Chapter V

Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pak Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis

As we have already discussed above in chapters III and IV about the Indo-Bangladesh conflict and Indo-Pak conflict separately, this chapter is a modest attempt towards the comparative study of these conflicts. The central focus of this chapter is on the comparison of the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pak conflicts and also on why it is so that conflict resolution has been successful in the case of Indo-Bangladesh Ganga water dispute whereas failed to work in the case of Indo-Pak Kashmir conflict. But before making comparative analysis of these two important conflicts, it is necessary to give a brief account of them.

The conflict between India and Bangladesh over the sharing of Ganga water has been resolved through Conflict Resolution approach whereas the conflict over Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan has yet to be resolved. In fact, the resolution of the conflict between India and Bangladesh over the sharing of the Ganga water has been one of the significant developments with regard to conflict resolution in South Asia. As we have already discussed in chapter III that intense discussions culminated in a summit meeting between Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Indian counterpart Deve Gowda wherein the two leaders signed a Treaty on 12 December 1996 that envisages the sharing of Ganges water between the two countries for the next 30 years. Bangladesh-India water treaty is the outcome of a compromise on the part of both the sides. Thus, conflict resolution approach between India and Bangladesh marked an end to the oldest and by far, the thorniest conflict between India and Bangladesh. The resolution of this conflict generated remarkable confidence in bilateral relations that the Indo-Pak countries would also be able to resolve Kashmir amicably. This specifically can be applied to conflict between India and
Pakistan as well because this has been culminated into three full-scale wars and numerous border skirmishes. In fact, Indo-Pak conflict has been lingering for too long, expending too much energy and resources from economic development. Lately, since the late 1990s the region has become a nuclear flashpoint.

Conflict Resolution is not a new phenomenon particularly between India and Pakistan. Since the hurried departure of the British from South Asia and the partition of Indian sub-continent, both India and Pakistan have signed many agreements aiming to generate confidence and reduce tensions. Among them perhaps the most notable are: Liaquat – Nehru Pact (1951), Indus Water Treaty (1960), Tashkent Agreement (1966), Rann of Kutch Agreement (1969), Simla Accord (1972), Salal Dam Agreement (1978) and the establishment of the Joint Commission. In late January 2001, both countries agreed to continue running the railway train, Samjhota Express despite the ongoing tensions – as a visible communication link between them. The bus diplomacy and the Lahore Declaration February 1999 was a major milestone in the history of conflict resolution. With the exception of the Joint Commission all the others were the products of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments. But Conflict Resolution Approach in Indo-Pak relations failed to yield desired results.

A highly complex process in Indo-Pak relations, particularly along the line of control in Kashmir has also been accompanied by the efforts on the part of two countries aimed at conflict Resolution. In this regard collective efforts towards conflict resolution occupy a prominent position, because the resolution of the other bilateral conflicts in South Asia boosted mutual confidence in relations between India and Pakistan. Conflict resolution can take the form of a general understanding between nations or may emerge in the form of a formal agreement. Thus, the resolution of Kashmir problem, the central issue in Indo-Pakistan conflict continues to remain as illusive as ever. But there is an urgent need of building confidence for resolving the conflict between India and Pakistan. The conflict resolution will be an important step
in the direction of the resolution of the conflict and for creating a better image about cooperation in South Asia. However, the central focus of the present study would be on the feasibility of conflict resolution approach in finding long-term solutions to varied conflicts in South Asia. Experiences of conflict resolution in South Asia show successful application of conflict resolution approach for seeking non-violent resolution of Indo-Bangladesh water conflict. However, the same approach has not been successful in the case of Indo-Pak conflict. Therefore, the present chapter aims at locating the differences with regard to the characteristic and nature of both the conflicts for comparative analysis. Comparison will also be made on the basis of the factors, which hindered the resolution of Indo-Pak conflict and facilitated for the resolution of indo-Bangladesh conflict.

Comparing Conflicts

In order to make comparisons between the two conflicts, the characteristics of the conflicts are necessary to be explained. The idea is to demonstrate the complexity of the Indo-Pakistan conflict and consequently the inherent difficulties in conflict resolution. Identifiably, there are several notable features of the India-Pakistan conflict. First, there is an interlocking of issues between the two countries in the process of conflict formation. This means that the conflict has not resulted from a single incompatible goal but a variety of competing interests which are linked to each other in a manner that solution or difficulty in resolution of one issue influences the other. As the issues constituting the conflict are composite, a combined solution is considered effective and enduring. The interlocking nature of the conflict can easily increase its intensity and result in its protraction reflecting in incessant violence and intractable peace process. To elucidate, the Kashmir conflict not only has a territorial dimension but also a strong security dimension, which is linked to both countries’ search for power and dominance leading to an
unending bilateral “prestige dispute”. The greater the criticality of state interests at stake in territorial conflict, the stronger their impact on the security competition. Also, cross-border terrorism forms an important subsidiary issue resulting from the conflict over territory.

