CHAPTER - II

THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
AND PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Introduction

Phenomenology is generally considered as the science of consciousness. Husserl's definition of consciousness is different from traditional understanding of consciousness. For him, consciousness is always consciousness of something, which may give the impression that Husserl is talking only about empirical consciousness. Indeed, he did it in his analysis of time-consciousness where consciousness functions with the fundamental modes of intuitive space-time and intuits the phantom. Still by means of phenomenological methodology of reduction he reaches transcendental consciousness. Here also, it may give an impression that he is talking about pure consciousness devoid of all contents in a traditional sense. But Husserl's notion of transcendental consciousness is quite unique that it in-house ideas, or eidos or universal essences. It is by means of identity between them, that Husserl's notion of transcendental consciousness is regarded both as the ontological and epistemological foundation of experience. Later phenomenologists disagree with the Husserlian notion of consciousness. For Sartre, consciousness is nothingness having no content immanent within or identified with it. According to Heidegger, there is no transcendental essence as the basis of experience but reveals itself to Dasein in the mode of use with the
forgetfulness of being. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is always embodied and the embodiment is the center of experience.

However, unlike phenomenologists there are certain scientists as philosophers in the fields such as neurobiology, cognitive psychology, etc. who made phenomenological study on consciousness. Their experiments reveal two notions of consciousness such as access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Access consciousness may be considered as pure-consciousness which may be called as the capacity for consciousness but without contents. Phenomenal consciousness is the contentful consciousness and is called qualia. The neurobiological analysis of phenomenal consciousness match with Husserlian definition of consciousness as consciousness of something, not in a transcendental sense but empirical. Qualia may match well with Husserl's notion of noema. According to neuroscientists, both types of consciousness are the foundation of experience. With Access-consciousness one may become conscious in vegitative state. With phenomenal consciousness, one will not become conscious of the contents of consciousness though they are present in the state of coma. Hence, as far as the concept of experience is concerned both the notions of consciousness are important. In Husserlian Phenomenology, transcendental is that which is not given to experience but which is the foundation or datum of all experiences. In Husserlian phenomenology, foundation of experience is the transcendental consciousness with the essential structure of ideas giving rise to noema. Here, it will be interested to compare the scientific analysis of consciousness especially in its
experiential dimension with phenomenological analysis of consciousness as the foundation of experience as well as the fact of experience.

Dan Lloyd points out the relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology by bringing an identity between the phenomenal properties of consciousness and the biological properties of consciousness as in cognitive science. He also makes a distinction between phenomenal objects of consciousness and empirical objects as sensation as in Husserl's phenomenology. According to him, "a fundamental and familiar distinction within phenomenology is the contrast of sensory and non-sensory experience. (e.g. Husserl's distinction between hyletic data and intentional functions.)¹¹

As far as experience is concerned, the focus of attention goes beyond the access consciousness to phenomenal consciousness, or so to say, the content of experience. Hence, a philosophical analysis of experience is needed to inquire into the nature and characteristics of the content. The features of content is dealt with several theories of perceptions in philosophy. For Husserl, content as qualia is the 'sense', that is, the experienced in experience as valid within phenomenological realm. For him, referent is the underlying universal essence or meaning of sense. Immanuel Levinas certainly speaks about the other of phenomenology as the other to consciousness making a move beyond phenomenological to the phenomenal. Such a move has inspired Derrida to deconstruct the sense and referent as a medium of experience and language as a medium of communication.
Consciousness

The most striking fact about consciousness is that it is the most common phenomenon in our life. It is consciousness that makes our life livable. No experience and no knowledge is possible without consciousness. It is the basis of all experiences and knowledge. We are with it as long as we are awakened and also in dream. Both these stages cover almost 75% of a man's lifetime. Yet, it is almost impossible to say what consciousness is. (For a survey of these philosophical discussions, see Churchland, 1988; Dennett, 1992; Flanagan, 1991. For other perspectives, see Crick, 1994 etc.)

There are a number of attempts to explain consciousness as the center of experiences or as it forms our experiences. In all these attempts the term consciousness is used to denote a number of phenomena like states of awareness, attention, introspection, qualia etc. All of these phenomena are central to our mental lives and they are closely related to each other. Let us examine some of these phenomena as explained by philosophers as well as scientists turned philosophers.

State of Awareness

One of the phenomena of consciousness is explained as the state of being aware. The state of awareness makes any person as a conscious individual. In such a state, the organism is mentally responsive to its environment. State of awareness is a very broad phenomenon of consciousness. This may be considered as the commonsense understanding of one of the
phenomena of consciousness and is equated to the state of being awakened. Kristen Hastrup makes a distinction between consciousness and awareness: One operative distinction between consciousness and awareness can be made in terms of relative explicitness: awareness refers to an explicit understanding, while consciousness is largely an implicit vector of knowing. Explicitness is also that which makes awareness social, rather than individual, since explicating something, if only to oneself, of necessity involves particular cultural schemes and values.\(^3\)

Ladd's frequently quoted definition states that: "Whatever we are when we're awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that is to be conscious". But this definition is only circumstantial. This definition indicates a state in which consciousness is directly observable. But it does not explain what it is like.

**Attention**

A second phenomenon of consciousness is to be aware of something. To be aware of something means to perceive or to feel or to think about something. In this sense consciousness is equated to the awareness of something. It is a specific aspect of consciousness, which comes under the above mentioned broad phenomenon of consciousness. In such a state of being awaken, we attend to a particular object among several objects in our perception.
Cartesian Theatre

According to Descartes whatever is in our mind, we are conscious of it. In other words, we think about it. According to him, "We cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us". Here consciousness is identified with mind and not considered as its property. All mental states are conscious. Thinking is the proof of the existing of the 'I'. Here Descartes defines consciousness as the thinking thing. Being conscious is essential to being mental and vice versa. Descartes equates consciousness to mind. It is like a theatre where experiences and thoughts have their existence. It is the theatre of mind where desires are felt. It is consciousness itself where intentions are formed. The 'I' or 'self' is the spectator of this theatre.

Pervasive Features of Experience

Another phenomenon of consciousness is considered as the pervasive feature of our experiences. We have experiences of sensation, perception and thought. All of them are different kinds of mental states. Sensations are emotional events such as the pleasure of relaxation a hot bath or the discomfort of a hangover, etc. Perceptions are psycho-motor processes such as vital, tactual and audio experiences. We may have both sensations and perceptions together at times. We have the experiences of occurrent thoughts too. For example, a sudden thought where I intend to solve a puzzling problem. In such events, consciousness is pervasive and is generally defined as a pervasive feature of our mental states. Thus consciousness is quite familiar to us with our sensation, perception and thought.
Property of Mental States

Another use of the term 'consciousness' is referred to as the property of mental states. In this sense consciousness is equated to reflective apprehension of mental states. Consciousness is the quality of becoming aware of the mental state in an immediate way. This immediate awareness is the property of mental states themselves. Since consciousness is the intuitive property of mental states there is direct access to them. Locke defines it thus: "Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind." In this definition consciousness is the immediate perceptive property of mental states. Here consciousness is equated to the general inherent quality of mental states to be conscious of themselves.

But we know already that all mental states are not conscious in themselves. There are unconscious mental states too. All mental states do not have intuitive property. If they were inherent property of mental states it would be the property of all mental states.

This explanation treats consciousness as part of mental states. In this sense, it is an ontological explanation of consciousness. Treating it as part of mental processes is argued as the mental states. But this explanation of consciousness is a matter of how we know about our mental states. In this sense it is an epistemological explanation of consciousness. Hence, the question is whether the ways we know about our mental states tell us anything significant about the intrinsic nature of consciousness. It only infers the nature of consciousness from the way of knowing the mental states. Explanation of
consciousness as the immediate awareness of mental states is merely an inferential one. We know only mental states. It makes consciousness as an extremely mysterious phenomenon. For them, consciousness is presupposed by mental phenomenon. Hence, consciousness can never be explained without appealing to mental phenomenon. Such explanation is only inferential in nature. Such an explanation of consciousness is circular and becomes an unexplainable mysterious phenomenon.

**Apparent Unity**

Following Kantian synthetic unity of apperception, certain philosophers provide a different sort of explanation for consciousness. According to them, conscious subjects apprehend things in a characteristic way. Human beings apprehend objects from a particular point of view and provides a certain unity to our conscious states. It may be considered as the uniting point of view. They consider consciousness as an apparent unity. But the question remains the same. What is this very point like?

To consider consciousness as an apparent unity makes an unbridgeable division in reality such as consciousness and the rest. Such distinctions are seen in mind/body dichotomy. Further, in recent period there is a division within the mind as conscious/unconscious. Because of such divisions, there is a tendency to define consciousness as opposed to unconscious or subconscious and to the whole domain of the physical and non-mental. Such type of definition depends on the conceptual contrasts. They aim at defining what it is not. In this sense, it is only negative and devoid of any content.
Introspection

Though such negative definition is contentless, consciousness is not out of actuality. It is positively present in introspection. In introspection we focus our attention on the mental process itself. It is known as the phenomenon of introspective consciousness. Introspective consciousness makes human being distinctively mental beings. In this phenomenon consciousness is equated to introspection. It is the consciousness that apprehends mental processes.

Self-Consciousness

When used in association with human beings the word ‘consciousness’ often implies consciousness of consciousness. We are not only conscious, we are conscious of the fact that we are conscious, which is known as self-consciousness. Here, consciousness is defined as self-consciousness. It is often taken for granted that we possess this kind of consciousness to a much higher degree than any other organism. This point has been made, for example, by Jean-Paul Sartre. He defines consciousness as ‘being-for-itself’ or nothingness as a project toward ‘being-in-itself’. For him, there is a division like pre-reflective consciousness and reflective consciousness. The former is the self-consciousness. Sartre defines that the for-itself is the being, which determines itself to exist inasmuch as it cannot coincide with itself. This nature of nothingness of consciousness is an antithesis to the Husserlian phenomenological definition of consciousness as always consciousness of something, which is always only reflective consciousness for Sartre.
But the introduction of infinity into consciousness, aside from the fact that it fixes the phenomenon and obscures it, is only an explicative theory expressly designed to reduce the being of consciousness to that of the in-itself. Yet if we accept the objective existence of the reflection-reflecting as it is given, we are obliged to conceive a mode of being different from that of the in-itself, not a unity which contains a duality, not a synthesis which surpasses and lifts the abstract moments of the thesis and of the antithesis, but a duality which is unity, a reflection (reflect) which is its own reflecting (reflection). ... But if on the contrary we wish to take our point of departure from duality as such and to posit consciousness and belief as a dyad, then we encounter the idea-ideae of Spinoza and we miss the pre-reflective phenomenon, which we wished to study. This is because pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness.6

Higher-Order Thought Theory

In 1986 David Rosenthal proposed a theory that provided a straightforward explanation of consciousness. It is known as 'higher-order thought theory'. It tries to demystify the notion of consciousness. This theory explains consciousness as a matter of thought about mental states. There are mental processes such as sensation, perception, etc. These processes themselves are not conscious. They become conscious mental states when they
are caught by consciousness. According to this theory consciousness is a peculiar phenomenon of 'higher-order-thought'. Consciousness makes unconscious mental states as conscious mental events. To make them conscious means the subject is to have a thought about it. Here, consciousness is not the subject or self. It is the person that is having thought which is equated to consciousness. Consciousness is the property of the subject for its conscious experience. This theory tries to demystify the notion of consciousness. Consciousness is no more mysterious than the occurrence of mental states. It is as usual as the occurrence of thoughts about mental states.

