself over time. According to Derrida, perception requires the functioning of an ideality. Ideality works as a linkage between these dispersed representations. The object remains identical to itself due to the functioning of ideality. Hence, the perceptual object is not the object that is dispersed in temporal dimension. It is only an ideality over time that is present in perception. Let us find out as to what the status of this ideality with reference to the object in question is. The presence of the perceptual object to consciousness is not due to the identity between the ideality and the dispersed representation. According to Derrida there is a play of difference that takes place here. The abiding ideality differs from momentary percept. No ideality can be identical with the deferring object. Hence what is presented to consciousness is not identical with the object in question but may be regarded as difference. According to him, deferral is prior to any conscious awareness or perceptual experience of the object. It is the mediation that conceals the direct presentation of the thing itself. What we take as a perceptual presentation is actually a re-presentation.

What is represented is different from what is presented. The object presented to consciousness is deferred in time dimension. Due to the deferral there is a difference between impression and retention. The represented retention as the foundation of perception interprets the impression. Hence, the presented original object is deferred in time and re-presented as retention. According to Derrida, impression is original but not retention. Re-presented is only originary. It is originated from the original. Hence there is a difference between original and originary. What
is presented to consciousness is only what is re-presented in time. What is originally presented is always represented or interpreted due to deferral in time. Hence, perception of presence rather than absence takes place by means of projection of what is represented to consciousness by consciousness. It leads to the crucial difference between origin and originary.

"That which is not subjected to the process of differance is present. The present is that from which we believe we are able to think time, effacing the inverse necessity: to think the present from time as difference."15

There is also another intrinsic moment of deferring in perception. The adumbrated object is seen as an aspect of totality. Totality is the totality of adumbrations. Such a totality can never be apprehended. It functions only as an ideal synthesis. It regulates our sense of a finally adequate vision. The totality is not a presence to consciousness. It is an endless deferral. Husserl's ideal of fulfilment defers in such that undermines the principle of all principles. Hence there can be no identity between an absence and consciousness. According to Derrida, the abiding ideality is not a presence as such. Ideality for its presence depends upon the functioning of a signifier. Hence, it is not a self-presence or immediate presence. Accordingly, Derrida argues that meaning that are fully present to consciousness are in principle impossible. The idea of meaning is the idea of repeatable ideality. Repeatability is not a feature that can be present. The signifier on which it depends for its existence is also a self-
differential structure. There is no identity between ideality and signifier. There is difference between them as they are differential structures to themselves as well as to each other.

Husserl also speaks of certain 'difference'. But that difference is the difference between two beings or essences. It is a general kind of difference among most general characters or the genus. For Husserl, this difference is not a given in intuition rather a difference between two particular intuitive acts.

However, Derrida is not speaking about this kind of difference of generic nature among being but the difference; within one and the same being. The being is scattered into retention, impression and protention in a single intuitive moment. Derridian analysis penetrates into different regions of the being deconstructing the self-identity. Even among these different regions retention is the originary basis. It interprets the impression and gives rise to protention. According to Derrida, the retention itself is a trace. It is not an original impression or an original presence but only originary. The trace is the product of circular nature of the mind or consciousness.

"... productions of mind thanks to which the latter returns to itself, comes back to consciousness and cognizance and comes to its proper place by returning to it, in a circle. What is called [s'appelle: lit. "calls itself"] mind is that which says to itself "come" only to hear itself already saying "come back." The mind is what it is, says what it means, only by returning. Retracing its steps, in a circle."
It amounts to the ternary rhythm of circulation. Pastness in its truth encircles itself. It is the circle of circle of philosophical encyclopaedia.

**Time and Metaphysics of Time**

Heidegger's question of being undertakes the destruction of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, the question of being is linked to the discourse of metaphysics. It is like the question of meaning as it is linked to the lexical and grammatical discourse of metaphysics. The question of meaning of Being makes the Being determined. It is the metaphysical tendency to preserve meaning. According to Bataille, it is a "vulgure" tendency.

The question of meaning of time also makes it determined. It establishes metaphysics of time. Metaphysics is different from what is there. Time is metaphysically determined with reference to the concept of presence. According to Heidegger it assures the presence of the present. It tells us that time is. It is Being, the presence of present tense. It makes the time to be considered of composed 'now' points. Heidegger says that the now points are not simultaneous. Hence the unity and identity of the now are problematical. The identical now becomes always the other to the temporal flow of time. The flow itself makes time a stream of temporal difference. Time as unified now cannot be identified with its structural difference. According to Heidegger, since the now being always the other the presence of the present is lost. Temporal flow is composed of non-simultaneous parts. It makes time the impure unity of past and future without present. Hence time is not Being but non-being. This view of time
destructions the metaphysics of time with reference to presence. It is an exoteric aporia of time's non-existence. Time is both no longer and not yet without is. Heidegger discloses time's bare existence. According to Heidegger past and future overtake the present. Presence of the present is the meaning or essence of being(s). According to Heidegger none of the parts of the time is present. What are the parts of time are not past, future as well as present. Hence time is not. It does not participate in presence. Heidegger viewpoint undermines the traditional tendency of privileging the present tense throughout the history of metaphysics. Heidegger's analysis of time makes a radical attack on Husserl's intuitive time making it an other to temporal flow.

According to Derrida's evaluation, Heidegger destroys the metaphysics of presence from Aristotle to Hegel and Husserl. For them, the pure presence is the desirable good. The desire itself is inspired by the prime presence itself. Hence it is the prime mover. It is the pure act as well. It animates all movements. The prime presence is the supreme. Hegel calls it telos, the absolute concept or subject. It puts movement in motion. It orients becoming towards itself. For Husserl, it is the original moment of impression that intuit itself as the self-presence. For Hume, it is the self-interpreting ideas. For Aristotle, it is the self-thinking thought. Here the supreme presence is transformed into a subject that thinks itself. It is the self-thinking subject. In this pure act of self-thinking, it assembles itself near itself in knowledge. It is the absolute subjectivity. It is for-itself and near itself. By self-thinking it transforms into self-presence. It is made possible by erasing its time. It assembles itself as timeless self-presence.
effacing its difference. It is the thought of thought that thinks itself. It is the prime mover that returns to itself. It is the self-presence of the infinite circle with no beginning no end. It is immobile in the infinite movement of the circle. It has no objectivity and exteriority. It culminates into the metaphysics of God who thinks himself. It is the onto-theo-teleology.

