CHAPTER-II

Locating WOMP: The Philosophical Context

What do we mean by ‘Order’ and, more specifically, ‘World Order’? What are the alternative perspectives on world order? Why did the WOMP theorists emphasise certain specific values like peace, economic well-being, social and political justice and ecological balance? These are some of the questions addressed in this chapter. We try to examine the anatomy of the preferences behind WOMP’s “Preferred World” and relate them to the larger philosophical domains in which these preferences are embedded. We try to map the common theoretical ground of WOMP social theorists.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section attempts a brief survey of western political thought in order to explore the notion(s) of ‘order’ implicit in its various strands. The second section examines alternative meanings of ‘world order’ found in different versions of Liberal as well as Realist theories of International Relations by way of seeking the theoretical context of the WOMP. The third section continues the discussion by referring to different forms of globalism. The next four sections take up successively the four values central to the WOMP project: peace, economic well-being, socio-political justice and ecology. In every case, the value is approached from alternative perspectives before an attempt is made to contextualise WOMP theorisation.

I

The question “what constitutes order?” has been asked by almost all political philosophers but it has been answered in different ways. Making a thematic survey of western political thought, John Morrow arrives at three alternative notions of order. To quote him:

First, the issue of order has been related to the need for coercive regulatory agencies to repress behaviour that threatens the stability of society and jeopardises
beneficial human interaction. Secondly, order has been treated in more positive terms, and has been identified with establishing a basis from which human beings can reap the material, moral and psychological benefits of cooperation. Finally, one can identify a perspective on order that has played a prominent role in Marxist and anarchist political theory. Writers in these traditions view the state as an instrument of order, but they argue that it is necessary only because tensions between individuals and classes have resulted from oppressive and exploitative tendencies within modern societies. Marxists and anarchists believe that once the social and political structures of society have been transformed, a beneficial order based upon voluntary cooperation will emerge. This condition will be social, but it will not be political because it will lack both the state and the forms of coercive regulation that are central to politics.¹

Classical political thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Cicero tended to focus on the polis or the city state, for they believed that a good order was possible only in a properly regulated polis that strives for the common well-being of all members of the community and helps them to achieve ideals considered foundational to humane life. Plato’s notion of order depended on hierarchical yet harmonious relationship between three principal social classes. While the class of ‘guardians’ ruled, ‘auxillaries’ performed military and executive functions whereas the ‘producers’ were engaged in economic activities. Plato tightly separated the economic from the political, and made the non-involvement of the ‘producers’ in the political life a precondition of order.²

² ibid., p.19 and pp.22-23.
Aristotle differed with Plato on two counts. First, he looked not for an ideal, universally appropriate, notion of order but chose instead to examine diverse forms which order could acquire depending on the socio-economic bases of various communities. Second, he believed that a judicious mix rather than separation of classes would produce order. Such a mix would reduce the risks of misuse of power on the one hand and chronic disorder and revolution on the other. Common to Plato and Aristotle, nonetheless, was a positive conception of order and the centrality both accorded to structures and forms of politics in the creation of such an order.  

Medieval political theory contained both negative and positive conceptions of order. St. Augustine's theory of the 'two cities' postulated that timeless, rational order characterised the 'city of God' and provided "a positive framework for the realisation of the supreme end"4, whereas the political order of the human existence "through which all must pass"5 was necessarily incomplete and imperfect even when not repressive. Aquinas on the other hand did not look at state as a repressive institution; it was the only institution which could promote effective cooperation among individuals. He believed that "the order created by politics is directly related to the cosmic order that leads to God".6 Thus, Aquinas essentially laid the foundation of a positive conception of order.  

Machiavelli, an early modern thinker, restored to secular politics the role which Christian thinkers had robbed it off in the establishment of positive order. He "regarded participation in the political life of a republic as a way of both creating" a "political order" and enjoying its benefits for "human fulfilment".7 At the same time, Machiavelli postulated for its principalities a more restricted, or even 'negative', notion of order which was established by a 'sovereign' or supreme authority, unrestricted by everyday demands of participatory ethics. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thinkers like

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3 ibid., pp. 23–24.
4 ibid., p. 27.
6 ibid., p. 28.
7 ibid., p. 29.
Bodin, Grotius and Hobbes carried forward the restrictive tradition of conceiving order as a function of sovereignty.\(^8\)

In the 18\(^{th}\), 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Green visualised a positive relationship between politics and order, promoting cooperation that they regard as fundamental to human well-being\(^9\) and yet ascribing “a central role to the state in defining and maintaining such an order.”\(^10\) Anarchists and Maxists too “believed individual well-being to be materially, morally and psychologically dependent on social cooperation”, yet they argued that such a “cooperative order is an exclusively social phenomenon and political institutions, above all the state, are incompatible with it”\(^11\). A social order based on true sociability was possible only in a stateless society.

II

As our summary of the positions taken in western political thought should show, negative and positive conceptions of order were often related to how individuals, groups, communities, classes and states were conceptualised and the way in which their interrelationship was understood. Some privileged the state, others the individual. To some organically constituted community came first, to others, freely formed associations. When a theorist thought of world order, his conception of world order too centred on the category he privileged. Major schools in the study of international relations - Idealism, Realism, Neo-Realism, Neo-Functionalism – all privileged states even if their conceptions did not match as to why states did what they did. Liberals and certain kinds of Functionalists, on the other hand, privileged individuals and free associations; Marxists and Neo-Marxists privileged classes; and Communitarians privileged communities.

\(^8\) ibid., pp.29-30.
\(^9\) ibid., p.42.
\(^10\) ibid., p.46.
\(^11\) ibid.
Indeed, there were areas of overlap as well, but by and large, the basic divisions remained unbridgeable. The best course for us therefore would not be to search for one common notion of world order. It appears far more appropriate that we place the different conceptions parallel to one another in order to see which of these would most closely fit the WOMP notion of world order.

