CHAPTER-III

Locating WOMP: History and Evolution

In the previous chapter, we explored the philosophical context of WOMP. This chapter looks into the historical context of its genesis and development. It is divided into five sections. The first section traces the emergence of ‘international society’ from the days of the Westphalia peace treaty. It seeks to tease out the notion(s) of world order implied in this society. The second section deals more directly into the genesis of WOMP, locating it in the postwar political context of cold war, nuclear arms race and neo-colonialism as well as in the academic traditions of Peace Research. The next three sections sketch the evolutionary process of WOMP through different stages. The third section deals with the initial years of 1961-68, when theorists were concerned almost exclusively with the issue of peace and displayed a shared faith in the adoption of a legal-institutional framework for war-prevention. The fourth section deals with the years of 1968-78 when, thanks to the participation of non-Western scholars, the WOMP broad-based its concerns to include values of economic well being as well as socio-political justice. This was also the period in which WOMP became increasingly conscious of the need to work out the strategies of transition to the ‘Preferred World.’ The final section deals with what might be called the third and the fourth stages of WOMP in which interest shifted from governmental agencies to transnational social movements and grass-root initiatives. It also deals with the circumstances in which WOMP suffered from growing lack of internal cohesion and went into relative decline. The chapter ends with a reference to the newer forms of theorisation in the age of globalisation.

Most conventional notions of world order presume or postulate an international society. This society is defined as a “group of states” which are "conscious of certain common interests and common values"; they are “bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another” and participate in
"common institutions". The core constituent of such a society is thus the sovereign state. It should be appropriate, therefore, to trace back historically the concept of world order since the formation of the modern sovereign state system.

It is generally agreed that the transition from the medieval to the modern state system took place with the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The Thirty Years' war (1618-1648) which preceded it destroyed the medieval order which had been shaped in the image of a Euro-centric Christian commonwealth dominated and held together by imperial and/or papal hierarchies. The treaty created instead a world in which sovereign states competed with one another in pursuit of power and material interests but also had to learn to coexist and interact. This marked the starting point for the development of "new norms applicable to the behaviour of new sovereigns" and resulted eventually in the formation of "the first completely explicit international society with its own diplomatic institutions, formal body of law, and enunciated practices of prudential statecraft, including the balance of power".

Practices such as "conciliation, mediation" and "arbitration" were introduced in this period, as was 'international congress' "as an ad-hoc system of communication and conflict resolution". A multipolar balance of power moderated power clashes. Yet, sovereign states waged wars as often as they entered into alliances and treaties. The logic of sovereignty often triumphed over the need for international consonance. The dominant mood of the classical period was separation rather than integration and autarky rather than interdependence. As a result, social integration in the system was quite low.

3 ibid.
low. Figures such as William Penn, Abbe St. Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham and Kant made pleas for world order through institutional reforms, but these pleas were "all dismissed as incompatible with the realities of the states system."8

The first significant attempt to establish a world order was made only at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Underlying this attempt was the assumption that world order could be maintained only if great powers exercised special rights and responsibilities. The Concert of Europe which emerged as a result reflected the exclusive concerns of five great powers - Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Austria - which acted as self-styled guardians of world order.9 The Concert performed "a variety of functions associated with contemporary international institutions: collective legitimization of new states, collective neutralization of certain areas, collective peacemaking and peacekeeping, collective enforcement of certain decisions, and collective rule-making".10

It was also during this period that European powers extended their colonial control in Asia, Africa and Latin America, thereby encompassing most of the world. The First World War further consolidated European supremacy all over the world "whereby a handful of European states dominated the affairs of the world".11

At the same time, the First World War also marked the breakdown of the nineteenth century balance of power system which had thus far succeeded in maintaining peace among self-seeking sovereign states. In the