The question of time is also like this. It considers time as nothing but the existence of the circle. It is the end of the logic that is the circle of circles. In its movement it dissimulates its circularity. Its totality is the unity of its beginning and its end. It is its totality in its circle. By the same way it hides itself from itself. Hence, it loses in difference. Its beginning as well as end becomes derivative. It cannot be anticipated in a temporal development. Hence, it is the pure concept that conceives itself. It erases itself and never realizes itself. In this sense it cannot be extracted from onto-theo-teleology. The meaning belongs to onto-theo-teleology. Time becomes the anticipation of its meaning. According to Derrida, time cannot be related to appearing, truth, essence or presence. Time is suppressed at the question of its meaning. Hence, the only answer to the question of meaning or Being of time is: Time is that which erases itself. According to Derrida, this erasure is a writing. It gives time to be read. It maintains time in suppressing itself. According to Derrida, time as the other to the metaphysics of time is there. It presents itself to consciousness. It is not intuitive time of now points, which is fissured into impression, retention and protention. They are the cognitive aspects of internal intuition where experience of time itself becomes the metaphysics of time. Time as exterior presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition. Everything

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manifests in exterior time. Even consciousness, itself manifests in time. In this process of manifestation it does not grasp the pure concept of time. Maximum it can have an empty intuition of time. In the process of manifestation it does not eliminate time. Time is not what is grasped by self. Time manifests itself. Everything manifests in and through time. Time is there. The concept grasped of time suppresses its temporal form. Self-manifestation of time is the necessity for manifestation of everything else, even for the process of grasping the concept of time. Yet the concept grasped does not fall into temporal manifestation. According to Derrida, it is like Hegelian Being. It departs from time to enter parousia. In metaphysics, time is thought on the basis of the model of circle where it appears as the movement of sphere. All other movements are measured by this basic movement. Even time itself is measured by this movement. Hence, in the metaphysical thought time appears to be a circle, an endless beginningless infinite circle, an eternal self-presence of present. Derrida argues that time lets itself be said. It is made by means of the concept "present". This concept is implicit in the relation between time and Being. This implicit concept is generated by the present participle 'being'. It is the present of present. Hence, time, according to Derrida, is only an (in)being. It means that it is (in)being.

"In believing one knows what time is, in its physics, the question that will be asked only later has implicitly been answered and this permits the conclusion, in the exoteric aporia, of time's bare existence, that is, its non-existence. One already knows, even if only in the naive practice of
discourse, what time must be, what past (gegone) or future (mellie) mean, in order to reach the conclusion of time's bare existence or non-existence. And past and future are thought as attenuating affections overtaking the presence, which is known to be the meaning or essence of what is (beings). This is what will not budge from Aristotle to Hegel.¹⁸

Hence, time is also thought of nonbeing or absence in its metaphysical sense as an opposition to the other metaphysical sense of being or presence. It clearly denotes the metaphysics that ultimately depends on the fundamental contrasts of binary oppositions that depend on each other for their illusory projection having no positive basis.

**Meaning and Time**

Derrida's analysis of time, has its reference to the notion of meaning. Here, meaning is considered in the context of lived conscious experience with the backdrop of language. Hence, Derrida compares it to the theatrical effect. Both meaning and theatre perform in the present. Meaning is broadcasted live in the present as a stage demonstration projects events as happening in the present. Both the meaning and theatre claims the presence of the present.

But it is merely a theatrical effect. The play of ghost illusorily presents the presence. The presence of present is a phantasm. According to Derrida, the moment of present in language is a play. The content of experience is only a surface effect. It is the presence in general, meaning, consciousness, the horizon. Accordingly, the pure infinite opening is always already framed in
time. The present is made up of past and future. It makes present a part and suddenly apart, a play, a question. Derrida contrasts the present tense with future perfect tense. It contains a kind of contortion of time. It implies both past and future simultaneously but no present. It is just like the play of differences. The meaning seems to rise up into a kind of illusory present and then fold under like a wave. Derrida has explained this elaborately in his books 'Margins of Philosophy' and 'Writing and Difference'.

In his deconstruction of textuality Derrida uses several images such as dissemination, the column, the theatre, castration and mimesis. These images cannot be explained. All such explanation will remain with the surface effect of the present. Yet we can say that column is the illusion of present. "The column is nothing, has no meaning in itself. A hollow phallus, cut off from itself, decapitated." The column of the text stands forth like the present. The seeming presence of meaning asserts itself like explanation. At one moment it asserts, the next moment it is decapitated. The surface effect of pure presence will have already castrated. In this play, the text and reader, subject and object, become intertwined. The play of differences deconstructs the binary oppositions like text/ commentary, author/ book, book/ reader, meaning/ sound, signified/ signifier, origin/ expression, subject/ object, etc. The interplay of meaning uproots all dichotomies. According to Derrida the meaning (n)either exist (n)or do no exist. No signifier never has nor ever will belong to any meaning. Dissemination is always a restless tension that will disallow any signifier to settle into any meaning. Meaning never settles into the present tense, into being. Derrida's deconstruction demonstrates how logocentric
metaphysics is impossible. According to him, there is no eternal metaphysical principle.

3. Difference in Writing

(A) Critique of Phenomenology of Language

Speech over writing has been favoured in the tradition of philosophy. This aspect of speech is evident from Platonic idealistic philosophy to the Romantic philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Even the modern linguistic philosophy of Ferdinand de Saussure the anthropology of Claude Levi-Strausse and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology favours speech over writing. This phenomenon of privileging the spoken word over written, is called phonocentrism. Phonocentrism is essentially related to logocentrism. In phonocentrism the immediate presence of the meaning in spoken word is the logos.

"Logos" is originally, a Greek term which means word, truth, reason and law. Ancient Greeks believed that there is a cosmic principle hidden deep within human beings, speech and the universe.

Transcendental Signified

They called this natural principle as logos meaning thereby reason within human or the law within the universe. It is also meant as the principle of truth revealed in voice or word. Truth is the voice of absolute cause. It is the word in which truth is expressed as original. Hence, it is central and natural. In new Testament, the Gospel of St. John declares the identity of God with word. It may be termed as the transcendent cause, and everything in the universe is the effect of it. God-word is transcendent means that it lies
beyond everything else. God makes the rules preventing the free play of the created world.

