CHAPTER - I

REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described the institution of state as 'a divine march on the earth' and believed that it was "the final embodiment of spirit on the earth" and that there could be "no spiritual evolution beyond the state, anymore than there can be any physical evolution beyond man". The marxists, on the other hand, look from a historical perspective on state and prophesy that after the proletariat revolution [when the society becomes classless], the institution of state, in Frederick Engels' famous phrase, would 'wither away' - paving the way for a classless and stateless society. But a careful analysis of the post Second World War scenario reveals that belying the 'scientific' prophesies of these philosophers, the institution of state has neither 'withered away' nor has it proved to be the 'final spiritual evolution'. On the contrary, due to lack of self-sufficiency of modern states and resultant increasing interdependence of mankind, the evolution of state continues and the concept of nation-state, at least on the face of it, seems to be on its way to become an anachronism. One clear manifestation of this

1. C.L. Wayper, Political Thought (New Delhi, 1983), p. 163.
development is the growth of phenomenon of regionalism in international relations.

Indeed, the growth of regionalism seems to be one of the most outstanding and baffling developments in the post-Second World War international relations both in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. There have emerged a number of regional organisations of varied nature and scope. However, it should not be inferred that such regional activity was totally unknown in the previous annals of history. On the contrary, regional arrangements among states are not entirely a new phenomenon. For example, Greek history clearly shows that there existed a number of regional organisations in the form of Amphictyomic Leagues. Though to begin with the raison d'être of these leagues was the protection of the common temples belonging to various Greek tribes and were, thus, non-political in nature, nevertheless they provided an impetus to and served as models for the later political leagues. Taking a cue from these leagues, the Greek city-states, in order to promote cooperation among themselves and seek security vis-a-vis non-Greek states, established many other leagues, such as the Peloponnesian, Thessalian, Aetolian, Lycian, the Achaean League each of which endured for more than a century—in some

cases much longer.

Thus, beginning with Greek Leagues, regional arrangements continued throughout the middle ages and provided an important mechanism for the states to achieve certain common objectives. However, in the modern history, with the conceptualization and practical establishment of sovereign states, and mounting interdependence of mankind, the compulsion for regional coalescence assumed a new form and greater urgency. Therefore, the modern history, especially the nineteenth century history, provides numerous examples of regional experiments among states, and political scientists, more precisely, the students of international organizations have endeavoured to describe, analyse and explain the dynamics of such organisations. But it should be noted that until the Second World War, notwithstanding the progress achieved towards regional coalescence, these attempts were, in essence, rudimentary, sporadic, uncoordinated and often ephemeral. Thus, Second World War may be considered a rough benchmark for mushroom growth of regional organisations and the period ensuing after Second World War rightly be called an era of regional cooperation in international relations. During this period,


there has not only been a surprising increase in the number of regional organisations, they also differ from the pre-Second World War regional organisations in many fundamental respects.

First, the pre-Second World War regional organisations were motivated primarily by security orientations. But now there is an increased and discernible emphasis on socioeconomic, scientific, and cultural cooperation among members of such regional organisations. Second, while the earlier regional organisations, by and large, revolved around Great Powers, resulting in the establishment of the paramountcy of that power in the region [the provisions of the treaties ensuring 'equality of nations' notwithstanding], most of the regional organisations in the present day international relations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SARRC), Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) etc. are based on de-facto 'equality of partners'. Third, regional arrangements, in the past, were confined mainly to Europe for the basic reason that most of the remaining world was under the colonial yoke. The post-Second World War dismantling of colonial 'Leviathan' and

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7 Of course, before the Second World War, some functional organisations such as International Postal Union (IPU), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health Organisation (WHO) etc. were established at International level, but for regional organisations, security had primarily been raison d'être.

8 K.M. Pannikar, "Regionalism and World Security", *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), vol. 2, n. 2, (May 1946), p. 120.
consequent emergence of newly liberated countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America has given a powerful fillip to the phenomenon of regionalism in international relations.

**Problem of Definition**

Given the premise that in the present day international relations, regional organisations have come to play such a vital role in the web of socio-economic, political and security interests of nations, a question that naturally assumes importance, is the problem of defining a region or a regional organisation. Region connotes different things to different people. It has been such an elusive term and that even after examining it from different angles one is left with a feeling that one has not really grasped it. In fact, the problem of defining a region or a regional organisation seems to be as old as the phenomenon of regionalism itself. It has confronted and vexed the minds of social scientists and has been a substantive bone of academic contention and interpretation. Various attempts have, in the past, been made to provide a precise and universally acceptable definition to a 'region' at different forums, albeit without any fruitful results. For example, in the late 1930's substantial research was done on the subject in the United States under the sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council and the National Committee to delineate regions of the world but without positive results. Similarly, diplomatic endeavours to define regional
arrangements both under the aegis of the League of Nations and the United Nations foundered because of disparate political interests and perceptions. For example, at the San Francisco Conference on International Organisation in 1945, Egyptian diplomats pressed for a definition of a regional organisation that clearly resembled the Arab League (based on cultural factor), while American delegates demanded a definition of regional organisation that would clearly bolster support to the Inter-American System [based on geo-strategic considerations] without giving much leeway to the organisations such as the Arab League. Similarly, the former Soviet Union, till the recent past, had consistently refused to recognize North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] as a legitimate regional organisation.

Thus, against this backdrop, it is least surprising that to provide a universally or even broadly acceptable definition to a regional organisation has proved to be a herculean task. In fact, there are numerous intriguing issues involved which plague our efforts to define a regional organisation in a universally acceptable manner.

Foremost, the difficulty to precisely define a regional organisation arises because there is a semantic confusion and fuzziness about the concept of a region itself. The concept of a region, for all practical purposes, seems to be

vague and amorphous, and the only consensus among scholars regarding it, clearly is on its ambiguity. The reason for the ambiguity is that regions can be and have been defined from geographical, geo-political, geo-strategical, ideological, cultural, sociological, economic viewpoints and so on. But which criteria should we follow for defining a region for the study of international regions and why? Should the concept of a region be based on relations germane or distinctive to a particular geographical area? These, in fact, are some of the vital questions which not only render fuzziness to the concept of a region but also hinder its precise definition. Armstrong raises certain interesting issues in this context. For example, he poses a question i.e., focus of power is there in Africa or Southeast Asia or the Middle East? Further, he argues that when we devise a region to fit one set of requirement, it does not hold for another, and may be still less valid in the foreseen circumstances. To quote him verbatim:

What-not approximately, but exactly, in the sense that this nation is in and that notion is not - do we mean by 'West Europe'? What in this exact sense is the 'North Atlantic Community'? or 'Southeast Asia'? Begin regarding nations into groups - put Canada or Portugal or Italy or Greece or Australia or Iran 'here' and not 'there', and the contradictions and dangers of the attempt become obvious... The quandary in which one attempts at arbitrary allotment placed on the Scandinavian countries is a warning against

10 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Regional Pacts : Strong Points or Storm Cellars", Foreign Affairs (New York),
looking on a living international fabric as a paper map which can be cut to suit the pagination of a book of Geography written in accordance with some particular theory.

11 In fact, regions are relative. We neither have well-defined or absolute naturally determined regions nor is there, as a noted jurist and a former judge of International Court of Justice, Alejandro Alvarez remarks, any rule to determine regions. The concept of a region essentially differs depending upon the criterion or criteria one uses to define it. Further, the delineation of regions is often influenced not only by geographical but also by political and strategic considerations. Highlighting this, Jacob and Atherton cogently observe:

In fact, political rather than geographical ties have determined most groupings. The "Regional" security organisations encompass states widely scattered over the globe. Some groups paradoxically do not include states that are geographically at the heart of the region. Consequently, these arrangements are more aptly described as instruments for selective, rather than regional security. They may unite any combination of states in "collective self-defense" regardless of geographic location.

13 Thus, it seems that delineation of regions is essentially perceived as a subjective exercise. Relevant

11 Ibid., p. 359. Emphasis added.
Regional boundaries vary with different purposes and purposes differ from country to country, and more often than not, are ephemeral. Of course, an attempt can be made to identify and determine various international regions and delineate their respective boundaries empirically by an analysis of certain usually agreed upon multiple indices such as geographical proximity, cultural homogeneity, common interest perceptions, mutual transactions and other interdependencies, but in this case too, agreement on such an identification and perforation of a region would ultimately depend upon political decisions.

Academic authors have also used the term region and regional organisation in a loose and variety of ways. One is perplexed by an argument put forward by some scholars that regional category is broad enough to include all limited member organisations, whether or not they are genuinely regional in the sense that they consist of the states which are geographically proximate. Similarly, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines 'regions in the international sphere' as consisting of "a group of states possessing a common culture, common political interests, and often a formal organisation".


Obviously, this perception of a region does not take into account geographical contiguity as an essential ingredient of a region. Thus, following this viewpoint of a region, the Commonwealth of Nations, whose members are virtually scattered throughout the world can be considered to be as much a regional organisation as the Nordic Council. In other words, according to this perspective, a regional organisation signifies any interstate transactions among more or less culturally and politically homogeneous states having less than global participation. This open-ended usage of the term clearly indicates the existence of fairly wide spectrum of perceptions embraced by the rubric region. But it should be emphasised here that a conception of a region that abandons geographical contiguity as an essential ingredient "opens up the possibility that any entities related to each other with respect to one or more attributes will meet the requirement for consideration as a region. This leads to a situation in which the term "region" is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless."

In certain other quarters, the term region is employed to refer to geographically contiguous states but there is lack of agreement on the degree and percentage of contiguity.


required, and hence arbitrary limits of geographical regions are prescribed.

The problem of defining a region is further confounded due to the overlapping of regions, i.e., when some states are members of two or more regional organisations belonging to different regions. For example, some North African countries viz., Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya etc. belong to Organisation for African Unity (OAU) but they are also members of the Arab League which draws its majority of the partners from the Middle East. Thus, it seems that in case of OAU, it is the territorial contiguity and common race which bring these countries together, while their membership of the Arab League is primarily the result of their felt cultural affinity with the Middle East Arab countries.