The Indo-Pakistan territorial conflict is a multi-pronged affair in the sense that both countries have competed for more than one part of territory at a time. If Kashmir is a dominant issue between them, Siachen and Sir Creek have been subsidiary issues. In a way one territorial conflict is linked to the other, as is evident from the Siachen conflict’s linkage with Kashmir. This means that solution to one issue is expected to facilitate resolution of other issues. At times, lack of agreement on one issue can concomitantly deny solution to others too. In such situation, the conflict resolution process should entail a composite framework for negotiations. This is what has been adopted for India-Pakistan conflict resolution. Such a composite dialogue process has a daunting task of achieving a comprehensive, composite solution. This has been the fundamental challenge of conflict resolution and peacemaking in the India-Pakistan conflict.

Another important feature of the conflict is that from the standpoint of both countries, their conflict goal is forcibly linked to their ‘national ideology’. Such an internalization of the goal in the national systemic framework and consciousness of the people makes very little scope for compromise by the parties. In this context incongruent ideological position in India and Pakistan is an important source of conflict formation. Whereas the Pakistani State has adopted Islam as its mainstream ideology, the Indian State asserts itself to be secular. As a result, Pakistan sees itself as the guardian of Muslims in the whole region and considers the Indian claim of being a secular polity as sham.
given the aberrations caused by some religious-oriented political parties. Therefore, Indian Nationalism, for Pakistan, is essentially Hindu nationalism even though Indians and their state assert to the contrary and work for maintaining secular credentials amidst internal pressure for vitiating the basic secular character. Pakistan gives large religious dimensions to its conflict with India, which is very much evident in Kashmir conflict. India considers the possession of Jammu and Kashmir, as an ideological fulfillment of its secular statehood and Pakistan, likes to possess the territory to achieve its ideological commitments of being an Islamic state, in the similar vein. This has given rise to slogans that the J & K – for Pakistan and POK – for India are an unfinished agenda of partition. Such antithetical ideological commitments have not only made the Kashmir conflict highly intractable but also extended their influence to the security spheres of their relations to create more competition and conflicts.4

The next important characteristic of the India-Pakistan conflict results from the previous one. That is, the conflict has a ‘larger political value’ since it forms an important factor in politics. Out of electoral compulsions and to ensure regime survival, even national leaders with a moderate face cannot genuinely seek peace or concentrate on a peace process. This situation has often marked the Kashmir conflict. There has been a strong tendency on the part of the Pakistani ruling elite (i.e. both belonging to the bureaucratic-military and civilian establishments) to effectively use the notion of Indian threats to capture or remain in power. All those generals who wrested power from the democratically elected leaders made India into a scapegoat for their misdeeds and unconstitutional activities. If India’s military power and battlefield performance (in 1965 and 1971) have provided the basis for the local political use of regional security issues, Kashmir has been a useful rallying cry and a strong issue of diversion from the daunting task of nation building and maintaining democracy. Similarly, the political forces in India have tried to take a partisan stand on bilateral conflicts and make political use of them.

4 Ibid.
Thus, the foreign policy orientation of governments and the inter-state conflicts hold very little value for electoral politics. And this can emerge as a stumbling block to any meaningful conflict resolution peace process based on mutual compromise, particularly on the Kashmir conflict.5

Another most important characteristic of the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict is that it is manifested in everyday life. It is known as a 'stable conflict' formation that is defined in time (spreading over an extended period), space (encompassing the entire region) and consistency (in motives and tactics of the parties).6

Confidence Building Measures have limited real value for India-Pakistan conflict resolution is also one of the most significant feature of Kashmir conflict, because it is accepted in Indo-Pak case that confidence building measures themselves are not solutions to international conflicts, instead they merely facilitate solutions by providing a vehicle for a peace process.7 In fact CBMs have under performed their role in the case of Indo-Pak Kashmir conflict. Some of the reasons for their under-performance are: First, there is a problem of commitment. CBMs are seen as a political arrangement that does not entail legal binding or commitment. Thus the contracting parties have selective compliance to CBMs and use them according to their needs. This argument is more relevant to Pakistan. Second, conflict environment in the India-Pakistan case is complex. This undermines the effectiveness of CBMs. Third, when the contracting parties, mostly the weaker ones, perceive CBMs as a peaceful way to dilute their original conflict goal; they seek to undermine the agreed CBMs. Many India-Pakistan CBMs have become redundant or dysfunctional because of this perception held by Pakistan. Fourth, the feeling of one or both parties that

