CONCLUSION

In retrospect, our thesis has been concerned with assessing the varied investigations of Jacques Derrida in favour of a philosophy of emancipation with the end in view of developing its latent metaphysical motifs. Derrida, as approached in this study, in attempting to articulate a framework for the concrete exercise of the human emancipatory potential opens a space where his philosophy exposes the limits of thought in relation to language especially metaphysical language. In his systematic and unremitting task of deconstruction of metaphysics, Derrida speaks about the process of interaction between metaphysics and prophetic experience as concealment and deconstruction. What followed, then is (I) a reconstruction of Derrida’s position, including his practical proposal with respect to stated dichotomy. From this context (ii) the philosophy of the culture of emancipation in Jacques Derrida was introduced as a theoretical alternative to the two main streams of human culture. This has provided a framework for clarifying (iii) the projected contribution of this study. Resultantly, we exemplified the dynamics between philosophical thought and religion for a new personal and communitary awareness.

With this aim in view, the first chapter of the thesis endeavored to situate Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction as a culmination of the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Derrida became the centre of the French philosophical scene inaugurating the project of deconstructing western metaphysics or logocentrism. However, his critique of western metaphysics did not mean merely the western philosophical tradition but everyday thought and language as well. It is within and around the particular phenomenological framework of Husserl, Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas that his deconstructionism has evolved. Derrida starts his
philosophical enterprise with a critical study of Husserlian phenomenology as an example of the principle of presence.

Husserl’s phenomenology starts with a pure analysis of experience as different from that of empiricists. Husserl’s attempt was to discover the pure content of sense experience which is different from sensation and is supplied from within. Husserl was in search of internal contents which are supplied from outside. Husserl was in search of internal contents which are experienced as themselves and are certain and verifiable as different from external entities which are facts of belief. In order to reach such an apodictic object, Husserl adopts the technique of phenomenological reduction which is meant to bracket out the empirical objects so as to reach what he calls the noetic meanings.

Husserl was trying to find out the immanent phenomenon of direct sense experience. In order to appropriate the internal entities of experience, he adopts a new methodology of intuition, which is different from the rationalist notion of intuition. For Husserl, intuition is a unique mode of experience, which is the basis of our all experiences and knowledge. In the case of Husserl’s intuitive methodology, intuition is a mode of experience that provides verification of all sorts of epistemological noemas and logical eidos. Accordingly, Husserl regarded intuition as direct and explained it as the intentionality of consciousness. According to Husserl, the intentional entities are immanent in consciousness. Intentionality is the essential structure of consciousness. For Husserl, Intentionality is the datum that provides data by itself and in itself.

There are two sorts of intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology. One is empirical intuition and the other is essential intuition. Empirical intuition provides the facts of direct sense experience whereas essential intuition provides the essence of different
particulars of certain class. All aspects of sense data are the objects of empirical intuition or individual intuition. Essential intuition is the eidetic intuition that supplies universal objects, which are present invariably in all particular facts. Husserl discovers these universal phenomena by means of transcendental logic and calls them logical contents or abstract contents. For Husserl, these essential contents are the meaning-giving eidetic entities to logical concepts.

Husserl reaches these universal phenomena through the technique of reduction of particular phenomena of empirical intuition. It may be possible that these two aspects of intuition as far as their nature is concerned is one and the same but the objects given by them are different leading to facts and essences.

Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology deals with the task of discovering facts and essences through the methodology of phenomenological and eidetic reductions. He established that the field of phenomena harbouring the intuitive entities are the meaning giving layer to experience and knowledge. Accordingly, the task of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was to establish the epistemological and logical entities as real. Resultantly, Husserl considers consciousness as pure subjectivity as it is different from the psychological subject. Husserl reaches this pure subjective field of consciousness through the reduction of psychological ego and the acquired transcendental consciousness is the field of pure objectivity in which the intentional entities are immanent. The intentional experiences are said to be the experiences of the transcendental consciousness. Husserl establishes a phenomenological identity between the transcendental consciousness and the pure phenomenological data as immanent in it. This identification leads transcendental phenomenology as the condition of Being. Being is given in consciousness and
provides a meaning-constituting world which is established through the phenomenological identification of an idealizing consciousness.

