INTRODUCTION

Phenomenology has been a force in philosophy since Hegel wrote his "Phenomenology of Mind" in 1807. But his most valuable formulation as a philosophic method was given by Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl provided the methodological background and theoretical justifications not only for phenomenology but also for much of what is known as the existentialist philosophy as well as deconstruction, today.

The use of the term phenomenology here refers mainly to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and to that of those who derive their main inspirations from him. Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy, regarded consciousness, "that wonder of wonders" as the primary theme of phenomenological inquiry. In his "Philosophie als strange Wissenschaft", Husserl very clearly indicated that he was going to give philosophy a new rigorous foundation, which he felt, it badly needed but did not possess. He protested against the conception of philosophy which equated it with "Weltanschauung". Phenomenology, as originally conceived by Husserl, also meant a critique of relativism, psychologism, skepticism, historicism, nominalism, etc. All that it accepts is intuitively given essences. He
maintained that philosophy should never take any thing for granted and should always be ready to start all over again.

Husserl opposed the Kantian bifurcation of objects and events as they appear in our experience as opposed to objects and events as they are in themselves. Hegel, who characterizes his approach to philosophy as phenomenology agrees and differs with Kant. With Kant, he does accept that all what we know is the phenomenon. But unlike Kant, he felt no need to introduce the concept of an unknown and unknowable "noumena". It is an interesting coincidence that Husserl who temperamentally differs from Hegel and protested against his 'constructionism' is fully convinced that his phenomenology (as Hegel was convinced of his philosophy) is the necessary culmination of western philosophy and contains the solutions to the contemporary 'Crisis in European sciences', culture and humanity.

Philosophy was for Husserl not just the profession he pursued. It was a personal commitment to him. Phenomenology is an unending search for the 'given' because the only foundation beyond all doubt can be found in what is intuitively certain. Phenomenology stands in the first instance for a method leading to the most originary given in all fields of human activities; secondly, it may or may not mean a philosophical system. Phenomenology as a method has exercised enormous influence and is in fact concretely applied to different areas of search starting from logic to art and religion. It does not commit itself to any metaphysics. It's concern is with consciousness which is intentional and not with existences and facts, important no doubt they are. The real spirit of Husserlian phenomenology is not to erect a system of its own as a theory
amongst others. The ideal of presuppositionlessness which phenomenology is committed to provide the right to play as the role of an arbiter.

In the first edition of the 'Logical Investigation', Husserl used the term descriptive psychology to devote a purely descriptive non-reductionist approach to phenomena. Because of his fear of psychologism, Husserl classified in his 'Philosophy als strenge wissenschaft' as to what he really intended. To describe, for him is neither to reduce nor to speculate; it is not to hypothesize either. The concept of description really aimed at philosophizing without any presuppositions, prejudices and pre-judgments. In his attempt to overcome all forms of relativism, Husserl was in search of the notion of a non-linguistic, non-formal, non psychological, non-speculative givenness. In order to reach this goal, he introduced the method of phenomenological description assisted by the methods of epoche', eidetic variation and phenomenological reduction. His famous dictum 'Zuruck Zu den Sachen Selbst' is normally taken as indicative of the philosophic concern of phenomenology. A fundamental theme underlying Husserl's work, especially in his later years, is his concern to transcend all beliefs and doctrines which threaten to turn philosophy into accumulation of mere empirical facts. He terms such a philosophy naturalistic and defines it as a "phenomenon consequent upon the discovery of nature considered as a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact laws of nature."1

Naturalistic or positivistic philosophy is modelled after the methods and aims of natural sciences and conceives the world as a mere collection of things independent of consciousness and man. It also considers things of the world as complete with meaning. Naturalistic philosophy does not give
adequate place to an understanding of consciousness and man's relation to the world. It was the rise of naturalism-dissociation of reason-which Husserl, in his later writing, identified as the cause of 'crises' in European culture and civilization. He saw two responses to this crises.

"The crises of European existence can end in only one of two ways: in the ruin of a Europe alienated from its rational sense of life, fallen a barbarian hatred of spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the rebirth of philosophy, through a heroism of reason that will definitely overcome naturalism."

Phenomenology was the philosophy that was going to accomplish this rebirth of reason. It was the study of the 'phenomena' as it appears to consciousness. Husserl characterized phenomenology as a "return to things themselves". It does not mean a return to the things of the objective world, i.e. the way things are described in everyday scientific discourse: if it did, then phenomenology would be superfluous in its characterization of consciousness and its modes. It means, rather, a return to things as they appear in the primordial experience of man and to describe the objects just as one experiences them; and thereby to extract philosophy from the process. Phenomenology means the study or description of phenomena, and a phenomenon is simply anything that appears or presents in experience. Accordingly, phenomenology aims the description of things as one experiences them. For Husserl, phenomenology was not only meant to be descriptive of consciousness and its acts, but also transcendental in the sense that the world apprehended as human and meaningful may be understood as constituted by consciousness.
Phenomenological Methodology

Phenomenology, unlike positivism, refused to consider the world as essentially independent of consciousness; rather, it considers the world as a correlate of consciousness. Accordingly, phenomenology establishes a primitive unity between consciousness and the world. This is expressed in the fundamental thesis of intentionality, according to which consciousness is always the consciousness of something; that is to say, that any act of consciousness intends its correlate object in the world. Husserl explains,

"We understand that under the intentionality the unique particularity of experience to be consciousness of something. It was in explicit cogito that we first come across this wonderful property to which all metaphysical enigmas and riddles of theoretical reason lead us eventually back: perceiving is the perceiving of something, may be a thing; judging, valuation, the valuing of a value; wish, the wish for the content wished and so on acting concerns action, doing concerns deed, loving the beloved, joy the object of joy, in every wakeful cogito, a glancing ray from ego is directed upon the object of correlate of consciousness.³

In view of the above, it may be emphasized that phenomenological understanding of consciousness is essentially directed toward the world in its acts and manifestations. Its objects have both a subjective pole-the consciousness itself, and an objective pole, the world. Intentionality, therefore, is the characteristic property of our consciousness always directing this
consciousness to that which it itself is not. When Husserl says that consciousness essentially tends to that which it is not, he wanted to suggest that it belongs to the essence of our consciousness to form a meaning and consequently to constitute its own objects. Thus intentionality is essentially an act that gives meaning and has nothing to do with relations between 'real' objects.

The Phenomenological Reduction

The method Husserl advanced for the investigation of intentional structure of consciousness was termed as phenomenological reduction. This is an attempt to suspend our beliefs and presuppositions about the phenomena, which are usually accepted on scientific or commonsense grounds. Hence what appears to consciousness is that which is given to consciousness in its naive form, and not with our preconceptions of what ought to appear to consciousness. It further distinguishes between ordinary experience and transcendental experience and also between 'natural standpoint' and the 'phenomenological standpoint'. Phenomenology proper is characterized by Husserl as a critique of transcendental experience. Transcendental experience is said to be a new kind of experience, distinct from ordinary experience; and the phenomenological reduction is held to be an operation through the performances of which this new kind of experience becomes accessible to us. As Husserl observes:

"I find myself continually present and standing against the one spatio-temporal fact-world in the same world as the world already tells us, I find to be out their and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there."4
Thus natural standpoint about oneself is the stage wherein the objects of the world are looked upon as they are without any intentional relationship with consciousness, i.e., in their natural existence in which they are considered as being complete with meaning. Accordingly, when one looks upon an object from natural standpoint-the world as it exists out there in its natural order of space and time, one apparently experiences it as it appears to him without making any intentional effort to reach its "eidos". This perspective presumes a passive role on outside—a mere mirroring of the given reality which is considered certain.

One may, however, adopt a different standpoint setting aside all the judgements, which are taken to be absolutely certain. This means that one must, at least for a while, regard everything one experiences as nothing more than a phenomenon in one’s flow of experience. In short, one may bracket his judgement involving implicit or explicit reference to existence independent of our flow of experience and restrict oneself to the consideration of the phenomena, which constitute one’s ‘flow of experience’ qua phenomena. This, very briefly, is what phenomenological reduction involves. Husserl admits complex of phenomenological reductions. They may be divided as follows:

1. The phenomenological reduction in the strict sense which is also called the ‘bracketing of being’ in order to reach the intuitive individual experiential objects of consciousness.

2. The eidetic reduction or essential reduction, which is called epoche, corroborates the universal essences or eidos among them.
3. The transcendental reduction, which leads us from the phenomenal world to transcendental subjectivity or consciousness.

Having made the reduction, one leaves the natural standpoint and adopts a phenomenological stand point; and one's experience, thus reduced, becomes what Husserl terms 'transcendental experience'. It is only at this point that Husserlian phenomenology proper begins. In short, natural standpoint is replaced by a philosophic or transcendental attitude in which the world is understood as an intentional correlate of consciousness.