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6 ibid.
7 ibid., p. 31. For details see William Penn, Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament or Estates(1693); Abbe St Pierre, Project for Perpetual Peace (1712); Jean Jacques Rousseau, Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe (1761); Jeremy Bentham, Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace (between 1786 and 1789); Immanuel Kant, Thoughts on Perpetual Peace (1795).
8 ibid., p. 31.
9 ibid., p. 32.
wake of this massive failure, “pacifists and legal scholars began to advance anti-sovereignty arguments and doctrines.” The focus was on improving and reforming peaceful settlement procedures and further developing and codifying international law. The first organised attempt to restructure the normative foundations of world order was made with the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920. Before the League was established, states were believed to have the sovereign right to wage war. Now, there was a renewed emphasis on natural law and just war. The Covenant of the League of Nations restricted the right of a state to resort to war and sanctioned only "legitimate use of force".

Central to the League was the collective security system, whereby the League could use military power to deter aggression and, if necessary, use a preponderance of power to enforce its decision. Another step forward in the progressive de-legitimisation of war was the Pact of Paris (also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928, which was ratified by sixty two nations. Through this Pact, all international conflicts, regardless of their origin or nature, were pledged to be settled through peaceful means, and war was denounced as an instrument of national policy.

Requirements of world order seemed to gain further precedence over claims of sovereignty when the rights and responsibilities of individuals were sought to be redefined in a manner that would transcend moral and legal obligations to territorial states. The Treaty of Versailles introduced the concept of individual responsibility for war crimes. New norms were defined also on such matters as the social welfare, slavery, narcotics and drugs trade, and customs violations.

While the League may thus be seen as an attempt to transcend the Westphalian state system, it could not remain unaffected by the malaise and malfunctioning of the existing world. Autarky and unilateralism on the part of

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13 ibid., pp. 37-38.
14 ibid.
15 ibid., p. 38.
states restricted its scope and success. From the very beginning, many states like the US refused to join it. The mandate system revealed the colonial mentality of the founders of the League. Further, the League was also unable to handle the Manchurian crisis (1931), Ethiopian crisis (1935), and most important, Hitler's decision to reoccupy the Rhineland in March 1936.

While the League eventually failed in overcoming the pitfalls of the sovereign state system, the Westphalian norms were brought into question on several other counts in the inter-war period. The Wilsonian advocacy of the right of national self determination challenged imperialism indirectly while Soviet revolutionary challenge was more direct. The latter sought to establish a new world order based on socialist internationalism and solidarity. Yet these challenges were rather short-lived. As Samuel S. Kim had pointed out:

The Soviet Union and the United States both abandoned their initial revisionist challenges and retreated into the cocoon of state sovereignty. The Marxist notion of the state as a coercive instrument of exploitation that would eventually wither away was transformed (or rather deformed) into the Stalinist notion of a garrison super state.\textsuperscript{16}

Nonetheless, anti-colonial nationalism did gather force and momentum in the inter-war period.

At another plane, economic depression in 1929 shattered the world economy. This crisis of unprecedented depth brought even the strongest capitalist economies to their knees and seemed to reverse the creation of a single universal world economy, which had been so remarkable an achievement of nineteenth century liberal capitalism.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} ibid., p. 37.

The 1930s also witnessed the rise of totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany. While Mussolini established a ‘Fascist State’ in Italy, Hitter established a ‘Nazi State’ in Germany. This was accompanied by the crisis in the Far East, especially Japanese occupation of Manchuria between 1931 and 1933.

The Second World War brought about fundamental changes in world politics. European domination of world politics came to an end. The U.S. and the former USSR emerged as the two key players in world politics. Three major political, ideological and technological developments took place in the wake of the war. These were: (1) the collapse and end of the colonial empires in Asia, Africa and some parts of Latin America; (2) the beginning of the Cold War — which reflected the political, military and most importantly, ideological confrontation between the U.S and the USSR; and (3) the development of the weapons of mass destruction — the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons; the means of their delivery as well as their control over them by the developed countries.18

The period saw unprecedented and dramatic expansion of the international society. Newly independent Third world countries wanted to pursue independent foreign policies and desired to establish their own distinct identity in international relations. Most did not want, therefore, to be part of cold war politics or get associated with military pacts led by U.S and the USSR. Another major development was the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 in order to promote global peace and prevent the outbreak of another world war.