**Hard Problem of Consciousness**

In the 'higher-order thought' theory there are two aspects viz. consciousness and unconscious mental process and problem of the relation between them. What is the certain mental event like to be conscious of? There should be some sort of a creature to be in certain states. The creature may not be having any thought about those states. This creature is that which is experienced by consciousness. The unconscious mental processes become conscious mental lives by this creature. If this creature is absent then the notion of thought in this theory is not sufficient for consciousness. Then the paradox is that, if the creature is present higher-order thought is not necessary for consciousness. Higher-order thought theory considers consciousness as an immediate thought process. But without any mediacy it can't catch the unconscious mental process.
R.Kim Guenther posits the hard problem of consciousness in this way:

“But the hard problem is why it is that some brain processes are accompanied by a subjective, phenomenological experience. And cognitive neuroscience lacks completely an explanation of how the brain makes possible the subjective sense of being aware. This is the sense of consciousness I labeled conscious awareness. Neurophysiology may explain, for example, how the brain discriminates the color red from the color blue, but it cannot explain why the act of processing color information is accompanies by the subjective experience of seeing red. Why is a person also aware of seeing red when discriminating red from blue?”7

A mental state is conscious when the subject is conscious of it. The subject is just to perceive it or to have a thought about it. In this case our explanation or having a thought about it does not seem to be immediate. It seems to be immediate may simply because our perceptions or thoughts of these states seem not to rely on inference. Hence the notion of consciousness is inevitably associated with the subjective character of experience. It generates the hard problem of consciousness. Here both the aspects of consciousness becomes a mystery and as a whole paradoxical.
Subjective – Experiential Point of View

In a related way, Nagel (1974) raised a challenge and questioned whether objective account of consciousness is possible. He agrees that in all conscious experiences there is something like a creature.

"In describing consciousness, philosopher speaks of qualia – the “raw feels” of sensory experience. When you see a red apple, for example, you gain the information that a red apple is before you, but the red also looks a certain way to you, has a certain appearance that you are aware of. Likewise, when you feel pain, but you also have a specific sensory experience – the pain feels a certain way. These sensory experiences provide the basic “stuff” of which our awareness, our subjective states, is built. ...... It would be like knowing that someone else was seeing red or feeling pain. In this case, you might know what this other person knows, but you couldn’t be experiencing what he or she is experiencing."8

It is by the way of this creature that particular experience takes place. Consciousness can be explained only from the point of view of the relevant kind of creature. Nagel says that an objective account of consciousness must be independent of any particular point of view. But consciousness is always tied to particular point of view. Hence no objective account is possible.

It may be counter argued in another way. Objectivity cannot be provided because of its dependence on viewpoints. The creature of the point of view is the perceptual apparatus. There is a possibility to extrapolate from this creature
to the resulting kind of experience. The particular perceptual mechanism is the micro process of experience. It leads to the microscopic effects that are uncontroversially objective. Anyway, a suitable scientific theory is necessary for this extrapolation. It means that objectivity is never undermined by a particular point of view. One example for this is one’s vantage point in place and time.

Two Phenomena

Here consciousness is split up into two broad categories. Somehow, this splitting programme saves the integral unity of self in its one category of immediate awareness. This view suggests that in all conscious experiences there are two distinct phenomena. One is the sensory quality. The other is the immediate awareness of those qualities. These two phenomena are experienced simultaneously but it does not mean that they are one and the same.

Daniel Reisberg makes a distinction between unconscious category of thought and conscious category of thought.

"We have suggested that we must distinguish two broad categories of thought – one that is highly efficient but inflexible, and one that is maximally flexible but much slower. We have not explained, however, why this second category of thought needs to be conscious. Could there be a category of thought that is slow, deliberate, flexible, but unconscious?" For him the unconscious sensory qualities are the conscious category of thought the other is the unconscious category of thought."^{9}
According to Moore we cannot say that consciousness is immediately present in the qualities. The sensory states are different having distinct sensory qualities. All of them share one common property of being conscious. This common property is the intuitive awareness of these states. Hence, this common phenomenon is distinct from the other phenomenon. These two types of phenomenon demand different explanations. But being a common property it does not mean that it is separate from the other. Any way, it suggests two types of phenomenon. But the unconscious mental states, somehow manages to differentiate consciousness from the states. Some consider consciousness as intuitive awareness as nothing but act of consciousness and the sensory qualities as the content of consciousness. According to Husserl, this act of consciousness is the consciousness itself. For him, consciousness is always consciousness of its own intentional immanent entities. The above mentioned distinction do not appeal to him. By this way he resolves the problem of transcendence that inherent in dual notion of consciousness.

"The existence of the cogitatio, more precisely the phenomenon of cognition itself, is beyond question; and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. These existing things are already presupposed in the statement of the problem of cognition. The question as to how transcendent things come into cognition would lose its sense if cognition itself, as well as the transcendent object, were put in question. It is also clear that the cogitationes present a sphere of
absolutely immanent data; it is in this sense that we understand “immanence.”

Consciousness as an Explanatory Construct

Throughout the 20th Century, the concept of consciousness has had a controversial history. For most of the history of philosophy and psychology, it was simply taken for granted as an ideal that we are conscious. Scientific psychology that began in 19th Century argued that consciousness is the key to studying mental events. They considered consciousness as a causal principle of psychic events. It was because of this supposition that consciousness plays a fundamental role in our mental processes. To analyze causal principle they investigated into the mental events that are accompanied by conscious experience and focused on human cognitive experience. But in early 20th Century Ivan Pavlov and John Watson maintained that only the physical behaviour and brain events can be contented as it is scientifically improper to deal with consciousness. In the 1910’s the father of behaviourism, John Watson, proposed that the concept of consciousness is useless for psychology. It is subjective and consequently not open to the public observation of two or more independent observers, a basic requirement of the scientific method. According to him, consciousness does not personally explain anything, while saying that a person does or does not do because, the person thinks or decides to do or not to do. We generally consider that there is a conscious process beneath an action or non-action. A person does or does not do something because he or she is using a conscious process such as thinking or decision-making. It does not
explain anything about the behaviour. There remains the question of the 'why' of
behaviour. The 'why' is tracked back to the learning history of organism. Therefore, the concept of consciousness is just excess baggage as far as a
description is concerned. Watson's view was highly influential and led to a
substantial downgrading of the importance of consciousness to an explanatory
construct in psychology. As a consequence, human personal experience
becomes almost a taboo subject in science. Behaviorism banned consciousness
from mainstream experimental psychology.

Daniel Reisberg describes this phenomenon as follows:

"However, in its eagerness to be objective and scientific, the
young field of psychology soon rejected this focus on
consciousness, arguing that this research was both subjective and
unscientific. By the early twentieth century, the topic of
consciousness was largely gone from psychological research, and
little was written on the topic of the next half-century."

Reber and Velonans took cognizance of the contribution of consciousness
in cognition and made clear that a substantial amount of cognitive processing
occurs independent of consciousness. In the late 20th Century, a number of
strikingly neuropsychological syndromes made a compelling case for the
existence of unconscious cognitive processes. It pointed to the need of
consciousness only as an explanatory construct.
Function of Consciousness

The question of the function of consciousness is related to cognition. Creating a sensory intentional content is also a function of consciousness. Cognition can be divided into the processes of cognition and the results of cognitive processes. How is consciousness related to both of these aspects of cognition? Certainly, consciousness has access to some of these results of the processes. According to Reber, “consciousness has no access to the cognitive process and no part of human cognitive processing is conscious.”

It is a crucial issue as far as the function of consciousness is concerned. It will lead to the conclusion that consciousness has no casual role in cognitive process. It is confined to mediatory function in so far as it has access to some of the results of the processes. It has no role even in the higher order process. In turn, the higher order processes render consciousness to choose among alternative courses of action, to plan and time their execution and to make decision. Though we are conscious of these processing, consciousness has no casual role in operations they perform. Consciousness has access only to some of the results of these processes.

Focal Attention

Instead of consciousness, it is focal attention that plays casual role in cognitive processes. In such cognitive processes, the processing is
accompanied by focal attention. Consciousness is present in this process as long as there is focal attentive processing. Here, it is focal attention that plays casual role in processing but not consciousness.

Consciousness without focal attention cannot cause focal attentive cognitive processing. Consciousness and focal attention are different, more over they are confounding. Consciousness is closely associated with focal attention. Both of them involve working memory. They operate in series and use processing resources. Both intervene in planning and decision making. Irrespective of all these similarities they are separated. Attention is not always necessary for the product of a process to access consciousness. There are cases in which consciousness is accessed by passing attention as in the case of well-learned routine. Hence they are confounding. Attention is a privileged route to consciousness, but not the only one available.

Inhibition

There is a mental event called inhibition. Inhibition is a state of mind in which one is self-conscious but unable to act in a relaxed and natural way. In inhibition the stimuli that are to be inhibited are processed consciously. It is found that then only it can be inhibited.

This suggests that consciousness plays a casual role in mediating inhibition or conscious inhibition. Inhibiting process takes place only because of conscious processing of stimuli. In the study of Morcel a target word with two meanings was presented for conscious perception. Hence, the stimuli of the target word were consciously processed. A context word was also given to be
accessed to consciousness. One meaning of the target word was selectively activated by the context word. The other meaning was inhibited. When the context word did not access consciousness both meanings were activated. In the first case, though the other meaning was conscious it was not activated rather inhibited. It is the conscious processing of stimuli that caused inhibition. It shows that consciousness plays a causal role in mediating inhibition. By being activated by the context word the other meaning was inhibited though it was conscious. Yet it must be stressed that the inhibiting process themselves are not necessarily conscious. The representation that needs to be inhibited is conscious which allows inhibition to take place.

Libel's study also showed that consciousness is instrumental in allowing inhibition of ongoing cognitive processes. He recorded the time of execution of the conscious intentions to act. It was recorded when the subject became conscious of wanting to move. Simultaneously he recorded from the scalp the electrophysiological readiness potentials of the subject to act. It occurred about 550 ms before the execution of voluntary act. The wish to act was consciously experienced by about 350 ms after the readiness potentials. It means about 200 ms before the execution of voluntary act. It shows that the activation of the neural mechanism eventually leads to an action consciously. It also shows that after experiencing conscious intention to act, the decision to act was still inhibited up to 200 ms before execution of voluntary act. Libel proposed that the role of consciousness would be that of either permitting or preventing the motor
implementation of the intention to act. In the absence of conscious experience, execution of the movement could not be prevented. Libel says:

"There is nothing surprising in our performing without awareness – it could even be said that most of our bodily activity is unconscious, and that many of our interactions with the outside world are carried on 'automatically' and, in a sense, thoughtlessly. What is surprising about these examples from neuropsychology is that in all these cases the patients are unaware in precisely the situations in which we would normally expect someone to be very much aware!"\(^{14}\)

Origin of Consciousness

There are several neurobiological theories regarding the problem of consciousness. There are two important theories (i) one is unitary theory and (ii) interaction theory. According to Unitary theory, the activity of brain mechanism in a unitary way gives rise to consciousness. Interrelation theory says that consciousness arises as a result of interactions among various brain mechanisms. There are other theories, which posit that consciousness arises from the binding of disparate neural elements into an integrated pattern by an oscillating 35-76 Hz signal. They consider consciousness as associated with signals transmitted through the central white matter between cortex and the striatum in Brain. It can be cleared in the following conversation between Advo and Krit:
Advo: "Well, it is the whole cortex, more or less, which feeds information into the striatum: very many separated processors working away frantically at detailed calculations of the sort that never 'reach consciousness'. It would fit the facts as far as they go to say that it is on the way across between the cortex and the striatum that it all comes together: because the machinery for consciousness – for making feelings – is located in the intervening white matter... It is an amusing thought.

KRIT: They 'reach consciousness' in the process of transmission between the two sets of grey matter processors, those in the cortex and those in the striatum (and other basal ganglia)? Certainly consciousness is associated with signals being transmitted over long distances through the central white matter in the brain. It would be nice to have something more definite about how it works, this spooky stuff slurping about inside the brain."15

These two main theories of consciousness propose different solutions to the problem of how consciousness is represented in the brain. In the theory of unitary brain mechanism, consciousness originates from the activity in one privileged part of the brain. In the theory of multiple brain mechanism consciousness originates from interactions among several brain structures. Gray supports the first type of theory of single brain mechanism. He suggests that it is the rubicular area, which belongs to the septohippocampel system in brain that is the locus of consciousness. Dennet and Kinsbourne criticized the unitory type.
theory as the Cartesian theatre model like the pineal gland of Descartes. The explicit/implicit dissociations are domain specific i.e. occur in single domain. Each of these domains can be separately lesioned. It is against the idea of a general-purpose consciousness system. A focal lesion to such a unitary neural structure will make explicit/implicit dissociation possibly across all domains. No such patients have been described so far. It supports the notion that consciousness arises from many independent consciousness system.\textsuperscript{16} Umitta and Zozi have held this view.