God makes the rules for the universe and centres it. He is beyond the rules as well as the structure of the world. Accordingly, the rules are known as the expression of the Divine Will of the Word Spirit. The Divine Will is the meaning that lies beyond everything in the whole universe. It is the transcendental that is signified as the inner principle or meaning of the cosmic consciousness.

The laws are the logos expressed in the God-Word. This idea is classically represented by the traditional theory of phonocentrism. According to Derrida, Husserl had radicalized the traditional theory in his phenomenology of language, the theory of internal language of thought and intention.

In phonocentrism, the spoken word is privileged as having the presence of origin. Meaning is originally present in speech but is absent in writing. The immediate presence of the origin is the logos in phonocentrism making it a version of logocentrism. It is the basis of traditional linguistic theory of phonocentrism.21

Derrida's analysis of phonocentrism directs the same argument made by phonocentrism against itself. Phonoceentricism favours speech over writing since writing has a differential structure. Derrida's analysis demonstrates that speech is also a differential structure and makes use of the same differential structure of writing against phonocentrism.

Derrida's demonstration of difference in writing can be approached by (3-A) critique of phenomenology of internal language of thought and intention.
and by [(3-B) Chapter – IV] the critique of structuralism. Let us first examine
Derrida's demonstration of difference in writing by the critique of
phenomenology. The latter will be examined in the next chapter.

Internal Language of Thought and Intention

The medium of consciousness is mistakenly regarded as the self-
presenting principle in Husserl and the same mistake creeps into linguistic
area too. Due to this mistake the medium of language becomes a self-
identical presence of meaning that constitute the internal language of thought
and intention. Moreover, Husserl's linguistic identity establishes an identity
between the mediums of consciousness and language. Universal concepts
are said to be contentless because of the lack of reference to such external
concrete entities. Despite these logical and epistemological impossibilities,
Husserl makes a difference between abstract concept and abstract content
that is logical content and sets out to achieve the same through eidetic
intuition by means of transcendental logic through the process of
phenomenological abstraction in order to attain the 'essential'. Husserl calls
the logical contents as the eidos, the basis of experience. It is the essential
structure of noematic contents of experience. Eidos are experienced as
abstract universal entities and immanent in consciousness. They are the
ground of reason and abstract content of abstract concepts. This
phenomenological discovery of transcendental content represents the logos of
phonoceentrism. The contents are identified with thought-terms which are
logical and abstract in nature. Thus the thought terms have their sense and
referents which are intrinsically interconnected.
According to Husserl, this internal language of thought and intention is the absolute beginning. Because, language in phenomenology unfolds meaning of phenomenological intuitive entities. The manifested language is the principium, the foundation for absolute beginning. The manifested primordial dator intuition is the principle of all principles.

"No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the principle of all principles: that every primordial dator intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself...... as we have put it in the introductory words of this chapter, an absolute beginning, called in a genuine sense to provide foundations, a principium." 22

Derrida interrogates Husserl at the crucial point of manifestation or unfolding of meaning in the form of statement. Here, Derrida finds a difference between signifier and signified or term and meaning. He further shows a difference between the primordial dator and meaning. Rather, there is an irreducible difference among the principle of all principles, the meaning and the principium. For, Husserl such a difference is unravelled since he makes an identity between the principle and principium. Meaning for him is the very nature of identity in which it is self-present.

Signification And Signifying

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Husserl’s theory of language is essentially related with his theory of intentionality. According to Husserl intentionality of consciousness has two aspects viz. signification and signifying. Signification is the objective aspect of intending the meaning. Husserl makes a clear cut distinction between meaning and content of meaning. Meaning is the characteristic act of consciousness as intentionality. Intuition of consciousness is the intuitive content of meaning. This can be explained as noema of phenomenological analysis. In neurobiological or cognitive study it is called qualia. According to Husserl the content of meaning is different from meaning itself, though they are related. Husserl explains the relationship in the following way:

"Correlatively meaning as posited can also be said to have its own rightness: it stands within the rational consciousness equipped with the noematic character of rightness, which essentially belongs moreover to the posited meaning in its capacity as the noematic thesis so qualified together with this content of meaning. Or to state it more accurately, there “belongs” to it a fullness made up in this way, which on its own side furnishes the ground for the rational character of the thesis."23

Meaning is the transcendental referent or eidos or signification. Verbal expression is identified with it. Signification being the generic ideal characteristic, sign is needed to express them. Hence, in phenomenology of language, there is an implicit shift from consciousness to language. In
postmodern period this shift is explicit in cases such as deconstruction which focuses on Husserlian internal Language of thought and intention. Due to the supposed identity of the generic characteristic of eidos with consciousness as its essential structure, consciousness itself becomes a kind of linguistic stream by means of identity of the so-called eidetic meanings with the thought terms. Hence in Husserlian phenomenological analysis his theory of language rests upon double edged identity i.e. identity between consciousness and its structure as its essence and identity between essence or meaning with the sign since the ideal entities cannot exist or even be expressed as such without sign as they are different from their content or particular intuitive images.

"Verbal expressions are no doubt often accompanied by images, which may stand in an intimate or a distant relation to their meanings, but to treat such accompaniments as necessary conditions for understanding runs counter to the plainest facts. Thereby we know that the meaningfulness of an expression – let alone its very meaning – cannot consist in the existence of such images, and cannot be disturbed by their absence."24

Hence, according to Husserl applying sign to meaning is a necessary process for the live stream of meaning-consciousness. Signifying is the subjective aspect of applying sign to signification. It is this second phase it is essentially related with language since it includes sign. It does not mean that signification is totally unrelated to Husserlian theory of language rather
it may be regarded as the meaning-supplying process. Both these acts are essentially united in Husserl's theory of language. Moreover, both these acts are intrinsically identified within the act of intentionality. As far as the theory of language is concerned both these aspects of intentionality are unique and inevitable as meaning cannot be expressed without signs and signs without meaning are mere senseless traces that can never constitute a linguistic network.