Husserl was the philosopher whom Derrida studied painstakingly. Derrida worked out his central notion of 'differance' a key term in deconstruction and was coined chiefly against Husserl's phenomenology of identity. The methodological rigour of phenomenology that influenced Derrida to a great extent made him to doubt the notion of presence. Besides, his re-evaluation of western thought enabled him finding out the crucial and fundamental role that is it has played in all philosophies. Most of the metaphysics define being as the timeless self-identity or self given presence. They considered the principle of presence precedes difference. What Derrida wanted to show was that differance precedes presence. By means of 'differance' Derrida proposed to perform ultimately the task of deconstruction of metaphysics. According to him, differance as difference means both to 'differ' and to 'differ'. Difference refers to the play of difference which is both active and passive, cause and effect; it is not the product that constitutes the subject, nor does it refer to a "transcendental signified" that is present within it. His rigorous analysis finds out the irreducible structure of differance that operates in human consciousness, unconscious, temporality, history and in the activity of writing.

In this task of deconstruction, Derrida moved beyond phenomenology in order to achieve a more radical and non-philosophical questioning. His discovery of genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and Freud helped him in this task. Despite Husserlian influence, Derrida never showed Husserl’s pathos for, and commitment to, a phenomenology of presence. Having established the reality of meaning-giving entities through the transcendental identification of them with the transcendental consciousness, Husserl brings forth a linguistic identity between
meaning and term. If the former identity is the net result of transcendental phenomenology of the of being, the latter points to a descriptive phenomenology of the condition of knowledge. The transcendental identity constitutes the reality of eidetic entities and is regarded as the essential condition of knowledge for the logical concepts. Thus the universal logical entities are intrinsically connected with the thought terms that constitute the internal language of thought and intention. Both of these identities serve as the purpose of presenting self presence of meaning which Derrida calls the phenomenology of presence. Regarding transcendental identity, Derrida differs from Husserl despite his agreement with him in the inevitable dependence of knowledge. Transcendental identity constitutes and is regarded as the essential condition of knowledge for the logical concepts. Thus the universal logical entities are intrinsically connected with the thought-terms that constitute the internal language of thought and intention. Both of these identities serve as the purpose of presenting self-presence of meaning which Derrida calls the phenomenology of presence. As far as the transcendental identity is concerned, Derrida differs from Husserl despite his agreement with him in the inevitable dependence of knowledge on consciousness pointing out a difference between the medium of knowledge and the process of knowledge. Bereft of consciousness, knowledge is impossible since knowledge requires a medium but the process of knowledge is entirely independent of consciousness, for, it is not involved in knowledge process. Derrida argues that transcendental phenomenology through transcendental identification mistakes the medium of knowledge as involved in the process of knowledge, and consciousness thus becomes a kind of self-identical presence which guarantees the reality of absolute being as present in intentional entities.
According to Derrida, Husserl made a confusion of mediatory act of consciousness as the species of consciousness. But consciousness being a mere medium, there is functional difference within the medium that makes identity only a repeatable identity. Hence meaning as such is impossible to be fully present in consciousness. As the medium of consciousness is mistakenly regarded as the self-presenting principle, the same mistake creeps into linguistic area too. Due to this mistake, the medium of language becomes a self-identical presence of meaning and constitutes the internal language of thought and intention. Universal concepts are said to be contentless because of the lack of reference to such external concrete entities. Despite these logical and epistemological impossibilities, Husserl made a difference between abstract concept and abstract content and sets out to achieve logical concepts through eidetic intuition by means of transcendental logic through the process of phenomenological abstraction. Husserl called the logical contents as the experienced eidetic idealities. These ideal meanings are experienced as abstract entities that are immanent in consciousness. They are identified with thought-terms and are logical and abstract in nature. Thus the thought terms have their sense and referents and are intrinsically connected.

Derrida interrogates this linguistic identity because, a term is basically divided into a phonic signifier and a mental signified and the term itself is a structural difference that proves identity as a mere incoherent supposition. Derrida's study of language shows that meaning is endlessly slipping from sign to sign and from time to time making writing itself as an activity of difference. Through the strategy of deconstruction, Derrida moves from the conceptual dimension of language to the unconceptualizable dimension enabling to think about the unthinkable. Derrida argues that since there is endless slippage of meaning, the fixidity between the
signifier and the signified is at stake making the linguistic identity an impossibility that provides self-presence of meaning. Rejecting the phenomenology of presence by means of ‘differance’, Derrida attempts to find out the origin of the principle of presence in the traditional linguistic theory of phonocentrism and its logical establishment in Aristotelian logic of identity.