**Double Locus and Double Notions of Consciousness**

It can be argued that there are states that contradict multiple consciousness systems. These states show general and severe alteration in consciousness. In this context, Zeman makes a basic distinction between the capacity for consciousness and the contents of consciousness.\textsuperscript{17} The capacity for consciousness depends on the normal activity of the upper brainstem and related areas of the thalamas – the relicular activity system. The contents of consciousness are supplied by cortical area. If the cortical areas are lesioned they won't supply contents of consciousness. Focal cortical lesions lead to domain specific dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge. It occurs due to the lack of contents of consciousness in the specific domains because of lesion. In vegetative state there is no consciousness irrespective of the fact of wakefulness. In this state patients are awake and their eyes are open. Yet they demonstrate no evidence of being conscious. In vegetative state the contents of consciousness are lacking across all domains. Experiments conducted by
Barbur, Watson, Frankowiack and Zeki hint at the possibility of preserved implicit knowledge. This total implicit/explicit dissociation, however, is not necessarily an evidence against the presence of multiple consciousness system. This state results from acute insults or chronic diseases that affect the entire cortex. Hence the entire consciousness systems are damaged. Consciousness is lacking in every domain. It is not due to damage of a unitory consciousness system. Contents of consciousness are completely absent in all consciousness systems. Coma, in some sense is converse to vegetative state. Coma is the state of unconsciousness resulting from the lesion of the reticular activating system. In this state the capacity for consciousness is lost. Hence, in this state the eyes are closed and the sleep-wake cycle is absent. In coma reticular activating system is not functional which has the capacity for consciousness. For vegetative state this system is functional but all cortical functions are lost that generates contents of consciousness. According to A.G. Cairns –Smith:

"Consciousness is a physical effect – an assertion which I would make my first feature for an acceptable theory... I do not mean by saying that consciousness is a physical effect that it should be immediately understandable in terms of current science, that it is necessarily a known physical effect in the sense that there is a place for it all ready and waiting among the intellectual inventions of physics and chemistry, any more than there was such a place for the paradox of black – body radiation when it was first encountered."
Existence of neural basis of consciousness changed the scene altogether. The pendulum has swung back from the extreme of Watson's radical behaviourism. Today there is a conviction that consciousness is important, that phenomena associated with it merit serious study. It lead to the new topic of phenomenal consciousness. Although there are severe problems of definition, theory and methodology continued to plague the experimental study of consciousness: "If we continue to resign ourselves to the inaccessibility of consciousness, then we resign ourselves to a view by which by now we know to be false: that what you see is what you get; that behaviour can be taken at face value. Further we would have to rest content with defending our imputations of consciousness as being somewhere between inventions and best guess."  

The difficulties are now seen as problems to be confronted and solved. They are no more fatal flaws that question the legitimacy of research on consciousness at least in the sense of phenomenal consciousness.

**Relation between two notions of consciousness**

There are two notions of consciousness, one is Access consciousness and the other is Phenomenal consciousness. A-consciousness is clearly related to thoughts. It is the immediate awareness. In A-consciousness its content is inferentially promiscuous and have the characteristic of reportability. Controllability in speech reasoning and action is due to its feature of inferentiality and reportability.

P-consciousness is something as related to sensations and perceptual experiences. They are the mediate contents of conscious experience. It is also
known as sensory consciousness. These sensory qualities lack inferentiality, reportability and controllability. It is generally considered that thoughts are not included into p-consciousness. Thus these two notions can be considered as independent of each other. P-consciousness is possible without A-consciousness and vice versa.

Then, what is the relationship between A & P, thought and phenomenon? Can thoughts as well as sensory experience be included into P-consciousness? Can sensory experience as well as thoughts be included into A-consciousness? Consciousness from the standpoint of A-consciousness evidently requires thought. There is no distinction between the notion of thought and notion of A-consciousness. On the other hand, A-consciousness without P-consciousness can be considered as merely, formal or contentless though reportable.

There are unconscious intentional phenomena. They are P-consciousness. Those unconscious intentional states stand in close relation to conscious intentional states. Hence, A-consciousness becomes phenomenally conscious states. Central cases of thinking are at least akin to phenomenally conscious states. Perceptual experience of objects and their properties demonstrate modes of presentation. These modes are involved in the intentionality of consciousness. This we call the unconscious intentional modes of P-consciousness. They become conscious intentional modes by A-consciousness.

According to Husserlian phenomenology, the principle of connection is established in transcendental identity by which the transcendental ego
structurally intuits within itself the transcendental sense or noema. Accordingly he explains perception in the following way:

"Perception in the normal sense of the word does not only indicate generally that this or that thing appears to the Ego in embodied presence, but that the Ego is aware of the appearing thing, grasps it as really being there, and posits it."21

The process of awareness is constitutive in nature that it intends its own objects.

According to Perry, some theoretical primacy is attached to the perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. He argued that in order to be able to think about objects at all, subject needs to think about objects under perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. This argument establishes a deep connection between P-consciousness and A-consciousness or intentionality and consciousness.

In P-consciousness intentionality is unconscious perceptual demonstrative modes. They become conscious intentional states only through A-consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is not conscious states in itself. Access consciousness without these phenomenal intentional modes will become blind.

However, According to Husserl the neurobilogical explanation of P-consciousness is only a psychological fact of 'sense'. It is perceived by ego consciousness in the empirical time order.
"It stands there as a mental process of this mentally living person, as his state, his act; the sensory content stands there as what is given or sensed, as that of which I am conscious; and it integrates itself with the perception of objective time. Perception, and any other cogitatio, so apperceived, is a psychological fact. Thus it is apperceived as a datum in objective time, belonging to the mentally living ego... This, then, is the phenomenon which is investigated by that natural science we call "psychology".22

Carrathers, say that phenomenally conscious thoughts are clothing in the phonological or orthographic forms of natural language sensations. According to Derrida, the notion of consciousness is dependent on phonological or orthographic forms. Hence, we mistake the forms as well as consciousness as involved in knowledge process. It constitutes the metaphysics of presence.

According to Antony P.Cohen and Nigel Rapport, studies of consciousness are divided into two extreme poles such as subjective and objective as we can see in Francis Crick, Hans Moravec, Roger Penrose, Danniel Dennett, Colin MaGinn, John Eccles, John Searle, Gerald Edelman, etc.

"Competing explanatory paradigms of consciousness might conveniently be plotted on a scale one pole of which would be a 'closed' view which sees nothing in nature that is not ultimately explainable by 'natural science': by a notion of an objective world and a physical theory of mind; and at the opposite extreme, an open view which, emphasizing the unconfined scope of the
imagination and the potential infinity of linguistic expression, sees a subjective quality in conscious experience which cannot be accounted for in a purely objective terms."23

Qualia

Some calls phenomenal consciousness as qualia. The term quale and qualia (pl) are most commonly used to characterize a particular qualitative mental state. They are experimental or felt properties. These mental states are human and definitely conscious. We cannot explain qualia without consciousness. Qualia are the conscious mental states. Even if consciousness as the basis of experience is inexplicable, it is sure that, our experience contains certain contents. They are qualitative mental states of experience. This intentional nature of consciousness is different and separate from the body.

"The intentionality of consciousness, its leap towards the world and its further development within a field of consciousness, the space of interaction of the intentionalities of other human beings, can create the suggestion within embodied experience that consciousness is something separate from body."24

One of the definitive features of conscious mental states is that there is something to which it is pertinent. It is a feature of mental disposition. Its subjectivity presents most difficult challenge to a materialist theory of mind. They are the qualitative character of conscious experience. Nagel's diagnosis of the problem is that conscious states essentially involve a "subjective point of view" whereas the physicalist and computationalist theories involve adopting an
objective point of view. Thus to know, what-it-is like to have a certain conscious
experience one must be capable of taking up the relevant point of view, i.e. one
must be capable of having a sort of experience. They are experiential felt
properties. Only with conscious creatures it seems sensible to ask, with regard to
their conscious mental states 'what-its-like' to have them.

As far as qualia is concerned there are two issues involved. The first
issue is that of a difference between two states of absent or present. What
distinguishes those states that there is 'something it is like to be in' from those
there is 'nothing it is like to be in'. If there is a difference between these states,
what is the nature of that which makes the difference? It is the subjectivity that
makes the difference. What distinguishes that state that has a subjective
character from those that don't? It is the difference of subjectivity of conscious
mental states. It seems as if one has to undergo conscious experience to know
what they are like.

The second issue concerned with qualia is about its nature. The particular
types of mental state the qualitative, subjective, experiential essences of our day-
to-day life. Husserl calls them objects in themselves or eidos or noema. They
are the original objects immanently present in consciousness.

"Finally, it remained to be shown that immanence is the
generally necessary characteristics of all epistemological cognition,
and that it is nonsensical not only at the start but also in general to
borrow from the sphere of transcendence, in other words, to try to
found the theory of cognition on psychology or on any science whatever of the natural sort."25

Epistemic Features of Qualia

There are epistemic arguments for the existence of qualia. The epistemological aspect of qualia considers that the distinctive feature of mental states cannot be explained in terms of their physical properties. Qualia have some special epistemic features like special authority and self-intimating nature. Special authority is its unique subjective experiential characteristic. It is self-intimating in the sense that it will necessarily produce adequate conceptual sophistication with accurate beliefs about their nature. These epistemic features make them importantly different from physical properties.

Explanatory Gap

The existence of qualia is incompatible with a physicalist theory of mind. The metaphysical status of qualia affirms that mental states could not be realised in physical states. Metaphysical aspect posits dualism of mind and body. Antiphysicalist theories argue that qualia cannot be or, at least, cannot easily believed to be identical with physical or functional properties.

According to these theories the first assumption is that there is no connection between qualitative and physicalistic terms or concepts. Levins called it as the explanatory gap. The explanatory gap is that which makes impossible for qualia to be identified with physical or functional characteristics of mental states. If there is an essential connection between them it would be
impossible to conceive of qualia existing apart from the relevant physical or functional properties. It would also be easy to explain why it feels painful to have the associated physical or functional property.

McGinn viewed that the explanatory gap reflected a limitation on our cognitive capacities.26 We just do not have, and are constitutionally incapable of forming the requisite concepts to bridge the gap. Dan Lloyd rejects explanatory gap saying that it is a mysterious standpoint. He posits phenomenology as an answer to this problem. For him, the phenomenological experience fills up the gap of explanation.

"So far these points might be made by any of a number of critics of the scientific approach to consciousness, a group known to their opponents as the mysterians .... But for the reasons just stated, the mysterians have a point: the core theory of consciousness will require an explanatory step beyond what would be sufficient grounding in any other scientific domain, a step required just because what is scientifically unobservable is phenomenally observable. .... A core theory of consciousness can exploit phenomenological description of a state of consciousness and attempt to co-ordinate it with neural explanation of the corresponding brain state. .... However, rather than continuing this debate at the metatheoretical level, I propose a more modest effort, somewhat in the spirit of a case study, with the goal of sketching a part of the core theory.... weakening
Lycon, Rey and Tye argued that the gap is real but that it is not to be expected given certain peculiarities associated with our first person to experience. Qualia are the first person access to experience. Its metaphysical aspect posits dualism of mind and body. The second assumption is that given the lack of connection, the use of qualitative terms or concepts requires (or at least suggests) the existence of irreducibly qualitative properties.

**Anti Qualia Argument**

Denett and Rey see in the explanatory gap an evidence that the very notion of qualitative character at issue is confused and probably inapplicable to any real phenomenon. For them, Qualia is not a real phenomenon. On this view, Qualia literally do not exit.