According to Husserl's theory of expression pure signification are inexpressible without signs. Accordingly even consciousness cannot become conscious of those species of meaning without signifying. Hence both signification and signifying are two aspects that are identified with each other within one and the same act of intentionality. If signification is the conferring act of consciousness that supplies meaning to signs, then signifying is the expressive act of consciousness that applies signs to signification. Pure significations devoid of signifying remains unintelligible and pure sign without significations are mere babbling.

Significations are the entities that are transcendental to both space and time but signifying is a contingent act of consciousness. It is the indispensable physical phase of intentionality that has space-time reference. It has reference to context or situations. Signification is the pure objective process because it is transcendental to psychological subjective aspects. Signifying includes a corporeal and graphic aspect. This is the sensuous aspect of sign that is related with the linguistic structures.
Theory of Expression

Husserl’s theory of signifying and signification are confined to linguistic spheres as well as to intentional acts of consciousness. His linguistic theory of expression explains as to how the inexpressible pure thoughts of intentions become expressible by means of linguistic signifiers.

According to Husserl meaning as ideal unities are logical. For him, Logic is the science of meaning, the ideal essence,

"Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, judgements, and syllogism, is exclusively concerned with the *ideal* unities that we here call 'meanings'. If we take the trouble to detach the ideal essence of meanings from their psychological and grammatical connections, if we try, further, to clear up their *a priori* relations of adequacy, founded in this essence, to the objective correlates that they mean, we are already within the domain of pure logic"\(^{25}\)

According to Husserl, the pure logical meanings or logos. This logical nucleus of particulars itself is the conceptual. Hence pure logical form is identified with the conceptual general. Hence,

"*Logical meaning (Bedeutung) is an expression.*

The verbal sound can be referred to as expression only because the meaning which belongs to it expresses; it is in it that the expressing originally lies. "Expression" is a remarkable form, which permits of being adapted to every
"meaning" (to the noematic "nucleus") and realise it to the realm of the "logos", of the conceptual, and therewith of the "general".

Generally, it is considered that the sole function of language is to communicate with others. Though communication is the eminent function of language, to communicate with others is not the only function of language, but to communicate with oneself too. Derrida recognizes this fact as follows:

"Writing is a body that expresses something only if we actually pronounce the verbal expression that animates it, if its space is temporialized. The word is a body that means something only if an actual intention animates it and makes it pass from the state of inert sonority (Körper) to that of an animated body (Leib). This body proper to words expresses something only if it is animated (sinnbelebt) by an act of meaning (bedeuten) which transforms it into a spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit). But only the Geistigkeit or Lebendigkeit is independent and primordial. As such, it needs no signifiers to be present to itself... Such is the traditional side of Husserl's language."27

It is evident in the case of internal monologue that there is a pure private phenomenon of speech or thinking. It is the stream of self-consciousness by which one communicates with oneself about one's own thoughts and intentions. Through the stream of self-consciousness one speaks to
oneself as an other in a pathological state of auditory-verbal hallucination. Pure thinking without uttering or signifying as a matter of fact is never experienced. Utterance or communicability must be coloured in the form of an expression which needs to have recourse to sign in order to express not only to other but even to oneself. Thoughts are given in and through signs. Sign is the form of expression of intention. Husserl's theory of language describes as to how we live language in speaking, hearing and thinking by means of linguistic signs.

Husserl identifies sense with sign in the unity of intentional act. According to phenomenology of language this identity is an experience of the agreement. This agreement is the truth. If there is no agreement then it is false. Consequently, according to Husserl, identity is truth, difference is false. Identity is truth because it is the identity between two self-identicals, i.e. the self-identical state of affair and self-identical meaning.

"The experience of agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs, is inward evidence: the idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity. It is not a chance fact that a prepositional thought, occurring here and now, agrees with a given state of affairs: the agreement rather holds between a self-identical prepositional meaning, and a self-identical state of affairs."

According to Husserl, the experience of identity is the inward evidence. It is the identity that makes possible the repeatability of sign. Hence the
signifier signifies the signified repeatedly in different places and times. Without such a linguistic identity no ordinary language can function. Identity is essential for the function of meaning and works of culture. Because of identity, significations are comprehensible to anyone, and expressible in discourse. According to Husserl, signs are significations themselves. Because of the identity the sign has got a referential function and denotes beyond itself.

Nevertheless, Husserl makes a distinction between sensuous aspect of sign and non-sensuous aspect of sign. The sensory aspect of the sign is the objective aspect of sound or word as physical. Non-sensory aspect is the subjective aspect of sign that is identified with the meaning. It is the linguistic life of meaning-consciousness. Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes the surrogative function of sign as denoting something else. Hence, intentionality of consciousness is the life of sign that makes it different from its sensory aspect or physical aspect.

"This situation is quite inadequately described if one talks of the 'surrogative function of signs', as if the signs themselves did duty for something, and as if our interest in symbolic thinking were directed to the signs themselves. Signs are in fact not objects of our thought at all, even surrogatively; we rather live entirely in the consciousness of meaning, of understanding, which does not lapse when accompanying imaginary does so. One must bear in mind that symbolic thinking is only thinking in virtue of a new
intentional act-character: this distinguishes the meaningful sign from the mere sign, i.e. the sounded word set up as a physical object in our mere presentations of sense."

However, Husserl makes a distinction between complete expression and incomplete expression. Complete expression is the total unity or identity of the expression and expressed. According to him

"We must further lay stress on the difference between complete and incomplete expression. The unity of the expressing and the expressed in the phenomenon is indeed that of a certain congruence, but the upper layer need not extend its expressing function over the entire lower layer. Expression is complete when the stamp of conceptual meaning has been fixed upon all the synthetic forms and significations of the lower layer; incomplete when this is only partially effected..."  

Therefore, every sign is a sign of something. In its communicative function sign transmits a sense which makes the sign significant. Bereft of sense, a sign is mere flatus vocis. In a linguistic signifier sense and sign are united mysteriously within the unity of intentional consciousness which may be regarded as the essential moment of identity of discursive language. Husserl calls sign as signification and regarded them as object. According to him, the very possibility of communication depends upon the objectivity of signification. Signification is not exhaustively reducible to its

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psychological, sociological historical or pragmatic circumstances. Beyond these aspects, a sign has its signification because of its identity.