Within liberalism, one could identify three schools of thought - internationalism, idealism and institutionalism – which had different perceptions of order and world order.

The cornerstone of liberal internationalism was the idea that basically human beings were rational in their individual behaviour and reasonable in their interaction. Reason and reasonableness assured conditions of freedom. A natural order thus underpinned all human societies. “A law governed international society” could also similarly emerge even without the formation of “a world government”.12 Kant, for example, argued that “a federal contract between states to abolish war, “likened to a permanent peace treaty”, could ensure “perpetual peace”.13

Liberal idealists, on the other hand, emphasised that international order neither existed nor would it emerge spontaneously; it had to be constructed in order to prevent wars. This line of argument was essentially put forward by the likes of Woodrow Wilson who advocated the formation of international organisation(s) which would, in the fashion of a world government, regulate the behaviour of states in the world.14

Liberal idealists like J.A. Hobson did not accept the laissez faire view that free trade would deliver peace. Hobson argued that,

imperialism – the subjugation of foreign peoples and
their resources – was becoming the primary cause of
conflict in international politics. For Hobson, imperialism

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13 ibid., pp. 165-166.
14 ibid., p. 167.
resulted from under consumption within developed capitalist societies. This led capitalists to search for higher profits overseas, which became a competitive dynamic between states and the catalyst for militarism, leading to war.15

However liberal institutionalists like Haas believed that "international and regional institutions were a necessary counterpart to sovereign states whose capacity to deliver welfare goals was decreasing."16 It was in the 1940s that liberal institutionalists presented the third form of liberalism. As the label itself suggests, they stressed the significance of transnational (non-governmental) institutions rather than (government-like) international organisations. This led to integrationist theory, advocated by David Mitrany, in Europe and pluralism, which focused on interdependence, in the United states. The pluralists underlined the importance of new actors such as transnational corporations and NGOs on the one hand, and new patterns of interaction based on interdependence and integration, on the other.17 Most important theorists in this respect were Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.18

On the other hand, Realists like Hedley Bull, Raymond Aron and Stanley Hoffman put forward a state-centric concept of world order. Bull pointed out that government was the principal source of domestic order whereas a more primitive form of order was operative in what he regarded as the "anarchical setting of international society".19 Generalisation about

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domestic society and politics could not be extrapolated to international society and politics. Realists accused Liberals of assuming a false continuity between intra-national and inter-national domains. The nature of domestic order and world order had to be theorised entirely differently. Bull added:

The maintenance of order in any society presupposes that among its members, or at least among those of its members who are politically active, there should be a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life.20

Further, he added:

For international society, which lacks governmental capacities and is composed of members with a weak perception for common interests, order is obtained primarily by such mechanisms as ‘balance of power’ and ‘deterrence’, encouraging mutual restraint in a manner compatible with the perceived separate interests of governments.21

Order would help us in our realisation of other values, including the pursuit of justice. However, Bull held that

the demands for justice was related in a profound way to the search for acceptable forms of order. If the parties could agree on just results, or if a consensus on international level could be achieved, then order and justice could be reconciled.22

Away from the endless debate between the Liberals and Realists, there developed in the 1950s and 1960s what looked like quite another approach to

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22 ibid.
world order. Martin Rochester contended that Liberals and Realists had been equally “impressionistic and unstructured”\textsuperscript{23} when they set out to “speculate on how much progress has been made toward ‘world order’ and how much progress can be expected in the future.”\textsuperscript{24} The behavioural methodology sought more reliable answers to such questions by measuring “quantifiable elements of international politics”.\textsuperscript{25} The central focus of Rochester’s view was that if states were using the judicial facilities, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice, which operated between World War I and World War II, and the International Court of Justice which has been operating since World War II, “more frequently and regularly to resolve their disputes with one another, then it is proper to conclude that a growth towards world order had taken place”.\textsuperscript{26}

Considered more closely, this approach turned out to be different not so much in its philosophical content as in its methodological orientation. While it was certainly more empirical, and therefore looked more scientific and objective, it was in fact no more than an “extension of World Government thinking on world order”.\textsuperscript{27} It measured change in quantitative terms, but progress still meant only one thing: movement away from the dispersed state system towards convergence and consolidation of a single world-wide organisational system. Rochester simply assumed that the state system was “incapable of qualifying as a world order system since it was insufficiently centralized”.\textsuperscript{28}

A more sophisticated version of this perspective on world order preferred to measure the growth of interdependence rather than centralisation. In this way, while “the objectivity of analysis” and “behavioural

\textsuperscript{24} ibid., p.152.
\textsuperscript{25} ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} ibid., p.153.
\textsuperscript{27} ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} ibid.
criteria of assessment” were retained, the focus shifted to “the rise of transnational phenomena of many kinds.”

The perspective of World Order Models Project was unabashedly normative and prescriptive. WOMP theorists saw no value per se in ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ analysis; whether quantitative or otherwise, analysis had to illuminate the path of efficacious transition from the highly unsatisfactory present to a desirable future. World order was defined as:

The study of international relations and world affairs that focuses on the manner in which mankind can significantly reduce the likelihood of international violence and create minimally acceptable conditions of worldwide economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability and participation in decision-making process. In short, a student of world order seeks to achieve and maintain a warless and more just world to improve the quality of human life.