In view of the overlapping of regions and existence of 'regional' organisations which transcend regional boundaries, a question that naturally arises is: what exactly is the role of geographical factor in the delineation of regions? In other words, should geographical contiguity be treated as the sole factor responsible for guiding the behaviour of states towards regionalism? While it seems true that geographical proximity does generate some degree of homogeneity and common outlook among states and that the "neighbouring states with common background and objectives are most ideally suited as partners in a regional arrangement since similar ideological and governmental
institutions contribute tangibly to the successful regional structure", geographical proximity alone should not be singled out as the determining factor for regionalism. As Padelford and Lincoln rightly observe:

Organized cooperation does not necessarily thrive simply because geographers have referred to a particular part of globe as a region. The cultural and political affinities of states that exist in an area, the measure of trust and communication, the consensus on values and objectives among them are significant along with geographical propinquity.

Thus viewed, the phenomenon of regionalism in international relations seems to be a multidimensional concept and its definitional pursuit clearly requires a multivariate analysis of the practical implications involved in the concept.

Russett, by and large, follows this approach. In his attempt to examine the possible criteria for perforating international regions, he uses a variety of quantitative methods. He holds that geographical contiguity alone cannot be relied upon as the sole criterion for determining a region because the perception of what constitutes a region.

to a great extent, is not influenced by geographical proximity alone but by various considerations, including political interests. He, in this context, emphatically says that "there is no region or aggregate of national units that can be in the very sense of boundary congruence be identified as a sub-system of international system". Thus, in view of the limited utility of geographical criterion, Russett relies upon behavioural method of data-analysis and uses multiple variables to determine regions and perforate their boundaries on the basis of the degree of relatedness that may be discerned among nations. But before attempting it, he deals with and analyses at least six such criteria offered by fellow regional theorists. These are:

(i) Geographic isolation; (ii) social, cultural and economic homogeneity i.e., "a relative large degree of homogeneity measured by a relatively large number of purposes or classifications"; (iii) interdependence i.e., "areas within which a high degree of mutual dependence exists than in relationships outside that area modes where people are bound together by mutual dependence arising out of common interests"; (iv) loyalties or patriotism - a natural corollary of interdependence and means "an area of

21 Ibid., p. 191.
which inhabitants instinctively feel themselves as a part; (v) an areal unit defined by an adhoc problem e.g., Southeast Asia's claim to regional status with many Americans is simply because of the threat posed to the whole area by communist powers; and (vi) finally, a device for effective control e.g., the term Middle East seems to have originated by the British in the nineteenth century to refer to an area with common implications for Her Majesty's strategy.

After having examined the various criteria mentioned by other scholars, Russett sets forth his own five variables which, according to him, might prove useful in identifying international regions and perforating their boundaries. These are: cultural similarity, common political orientations, institutional membership, transaction flows, and proximity. A proposed region is accepted as such if it attains a certain minimum score when measured quantitatively against these criteria. Thus, by applying these set of criteria to different areas, Russett tries to build up a model on the basis of which regions can be delineated.

Due credit must be given to Russett for having made an honest, nay, valiant attempt to identity with dexterity.


certain indices, which may help in delineating international regions. But contrary to one's expectations, as the very title of the book review of Russett's forecited work by Young also indicates, in his endeavours to define a region, Russett appears to be an "Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor". To put it in the baldest terms, the concept of a region is comparable to a naked emperor which simply cannot be clothed.

To substantiate our argument, it may be noted that the criteria mentioned by Russett may not be found in the areas which are normally identified as regions. For example, Middle East is considered a region, but there are in this region - Arab countries (e.g., Iraq, Syria etc.), Non-Arab countries (e.g., Iran), and above all a Jew country viz. Israel. And what makes the problem even more complex is that it is difficult to identify Middle East itself. As a regional theorist questions, "Does it (Middle East) extend from Morocco to Pakistan or should the line be drawn somewhere between? What do we do about Israel which though right in the middle of any geographic delimitation of the region, still does not fit by any cultural criteria? Or Turkey, which - in part is physically on the European

26 Young, n. 17, pp. 486-511.

27 For example see, Lenczowski, who argues that politically, culturally and ethnically, the Middle-East may be divided into two 'regions' viz.,: the Northern Belt (Non-Arab Countries) and the Arab Core. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (New York, 1956), p. xix.
Moreover, the recent Gulf war and the different stands taken by the Middle East countries - varying from neutrality (e.g., Iran) to active alignment (e.g., Turkey, Saudi Arabia etc.) with the United States led United Nations Peace Keeping Forces against Iraq clearly reveal that notwithstanding whatever socio-economic, religious, and cultural homogeneity which the Middle East countries profess, these nations have disparate interest perceptions. This, to a great extent, blasts Russett's thesis which considers common political orientations, social, cultural and economic homogeneity as important indices of a region. In other words, by following Russett's set of variables for identifying a region, the Middle East does not seem to qualify as a region.

However, it should be said to the credit of Russett that he is, perhaps one of the earliest regional theorists to employ non-geographical indices in determining various regions and perforating their boundaries. The earlier scholars almost invariably relied on geographical factor as the basic criterion for determining regions or sub-

27a Davidson, n. 25, pp. 182-83.

Thus, the foregoing analysis of the concept of a region clearly reveals that due to numerous problems involved in the definitional pursuit of a region, the concept is semantically amorphous in nature and is likely to remain so in the near future. Consequently, no two scholars agree on as to what precisely constitutes a region or which criteria or variables should we employ in determining a region. It seems true that the world does not easily fit into neatly perforated regions. As Hartshrone emphatically points out, "any regional division is not a true picture of reality, but is an arbitrary device of the student ... depending upon what elements appear to him as most significant". Thus, partly due to lack of agreement among scholars as to which set of criteria or indices should be chosen from an apparently infinite universe to define the concept of a region and partly because of wide gap between theoretical analysis and practical considerations that influence the determination and perforation of a region, the regional theorists who continue to unsuccessfully grapple with the concept in their attempt to provide a "definitional clothing" to a region seem to be more or less like prisoners in Plato's parables of the cave, watching shadows with the belief that they are the real world.

However, notwithstanding an apparent confusion in the concept of a region and corresponding difficulties involved

in the pursuit of defining a region, some scholars have devoted themselves to the exploratory venture of defining a "regional organisation". For example, Ghali 30 approaches the study of regionalism as a political sociologist and draws insights from both disciplines to enlighten one's understanding of the structure of regional organisations.

He regards regional groups as composed of a mixture of 'necessary' and 'sufficient' elements, and attempts to provide the 'anatomy' of a regional system i.e., the ingredients which are required for constituting a successful regional system. These elements, according to him, are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The reason for this, as Ghali explains, is that a regional system that depends upon a single element of solidarity "will be condemned to failure to the extent (that) they are not based on different elements which are interconnected". 31

The "necessary elements" include:

(a) legal : a treaty for the maintenance of peace ;
(b) sociological : a treaty based on a particular sociological solidarity embracing racial or ethnic affinities, economic cooperation, mutual defense ;
(c) geographic : contiguity of member states ; and
(d) institutional : an international agency of a permanent character.

31 Ibid., p. 17.
In addition to these necessary elements, regional organisations require for their success, the following "sufficient elements":

(a) legal equality of member states;
(b) free-adhesion; and
(c) more than five signatories.

According to Ghali, the various elements of sociological solidarity constitute the structure upon which are superimposed provisions for pacific settlement, use of force, juridical structure, and economic and social cooperation. Regional solidarity is further defined in terms of three aspects viz., a series of primary elements existing prior to any human will such as the belief in a bond of imaginary race and belongingness to a similar complex history; and existence of a given geographical situation; and certain consciousness of group sentiment that dominates in times of crisis.

Further, in the discussion of geographical contiguity as a pre-requisite for regional cooperation, a distinction is made between 'direct contiguity' and 'interposition'. In the latter case, a number of states have a common interest in a region but are themselves not contiguous with each other. Ultimately, regions are defined politically i.e.,

32. Ibid., p. 18.
33. Ibid.
on the basis of power capabilities of states. The reason for this is that while natural barriers may separate one region from another, they have not prevented states from establishing spheres of influence far removed from the home territory. Thus, on the basis of 'necessary' and 'sufficient' elements of which regional organisations are composed, Ghali defines regional 'understanding' (ententes) "as organism of permanent character, grouping in a geographically determined region of more than two states which by reason of their proximity, their communities of interests or their affinities, ... [establish] an association for the maintenance of peace and cultural security in the region and for the development of their economic, social and cultural cooperation with the final purpose of forming a distinct political entity".

This definition, though applies to most of the regional organisations comprising of states which are geographically contiguous, yet it fails to explain the dynamics and existence of regional arrangements among states which lack geographical proximity such as SEATO, CENTO etc. Hence, it may, at the best, be regarded as a partial definition of the

34 Ibid., p. 19.

35 It should be noted that although, Ghali regards geographical contiguity as an essential attribute and makes a distinction between 'direct contiguity' and 'interposition', yet while defining a regional organisation, he categorically uses expressions such as "geographically determined" and "proximity" as essential ingredients of a regional organisation.
concept of a region or regional organisation. Also, despite
its comprehensiveness, it does not take into consideration
various dimensions of the problems involved in the
definition of a region briefly discussed in the foregoing
pages such as overlapping of regions, lack of socio-
economic, cultural homogeneity in a region etc.

On the other hand, another scholar endeavours to
define regional subsystems or what he calls partial
international systems by applying systematic approach to the
study of international politics (Because of its emphasis on
interdependence of social action, the concept of system can
accommodate a variety of phenomena which we desire), and
defines 'regional subsystems' as "...organised groupings
such as EEC, NATO, SEATO, the OAS or LAFTA as well as... the
patterns of relations without institutional or legal
accompaniments as they may exist in regions with societal
interaction in the form of trade or flow of men".

This definition, despite its obvious thrust on an
attribute of interdependence among the members of regional
organisations, too, seems to be of a limited value. It fails
to address the fundamental question of geographical
proximity. Rather, it lumps together geographically

36 Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems :
Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Pattern and Role of
the Super-Powers", World Politics, vol. 21, n. 1,
(October 1968), pp. 84-104.