Derrida considers Husserl's theory of linguistic identity as the privilege point of conferring meaning. He views it as radicalization of traditional linguistic theory of phonocentrism. In phonocentrism speech is privileged over writing, as meaning is immediately present in speech whereas writing is only graphic representation of the former. Writing is only a deformation of speech that contains the essence of language. Speech is closer to thought and thus to the emotions, ideas and intentions of the speaker and it is the essence of language. Writing is only secondary representing the sounds of language and it is only an aid to memory. Phonocentrism is of the position that since the speaker hears himself speaking at the same moment the listener does, there is an immediacy that guarantees the notion when we say, that we mean, and know what we have said.

Difference in Phonocentrism

Derrida argues that the idea of presence lies in privileging spoken word over written word. It is considered that in the former case meaning is present since the speaker and listener are present both temporally and spatially to the same utterance. The simultaneous presence of speaker, speech and listener present meaning as self-present in spoken word as there is an identity between what is intended by the speaker and what is understood by the listener as recognized by both simultaneously. Thus the spatio-temporal presence makes meaning possible through the identity of meaning as what is
intended and understood as one and the same with the spoken word. Phonocentrism implies that there is complete identity between meaning and term because of the identical recognition of meaning by both speaker and listener.

"Conversation is, then, a communication between two absolute origins that, if one may venture for formula, auto-affect reciprocally, repeating as immediate echo the auto-affection produced by the other." 31

According to phonocentrism, the voice is absent in writing. In phonocentrism voice is determined as being. Being as voice is guaranteed in speech as the direct or immediate manifestation of logos. Speech takes place within the periodicity of voice. Periodicity of voice is the immediate presence of now which necessarily includes the spatio-temporal proximity of the speaker and listener. The presence of the speaker can clarify the meaning of the speech undoubtedly. Hence, meaning is the self-present in speech. Speech is the transparent medium for the presence of meaning. Voice, in turn, is the guarantee of the authority of speech. Meaning as logos is self-revealed in it. Self-revelation of logos is the articulation of logos to itself. It is the mechanism of self-presence of logos as self originated and self-existing. For this the transparent medium of voice is used. Self-revelation binds meaning to a destination. Speech in its itinerary is the final destination of logos. Telos of logos is speech. In phonocentrism writing is marginalized for its distancing of the voice.
Voice with its structure of nowness constitutes the "living" speech. According to Derrida, this phonocentric speech system produces its own signifier. In the audiophonic system the signifier does not fall out of speech. Hence Derrida would like to contradict by bringing the problems of cry as well as speech.

"One must understand speech in terms of this diagram. Its system requires that it be heard and understood immediately by whoever emits it. It produces a signifier which seems not to fall into the world, outside the ideality of the signified, but to remain sheltered ...... Within so-called "living" speech, the spatial exteriority of the signifier seems absolutely reduced. It is in the context of this possibility that one must pose the problem of the cry—of that which one has always excluded, pushing it into the area of animality or of madness, like the myth of the inarticulate cry—and the problem of speech (voice) within the history of life."^32

In both the problems of cry and speech there is the exteriority of signifier. The pure interiority of auto-affection, according to Derrida, is a myth. The phonic signifier with the periodicity of voice falls into exteriority of space. Hence, whoever emits it, hears and understands it not immediately but mediately. Hence the signifier is outside the ideality of the signified differing the identity between them.

According to Phonocentrism speech has immediacy whereas in written word there is spatio-temporal non-simultaneity between the writer.
and the reader. Hence meaning is subject to all sorts of adulteration in writing. The absence of immediate presence of meaning is caused by the structural and yet differential nature of written word as representative of phonetic and graphic element that are inherent in it. Derrida interrogates the immediacy of meaning that is present in spoken word and as absent in written word.

"Immediacy is here the myth of consciousness. Speech and the consciousness of speech—that is to say consciousness simply as self-presence—are the phenomenon of an auto-affection lived as suppression of difference. That phenomenon, that presumed suppression of difference, that lived reduction of the opacity of the signifier, are the origin of what is called presence". 33

According to Derrida, the structural difference that written word is to possess is more or less the same in spoken word too. The reason that Derrida advanced is that due to its nature of punctuation, presence of sound variable and unrepresented silence speech is not entirely at the auditory level. Given such problematics, how can meaning be identified with the spoken word which is already structured by difference? Derrida argues that the immediate self-presence of meaning in speech is nothing but a mere imagination. He rejects the phonocentric notion of difference between speech and writing on the basis of immediacy vs. mediacy or presence vs. absence or identity vs. difference. Having shown the idea of
presence as lying in phonocentrism, Derrida rejects the phonocentric notion of self presence of meaning as mere illusion.

According to Derrida, phonocentrism is the most revealing theory of notion of the presence. His investigation shows that phonocentrism is the origin of the principle of presence and explains as to how the principle of presence has functioned within the western philosophical tradition. Within the tradition of philosophy writing has always been treated with suspicion due to phonocentrism. Accordingly, Derrida sets himself preoccupied with the problematic of writing.

According to him the phonocentric positing of the problematic of writing as fissured in its value is itself the problematic of speech as fissured in its value. The phonocentric attempt is a conservation of this problem foreboded within speech to writing. By this way phonetic sign affects self-presence that is already there. According to Derrida, this auto-affection of self-presence is the condition of experience.

"From the moment that nonpresence comes to be felt within speech itself—and there is at least a foreboding of it from the very threshold of articulation and diacriticity—writing is somehow fissured in its value. On the one hand, as we have seen, it is the effort of symbolically reappropriating presence. On the other, it consecrates the dispossession that had already dislocated the spoken word. In both senses, one may say that in one way or another, it had already begun..."
to undermine and shape "living" speech, exposing it to the death within the sign.34

According to Phonocentrism meaning is not self-present in writing as it includes pictographic, ideographic and phonetic elements. Writing is not identical with itself due to the operation of signifier. Meaning cannot be identical with a self-differential structure. According to Derrida, this deprecation of writing points to a forgotten primal scene within the history of western philosophy whose mediatory operations of signifier assumed self-revelation of logos. Derrida interrogates the theory of phonocentrism by arguing that meaning is not self present in speech. According to him, speech is already structured by difference and distance as much as writing is. There is no justification for opposing the two terms on the basis of presence vs. absence, immediacy vs. representation. Living speech is purely graphic as much as writing is. Speech is not entirely auditory. It has an irreducible graphic element which cannot be detected at the level of voice. Punctuation, sound variables and the unrepresentative silence of speech reveal its graphic nature. Since this graphic nature is a self-differential structure, it challenges the notion of identity. The very fact that a word is divided into a phonic signifier and a mental signified indicates that language as such is already constituted by the very distances and differences that it seeks to overcome.