The Second World War also witnessed the emergence of a new liberal world economic order. At the Brettenwoods Conference in 1944, policy makers sought to ensure that the economic depression did not recur. They also sought to rebuild the war torn economies of Europe. The Brettenwoods Agreements of 1944 set up the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (also now known as the World Bank). The former "was created to ensure a stable exchange rate regime" and provide "emergency assistance to countries facing a temporary crisis in their balance of payments regime."\textsuperscript{19} The World Bank "was created to facilitate private investment and reconstruction in Europe. The Bank was also charged with assisting 'development' in other countries, a mandate which later became the main reason for its existence. Finally, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was signed in 1947 and became a forum for negotiations on trade liberalisation."\textsuperscript{20}

In retrospect, it may be said that the objective of every "world order planning" since Westphalia was to minimise the recurrence of the last great war. Yet, as Samuel Kim pointed out, common to these attempts was a "negative, retrospective, and reactive mentality."\textsuperscript{21} They were products of "condominial consensus or compromise among the great powers," and embodied "a corporate oligopolistic structure with uneven distribution of values."\textsuperscript{22} They were "designed more to manage interstate relations than to satisfy global human needs."\textsuperscript{23}

\section*{II}

Wishing to avert the repetition of the horrors of the Second World War, the UN found itself caught up in Cold War calculations of the rival super powers. The Cold War was at once military, economic, political and ideological. It's military manifestations were strategic alliances, arms race, nuclear build-up and proxy wars. World economy stood divided into two parallel streams once the Soviet bloc opted out of Brettenwoods arrangements and set up a socialist commonwealth in the form of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Economic aid and trade as well as

\begin{footnote}{19} Ngaire Woods, "International political economy in an age of globalization" in ibid., p. 278. \end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{20} ibid. \end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{21} Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order, op cit., p. 52. \end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{22} ibid. \end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{23} ibid. \end{footnote}
capital and technology transfer among states were driven by the Cold War rivalry. While the two power blocs sold different paths of economic development to the newly independent countries, most were lured into adopting the western path of capitalist modernisation with varying does of Keynesian welfarism. However, even after several decades, the promise of fast and comprehensive growth remained unfulfilled, causing widespread dissatisfaction and resentment. The Third World countries also discovered that they were slipping deeper and deeper into a relationship of dependency on the advanced Western economies, while the gap between the rich North and the poor South widened rather than narrowed.

The Cold War, underdevelopment and poverty combined to stir a critical consciousness amongst people against the growing disorder and anarchy. Institutions of civil society, the academic community, and the political elite of the different countries started demanding an 'Alternative World Order', though the tone and temper of their arguments often set them apart.

Besides the political context sketched above, the intellectual origins of WOMP are usually traced back to the Peace Research movement of the 1950s and 1960's. The movement arose out of disenchantment with the intellectual self-isolation of traditional international relations studies. Peace research sought to be more inter-disciplinary. "In fact, it served as a rendezvous point for various disciplines concerned with human conflict behaviour"24. Peace Research was also "more value-oriented," questioning "the feasibility as well as desirability of value-neutral" inquiry. It was "broader in its scope" since it studied violence in all forms, domestic or transnational. It probed conflicts in a comparative framework.25

World order studies refined and expanded the interdisciplinary approach of peace research by synthesising the "loose juxtaposition of concepts, paradigms, and theories borrowed from various social science

24 ibid. p. 76.
25 ibid.
Given their futuristic orientation, world order studies also formulated their own concepts and models suited to the purpose of designing sketches of ‘preferred world’ order and working out the strategies of transition.²⁷