37 Ibid., p. 86.
contiguous (viz., European Community (EC)* Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) etc.) and non-contiguous (viz., NATO, SEATO, OAS) regional organisations.

Similarly, Cantori and Spiegel, too, have made an attempt to explicate a framework for the delineation of the world into certain regions or what they call subordinate systems and provide a definition to a subsystem. The main thrust of their effort, it may be noted, is to delineate clearly the idea of 'subordinate system' vis-a-vis global system, and provide bases for the systematic study of regions and their comparative study at subsystem's level. On the basis of the premise that in international politics interaction takes place at three different levels viz., global, regional and the nation-state, they divide the international system into three systems. These are: the dominant system, in the global arena (which is represented by the confrontation of most powerful nations); the subordinate system, in the region (which is the total

* There are, in fact, three Communities viz.; the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM). Since all the three Communities are managed by common institutions, they are increasingly referred to in the singular, as the European Community (EC). Therefore, except in quotations, the term EC shall be used throughout the present study.

interaction of relations within that region), and the internal system, in the nation state (which is the totality of relations of the organisations which comprise its domestic politics). While approaching the study of subordinate systems, they take into consideration the seven following generalizations:

1. Every nation-state (no matter how strong or weak) is a member of only one subordinate system. The two exceptions to this generalization are: (a) the most powerful states are also active in other subordinate systems besides their own, and (b) the states which exist on boundary line between the two subordinate systems may be considered to belong to both (e.g., Finland, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Burma).

2. All subordinate systems are geographically delineated, at least in part, by reference to all geographical considerations, but social, economic, political and organizations factors are also relevant. Consequently, members of subordinate system are proximate, but may not be precisely contiguous.

3. Size does not necessarily determine the existence of a subordinate system. It may consist of one nation and be relatively large (the USSR) or it may consist of several nations and be largely compact in area (the Middle East). Where only one nation is member of a region we can say that internal and subordinate systems are identical.
4. Within the boundaries of a subordinate system there is a complex interaction between political, social, and geographical factors. They consider it as the most important factor in defining the limits of a subordinate system.

5. Indigenous political relationships (antagonistic and cooperative), geographical factors, and social and historical backgrounds help to define a subordinate system.

6. Outside powers play a role in defining a subordinate system. This is particularly true in East Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin America.

7. Although geographic boundaries do not change and social factors rarely do, political and ideological factors are fluid. Consequently, the identity of a subordinate system is both tenuous and dynamic.

On the basis of the above suggestive, perhaps provocative generalizations, they divide the globe into fifteen subordinate (intermediate units) systems and define subordinate subsystem as a system that "consists of one state or of two or more proximate and interacting...

39 Ibid., pp. 399-404.

40 They are: Middle East, West Europe, East Europe, USSR, North America, Latin America, East Asia, Southwest Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa. Ibid.
states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system".

Cantori and Spiegel's framework though not without any merit, too, is vulnerable to serious academic as well as practical limitations.

First, although Cantori and Spiegel clearly state (generalization - 1) that every state (no matter how strong or weak) is a member of only one subordinate system, yet it is not clear as to what they precisely mean by 'the most powerful states are also active in other subordinate systems besides their own' (exception (a) of generalization 1). However, a discerning analysis of their work gives an impression that they assign only an 'intrusive' role to the powerful states in the subsystems other than their respective ones. It naturally follows, therefore, that although a state belonging to one subsystem may influence the working of another subsystem, yet it cannot become a member of another subsystem. (The only exception to this is the state lying on the borderline of two subordinate systems, i.e., exception (b) of generalization - 1). If so, then how can a major power (which is not a member of a subsystem) 'intrude' into the subsystem to the extent of becoming a member of a regional organisation whose all the

41 Ibid., p. 404.

25
remaining members belong to the subsystem? Would such a regional organisation (involving an outside major power) be still entitled to retain the 'regional' label? If no, then how would one explain the logic behind the inception and working of regional organisations which cut across regional or what they call subsystem's boundaries? Take for instance, SEATO was considered a regional organisation but its members belonged to diverse and heterogenous regions of the world viz., the US (North America), Australia (South-west pacific), Pakistan (South Asia) and the Philippines and Thailand (Southeast Asia). Another illustration is provided by OAU which, too, permeates subsystem's boundaries. For example, Morocco belongs to North Africa, Guinea is from West Africa, Lesotho belongs to South Africa, Chad is from Central Africa, and Kenya belongs to East Africa. Of course, these examples can be multiplied but they seem to prove beyond doubt that "regional tiger" cannot be confined to a "subsystem's cave".

Another question pertaining to Cantori and Spiegel's framework may be asked. Even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that the major powers have world wide interests (and consequently, influence the working of other subsystems) and their membership of regional organisations across the globe does not affect the latter's 'regional' nature, then what about the so called regional organisations, say the Arab League, which do not have any of
the 'intrusive' powers as their members but still cut across subsystems geographical barriers? Cantori and Spiegel's possible answer could be that a cultural organisation cutting across subsystem's boundaries is an exception. But why this concession in case of cultural organisations only? Why not in case of political, economic, strategic or for that matter any type of a regional organisation? Indeed, the list of such exceptions could be endless but it would defeat the very purpose of delineating subsystems and perforating their boundaries.

Also, contrary to Cantori and Spiegel's thesis (generalisation-2), the members of the above named regional organisations (involving intrusive powers) not only belong to different regions (in a few cases to different continents), they also conspicuously lack, to borrow their expression, "common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds".

Such organisations, in fact, are 'inter-regional' or 'trans-regional' organisations and seem to have their roots in what we may call 'inter-subordinate system' - a vital link missing in Cantori and Spiegel's framework.

In this context, it seems relevant to refer to the study of Brecher which seems to provide a better insight

into the delineation of subordinate systems, and seeks to explain their internal as well as external dynamics.

In his analysis of Southern Asian subordinate system, Brecher suggests that for the existence of a subordinate system, the following six conditions have to be satisfied.

(i) There should be a delimited scope with primary stress on a geographic region;

(ii) There should be at least three actors;

(iii) Taken together, the actors should be objectively recognised by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region or segment of the global system;

(iv) The members should identify themselves as such;

(v) The units of power should be relatively inferior to the units in the dominant system (taken to mean the major world blocs); and

(vi) change in the dominant system should have a greater effect on the subordinate system than the reverse.

He further suggests that although the existence of the above six traits would define the system in space and time, yet to complete the description of a subordinate system, two additional sets of features viz., 'structure' and 'texture'

42a Ibid., p. 220.
should be incorporated. While 'structure' refers to the basic patterns of relations among units of the system, 'texture' denotes the broad characteristics of the environment in which these relations function.

But the question of drawing exact boundaries of the region still remains. Though Joseph S. Nye, Bruce M. Russett, Lymn H. Miller and some other regional theorists have made attempts in this respect, but it seems to be agreed upon that regional boundaries are usually indeterminate rather than determinate. In majority of cases, therefore, any boundaries which may be delineated will necessarily be arbitrary. What is still more serious a problem is that even if we draw boundary lines and identify a particular region, the question of the specific membership of certain states lying on the boundary of a region poses a serious problem e.g., where would we place Burma in Southeast Asia or South Asia or Afghanistan in South Asia or the Middle East or Turkey in the Middle East or Western Europe or Finland in Western Europe or Eastern Europe? Although Contori and Spiegel attempt to provide a way out to this conundrum, but such a delineation would

43 Ibid., p. 218. Structural features include the configuration of power, organisational integration, the character and frequency of integration between actors and the extra-state relationship with the dominant system. Textural features include the intensity of communication and transport, common and conflicting ideologies and values, the diversity of political systems and internal stability among member states. For details see, Ibid., pp. 221-33.
### TABLE - I

**QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN VIS-À-VIS THE MIDDLE EAST**

**PERCENTAGE HOMOGENEITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cultural Homogeneity</th>
<th>Political Homogeneity</th>
<th>Economic Homogeneity</th>
<th>Geographic Homogeneity</th>
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<td>33.33%</td>
<td>71.42%</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28.57%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
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<td>25.00%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>38.50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>900%</td>
<td>500%</td>
<td>800%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional homogeneity in each indice (%): 81.81% 45.43% 29.77% 26.22% 15.13% 72.72%

Overall regional homogeneity: [274.12 / 8] = 34.26%

* These percentages are calculated on the basis of common official language, religion and ethnic groups in case of cultural homogeneity; number of complementary commodities in case of economic homogeneity; and degree of similarity in climate in case of geographic homogeneity which these countries share with Afghanistan.

Note: A problem may arise if a state lying on the borderline of a region has cultural and political affinity with one region, and geographical contiguity and economic complementarity with the other. To overcome this, one can give uniform ratings to different indices, and on the basis of comparative analysis of total ratings scored by the two regions vis-à-vis the borderline state, one may determine as to which region it really belongs.

### TABLE - II
QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN VIS-A-VIS SOUTH ASIA

PERCENTAGE HOMOGENEITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official Languages</th>
<th>Official Religion</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Type of Govt.</th>
<th>Chief Natural Resources</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Climate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B'Desh</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>42.85%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>42.85%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>85.71%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>185.69</td>
<td>262.50</td>
<td>166.66%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional homogeneity in each indice(%) = 42.85% Nil 14.28% 26.52% 32.81% 23.80% 7.14%

Total regional homogeneity i.e., \( \frac{147.40}{8} \) = 18.42%

* Same as in Table - I.
Note: Ibid.

Source : Ibid.
result into overlapping, if not total blurredness of regions.