Phenomenological Phonocentrism

Husserl attempted to establish the principle of presence in the linguistic context where he identified sign with pure presence. His theory of
internal language of thought and intention explains the principle of presence as identified with sign.

The internal language of thought and intention is composed of magical thought terms. These mystical thought terms are intrinsically identified with their sense and referents whose nature determines their sense and referents. By his theory of internal language of thought and intention, Husserl radicalised the traditional theory of phonocentrism by means of identity of eidos with sign in the subjectivity of transcendental consciousness. It is a theory of language that privileges speech over writing, so to say, a theory which has given privilege over inner speech of monologue. According to Husserl, this stream of consciousness in solitary mental life is the expressive essence of language. In Husserl's theory it is the transcendental consciousness where from the logocentric language springs forth. The logos are voiced logos in the act of expression. Hence the voiced logos of speech is privileged over writing.

What first makes mental commerce possible, and turns connected speech into discourse, lies in the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences of communicating persons which is effected by the physical side of speech. Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are mutually correlated.35

Husserl's theory of intentionality with its both acts of conferring and expressing makes the immediate presence of meaning in the internal
language of thought and intention. Though, like phonocentrism, Husserl's theory of linguistic intentionality privileges speech over writing, retains the privilege point of identity between meaning and thought terms. Derrida rejects both the standpoints of privilege of speech over writing and of identity. Phonocentrism undergirds writing as phonetic representation of the sounds of speech. It includes the irreducible graphic elements making it totally the other to speech sounds and because of that the immediate presence of meaning is absent. But Derrida argues that speech itself is composed of an irreducible structure of voice variables. Speech is not entirely auditory as long as it includes the graphic nature of punctuation and the unrepresentable silences as spaces of speech. Then, if meaning cannot be identified with self-differential structure of writing it can never be identified with speech either, as it is also made of self-differential structures. Hence, Derrida says that the classical privilege of speech over writing is no more tenable since identity of meaning with speech is merely an imagination.

It is only a matter of convention. The very possibility of opposing the two terms on the basis of presence vs. absence or immediacy vs. representation is an illusion, since speech is already structured by difference and distance as much as writing is. According to Derrida, it is the same case with Husserlian linguistic identity of intentionality. Husserl says that sense and referents are identified with the internal thought and intention. But Derrida interrogates that as long as these magical thought-terms include signs they are of the structures of self-difference. No identity of meaning with these self-differential structures is possible. So instead of
identity there is difference in speech or writing. According to Derrida, the very nature of writing as it includes pictographic, ideographic and phonocentric elements indicate difference. It challenges the notion of identity as it is not identical with itself. It is neither presence nor absence but only a trace, mark or grapheme. According to Derrida writing replaces being and it is more original than the phenomenal forms as it becomes the precondition for the latter. It is virtuous but not phenomenal, it is not what is produced but what makes production possible.

Derrida interrogates such a linguistic identity. According to him, a term basically divided into a phonic signifier and a mental signified and the term itself is a structural difference that proves identity as a mere incoherent supposition. Derrida's study of language shows that meaning is endlessly slipping from sign to sign from time to time making writing as an activity of difference. In this activity, the substitution of sign to the thing itself is both secondary and provisional.

"Whether we are concerned with the verbal or the written sign, with the monetary sign, or with electoral delegation and political representation, the circulation of signs defers the moment in which we can encounter the thing itself, make it ours, consume or expend it, touch it, see it, intuit its presence. What I am describing here in order to define it is the classically determined structure of the sign in all the banality of its characteristics—signification as the difference of temporisation. And this structure presupposes that the
sign, which defers presence, in conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. According to this classical semiology, the substitution of the sign for the thing itself is both secondary and provisional: secondary due to an original and lost presence from which the sign thus derives; provisional as concerns this final and missing presence toward which the sign in this sense is a movement of mediation.36

Through the strategy of deconstruction, Derrida moves from the conceptual dimension of language to its unconceptualizable dimension which enabled him to think on the unthinkable. Derrida argues that since there is endless slippage of meaning, the fixidity between the signifier and signified is at stake making the linguistic identity an impossibility that said to provide self-presence of meaning.

According to Derridian analysis, Husserl's strategy of radicalisation of phonocentrism in his theory of internal language of thought and intention was a failure. The differential structure of language contaminates the expressive purity of inner speech. Difference in linguistic context suggests two things. (1) Meaning is the function of difference or contrasts within a network of terms. (2) It suggests an endless deferral of any final fixed point or privileged meaning that determines the relationship with the extra linguistic. According to him, there is perpetual slippage of meaning from sign to sign and from moment to moment in the linguistic chain. Hence
there is no possibility of achieving rigorously theorized account of the structures and modalities of internal time-consciousness. Consequently, it suggests that there is no relationship between speaker's meaning in language which functions as a network of differential signs. Derrida argues that difference, absence and writing turn out to be more fundamental than identity, presence and speech. If phenomenology attempts to describe different sorts of objects that arise from the phenomena then deconstruction moves beyond the peripheral level of phenomena. It penetrates the very gap within the phenomena itself. It traces the gap that divides the different regions of being from one another. Deconstruction demonstrates that these different regions are never joined together.

Hence, Derrida claims that presence and absence, truth and falsehood are re-inscribed within their larger and differentiated context difference. *Difference* is the transcendental non-principle of undecidability, which does not mean that Derrida was aiming at a new relativism or scepticism or nihilism as others blame him. Rather such an outlook and perspectival make ethical responsibility genuinely possible.

**Deconstructive Strategy**

In order to show the difference rather than identity between sense and term Derrida adopts rhetorical, graphic and poetic strategies. His deconstructive employment of these strategies shows that the signified is not identified with the signifier and in a different sense the signified is no longer easily separable from the signifier. In the former sense he deconstructs immediate presence of being and in the latter sense he
replaces being by writing. It is the most necessary and yet controversial move in the whole Derridian enterprise. According to Derrida, identity is not a deeply entrenched truth but only a constructed matter of convention. It is invariably fragile that it is set up on the basis of a kind of trust. What Derrida's analysis shows is that the eternal metaphysical principles have an extremely fragile and ultimately ambiguous basis.