Scholarly interest in World Order Studies received a major boost in the late 1960s when a group of eminent social theorists from different continents came together under what came to be known as the World Order Models Project (WOMP). WOMP drew scholars from Latin America, Africa, Japan, Europe, Soviet Union, India, United States, and had indirect representation for China. They published over the next two decades several normative futuristic studies on what they thought the ‘Preferred World for the 1990s’²⁸ could and should be. The WOMP participants subscribed to a future world order based on four values: peace, economic well-being, social and political justice and ecological balance. A direct offshoot of the 'legal-institutional' approach, the WOMP was sponsored by what was earlier known as the World Law Fund and was later redesignated as the Institute for World Order.

The values upheld and projected by the WOMP writings have truly universal relevance and appeal, yet the perspectives brought to bear on these issues by the theorists belonging to different continents were refreshingly different from one another. The universalism of WOMP was thus multiculturist. Its assumption was that even though different cultures had different values, they also had some values which were universalisable. The hope was that such universalisable values could with conscious effort, be turned into universal values.

WOMP gradually developed into an academic discipline which was at once scholarly, scientific, predictive, inventive and critical. It did not confine

²⁶ ibid.
²⁷ ibid.
itself to philosophical or speculative discussion of values. Rather, it tried to identify and address policy questions as well. Transformation was the key element in WOMP’s approach, but there was no room in it for violent or revolutionary transformation. WOMP theorists believed that a more just and humane world order would emerge in a gradual, non-violent and evolutionary manner within a broad liberal paradigm.

Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, two pioneering theorists of the project, believed that WOMP values could be best promoted if an academic and pedagogic discipline were developed around them. Their program was designed to “spread among professional and graduate schools, and ultimately permeate college and pre-college years.” The WOMP theorists believed that such intellectual interventions would go a long way in achieving desired change.

Within WOMP, there were discernible differences between the views of the Western scholars and the Third World scholars. While Western scholars like Falk and Mendlovitz adopted a perspective which emphasised the role of world level institutions, Third World scholars like Rajni Kothari feared that such institutions could encourage excessive centralism. Kothari’s perspective was of a pluralist and decentralized world order in which grassroots activism played a significant role. As he put it, “from the idea of world unity, the whole idea of world federation was evolved.”

III

The WOMP approach went through various stages of evolution from its inception. Although the more basic values and features remained constant, there were significant shifts in conceptual focus and methodological

One can see at least four distinct stages in the development of WOMP.

The period from 1961 to 1968 constituted the first stage in the development of WOMP, marked by the efforts of a group of concerned U.S scholars like Falk and Mendlovitz to establish an academic discipline devoted specifically to study prevention of wars and other forms of large scale collective violence. Rejecting the prevalent notion that conflicts and violence were integral to the anarchical inter-state system, these scholars proceeded on the premise that international law and institutions could be developed into credible and effective means of maintaining peace. These scholars were greatly influenced by the publication of *World Peace Through World Law*, a plan conceived and elaborated by two international lawyers, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, who proposed that the UN Charter be amended “to transfer some functions, capabilities and resources from national governments to a rearranged set of global institutions.” Falk and Mendlovitz did not postulate any organisational alternative to the state system but they expected states to rise above narrow geopolitical calculations. They believed that it was possible within the existing framework to demilitarise international relations, promote interdependence resolve issues such as human rights and developmental assistance character. A variety of structural reforms could be ushered by augmenting United Nations, strengthening regional institutions and specialised regimes to handle growing complexity and international relations.

The group actively thought of involving academic community from different parts of the world in order to build strong intellectual support for a global peace movement. Aspiring to turn their project into a transnational research enterprise, it was decided that scholars world-wide would be invited

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33 Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for a Just World Order*, op. cit., p. 83.
to pursue nationally or regionally based inquiries into the problem relevant to war-prevention.