However, one possible method to deal with the problem of such states (lying on the borderline between two regions) seems to be to place them in a proximate region with which they share common heritage and have greater socio-cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, and political homogeneity. The case of Afghanistan which lies on the boundaries between South Asia and the Middle East may be cited to illustrate the argument. On the basis of certain indices, one can make a comparative study of relative homogeneity between the Middle East nations and Afghanistan on the one hand (Table I) and between South Asian nations and Afghanistan on the other (Table II). An analysis of the two tables clearly establishes that Afghanistan has greater linguistic, religious and economic homogeneity with the Middle East than South Asia. For example, it has linguistic affinity (though partial) with at least one Middle East state (i.e. Iran), shares common religion with as many as ten countries and has far greater complementarity as far as the chief natural resources, major agricultural products and nature of industries are concerned. Also, it shares more or less similar (i.e., non-monsoon type), if not identical, climate with most of the Middle-East countries. Moreover, Afghanistan has a common heritage with the Middle East countries as all these countries, with the exception of
Iran, once constituted what was then known as the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, Afghanistan has far less common indices with South Asian countries. It naturally follows, therefore, that Afghanistan belongs to the Middle East and should be treated as such. One may draw similar comparative tables to solve the problem of membership of other such states (viz., Turkey, Burma, Finland) which exist on the borderline between two regions. But would such placement of these countries in one or the other definite region be acceptable to their people and respective regimes is anybody's guess.

Appraisal: Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the endeavours of regional theorists for what seems to be a sort of ungratifying definitional pursuit, the concepts of a region and regional organisation not only continue to be vague and arbitrary, the numerous issues involved in these concepts also remain either unanswered or answered in a dissatisfactory manner. Perhaps, the most realistic and down to the earth expression is contained in the following statement about the delineation of regions:

There is no particular mystique about identifying them and working with them as units of analysis. They are ordinary, common, practical, geographic areas for which social and economic improvement programs have been conceived, planned, and undertaken. Sometimes, these regions are defined by natural features such as river basins, agricultural zones, forest districts and the like. Sometimes, they find their identity in terms of trading areas within which economic transactions and flows are numerous and dense as compared to their economic relations with outside areas. In
some instances, a metropolitan region is the focus of primary concern... In still other instances, a region will be characterised by relative cultural similarity; for example, a tribal region, an ethnic or traditional areas with high degree of self-consciousness, a remote and backward district or a distinct political jurisdiction such as a province or republic... In other words, the regional concept... [has] been found useful and reasonable under a variety of circumstances.

44 Analysing the vagueness and apparent difficulty in the attempts of delineating a region, and the context and regions covered by the regional organisations that operate in the present day international relations, one is tempted to throw away one's hands and a question that naturally comes up in one's mind is that if these attempts are basically beyond human contrivance and invariably involve the risk of producing a botched job, why should the concept of a region be not abandoned altogether? So discouraging and pathetic is the situation about the ambiguity embedded in the concept that one is often enticed to argue that the time has come either to replace it by more precise terms or expunge it from the vocabulary of international relations. The urge to abandon the concept altogether is strengthened by an observation made by one of the pioneering regional theorists that "the actors who make integrative decisions do not always worry about the naturalness of their region". 45 Therefore, why should the students of regionalism be at all


concerned about the fact as to whether or not a regional organisation is confined to a determined geographical region or strictly qualifies as a regional organisation?

However, without getting trapped into this 'vicious circle' of fascination of abandoning the concept altogether, a question may be asked i.e., is there any way out of this definitional impasse? Or is it possible to provide a workable definition for the purpose of our study? Perhaps yes. An honest, though provocative, attempt can be made to define a regional organisation for the purpose of our study by providing a self-coined definition. But it should be stressed that ontologically correct definition to the satisfaction of every scholar cannot be provided to a region or regional organisation. Only an operational and de-facto definition may be given, that too by following the path of nominalism. This definition has to be two fold i.e., in a narrower and broader sense.

In a narrower sense, it may be defined as:

an organised arrangement with an institutional structure among proximate independent political units of a determined geographical region which have a regular pattern of interaction among themselves. The members of such an arrangement are usually bound by a strong historical heritage; share or profess to share common socio-economic, cultural and political affinity; have or have been compelled (by internal or external catalysts) to evolve a more or less shared regional interest perceptions and believe that their interests can be served better by collective action at a regional level rather than acting as isolated
actors in international relations.

This definition can be applied the EC, Council for Mutual Assistance (COMECON), Warsaw Pact, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) etc.

In a broader sense, it signifies:

a transnational arrangement, with or without an institutional structure, primarily conceived as a mechanism or a vehicle for the furtherance of a specific shared interest or interests among independent states, not necessarily geographically contiguous to each other or belonging to a determined geographical region.

*

Suggestions:

As pointed out earlier, the above definition of a

46 Since the selection of the criteria employed in this definition is somewhat arbitrary, a question may be asked i.e., why to choose particular set of variables from an infinite universe? While there is no a priori reasoning for doing this, but it seems that these are vital variables which have a direct or indirect bearing upon the behaviour of states towards regional cooperation, and their absence usually result in the development of divergent interest perceptions and related disputes which plague the evolution of 'functional equivalence'. Further, given the infinite nature of the universe involved, some degree of arbitrariness has to be exercised in this respect.

47 Although such organisations do not strictly qualify as regional organisations, they do explain the raison d'etre of broader regional organisations such as NATO, SEATO, OAU, Arab League etc. Thus, it seems that while regional economic organisations usually belong to a geographically determined region, geo-strategic and cultural organisations, more often than not, are trans-regional and often overlap.

* I am indebted to Prof. Ladis K.D. Kristof of Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA, for going through an earlier draft of this chapter and raising some of these issues.
regional organisation is offered only as a tentative and operational one for the purpose of our study. However, in this context, a few suggestions may be made, the pursuit and operationalisation of which, at present, is not feasible due to limited resources and non-availability of data at a micro-level. But it may be stressed here that although these suggestions are in no sense intended as a "cook book" in defining a regional organisation, it is hoped that these suggestions, if followed and operationalised, should help to remove some misgivings about the concept of a region; prove useful in the perforation of international regions, and provide a more readily acceptable definition to a regional organisation. These are:

(i) Distinction should be made between a regional alliance and regional organisation, even if the distinction may not be sharp. Alliances often evolve into something more than organisations. While regional organisations are essentially defensive in nature, alliances are usually of offensive character. In other words, alliances are primarily antagonistic in nature i.e., they are directed against someone or something. Further, while a sense of community and common heritage play important role in the inception of regional organisations, the role of these variables in the formation of alliances seems doubtful. The sense of 48

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The community may help consolidate alliances, it rarely brings them about.

(ii) It seems useful to emphasise the difference between a region defined primarily in geo-political terms and a purely geo-strategic region. The latter is usually defined in terms of interests and influences which are quite independent of territorial contiguity and even of any cultural heritage. This distinction should prove helpful in the explanation of transnational strategic organisations.

(iii) Regional organisations are essentially voluntary arrangements among states, while alliances may or may not be voluntary in nature. For example, while SEATO was a voluntary alliance to meet strategic defence needs, voluntary nature of the former Warsaw Pact was doubtful.

(iv) Regional organisations should not consist of less than three and more than twenty members. Although this fixation of number of members for a regional organisation is somewhat arbitrary, but some degree of arbitrariness seems necessary to distinguish a regional organisation from an alliance and also from an organisation which is more than regional in composition and scope but falls short of universal requirements. Thus, while a bilateral arrangement among states should essentially be viewed as an alliance, an arrangement involving more than twenty countries should not

be treated as regional.

(v) In certain quarters, a distinction is made between a regional and sub-regional organisation. Since, at present, there are only a few organisations which are regional in the sense that they embrace the entire determined region nor there seems to be any justification for such a demand, this distinction should not be considered valid.

(vi) Since the concept of region and definition of regional organisation differ depending upon the criteria we adopt, the purpose of regional organisations in terms of types should be stressed. Thus, while geo-political and economic organisations are primarily confined in their membership to a defined region and seldom transgress regional boundaries, geo-strategic and cultural organisations are usually trans-regional in nature.

(vii) Ideological variable as a criterion used for delineation and separation of one region from another seems irrelevant. While it may serve as a powerful incentive for the group of ideologically homogenous countries to form an antagonistic compartmentalized regional arrangement, ideological factor as a variable for perforation of a region should be viewed as fluid and ephemeral. The irrelevance or limited utility of ideological variable has been clearly substantiated by the unification of Germany, disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and disbanding of the Warsaw Pact Treaty etc.
Finally, although due to rapid technological advancements and developments in the means of communication and transportation, and consequent shrinking of world into an immediate neighbourhood, the variable of geographical proximity seems to have, at least at the face of it, lost its traditional importance, this criterion as a determinant of region should not be abandoned altogether. For example, if India, Mauritania and Australia; or China, South Africa and Poland happen to have convergent economic, cultural, strategic and political interests, and consequently, form an organisation for the protection and furtherance of their shared interests, it would be ridiculous to term such an organisation as a 'regional' organisation by any stretch of imagination. Therefore, if we desire to retain the concept of a region and continue to make comparative study of the behaviour and interaction of national actors at a regional level as a part of the discipline of international relations, geographical proximity as a criterion for the perforation of a region and definition of regional organisation seems indispensable.

Growth of Regionalism: Internal and External Factors

Although, as pointed out in the preceding discussion, the idea of regionalism or regional organisations has long held a place in the thinking on international relations, going back to ancient history, the process of large-scale translation of these ideas into actual practice got a sudden
impetus only recently, particularly after the Second World War. However, it should be noted that notwithstanding the respectable background that the phenomenon of regionalism has in international relations, it is not an isolated or spontaneous phenomenon. Rather, its roots appear to lie in interdependence of mankind, and it manifests both an urge and necessity for mutual cooperation in order to achieve certain shared economic, cultural, political and security objectives. Indeed, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of regional organisations other than as instruments for achieving something. As the conscious creations of mankind, regional organisations are brought into existence in order to achieve certain tangible or intangible objectives and produce certain desired results. Thus, in order to gain a proper insight into the phenomenon of regionalism, it seems necessary to identify and discuss, in detail, the factors that appear to facilitate its initiation and continuation in the arena of international relations.