Proper/Improper

Derrida exemplifies that it is impossible to separate the poetic-cum-theoretical dimension of the text from the content, message or meaning. In this demonstration he turns the proper noun into improper. Proper noun is proper because it has a fixed identity but Derrida deconstructs these identities in his deconstructive style of writing through pun, anagram, etymology or any number of diacritical features. He shows that a proper name can be connected to one or more different systems of concepts, ideas or words including those of other languages. By connecting proper name to varying series of images, sounds, he makes the reference text to have a tangential relationship to the critical text. According to Derrida a name simply does not refer to a simple real or phenomenal object or person for it also has a rhetorical dimension. Because of this, writing in Derrida's sense provides an admirable source of creative and critical writing. This way of creative writing will prove that the reference text has only a tangential relationship to the critical text. Commonsense view tends to assume that interability is a more or less accidental quality of language. For Derrida, it is the very quality that irrevocably detaches the level of
signifier from the signified. Thus if meaning is related to context, there is, with respect to the very structure of language, no proper context to provide proof of a final meaning. Context is unbounded.

According to Derrida a proper name should refer to what it names. In order to refer properly, it should refer nothing else. A proper name should not have any meaning. They are not supposed to make any sense. But names are words caught up in a system of language. In a system they make sense and meaning. They contradict themselves. The 'non-sense', non-meaning is always already contaminated with sense. Hence the proper turns to be improper. The proper name is always already divided in proper like 'joy' in Joyce, 'words' in Worsworth, etc. Hence a name cannot be a symbol of authority. According to Derrida, Husserl's act of expression does not express the object as it is. According to Husserl, both sides of a sound as meaning-essence and meaning fulfilling content are somehow mutually conglomerated making communication possible.

"The sounded word is first made one with the meaning-intention, and this in its turn is made one (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfilments) with its corresponding meaning-fulfilment."^37

**Mental Signified and Transcendental Signified**

The intuitive objects of perpetual act of apprehension are essentially different from the identical object of signification and signifying. The latter amounts to understanding or judgement, which for Derrida, is the power to think.^38 The difference between intuitive perceptual act and intentional act
constitute another sense of difference in writing. The indispensable physical face of sign doesn't comprise the essential empirical phase of sense. As long as the subjective aspect of intuitive experiences is not communicable, the sign and the sense communicated have an irreducible limit of otherness. Because of this fundamental difference, for Derrida, language is a system of differences rather than a collection of independently meaningful units. According to Derrida, though language seeks to overcome this difference, it will never attain its goal since language as such is constituted by the very difference. The difference is inherent in any signifying Act of consciousness. Difference inhabits the core of what appears to be immediate and present. The illusion of self-presence of meaning is thus provided by the repression of the differential structures from which they spring. As soon as there is meaning, there is difference. Derrida's grammatology or the science of writing studies the effect of difference in the following way.

"To reanimate writing is always to reawaken an expression in an indication, a word in the body of a letter, which, as a symbol that may always remain empty, bears the threat of crisis in itself. Already speech was playing the same role by first constituting the identity of sense in thought. For example, the 'protogeometer' must produce the pure ideality of the pure geometrical object in thought by a passage to the limit, assuring its transmissibility by speech, and must finally commit it to writing. By means of this written inscription, one
can always repeat the original sense, that is, the act of pure thought, which created the ideality of sense.\textsuperscript{39}

The Logic of Supplementarity

According to Husserl, language is not language if it does not communicate in the absence of original objects. Language is essentially related to sense or meaning. The act of expression is not directly related to the intuitive objects but to the intentional objects. Sense or signification is the intentional object that is expressed in the act of signifying. According to Husserl, usage of an expression meaningfully relates it to the object that it represents is one and the same act. The intentional act is fulfilled by an intuitive act.

"If we may trust our arguments, we must not only draw a general distinction between the perceptual and the significant element in the statement of perception; we must also locate no part of the meaning in the percept itself. The percept, which presents the object, and the statement which, by way of the judgement (or by the thought-act inwoven into the unity of the judgement) thinks and expresses it, must be rigorously kept apart, even though, in the case of the perceptual judgement now being considered, they stand to each other in the most intimate relation of mutual coincidence, or in the unity of fulfilment".\textsuperscript{40}

What Derrida interrogates is that in language due to its constitutive nature of difference, the intentional sense is only a supplement. Hence the
intuitive fulfilment is not adequate to eradicate its functional nature. Various intuitive acts may be able to fulfil the intention of signification in various situations. But fulfilments never coincides neither necessarily nor perfectly due to the fact of ideality of meaning. Language always makes reference to the ideal meaning not to the facts of empirical subjectivity that is linked to a particular spatio-temporal situations.

The subjective lived experience as such is never expressed by any means of linguistic communication. There is a difference between object experienced and the object thought about. Intentionality itself is the meaning thought about by signified words. By means of signification and signifying word names the object or state of affairs but it never expresses as such. Here the act of intuitive fulfilment in which things themselves are present will not be sufficient because they are essentially different from their senses that are thought about. According to Husserl, discourse occurs even if the intention is neither fulfilled nor confirmed by intuition because signifying harbours a reference to the object. It is the object of sense that gives life to sign though they are different from sensible or sensuous object. Husserl's theory of language is concerned with signification and signifying of consciousness and not with the sensible intuition. To be the object of discourse, the object must be registered in an order of linguistic structures. Language fulfils the signification function regardless of the object that it refers to. So there is a difference between object of experience and object of expression. Expression never expresses the object as such. This enables one to speak without knowing, or seeing. Whatever that is expressed is supplement. According to Derrida, the supplement is due to
difference, it is not the self presence but absence. The loss of presence has always already begun. Speech itself springs out of an alienation or difference that has the very structure of writing.

"But why is Husserl not content with the difference between the existing (or perceived) word and the perception or being perceived, the phenomenon, of the word? It is because in the phenomenon of perception reference is made, within its phenomenal being, to the existence of the word. The sense of "existence" thus belongs to the phenomenon. This is no longer the case in the phenomenon of Imagination. In Imagination, the existence of the word is not implied, even by virtue of intentional sense. There exists only the imagination of the word which is absolutely certain and self-present insofar as it is lived. This, then, is already a phenomenological reduction which isolates the subjective experience as the sphere of absolute certainty and absolute existence."