The above explanation suggests that the phenomenological method consists in performing an explication of the ego, with the phenomenon of the world as a guiding thread. To assure the neutrality of givenness, the phenomenologist sets aside his common sense, taken for granted belief in the existence of natural world considered to be complete with meaning. We shall see in the following quotation as to what Husserl means by the methodological suspension of what he terms the 'general thesis' of natural standpoint.

"The General Thesis according to which the real world about me is at all times known not merely in general way as something apprehended, but as a fact-world that has its being out there, does not consist of course in an act proper, in an articulated judgement about existence. It, is, and remains something all the time the standpoint is adopted, that is, it endures persistently during the whole course of life of natural endeavour."

8
Eidetic Reduction

The *Epoche* or phenomenological suspension consists in making explicit to consciousness the thesis which pre-reflectively underlies every individual judgement made within ordinary life about reality. Suspension means, first of all, coming into awareness of the meaning of natural standpoint or attitude itself. So the phenomenologist, in suspension, places in phenomenological doubt (which is not psychological doubt) his traditional common sense, taking for granted the everyday reality of the world within which things and events are noted and appraised. As Dorion Cairns explains:

“The fundamental methodological principle of phenomenology may be initially, formulated as follows: No opinion is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by observation of what is seen to be itself ‘in person’. Any belief seen to be itself given is to be subjected. Toward opinions that fall in neither class—whether they be one’s own or another’s—one is to adopt an ‘official’ philosophical attitude of neutrality.”

When the naturalistic attitude is abandoned and a radical attitude adopted, we reach the next stage, which Husserl calls ‘Eidetic reduction’, wherein an attempt is made to understand the basic essence, form of structure (Eidos) of the given thing in a reflective-selective manner, by not paying any attention to, or taking any interest in, the particular details of the thing under observation. It is not the chair, but the ‘chairness’ which is reflected upon the grasping mind by holding in abeyance the material details of the perceived object or objects. It is here, at this stage, that after abandoning the natural attitude, the
object is viewed from as many angles and standpoint as possible to understand its different shapes, appearances and phenomena with a view to arrive at the fountainhead of its essential structure. We thus step from a mere empirical level to the eidetic level of perception. Here we grasp the essence of the objects not by generalization, which is done in the case of empirical method, but by “direct seeing”, which is not merely empirical sense perception because it is directed by a free play of imagination. Proceeding in this way, one ceases to think upon external appearances of an object and begins to concentrate upon pure experience or pure phenomena as grasped by the reflected mind which has been, by now, put out of its natural standpoint. Thus, one abandons the individual experience in its particularity and concentrates on the structure of experience-its inner logic, the essence. At this moment, every thing can be viewed in its essentiality, be it sense-given natural objects or ideal object of mathematics because, in this stage, we find that everything is ultimately referred to by mind, or constituted in mind. Husserl goes further to declare that just as we can reflect on different experiences or appearances of an object, similarly, we can concentrate on our different experiences or acts of experience. Thus we can remove ourselves from our natural standpoint and shift the stance of the perceiving mind; the whole mode of manner of consciousness is shifted so as to enable us to perceive the world in a new light, a new perspective, as it were a new being, a new consciousness, an another self looking upon an already reduced or bracketed world.
Transcendental Reduction

After completion of ‘Eidetic’ reduction, the final step in phenomenological reduction is, what Husserl calls, the ‘transcendental reduction’ – the process of complete reduction, i.e. uncovering all layers of appearances and arriving at pure consciousness of an individual knower or experiencer, and is the real starting point for philosophy. When this process of ‘suspension’ or ‘bracketting’ completes, one reaches at, what he calls, is the stream of pure experiences of single experiencing being.

Resultantly, we modify our viewpoints about the world which is still ‘out there’ but in which we are no more interested as it appears to be, but as it essentially is. Husserl points out that under this realm one no longer surveys his perceptions, experiences, imagination- experiences, the psychological data which our psychological experience reveals; we rather learn to survey ‘transcendental experience’. One is no longer in one’s own existence but is interested in the pure intentional life wherein one’s psychically real experiences have occurred. This step raises the transcendental problem to its true level. The transcendental problem is ‘eidetic’. One’s psychological experiences, perceptions, imaginations, and the like, remain in form and content what they were, but one sees them as ‘structures’ (ideations); at this stage one is face to face with the ultimate structure of consciousness, its intentionality. In this way, the process of reduction transcends the natural world in every respect and the reduced sphere is a transcended one. What remains after the performance of transcendental reduction is nothing less than the universe of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its integrity, with all its activities and with all its cogitations and experiences, (Both terms being
used in the broad Cartesian sense which includes not only perceptions, judgements, but also acts of will, feelings dreams, fantasies, etc.)

Transcendental phenomenology thus consists in a number of related enterprises, all of which presuppose that phenomenological reduction has been made. The first involves descriptive stream of experience or 'phenomena of consciousness' precisely as experienced primordially. As has been noted earlier, Husserl does not consider this to be phenomenology proper. The second enterprise is epistemological; and because it is 'eidetic', it is part of intentional objects of which particular ones are instances.

The third enterprise is 'Egological' in Husserlian phrase. It is the other part of Husserlian phenomenology and is also eidetic as it is concerned with the 'essential structures' of transcendental ego. In this, one turns from the investigation of the eidos or 'essence' in the sphere of intentionality to the ascertainment of their objective counterparts, namely the essential structures of the ego, which presuppose an objective 'object'. Husserl says that the 'idea' or 'essence' (eidos) points to a structure within the transcendental ego that is governed by rule. According to Husserl, the activity of transcendental reduction is performed by the subject's deepest 'I'. This is different from the psychological 'me' which work only at empirical level. This 'I' who has been experiencing all the appearances can be concentrated upon, similarly, the experiencing 'I' can also be reflected upon as a result of phenomenological reduction. For Husserl, it is simply a matter of shifting one's attention from the object to the subject. This gives rise to a theory of the nature of the transcendental ego, or a 'pure egology, which is different from empirical ego.
Briefly, it may be said that 'reduction' is the technique designed by Husserl to get rid of the presuppositions of prior beliefs that consciousness naturally attaches to its perceptions. By the above mentioned series of reductions one transcends the 'natural attitude' and after the application of the method of 'epoche' the acts of consciousness are found to be essentially correlated with the objects of which they are the consciousness. Phenomenology is thus a *priori* eidetic and descriptive. The new field thus discovered is the rich transcendental field of acts of consciousness along with their correlates. It is neither objectivist (naturalistic), nor subjectivistic, nor metaphysical. Looked at from this angle, we may say that phenomenology is 'a way of looking at things' – from a standpoint which consists in clarifying as to what we mean by judging, explaining, understanding and interpreting.

**Identity Thesis**

Husserl's phenomenology as a pure analysis of experience is different from that of empiricists. He has attempted to discover the content of sense experience which is different from sensation and is supplied from outside. Husserl was in search of internal contents, which are experienced as themselves and are certain and verifiable as different from external entities which are otherwise facts of belief. In order to reach such an apodictic object, Husserl adopts the technique of Phenomenological reduction which is meant to bracket out the empirical objects so as to reach to intuitive entities which he calls the neumatic meanings.

"Thus to each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure
phenomenon, which exhibits its intrinsic (immanent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute datum. Everyday postulation of a "non-immanent actuality," of anything which is not contained in the phenomenon, even if intended by the phenomenon, and which is therefore not given in the second sense, is bracketed, i.e. suspended.\[7\\]

Husserl in his phenomenological analysis was trying to locate the immanent phenomenon of direct sense experience. In order to appropriate the internal entities of experience, he adopts a new methodology of intuition, which is different from the rationalist notion of intuition. For Husserl, intuition is a unique mode of experience which is the basis of our experiences and knowledge. Husserl’s intuitive methodology is a mode of experience that provide verification of all sorts of epistemological ideas and logical concepts. Accordingly, Husserl regarded intuition as direct and explained it as the intentionality of consciousness. According to Husserl, the intentional entities are immanent in consciousness. Intentionality is the essential structure of consciousness. For Husserl, intentionality is the datum that provides data by itself and in itself. It is the intuitive experience of consciousness of its own immanent objects.

There are two forms/categorization of intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology. One is called empirical intuition while the other is essential intuition. Empirical intuition provides the facts of direct sense experience whereas essential intuition provides the universals among particulars of a certain class. All aspects of sense data are the objects of empirical intuition of individual intuition.
"The essence (Eidos) is an object of a new type just as the datum of individual or empirical intuition is an individual object, so the datum of essential intuition is a pure essence".  

Essential intuition is the eidetic intuition that supplies universal objects which are present invariably in all particular facts. Husserl discovers these universal phenomena by means of transcendental logic and calls them logical contents or abstract contents. For Husserl, these essential contents are the meaning-giving eidetic entities to logical concepts. Husserl reaches these universal phenomena through the technique of reduction of particular phenomena of empirical intuition.

Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology deals with the task of discovering facts and essences through the methodology of phenomenological and eidetic reductions. He established that this field of phenomena harbouring the intuitive entities are the meaning-giving layer to experience and knowledge.

(But) one thing seems to help us along: eidetic abstraction. It yields inspectable universals, species, essences, and so it seems to provide the redeeming idea: for we do not seek "seeing" clarity about the essence of cognition? Cognition belongs to the sphere of cogitations. Accordingly, we must through "seeing" brings its universal objects into the consciousness of the universal. Thus it becomes possible to have a doctrine about the essence of cognition.

Accordingly, the task of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was purported to establish the epistemological and logical entities as real.
Resultantly Husserl considers consciousness as pure subjectivity as it is different from the psychological subject. Husserl reaches this pure subjective field of consciousness through the reduction of psychological ego and the acquired transcendental consciousness is the field of pure objectivity in which the intentional entities are immanent. The intentional experience is said to be the experiences of the transcendental consciousness. Husserl establishes a phenomenological identity between the transcendental consciousness and the pure phenomenological data as immanent in it. This identification leads transcendental phenomenology as the condition of Being. Being is given in consciousness and provides a meaning-constituting world and established through the phenomenological identification of idealizing consciousness. This self identical presence is the evidential foundation of experience, knowledge, reason, concepts, etc.

The intuitive or intentional function of consciousness takes place in an empirical level. It corresponds to the external stream of sense-data in temporal dimension. Husserl calls this flow of intuitive internal objects as noeses. These objects are reached by phenomenological reduction. According to Husserl, our perception is always centred around fixed objects because consciousness intuits an ideal fixed object across the temporal flow of noeses which Husserl calls as noema. Noema is reached by the reduction of temporal as well as manifold aspect of noeses. Noema are facts among multi-layered streams.
"Corresponding at all points to all manifold data of the real (reellen) noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure (wirklich reiner) intuition, and is a correlative "noematic content", or briefly "noema". Husserl's eidetic reduction establishes the essential universals among particular facts. Eidos are the genuine evidential ground of all experiences and knowledge. According to Husserl, they are the epistemological foundation which is the object and task of Husserlian phenomenology. According to Husserl eidos are the transcendentalism that constituted experiential referent. It is the self-evident universal unities that provide experience and knowledge.

"On the other hand, our deliberations showed that the real (reelle) experiential unity of hyletic and noetic factors is totally different from that of the factors of the noema "of which we are aware" within that same unity; and again, from the unity which unites all those real elements of experience with that which comes to consciousness and through them as noema. The "transcendentally constituted" product, shaped "on the basis' of the material experiences, and "through" the noetic functions, is needed something "given", and when we faithfully describe the experience and its noematic object of awareness in pure intuition, something self-evidently given; but it belongs to the experience in a completely different
sense from that in which the real (reellen) and consequently proper constitutes of the experience belong to it.¹¹

The fundamental aspect of phenomenology is the transcendental consciousness where the eidos are immanent and are the functional structure of consciousness immediately experiences them by having intuited them. Through the transcendental reduction, Husserl wanted to bracket out the psychological ego, which is the centre of one's awareness of oneself, and our experiences belong to it. Transcendental reduction idealizes consciousness as transcendental ego as the pure epistemological subject to which all experiences belong. Consciousness is transcendental in the sense that it transcends the psychological subject and the intentionalities of consciousness are also transcendental in the sense that they are identified with consciousness.

"Husserlian idea of the transcendental ego, as developed in Cartesian Meditations, is multilayered: the transcendental ego is (a) the identical pole of subjective processes; (b) the substrate of habitualities (whereby, we are told, it shows 'personal character") and (c) the monad taken in full concreteness, i.e. as the totality of all his intentional life."¹²

Husserl establishes the identity of intentional entities with consciousness in a specific way that they are constituted by consciousness itself. Consciousness is constitutive in the sense that it
is intentional or intentionality is the essential and functional structure of consciousness. Husserl's theory of transcendental identity explains the unique feature of identity between epistemological object and the ontological subject. According to Husserl, the transcendental consciousness is the constitutive origin of the world. It is the ontological foundation and is directed to the epistemological process of self-awareness. Such an identity solves the problem of connection between subjectivity and objectivity without the layers of scepticism and relativism. Husserlian phenomenology regarded transcendental consciousness as the ontological foundations of experience and knowledge with the epistemological foundations immanent in it, yet transcendental consciousness is constitutive in its most fundamental temporal dimension. This standpoint leads Husserl to the analysis of temporality of conscious experience and in turn gives rise to the thesis of time-consciousness.

"... Time is the name for a completely self-contained sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be seen that in certain sense our previous exposition has been silent, and necessarily so, concerning a whole dimension, so as to maintain free of confusion what first becomes transparent from the phenomenological standpoint alone, and quite apart from the new dimension constitutes a self-contained field of investigation. The transcendental "Absolute" which we have laid bare through the reductions in
truth not ultimate; it is something which in a certain profound
and wholly unique sense constitutes itself, and has its
primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute.\textsuperscript{13}

Transcendental consciousness becomes absolute in its temporal flow
that constitutes itself as well as consciousness of time. Hence Husserl
calls it time-consciousness, the absolute flow.

**Treatment of Time-Consciousness**

Husserlian phenomenology regarded 'time' and consciousness of
time as its central themes. Husserl does not consider temporality as a
simple phenomenon but as a complex one. According to Husserl there are
two dimensions of temporality such as objective time and internal time.
Husserl in his phenomenological analysis was interested of time as it is
experienced, i.e., internal time. Internal time, is the consciousness of time
whereas objective time may be suspended for the analysis of
phenomenological consideration as part of his methodology. Accordingly,
Husserl reflected on time within the boundaries of phenomenological
epoche and reduction. Epoche or reduction is applied in order to reach
what is intuited or intended by consciousness. He has made use of
reflective eidetic method toward the consideration of time as one
experiences it. According to Husserl, internal time is the time intended by
consciousness and thereby a consciousness of time. In other words, the
intentional experience of time is the consciousness of time. Husserl
investigates temporality as a complex instance of intentional
consciousness. Consciousness is time-consciousness in the sense that it
constitutes the consciousness of time. On the other hand consciousness is time-consciousness in the sense that its fundamental constitution is in the temporal dimension. This is the more fundamental aspect of consciousness than the former aspect. The former is the empirical aspect and the latter is the transcendental. Husserl calls it the Absolute flow. It matches with the quantum theories of consciousness as explained by Advo in a conversation with Krit.

"Now the price you pay for this way of doing it – using space to broadcast in – is that you do not then have it so easily available for modulation, the making spatial structure. We have to say that the main structuring of the flame of consciousness must be in time not space (a form a la Mozart rather than Michaelangelo) – that generally speaking there is only one waveform, however complicated it is, however much it changes, however, many molecules in however many places are used to create it: or however many molecules in however many places may come to be affected by it." 14

Time-Consciousness

According to Husserl, Consciousness of time is the fundamental intentional structure of Consciousness. It means that Consciousness functions essentially in temporal dimension. Act of consciousness takes place always with temporal awareness. Since intentionality is the defining feature of consciousness, consciousness is always consciousness of
something. Since intentional act takes place essentially in temporal dimension, consciousness is always consciousness of something in temporal dimension. Hence, time is uniquely an important form of intentionality. Time enters into everything of which we are aware. Time is so important in Husserlian phenomenology that he dared to call consciousness as time-consciousness. Time-consciousness is the necessary condition for constituting intentionality. Hence time-consciousness, for Husserl, means time constituting consciousness. Husserl's phenomenological analysis shows that every intentional experience pre-suppose time-consciousness.

**Intuitive Now Points**

According to Husserl our fundamental experience of time is 'nowness'. This is the intuitive structure of time consciousness. Husserl calls it as now-point. The now-point changes from moment to moment. Only one now-point will be actual at a moment, others are elapsed points or points yet to come. Now-point are fleeting in nature.

According to Husserl, all experiences begin and end with a temporal interval that one attends. Husserl says:

"But I can also pay attention to its mode of declaring itself: to the modus of the actual "Now", and to this feature also that with this very 'now', and in principle with every 'now', a new and continuously new 'now' links up in necessary continuity, and that in concert with this very actual now-passes into a just vanished, the just vanished one again and
continuously so into ever-new just vanishings of the just vanished, and so forth. And similarly for every 'now' that has been newly linked on to its predecessor.\textsuperscript{15}

The now-points are points that make up intuitive time. Intuitive time is constituted by the actual now-points. Nowness is the essential structure of consciousness of time. Even the thoughts about past and future occur within the intentional structure of nowness. Everything that is intended by consciousness happens within the now-point. It can be illustrated by an example from neurobiology. Though they are speaking about objective time, it may show something like nowness or now point in cognition as a structural unit of experience.