Although we have experiences, they do not actually possess the features that we rarely take to be definitive of them. The appearances of residual mystery is an illusion. It is just a mediatory principle that makes experience possible. Qualia as a real entity are a product either of fallacies and confusions that surround the notion of the subjective character of experience. It is the result of an illegitimately high standard imposed on explanation.

However, Husserl has a reply for this standpoint by making a distinction between pure phenomenon and psychological phenomenon.
"If it is possible to take such phenomena for objects of investigation, then it is obvious that we are now no longer within psychological, within a natural, transcendentally "objectivizing" science.... but of that which exists and is valid whether there is such a thing as objective actuality or not, whether the postulation such transcendent entities is justifiable or not.... And this pure immanence is first of all to be characterized, in our approach, through phenomenological reduction: I mean, not with respect to what it refers to beyond itself, but with respect to what it is in itself and to what it is given as.29

The whole study and analysis of consciousness both in philosophical and scientific tradition shows that there are two notions of consciousness. In scientific terminology they are named such as phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. The two types have their own separate locus. It shows that there is no non-embodied consciousness in a transcendental spiritual sense as in the Indian context. Husserlian transcendental consciousness also is merely a philosophical supposition. The pre-reference consciousness is not absolutely unknown as Sartrean existential analysis shows.

Pre-reflective consciousness in its scientific sense as Access-consciousness has its special locus and origin. It is access consciousness that makes the phenomenal content known or experiential. However, consciousness as such is unknown or baffles all scientific explanation. Still, it does not mean that there is transcendental non-empirical non-embodied consciousness.
Whatever is known with reference to consciousness is only the phenomenal contents or qualia. It is equal to Husserl's concept of noematic entity, the ideal object across the stream of noeses.

Dan Lloyd observes such a striking similarity between the scientific tradition and phenomenological tradition of consciousness

"In the study of consciousness, the dualism of viewpoints necessitates a further step. The target entity in this case is not simply the cause of observed phenomena, but is itself phenomenal. It has its own rich and complicated structure, the structure of consciousness. As a result, once one has to correlate pegged and the causal relationship in registration, one must go further to explain why the hypothesized physiological state of consciousness should have the phenomenology that it has for conscious subjects. This extra step makes the study of consciousness unique."\(^{30}\)

Hence it is inevitable to analyze the notion of experience to understand the phenomenological significance of empirical consciousness. Even in scientific tradition, the study of consciousness is resurrected in the form of phenomenal consciousness. According to Husserl, there are certain essential structures of consciousness as the foundation of the notion of experience may throw some light to the nature of the content of experience or the experienced. According to Husserl, these are underlying universals as identified with transcendental consciousness.
"Indeed, lack of clarity with regard to the meaning or essence of cognition requires a science of cognition, a science whose sole end is to clarify the essential nature of cognition. It is not to explain cognition as a psychological fact; it is not to inquire into the natural causes and laws of the development and the natural sort, of a science of the natural occurrence of cognitions.... Rather the task of the critique of cognition is to clarify, to cast light upon, the essence of cognition and the legitimacy of its claim to validity that belongs to its essence; and what else can this mean but to make the essence of cognition directly self-given."31

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Epistemic Role of Perception

Experience

In our analysis of the concept of consciousness, it is noted that there are two dimensions/factors upon which consciousness generally can be explained. They are named as Access consciousness and the phenomenal consciousness or qualia. In this part of the thesis, we intend to look upon the aspect of 'experience' without which consciousness cannot be explained satisfactorily.

Experience is generally considered as the interaction of the subject with an object. As far as the subjective aspect is concerned the psycho-motor process are important which makes experience possible. Without this it will loose its subjective status and will become a blind object. Without the objective
counterpart the subject is blank. Experience is said to be the actual interaction of
the subject with the object. Hence both the subjective and objective aspects are
to be equally included in experience. But the most controversial aspect of
experience is a third category – the experienced – which is apprehended by the
subject about the object.

The Subjective Aspect

The subjective aspect includes the function of both mind as well as
sensory process. Analysis of experience limiting to subjective aspect will make it
one-sided. The technique that makes experience possible with regard to the
subjective processes are very important. It includes the functions of
consciousness as well as the activities of sensory apparatus. These are the
functions that make the subject possible to have an acquaintance with the object.
But contrary to this fact, there are certain traditions of thought that totally
eradicate the objective counterpart. They consider the objective consciousness
as the only sure foundation. Such an example is seen in Vedanta that equates
the ultimate reality as pure consciousness. An identity is established between
the universal ultimate, which is posited as real as it is reflected in individual
reality as the fact of experience. Such an identity is quite peculiar in Indian
Philosophy rejecting the objective world as of illusory nature. According to
Kirsten Hastrup the first person stand point of radical reflectivity made the self
and action outside the world or divided from the world.

"With the development of the first person standpoint in
Western philosophy as a derivative of St Augustine's radical
reflexivity, knowledge or awareness became that of an agent. This is not solely the matter of musing upon one's own experience, making it an object of contemplation. "Radical reflexivity brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is inseparable from one's being the agent of that experience." This is what makes one a being that can speak of itself in the first person, and what made the language of inwardness irresistible. 'I think' somehow became an action outside the world, inside the self. 'Will' became located in the mind, and it was essential to rational action in the early modern period; 'weakness of will' became the ultimate failure however much we can now unmask it as a contradiction in terms.32

The Phenomenological Aspect

Husserlian Philosophy provides an example of positing pure consciousness as the absolute reality. However, it doesn't negate the objective reality though it is suspended. Pure consciousness is identified with the essential eidos and is the foundation of experience. Hence consciousness becomes ultimate in a phenomenal sense. Hence, the third category between subjective and objective poles are posited as the phenomenal reality. It is also known as phenomenal consciousness in Neurobiological analysis of consciousness. In Husserl's phenomenology it is identified with pure consciousness as its essential structural necessity. In cognitive science the mental phenomena is known as qualia. Phenomenology struck with the mediatory principle bracketing the
objective reality. Rather phenomenology posits a pure objectivity within consciousness or subjectivity.

"Thus there is a certain, extraordinarily important two-sidedness in the essential nature of the sphere of experience, concerning which we can also say that in experiences we must distinguish between a subjectivity and an objectivity oriented aspect: a form of expression which should not indeed be misunderstood, as though we taught that the "object" of knowledge might, in this respect, be something analogous to the pure Ego."33

Subject cannot have any experience without the experienced. It is argued that, the experience of subject is limited to the experienced only. It never knows the external object. It does not mean that the objective can totally be eradicated. Without the object, the subject can never experience the experienced. Its existence, on the other hand, depends on the object, to a certain extent though it is represented by the function of consciousness through the media of sensory process.

However, Husserl's discovery of the given in all sorts of diversified experiences, denotes the limits of the given as absent in certain fields where we have to take help of fancy.

"Keeping to the most general considerations, the position for the phenomenologist…. is substantially the same…. He has indeed at his disposal as primordial data all the main types of perception and representation. He has them as perceptual
illustrations for a phenomenology of perception, of fancy, of memory, and so forth. For the most part he has likewise at his disposal in the sphere of the primordial examples for judgments, supposals, feelings, volitions.... Here too at all events the freedom of research in the region of the essence necessarily demands that one should operate with the help of fancy.34

Erroneous Experience

Generally we think that experience is the direct access to reality. There is no difference between what is experienced and the real. Commonsense tends to establish an identity between them. But there are instances of deception, misapprehension, delusion, hallucination, optical illusion, dreams etc. In these cases, experience is not identified with real. Experience including its erroneous nature can never be considered as something fundamental to know the reality.

Hence, experience as a whole can never be considered valid as far as the reality is concerned. This traditional trend got scientific through Cartesian duality. According to Kirsten Hastrup, we begin to disbelieve our ordinary experience considering it as a source of error.

"The distinction made by Descartes between res cogitans and res extensa provided rationale for the sharp distinction between mind and body, which we have since then had to straddle. It is also this metaphysical dualism which has ever since been reflected in the subject-object dichotomy as basic to our knowledge of the world. This violates both the classical ontology and the
ordinary experience of embodied understanding so vigorously demonstrated by the notion of delirio de fome. To understand, for Descartes, involved disengagement from our own material selves, those uncontrolled sources of error and moral voice.35

But it does not mean that experience as such can be abandoned as illusory. Illusion is proved as false by further true experience or by inference from past experience or by reflection on the false nature of present experience in comparison with the past experience.

Dreams are proved illusory when awakened. But if we doubt the illusory status of waking period also we will have to negate all our experiences. It will be unjustifiable, at least, to commonsense.

This comparison of dream state with waking state is an age old problem perhaps quite old as human kind. Because of this primitive tendency the waking experiences were also considered as illusory as the dreaming experiences. A latest example can be sighted from A.G. Cairns-Smith's book "Evolving the Mind" in the chapter 'Dreaming aware'. The chapter starts like this:

"Even before that critical point when the eyes actually open for the first time each day there are figments of consciousness.... changing slowly from dreaming asleep to dreaming awake, still mainly aimless wonderings, but beginning to connect up now with reality; going from dreaming awake to 'dreaming aware."
Do we then wake up? No, no when we are 'dreaming aware' we are well awake. When we start to do things, rolling over to look at the clock, getting up to open the curtains and see what the weather is like, we indeed move on to higher levels of wakefulness. But it is all still dreaming aware. Our waking thoughts make more sense than our crazy fragmented dreaming thoughts and no doubt perceptions, the feel of the curtains, the look of the sky, are still better connected with reality. But the process of waking shows us each morning that there are no sharp distinctions to be made between dreams and other forms of our conscious being.

Dreams are evidently manufactured. (I have not met Mr. Henderson for twenty years, and I have never seen a pair of purple galoshes.) Yet for all their higher-level absurdities our dreams are usually manufactured out of sensible enough parts including those 'elements of consciousness', feelings and sensations.

But then feeling and sensations must somehow be manufactured too, and not only in dreams. There is no more reason to believe that the sensation of purple is 'out there' especially attached to purple objects than that any other such elements of conscious experience are thus simply 'out there', whether in dreaming or imagining, or remembering – or perceiving.
Arguments for the indirections of our experience of the world go back at least to Plato." 36

Cairns and Smith, while comparing these two states, argue for the indirectedness of waking experiences. But the undermined crucial factor in waking period is the extra-conscious world that delimits our experiences. In a just opposite way we can argue that even dream experiences run contradictory to our natural wish causing anguish and fear and sudden wake up. If we make slight shift to Merleau-Ponty's stand point that world teaches us against our anticipations, we can say that even dream would teaches us against our anticipations. It goes well matching with extra sensory perceptions of mystics that there are something extra-conscious even in dream state.

It emphasizes the extra-conscious existence of experience. It is again true that experience is needed to disapprove false experiences. Though the knowledge in erroneous experience is false, it itself is necessary for the further knowledge that it was not true. The rectification of experience is possible by further experience or resultant experience or inference from past experience. Hence, experience is central even to disapprove false experience. Nothing can replace experience.

Nature of Erroneous Experience

In the case of false experience, the knowledge as such is not true. There is a difference between the experienced and the real. The difference makes the experienced as erroneous. The experienced is erroneous in comparison with the real. The experience itself is neither true or nor false but neutral irrespective of
the real. But experience is not complete without its real correlative. The difference that makes experience false is due to three reasons. (i) The error of the experienced itself. It may occur due to inherent problem of the subjective components of experience and the improper functioning and improper motor activity or damage of the sense organs. In this case the deliverances of the senses themselves are false. (ii) It may occur due to objective circumstantial improper conditions. (iii) What is experienced is true but the interpretation is false. What is contributed to the experienced is by inference, interpretation and constructions. The contribution is exclusively an active part of the mind. The experienced is the passive part of the mind. It cannot alter it on its will. Consequently, there arise four divisions of experience. First pair of division is the subjective and objective. The second pair is in the subjective field itself as the experiencer and the experienced. We can see such examples in Cartesian method of doubt or in Indian theory of Maya.