The difference which causes the supplement is unconceptualizable. The presence of the supplement is not due to the self-presence of meaning but the desire for presence and meaning. Without the possibility of difference, the desire for presence as such would not find its breathing space. Difference produces what is forbids, making possible what it makes impossible.
Supplement is always a substitute for original object because of the fundamental structure of desire itself. Presence is not only an ambiguous but also dangerous idea. Supplement is a dangerous illusion. The word supplements has two meanings. It means both addition and substitute. It is added to something that is already present in which it is superfluous. It replaces something that is not present. Derrida calls this logic the logic of supplementarity and it is nothing less than a revolution in the logic of meaning. It revolts against the traditional tendency of marginalizing the supplement as simple exterior absence. It subverts the hierarchy of presence/absence and centralizes the pure addition of supplement as a remedy with a play of illusory presence and inherent absence.

"From then on, metaphysics consists of excluding non-presence by determining the supplement as simple exteriority, pure addition or pure absence…. Speech comes to be added to intuitive presence (of the entity, of essence, of the eidos, of ausia, and so forth); Writing comes to be added to living self-present speech; masturbation comes to be added so-called normal sexual experience; culture to nature, evil to innocence, history to origin, and so on."42

The very presence in the binary oppositions such as eidos/word, speech/writing, sex/masturbation, etc. themselves are supplements. The primary term is that with which presence is identified, the other is what is secondary or absence. Generally it is considered that absence depends upon presence but it is presence that depends upon absence because it is
a supplement. So the absence is added to presence and it replaces presence. According to Derrida the ideal sense identified with sign is the supplement. Supplement is constituted by the very difference between ideal sense and experienced sense. Experience as such can never be expressed. The experienced is the represented as different from what is originally presented. However, what is expressed as different from experienced is only ideal. This is an extra addition to the experience, in that case it is superfluous and the ideal meaning replaces experience. The supplement is dangerous because it adds something to that is already present. It is redemptive that it replaces something that is not present. The supplement is the result of the absence of self-presence of meaning itself that causes the desire for the self-presence of meaning. According to Derrida, this self-presence is a dangerous illusion. Moreover, because of its non-existential status, it is, as such, neither identified with the term nor detachable from the term. It is the difference in writing that the ideal entities are not identified with terms. Hence, to mean is always a 'not to be'. Consequently, only writing is. Hence, writing replaces being. Meaning is both dangerous and illusory play of differences from sign to sign from moment to moment. It is the ultimate sense of difference in writing.

Language as the Other

According to Immaneul Levinas, Husserl's transcendentality consciousness as the stream of internal language of thought and intention is closed itself in its egoism. It is a separated being. Transcendental always transcends itself in its own enclosure. It cannot be an end in itself having
accomplished its isolation proving the metaphysical self-presence. For Levinas, metaphysics is the relation to the other, having a transcendence beyond the absolute truth of radicalism of separation. According to Levinas the transcendence is accomplished as service and as hospitality. This metaphysical relation is ethical as well as linguistic respectively. He considers language as transcendence having possibility of hospitality. It permits transcendental relation accomplishable. To forget the transcendence of the other (language) is to shut itself in itself. Derrida recognizes Levinasian notion of language as the other. Let us see one example where he gives reference to Levinas' Concept of peace as distinguished from that of Kant.

"If language or the transcendence of the other are or translate hospitable friendship itself, then the interpretation of this translation distinguishes in troubling fashion (troubling because, as we began to see a moment ago, this distinction constantly risks being effaced) the Levinasian concept of "peace" from the Kantian one. This paradoxical legacy of Kant seems to be evoked in a sort of wry allusion to the peace of cemeteries that Toward Perpetual Peace also treats with irony. For Levinas, as for Kant, eternal peace must remain a peace of the living."

Language as absolute truth or radical separation gives rise to pluralism where Kant considers peace as coherence of elements that constitutes plurality. According to Levinas, it will lead to victory of some or 'peace of
empires’. Hence peace must be unity of plurality where I go to the other, in desire and goodness maintaining itself without egoism.

“The final pages of Totality and Infinity return to the proposition that, in the chapter entitled “The Dwelling”, refers to language in terms of non-violence, peace and hospitality. Levinas there speaks of what “is produced in language,” namely, “the positive development of this (my emphasis) relation with the other, without any border or negativity.” Twice in a few lines, the word “hospitality is identified with recollection in the home, but with recollection [recueillement] as welcome [accueil].” Recollection in a home open to the other—hospitality—is the concrete and initial fact of human recollection and separation it coincides with the Desire for the other absolutely transcendent.”

According to Levinas politics must never be left “to itself”. It must have a metaphysical relation transcendence towards the other as service i.e. ethics of the other and as hospitality i.e. language as the other more over non-violence and peace.

Prophetic Language: The Other of Logocentric Language

According to Derrida, the illusory self-presence of meaning or signified is caused by the desire for presence. As the desire itself is caused by absence, it includes the destiny of non-satisfaction. According to Derrida, the signified itself is not an experience of presence, but only a supplement. Derrida is of the opinion that if the signified itself can be an
experience then it is self presence. This self-presence of meaning is provided in prophetic language where meaning is the experienced sense in the form of revelation. In revelation the word with its sense or meaning is the direct experience. One of the peculiarities of this immediate experience is that it can be repeated by the prophet. This is the form of direct expression in which the self-presence is expressed as such. As long as it is considered as an expression, it is self-present. But the reading of prophecy by an other is again the case of supplement. This is the case when Derrida says that it is a dangerous illusion that one hears the voice of God within the text. Text can only give directions to the experiences. Text itself never becomes an experience, for, the meaning is only a supplement.
Notes and References:


6. Ibid., p. 16.

7. Ibid., p. 17.


12. Ibid., p. 11.

24. Ibid., p. 299.
25. Ibid., pp. 322-23.
26. Ibid., p. 347.


30. Ibid., p. 352.


32. Ibid., p. 166.

33. Ibid., p. 166.

34. Ibid., p. 166.


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44. Ibid., p. 92.