"A promising experimental approach to locate the NCC (Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness) has been the use of bistable precepts, that is, pairs of precepts, alternating in time, that arise from a constant visual stimulus as in a Necker cube (Crick and Koch, 1992). In one such case, a small image, say of a horizontal grating, is presented to the left eye and another image say of a vertical grating, is presented to the corresponding location in the right eye. In spite of the constant retinal stimulus, observers, "see" the horizontal grating alternate every few seconds with vertical one, a phenomenon known as "binocular rivalry" (Blake 1989). The brain does not allow for the simultaneous perception of both images."\textsuperscript{16}
Tripple-Intentionality

One may get tempted to conclude that as time-consciousness intends everything in intuitive nowness, everything will appear in the form of now. Actual now-point of time-consciousness intends objects as now or in the mode of now. But the object is extended in time and not simply now. There is awareness that object is extended in past as well as future and not merely limited to 'now'. Here a question arises as to what is the structure of time-consciousness that is constituted by intuitive now-points in order to intend objects as extended in time. It is certain that consciousness reaches beyond the now. Reaching beyond now means that it should necessarily intend the extended sections. Hence the actual now-point of time-consciousness must reach out beyond now. In order to have an awareness of object extended in time, the object should be intended in its elapsed phase as well as in its phase yet to come. Each actual now-point refers intentionally to the extended section of object and not merely to its now-point. If intention referred only to now, our experience will be fragmented water-tight compartments of now-points. For example, in the case of music we will have only momentarily scattered pieces of sound instead of music. So the object is extended in time, which is intended by consciousness. Time experienced is not isolated now-points but an ever changing synthetic structures of now, past and future. Reaching out beyond now is, a necessary condition in order to explain perception of objects which is extended in time. Husserl brings the notion of tripple intentionality of consciousness, in order to explain away the beyondness of now. The tripple intentional structures are the instances of now-point of time-
consciousness. Husserl calls these instances as primal impression, retention and protention. Primal impression intends what is actually present now. Retention or primary memory intends what has just elapsed. Protention intends what is yet to come.

Impression

Reaching out beyond now is a necessary condition for explaining perception of objects as extended in time. But it doesn't adequately explain perception of temporal objects. According to tripple intentionality one is conscious of the three temporal aspects of the objects which eventually envisages status of the instances. For example, if the tripple instances are of the same status, then one remains conscious of just elapsed notes of a melody in precisely the way in which one is conscious of the present note. This will make one hear a crash of simultaneous sounds but not melody. Hence the tripple intentional phase should not be on the equal status. In order to solve this problem the tripple instances should intend the object as modified modes of present, past and future. Accordingly, Husserl gives priority to impression. He considers primary impression as the determining factor of both retention and protention. It is the primal source for all consciousness and being. The instance of the impression is the wellspring of the now. Primal impression is the actual instance of tripple intentionality of time-consciousness. Impression intends the actual phase of the mode of present. According to Husserl, primal impression is the absolutely original consciousness. This instance of intention has its fulfilment by the fact of the presence of the original object and impression makes consciousness as
the time constituting consciousness. It is this same impression that becomes past and by the same way objectifying the impression.

"The mental process which we are now undergoing becomes objective to us in immediate reflection, and thenceforth it displays in reflection the same objectivity: the self-same tone which has just existed as an actual "now" remains henceforth the same tone, but moving back into the past and there continually constituting the same objective point in time."\textsuperscript{17}

**Primary and Secondary Memory**

Retention or primary memory is the just elapsed instance of the tripple intentionality. Retention intends the just elapsed phase of the object in the mode of past. In this respect, it lacks the fact of fulfilment as it is present in impression. It does not intend the actual phase of the temporal object. Yet, retention is the original consciousness of the past in several other senses. Firstly the sense of past initially gets constituted in the mode of past. Secondly it entails fulfilment due to the presence of elapsed phase of object. It is also original in the way in which it gives the past though it is not as original as the actual instance in the mode of present. Retention is the direct and immediate consciousness of what is just past as it slips away from the present. In this respect primary memory sees the past. In other words, we can say that retention presents the past.

"The actual now is necessarily something punctual and remains so, a form that persists through continuous change of
content. It is the same with the continuity of the "just vanished"; it is a continuity of forms with contents ever new. And it also comes to this: the enduring experience of joy is "consciously" given in a consciousness-continuum of this constant form: an impressional phase as the limiting phase of continuous series of retentions, which however, are not on the same level but constitute a continuous succession of intentional relationships – a continuous chain of retentions of retentions. The form receives a continually fresh content; thus to each impression united with the experience of 'now' a new impression, corresponding to an ever-new point of the duration, is continually "annexing itself": the impression continuously transforms itself into retention, and this continuously into modified retention, and so forth.¹⁸

It is unlike and opposite to ordinary recollection or secondary memory. Secondary memory is not capable of presenting the past but only re-present it. Representation is not original presentation. Ordinary recollection re-presents the whole experience again as if it is running off for consciousness anew. In ordinary memory the actual past event may get modified in an infinite ways due to several voluntary as involuntary actions. These possibilities are not open to retention as it is the original consciousness of the past. Retention is neither freely undertaken nor free to change what it is aware of. The immediate awareness of past occurs automatically. Retention simply presents the continual flowing away of what is past.
"As far as memory is concerned it is not anything simple, and from the start it presents different forms of objects and, interconnected with these, different forms of givenness. Thus one could refer to the so-called primary memory, the retention which is necessarily bound up with every perception.\(^{19}\)

**Protention and Expectation**

Protention is the original consciousness of what is to come about. It is in this instance of intention that the sense of future initially constituted. Protention presents its correlate in the mode of future. The instance of protention intends the phase of object as yet to come.

"There belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant' – not yet perceived, but only anticipated and at first, with non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are 'coming' now perceptually); a continuous protention, which with each phase of the perception, has a new sense\(^{20}\)

In this respect, it has no fulfilment that characterise primal impression. It does not have the sense of fulfilment which is present in retention. What is future is precisely what has not yet made its appearance "in person" by presenting itself in the mode of present or past. It has got its correlate from the original presence that is present in impression. Protention is, therefore, the perpetual and immediate openness to more
and more experiences. With the help of a large number of examples, especially chosen from the domain of music, Husserl demonstrates that expectation belongs to the very essence of an impression of the present and the element of expectation is present in every act which is perceived as a temporal event. This makes one surprised or annoyed if the music is stopped when one is in the midst of enjoying music. Hence, protention is quite important for conscious life. According to Husserl, protention is just opposite to retention in the stream of temporal changing modes.

"To all this must be added continuous changes in an opposite direction: 'after' corresponding to 'before', a protentional continuum corresponding to the retentional."21

Whatever content it has, will conform to what one is presently experiencing. Protention possesses some content does not mean that it is equivalent to expectation. Expectation is the act of anticipation of future as if one perceives it. It is a full and independent act just like secondary memory.

Temporal modes

Impression, retention and protention, though distinguishable, are not self-sufficient acts. They are dependent instances of time-constituting consciousness. They depend upon the temporal modes of now, past and future and present their intentional correlatives in the mode of present, past and future respectively. They are the temporal modes of appearance. The temporal modes characterize the objects of consciousness as temporal objects. Temporal objects are the objects that appear in their ever-changing temporal modes. Even the non-temporal objects such as
theorems in mathematics, presume time as background against which their timeless character stands out. Temporal objects are experienced as present, past and future. The temporal modes are neither things nor containers for things nor parts of the objects presented in them. Temporal modes are the ways in which temporal objects appear. They are temporal perspectives of objects just like the spatial perspectives in which objects appear in space and simply the ways in which something appears.

**The Privileged Present**

According to Husserl, the temporal mode of present has got a privileged status than the temporal modes of past and future. The mode of present is the absolute point of orientation for the life of consciousness. Past and future are always oriented toward present and are constantly changing in relation to present. Another privilege point of present is that the temporal objects appear initially in the mode of present. Hence, it is the living source of new temporal objects and new temporal positions. What appears as present will immediately sink into past. Yet, it remains identified with the temporal location at which it initially appeared and is the living source-point of individuation. Something can become individuated only by appearing at a particular point of time as present. The present is characterized by its hospitality. It can play host to many temporal objects and may not be considered as a thing or part of a thing. According to Husserl, the absolute present is a tone of continuation that accounts to extend the strictly present moment.
"And if the tone does not cease but continues, and during the continuation presents itself as the same in content or else as changing content, can we not grasp this fact—that it remains the same or changes—evidently (within certain limits)? And again, does this not mean that "seeing" extends beyond the strictly present moment and hence is capable of grasping intentionally, in continually new moments, what is no longer existing, and that it is capable of becoming certain of a stretch of past time in the manner of evident givenness?"\textsuperscript{22}

The Whole

Though the present has a privileged status, it cannot exist independently of its other modes. It is never without its horizon of past and future. Present is dependent on the larger whole of temporal appearances. This whole is formed by the three modes in their continuous mediation with one another.