WOMP believed that normative and empirical approaches were not only complementary but could also be synthesised:

World order studies is postulated by the synthesis of normative and empirical analysis. Although the central objective is clearly normative in striving toward the realization of values, world order practitioners argue that the main global problems cannot be effectively explained, let alone projected or controlled, without first


generating a vast amount of reliable empirical and behavioural data through rigorous empirical research. World order studies also adopts a holistic integrated approach to the human conditions by conceptualizing and analyzing the global problematique as a set of interlocking processes and relationships between and among the seemingly discreet global problems.31

Kim further added:
In short, world order studies does not so much reject the behavioral and social sciences, it attempts to refine, expand and synthesize a variety of concepts, paradigms, and theories from different social science and humanities disciplines. The purpose is to develop concepts and theory suited to the world order modelling process. World order studies is designed to do what Saul H. Mendlovitz calls ‘normative social research’ and to develop a normative global paradigm for the study of value-shaping and value-sharing process in a world that is becoming both increasingly interconnected and increasingly fragmented.32

Falk, probably the most eminent WOMP theorist, combined analytic, empirical, ideological and normative concerns in his definition of world order. He argued:
The set of human goals, or values can be specified in a variety of testable and semi-testable ways. Past and future systems can be compared with the present

32 ibid., pp.6-7.
system to the extent that relative goal realization can be determined in measurable terms.  

The WOMP theorists pointed out that world order inquiry was associated with both probable world modeling (i.e., the linear projection of empirical, demographic, economic and social trends) and preferred world modeling (i.e., the imaging or construction of alternative framework of world order, sometimes called “relevant utopias”, capable of realizing world order values).  

WOMP theorists also distinguished between ‘normative futurism’ and ‘technocratic futurism’:

The former is ‘based on the altered frameworks of comprehensive value-realization’, i.e. a globalist approach to peace, social justice, economic well-being, ecological balance, while the latter finds ‘fixes’ (e.g. space colonies, nuclear fusion energy) to solve the problems of human society within existing economic, cultural, political and ecological frameworks.’ Hence, the globalism which is ‘normative futurism’ and ‘technocratic futurism’ is further understood by that these propose to do – i.e., how they would order the world: its politics, its economics, its social possibilities, its ecology, its culture.  

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In short, a world order theory becomes relevant, based on the following conditions: "(1) adoption of the instrumental view of theory; (2) avoidance of all the common traps of theory building; (3) affirmation of the centrality of values (normative theory) using scientific tools when necessary or useful; and (4) acknowledgement that theory building is a continuous, cumulative and self-correcting process."\(^{36}\)

WOMP believed that the 'Preferred World' was attainable only when concerned actors made a combined effort:

The quest for a just world order is a collective, transnational struggle in which individuals and groups at different systemic levels join hands, actively participating in ongoing social, political, economic and cultural processes that embrace all of humanity.\(^{37}\)

No doubt, states were commonly obsessed with outdated notions of sovereignty, territoriality and militarised security. As such, they often acted in conservative and reactionary ways. But states should not necessarily be seen as a hurdle, for there could exist within them forces of progress. However, since there was a general depreciation of the state as an instrument, non-state actors, ranging from international institutions to multinational corporations had come to play an important and active role for system change and transformation.

III

The spirit and style of WOMP can be more clearly grasped if we were to place it against four contending world order images in the form of global models which Falk and Kim have enumerated as "(1) system-diminishing, (2) system-maintaining, (3) system-reforming, and (4) system-transforming."\(^{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order, op cit., pp.60-61.

\(^{37}\) ibid., p. 301.

System–diminishing globalism was “essentially imperial in conception. It premises prospects for order upon global unification through the domination of a single centre of power or through some kind of allocation of imperial authority arising out of unresolved rivalries. The basis for this globalism is military power forged into tight alliance systems.” Falk enumerates some of its modern day manifestations thus:

In general, system–diminishing attitudes include abandoning concern about human rights, renouncing efforts to complete negotiations on a new Law of the Sea, eroding support for the United Nations, diminishing support for programs designed to help poorer Third World countries, and avoiding procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.  

The system-maintaining image of world order had a Realist perspective. It sought to prevent the breakdown of existing patterns of order based on hierarchical/hegemonic structure of power and authority in the face of rapid change and disruption. It drew sustenance from the propensities of principal governments and elites. It avoided normative political questions and preferred to seek technical solutions. It attached priority to coordination of economic policy as the basis for an improved world order.  

System-maintaining approach was primarily defensive and status-quoist, but in order to maintain stability and status-quo, it was prepared to make marginal adoptions and accommodations, which were perceived essential. Advocated by Realists like Daniel Bell, Hedley Bull and Stanley Hoffman, the system–maintaining perspective on world order was reflected in the Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 at the initiative of David

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40 ibid.

Rockefeller; Jay Forrester’s 'World Dynamics' (1971) and the Club of Rome’s 'The Limits to Growth' (1972). As Richard Falk observed:

The organizing objective is to assume efficient economic performance, as measured by economic growth and calculated by GNP increases. Whatever means facilitate such growth are positive and should be encouraged; whatever means interfere, even if it is the exercise of democratic rights themselves, are negative and should be curtailed. The international distribution of power, wealth and prestige is relevant only to the extent that it poses managerial challenges. The state system, with its reliance on war as the ultimate arbiter of conflict is accepted as inevitable, and the ecological dangers engendered by industrial technological pressures are viewed as containable.

