CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is in the very nature of philosophical inquiry concerning human condition that a closure is moved only arbitrarily. Most of the issues involved in the understanding of human actions have been of such perennial interest that they necessitate reformulation and reconsideration time and again from alternative perspectives. This awareness is enough of a warning against eluding oneself that one has hit upon some final conclusions. Hence, this inquiry can only end up in a recognition of the need to begin all over again.

This study has aimed at two things: (i) an elucidation of the concept of action; and (ii) in view of that elucidation, to consider the appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain models of explanation that are prevalent in contemporary social sciences. However, an examination of the value and validity of social sciences in studying those social facts which are not actions, though they may have emerged from intended or unintended consequences of actions, was not the aim of this study. The primary focus of this study was on the nature of human action and its explanation rather than on social, psychological and neuro-physiological factors which constitute the very conditions for the performance.
of actions. It is recognized that these conditions do exercise an influence over the ways in which a person acts. Nevertheless, it is denied that these conditions by themselves determine the actions as such.

At this stage, it would not be out of place to reiterate the seminal influence of the ideas of Marx, Sartre and Wittgenstein, in the understanding of the human condition, as alluded to in the introduction. Whether these ideas have been formally discussed in the dissertation or not, they have provided a direction, if there is any, to this inquiry. The influence of Marx must be acknowledged for pointing out that human situation, i.e., socio-cultural institutions and the values that inform them, is not ontologically given but created and reinforced (also reified) by human beings in and through their praxis in history. The dilemmas of being human which are faced (evaded more frequently) at an experiential level have been identified and focussed by Sartre in terms of an inter-play of choices, decisions, bad-faith, inauthenticity and commitment. Wittgenstein has shown the significance of understanding the nature of language and forms of life in clarifying the conceptual presuppositions that underlie unexamined in our ordinary discourse about actions. Concept of action as analysed in this dissertation owes a great deal to the ideas and approaches of these thinkers.
The study of human action in contemporary social sciences has been guided by the pattern of the study of natural phenomena in the physical sciences. The basic fallacy has been to consider the socio-cultural realm as similar to the natural realm and to understand the dynamics of social processes with the methodological tools of physical sciences. The elusive hope was that laws of society could be discovered in the same way as physical sciences discover laws of nature. Consequently, the deterministic bias of the natural science has been so pervasive in most of the contemporary social studies that a set of mechanistic, causal theories have been constructed with a view to explaining why people act in the manner they do. It is assumed that social, psychological, and neurophysiological factors function as antecedent determinants of human actions. The tacit presuppositions of such theories have been identified with a view to showing the inherent weaknesses of a mechanistic deterministic perspective for understanding actions. It is suggested that a praxiological approach which views human beings as conscious subjects, influencing and being influenced by the conditions in which they find themselves, is a necessary pre-requisite for an adequate understanding of human actions.

An analysis of the concept of action has shown that the concepts of belief, choice, intention, norms
and values are so central to any description of action that it is not possible to describe actions in the same way as we can describe events. Since the concept of 'action' cannot be assimilated within the concept of 'event' due to its normative character, it would be inappropriate to expect that value-neutral descriptions could be given of all actions. Once it is recognised that values enter into the realm of action, then it is not difficult to see that rational explanations are essential for understanding actions. Human beings, unlike natural objects in that they are self-conscious beings who can transcend the given, here and now, and attempt to realise the ideals that they visualise or are committed to. The relationship between the ends which they pursue and the actions that they perform (in pursuit of those ends) is not a causal one. It is only human beings who are capable of reckoning with their conditions and devising ways to overcome them. Therefore, to look upon them as mere victims of their conditions and to treat them as objects can be only a way of completing the circle; man first saw nature in his own image and now is trying to see himself in the image of nature. This way of looking at oneself can only be dehumanising and alienating and cannot provide an adequate understanding of what makes us human as distinct from objects and other animals.