The current emphasis on regionalism or regional arrangements (especially in the period ensuing after Second World War) may be attributed in part to the emergence of socio-economic and political conditions rendering frequent consultations and joint action among number of states having shared interests, desirable or necessary. Such

50 Fanikkar, n. 8, p. 120.
arrangements, as Padelford points out, have also been called into existence in order to provide for mutual defense and reciprocal assistance to meet the increased threats to security arising out of the new range and power of weapons in the hands of an aggressor and from growth of subversive movements aimed at overthrowing established regimes. But as noted in the foregoing, use of regionalism as a mechanism for ensuring national security is not entirely a new phenomenon in international relations. Security has been traditionally sought through regional forum, producing a favourable balance of power even during ancient period. What seem new in this context has been the direct and indirect impact of certain closely inter-related post-1945 historical developments viz., the emergence of ideologically oriented loose bipolar system, bloc-politics, cold war, stock-piling of atomic and nuclear weapons, ideological subversive movements etc. These developments not only resulted in the mushroom increase in regional arrangements in most parts of the world, it also significantly altered


52 In the ancient period, Kautilya in his 'Mandla Theory' duly emphasised the importance of cooperation and joint action among neighbouring states (which seems roughly comparable to the present day regional security arrangements) for safeguarding and furthering national interests and security. See, Kautilya, Arthasastra, R. Ramasastry, trans. (Mysore, 1960), pp. 289-93.
the very parameters of regional organisations. Thus, while pre-Second World War regional arrangements were, by and large, in tune with the classical principle of balance of powers aiming at the preservation of international peace and security, the principal consequence of the emergence of loose bi-polar system and ideological oriented subversive movements (growing out of cold war) for regionalism was the inception of a new type (ideological) of regional organisations such as the NATO, Warsaw Treaty, CENTO, SEATO etc., resulting from the implacable hostility of the two blocs towards each other. Similarly, the impact of the cold war and the US and Soviet arsenals of atomic and nuclear weapons created fear psychosis; and consequently resulted in 'de-facto' dependence of most of the newly liberated countries on either of the super powers. These newly liberated countries, compelled by these new historical developments, became camp followers and joined one or the other bloc for the large scale protection against infringement of their sovereignty and newly won independence. Thus, it seems that whereas for super-powers, such regional arrangements served as an instrument to establish, sustain and expand their respective hemispheric hegemony, and excorcising or circumscribing each other's

influence, the small states, it may be argued, essentially perceived such regional arrangements as an effective mechanism for the solidification of their national independence and protection of territorial integrity. Hence, the motive behind the inception and sustenance of these regional organisations seems clearly to be other than achieving regional integration.

Another related and vital factor which seems to explain the logic behind an increased tendency on the part of states to take recourse to regional arrangements in the present day international relations may be ascribed to a widely shared perception (especially among the small and developing states) that the United Nations under the present circumstances and framework cannot wholly suffice to protect or further the interests of states. It is because of this incapacity of the United Nations to act an effective instrument of maintaining international peace and security that the states have increasingly reposed faith in regional security arrangements in preference to "collective security" under the universal organisation. In this context, Gerhard Bebr diagnoses the problem in detail and emphatically concludes that "the disunity among the permanent members has been primarily responsible for the ineffectiveness of the organisation, and it is no wonder, when the world organisation becomes paralysed and impotent, states tend to seek in regional organisations the security they are unable
to find on a global basis”, and turn to regional groupings as a supplement to unilateral national action and usual diplomatic relations. Thus, as a result of the incapacity of the United Nations, the modern states have themselves taken upon the responsibility to protect their territorial integrity through regional security arrangements and consequently, regional security arrangements seem to have assumed an increasingly important role as the guarantor of security. Perhaps, it is against this backdrop that E.B. Hass cogently observes:

...the advent of regionalism reflects the disintegration of the concert of power (security council) as the guarantor of security. Collective security within the universal organisation has become the function, not of concert, but a pair of new operational maxims: permissive enforcement; and balancing.

Thus, from this perspective, regionalism in international relations seems to be a manifestation of three interacting trends viz., (a) an urge of the states for self-preservation, security, and furtherance of their national


55 Ernst B. Hass, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organisations", World Politics, vol. 8, n. 2, (January 1956), p. 239. Put in regional terms permissive enforcement implies the delegation of enforcing power to a NATO or a SEATO as the only focus of strength which could be expected to undertake large-scale military operations. Balancing, by contrast, comes about as the result of a natural or mediating blocs seeking to prevent permissive enforcement.
interests; (b) relative inability of the individual nation states to achieve these objectives single-handedly or on the basis of their own strength; and (c) disillusionment with the UN as the sole guarantor of international peace and security.

Another important reason for regionalism in the present day international relations is that degree of self-sufficiency of modern states is rapidly decreasing. At present, there are a great variety of social, economic, cultural needs which cannot be fully satisfied in a limited national scale or within a circumscribed territory, and thus, require a transnational organisation. In fact, the modern states are finding it very difficult to satisfy even the basic necessities of their citizens from their own resources. As such they have to depend upon each other for their economic, scientific, technological needs etc. The modern states have become unprecedentedly interdependent not only in economic sphere but also in political matters for they have to get the support of fellow states on vital political issues affecting their national interests. While it is not argued that the countries, in the previous annals


57 While it seems foolhardy to contend that power considerations have ceased to play an important role in the contemporary international relations, the very nature of power in international relations has been significantly changing and has, in a way, further contributed to this interdependence. For details see, Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power", Foreign Affairs, vol. 51, n. 2, (January 1979), pp. 286-99.
of history of international relations were fully self-sufficient, nevertheless due to rapid industrialization and the recent scientific innovations, the degree of this inter-dependence or 'functional equivallence' has taken a quantum jump in the modern era. Therefore, in the contemporary world, there seems to be hardly any problem of national or international importance that can be solved unilaterally by any state, no matter howsoever powerful it might be. Thus, interdependence appears to have become the central theme of contemporary international relations, and has resulted in gradual but consistent 'de-facto' erosion of sovereignty.

But it appears to be an equally important fact of the contemporary international relations that genuine cooperation at global level or global forum, though desirable, is not feasible. The reason for this is that given the widely divergent political perceptions, attitudes and varied economic conditions of the participating nations, agreement among a very large number of countries on cooperative projects and programmes at global level is not easy to obtain. Further, progress towards international economic cooperation is hampered by the weakness and


inadequacy of international institutions to police and enforce agreements in trade. As a result, a small number of states, usually belonging to a given geographical region, who have a relative degree of social, cultural, political homogeneity, common heritage, economic complementarity, and shared interests and perceptions, opt for a regional approach and prefer cooperation at a regional level for the fulfilment of their shared needs and objectives.

Thus viewed, the phenomenon of regionalism in international relations seems to reflect not only mounting inter-dependence, lack of national self-reliance, and resultant desire of the modern states to cooperate, but also a realization by the modern states that given the texture of present international relations, cooperation at global level is not viable at this juncture of international life. In this sense, regionalism appears to be an important stepping-stone and middle ground for the realization of the cherished goal of world federation or world government.

However, the incentives and considerations which influence and propel the modern states to form and participate in the regional organisations are, in fact, often complex. Different motives condition the policy decisions of different states in different contexts and circumstances. Here, it seems relevant to refer to Nye's

which, perhaps, is the most significant and generic account of regionalism in the existing literature. Nye traces the mushroom increase in the number of regional organisations by inquiring into the incentives which are there for elites and statesmen to form regional organisations. He, however, offers a somewhat different perspective and does not regard politics of regionalism as purely the politics of cooperation. In this context, he suggests two alternative hypotheses viz., (a) derivative diplomatic uses, and (b) ambivalent political identities, and argues that regional organisations like all other organisations, have derivative uses as well as declared ones. Nye, however, views derivative diplomatic uses as often more important than the declared functions for the political regional organisations, particularly the macro-regional political ones such as the Arab League, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Council of Europe. But he argues that military and economic regional organisations can also be put to the same diplomatic uses e.g., "control of Germany was a major derivative function of the ECSC". He enumerates five characteristics of current international system which have


62 By macro-regional organisations, Nye means those organisations that encompass vast 'regions' - where the maximum distance between members' capital is one fourth to one half that of the 'global' - United Nations (i.e., 3100 to 6200 miles). See, Ibid., pp. 432-33.
enhanced the attractiveness of regional organisation as a diplomatic tool. These are:

(i) As the less tangible psychological components of power have increased in importance, the statesman have sought the prestige of regional relationship as a symbol of power, e.g., foreign policies of France, Ethiopia, and Egypt in the EC, OAU and Arab League respectively.

(ii) Given the increased importance of domestic populations in world politics, coupled with the legitimacy of the national sovereignty, regional organisations provide an opportunity to appeal over the heads of government to groups in other states (despite the sovereignty clauses often written into the Charters), as the successful and unsuccessful efforts of the Ivory Coast and Ghana to influence their neighbours through the Conseil de l'Entente (CF) and the OAU, respectively demonstrate.

(iii) With the diminished utility of military force, in many settings traditional military alliances have lost some of their attractiveness. Nonetheless, statesmen still feel the need to draw lines, and introduce even a faint element of predictability into their search for security by creating political alliances under the guise of regional organisation e.g., Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and the ASEAN

63 Ibid., p. 434.
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

(iv) With the predominance of milieu goals over possession goals, regional organisation can serve as useful tools for shaping conditions beyond one's national boundaries, whether it be creating more favourable conditions for aid for economic development (e.g., the regional development banks), or creating regional balance of power (a major motive for ASPAC).

(v) Finally, with the increased importance of communication and signals, regional organisations have been useful as 'no tresspassing' signs, either between the Superpowers (the OAS or the Warsaw Pact) or from the weak to the Superpowers (OAU).

Nye further argues that in addition to these incentives provided by the derivative diplomatic uses, regional organisations may be created and used by political leaders in response to personal or elite desire to express a collective identity in world politics. Particularly in less-developed areas where foreign policy is less bureaucratized, a leader may succumb to the handy wine of 'instant brotherhood' sometimes felt at summit conferences, or he may shrewdly calculate that he must make a token

64 "They may properly be seen as publicising cherished ideas, as providing a forum, or rather forums, and as a means of launching pilot schemes which might possibly lead to further political unification...", Peter Lyon, War and Peace in Southeast Asia, (New York, 1964), p. 154. Cited in Ibid., p. 434.
concession to regional identity to satisfy domestic elites who wish to assert their status or defend their culture in the world arena.