The system-reformers built their theories on the reform tradition of John Hobson, John Maynard Keynes and David Mitrany. They demanded that the global political economy should be efficiently and equitably managed through a series of institutional reforms. Their proposals for global reform were primarily with regard to inter-state social and political justice and inter-state economic well-being. However, the structural modifications, as they advocated would not alter the basic order of international relations pivoted around the role and predominance of the sovereign state. The system-reformers

\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{Richard A. Falk, “Contending Approaches to World Order” in Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Toward a Just World Order, op cit., p. 159.}
\footnote{ibid., pp. 159-160. Also see Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order, op cit., p.64.}
believe that greater international efficiency can be combined with greater international equity, greater international protection of national autonomy with greater international cooperation, greater international justice with greater international law and order.45

The system-reforming image of world order was linked to the liberal internationalist approach based on the notion of 'complex interdependence.' Subsumed under this category are Neo-Realists, Functionalists and Neo-Functionalists.46 One of the most influential works on regime research was *Power and Interdependence* by Keohane and Nye.47 The prime mover for system-reform was the Third World caucus on global developmental strategy popularly known as the Group of 77 (G-77). It had through the U.N. General Assembly and UNCTAD put forward the demand for New International Economic Order. Other good examples of the system-reforming image of world order were *RIO: Reshaping the International Order* and *North-South: A Program for Survival.*48

Whereas the system-reforming image of world order did not challenge the legitimacy or viability of the Westphalian state system, the system-transforming image was based on the belief that, dominated by inter-state rivalries, this system was inadequate to serve the interests of humanity in the present age. The neo-Marxist world system approach is one of the glaring examples of the system-transforming image of world order. Elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein, it envisioned; "a disintegration of the world capitalist system brought about by accelerating contradictions, on the one hand, and

45 Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for a Just World Order*, op cit., p.64.
46 ibid., p.65.
the coalition of the world’s anti-systemic forces – or what he calls ‘real worldwide inter-movement links’ – on the other.”

However, the most apt example of a system-transforming perspective was the World Order Models Project (WOMP). Samuel Kim pointed that whereas the “world the system image of system – transformation is grounded upon too narrow a value base” in Marxist theory,

the WOMP approach relates “oppression” to a broader category of social reality than the adverse effects of the international division of labor, placing greater emphasis on what it means to be treated as “a nuclear guinea pig” or as ecologically expendable. This world order theory also clarifies the preferred future by postulating values rather than by conceiving of the oppressed as automatic bearers of the normative content of the politics of transformation. World order theorists are more concerned than world system theorists with mapping structural alternatives to either world government or statism. The world system approach is essentially a depiction of the rise and fall of capitalism as a world force in the aftermath of the breakdown of feudalism; the WOMP approach is more concerned about discerning challenges and devising responses in short-term as well as long term spans.50

Kim defined World Order transformation as

a series of long term and largely irreversible changes and trends in the established values, norms and structure of international society, resulting in a new
pattern of relationship between its constituent units (actors).\textsuperscript{51}

Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz clarified further that:
System change does not necessarily mean political integration or centralization at the supranational level, much less "world government". It means a fundamental rearrangement of structure so that a different configuration of actors with different orientations towards power, security, well-being and governance will emerge.\textsuperscript{52}

WOMP Values in the larger philosophical context

In his \textit{The Quest for a Just World Order}, Samuel Kim defined the WOMP tasks as clarification of assumptions, diagnosis of the state of the world, exploratory forecasting of trends, normative forecasting of preferred futures, mapping transition strategies, and review and evaluation.\textsuperscript{53}

The WOMP participants wanted to build a 'preferred world' based on the four world order values, accepted by all of them even though the primacy accorded to these values varied from scholar to scholar. These four world order values were: peace, economic well-being, social and political justice and ecological balance.

In this section, we will analyse the anatomy of the preferences behind the "Preferred World" in WOMP and relate them to the larger philosophical domains in which these preferences are embedded. Any political theory is implicitly or explicitly based on certain epistemological and normative assumptions. While epistemological assumptions set the limits within which

\textsuperscript{51} ibid., p.17.
\textsuperscript{53} Samuel S. Kim, \textit{The Quest for a Just World Order}, op cit., p.309.
political enquiry takes place, the normative assumptions provide the basis for the criteria of relevance and significance of choosing research paths.

IV

The notion of ‘peace’ is one of the central concepts in political theory. However, theorists of different persuasions have defined peace differently.

Defining negatively, the Realist / neo-Realist school of thought saw peace as the prevention of war. Realists believed that the state was both immutable and irreplaceable as the principal actor in international relations. States were primarily preoccupied with questions of material interests, power and hegemony. The Realists, including the structural realists (like Morgenthau), and historical or practical realists (like Machiavelli, Carr) believed that a perennial struggle for power among states made permanent peace in international relations a virtual impossibility. Realists saw the best chances for peace in balance of power. The contemporary neo-Realists like Kenneth Waltz\textsuperscript{54} and John Mearsheimer\textsuperscript{55} too believed in this general framework of international relations. The ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis of Huntington considered the emergence of positive peace, based on legitimacy and authority, improbable because notions of what is legitimate vary from one civilisational area to another and a cross-cultural consensus on the question is impossible.\textsuperscript{56} However, as Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt argued, at the margins of Realism we find a form of liberal realism which rejects the pessimistic picture of historical and structural realists, believing that the state of war can be mitigated by the management of power by the


leading states in the system and the development of practices such as diplomacy and customary international law.⁵⁷

From the sixteenth century onwards, liberal theorists have proposed various plans for peace. However, liberals disagree on whether collective security, commerce, or world government should be employed to establish peace. We have already noted the need to distinguish three different strands of liberalism – liberal internationalists, idealists, and liberal institutionalists.