Quite soon, these theorists realized that war-prevention could not be discussed in isolation. Poverty and social injustice were so inextricably interwoven with the outbreak of international violence that they should be included into an integrated framework for defining the measures for war-prevention. While the advanced economies had largely solved problems of mass poverty and grave injustices, and could therefore afford to give almost exclusive priority to peace, it was also felt that the Third World countries had to give much higher priority to economic well-being and social justice37.

This initial stage of WOMP suffered from several limitations. A major flaw in its framework was that "it appealed to the enlightened self interest of the privileged to take the initiative in transition polities, basing the appeal on the uncritical transference of liberal reform politics to the international scene."38 A second flaw was its excessively American orientation. As Samuel S. Kim had pointed out:

Its conceptual origin, key participants and pedagogic materials were all American. Its legal and structural design for world order reflects the rather unique historical experience of the United States with its largely successful transition from the relatively decentralized condition of "state" sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation to a 'more perfect union' under a new federal system39.

More severe critics charged that that it was no more than a mask to disguise the "neo-imperial motive of the Pax-Americana."40 Many condemned

37 Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Introduction" in Rajni Kothari, Footsteps into the Future: Diagnosis of the present World and a Design for an Alternative, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1974, pp. xi-xii.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
it as an exercise in constitutional or legal engineering while still others thought of it "as a kind of intellectual utopianism through which world order scholars could escape the 'messy and uncivilized' political struggles of forging an actual new order."\textsuperscript{41} "Finally, this world order approach was considered conceptually inadequate" as it "abstracted the question of system transformation in a manner unresponsive to the broader world order agenda of the non-Western peoples of the world."\textsuperscript{42}

IV

World Order studies reached their zenith with the formal establishment of the World Order Models Project in 1968. WOMP was sponsored by what was then known as World Law Fund and was later re-designated as the Institute for World Order. It was during this phase (1968-1978), that participation of scholars from Latin America, Japan, India and Africa made WOMP a truly broad-based movement. Falk described this as a phase of "transnational collaboration."\textsuperscript{43} Since values were stated in general terms and could therefore be subjected to a variety of interpretations, the WOMP became genuinely pluralistic in its vision. Participants were free to propose additional values. There was also a general consensus in favour of including a much broader range of actors. These could be world institutions, transnational actors, international organisations, regional arrangements, sub­national movements, local communities and individuals.\textsuperscript{44}

The research group agreed on a series of enterprises to promote research, education and a transnational social movement to realise world order values. The first major venture was the publication of a genuinely transnational journal called 'Alternatives', with Rajni Kothari as its first Editor, and two dozen distinguished scholars on its Editorial Board. It was decided to

\textsuperscript{41}ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}ibid.
bring out an annual ‘State of the Globe’ message to track local, regional and
global trends and evaluate the extent to which world order values were
diminished or realized during the preceding year. The message would also
make suggestions and recommendations as to what ought to be done.\textsuperscript{45} In
addition, WOMP decided to hold a series of transnational seminars for
scholars and public figures. It also “set out to create the basic instructional
materials needed for a world wide educational movement whose ultimate
thrust world be global reform”.\textsuperscript{46}

Nine meetings of WOMP were during this period in different parts of
the world. The first meeting was held in New Delhi in February 1968, with
participants drawn from Western Europe, Latin America, Japan, India and
North America. In the subsequent years, participants from Africa, the USSR
and Scandinavia joined the deliberations, as did at a still later date a Chinese
and a Middle Eastern Scholar. Jagdish Bhagwati of MIT organised one
meeting with a group of economists in order to provide an economic
perspective. It resulted in the first WOMP book entitled \textit{Economics and World
Order: From the 1970s to the 1990s}.\textsuperscript{47} The African research group organized
conference, which resulted in the second WOMP book edited by Ali Mazrui
and Hasu Patel called \textit{Africa and World Affairs}.\textsuperscript{48} The collaborative research
culminated in a series of five books under the umbrella title of ‘Preferred
Worlds for the 1990s’.\textsuperscript{49}