"The description previously given should thus be completed by the bringing in of a new dimension, and not until we do this have we the whole phenomenological time-field of the pure Ego, which, from any one of "its" experiences as a centre, it can measure throughout according to the three dimensions of before, after, and at the same time; or in other words, the whole, essentially unitary, rigorously self contained stream of temporal utilities of experience."
One pure Ego, one Stream of experience filled with content along all three dimensions, and in such filling holding essentially together and progressing \((srich fordernder)\) through its continuity of content: these are necessary correlates.\(^{23}\)

The whole does not mean that the three temporal modes dissolve into one another. At the same time it does not mean that they appear differently of one another. They maintain their identities within the whole.

**Time Fixed and Flowing**

Temporal modes are not points making up objective time but they are just instances of intuitive now-points. Objective time is the sequence of temporal positions. Temporal position of an object is different from the temporal appearance of an object. Temporal position remains the same as the object recedes into the past. The object is glued to its temporal position with its spatial location. It preserves a rigid relationship to what comes before it and what followed after it. Objects find their fixed locations in their temporal positions. In this sense, according to Husserl, time is fixed. Time as fixed is measured by the objective relationships of before and after. But, according to Husserl, these fixed relationships are experienced in the changing modes. Hence time is also flowing, in the sense that, it appears always in the shifting modes of present, past and future.

"This means that every present moment of experience has about it a fringe of experiences, which also share the primordial now-form, and as such constitute the one
primordial fringe of the pure Ego, its total primordial now-consciousness \(^{24}\)

The object in fixed spatio-temporal position, runs off for consciousness and appears in continually different temporal modes in relation to the living now.

**Absolute Flow**

Husserl was concerned with the basic structure of intuitive time in its now-points and explains accordingly the structure of the act of intentionality of time-consciousness as tripple phaseted. In other words it explains the way that objects appear and perceived as temporal objects. It also explains as to how we are aware of objects as extended in time. These objects are constituted by the very time-consciousness i.e. the tripple intentional structure. According to Husserl this tripple intentional structure belongs to a more fundamental level of consciousness. Hence, for Husserl, not only the temporal object, but also the very acts that intend the temporal objects are themselves temporal objects. They are immanent objects of consciousness as well as immanent temporal modes of consciousness. The structure of tripple intentionality as temporal objects is immanent in fundamental time consciousness. Consciousness becomes aware of these objects as immanent objects of consciousness. The dimension of temporal awareness is beyond the structure of tripple intentionality of time-consciousness too. In order to account for a viable basis temporal awareness Husserl further delved into the founding level of time-consciousness, which he calls as the "absolute flow" of consciousness. This is the universal and necessary
condition for our temporal awareness. This absolute flow is the phenomenological time that constitutes the stream of experience.

Every single experience can begin and end and therewith bring its duration to an end—for instance, an experience of joy. But the stream of experience cannot begin and end. Every experience, as temporal being, is an experience of its pure Ego. And to this the possibility (which, as we know, is no empty logical possibility) necessarily belongs, that the Ego may direct its pure personal glance to this experience, and grasp it as really being, or as enduring in phenomenological time.25

Double Intentionality

The absolute flow is the dynamic, continuous and ultimate level of consciousness. Its dynamic dimension is expressed by its double intentionality. Dual intentionality, is the absolute flow of consciousness which is conscious of itself in its flowing and hence also conscious of its immanent temporal objects. Two intentionalities, therefore, are inseparable aspects of a single consciousness. The flow intends the immanent objects by bringing itself to appearance. Thus the absolute flow accounts for the consciousness of immanent unities as they run off in intentional time. By double intentionality absolute flow becomes conscious of the tripple instances of the intentionality of time-consciousness as well as the immanent temporal objects. This awareness is implicit or nonthetic. The temporal modes of time-consciousness such as present, past and future
are intended by the absolute flow. In this sense they are the temporal objects of absolute flow. Intending these objects is an act directed towards a transcendent temporal object. In this case, the awareness of the transcendent object itself becomes constituted as well. Hence, the two intentionalities are, therefore, inseparable aspect of a single absolute consciousness.

**Tripple Moments**

The continuous nature of the flow is expressed in its "quasi-temporal" character in so far as it flows. The absolute flow of consciousness is constituted by phases that occur in temporal dimension. Phases of the flow ceaselessly well up and pass away. At one moment it has an actual phase and post-actual and pre-actual phases. Each actual phase has its primal moment, retentional moment and protentional moment. Husserl introduced the three intentional instances of impression, retention and protention in order to explain the awareness of object as extended in time. He introduced this notion of tripple intentionality in connection with perception as related to the structure of time-consciousness. Later he adopted this notion to the concept of the absolute flow of consciousness. Primal moment is the actual phase of the absolute flow. The primal moment of absolute flow intends the instance of primal impression while intending itself. Since the instance itself is an immanent object, it intends directly the actual phase of immanent object. Hence, the actual moment of the flow is the consciousness of the presence of the object. Retentional moment of the actual phase of the flow directly intends
the just elapsed phase of the flow. By this direct intention it indirectly intends the just elapsed phase of the object that is within the elapsed phase. Likewise, the protentional moment directly intending the yet to come phase of absolute flow, indirectly intends the future phase of the object within it. The triple moments of absolute flow, provides an adequate description of the modified form of intentional modes of past and future. Thus the flow of consciousness, far from rendering problematic the awareness of temporal extended objects, makes it possible.

Temporal Monad

The ultimate nature of the absolute flow is expressed through its essential relationship to temporality. Absolute flow is ultimately a temporal being. It is not a non-temporal monad sealed up in eternal self-presence. The inseparable temporality as its ultimate dimension is fundamentally constituted through its intentional act. Double intentionality accounts for the capability of the flow to experience itself and the temporal objects. The triple intentionality accounts for the succession of consciousness as the consciousness of succession. It accounts for the unity of stream of experiences of the transcendental consciousness or pure Ego in time dimension.

"No experience can cease without a conscious of the ceasing and the having caused, and that is a now filled with a new content. The stream of experience is an infinite unity, and the form of the stream is one that necessarily envelops all
The experiences of a pure Ego—a form containing a variety of form-systems."26

The temporality of absolute consciousness is unique and irreducible to the temporality of temporal objects. The flow is distinct from the founded or constituted immanent objects. Yet, it is neither separate nor separable from them in its existence and self-appearance. It simply is the experiencing of temporal unities in immanent time. Hence, Husserl calls this "absolute flow" the "living present". The concept of the absolute flow is the first stage in Husserlian phenomenology for the constitutive aspect of transcendental ego. Particular experiences are passing away one by one; the flow abides. The absolute flow supports the interplay of unity and multiplicity, of identify and difference that marks the life of consciousness in time. Hence he makes a distinction between the temporal existence of pertinent object and the essential nowness of the absolute flow.

"And again we must distinguish, on the one hand, the pertinent object which is and was, which endures and changes and, on the other hand, the pertinent phenomenon of presentness and pastness, of duration and change, which is from time to time a "now". It is in the latter, and in the gradations it contains and the continual changes it undergoes, that temporal existence is brought into appearance and presented. The object is not a genuinely concrete part of the phenomenon; in its temporality it has something which cannot at all be found in the phenomenon or reduced to the

37
phenomenon. And yet it is constituted within the phenomenon. It is presented therein and evidently given as "existing" there.\textsuperscript{27}

**Criticism of Time-Consciousness**

Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty shares certain fundamental positions with Husserl. They agree that temporal awareness depends on the capacity to reach out beyond the now. Consciousness gathers itself together into a totality out of its temporal diaspora. These shared positions are developed differently setting in Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

**Martin Heidegger**

Husserl analyses the consciousness of temporal objectivity as constituted by transcendental consciousness. Instead of temporal experience of transcendental consciousness, Heidegger analyses temporality as the everyday temporality of Dasein. Heidgger's Dasein is unlike Husserl's transcendental ego which is purely cognitive in character. Dasein is the practical human-being-in-the-world pursing its projects in the world. Hence Dasein's being is involved in the meaning by which he interact with the world. Since his projects in the world is in everyday temporality, time is an essential factor of his being. Hence, time becomes an issue in relation to the meaning of being. Dasien is the being whose being in an issue for it in terms of its temporality. In this way, Heidegger's analysis of temporality is directly related to the question of being. Hence,
Heidegger analyses everyday temporality of Dasein in a different perspective of the meaning of being.