To negate all experiences will not be justifiable even to commonsense. It is again true experience that is needed to disapprove false experience. Though the knowledge in erroneous experience is false, it is necessary for the further knowledge that it was not true. The rectification of experience is possible by further experience or resultant experiences or inference from past experience. Even to deny a certain experience as false that very experience is inevitable. Experience whether it is true or false is central to all sorts of knowledge that is valid. Experience can truly be considered as a criterion for verification of
knowledge. The proof of knowledge is experience. (A detailed description of this view is seen in Merleau-Ponty's theory of phenomenology of perception.)

However, Husserlian phenomenological analysis of experience, somehow manages to free itself from the problem of erroneous experience or perception. This problem chiefly arises due to the comparison of the experienced with the extra experienced. By virtue of Husserlian methodology of suspension he brackets the external entities avoiding comparison. Hence, Husserlian phenomenology can even work with hallucination, illusion, etc.

"Together with the whole physical and psychical world the real subsistence of the objective relation between perception and perceived is suspended; and yet a relation between perception and perceived (as likewise between the pleasure and that which pleases) is obviously left over, a relation which in its essential nature comes before us in "pure immanence".... It may be that phenomenology has also something to say concerning hallucinations, illusions, and deceptive perceptions generally, and it has perhaps a great deal to say about them; but it is evident that here, in the part they play in the natural setting, they fall away before the phenomenological suspension. Here in regard to the perception, and also to any arbitrarily continued nexus of such perceptions (e.g., if we were to observe the blossoming tree ambulando), we have no such question to put as whether anything corresponds to it in "the" real world."38
The Experienced and the Constructed

The mediatory principle is that which the subject experiences about the object. This principle involves the work of mind. Nevertheless, experience cannot be fully invented or created. Individual is powerless to alter the experience at will. The given is the epistemic content of experience. It is given from outside. Intentionality thesis considers it as intuited within. However, mind works on it, building everyday experience into its fullness and diversity. This interpretative elaborating aspect is the psychological as well as cultural product of mind. It is produced with respect to several psychological, intellectual, social and cultural aspects.

Problems related to this mediatory principle are many. There are two pairs of two fold questions regarding the nature of this principle. What does it consists of? What marks or features does it exhibit? These two questions are directly related to the content of the given or to the given itself. The other pair is emphasized on cultural aspects with all interpretation of the given. How is it related to the everyday experience built upon it? How the built up has been derived from the given? The remaining question is essentially a metaphysical one. Is it possible to proceed thence to the realities, which presumably underlies and explain the whole?

According to Husserlian phenomenology the epistemological given is intuited within. It is not given from outside. For Husserl, if it is given from outside the Cartesian doubt will remain to haunt.
"The root of the matter, however, is to grasp the meaning of the absolutely given, the absolute clarity of the given, which excludes every meaningful doubt, in a word, to grasp the absolutely "seeing" evidence which gets hold of itself.... But for Descartes to discover and to abandon were the same. We do nothing but clearly formulate and develop consistently what was always implicit in this age-old project. We part company in this connection with psychologistic interpretations of evidence in terms of feelings. 39

Myth

There is a contradictory view regarding the very existence of the given. It considers the given as a myth, a mere abstraction got by bare analysis. It can not exist psychologically by itself. For them, all experience includes interpretation. There is no direct acquaintance with the given since there is no given as such. But the hard question pertaining to an interpretation without nothing to interpret. Hence, epistemic or psychologically given must, nonetheless, be present in experience, though it can be construed in some fashion only under the provisions of thought.

Direct realism speaks that material objects are immediately given. There is no real difference between the naked experience and the clothed experience of interpretations. There is also no difference between sensation as coming from outside and perceptions as experienced by interpretations. Accordingly, there is no difference between appearance as experienced and reality as inexperienced.
In the present scenario of overwhelmed mechanization also, the given is considered as something that can be constructed. Perhaps it might be possible in a post-human society. When the machines began to do almost everything that man can do, phenomenology is the hope of mankind as it gave birth to phenomenologists in U.S.A. not in hundreds but in thousands in the last century. But if the machines also begin to feel then it marks the end of phenomenology and starting of post-human era. It is a challenge and threat to the uniqueness of human experience. A striking narration is provided by Cairns-Smith:

"Perhaps the easiest way of emphasizing that feeling really is the crux problem is to think about machines that mimic brain functions but are made out of materials other than proteins, lipids, etc. and are designed quite differently. If we can mimic a function in that way then perhaps we understand it. Well, we can make computers that can solve problems, that mimic unconscious thought; we can make burglar alarms that can be unconsciously aware, no doubt Brooks's MIT lab is working on artificial insects that can play ping pong. But machines that feel?... And then again at the level of the cell the machine that makes conscious experiences was cobbled together out of only somewhat modified eukaryotic cells. All this does not speak of consciousness as a phenomenon that can only be created in one particular way."
Problem of the Given

The given as given to consciousness, or the given is adventitious as given from outside or intuitively presented within are problems of givenness. Intentionality theory too speaks about the nature of given. Another problem regarding the given is whether the pastness of the memory image is intrinsic to it or imputed on the strength of some other feature, and images, and whether in general, the inner and outer character of feelings and images on one hand and sense impressions on the other are marks of the data themselves or a construction imposed upon them.

The problem of pastness can be answered only in the context of intuitive now or analysing time as explained by Husserl. Knowledge is possible because of time. There is no epistemological opening in consciousness. In Derrida, the mediatory principle has become the retention or the trace, the perception within the stream of sensation. Another problem is whether the inner ‘outer’ character of feelings and images, on the one hand, and some impressions, on the other hand are marks of the data themselves or a construction imposed upon them. It poses the question of the transcendence of the given. Transcendence is possible with the time factor in experience.

The Two Aspects of Experience

It is generally considered that the simple sense qualities of color, taste, sound etc. together with organic sensations, feelings and images are the given atomic cognitive units. Yet, these epistemic units are not enough for the fullness of experience. Having accepted such a givenness, there arises a problem which
can be stated thus: What is the manner in which the given is elaborated into the fullness of ordinary experience. Here, an elaboration process is required. It is the process of abstraction, association, composition, induction by memory, judgment, thought and language with spatial temporal, casual relations.

"In 1781 Immanuel Kant published his great work the *Critique of Pure Reason*, followed by a second, revised edition in 1787. All human experience, he argued, is shaped by twelve schemata, reflecting twelve forms of judgement. Rational beings, he tried to show, can think and perceive only in accordance with these principles. According to Kant, this is because we synthesize the content of our experience by means of these schemata out of a stream of inchoate impressions.... It follows that everything rational beings can think or perceive will display characteristics conforming to the twelve schemata."^{42}

Rationalists are of the opinion that this process of elaboration depends on principles contributed a priori by the mind. Empiricists held the view that the principles employed in the construction of the developed experience are themselves derived from immediate experience. Rationalists do not agree with this though they do not reject the fact of immediate experience. For empiricists experience is epistemically fundamental but for rationalists experience is casually relevant and not epistemically relevant to justify empirical belief. Hence, experience occupies a central position in both trends. The only difference is that immediate experience does not make itself intelligible by any natural process. It
is only the logical activity of the mind that brings order and coherence into the result. The most elaborated statement of this position is of Kant. According to Kant, the manifold of sensory intuition though spontaneously ordered, is brought under the a priori rules or categories of understanding. Experience in the full sense is thus a synthesis, part given and part made. The associative or sign material are part of given but the interpretative aspect is the work of mind. According to James, experience is a blooming and buzzing confusion and a chaotic sensory presentation requires conceptualization or interpretation. What is experienced is the given. In interpreting the given we make of it what we will. It is the active part of conceptualization of experience. Knowledge is the direct derivative of conceptualization. Because of this, experience points to something definite. This depends not merely on the character of the experience itself, but on the conceptual repertoire of the experiencer as well.

According to R.Kim Gonther, the interpretative construction is an unconscious process. We are conscious of the output of the computation. Accordingly, he defines perception in terms of computation.

"Perception can be defined as the process by which we arrive at an interpretation of sensory experiences. The interpretative process provides meaning to stimuli; it makes sense of the sensations we experience…. We are unaware of the action of computing an interpretation of our sensations but are aware of the output of those computations."
In order to understand this process in more detail with the inter-relationship between the two aspects of experience such as the unconstructed and the constructed, let us examine some theories of perception.

**Causal Theory of Perception**

Rene Descartes formulated a causal theory of perception. His theory sets the context and problem structure of perception in the times of modernity. His explanation was empirically oriented and scientific. Hence, his paradigm still continues in many of the contemporary schools of thinking.

According to Descartes, there are two kinds of causality, which are operative. They are transcendental to human consciousness. In the first kind of causal operative the real object exerts a causal influence upon our sense organs. The causal influence generates a likeness or copy of the object in the imaginations. For Descartes, imagination is the faculty of mind that retains images.

In the second type of operative, the causal influence is in reverse order. The faculty of imagination influences the immanent image. Imagination has a capacity to separate aspects of the image from each other. Recombining those different aspects in different ways it generates new images. This accounts for the false and fantastic images. Dreaming, hallucinating, etc. are the examples of these pseudo images.
Cartesian Epistemological Problem

Descartes' casual theory generates the Cartesian model of epistemological problem in perception. This model asserts that our knowledge of the transcendent thing is limited to the knowledge of immanent image. There is enough space for doubting the status of our knowledge. First, the immanent image and transcendent are two entities. Secondly, mind has a capacity to create. In order to verify knowledge, there is no way to compare the transcendent with the image in the imagination. There is no way to determine that the immanent image is a true copy of the transcendent. There is no certainty that the information derived from perception is veridical knowledge about the world. Cartesian epistemological problem of perception results in scepticism as expressed by Hume. Ultimately, we have to trust in God that the faculties we are endowed with are reliable for practical purposes. The real world is known only to God. Finite minds can only approximate it. Husserlian phenomenological epistemology tries to solve this problem by means of a methodology of reduction and thereby reaching the essence beyond doubt.

"The playground of these unclear and inconsistent theories as well as the endless quarrels associated with them is the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics which is bound up with it historically and in subject matter. The task of the theory of knowledge or the critique of theoretical reason is, first of all, a critical one. It must brand the well-nigh inevitable mistakes
which ordinary reflection makes about the relation of cognition, its meaning and its object, thereby refuting the concealed as well as the un-concealed sceptical theories concerning the essence of cognition by demonstrating their absurdity.  

Transcendental Model of Perception

Kant formulated a different kind of causal theory of perception, which is known as transcendental model of perception. In Kant's theory of perception there are two kinds of causality. One is transcendent causality and the other is transcendental causality. Kant calls the real as the thing-in-itself and considers it as transcendent reality. Reality is absolutely transcendent to the human realm of cognitive experience. However, in the notion of his first causation thing-in-itself causes sensations on our sense organs. The generated sensations are fleeting and incoherent raw data.

According to Kant there are two faculties that synthesize these incoherent sense data. The first faculty is the faculty of sensibility as pure forms of intuition. Space and time are the pure forms of intuition. They are immanent structures of sensibility. They account for the fact that we perceive objects as extended in three dimensions and events as succeeding one another in a one dimensional linear sequence. The second faculty is the categories of understanding. These categories are transcendental sources of form, which are applied to raw data of knowledge. This meaning-applying process is his second notion of causality. These faculties organize an abiding
object among fleeting raw data. Kant calls it as the phenomenal that stands in stable relation to one another. The categories governing our manner of understanding mediates the knowledge of phenomenal world. Our knowledge is always only of phenomenal world. The phenomenal world is an immanent domain and is constituted by intuition of mental faculties. There is no way to compare the phenomenal object to the thing-in-itself. Our knowledge cannot be asserted to be true of the thing-in-itself.

Kantian theory of perception is generally known as transcendental theory of perception. The transcendental aspect of perception is emphasized with regard to its perceptual experience. The transcendental categories of understanding organize the content of perception into a formal meaning. The content of perception is attributed to the origin in the transcendental or numeral domain. The Cartesian epistemological problem becomes more crucial in Kantian theory. In Kantian theory of perception both the transcendent origin and the transcendental categories are beyond the realm of experience. Kant’s theory of perception ends in agnosticism. Kant presupposes the existence of a God or a thing-in-itself and a soul etc. According to Kant such presupposition is necessary in order to give accounts of our existence and the existence of a phenomenal world. Husserl was trying to remove Kantian agnosticism and Humean scepticism from philosophy. He tried to establish the apodictic ground in knowledge as experienced by the phenomenal reality, which can be saved from its illusory status. This task
made Kantian phenomenal world as the, 'life world' in Husserl. It is the world with its sure foundation in human immediate perceptual experiences.

"Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure "seeing" and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this "seeing". It is given as something that is, what is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted".45

Perceptual Roots of Life World

The concept of ‘lifeworld’ is one of the basic ideas that Husserlian Philosophy had developed. It is the same concept that is widely appropriated across a number of disciplines than the other concepts. Husserl’s notion of ‘lifeworld’ is derived from his prior notion of the world. Later he enriched it with his notion of the life world. Philosophical analysis of the world is directly related to the position from which the world is approached. The point of phenomenological approach is different from the approach of natural sciences towards the world. Science has a natural attitude in its analysis of the world. The natural attitude valorises the objectivistic image of the world. Phenomenology deletes such an attitude setting lifeworld in opposition to the scientific world. The world of our everyday experience devoid of natural attitude is the lifeworld. Such a lifeworld precedes all other notions of the world.
Husserl's phenomenology takes its starting point with a call to return to the things themselves. The original phenomenological objects are multiple modes of self-givenness. These modes of givenness provide the ground for possibility and verification of all our experiences and knowledge. Husserl's concept of lifeworld is the world of self-givenness. Consequently, lifeworld is the world of self-evidences. It is the world of common experiences. Hence, his concept of 'lifeworld' implies the notion like levels of reduction, levels of perception, components of experience, etc., Husserl's theory of perception provides the essential roots of lifeworld.

"(But) if we can subject the forms under which our experience is inwardly lived, and in particular the basic experience of the perception of things of an eidetic study, looking out for their essential necessities and possibilities (as we can obviously do), and on these lines also eidetically track down the modifications of empirical connexions that are essentially possible with their motivations: "the real world", as it is called, the correlate of our factual experience, then presents itself as a special case of various possible worlds and non-worlds, which, on their side, are no other than correlates of the essentially possible variations of the idea "empirical consciousness", with its more or less orderly empirical connexions."
Perception: Kant & Husserl

Husserl's theory of perception radicalised Kant's transcendental approach to perception. Husserl did it by introducing a new phenomenological methodology known as the transcendental epoche and reduction. This innovative methodology is essentially related with his theory of perception. His double-edged methodology while brackets something, acquires something too. It suspends whatever is not a part of experience in perception and acquires whatever is an experienced component of perception. Husserl's theory of perception agrees with the aspects of causation of perception in Kant but only to a certain extent. In the case of transcendental causation, Husserl and Kant, does not negate the noumenal reality though it is beyond the realm of experience. But, unlike Kant, instead of supposing its existence as an ontological necessity, Husserl suspends it. For him, the ontological necessity should be within transcendental causation. In the case of transcendental causation, Husserl is in agreement with Kant, as long as it considers internal structures to supply form of knowledge as an epistemological necessity. But unlike Kant, instead of supposing the internal categories as beyond the realm of experience, Husserl brings them into the very realm of experience.

"An object that has being in itself (an sich seiender) is never such as to be out of relation consciousness and its Ego. The thing of the world about me, even the thing that is not seen and the really possible thing – not experienced, but
experienceable or perhaps experienceable. Experienceability never betokens an empty logical possibility, but one that has its motive in the system of experience.  

Thus he tries to provide an ontological foundation for epistemological process. Husserl's theory of perception makes the categories not only as a source of knowledge but also as a fact of experience. Here, what we see in Husserl is, a shift from Kantian epistemological and ontological dualism to a unification of both.

**Sensory Perception**

Husserl's concept of perception underlies a broad generic concept. Perception is not a single form for Husserl, but multidimensional. Corresponding to different kinds of objects or dimensions of reality, there are different forms of perception. Hence, Husserl includes under this concept different specific forms of perception. Among these forms of perception Husserl emphasizes sensory perception. Husserl's phenomenological analysis shows that sensory perception has certain characteristics that other form of perception is devoid of. Due to its unique characteristics, sensory perception is privileged. For him, it is the original consciousness of spatio-temporal objects. They are intuited empirical facts in phenomenological sense. Sensory perception has full sense of perception. It gives the original as the now present. His understanding of sensory perception is different from that of
empiricism. According to him, the empiricists speak of the transcendent but unfortunately they reach only the psychological fiction.

"Does not Hume’s psychology, along with any psychology, transcend the sphere of immanence? By working with such concepts as habit, human nature, sense organ, stimulus and the like, is it not working with transcendent existences (and transcendent by its own avowal), while its aim is to degrade to the status of fictions everything that transcends actual "impressions" and "ideas"? 48

Natural Level of Perception

According to Husserl, sensory perception operates on two levels. One is at the level of natural attitude and the other is at the constitutive level. First level includes our natural attitudes towards the world and our relation to it where the spatio-temporal world is given to it. It generates an attitude that the world is already there as ready-made. According to Husserl, this attitude is to be suspended by means of his methodology of epoche and reduction. This is the level of attitude that can never be validated by perceptual experience. According to Kant, our cognition is limited to the phenomenological domain only. This limitation is caused by the pure forms and categories of human understanding. They give structure to experience and form to human knowledge. We cannot apply these cognitive structures to the world independent of human cognition. Hence we have no access to the thing-in-
itself. In this case Husserl wanted to go beyond Kant and to establish it as an internal necessity. Husserl bracketed out what was naturalistic even in Kantian standpoint. Husserl regarded that we should abstain from the theoretical claims in the case of transcendent causation. We can never provide experiential evidence to such a claim. Husserl blames the natural scientists that they do not observe this restriction. In the law of science, "causality" is one of the major operative notions. According to Kant, "causality" is one of the key categories. The law of science merely reflects on our manner of synthesizing or unifying experience. Irrespective of this limitation the natural scientists typically consider that the laws of science govern the "real world". Their naïve thesis is only a taken-for-granted-belief that we experience the world, as it is in-itself. Husserl regards this attitude as both naïve and natural. He uses his phenomenological epoche to suspend the thesis of natural attitude. It was Cartesian dualism that caused the problem of objective reference of consciousness.

"This "fact-world" as the world already tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. A doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint"49

According to Husserl, this problem leads to important forms of naturalism. Naturalistic theory simply postulates mundane relationship between the objects of perception and the perceiving mind. It is upon this
postulation that the objective reference of perception and their role in producing knowledge depends. According to Husserl, naturalistic theory of perception threatens reason in various ways. Some of them are cultural developments in society, psychologism in logical theory and naturalism in both natural sciences and human science.

**Constitutive Level of Perception**

Constitutive level is the deeper second level of perception. This level never relies on the assumption that the world is simply there. It is true that consciousness has certain awareness of the features of the world as experienced. Constitutive theory tries to find out the relevant process of consciousness that achieves the awareness of the world. Our natural attitude toward the world is based upon the subjective components of consciousness. It also tries to identify sets of correlation between the features of the world and the components of consciousness that achieve them. Husserl's phenomenological investigation shows that perceiving is not like empty featureless opening onto the world. No transcendent reality can make an impression of its nature on to our mind through such an opening. The encounter with any object certainly involves a highly specific "way of being conscious". The way of being conscious makes possible the very basic sense of encounter. Experience of the object is possible only by this way.

Husserl's theory of perception can be called as constitutive theory of perception. The central idea of constitutive notion of perception is that the
objects of perceptual experiences are originally constituted in those experiences. Husserl's theory argues that we should take the perceptually given just as it is given. According to Husserl, it is consciousness itself that structures sensory contents. The world is constituted in consciousness. The presence of the world is achieved through suitably structured process of consciousness. His concept of constitution of consciousness gives an ontological dimension to perception.

"It is true I can wonder what givenness means here, and reflecting further I can "see" the "seeing" itself in which this givenness, or this mode of being, is constituted"\(^50\)

The constitutive act of consciousness originates objects within consciousness. These objects are presented to consciousness since they are immanent objects to consciousness. Consciousness is conscious of its own objects in an immediate way. Intentionality is the immediate function of consciousness to catch the objects. It is the subjective act of consciousness that immediately refers to objectivity within consciousness. Through intentionality, if consciousness directs itself toward its objects then through constitutive act, consciousness constitutes itself as its object. Both these acts are intrinsically identical; they are two aspects of one and the same act of perception of consciousness. If constitutive aspect is ontological in character then intentionality is epistemological. These two aspects are intrinsically unified in Husserlian theory of perception. Hence, the constituted objects are also known as intentional objects of consciousness. The very understanding
and experience of the world is based on those objects of consciousness. Intentionality is the intuitive experience of consciousness. The concept of constitution intrinsically captures the idea of intentionality. Intentionality is the core of constitutive act from an epistemological angle. From an ontological perspective, Husserlian concept of constitution is intrinsically intentional. According to Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of something. It is the perceptual capacity of consciousness to be conscious of something. This intrinsic feature of perception is the intentionality of consciousness.

“What forms the materials into intentional experiences and brings in the specific element of intentionality is the same as that which gives its specific meaning to our use of the term "consciousness", in accordance with which consciousness points eo ipso to something of which it is the consciousness.”\(^{51}\)

According to Husserl, intentionality has three components. They are: (i) sensory content; (ii) interpretative content and (iii), awareness of the object as experienced. These are the three components that make intentionality intrinsical. Intentionality in its totality has the nature where its sensory contents motivate and sustain an interpretative content in a certain way which gives rise to awareness of an “object as experienced”. His theory of intentionality can be accounted for without assuming the existence of the world. Using the phenomenological methodology of epoche and reduction Husserl abstained from such assumptions. By the theory of constitutive perception as intrinsically intentional he solved the problem of objective
reference of consciousness. It caused his phenomenology to be called as transcendental idealism. But phenomenology does not deny the existence of the world of normal experience. Husserl shows as to how objects have their features as we ordinarily experience. He explains how experiences of perception can and do have their-objects as the very mundane objects of experience.

Component of Sensory Data

Husserl’s concept of sensory content is radically different from that of others. For others, sensory data are the part of what is experienced as existing outside. For Husserl, sensory or hyletic data are components of the experience pertaining them. They are not apart from consciousness as imprinted on it but immanent in it. Hyletic data correlate with both structural and qualitative aspects of experience. In virtue of this correlation, hyletic data contribute to the intrinsic intentionality of perception. This is the peculiar nature of hyletic data that it sustains ‘noeses’. Noeses are constituted in inner-time consciousness. Since consciousness essentially functions in temporal dimension, hyletic data and noeses are of the form of temporal flow. Due to this peculiar nature of flow they do not by themselves amount to an experience of anything. They themselves do not present us with something identical or identifiable across time.
Component of Interpretative Content

According to Husserl, Consciousness intends an identical element within the flow of noeses. Husserl calls this identifiable element within the flow of time-consciousness as noema. Phenomenological analysis of consciousness is structured as noetic-noematic correlation. The noetic-noematic elements are the intrinsic components of perception. The distinction between them is that if the former is the part of mental flow, then the latter stands identifiable across time. Husserl makes a further distinction between perceptual noema and full noema within the concept of noema. Noetic elements are correlated with the experienced features of the objects. The experienced features of the object are the experienced object. Husserl calls the experienced object of sensory perception as perceptual noema. Husserl claims that the noematic sense is an inseparable ideal part of sensory perception. Every perception has such an object as experienced. It is the sense of a particular perceptual act of perception. Noematic sense belongs to the perceptual experience.

“But we must stress at this point in advance, that the parallelism between the unity of the noematically “intended” object of the object we have in mid, and the constituting formations of consciousness should not be confused with the parallelism between noesis and noema, understood in particular as a parallelism of noetic and corresponding noematic characters.”52
It is certain that an object has more features than it is experienced to have. Perceptual noema doesn’t exhaust the object completely. Still we are able to determine a complete object. It is an act of thought in which we are aware of such a full object. Due to the awareness of a fully determined object within the perceptual act we have the experience of full noema. Both the perceptual noema and full noema are intrinsic components of perception. Husserl claims that the full noema is present within the perceptual noema. The fully determined object is a component of the perceptual sense. The idea of full noema of the act of thought within the act of perception is quite important in Husserl. The experience of the fully determined object has a topological function. The full noema provides a future directed interest to the perceptual act to explore the full object. Thus the determined object of the act of thought provides a basic epistemic orientation in life world.