The liberal internationalists assumed that a natural order underpinned human society. They expected this natural harmony to deliver peace. They believed that the natural order had been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and their outdated policies such as the balance of power. The two leading liberal internationalists of the Enlightenment (in the 18th Century) were Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. Bentham famously argued that "between the interests of nations, there is no where any real conflict" and showed that many federal states "were able to transform their identity from one based on conflicting interests to a more peaceful federation."⁵⁸ Liberals based their optimism on "an extension of idea of social contract between individuals in domestic society to states in the international system, subjecting the states to a system of legal rights and duties."⁵⁹ They “believed that a law governed international society could emerge without a world government."⁶⁰ They believed that a more pacific form of international relations would evolve through commerce or travel between the peoples of the world.⁶¹

Idealism, the second strand of liberalism, believed that states could never settle their disputes by themselves. Idealists like Woodrow Wilson believed in collective security. They underlined the need for the construction

⁵⁷ Tim Dunne and Brian Schmidt, "Realism" in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, op cit., p.149.
⁵⁸ Bentham quoted in Tim Dunne, "Liberalism" in ibid., p.166.
⁵⁹ Tim Dunne, "Liberalism" in ibid., p.166.
⁶⁰ ibid.
⁶¹ ibid., p.170.
of an international order managed by an international organization. States must be bound by the rules and norms of such an international organization. These policies of the liberal idealists led to the formation of League of Nations in the 1920s and the United Nations in 1945.⁶²

The period of liberal idealists gradually came to a close with the collapse of the League of Nations. Liberal idealism gave way to liberal institutionalism in the 1940s. The liberal institutionalists emphasized the growing importance of the international institutions. The core concept was ramification: "co-operation in one sector would lead governments to extend the range of collaboration across other sectors. As states become more embedded in an integration process, the 'cost' of withdrawing from co-operative ventures increases."⁶³ Peace would be natural fallout of integration.

Neo-liberalism could again be differentiated into three strands: neo-liberal internationalism, neo-idealism, and neo-liberal institutionalism. The neo-liberal internationalists advanced the thesis of 'democratic peace' in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This thesis emphasized that liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states.⁶⁴ It essentially meant that a major source of peace is democracy. Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett were mainly associated with the 'Democratic peace' theory. Doyle pointed out, democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights, and transnational interdependence provide an explanation for the 'peace prone' tendencies of democratic states. Equally, the absence of these attributes, he argues, provides a reason why non-democratic states tend to be 'war-prone'. Without these domestic values and restraints the logic of power replaces the liberal logic of accommodation.⁶⁵

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⁶² ibid., pp.167-171.
⁶³ ibid., p.169.
⁶⁴ ibid., p.171.
Further, the “supporters of democratic peace ideas do not reject the insights of realism, but they reject ‘vulgar realisms’ and its preoccupation with the idea of war of all against all. They argue that internal norms and institutions matter.”66

The argument was taken further by another hypothesis put forward by Francis Fukuyama in 1989. In an article entitled ‘The End of History’ (1989) and later in the book The End of History and the Last Man (1992),67 Fukuyama contended that liberalism had become the dominant ideology with the collapse of the socialist bloc. Since most East European countries had opted for liberal democracy and market economies, it meant the beginning of a new phase in history “where liberal economic values would prevail globally.”68 Fukuyama’s theory was essentially based on three concrete arguments: “one about the pacific character of democracies; another about the integrative role played by multilateral institutions, and a third about the benign security consequences of global capitalism.”69

According to Tim Dunne:

Neo-idealists have responded to globalization by calling for a double democratization of both international institutions and domestic state structures. Radical neo-idealism is critical of mainstream liberalism’s devotion to ‘globalization from above’ which marginalizes the possibility of change from below through the practices of global civil society.70

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66 John Baylis, “International and global security in the post-cold war era” in ibid, p.263.
70 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism” in ibid., p.177.
Neo-liberalism, referred to as 'neo-liberal institutionalism', emerged primarily in response to Kenneth Waltz's theory of neo-realism elaborated in his *Theory of International Politics* (1979). The leading neo-liberal institutionalists like Axelrod, Keohane and Oye were specifically concerned with how cooperation could be initiated and maintained under conditions of anarchy. They suggested the creation of regimes in order to facilitate cooperation.\(^1\)

It is in this context that we can best understand the WOMP position on the value of 'Peace'. Most of the WOMP theorists had in the initial period conceptualised peace as 'absence of violence'. Richard Falk had discussed international law, nuclear disarmament and international organization in the context of war-prevention. However, from the early 1980s, WOMP scholars conceptualised the social, economic, cultural and environmental dimensions of peace. Going beyond the narrow notion of military security, they discussed varied aspects of social security, economic security, cultural diversity and environmental stability. Richard Falk believed that the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, repression and the escalation of large scale violence in many parts of the world were intrinsically related to militarism.\(^2\) The same argument was echoed by Rajni Kothari who also pointed to "non-military threats to peace arising out of the socio-economic and political process."\(^3\) Kothari believed that the concept of peace should be conceived as a new conception of life itself and not in a negative sense as negation of war.\(^4\) Kothari added that ensuring a more peaceful world had two major preconditions:

The first of these is the achievement of a world consisting of autonomous states that are in a position to

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\(^1\) ibid., pp.176-177.
\(^4\) ibid., p.46.
enjoy a much more meaningful equality of status than today; the second is the ability of these states to provide minimum living conditions for their peoples, which also entails a certain minimum of equality among them.\textsuperscript{75}

Ali Mazrui added a cultural dimension by pointing out that the problem of world peace is in the initial stages, a problem of domestic cultures and of relations between social groups in individual countries and of values governing those groups. It could be said that all international wars, have been, so far externalized civil deficiencies, both cultural and social. To solve the problem of international conflict therefore necessitates an attempt to tackle the causes of domestic tensions and domestic pathologies.\textsuperscript{76}

Mazrui pointed out that denial of social justice and economic welfare were more basic social determinants of social violence.\textsuperscript{77}

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All political philosophers and all major political ideologies — liberalism, neo-liberalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism as well as the liberal normative theorists of WOMP assume the value of economic well-being, but their interpretations differ widely from one another.