**Temporality: Inauthentic and Authentic**

According to Heidegger, there are two types of temporalities such as inauthentic temporality and authentic temporality. Inauthentic temporality is time as it is ordinarily understood. Authentic temporality is the everyday temporality as it is lived by Dasein. Inauthentic time presents itself as an autonomous system. Time is conceived as an infinite sequence of now-points. They are arranged in the relations of before and after. Past refers to points that are no longer actual. Future refers to points that are not yet actual. This autonomous system involves human reality only as occurring in it factually or as something that occasionally takes its measure through acts of memory, expectation and perception. In authentic temporality past, present and future are not successive time-points. They are not temporal modes of appearances. They are not the intentional correlates of memory, perception and expectation. They are Dasein's ways of being-in-the-world. Authentic temporality is identical with the structure of Dasein itself. Dasein is necessarily always in the process of "temporalization" of its being. Hence, the structure of Dasein in its everyday temporality is ec-static. According to Heidegger past, present and future are ec-states of temporality. Hence, due to temporalization Dasein is outside itself in its past as what it has been. It is outside itself in the present by making present entities in the world. It is outside itself in the future that "comes toward" it.
Future Priority

Among the ecstases, according to Heidegger, the future enjoys priority. The activities in which Dasein engages are not oriented around the now. The activities of Dasein project towards the ends. Hence, it is toward ends that the activities are oriented. Heidegger says that Dasein is always ahead of itself. It is futural.

"Only an entity which, in its being, is essentially futural so that it is free for the death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual "there" by shattering itself against death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'."^{28}

Its projection into the future is grounded in authentic past and present. Authentic past and present is the past and present of the activities of Dasein. The temporal ecstasies therefore from a unity in Dasein.

Jean-Paul Sartre

Sartre shares the Husserlian standpoint that reaching out beyond now is essential to the awareness of time. This awareness is possible only by the synthetic unity of present, past and future. For this unity Husserl introduced the concept of absolute flow. By intending itself in its flowing, the absolute flow handles the task. Sartre is critical of this Husserlian viewpoint. He is of the opinion that Husserl have taken resort to the
transcendental ego. According to Sartre, Husserl's mature position is thoroughly egological. The absolute flow is the original moment of the Husserlian ego's self-constitution. Though, for Sartre, consciousness-as-ego precludes the reaching beyond now. Ego imprisons both retention and protention in the now. Hence, then, "in vain pretensions batter the window panes of the present without shattering them."29 According to Sartre, "temporality is evidently an organised structure. The three so-called "elements" of time, past, present and future, should not be considered as a collection of 'givenness' for us to stump up – for example, as an infinite series of 'nows' in which some are not yet and others are no longer-but rather as the structured moments of an original synthesis. ... Thus the whole series is annihilated and doubly so since the future "now", for example, is a nothingness qua future and will be realised in nothingness when it passes on to the state of a present 'now'. The only possible method by which to study temporality is to approach it as a totality which dominates its secondary structures and which confers on them their meaning."30

Sartre borrows the notions of ec-static temporality and authentic and inauthentic time for Heidegger. Sartre's understanding of the temporal ec-stases is determined by the division in his ontology between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The for-itself is consciousness. Sartre defines it as nothingness being not what it is conscious of. Though it is conscious of
being-in-itself, it is not that. It is always projected towards being-in-itself. This projective nature is possible by means of its modes of existence. Past, present and future are the modes of being of the for-itself. They are the ways in which the for-itself surpasses itself towards being-in-itself. The past is the for-itself behind itself as what it was but no longer is. The future is the for-itself before itself as what it will be but is not. The present is the presence of the for-itself to what it is not. Sartre describes the for-itself in its temporal structure as a flight. "A flight outside of co-present being and from the being it was towards the being that it will be."31

**Maurice Merleau-Ponty**

Merleau-ponty links the triple intentionality of Husserlian time-consciousness with Heidegger's temporal ec-stases. While Husserl focuses on the conscious human subject, Heidegger focused instead on the practical Dasein. But in the case of Merleau-ponty, he was concerned about the conscious human subject as embodied. His conscious embodied subject is the subject as engaged in the world. Its engagement makes time to be a dimension of its embodied being. For Husserl, time is an object of knowledge constituted by an ego standing outside time. But Merleau-ponty considers subject as time. To elucidate this claim, he draws on Husserl's conception of the absolute flow. According to him, the subject is a network of intentionalities. It manifests itself and the world in its temporality through intentionality. Temporalisation of the embodied subject is ec-static. According to Merleau-ponty it is in the present that the ec-static temporalisation is centered. Hence, present is privileged among past and future. Though in later works, Merleau-Ponty recognizes like Derrida that the transcendence exists at
the heart of present. According to Derrida, this privileged present is the later representation of the metaphysics of presence in Husserl. However, Husserl's phenomenology of temporality is in fact, a careful examination of absence, offering grounds for a defence of the view that absence can finally be understood only in terms of its intimate intentional relationship with presence. His concept of temporality essentially related to and continual in experience. Phenomenology as science of experience accounts for the unity of stream of experience which includes particular streams of experience by means of internal time-consciousness.

"The essential property which the term "temporality" expresses in relation to experiences generally indicates not only something that belongs in a general way to every single experience, but a necessary form binding experiences with experiences. Every real experience (we ratify this as self-evident on the ground of the clear intuition of an experiential reality) is necessarily one that endures; and with his duration it takes its place within an endless continuum of durations—a concretely filled continuum. It necessarily has a temporal purview concretely filled, and stretching away endlessly on all sides. And that at once tells that it belongs to one endless "stream of experience"."

Space - Time

Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness establishes the original content of experience in the intuitive content of primal impression. Experience
with its temporal aspect is incomplete without its spatial aspect. However, it is true that Husserl's phenomenological methodology has something to suspend. Indeed, it is spatial with its external existence. Nevertheless, Husserlian analysis of the phenomenology of space made him realize that it is experiential. It is different from the scientific explanation of objective space in which matter is filled with. In the modern quantum physics scientists consider space and time as a single concept with a hyphen between them. According to them it is a single reality and cannot be detached in a traditional way. Though Husserl does not speak of objective space-time, in the phenomenal level he regards inevitably the necessity of analysis of space. The original objects that are experienced in temporal modes having their own intuitive spatial aspect. Hence, it was necessary for Husserl to describe the phenomenology of space like Immanuel Kant. For Kant, space and time are faculties of sensibility which are a priori conditions of experience.

Phenomenological Analysis of Space

Reflection on the nature of "space" as well as "time" has traditionally been central to philosophical reflection. This centrality stems from the fact that "space" with "time" is a form of governing the objects of the physical world. Space becomes central to all our experiences of objects. Space is experienced in multiple ways, yet, it is one and the same space that we experience. Reflection on the experience of space is thus necessarily complex and varied. Husserl distinguishes four senses of the word "space" in his manuscripts which was published as "Studien zur Arithmetic and Geometric" from 1886 to 1901. They are: 1, the intuitive space; 2, the
space of pure geometry or mathematics; 3, the space of applied geometry or natural science; and 4, the space of metaphysics. The texts give detailed account of the first 2 senses.

**Space & Phantom**

The study of intuitive space is so crucial in Husserlian phenomenology. As a student of mathematics, Husserl had started the phenomenological reflection on space from the very beginning. It has influenced his later conception of phenomenological epoché and reduction. According to Husserl, the immediate experience of space occurs within our everyday ordinary perceptual experiences. This ordinary perceptual experience of space together with the intuitive space includes the sensible experience of phantom. Phantom is the purely sensible object, within the ordinary concrete material object of perception with all its causal, functional and value properties. It is the immediate experience of phantom that permits him to speak of the intuitive experience of space. Therefore, his analysis of cognitive space is so closely related to his conception of phenomenological methodology of reduction and epoché as well as phantom.

**Intuitive Space**

Husserl gives an extensive explanation of intuitive space. By intuitive space, he means, the experienced space as such. It is the space of everyday living and is both before and beyond science.
We use the term 'space' of the familiar type of order of the world of phenomena, talk of 'spaces' for which, e.g. the axiom of parallels does not hold, is naturally senseless. It is just as senseless to speak of differing geometries, when 'geometry' names the science of the space of the world of phenomena. But if we mean by 'space' the categorical form of world-space, and, correlatively, by 'geometry' the categorical theoretic form of geometry in the ordinary sense, then space falls under a genus, which we can bound by laws, of pure, categorically determinate manifolds, in regard to which it is natural to speak of 'space' in a yet more extended sense.\textsuperscript{33}

According to Husserl, in our everyday perception of space we use analogues of mathematical concepts and perceive space as mathematically structured. Husserl makes a distinction between geometrical ideal objects and idealities of geometrical concepts. Conceptual expressions are merely sensible utterances though only by virtue of their, the geometrical objects exist objectively in the world. It is possible because of the virtue of spatio-temporal individuation in the world like all corporeal occurrences.