On basis of above arguments, Nye concludes that most of the organisations like Organisation of Central American States or the Arab League, the ASEAN, the Maghreb Council and so on are based on these derivative diplomatic uses or ambivalent political identitive functions alone. Thus, such organisations could be said to represent merely a token integration at the international level.

Nye's analysis of the factors directly or indirectly responsible for the growth of regionalism, on the whole, seems above rapprochement. But at least two additional 'derivative' incentives may be added to his thesis:

(i) First, a regional organisation may be used by a core or dominant state of a region as an obstructive alternative to the UN action e.g., use of OAS by the United States in the western hemisphere.

65 Claude has examined this relationship and argues that in Guatemala crisis in 1954, when Guatemala government headed by Jacob Arbenz (which was regarded by the US as a substantially communist) had allegedly become a victim of aggressive attacks launched from Nicaragua and Honduras with the support of the United States, it was denied access to the Security Council by the OAS under the slogan of "Try OAS First" - a coin the other side of which read "Security Council Stay Out". Inis L Claude, Jr., "The OAS, the US and the United Nations", International Conciliation, (New York), n.547, (March 1964), p.16.

52
(ii) Second, regionalism may also be used as an instrument by smaller states of a given geographical region to circumscribe the influence of a dominant state of the region by involving such a state in a regional organisation. In other words, it refers to the discreet ganging up of smaller states against a dominant regional power under the guise of regional cooperation. For example, it is argued by some scholars that an important reason behind the US encouragement to the formation of SAARC and its persuading Pakistan to join SAARC was its motive to isolate India on global issues, and to circumvent or moderate the hegemonical designs of India in South Asia.

Ronald Yalem regards geographical proximity, the existence of a similar political, ideological, social and cultural background as the conditions which account for the cooperation that is theoretically possible among states within a specific region and act as unifying elements.

Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, while inquiring into the dynamics of successful regional cooperation which may


eventually culminate in political integration endeavours to identify certain background factors or environmental conditions which may provide powerful incentive to regionalism. In this context, he mentions: initially compatible value system, adequate communication channels, mutually responsive elites, a commitment to a new way of life, and the existence of a 'core area', as the conditions which may prove helpful in achieving what he terms as amalgamated security community. Likewise, Hass regards a pluralistic social structure, a high level of economic and industrial development, and relative ideological homogeneity as the conditions upon which regional cooperation and political integration is contingent.

Etzioni, in his analysis of the factors conducive to regional cooperation and integration lays stress both upon background conditions and strategy involved to realize the goal of integration. Though Etzioni primarily focuses upon the working of the EC and analyses the "background conditions" at the time of the inception of the EC and "the strategy of change" employed by those who initiated and supported the EC, his diagnosis and prescription seem


relevant and applicable to other regional groupings as well because, as he says, "When the background conditions are favourable and similar to those present in Europe in the 1950's, an effective strategy could make the difference between success and failure".  

The background conditions which prevailed at the time of inception of EC were: common European tradition, a sizable Catholic population, similar stage of economic development, similar civilization, and so forth. But since there is very little that any country can do to change the background conditions which may not be so conducive for regional cooperation, Etzioni's main thrust is on the strategy required for successful regional cooperation and unification. In this context, he examines and recommends the following measures as the essential ingredients of successful regional strategy:

(i) Building up homogeneity i.e., since homogeneity generally refers to a set of similar background conditions, to achieve homogeneity, countries with heterogenous backgrounds should be excluded initially. They might be included at a later stage. The reason is that when "a union is established, its institutions moulded, and its image crystallized, it can absorb more countries and withstand more heterogeneity than when it is being initiated".

71 Ibid., p. 384.
72 Ibid., p. 385.
(ii) Aiming low and scoring high i.e. since there seems to be a strong negative relation between the level of ambition of various post-war European organisations and their degree of success i.e., the higher the aim, the lower the score, and vice-versa, stress should be on realistic and attainable goals.

(iii) Gradualist Approach i.e., step by step strategy towards regional cooperation and integration. It involves:
(a) amplifying close targets and underplaying more remote or more ambitious targets; (b) phasing of adjustments i.e., breaking up into small bits the adjustments which the parties have to make; (c) phasing of supranationality i.e., gradual adjustment to the loss of sovereignty; (d) stretching outs i.e., a device for easing the adjustment pains in which the participants can extend the period of adjustments beyond the stipulated period, and thus lure the timid into trying the common market way; (e) multiple-path approach i.e., allowing for a large variety of institutional arrangements; (f) provision for acceleration i.e., timetable of various unification processes to be accelerated; (g) lock-in-system i.e., a system that locks in integration that has been attained and makes regression difficult. In this system, while no party enjoys veto power on progress, every party has a veto against regression; and (h) provision for institutional spill-over i.e., power to the central institutions to increase the scope of subjects controlled or regulated by them without having to return to
national parliaments for ratification of change.

(iv) No reallocation before integration i.e., reallocation benefits should not be undertaken at an initial stage. The reason is that at this stage, community ties are not yet strongly built up, and reallocation may result into the breaking up of the organisation. Therefore, reallocation should take place at later stages when "community sentiments, institutions and integrative forces have been built up".

(v) Cushioning i.e. cushioning of these adjustments (made by the reallocation of funds) to reduce their negative political repercussions.

(vi) Domestic strategy i.e., at whom should the efforts to achieve unification be directed - governments or the people? Though both approaches appear useful, yet it is the focus "on governments rather than on people, on national legislation rather than on public education, and on the economic sector rather than on the political one", which may produce the desired results more effectively.

73 Ibid., pp. 386-90.

74 The cushioning may be achieved by: (a) setting up a "Social Fund"; (b) establishing a Regional Investment Bank; and (c) incorporation into the Treaty "Escape Clause" which allows an industry or a country to delay the reduction of particular tariff or other protectionist device. Ibid., p. 392.

75 Ibid., p. 394.
**Economic Regionalism**

Since the present study is primarily concerned with regional economic cooperation, it seems relevant to discuss, in detail, the factors which provide a powerful incentive or incentives to the modern states, particularly the third world countries to take recourse to economic regionalism in international relations. Also, it would be interesting to discuss and analyse the various stages involved in economic integration which may eventually spill over into political union.

**Third World Economic Regionalism: Incentives and Motives**

Following the success of regional economic cooperation in the Western Europe, regional economic cooperation has been experimented in almost all regions comprising the third world countries, albeit with varying degrees of success. The important illustrations of third world economic regionalism are: the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), Union of African States (UAS), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the more recent South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) etc.

Although regional economic cooperation in the third world seems to be much more rudimentary and crude in nature, and nebulous in content than its European counterpart, the logic of certain historical factors, placing the third world countries in an economically disadvantageous position vis-a-
vis the developed ones, as well as pragmatic economic considerations, growing out of the contemporary international economic situation, have guided the behaviour of third world countries to take recourse to and establish regional economic organisations - the phenomenon which appears to have become a central theme of current international economic life.

The foremost reason impelling the third world states towards economic regionalism may partially be explained in terms of "the failure to achieve some kind of international mechanism for the management of world economy", and partially in terms of a growing realization among the states that their standard of living can be advanced, economic well-being assured, and prosperous international trade maintained only through cooperative endeavours in reducing the barriers to trade and affording mutual assistance to one another by way of economic aid and technological assistance.

In fact, under the present structure of international economy, the third world countries feel chaffed and find themselves in a desperate situation. The reason is that in the competitive international economic environment, their small size and structure of their economies are not conducive for rapid economic growth and development on

individual basis. Further, their efforts towards industrialization are invariably hampered by low real income, low buying power and saving capacity, low rate of capital formation, and lack of capital. To overcome this situation, certain structural adjustments in economy and industrial diversification efforts (which are essential ingredients for most development plans are required, but because of their small size and lack of capital, their domestic markets are not large enough to support such measures. In this context, Gordon sums up their hopeless position and bleak economic prospects for these countries and says:

... by and large these (third world countries) are the nations that have benefited least by the present structure of international economy. The foreign trade of most of them is centred on the export of one or two primary products. Except for petroleum, these products have generally suffered from price and market instability and in some cases from chronic over production... They rather face bleak prospects in the balance of payments, since reasonable domestic growth rates tend to increase their import requirements, while their export markets do not show signs of expanding accordingly. Economic diversification has not progressed far enough for them to meet any significant part of their developmental needs for capital goods domestically. Most of them are too small to permit such diversification within their own borders....

77 For details see, Allan B. Mountjoy, Industrialization and Under-developed Countries (London, 1963), pp. 91-107.

Thus, against this frustrating scenario, it seems that an important reason for economic cooperation among developing countries is the need to take advantage of economies of scale in industries which have not yet been established. These countries essentially perceive regional economic cooperative "schemes against non-members within which industrial markets are 'swapped' in such a manner that the aggregate import substitution programme is attained at lower total cost, and with a greater degree of specialization, than if each member had proceeded with its own programme independently".

Evidently, the desire for economic advantages through regional economic cooperation has proved to be a powerful fillip in to economic regionalism in the third world. Perhaps that is why, Hansen, too, accords an added importance to the role of economic factor in the formation of regional organisations among the developing countries and argues that a major impediment to rapid economic growth in many developing countries is that their domestic markets are too small to support efficient industrialization. Therefore, unfolding of economic cooperation among the developing countries is perceived as an important path to


Further, and closely related reason for regional economic cooperation among the developing countries is the benefits it can produce in training, technology and research projects and industries at a regional level. As pointed out earlier, since the majority of the third world countries are small in size, on individual basis they cannot muster the resources needed to provide well-trained managers for their development projects and industries; to conduct research required to improve productivity in various sectors and apply the results to their own peculiar circumstances. Thus, these countries seem to perceive regional economic cooperation quite an attractive and rewarding option—a important forum and a necessary mechanism whereby they can act together to pool their resources to achieve desired objectives, and thereby, increase industrial efficiency and development.