Participants were selected because of their intellectual credentials and
generally progressive orientation, and not because all of them had the same

\textsuperscript{45} ibid., p. xi.
\textsuperscript{46} ibid., p. x.
\textsuperscript{47} Jagdish Bhagwati, \textit{Economics and World Order: From the 1970s to the 1990s}, New
\textsuperscript{48} Ali Mazrui and Hasu Patel, eds, \textit{Africa and World Affairs}, New York, The Third Press,
\textsuperscript{49} Preferred Words for the 1990s Series : 1. Rajni Kothari, \textit{Footsteps into the Future :
Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative}, New Delhi, Orient Longman,
1974; 2. Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed. \textit{On the Creation of a Just World Order}, New Delhi, Orient
Johan Galtung, \textit{The True Worlds : A Transnational Perspective}.
vision on global reform. There was a great diversity of views among these theorists. As one participant, Foujad Ajami, pointed out:

Non-Western participants in that project assaulted and challenged its Western ethnocentrism; 'non-lawyers' enhanced and broadened its concerns and pushed it in the direction of political harmony and culture. Those concerned with socio-economic justice drew attention to the fact that peace, unless rooted in socio-economic justice can be meaningless, stultifying, and perhaps repressive; the strong have always sought peace as a means of ensuring that their order would be unchallenged and undisturbed. The intrusion of concern for justice into world orderism was to profoundly change its thrust and essence. The hitherto legal emphasis of the movement was increasingly modified to be more self-consciously political.50

However, one should not exaggerate these differences. Despite this diversity, the WOMP theorists shared a common commitment to the broader value framework of democracy, human rights and anti-imperialist politics51. For most of the theorists, became a life long scholarly and political vocation. Besides, as we shall see, circumstances and experiences of the later years led to considerable dilution of these differences. The end was that whereas the WOMP had in the first phase placed almost exclusive emphasis on war prevention, the second phase saw much greater emphasis on economic well-being and socio-political justice. Ecological issues, however, were yet to occupy these theorists as a major concern52.

52 Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order, op cit, p.84. Also refer Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., On The Creation of a Just World Order, op cit., p.xi.
Differences surfaced yet again when, towards the end of the 1970s, WOMP developed a major concern for the transformation of the state. First World participants tended to see state as the vehicle of militarist ambitions and arms race, and therefore regarded strong state as the chief obstacle to global reform. They wanted state to become more responsive to the aspirations generated within the civil society. In contrast, the Third World participants were greatly concerned about neo-colonial exploitation as well as First World domination in political and cultural domains. They reposed greater faith in the potential of Third World states to safeguard independence. They were worried that weak states could be easily penetrated.53

This faith in the progressive role of the state was shaken as many Third World states became increasingly militaristic in their outlook and actions, while their leaders squandered and plundered national resources. “The experience of the emergency in India during 1976-77”, and the militarisation of the Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the southern core of South America during the 1960s and 1970s were prime examples of these negative trends.54 As a result, there was a new thrust on human rights and democracy. The Third World scholars no longer regarded constitutionalism as a luxury which they should aspire for only after the ‘basic needs’ of the poor were satisfied.

The result was that sharp differences between the Northern and Southern participants once again gave way to a new convergence. A more balanced and variegated perspective now combined issues of peace, democracy, human rights, poverty alleviation and justice. For example, WOMP displayed a strong affinity during the early 1970s with the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which had been raised by Third World countries in forums such as the UN General Assembly and the UNCTAD.55