"But the idealities of geometrical words, sentences, theories – considered purely as linguistic structures – are not the idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as truth in geometry; the latter are ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc. Wherever something is
asserted, one can distinguish what is thematic, that about
which it is said (its meaning), from the assertion, which itself,
during the asserting, is never and can never be thematic. And
what is thematic here is precisely ideal objects, and quite
different ones from those coming under the concept of
language. Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal
objects which are thematic in geometry: how does geometrical
ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary
intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the
conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal
objectivity?34

It is Husserl's argument that, within this geometric presentation of space,
there must be a fundamental or immediate experience of space. Such an
immediately experienced space in and of itself does not have a particular
mathematical structure. According to Husserl we are using these
conceptual properties in order to describe the intuitive space. We employ
mathematical terms and structures for philosophical description of intuitive
spaces. But it does not follow that we intuit or immediately experience
space as mathematically structured. Hence, right from the very beginning,
Husserl made a distinction between the conceptual content of the
description of intuitive space and intuitive space itself. Accordingly, we
must distinguish different aspects of the intuitive experience and of intuited
spaces.
Kinaesthetic Activities

Husserl identifies vision and touch as the two forms of perceptions that brings an identical objective space to presence. According to Husserl, the space presented by both vision and touch is necessarily the correlates of certain bodily activities. Husserl calls these bodily activities as Kinaesthetic activities. These activities produce the satisfaction of the requirements for optimal appearances.

According to Herman Lubbe the Kinaesthetic experience reaches objective reality as per Husserl’s explanation. - "In Husserl’s Great Phenenologische untersuchugen zur Konstitution, which fill the second book of Ideas, the same phenomenology of kinaesthetics plays a central role; it shows how consciousness reaches 'objective reality through kinaesthetic experience.'\(^{35}\)

In the case of vision, for optimal givenness there are three requirements. 1, the object be given in the centre of the visual field rather than in its margins. 2, the object be presented at a suitable distance from the perceiver, not too near and not too far. 3, the object be susceptible to careful and comprehensive scrutiny by the perceiver. The first requirement deals with an appearance position within the visual field. The second and third requirements deals with an object's position in space relative to the percipient. The satisfaction of the first requirement does not demand the whole body movement. But in the case of second and third, movement of whole body is necessary.
Husserl calls the key to understand the satisfaction of each of these requirements as kinaesthesis. He means Kinaesthesis in two ways. 1, the capability of perceiving subjects to move their sense organs and body such that the position of the sense organs relative to the object changes. 2, the appertinent awareness in kinaesthetic sensations of bodily movements and bodily attitudes. The objective determination of the object existing in space are presented by the motivational connection between a particular course of kinaesthetic sensations and the sensation or hyletic data.

Two-Dimensional Space

Let us examine first the kinaesthetic situations as involved in vision. In the kinaesthetic situation of perfect rest, the correlative visual field is a flat expanse. Husserl identifies this flat expanse of area as visual field simpliciter. To this kinaesthetic rest, Husserl adds different kinaesthetic system of eye movements. Then the visual field simpliciter changes into oculomotoric field. Oculomotoric field is the quadridirectional widening of the visual field simpliciter. This widening is made possible by moving the eyes in both left and right and up and down. This field is different from the previous field insofar as objects appear newly and disappear at the margins of the field. All objects continuously change their orientation in the field as the eyes are moved. The changes introduced by eye movement can be extended by additional movements of the head to the right and left and up and down. The correlative of kinaesthetic system of eye and head movements is the cephalomotoric field. It is a field that forms a closed,
cyclical unity in the left-right dimension, but remains limited in the up-down dimension.

The kinaesthetic movements enable the object to be brought to the centre of the visual field. In these above described kinaesthetic systems the correlative visual fields are two-dimensional presentation of space. A third dimension is not available within the immediately experienced visual field simpliciter, oculomotoric field and cephalomotoric field.

According to Husserl, the intuitive experience of three dimensional space is absent in the form of perception of touch also. The kinaesthetic system are of two types in tactual perception. First it is the single system of touch and secondly, it is the simple binary system of distancing. The kinaesthetic activities of the single tactual system involve the hand with its fingers. Tactual space is the correlative of this kinaesthetic activity. The system of lower arm, upper arm and whole body are merely extension of this basic system. The kinaesthetic activities of the tactual simple binary system involve the movement of body parts either toward or away from the object. This binary system shows that either the object is near and in contact with the tactual organs or distant and not touched. In all these cases, distancing in tactual perception does not present a continuous three-dimensional space.

**Three-Dimensional Space and Action**

According to Husserl, intuitive experience of three dimensional space is possible only by the movement of the whole body. The kinaesthetic system of whole body movements are of two types; 1,
distancing; 2, orbiting. The first kinaesthetic activity is the movement of the body either towards or away from the object. It either expands or contracts the apparent size of the object with its background. It makes the viewer satisfy the optimal requirement of suitable distance. The second kinaesthetic activity is the movement of the body around the object. This kinaesthetic system results in an apparent turning motion of the object. It provides an axial rotation of the appearances of the object with the field in which it is present. This satisfies the optimal requirement and allows to become aware of bodily enclosedness of the object. Experience of three dimensional space is available only in the movement of the body. Hence experience of 3-D space affirms 'action' in our life experiences. The concept of 'movement' is primordial to the concept of 'action'. In Jainism, the concept of 'Chalanam' i.e. motion or movement, unlike any other systems considers motion as a category of substance. Hence, space, in which motion is possible and 'motion' by which space is experiential are interlinked with each other. Besides no action is possible without time. Hence, time, space and motion which are the fundamental aspects of reality – thrusts toward action. Hence reality provides room for ethical life pattern giving rise to culture. Thus Husserl's intuitive space culminates into existential space and cultural space as our every day space.

"What is historically primary in itself is our present. We always already know of our present world and that we live in it, always surrounded by an openly endless horizon of unknown actualities. This knowing, as horizon-certainty, is not something learned, not knowledge which was once actual
and has merely sunk back to become part of the background; the horizon-certainty had to be already there in order to be capable of being laid out thematically; it is already presupposed in order that we can seek to know that we do not know. All not-knowing concerns the unknown world, which yet exists in advance for us as world, as the horizon of all questions of the present and thus also all questions which are specifically historical. These are the questions which concern men, as those who act and create in their communalised co-existence in the world and transform the constant cultural face of the world.36

Geometrical Space

According to Husserl the geometric existence is objective. It is accessible to all people of all ages, hence geometric existence is neither personal nor psychological. It gets its objectivity from the very objectivity of the pre-given form on which it is founded.

"But geometrical existence is not physic existence; it do not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness; it is the existence of what is objectively there to, 'everyone' (for actual and possible geometers, or those who understand geometry). Indeed, it has, from its primal establishment, an existence which is peculiarly supertemporal and which of this we are certain - is accessible to all men, first of all to the actual and possible mathematicians of all peoples,
all ages, and this is true of all its particular forms. And all forms newly produced by someone on the basis of pre-given forms immediately take on the same objectivity.\textsuperscript{37}

Husserl's phenomenological analysis of geometrical space answers these questions. According to Husserl, our geometric experience of space has its origin neither in a-priori nor in empiricist accounts. Husserl claims that the geometric experience of space depends on idealization of intuitive space. The geometric presentation of space which is found in Euclidean geometry is grounded in an idealizing abstraction of empirical, intuited spatial structures. The idealizing presentation of shape has three aspects which may be explained as the following:

(1) The limitation of a general concern with objects to a theoretical concern with their shapes simply as measurable, (2) the focusing of attention on a side or appearance of an object in abstraction both (a) from the field and its horizons in which the side or object is presented and (b) from other sides and perspectives of the object; and (3) the limitation of attention to the two-dimensionality of the presentation of the object or its side.

The idealization consists precisely of the approximating approach to the two-dimensional limiting surfaces. Our perception of an object attends to the side or appearance of the object as measurable, focusing on its surface, and gradually idealizes the edge. This process can be repeated in yielding the awareness of the line and point and also other geometric notions, such as continuity, congruence, distance, direction and position.
The intersection of the geometric concern with shapes and volumes ideally postulates the points as the limit of one-dimensional magnitudes. It is fully developed itself in Euclidean plane and solid geometry. The intersection of the geometrical concern with its position developed itself as most fully in analytic, coordinate geometry.

Euclidean geometry is the result of idealization of intuitive space. Husserl makes a distinction between geometry as an idealization of intuited structure and geometry as an instance of manifold theory. According to Husserl Euclidean idealization is the regional ontology whereas Euclidean manifold is the formal ontology. The idealized geometry is further formalized to yield a Euclidean manifold. This formalization is carried out by the abstraction of the theory-form from the idealized geometry. The logical consequences of the theory of Euclidean manifold is the theory of non-Euclidean manifold. According to Husserl, the Euclidean manifold and Euclidean space are prior to the non-Euclidean manifold and spaces. N-dimensional (any number of dimension) Euclidean manifold and n-dimensional non-Euclidean manifold are constructed by mathematical choices.