**Awareness of the Object as Experienced**

According to Husserl, the experienced perceptual noema are intuitive objects. They make us actually see, feel and hear the objects. Due to this intuitive self-presence, the objects, environments, etc. are experienced as "themselves present" and helps us to discover the world through our perception. It generates the sense of the world as ready made and directly there. This awareness is due to the correlation of the perceptual noema of the visible colours and felt surfaces qualities etc. with hyletic data. Sensory data helps to achieve the "embodied presence" of objects within consciousness. According to Husserl, this is the full sense of sensory perception. This is the
original consciousness of spatio-temporal objects. It gives the original as objective and present now. According to Husserl it is not an imaginary entity but an insight of essential entity. "In particular essential insights is a primordial dator act, and as such analogous to sensory perception and not to imagination"53

Accordingly, sensory perception is privileged among all other forms of perception. The intuitive experience of something as objective is the basis of retentional consciousness. This experience rationally motivates to believe in the reality of objects. The embodied objects of consciousness, according to Husserl, are the foundation of reason. It is the ontological signification of perception. Constitutive phenomenology analyse ontological direction of perception. Since, sensory data is the basis of ontological foundation, it performs a very important function within rational consciousness. Due to this specific characteristic of sensory perception it has got special epistemic value. It is the privileged epistemic role of verification. Because of this, sensory perception is also related with other modes of consciousness. His theory of consciousness shows that the other modes of consciousness derive some aspects of their nature from their relationship to perception. Hence it has got the special epistemic role of verification. Accordingly, Husserl connects the concepts of perception in logical and epistemological contexts.
Horizon and Horizon of Horizons

An object of experience is always present through multiple modes of givenness. Each mode of givenness forms a profile of the object of experience. There are multiple levels of relationship among profiles, objects and the one to whom they appear. The profiles and objects are experienced in or through the conscious events. The conscious events are always directed to the object through its profiles. Hence the conscious events have an ecstatic structure. The conscious events have "intentionality" as sense giving act to the object. Without senses the object would lack its experiential qualities. They are constitutive of the transcendental structure of conscious acts. Hence, they are not directed to themselves as events or achievements. They are directed to the objects with which they are concerned. Sense does not exist either in the object or in its profiles. They exist in the relationship between them and the one to whom they appear. The sense of the whole determines the sense of the profiles and vice-versa. In this process the coming profile is already anticipated and prefigured by the profile in focus. Profile by its virtue of sense indicates yet other profile. Due to this indication we find things situated in a field. This is the field of possible appearances i.e. in a determinate horizon. According to Husserl our practical actual life experiences are related to this given horizon. "Every hypothetical construction of practical life and of empirical science is related to this shifting but ever-present horizon through which the world-thesis receives its essential meaning." 

133
This horizon is not itself an appearance but is always a 'pregiven' field. This field mediates the relationship between that is given and the anticipation that it solicits. Hence, the horizon is a complex of senses. The senses are connected by differential implication. Differential implication is the horizon at play within itself. Differential implication structures the indications in play with any given profile. Indication is the horizon at play in the relationship between profiles and then between profile and object. These two stands together make horizon a nexus of indications. Horizons are tied to yet other horizon also by differential implication. The nexus of these interconnected horizons is what constitutes the lifeworld. In Husserl’s terminology, it is the horizon of all horizon. According to Hsserl it has got a general unrelative structure that is prior to all sciences.

"... as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which every thing that exist relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all. In a way equally accessible to all. As life-world the world has, even prior to science, the 'same' structures that the objective sciences presuppose in their substruction of a world which exists "in-itself" and is determined through 'truths in themselves" (this substruction being taken for granted due to the tradition of centuries); these are the same structures that they presuppose as a priori structures..."
Epistemic Role of Perception

Husserl makes a distinction between act of thought and act of perception. Full noema is the intentional object of act of thought. Noematic sense is the intuitive object of act of perception. According to Husserl, the full noema contains characteristics of the object as experienced. These “experienced characteristics” are not part of the reality status with which the objects appear. The full noema also includes the kind of experience of noematic sense or perceptual noema. Husserl finds that the noematic sense is an abstract form within the full noema. The inter-relationship between noematic sense and full noema is quite peculiar in Husserlian phenomenology. The same noematic sense can be part of two different experiences, such as, an act of thought and an act of perception. Such an identity makes two types of experiences, which come together. Thus perception has a role of verification. His genetic phenomenology works out the relationship between perception and thought. This effort involved in such things as tracing logical syntax, as the disjunctive form brings back to the experience of perceptual conflict.

Anticipation of Consciousness

According to Husserl perceptual error is possible. It is the hyletic data that sustain the intentional act of bestowing a sense. The bestowed sense correlates with what is experienced in perceptual act. The experienced object includes all features like generic, individual, relational, etc. These experienced objects might not be the features of the object. The perceptual error is
possible because hyletic data can often sustain and bestow different sense. Hyletic data determine the sense-bestowing that they support. It makes perceptual error possible about the what, how or even of the object. The perceptual error is removed when a new better experience supports a different sense-bestowal. In perception there is always an anticipatory dimension. Error and correction of error are made possible by the anticipatory dimension of perception. Consciousness projects its sense more or less in specific ways. Its bestowal of sense functions as anticipatory. Consciousness anticipates the experience of its object in the immediate future. It’s anticipation would be always in continuing the experience of the same object. The anticipated future will be consistent with the immediate past experience of the object. Thus anticipation sustains the operative sense-bestowal. Co-presentation of full noema with perceptual noema provides the basis for anticipation. It leads to perceptual exploration of an object.

Coherence of Perceptual Experience

The perceptual noema might not be the features of the object as it actually is. It is the future experience that determines it. Sometimes a future experience will show that the perceived object does not really exist at all. Husserl envisions an extreme case in which all anticipations are disappointed. In this case, the sensory data will sustain no sense bestowal. It will make our experience chaotic. Our normal perceptual belief in its actuality would become impossible. Thus our natural attitude that the world exists would cease to exist. Thus we would no longer have a world. Still, instead of this extreme
case we have the awareness that the world actually exists which is due to the coherence of the perceptual experience. In other words, the coherence in experience motivates and sustain natural attitude.

"... more generally any metal acts, are not isolated particulars, coming and going in the stream of consciousness without any interconnections. As they are essentially relates to one another, they display a teleological coherence and corresponding connections of realization, corroboration, verification, and their opposites. And on these connections, which present an intelligible unity, a great deal depends. They themselves are involved in the constitution of objects. They logically bring together acts, which are, and acts, which are not given, in the proper sense, acts of mere representation (or rather of mere belief) and acts of insight. And they bring together the multiplicity of acts which are relative to this same objectivity, whether they take place in intuitive or in non intuitive thought."56

Identity Synthesis

According to Husserl, the object as perceived is not a part of nature. His concept of perception shows that they have no natural properties, rather determination derived by his analysis of perception. This determination makes his theory of perception to eliminate naturalism in epistemology. Naturalistic theory supposes that our objects of experience are same as the objects of
external world. Husserl's account of perceptual intentionality solves the problem of the objective reference of perception. The problem created by Cartesian dualism is solved by Husserl through his idea of synthesis. Husserl's phenomenological investigation proves that the objects of experience are results of ideal synthesis and knowledge is the result of ideal entities. There are two types of synthesis such as continual synthesis of perceptual senses and synthesis of linguistic and perceptual signs. The first type of synthesis takes place in the cognitive process of perceptual exploration. Knowledge as the product of perceptual process is the result of this synthesis. It is not subject to natural laws but to ontological forms.

"The content of intuition, in the sense of a particular essence, is constituted in either imagination of perception indifferently, while abstracting from existential claims. And..., from this proceed the categorical acts.... The categorical forms which we encounter here.... point to the forms of thinking by means of which thought-forms, when they have been appropriately constructed, come to consciousness on the basis of synthetic data which tie together the simplest acts." 

Synthesis based on such forms is not like mere presuppositions of naturalism. Naturalism merely supposes the existence of the external world. Husserl's notion of synthesis instead of supposing, logically establish the external existence of the world, which is based on pure intuitive experience. It is the basis of our awareness of the object as experienced.
In perceptual exploration the two ideal entities are provided by the two types of moments such as intuitional moments and non-intuitional moments. Intuitional moments give rise to noeses in its temporal flow whereas non-intuitional moments give rise to noematic sense. Noeses and noematic sense are ideal entities. The identity synthesis between these two idealities makes the experience of the knowledge of object. In his idea of synthesis the experienced object is the ontological direction of perception. It gives rise to anticipation. At the same time further intuitional moments enters into identity synthesis as part of temporal flow. Future intuitional moment makes the non-intuitional anticipation fulfilled or disappointed. According to Husserl, the harmonious progress of synthesis between the two moments maintains human rational power. Husserl explains that the identity synthesis is the ground of reason. Human reason posits objects as "actually existing" and hence an "actually existing" world.

In the second notion of synthesis, the identity is between linguistic and perceptual sense. The linguistic entity is verbal meaning whereas perceptual entity is noematic sense. In this identity synthesis both of them are ideal entities. Perceptual sense is an intrinsic component of perception. But the linguistic element is not an intrinsic part of perceptual experience. It is outside the realm of perception. It is the verbal meaning of an act of thinking or of speaking. They become experienced meaning due to the identity synthesis with the experienced object. They are dependent on experience for their existence. Experiences are tied to temporality but meanings are not.
Experiences have their individual identity due to their locus in time-consciousness. Verbal meanings are part of experience, but their individual identity is not tied to temporality. Hence, they are capable of being repeated as numerically the same in any number of experiences. Due to the numerical identity they can produce the same meaning in numerically different experiences. It doesn't mean that they have real existence like worldly objects. They have only ideal existences. This means that their individual identity is not determined by the spatio-temporal factors. The same meaning can be apprehended in numerically different acts of thought of different persons in different places at the same time.

Non-Sensory Perception

Husserl's concept of perception goes beyond the limits of sensory perception. It is evident in the case of phenomenological analysis of retention. In retention there is no sense of encountering the original as present. But there is another kind of encountering the original past. Retention is not perception in the full sense because it doesn't give us anything as present now. It is the consciousness of the just past. It is, again the original consciousness of the past. In this sense, though it is not a perception in full sense, yet it is perceptive. It is perception in the sense that it is a form of original consciousness. Perception, for Husserl is a unique form of consciousness. According to Husserl even ideas can be perceived. Ideas are perceived when we actually and insightfully produce them. He calls this
insightful perception as immediate seeing which is the primordial object-giving process.

"Immediate seeing" (Sehen), not merely the sensory seeing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial dator consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements. It has this right-conferring function only because and in so far as its object-giving is primordial. 58

Husserl's concept of perception includes all experiences in which something is "itself present" to some one. Husserl's concept of perception as forms of consciousness coincides with his concept of 'evidence'. The non-sensory perception, in turn, provides the absolute ground for sensory perception of particulars. The eidos are the ground of pure transcendental referent. This is the immediate seeing of the 'type' or universals as explained by Dan Lloyd in cognitive science.

"At the same time, experience superposes on its particulars an awareness of various levels of abstract knowledge about the objects of perception. For example, my experience of the tree in the front yard is an experience of a particular tree, but also a tree, a living thing, a material object, etc. These elements of type information are part of the experience as well. 59
Yet, Husserl considers sensory perception as privileged than any other forms of perception. He relates it to other forms of awareness in his theory of consciousness. His phenomenological analysis shows that the other forms of consciousness derive their nature from their relationship to perception. It gives us the original as now present "Constituting the world" in the mode of present as the specific function of sensory perception. Hence, sensory perception is used to verify all other forms of perception.