54 Ibid., p.21.
55 Ibid., p.20.
It was also during this phase that the WOMP developed a more policy-oriented approach. Theorists realised that utopian pictures of the 'preferred world' would not make a material difference by themselves; the real challenge was to work out viable strategies of transition. They had to develop an ordered agenda, for which operational strategies and policies could then be formulated. Intellectual and conceptual tools were needed to be developed for operationalising values. More data on their interrelationship was required. Reliable indices had to be developed for measuring change. In this endeavour, behavioural sciences approach was likely to prove more relevant than the speculative style which most WOMP theorists had adopted in the past.56

Theorists were asked to be "as explicit as possible" about the constitutive order and authority structures needed during the period of transition and at the ultimate end.57 Thanks to this methodological reorientation, the term 'Preferred World' came to have a more rigorous meaning, "stated in fairly precise behavioural detail, including a behavioural description of the transition process from the present to the new system."58

Since operational definition of goals was of crucial importance, it was necessary that precise priority-setting rules were laid down for handling instances of conflict among values. In thinking about transition, some participants tended to accord primacy to reform in national societies.59 They argued that such reforms must precede global social change, particularly so within the major countries. "Others argued for the primacy of the global agenda and the critical role of transnational functional political movements and institutions."60 The issue therefore was how much centralisation or decentralisation was appropriate in different substantive arenas and the criteria relevant for deciding the appropriate level. Unified approach

57 ibid., pp. xiv-xv.
58 ibid., p.xiii.
59 ibid., p.xv.
60 ibid.
demanded that theorists moderate the values emanating from their specific cultural or geographic backgrounds with values of greater universal relevance.\textsuperscript{61}

These were tricky issues and WOM\textsuperscript{P} did not prove too successful in sorting them out. Samuel Kim, himself a prominent WOM\textsuperscript{P} theorist admitted that "The Preferred Worlds series has not provided either a satisfactorily systematic or substantive treatment of transition politics by way of prescribing behavioral guidance for world order activists."\textsuperscript{62} In addition, he pointed out that "WOM\textsuperscript{P} was unable to achieve sustained participation of scholars from the Soviet Union, or more generally, from the Communist world."\textsuperscript{63} He was also of the view that while "Third World participation symbolized the transnationalization of world order inquiry," it did so "without achieving any corresponding cohesion in research purpose, modelling design or an integrated world order vision. Instead, it entailed a constant questioning of WOM\textsuperscript{P}'s premises."\textsuperscript{64}

At the same time, Kim had pointed out that "generating a strong and cohesive political will toward normative goals of system transformation" was difficult, "if not impossible", in the given "global conditions of fragmentation."\textsuperscript{65} Also, there was still a "virtual monopoly of the realist school in defining what is real and feasible."\textsuperscript{66}

V

The third stage began in 1978 when the WOM\textsuperscript{P} adopted a more diverse and diffused approach. Reflected in a number of its projects, including a multi-volume series called ‘Studies on a Just World Order’,\textsuperscript{67} this approach

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order, op cit, p.85.
\item \textsuperscript{63} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{64} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{65} ibid., p. 86.
\item \textsuperscript{66} ibid.
distinguished between three intersecting systems of politics. The first consisted of the territorial states with their supporting infrastructure of corporations, banks, and knowledge industries. The second was made up of international organizations, global as well as regional, including the United Nations. The third consisted of the popular sector, with people acting individually and collectively through voluntary social movements and associations of all kinds.\(^68\)

In its two earlier phases, WOMP had focussed on the first and the second systems of politics. In the latest phase, it shifted its attention emphatically to the third system, focussing on role of social movements and grassroots initiatives as forms of struggle of the oppressed. At the same time, however, WOMP embarked on a series of studies which were more in the nature of continuation from the earlier phases. Addressing governmental leaders and others who shaped public opinion, these studies were more business-like in their approach and dealt with global policy issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, basic human needs, and the demand for a New International Economic Order.\(^69\)

WOMP slowed down considerably in the late 1980s. As it lacked official backing of any sort anywhere, funding for its transnational conferences and research programmes became a major area of concern. Also, there was a growing feeling that the areas of consensus were shrinking within the WOMP participants and there was very little hope of a coherent vision emerging in the foreseeable future.\(^70\) Falk listed the basic issues which remained unresolved:

- Was it useful to set forth visions of global scale reform?
- Did such visions go beyond a new round of reformist

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\(^68\) Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for Just World Order*, op cit., p. 86.


constitutionalism, even if in the mild form of a strengthened
United Nations? was centralisation feasible and desirable
at a regional level? at a global level? what were the
economic feature of a positive ideology of global reform?\(^7^1\)

WOMP was never formally suspended, but most of its participants
began to focus their energies on activities within their own countries. Some
WOMP, including Richard Falk, got “involved in two follow-on collaborative
undertakings: ‘Peace and Global Transformation’ Project of the United
Nations University and the Committee for a Just World Peace”.\(^7^2\) Some
WOMP activities like the publication of the journal ‘Alternatives’ continue,
expanding dialogue across boundaries and providing educational material in
the world order studies.

As events actually unfolded in the 1990s, their harsh reality seemed to
expose the ‘hollowness’ of philosophical and normative foundations which
had informed the WOMP preferences. The theorists realised that their
capacity to exert influence on governmental policy or even public opinion was
marginal. They were kept away from all structures of decision-making. First
World policy makers were interested only in maintaining a status-quo, which
favoured the privileged position of their countries.

The result was a near eclipse of the WOMP spirit. It was against this
background of declining expectations, hopelessness and grim failure, that
activists initiated a program called ‘The Global Civilization: Challenges for
Democracy, Sovereignty and Security Project’ (or GCP)\(^7^3\) in order to move
away from earlier predicaments and to reassert normative concerns of world
community in a market driven global economy. The GCP emerged out of the
conversations and dialogue held in the fall of 1986 between the WOMP group

\(^7^1\) ibid., p. 22.
\(^7^2\) ibid.
\(^7^3\) Saul H. Mendlovitz, “Preface” in Richard Falk, *On Human Governance : Toward a New
and Georgi Shakhnozarov, the then Vice-President of the International Political Science Association and a special assistant to Mikhail Gorbachev.74

A Steering Committee - composed of scholars, diplomats, media persons and religious leaders - held two meetings in mid-1987 and in the Spring of 1988 (Nyon, Switzerland). Five workshops were organised over a period of five years, each devoted to a principal theme of the project. These were:

The Coming Global Civilization: What Kind of Sovereignty? (Moscow, 1988); Deepening and Globalizing Democracy (Yokohama, 1990); Global Political Economy: Trends and Preferences (Cairo, 1990); Shaping Global Polity (South Bend, 1991); Toward a Just World Order for the Twenty-First century (Harare, 1993).75

Results from these workshops were published in part through public education and dissemination programs but more especially through a wide range of WOMP-inspired publications in the form of books and papers. GCP rapporteur Richard Falk brought out a volume entitled On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Falk, 1995) in which he tried to crystallize ideas on some of the 'enduring concerns' of both WOMP and the GCP76. He argued that globalisation, and the consequent gradual erosion of the state-centric system, had led to the decline of geopolitics and the rise of what he called geo-governance. Falk was interested in exploring the extent to which such geo-governance could "be made more humane, more people-oriented, more focused on human rights, and global demilitarization."77 Geo-governance in this preferred form is what Falk called 'humane governance.'78

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74 ibid.
75 ibid., p. viii.
78 ibid., p. 9.
We should note in the end that the four stages in the development of WOMP were all inter-related. Even though there had been shifts in focus and methodological orientation, its basic concerns remained unchanged throughout: "emphasis on system transformation; depiction of preferred world order systems; avowal of explicit values; concern about transition politics; and a holistic conception of global human interests and needs"\textsuperscript{79}.

\textsuperscript{79} Samuel S. Kim, \textit{The Quest for a Just World Order}, op cit., p.86.