Another reason which appears to compel the third world countries to foster closer economic ties at regional level seems to be the deteriorating terms of trade for primary products and manipulation of tariff structures by the developed countries so as to discriminate against the third world products. Further, it seems that the developing countries are unable to find export markets because the

levels of effective tariff protection in the developed countries are very high for those industrial products which the developing countries manufacture in large quantity. Thus, the contemporary international economics system is propelling the different developing regions of the world toward economic cooperation, and it also seems to explain the feeling of need for cooperation among developing countries "as a form of collective self-defence against the new economic pressure from abroad". Therefore, it seems safe to argue that if the developed countries were to abolish the tariffs on items produced by the third world countries or to grant significant trade preferences to the developing countries, movement toward regionalism in Asia, Africa and Latin America world probably experience a major set-back. Faced with the lure of the developed markets, the developing countries would probably conclude that the costs of regional integration far-outweigh its benefits.

Thus, against this international economic scenario, the third world countries seem to have no option but to learn the knack of 'thinking regional' and collaborate at regional level. This frustration and perception of being victimized by the global economic system appear to have spurred regional economic cooperation in the third world regions as a way of "getting out from under", and led to the

83 Hansen, n. 80, p. 269.
84 Hass, n. 14, p. 620.
emergence of a new kind of "trade unionism" among the developing nations. Further, economic regionalism has got a significant momentum following a realization by the third world countries of the necessity to reduce dependence exclusively on the export earnings of one or two primary products and need to increase their bargaining strength in the world market, and thus, lay the bases of a widely diversified range of industries. Equipped with this realization and lured by the prospects to achieve greater economic benefits and rapid economic development in terms of stability of primary goods prices, an improved bargaining strength in trade relations with the developed countries, and also to overcome the constraints of their small size and low income by closer cooperation with their neighbours, most of the third world countries, it may argued, have taken recourse to regional economic cooperation or what may be termed as "developmental regionalism".

Thus viewed, regional economic cooperation in the third world regions seems to reflect at least six intertwined phenomena viz., (i) an inadequacy of the present

86 Rama S. Melkote ed., Regional Organisations: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi, 1990), p. xi.
87 Thus, viewed against the backdrop of 'development syndrome', there seems to be a direct linkage between economic underdevelopment of the third world and phenomenal growth of regional economic arrangements in the contemporary international relations.
international system and international economic order which is poised in favour of the developed countries at the cost of the developing ones; (ii) exploitation of this situation by the developed countries in terms of discriminatory tariff protections and consequent economic victimization of the developing countries; (iii) geo-economic realities of the third world plaguing their rapid economic development; (iv) realization of this adverse situation by the third world countries; (v) an inadequacy of the nation state approach to rapid economic development; and finally (vi) both an urge, and an economic necessity and strategy to overcome their handicaps vis-a-vis the developed countries, and alter the present situation through cooperative endeavours at a regional level. Such considerations appear to have, by and large, influenced the establishment and growth of regional economic organisations such as the LAFTA, the Andean Common Market, East African Community (EAC), Central American Common Market (CACM), the Maghreb Council, Conseil de L'Entente (CE), ASEAN, (Association of South East Asian Nations, and the most recent SAARC.

In this context, it seems relevant to ask a question i.e., what are the prospects for regional integration in the third world? Against backdrop of the above discussed incentives which provide rationale for economic cooperation to the third world countries it seems safe to argue that since the endeavours of these countries towards economic
regionalism are primarily guided by their stark geo-economic realities, in the third world, the prospects for integration on functional lines are quite unlikely. Evidently, the basic purpose of the third world countries in founding regional economic organisations seems merely "to facilitate or enhance a particular national capacity - to enlarge the range of what is technically possible for each member, in the performance of a particular task".

Viewed thus, the third world efforts towards regional economic cooperation and integration may in essence, be perceived as a vehicle "to enhance national capacity". These seem neither in tune with functionalists' nor neo-functionalists' approach, but essentially reflect a nation-state writ large. Further, while integration efforts among the developed countries are geared towards achieving a better allocation of resources among the participants, the rationale for the third world regional economic cooperation appears merely to encourage growth and industrialization. From this perspective, given the nature of incentives for cooperation, the third world efforts for regional economic cooperation and integration, may essentially be viewed as


falling in the category of "low politics" on the Nye's spectrum of "low" and "high" politics.

**Regional Integration : Stages Involved in the Process of Integration**

Before we venture to discuss the different stages involved in the process of regional integration, it seems necessary to know precisely the meaning of the term 'integration'. But it is rather lamentable that despite almost three decades of research and existence of integration theory as one of the contending approaches to the study of international relations, from viewpoint of terminology, integration theory lacks sharp precision and clarity about certain concepts central to it. The term

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91 As defined by Nye, "High" politics is symbol-laden, emotive and based on attitudes characterized by greater intensity and duration than "low" politics which is consequently more susceptible to the rational calculations of benefits associated with economic problems". Nye, n. 58, p. 871.


93 It is perhaps because of this state of integration theory that Linberg and Scheingold hold that integration studies are still in their 'Hundred Flowers' period. L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, in the Preface to International Organisation, vol. 24, n. 4, (Autumn 1970), p. viii.
'integration', too, has been used by regional integration theorists in a wide and variety of ways. Consequently, this liberal usage has rendered not only vagueness and imprecision to the concept but also hindered its evaluative clarity. Indeed, as Puchala points out, regional integration has proved to be a multidimensional phenomenon, much more complex than initially imagined. In fact, each and every scholar has employed the concept according to his perception with the result that "there is yet no settled conception of the term 'integration'".

Hass, one of the most sophisticated and thoughtful theorists of regional integration, in one of his earlier works, defines integration as:

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new

The word 'integration' has been derived from a Latin term 'integratio', and of course, is very old. In Latin, 'integratio' was mostly used in the sense of 'renovation'. The 'Oxford Dictionary' gives A.D. 1620 as the date for the first use in print of integration in the sense of 'combining parts into a whole'. Machlup Fritz, "A History of Thought on Economic Integration", in Machlup Fritz ed., Economic Integration : World-wide, Regional, Sectoral (London, 1976), p.61.


A.P. Rana, "Integrative Possibilities of Regional Order in the Third World : The Theoretical Landscape", in Melkote, ed., n. 86, p. 7.
political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones.

However, in view of the criticism by fellow integration theorists, Hass, in his later work, considerably modifies his earlier definition and defines regional integration as the study which is:

concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves... it is a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms.

Lindberg holds that political integration occurs when a number of governments begin to create and use common resources to be committed in the pursuit of certain common objectives and they do so by foregoing some of the factual attributes of sovereignty and decision-making autonomy, in contrast to more classical modes of cooperation such as alliances or international organisation.

Thus, political integration refers to the evolution, over time, of a collective decision-making system among nations. Therefore, it appears that if the collective arena

97 Hass, n. 92, p. 16.
becomes the focus of certain kinds of decision making activity, national actors will in that measure be constrained from independent action.

On the other hand, viewing integration from a different perspective, Nye defines it as a "process leading to political community - condition in which a group of people recognises mutual obligations and some notion of a common interest".

Karl Deutsch views integration in terms of 'peaceful change' and defines it as

the attainment within a territory of a "sense of community" - a belief that such problems must and can be resolved by a process of 'peaceful change' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.

Viewed thus, integration essentially seems to imply an evolution of 'sense of community' as well as stable expectations of peace among the participating units or groups. It does not, however, matter whether or not their political institutions have been formally merged.

100 Ibid.
102 Deutsch et.al., n. 68, p. 5.
Similarly, while defining 'integration', Russett's thrust, too, is on peaceful resolution of conflicts, and he perceives integration as "a relationship or pattern of behaviour, the ability to work out... conflict with minimum of violence and without one party always making important concessions, that marks the condition of successful integration".

Probably, the most comprehensive definition of the term integration is given by International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. It defines political integration:

as accumulative process of change in the nature of relations among more or less sovereign political units, such as states, during which these units voluntarily accept some kind of new central authority. This process requires at least four constituent elements: (a) the political units involved must permit the establishment of central institutions which promulgate policies; (b) the functions of this central authority may not be trivial or vague but must be important and specific (c) functions or tasks performed by the central institutions should be inherently "expansive"; and (d) the political units must remain committed to the common enterprise because they perceive ensuing benefits.

These definitions clearly reveal the wide range of perceptions on the spectrum which go by the rubric integration - the emphasis varying from 'shifting of loyalties' and 'factual loss of sovereignty' to 'peaceful

Russett, n. 20, p. 96.

resolution of conflicts' and 'peaceful change'. What further plagues our understanding of the term is the distinction made between sociological, economic and political integration. To confuse the matter still further, integration theorists have different perceptions on such a vital question involved in integration i.e., whether integration is a process or the terminal condition. While Etzioni regards integration as the terminal condition and not as a process of getting there, Deutsch essentially views integration as a 'process' resulting in the creation of security communities though its creation does not necessarily mean the merger of political institutions and loss of sovereignty of the constituent units. Similarly, Hass regards integration as a process.

Hence, against this confusing backdrop, any attempt either to altogether eliminate semantic fuzziness about integration or search for a consensus on a precise definition of the term integration seems futile. However, a careful analysis of the above definitions reveals that the concept of integration seems to involve the following attributes:

106 Etzioni, n. 92, p. 27.
107 Deutsch et.al., n. 103, p. 98.
108 According to Hass, "conceived not as a condition but as a process, the conceptualization (of political integration) relies on the perception of interests ... integration takes place when these perceptions (of actors participating in the process) fall into a certain pattern and fails to take place when they do not". See, Hass, n. 92, p. 11.
1. Shifting of peoples' loyalties from the nation-states to the new central institution or institutions across the national frontiers resulting from the latter's relative effectiveness to cater to human needs;

2. emergence of strong central supranational institutions (as a result of shifting of loyalties) which are capable of ensuring peaceful change;

3. accretion of functions from national institutions to regional or supranational institutions;

4. evolution of sense of belongingness to and faith in the central political institutions; and a strong urge to settle disputes and conflicts peacefully within the framework of such institutions;

5. while integration may not necessarily result in the factual or complete loss of sovereignty, or in virtual merger of the participating units, nevertheless, it involves diminution of national sovereignty; and

6. since integration is not a spontaneous phenomenon, it's study should include both quantitative as well as qualitative aspects. In other words, it may be viewed both as a 'process' (quantitative) and the 'terminal' condition (qualitative).