Numbers are achieved in formalizing abstraction which are formal concepts. Numbers as such being purely formal concepts are applicable to anything whatsoever. The introduction of number and of algebraic techniques in the coordinate geometry have made a significant step which is a step beyond idealization and is found in Euclidean geometry. The arithmatization of geometry makes it no longer limited to a spatial
interpretation. The formalization of geometry breaks the essential connection between the idealized geometries and the shapes of bodies. Hyperspaces i.e. geometries of n-dimensional can be produced by introducing greater number of variables into formulas through the exercise of mathematical choice. Once free mathematical constructions are introduced into manifolds and these manifolds are interpreted as "geometries" and applied to spatial objects of experience, however, false regional ontologies might result. In the case of space, this means that a mathematically derived manifold is applicable as a physical geometry only if it is consistent with the Euclidean idealization of the local space in which we live.

It gives rise to mathematical physics. According to Husserl these mathematically explained theories of physics can function only as models. They are not true states of external world. Aron Gurwitch comments somewhat like this upon mathematical physics:

"In an earlier phase of the modern period, the constructions mathematical physics were not simply regarded as models meant for convenience of systematisation, prediction or even explanation. On the contrary, they were thought to express the true state of affairs, the real nature of the external world. By means of his mathematically expressed theories, the physicist was believed to pierce through the veil of perceptual appearance and thus to describe nature as it really is. This realistic interpretation of
physics finds few defenders today, yet so recent and so great as physical as Marx Planck still adhered to.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Martin Heidegger: Practical Space}

Martin Heidegger's conception of a phenomenology of space in "Being and Time" (1927) sharply distinguishes the immediate experience of spatiality from the cognitive and formal intuition of an objective and homogeneous space. For Heidegger, the immediate experience of spatiality is contained in the comportment of 'DASEIN' toward the world. For Husserl, the immediate experience of space is within the subject's cognitive awareness of space. This made the difference of notion of "distancing" between them. According to Husserl, distancing is essentially related to objective distance. Whereas, according to Heidegger distancing is an act of overcoming a state of distance by bringing close, making ready-to-hand, what was formerly remote from our practical concerns.

"When one is primarily and even exclusively oriented towards remotenesses as measured distances, the primordial spatiality of Being-in is concealed. That which is presumably 'closest' is by no means that which is at the smallest distance 'from us'. It lies in that which is deserved to an average extent when we reach for it, grasp it, or look at it. Because, Dasein is essentially spatial in the way of de-severance, its dealings always keep within an 'environment' which is deserved from it with a certain leeway [Spielraum], accordingly our seeing and hearing always go proximally
beyond what is distantly ‘closest’. Seeing and hearing are
distancesenses [Fernsinne] not because they are far-
reaching, but because it is in them that Dasien as deseverant
mainly dwells."39

Heideggerian insights explore the ordinary lived experience of space as
manifested in our comportment toward things. Merleau-Ponty was primarily
concerned with an account of how space comes to presence in a bodily
relation to the world. Husserlian study of space limited itself to the
discussion of the experiential foundations of geometry in our intuitive
experience and to the discussion of geometric and physical space.

Two Fundamentals of Phenomenological Intuition

According to Husserl, three-dimensional space is experienced
only with the movement of body. Nevertheless the two-dimensional
ideal space is experienced with the intuitive experience of objects.
Phenomenological facts appear in temporal modes. Hence both space
and time are two fundamental aspects of intuitive experience of objects.
Hence it may be considered as a single unitary reality of ‘space-time’ as
in quantum physics. But it is the unitary single reality of three-
dimensional space with single linear dimension of time. In the case of
phenomenology, it is the unitary reality of three-dimensional time and
two dimensional space. For Husserl, it is not objective spact-time but
something subjective as immediately experienced. They are the
fundamental aspects of intuitive experience. Phenomenologically,
objects are intuited by consciousness in a spatio-temporal dimension as functional aspect of consciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness is functional as consciousness is always consciousness of something because of its spatio-temporal dimension. Hence the spatio-temporal aspect can be considered as the fundamental mode of phenomenological intuition. However, Husserl speaks about non-spatio-temporal essences as immanent within the intentional structure of transcendental consciousness. It can be argued that the intentional function of consciousness cannot take place without its temporal dimension though it is possible without a spatial aspect. The intentional structure of internal meanings of linguistic thought-stream of consciousness transcends only spatial aspect. Hence in later phenomenological trends time-consciousness is privileged over transcendental consciousness from Heidegger onward that reaches its culmination in deconstruction. In Heidegger the present is the mixture of past and future. He reveals the absence of presence of present in experience. However, he retains some presence in meaning considering language as the house of being. According to Derrida, this presence is also a mixture of past and future since meaning is intended by consciousness in time dimension. Meaning simultaneously is and is not (is/not). Hence, there is no presence of present with an absolute origin. According to phenomenological philosophy such an origin is present in temporal level in primal impression of time-consciousness and in non-temporal level in transcendental consciousness.
Phenomenology and Essentialism

Husserlian phenomenology contains two conflicting motives: it aims at being a descriptive science of essence and essential structures belonging to different regions and it also stands for an endless process of clarification of meanings which are constituted in the rich life of human consciousness. If the essentialistic version of Husserlian phenomenology is nearer to the classical idealistic and rationalistic tradition, its concern with meaning brings it closer to the empiricistic tradition. The radically empiricistic concern of Husserlian phenomenology is on the whole more dominating. The essentialistic approach to phenomenology is not satisfied with the descriptions of mere facts; it aims at the discovery of the essence and essential structures in phenomena. Phenomenology, according to Husserl, is nothing less than a theory of essences. Both facts as well as essences are given. Yet Husserl makes the discovery of the latter as the main target of phenomenology. This he does because, essences according to him, are totally given and the science of phenomenology aiming at absolute knowledge must prefer essences to facts which are contingent and given in an endless progression. Husserl does not give up the idea of description. Description, for him, is now more descriptive of phenomena; it is the description of particular sort of phenomena, namely of essences. They are (essences) neither mere idealities nor psychological realities but intentional objects given to consciousness. Accordingly, Husserl claims that his technique of eidetic variation helps to discover the essences beyond the contingent and empirically given facts. This discovery of essences as something invariant
must not be confused with the inductive discovery of empirical universalities. Essences have intuitive backing and are not mere empirical generalizations.

Husserl differentiates between essences and facts and contends that they are given in two radically different ways. The reason why phenomenology concentrates exclusively on essences lies in its original programme to reach absolute knowledge based on what is absolutely given and is Noesis-Noema correlation. This may be said to be the most important contribution of Husserl in his "Ideas". The subjective and the objective are just the noetic and noematic structures. The noematic structure refers to the intended object whereas the noetic act is the intentional act as such. In the 'Logical Investigation' Husserl goes so far as to see in the systematic exploration of this correlation as the main task of his philosophical career. The noetic acts as the meaning-giving originally experience are what Husserl calls the principle of all principles. This leads him to the theory of genetic constitution and constitutive phenomenology. The main task of the genetic constitution is to show how things get their meaning from the only center of meaning-giving intentional acts of intentional consciousness. These acts do not create or project their objects but the objects are revealed in them irrespective of the fact whether they are real or imagined. Husserl elaborated the essential relationship between the acts of intention and object as given is what is meant by the object as intended. Noema as the ideal correlate of noesis consists of subjective experiences, of mere intention. Noetic acts are themselves act which lead to noemata and these are not dependent on our will. Husserlian phenomenology therefore adequately emphasizes the relation between realms of noesis-noematic correlationship.
There is a life of transcendental consciousness in which all meaning experiences reside. In his 'Erste Philosophie', transcendental subjectivity is regarded as the absolute starting point. On the other hand, Husserl also speaks of the anonymous and pre-personal primal flux of consciousness. Husserl here distinguishes between empirical I (ego) and the transcendental I (ego). It is only the latter which is given in our transcendental experience. We may take Husserl's transcendental ego as the unconstituted but all constituting foundation.

The perennial problem which phenomenology called upon to solve is this: how to constitute that which constitutes all. How can phenomenology remain faithful to its original programme of pure description, if it accepts something which itself is not constituted? There is a paradox of human consciousness. It seems to consist in its ability to transcend itself and still to remain consciousness. Are then the consciousness which transcends and that which is transcended are two things or are they just two sides of the same phenomenon? But this would eventually lead to an essentialistic phenomenology with presuppositions and pre-conceptions. The transcendental phenomenology culminates in the foundational discovery of the 'Lebenswelt' as the reservoir of the lived experiences and as the irreducible basis of all meaning conferring activities. To clear the way further for a systematic and descriptive understanding, we shall, in the following chapter try to examine the 'hard problem' in its wider aspects.
Notes and References:


2. Ibid., p. 192.

3. Ibid., pp. 120, 122.

4. Ibid., p. 106.

5. Ibid., p. 107.


11. Ibid., p. 285


24. Ibid., pp. 238-239.

25. Ibid., p. 239.

26. Ibid., p. 236.


30. Ibid., p. 107.

31. Ibid., p. 111.


35. Ibid., p. 65.

36. Ibid., p. 46.

37. Ibid., p. 47.

38. Ibid., p. 78.