Liberals like J.S. Mill were the first to stress the need for a welfare state. Mill did not defend unqualified \textit{laissez faire} but argued that a just and orderly economic development was possible only if trade unions were allowed to operate, for that would ensure a balance between the bargaining powers of

\textsuperscript{75} ibid., p.59.
\textsuperscript{77} ibid., p.246.
the capitalists and their employers.\textsuperscript{78} It was Keynes, however, who built a comprehensive case for welfarism. He argued that capitalism had to be given a humane form in order to ensure its survival. Such a crucial thing as employment generation could not be left to whims of market forces. The state must ensure that levels of employment were satisfactorily maintained. If workers were unemployed, they must be given unemployment allowances. Keynes contended that full employment also led to higher growth rates. If workers were provided with better wages, they would wish to consume more, demand would increase, and both the capitalists and the workers would decide appropriate wages to maintain economic growth.\textsuperscript{79} The state must also undertake welfare oriented activities in the fields of health and education.

After the disintegration of the USSR, liberalism was increasingly replaced by neo-liberalism. For neo-liberals, free markets and free trade were of paramount importance in international politics for these promoted both peace and prosperity.\textsuperscript{80} Major trading states like the US and its G-8 partners, global financial institutions as well as multinational corporations had widely promoted the neo-liberal ideology in the underdeveloped countries of the Third World.

World System and dependency theorists, on the other hand, continue to point out the imbalanced nature of the international political economy. They divided the world into core, periphery and semi-periphery and believed that the core drained away all the wealth from the periphery in an exploitative relationship. This resulted in the core regions becoming richer, while the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions became increasingly poorer.\textsuperscript{81} Marxists and neo-Marxists thus saw economic well-being only in the defeat of global capitalism.

\textsuperscript{78} Subrata Mukherjee and Sushila Ramaswamy, \textit{A History of Political Thought : Plato to Marx}, New Delhi, Prentice Hall of India, 1999, p.322.

\textsuperscript{79} J.M. Keynes, \textit{The Economic Consequences of the Peace}, London, Macmillan, 1919.

\textsuperscript{80} Steven L. Lamy, “Contemporary mainstream approaches : neo-realist and neo-liberalism” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., \textit{The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations}, op cit., p.188.

\textsuperscript{81} Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, “Marxist Theories of International Relations” in ibid., pp.205-208.
Initially, the WOMP theorists did not give primacy to the value of economic well-being. It was only in the decade of 1970s that this value also emerged as one of the priority concern of the WOMP social theorists. Underlying Falk's discussion of issues such as the gap between the rich and the poor, income thresholds: minima and maxima, profitability versus minimum standards of human dignity, national economic development, etc. underlined this shift. In the 1990s, Falk advocated a people-centric economic approach to globalisation. He counterposed 'globalization from below' against 'globalization-from-above' in order to eliminate global poverty and to secure the economic well-being of the peoples of the world.

Rajni Kothari focussed on economic well-being especially of the peoples of the Third World. He advocated genuine democratization of economic structures at the national and transnational levels and proposed that the world be restructured into economically self-reliant federations of nation-states.

Kothari raised some fundamental normative questions with regard to the theory of development. Conventional theories of development rationalised policies which served structures of state security and promoted exclusive lifestyle of ruling elites, while the basic aim of economic development ought to be removal of poverty, and ensuring basic minimum living standards for all. Kothari proposed an 'Alternative Model of Development' to achieve the socially approved minima of health, education, drinking water and public transportation for all. He emphasised agriculture and rural development in order to remove unemployment and to bridge the gap between the city and

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the countryside. He also called for an ethic, both of production and consumption.  

Ali Mazrui believed that the process of modernization, especially the modernization of economic culture, would be the key to ensuring economic well-being. There was a need to restructure economic relationships in such a manner that there would not be any violent revolution. Rather than altogether abolishing classes, increased mobility among domestic classes ought to be promoted.

Samuel Kim talked about two dimensions of global inequities – human and national. He pointed out the failure of liberal capitalist international order, as global interdependence and global inequality continued to persist. The integration of the Third World into the capitalist world economy had resulted in its pauperization and peripheralization. He argued that the Bretton Woods post-war economic order perpetuated the established pattern of overdevelopment-underdevelopment, dominance-dependence, and centre-periphery relations.

Kim argued that distributive justice could not be realized unless the poorest countries and the worst-off group participated in the national decision making process at the global level. The movement built around the demand for New International Economic Order had forcefully “highlighted the national dimensions of global inequities in access to capital, markets, resources and technology”. Kim believed that state was the only organization which could promote general economic well-being and fulfill the Basic Human Needs (BHN). However, states sometimes promoted only urban-centred class

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88 ibid, p.193.
89 ibid, p.150.
interests. In the establishment of an equitable economic order, there were also some systemic structural constraints.\textsuperscript{90}

\textbf{VI}

The value of ‘socio-political justice’ was expounded by the liberals, neo-liberals, communitarians, Marxists as well as the eminent social theorists of WOMP.