Derrida suggests that the idea of principle of presence lies in the linguistic theory of phonocentrism in which spoken word is privileged over written word. It is believed that in the former case meaning is present since the speaker and listener are present both temporally and spatially to the same utterance. The simultaneous presence of speaker, speech and listener present meaning as self-present in spoken word as there is an identity between what is intended by the speaker and what is understood by the listener are recognized by both simultaneously. Thus the spatio-temporal presence makes meaning possible through the identity of meaning as what is intended and understood as one and the same with the spoken word. Phonocentrism implies that there is complete identity between meaning and term because of the identical recognition of meaning by both speaker and listener. Thus in speech if there is immediacy, then in written word there is a spatio-temporal non-simultaneity among the writer, writing and the reader. Hence, meaning is subject to all sorts of adulteration in writing. The absence of immediate presence of meaning is caused by the structural differential nature of written word as the representative and graphic elements that are inherent in it. Derrida interrogates the immediacy of meaning that is present in spoken word. According to Derrida, the structural difference that written word is said to have is more or less the same in spoken word because speech is not entirely at the auditory level due to punctuation, sound variables and unrepresented silence. Accordingly, Derrida argues that the
immediate self-presence of meaning in speech is nothing but a mere imagination. He rejects the phonocentric notion of difference between speech and writing on the basis of immediacy vs. mediacy or presence vs. absence or identity vs difference. Having shown the idea of presence as lying in phonocentrism, Derrida rejects the phonocentric notion of self-presence of meaning as mere illusion.

Derrida examines the logical establishment of self-presence of meaning and that goes against Aristotelian logic of identity. Aristotelian ‘laws of thought’ refers to an origin which is self-present to being. Derrida’s exploration of western thought shows that the tradition of thought depends on the laws of thought. Russell’s analysis on the nature of this origin referred by logic of identity explains it as free from contradiction and as homogenous, i.e., present to itself without any mediation. There is no gap between the origin and consciousness. According to Derrida, this origin as self conscious is the being of presence. The self presence of being is identified with consciousness in Aristotelian logic of identity. Derrida adds that this is the origin with which the term, which is known as ‘logos’ is identified. All logic which shows the presence have an opposite term which shows the absence of presence. Thus this oppositional dichotomies formulate a hierarchy where the logos is privileged and the opposite term is unprivileged. Laws of thought that refers to the origin establishes the oppositional concept of hierarchy. These are the fundamental concepts that operate thought process. Without these thought terms, the operation of thought cannot be governed because of its ultimate dependence on the presence of identity and the resultant opposition.

Derrida’s analysis of the above dichotomies shows that the first term, if it is identified with the origin, need not co-exist inevitably with the second for its derivation of meaning in an oppositional relation. Derrida argues that, identification

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of simple, homogeneous, self-present being with a term of structural difference is impossible. The resultant meaning is not because of identity but because of its dependence on the second term. Derrida interrogates the position of self-presence by asking the question whether origin depends on non origin. According to him origin is a mere incoherent presupposition. Derrida calls this system of dependent dichotomies as logocentrism in which the logos with which an origin is identified is nothing but a mere absence. Logocentrism is present in every human discourse with its characteristic hierarchizing opposition: logos/mythos, logic/rhetoric, intelligible/sensible, speech/writing, literal/figurative, nature/culture, intuition/signification, etc.

As the conceptual ordering is not the nature of things, the task of deconstruction is to bring the contradictions and paradoxes to light, to undo, rather than to reverse these hierarchies and thereby call into question the notions of being as presence.

Logocentrism, is the standpoint which seeks to exile from the realm of pure reason all that which do not conform to its centralizing logic of identity and non contradiction and claims to present us with certitude. Derrida analyzes logocentrism in order to explore the nature of certitude that the traditional rational thought is said to provide. Analysing logocentrism, he completed a process of reevaluation in the field of western philosophy. His real object of reevaluation was the nature of thought itself. Derrida’s analysis of logocentrism shows that logos can never englobe everything. There is always something which escapes, which refuses to be totalized into a homogeneous identity. Consequently, Derrida rejected the apparently self satisfied ideals of liberalism, enlightenment and universal reason. The totalizing ontology that originated from pre-Socratic Philosophy to Heidegger seeks to reduce difference and otherness to the same. Derrida’s analysis poses a radical challenge to the hollowed logocentric notions such as the eternal idea of Plato, the self thinking.

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thought of Aristotle, the *cogito* of Descartes, transcendental ego of Husserl, and the like.