**Martin Heidegger: Projective Theory of Perception**

Heidegger developed his phenomenological philosophy along an existential line. In Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness was regarded as disengaged, reflective and spectatorial thought. Heidegger’s Dasein is not a mere cognitive subject but multi dimensional fulltime practical human existence. Dasein is “being-there” with its everyday modalities of engagement as care and mood as well as reflective distantiation. It projects its own existential structures upon the world in which it dwells. Dasein perceives the world at the most fundamental level as an equipment complex. For “being there” in the world, the world is the totality of things structured around its use. Dasein concentrates on what it uses them for and what it is doing with them. At this level of engagement Dasein takes them for granted, even overlooks them, in this primordial or most basic contact with things. Hence, perception is projection on the part of Dasein. The constitutive framework of projection is oriented around goal directedness and utility. Hence, according to Heidegger perceptual projection includes involvement that determines Being of the entity.
'When an entity within the world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that being is its 'involvement'. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the "towards-which" of serviceability and the "for-which" of usability.  

Perception is not mere reflection on objects for the sake of reflection. Husserl viewed objects as removed from the context of human concerns. If Husserlian understanding of perception is merely the projection of categories of cognition, Heidegger's projection involved a suspension of such transcendental projection. According to Heidegger, we do not pay attention to an item only for the sake of attention only. For him, the knowing of a thing is involved in using it. Using the thing is fundamentally an overlooking or forgetfulness of the thing. Using subsumes the thing under the structures of user's concerns. It does not mean that to perceive is to ignore or neglect but to attune oneself to it on its own terms. The thing might reveal itself in a different way if the user just let it be. Hence, perception is neither active nor merely passive but both. In perception, things claim or appropriate us just as we intent upon grasping or appropriating them. At the primordial level, Dasein is unmindful of itself engaged in perception. Heidegger's paradigm of perception is the emergency of a thing within the finite framework of projection.
of Dasein. The projection is framed by the manner in which Dasein is tacitly attuned to being at a given moment.

**Sartrean Concept of Perceptual Freedom**

Husserl’s theory of perception accounts for two levels of perception. Perception in temporal dimension by means of time-consciousness and perception in transcendental dimension by means of transcendental consciousness. In the first case the perceived object is Noema and the second Eidos. The latter is the epistemological ground of the former, which in turn grounded on hyletic data in empirical space-time dimension that Husserl wanted to suspend. What Husserl wanted to unravel are both Noema and Eidos which the intuitive facts and intentional essences of consciousness as immanent in it. Sartre rejects such a thesis of immanence; rather consciousness is nothingness for him providing no ontological foundation and which has no epistemological tools and experiential entities. Hence, it is always a flight towards what it is not rather than confining to what essentially and structurally is. Hence, Sartrean consciousness is absolutely free from pre-given structures. Hence, in the act of perception it necessarily meant with the prevalent forms of thoughts as conceptual grounding for projecting itself to what it is not. Here Sartre warns against “bad faith” proclaiming perceptual freedom.

Sartre conceived perception as advocated by Husserl but with two important modifications. Husserl in his theory of perception by means of
phenomenological epoche and reduction refrained from making both ontological and epistemological claims about the transcendent. Whereas, Sartre, unlike Husserl, does not refrain from making an ontological and existential claim about the transcendent domain. But he refrains from making epistemological claim about it. This is the first modification that Sartre made to the Husserlian concept of perception.

In Sartrean analysis, there are two transphenomenal phenomena. One is being-for-itself and the other is ‘being-in-itself’. ‘Being-for-itself’ is the consciousness and being-in-itself is the transcendent world. For Sartre, being-in-itself is the defining factor and the transcendent domain has a relatively undefined background. According to Sartrean existential analysis, consciousness is nothingness and projective in nature. Consciousness is always a projection toward the transcendent. Through the process of projection being-for-itself defines being-in-itself. This mediation, in effect, is a limiting process. Consciousness as nothingness projects its negativity into this domain. It gives its perceptual meaning against the transcendent world. Being-in-itself appears as mediated or constituted by consciousness. It cannot be known as it is in itself. Being-in-itself is the phenomenal that accounts for the being of every phenomenon. It is, according to Sartre, is an itself.

Husserl adopted an egological view of consciousness. For Husserl, consciousness is grounded in the structures of transcendental ego. But Sartre explained consciousness as non-egological. He conceived consciousness as absolutely ungrounded and radically free. There is no structural framework in
which it is anchored. Consciousness is absolute nothingness. It is condemned
to be free. It is not bound by any innate structure. It is absolute freedom.
Hence in its activity of projecting meaning into the phenomenal world it is
absolutely free. Such a concept of perceptual freedom is the second
modification to Husserl's theory of perception by Sartre

Merleau-Ponty: Theory of Bodily Perception

Husserl's theory of perception has got several aspects. In his
phenomenology of body, Husserl speaks about the perception of movement.
This is the topic of kinaesthesia i.e., consciousness of movement. This aspect
of perception opened up by Husserl is developed by Merleau-Ponty in his
concept of bodily perception. In his theory of perception he reflects on the
philosophical implications of human embodiment. He has formulated an
innovative ontology based on the notion of the "flesh of the world". The
concept of perception played a central role in Merleau-Ponty. According to
Merleau-Ponty the world is accessed in perceptual horizon.

"It is first of all because we have present at this moment to
us a perceptual field, a surface in connect with the world, a
permanent rootedness in it, and because the world ceaselessly
assails and beleaguer subjectivity as waves lash round a wreck
on the shore. All knowledge takes its place within the horizons
opened up by the perception"61
Since the time of ancient Greeks the problem of the fallibility of perception has been a dominant theme in Western philosophy. It has been showing the tendency to distrust perception throughout the tradition. In all major philosophical systems perception was compared to illusion in order to point out its untrustworthiness. The reliability of perception was always determined by the tradition using non-perceptual criteria. Merleau-Ponty rejects such a criteria and reverses it. According to Merleau-Ponty, perception must produce the most basic model of valid knowledge. It is against the various arguments from illusion against perception. It is true that we are deceived by perceptual experience at times. But Merleau-Ponty pointed out that the discovery of perceptual error is itself a perceptual event. Perception, thus, provides the basic paradigm for the discovery and rectification of error. The unfolding of perceptual experience displaces the errancy of perceptual quest for trustworthy understanding. It is like the waking experience that dispels the dream making it difficult or even impossible to recall. According to him, perceived world is the presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence.

Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception is known as reversal theory, which amounted to a genuine philosophical revolution. His theory reversed the classical opposition of mind vs body, self vs other, spirituality vs corporeality, thought vs matter, etc. The traditional distrust of perception was correlated with the dichotomy of mind and matter. In this dichotomical hierarchy the body is derogated and mind is elevated. Merleau-Ponty reverses this hierarchy and
privileges the body. He considers the body as the core of human understanding and spirituality.

Merleau-Ponty conceives perception as a complex interaction taking place between the human body and the world. In its interrogation of the world, body is both active as well as passive and receptive. This complex nature of perception is involved in the bodily motility such as retinal focusing, manual probing and selectivity of the senses working together in synaesthesia. Merleau-Ponty conceives the relationship of the lived body and the perceptual world as one of reversibility. He explains its complex nature in terms of both empiricism and transcendentalism. According to Merleau-Ponty empiricism meant that our perceptual powers adjust themselves to the nature of the world. They measure reality on account of worldly things. Merleau-Ponty, however, recognizes the truth in transcendental claims as well. Our expectation has a certain function to be performed in our perceptual powers. What we take from the world is also a function of our expectation. The nature of this specific function is determined by various facts such as conceptual framework, cultural setting, attitude, etc. According to bodily theory of perception, the range of sensitivity of our sense organs plays an important role in expectation. By means of expectation we allure ourselves to the world. The world reveals itself to us according to the manner of our attunement. Merleau-Ponty explains perception as reciprocal accommodation of world and body. According to this theory, the world is revealed only to the extent that the body is capable of perceiving it. It is a limitation of our eye that it stops before
ultraviolet and infrared. The tree we see is real and our vision is trustworthy. If our eyes were capable of seeing beyond the current limits of vision we might see more. In the case of conceptual and cultural predispositions, the perceptual world has the capacity to draw us out of them. The world teaches us against our own expectation.

Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis led him to develop an ontology of the flesh of the world. Our bodily interaction with the world is that of manifestation of worldly corporeality interacting with another. I could not touch the tree if I were not touched by the tree. We are both emergence of the flesh of the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical break with naïve objectivism does not mean private life, but social and historical life which is not mere objective but intersubjective interaction.

"Philosophy certainly still involves a break with objectivism, a return from constructa to lived experience, from the world to ourselves.... When I come to realize that the social is not just an object, but first and foremost my own situation, and I awaken in myself the awareness of this sociality of mine, then my entire synchrony becomes present to me, and through it the whole of the past which I become capable of thinking as the synchrony that it really was in its time, as well as the whole convergent and discordant action of the historical community which is actually given me in my living present."62
The Other

Later phenomenologists were not ready to stuck with the immanent objects of transcendental consciousness. They wanted to reach transcendent objects of the extra-conscious world. Hence, they made use of the concept of the other. According to Immanuel Levinas, phenomenological methodology do not stop with the immanent objects rather posits the other to phenomenology. For Alfred Schutz, it is through the experience of phenomenological presence that the phenomena is available. It is this presence that makes experience and perception as a part of the objective world. Here consciousness functions as a mediatory principle with its transcendental sense.

"In order to uncover this sphere of the transcendental subjectivity at all, the philosopher, beginning his meditation within the natural attitude, must undertake that change in attitude which Husserl calls phenomenological epoche or transcendental phenomenological reduction.... On the contrary, what is grasped in the epoche is the pure life of consciousness which and through which the whole objective world exists for me, by virtue of the fact that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, etc. In the epoche, however, I abstain from belief in the being of this world and I direct my view exclusively to my consciousness of the world."63
The neurobiological analysis of consciousness also considers phenomenal consciousness as a mediatory principle between the subject and object that makes experience and knowledge possible. For Husserl too, phenomenology meant to abstain from the naïve attitude of naturalism to a certain extent which enables consciousness as creative. Schutz has rightly pointed out the Husserlian standpoint in his notion of transcendental intersubjectivity thus:

“Starting from myself as the original constitutive monad, I thus get Other monads, that is, others as psychopsychical subjects. These others are not merely related by means of associative pairing to my psychophysical being in their capacity as being bodily opposite me; rather it is a question of an objective equalization, a mutual interrelatedness of my existence and that of all Others. For, as the body of the Other is appresented by me as an Other, so my body is experienced by the Other as his Other, and so forth. The same thing obtains for all subjects, that is, for this open community of monads which Husserl has designated as transcendental intersubjectivity.” 64

Husserl had well aware of the problem of the other. Hence, within transcendental consciousness he postulated a special epoche:

“As regards method, a prime requirement for proceeding correctly here is that first of all we carry out, inside the universal transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoche with respect to our theme. For the present we exclude from the thematic field..."
everything now in question; we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness."65

The Objective Aspect

In deconstruction the mediatory cognitive principle is deconstructed as a metaphysical presence making the way for the other. Physicalism and functionalism performs such a task in scientific tradition. In the next chapter where we deal with deconstruction as phenomenology of phenomenology, we explain the experienced as a mediatory principle. It is demonstrated through the experience of objects both in the sense of presence in consciousness and time. By this way, it is posited as a gateway to the other – the real or external. In this sense the other is the other of logocentric language. It can be argued as the way to the prophetic language as the other where in prophetic tradition the other is a fact of spiritual experience.66
Notes and References:

5. Ibid., p. 92.
8. Ibid., p. 501.
13. Ibid., p. 229.


17. Ibid., p. 230.

18. Ibid., p. 230.


24. Ibid., p. 149.


34. Ibid., 200.


40. *Encyclopaedia of Phenomenology*, P. 24


45. Ibid., p. 24.


47. Ibid., p. 148.


156
52. Ibid., p. 290.
53. Ibid., p. 92.
57. Ibid., p. 57.
63. Ibid., p. 124.
64. Ibid., p. 127.