Liberal notion of political justice demands first and foremost:
the establishment of democratic institutions in the political life of the community so that these institutions represent and take care of the interests of the people, not of any privileged class.\textsuperscript{91}

Political justice entailed the establishment of representative institutions – the legislature and executive on the principle of universal adult franchise, and maintaining the independence of the judiciary. “In the second place, political justice implies a full guarantee of the liberty of thought and expression, especially the right to criticise the government and its policies. Finally, there should be complete freedom for forming associations and interest groups to enable the citizens to articulate their interests through the normal channels of communication and through political parties as well as to express their approval or disapproval of particular measures, to organise peaceful protests against harmful measures, and to pressurise the working of the government through democratic channels and procedures. In a nutshell political justice postulates a universal availability of the mechanism for resolving the conflicting claims of different interests in society.”\textsuperscript{92}

The classical liberals attacked absolute state and arbitrary authority. Constitutional restraints, representative government and individual rights were some of their major demands. The Glorious Revolution in England was the

\textsuperscript{90} ibid, p.193.
\textsuperscript{91} O.P. Gauba, \textit{An Introduction to Political Theory}, New Delhi, Macmillan, 1995, p.281.
\textsuperscript{92} ibid, p.281.
first liberal revolution which resulted in the victory of the idea of popular sovereignty over royal sovereignty. It resulted in the establishment of a limited constitutional monarchy. John Locke was the first to formulate the principle of a constitutional government.93 Others like Bentham and James Mill wanted to abolish distinctions and discriminations based on race, ethnic origin or gender and ensure equal dignity for all individuals. They advocated the idea of universal suffrage. Possession of property as a condition for political rights was sought to be removed.94 Modern liberals like. Green, Hobhouse and Laski wanted the state to play a positive role in protecting the interests of the poor and deprived sections of the society. They envisaged welfare state as a way of ensuring social-justice.95

Within the liberal tradition itself, there are variations in the interpretation of socio-political justice. The libertarians or the neo-liberals have tried to revert to laissez-faire philosophy. Libertarians like Hayek, Friedman and Nozick believed that free market was the only way to ensure full autonomy and freedom of the individual. They believed that laissez-faire capitalism would ensure social progress.96 Nozick argued that “a libertarian society, which allows all individuals and groups to shape their life according to their wishes, fulfils the most plausible definition of a utopian social order.”97 The neo-idealist liberal did not accept that market could be relied upon either for allocation of resources or for generation of employment opportunities. They therefore emphasized not just macro-institutional democratic reforms, but also ‘grass-roots’ democratization.98

The value of social and political justice was also embedded in Marxist political theory. Marx believed that these values could be realised only in a classless and stateless society. Justice of any kind was impossible in a class

93 ibid., pp.328-329.
94 ibid., p.329.
95 ibid., p.337.
96 ibid., pp.337-338.
97 Robert Nozick quoted in ibid., p.338.
divided society, where relations of only domination and subordination could exist between antagonistic classes. Class struggle was the only means to ensure social progress.

Antonio Gramsci, an early twentieth century Marxist thinker, focussed on subtler forms of class domination because of which consent for a particular social and political system was produced and reproduced. The ruling classes often managed to so disperse their moral, political and cultural values throughout the society that subordinate groups and classes would also accept these values as their own. Dominant ideologies got so entrenched in the institution of civil society that the subordinate group would never question their authority. Gramsci called such subtle forms of domination ‘hegemony’ and emphasized that a ‘counter hegemonic struggle’ had to be initiated in order to challenge the ruling class. 99

Critical theory which emerged out of the work of the Frankfurt School dealt with issues of ‘emancipation’. 100 In this regard, its theorists like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas made penetrating analyses of “culture, bureaucracy, social basis and nature of authoritarianism and the structure of the family”. 101

WOMP theorists followed a liberal approach. Whereas, western scholars like Richard Falk laid stress on issues like human rights, others like Rajni Kothari looked at the value of social and political justice from a Third World perspective.

In his later writings, Falk raised a crucial question: “How do we balance the greater economic and social equity of socialist polities with greater cultural and intellectual openness of capitalists nations?” 102 He outlined five categories of rights for purposes of inquiry, reflection and policy recommendation: (1) basic human needs; (2) basic decencies; (3)
participatory rights; (4) security rights; and, (5) humane governance. He argued that even materially advanced societies suffered from ‘normative regression’ and ‘invisible oppression’ in environmental and cultural areas.

Falk lamented that in most Asian countries, the native groups allied with the colonial exploitation had “held onto political power, stifling social progress and economic reform.” Therefore, a post-independence revolutionary struggle was required for “wresting political control from traditional ruling classes and instituting a mass based programme of land-reform, education, public hygiene, social equality and radical consciousness.”

In the post-Cold War era, Falk started emphasising the role of new social movements. He identified the two contradictory and antagonistic forces within globalization. While “globalization from above” was led by powerful states and transnational business, “globalization from below” required an array of transnational social forces animated by environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of human community based on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, humiliation and collective violence.

Falk used the concept of ‘humane governance’ to stress the need for achieving comprehensive rights for all peoples. Humane governance, Falk pointed out:

emphasizes people-centred criteria of success, as measured by declines in poverty, violence, and pollution

106 ibid.
108 ibid., p.39.
and by increasing adherence to human rights and constitutional practices, especially in relation to vulnerable segments of society as well as by axiological shifts away from materialist/consumerist and patriarchal conceptions of human fulfillment.\textsuperscript{109}

He concluded that democracy was both a means to humane governance as well as a feature of its embodiment.\textsuperscript{110}

Rajni Kothari stressed the need for autonomy and self-reliance in order to realise justice in a world where there existed extremes of disparity and inequality both between and within nations.\textsuperscript{111} In order to create a just society, we need to move "towards a pluralist, decentralised polity with a humane technology and a relatively self-reliant economy, self-reliant for the people and not just for the state as has been the thinking on self-reliance till recently."\textsuperscript{112}

Both governmental and non-governmental actors would provide the basis of a new coalition of interests, which would be engaged in politics of global transformation.\textsuperscript{113} New grass-root social movements had gradually emerged to reflect the viewpoint of the deprived and marginalised sections. These movements, Kothari added, could produce a macro challenge, a general transformation through non-party political process.\textsuperscript{114}

Kothari pointed out that if the Third World countries adopted Western model of development and modernisation, they would lose their autonomy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} ibid., p.116 and p.239.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Rajni Kothari, \textit{Footsteps into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative}, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1974, p.113.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Rajni Kothari, \textit{State against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance}, Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1986, p.70.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Rajni Kothari, "Towards a Just World" in Richard Falk, Samuel S.Kim and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., \textit{Toward a Just World Order}, op cit., p.601.
\end{itemize}
and would not be able to provide political justice to their citizens. Kothari suggested an alternative approach and outlined some major policy initiatives in it. Some of the major imperatives were:

- Economic self-reliance,
- national (or regional) security,
- distributive economic policy (with special reference to the agricultural hinterland),
- insitutionalisation of social democracy for achieving the integration of centre and periphery and establishing the authenticity of the national political culture.