According to Derrida, western thought as represented by Platonism, Romanticism and Structuralism is founded on the metaphysics of presence. This is surprisingly evident on the works of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and the contemporary structuralists. Derrida's study on structuralism demonstrates that the principle of presence still rules over structuralism. Structuralism is concerned with the form and function of language and is different from metaphysics. Through his analysis Derrida proves that even structuralism has not abandoned the commitment to an unproblematic ontology. Although Derrida inherited from structuralism that meaning is the function of differences of contrasts within a network of terms, yet he criticizes Saussure and Levi-Strauss for retaining the determinate relation between signifier and the signified: the idea of determinate meaning and reference. For Derrida, there are no test origins, no natural posts, no determinate meaning; only the infinite play of signifiers in a text.

According to Derrida, philosophy as logocentrism, is present in every scientific discipline, but philosophy as a specialized discipline renders its subtext explicit and thematic. This subtext is present in every discourse. The principle function of philosophy, accordingly, is to enable people to become conscious of what kind of discourse they are engaged in when they do mathematics, physics, political economy and so on. There is no system of teaching or transmitting knowledge which can retain its coherence of integrity without acknowledging its philosophical subtext. This may even include an interrogation of unspoken political interests or traditional values. From such an interrogation, each society draws its own conclusions about the worth of philosophy. Consequently, all discourse is founded
on a logocentric philosophical discourse and remain inseparable form it. Science is never purely objective nor can never be reduced to an instrumental or utilitarian model of explanation. Philosophy can teach science that it is ultimately an element of language. The limits of its formalization reveal its belongingness to language in which it continues to operate despite its attempts to justify itself as an exclusively objective discourse.

Derrida attempts more and more systematically to find a non philosophical site from which to question philosophy. Eventually he was in search of a non site in which philosophy appears to itself as other than itself. From this non site philosophy can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner. According to him such a non site or alterity is the other of logocentric language.

Since Derrida rejects logocentrism, the operative terms in his writing are not concepts but 'non concepts: as, for example, deconstruction, differance, dissemination, trace, etc. They are basically 'non concepts' because they are undecidables. Non concepts do not have logical generality and are not independent of literary language. But philosophical concepts are said to have logical generality in their supposed independence from ordinary or literary language. For example, Derrida explains the notion of 'diffarence' as non concept that it cannot be defined in terms of oppositional predicates nor is identified as this or that. It is the act of not only differing but of deferring too. It cannot be reduced to a dialectical logic nor can be defined with a system of logic.

Derrida’s attempt in deconstruction on metaphysics set apart the traditional forms of ontotheology and logocentrism. But it does not amount to saying that philosophy as critical reflection and interrogation came to an end. Philosophy indeed has found a new lease of life in deconstruction. The contemporary discourse of
Philosophy in its overcoming and deconstructing metaphysics is far more speculative in many respects than metaphysics itself. His deconstruction shows that reason is not versatile when it puts itself in question. Deconstruction is a strategy for Derrida that opposes reason from inside.

Derrida admits that the other of logocentric language is never totally free from the marks of philosophical language. Hence the philosophy of deconstruction, in a special sense, is still in a determinate language. This is said to be the uncomfortable position that Derrida's whole enterprise suffers from. It may be noted that it is not due to any inherent draw back in Derrida's thought but of thought and language themselves. Derrida agrees that the idea that we might be able to get outside of metaphysics is a naive thinking. According to him, there is nothing in thought that cannot be re-thought, nothing is said that cannot be re-said, even deconstruction itself must be deconstructed.

The problem naturally arises then is: if deconstruction prevents us from affirming anything, then one ends up not with difference but with indifference where nothing is anything and everything is everything else. Derrida answers that it certainly entails a moment of affirmation. It means that deconstruction is a positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls or motivates it. It is in rapport with self identity which is always a rapport of violence with the other. The notion of presence, so central to logocentric metaphysics, is essentially dependent on an oppositional relation with otherness. In this sense, identity presupposes alterity whereas deconstruction affirms it.

Derrida, however, argues that deconstruction is a form of literature. It is a literary text to be read like other texts. It is an interpretation open to several other interpretations. Accordingly, one may say that deconstruction is at once extremely
modest and ambitious. It is modest in that it admits only one textual interpretation among others. It is ambitious in that it puts itself on part with literary texts. The language in which deconstruction is written has no centralising power of mastery of domination. It is not a privileged meta language over and above the language of literature.