After having equipped ourselves with the proper understanding of the term, it seems relevant and interesting to conduct a brief inquiry into the stages involved in the integration process.

The integration theorists, in their study and analysis of integration theory, and its application and operationalisation in the developed as well as the developing countries, by and large, rely on and follow Bela Balassa's theory of economic integration. Emphasising the importance as well as the underlying motivation of the theory of economic integration, Balassa says:

The theory of economic integration can be regarded as a part of international economics, but it also enlarges the field of international trade theory by exploring the impact of a fusion of national markets on growth and examining the need for the coordination of economic policies in a union... the integration of adjacent countries amounts to the removal of artificial barriers that obstruct continuous economic activity through national frontiers....

Further, Balassa perceives economic integration both as a "process" and as the "condition" (state of affairs) and opines:

Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.

111 Ibid., p. 1.
TABLE-III

PROCESS OF INTEGRATION : STAGES INVOLVED

Key:
- Unification of policies and emergence of supranational authority.
- Harmonization of economic policies.
- Free flow of all factors of production.
- Common external tariff.
- No intra-regional tariffs or quotas.

Thus viewed, it seems clear that the purpose and net-result of economic integration is the combination of divided economies of nation-states into a single supranational regional economy - the condition or stage which may eventually spill over into political integration. Elaborating the stages involved in economic integrational process, Balassa puts forward five categories, ranging from free trade area to total economic integration and political union depending upon the varying degrees of integration achieved. Beginning with free trade area, each next stage is realized through progressive elimination of economic discrimination among the participating nations. This process may be illustrated with the help of a histogram (See Table III) and briefly discussed as follows:

In a free trade area, member countries, usually with geographical proximity, undertake to abolish all tariffs on their mutual trade over a definite period of time. However, each country retains the right to determine the level of its tariff and severity of other trade restrictions vis-a-vis other countries. The most outstanding examples of attempts to form free trade area are provided by European Free Trade Area and the Latin American Free Trade Area.

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112 It may be noted here that although this observation tends to suggest integration as a gradual process leading from one to another, this pattern may not be strictly followed. For example, the EC started straightway with a custom union without first establishing free-trade area.

A custom union has three characteristics:

(a) the complete elimination of tariffs as between the member countries;
(b) the establishment of uniform tariffs on imports from outside the union; and
(c) appointment of customs revenue between the members in accordance with an agreed formula.

Thus, a custom union goes one step further than the free trade area and the members of custom union are more integrated than the members of a free trade area. The Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) was an example of custom union.

A common market is a still higher form of integration in which all restrictions are abolished not only on trade but also on factor movement (labour and capital) within the common market. The European Common Market (ECM) is considered an example of the common market.

In an economic union, not only restrictions on trade and factor movement are abolished, there is also a harmonization of national economic policies.

Finally, in the case of economic integration, there is complete economic fusion of member countries. It involves the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies and the setting up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states.

**Economic Union to Political Union: Automatism of "Spill-Over"?**

While the process of integration from free trade area to total economic union seems to be relatively simple, and by and large, falls within the domain of an economist, it is the last category which is of special interest for a student of international relations, more particularly of international political economy, i.e., what is the linkage between economic and political integration? To put the question in a capsule form: Would economic integration automatically result in political integration without

115 It may be noted that complete economic integration presupposes an existence of a supranational authority with comprehensive powers which is possible only in a political union.


117 Stated in broad terms, "spill over" assumes the continued commitment of the member nations to the process of integration and "... no statesman, even if he dislikes the process, can permanently isolate his nation from a commitment to unity which is already partially implemented, unless he is willing to pay the price in diminished welfare". Ernst D. Hass, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe", in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., *A New Europe*? (Boston, 1964), p. 73.
requiring any deliberate political initiative and acceleration by participating nations?

In this context, it seems relevant to refer to the study of Hass and Schmitter who regard 'spill-over' from economic to political union as "continuum" and "automatic". Explaining the dynamics and logic of 'spill-over' from economic to political integration, Hass and Schmitter lay special emphasis on "the gradual politicization of the actors' purposes which were initially considered "technical" or "non-controversial", and on shifting of "exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some larger unity" as the most important factors which help trigger political unity.

In his later work too, Hass reaffirms his earlier conviction about the automatism of process of political union from economic union and says:

The superiority of step by step economic decisions over crucial political choices is assumed as permanent, the determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and economic structures is almost absolute. Given all the conditions, we


119 Ibid., p. 707.

120 Ibid., p. 710.
The progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states, is automatic. But how far is Hass-Schmitter model in tune with the realities of contemporary situation? The developments to-date in the EC clearly indicate that Hass-Schmitter's 'logic of integration' and an eventual but inevitable and "automatic spill-over" from economic to political union has been belied by political and economic events in the Western Europe, leading to the sluggish pace of and remote prospects for political integration of the EC in an immediate future.

The reason as to why integration process in the EC has been limited and much slower than that which Hass-Schmitter had projected seems to be that this model ignores the role of set of political variables i.e., the political will of the nation-state actors to merge into a political union after the harmonization of economic policies has been achieved. In other words, given the nature of contemporary


122 Though, the Maastricht Treaty signed in December 1991 provides for a European citizenship, common foreign policy based on majority vote, common currency, veto power to European Parliament in some cases, common policy in immigration and asylum etc., yet in view of the divergent interest perceptions and stands taken by some of the EC members such as Denmark and Britain etc., the prospects for "spill-over" from economic union to political union seem bleak.
international relations, the nation-state actors continue to be pre-occupied with their respective national interests and are not as yet prepared to surrender all authority to a central supranational institutions or institutions, their professed commitment to supranationalism notwithstanding. In this context, Hoffman seems to be more down to the earth when he observes that "We must analyse the building of the political community as an incipient instance of 'interest group politics' of 'domestic politics of the community', and as a continuing example of traditional inter-state politics.

Thus, while concluding this part of our discussion, two submissions may be made. First, despite lip-service to supranationalism, most of the integrative efforts are primarily motivated by national interests of the participating nations. Therefore, whatever regional economic cooperation (including harmonization of economic policies) that has been achieved in various regions of the world seems to be the result of a predominant but insatiable urge for national economic benefits. Thus viewed, these integration efforts essentially reflect what may be termed as 'nation-state writ-large'. Second, contrary to Hass-Schmitter expectations, "spill-over" from economic to political integration does not appear to be an inevitable or

even an automatic process. While the establishment of economic union may result in the emergence of common perceptions and shifting of loyalties from national governments to central institutions across the national frontiers, and thus, prove useful in achieving political integration but it seems that the latter shall "occur only as a result of a positive political decision to bring it about, not as a result of economic pressures alone".

Classification of Regional Organisations

Regional organisations are of many types. While some are formed for geographical regions, others represent political associations or regions. However, regional organisations may be classified in several ways based on the nature or scope of their functions, or membership, or possibly on the degree of eventual integration that is sought.

Miller, provides three-fold classification of regional organisations, and distinguishes them from one another taking into consideration "the single variable of security orientation (which includes economic as well) of component states as expressed through the organisational structure".

125 Miller, n. 16, pp. 352-78.
While considering security orientation as the most important variable, he mainly offers three hypothetical orientations:

(i) Firstly, an organisation's structure and practice may be designed to aid in settling disputes among its members either through diplomatic process or through more elaborate peace-keeping machinery.

(ii) Secondly, an organisation may be designed to present a common military and, perhaps, diplomatic front against an outside actor or actors.

(iii) Thirdly, both the above issues may be regarded as irrelevant to the purposes of an organisation (perhaps because other organisations with similar memberships may respond to them). The raison d'être of this third type of organisation is to be found in the perceptions of what may be called 'functional insecurity', i.e., in the mutual desire to improve economic relations to deal with other technical problems resulting from geographical contiguity and growing interdependence.

On the basis of these three orientations, Miller divides all existing regional organisations into three types viz.,

(i) **Cooperative**: This group includes regional organisations that combine both the first and the second orientations mentioned above and arise as an expression of some sort of
regional solidarity in the face of the outside world, and which also possess, at least in embryo, the machinery to control the use of force within their own region.

(ii) **Alliances**: This group includes regional organisations intended to provide protection against external actors and the component states are bound together by multilateral defense treaties. They are, primarily, politico-military set-ups, and are created mainly to pursue cold war. For example, NATO was formed in 1949, as an international defence organisation linking a group of European states with United States and Canada; the Warsaw pact was formed in May 1955, the OAS was formed at Bugata (Columbia) in 1948, to foster peace, security and mutual understanding and cooperation among nations of the western hemisphere and was an outgrowth of RIO Pact of 1947. Even the ASEAN established at Bangkok in 1967, to accelerate economic progress and ensure stability in the Southeast Asian region has a security parameter though such a contention is vigorously and consistently denied by its member nations.

(iii) **Functional**: The third group includes those organisations that basically aim at promoting socio-economic or cultural cooperation with little or no regard to military collaboration such as the EC, SAARC etc.
In addition to three-fold classification provided by Miller, Bennett mentions a fourth distinct category viz; the United Nations Regional Commissions which do not fit into any of the above categories but provide a link between the universal and regional systems, and serve to promote universal goals within the specific geographic areas through regional agencies established as a part of the United Nations System, such as the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), European Commission for Africa (ECA) etc. Each of these commissions is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Economic and Social Council to which it reports.

However, for the purpose of our study, regional organisations may be classified into three broad categories:

(i) Economic and technical arrangements;
(ii) arrangements for defence purposes; and
(iii) arrangements for providing an institutional framework for the deliberation and settlement of broad political issues.

It may, however, be emphasised that hard and fast distinctions cannot always be drawn between matters that are of an economic, political, socio-cultural, or defense character. Rather, they quite often intermingle in the deliberations and activities of regional organisations.


127 Ibid., pp. 318-19.
Moreover, as the interests, objectives and perceptions of the member nations change, so also do the purposes and activities of the organisations and agencies which they create to further their interests. Thus, any categorisation is subject to limitations and may be viewed as having a degree of flexibility.