Ali Mazrui also elaborated on political justice but from a cultural perspective. He examined the "post colonial tensions of political and cultural adjustment, especially as illustrated in Africa." There was a need to address the violence which accompanied processes of convergence in situations of asymmetry between cultural donor and cultural recipients. Problems of fragile institutions and of fragmented identity had been responsible for much of political upheaval in Africa.

VII

It was only in the 1970s that theorists took into cognizance the increasing menace of environmental degradation. Thereafter, it is only in the recent times that 'ecological balance' has become one of the key issues in international relations.

The 1960s witnessed the first general concern for the human environment and the "limits to growth" thesis gained acceptability. However, the environmental issues entered into the agenda of global politics only after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm,

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116 ibid., pp. 131-132.
in 1972. Thereafter, there were many UN Conferences on environment
related issues, but the last and the most effective summit was the Rio de
Janeiro Earth Summit held in 1992.

Dennis Pirages elaborated an ecopolitical theory of international
relations. The epistemological and normative implications of this ecopolitical
revolution could be compared with those of the earlier agricultural and
industrial revolutions. "Highlighting all the anomalies and dilemmas, as well as
the irrelevance of the prevailing realist school, Pirages advanced an
ecopolitical paradigm as an 'alternative model of reality' for describing,
explaining, and projecting shifts in world politics. Because of its planetary
scope, survivalist ethics, functional approach, and futurist time dimension, this
ecopolitical paradigm is congenial to world order studies."118

Rajni Kothari pointed out that there were two schools of ecologists. The
first school was "the eco-development school of ecologists, who are
concerned with making development both environmentally viable and socially
equitable."119 The second school of ecologists believed in pure and simple
conservation "with little or no regard either for the cause underlying today's
runaway technology and its ravaging of the environment, or for the need for
planning for the future which, while providing for the basic necessities of all,
would ensure an ecologically sustainable strategy of growth."120

It was gradually realised that there existed a mutually complementary
relationship between the two world order values of economic well-being and
ecological balance. Rajni Kothari, elaborating on this aspect, had argued:

This symbiotic relationship between environmental and
socioeconomic goals is becoming increasingly
recognized by world order advocates, and is leading to
the formulation of new development strategies that are

118 Dennis Pirages quoted in Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Ecological
Balances – Introduction" in Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds.,
Toward a Just World Order, op cit., p.437.
120 ibid., p.108.
In 1972, Richard Falk, one of the major Western WOMP theorist, for the first time discussed at length the ecological perspective of world order. He tried to show the contradiction between statist and the ecological imperatives. The world system had been dominated by territorially organised sovereign states ever since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In competitive pursuit of power and wealth, states had recklessly exploited resources located within their territories. Colonial exploitation had worsened the situation even more. Wars, population explosion, poverty, and ever rising material aspirations had lead to unbearable environmental overload.\footnote{Richard Falk, \textit{This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival}, New York, Vintage Books, 1971, pp.21-23, pp.37-43, pp.104-213.}

Falk designed a new ecological perspective on world order to achieve three main ends: peace and equity among humans; harmony between humans and nature; and regard for the future of the earth and the future generations of men.\footnote{ibid., p.xiii.} He was mostly concerned with the international setting of the planetary crisis and concentrated upon the changes that were needed in the structure of the world society to maintain the harmony of the planet.

Falk proposed and developed the idea of “ecological politics, whose essence is a political embodiment of man-in-nature, as the ideological underpinning for an adequate conception of world order.”\footnote{ibid., p.21.} “Pluralism, zones of autonomy, diversity of lifestyle, culture and ideology are all values that could be emphasized in a system of world order suitable for the ecological age.”\footnote{ibid., p.35.}

Samuel Kim pointed out that global environment consisted of two separate but closely intertwined and interacting subsystems – the natural environment and the social environment. While the natural environment

\footnote{Rajni Kothari, “Environment and Alternative Development”, \textit{Alternatives}, Vol.5, No.4, 1980.}
included “the atmosphere, marine and terrestrial environments”; “the environmental impacts of such human activities as population growth, resource use and militarization constituted the social environment.”

He argued, “the ecological crisis is much more than a crisis of external ecospheric limits.”

The exploitative and unjust social structures of domestic and international societies were the root cause of the ecological crisis.

Kim had identified the anti-ecological use of modern technology to exploit and consume scarce resources as one of the principal cause of the ecological crisis. He further added:

there are two kinds of socioecological pollution: the pollution of over-development (affluence) and the pollution of underdevelopment (poverty). The latter is also caused by unjust social structures, for peasants whose land has been preempted for cash crops end up cultivating marginal soil, contributing to further deforestation and soil erosion. Both forms of socio-ecological pollution are linked by the invisible hands of the global dominance / dependence system.

Thus, the quest for a just world order obviously included the quest for a more decent environment. Kim observed:

ecological thinking and world order thinking converge in their transnational and transdisciplinary framework of inquiry informed by values, holism, futurism, and humanism, and in their prescriptive commitment to social transformation for survival and solidarity with future generations.

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127 ibid., p.245.
128 ibid., p.250.
129 ibid., pp.250-251.
130 ibid., p. 250.