Here, the question of language as reference emerges. Can language as mutation or violence or monstrosity refer to anything other than itself? It is totally wrong to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference. Deconstruction rather is deeply concerned with the other of language and shows that the question of reference is more complex and problematic than the supposition of traditional theories of reference. It inquiries whether the term reference is entirely adequate for designing the other. The other which is beyond language and which summons language is perhaps not a referent in the normal sense that linguists usually attached to this term. To distance oneself from the habitual structure of reference to challenge our common assumptions does not mean that there is nothing beyond language.

Derrida redirects our attention to the margins and limits of philosophy. It is these limitations that determine the logocentric procedures of exclusion and division for the sake of an identity. His deconstructionism dismantles our preconceived notions of identity and exposes us to the challenge of hitherto unexpected and concealed 'otherness': the other side of experience. Derrida says that this dimension of otherness has ignored so as to preserve the illusion of truth as perfectly self contained and self sufficient presence.

It would be easy to understand if his programme of deconstruction could be situated in relation to the two major traditions of human culture. One is intellectual and the other is prophetic. It may be said that the former is Greek or Hellenic and...
the other is Arabic or Hebraic. Derrida feels that the questions that he attempts to formulate on the outskirts of Greek philosophical tradition have the Jew-as other. He does not invoke the Jewish tradition in any rooted or direct manner. It obviates the necessity to consider that his works are neither Greek nor Jewish in its thought patterns. His ultimate site of questioning discourse is neither Hellenic nor Hebraic but a non-site beyond them.

According to Derrida, Judaism offers an alternative to the Greek philosophy of presence. Judaism and Christianity represented a non logocentric heterogeneity, an otherness. But in the course of time they were assimilated into Greek Hellenic culture. What we know as Jewish and Christian theology today is a cultural ensemble, which has been largely hellenised. It is true to argue that Jewish and Greek cultures are fundamentally intertwined. Yet these original, heterogeneous elements of Judaism and Christianity were never completely eradicated by metaphysics. They perdure throughout the centuries, threatening and unsettling the assured identities of philosophy; hence Derrida argues that surreptitious deconstruction of Greek logos was at work from the very origin of western culture. The transference of Hebraic or Arabic ideas and structures into metaphysical terms produce fissures in the presumed solidity for Greek philosophy. They introduced alien and conflicting elements into logocentric homogeneity. In later periods, the holocentric logos conceals the reality of heterogeneity by the illusion of identity. Derrida's deconstruction stands against this thoroughly unjustifiable disingenuous dream at work. Yet, it is not deconstruction that deconstructs metaphysics but prophecy in general. Deconstruction being deconstructed by itself simply affirms the other of metaphysics as the experience of prophets. It is the heterogeneity of otherness that deconstructs homogeneity of metaphysics.

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It is essentially a philosophical gesture to search for an objective or absolute criteria or telos. It is the logocentric philosophy that frames the idea of eschaton or telos. This makes philosophy different from prophecy. Prophecy dispenses with such criteria. Derrida interrogates this criteria in its absolute formulation. But it does not mean that he dismisses all forms of Messianic or prophetic eschatology. He recognizes that all genuine questioning is summoned by a certain type of eschatology. In the case of eschatology of prophecy, it is impossible to define it in philosophical terms. The prophetic word has its own criterion. It refuses to be submitted to an external tribunal which would judge or evaluate it from an objective. The prophetic word reveals its own eschatology and finds its index of fruitfulness in its own inspiration. It cannot be judged with certain transcendental criteria. Accordingly, the last chapter of the thesis tries to analyse the causes and effects of the close intertwining of the streams of experience and metaphysical theorizing. Our analysis points as to how Indian metaphysical and Indian experience differs from each other despite its attempts to ensemble them into one stream and how the process of deconstruction and concealment takes place between them in concrete forms emanating cultural aspects. Hence, cultural contradictions arose in Indian society as Advaita on the metaphysical side and casteism on the practical side; Brahmans as the ultimate reality on the metaphysical side and polytheism and evil worship on practical side; doctrine of salvation on metaphysical side and worship of the trinity in the practical side. We have concluded by suggesting to replace the filled up metaphysics by experience so as to eliminate the conditions that foreshadow the cultural dimension of Indian society for the emplacement of a culture of liberation in its concrete aspects. We have argued in the final chapter that in the modern Guru tradition, this is evident in the case of Navajyothisree Karunakaraguru.
who experienced and advocated an egolessness yet was a willing participant in the transformation of ego-consciousness. The realization, though first described in the Upanishads, is not limited to time space and language. To that extent, it may be argued that Derrida's method of dissemination or deconstruction ultimately is enmeshed in the paradoxes of philosophies relying on subjectivity.