1 Ibd., p. 115.
CBMs are ways to avoid or postpone finding a solution to their problem. This is more widespread in the minds of Pakistanis. Fifth, domestic politics often curtail the prospects of success of CBMs. This is demonstrated in the India-Pakistan case. CBMs fail because the states of the contracting parties remain suspicious of each other as they refuse to have mutual trust. At the same time developing a mutual understanding among their peoples is highly undesirable for them. Therefore, non-military CBMs suffer or fail because of this sort of politically motivated fixation.  

Next feature of Indo-Pak conflict is that it has entrapped the people and leaders. The entrapment factor in the conflict needs to be removed for a successful conflict resolution. Entrapment is present at two levels. Elite entrapment is related to the extent to which the leaders of both countries have committed their political features to winning the conflict. General entrapment denotes the feeling of the critical masses in both societies that they have invested so much in terms of men and materials that they cannot give up the fight without actually accomplishing their original goal.

Finally, interruptions mark the India-Pakistan peacemaking efforts. Peace talks have been invariably short and negotiations are unsustainable. Taking a process approach one can state that India and Pakistan have not developed their 'peace talks into a peace process'. A closer look at the history of India-Pakistan peacemaking will reveal that the peace process has not evolved itself to become a strong factor. Both countries engaged themselves in peace process only four times – during 1948-50 under the UN mediation, during 1962-63 under the two countries conducted a series of ministerial level bilateral negotiations on Kashmir and during 1985-92 when talks were held on the Siachen dispute. To this list, composite dialogue process initiated in 1998 can be included. This process continued even now despite some intermittent breakdown in the recent past. None of these peace
processes has ameliorated the India-Pakistan conflict. Besides, there were four Summits, at Tashkent (1966) mediated by the former Soviet Union, Simla (1972), Lahore (1999) and Agra (2001). Barring the Tashkent Summit, all other Summits were bilaterally initiated and conducted. While the first two Summits resulted in agreement and the Lahore Summit produced a declaration, the Agra Summit could not bring both countries together to agree even on a joint declaration.10

From the above discussion one can conclude that all the characteristics, which were present in the case of Indo-Pak Kashmir conflict, were absent in the case of Indo-Bangladesh Ganga Water conflict. The notable features or characteristics of both the conflicts are not the same. As the significant features of India-Pakistan conflict i.e. the interlocking of issues between the two countries, its multipronged nature, linkage of the conflict with their national ideology, large political value of the conflict, manifestation of it in everyday life etc. were not seen there in the case of Ganga water. Moreover, the ‘significant indicators’ of Indo-Pak conflict like inter-state war, border tension, cross-border intervention, subversion, crisis, hostile propaganda and belligerent behaviour11 were not well recorded in the case of conflict between India and Bangladesh. Perhaps, it is because of the different characteristics of the Ganga water conflict. The conflict over Ganga has been influenced and accentuated by the factors arising out of the geographical location, nation-state formation and political processes of the riparian countries namely India and Bangladesh. The real value of CBMs that is absent in the Indo-Pak case has been seen in the Indo-Bangladesh case. In fact, Indo-Bangladesh case proved that successful CBMs is the one that ultimately makes adversaries redefine their objectives and adopt mutually profitable policies while keeping peace and cooperation in mind. In Indo-Bangladesh case bilateral negotiations, have been able to make the two adversaries change their behaviour, redefine their goal with a view to reaching a compromise solution

10 Sahadevan, no. 3. p. 117-118.
11 Sahadevan, no. 2.
and commit themselves to a negotiation process. Whereas bilateralism is very limited in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Therefore, none of the efforts became successful in resolving the Kashmir conflict even though the list of CBMs has been long. Because in this case it is accepted that CBMs themselves are not solution to international conflicts.

Comparing Conflicts: Success v/s Failure

As we have already discussed in the IIIrd chapter that the Ganga water conflict now stands resolved with singing of the treaty by the Prime Minister of India and Bangladesh. On 12<sup>th</sup> December 1996, the two governments signed the most recent treaty for sharing Ganga waters at Farakka during the dry season (1<sup>st</sup> January to 31<sup>st</sup> May). This treaty is valid for 30 years. The treaty can be viewed in the conflict resolution perspective that aims to resolve the conflict between India and Bangladesh permanently.

In 1996 some unique circumstances developed and their historic alignment resulted in successful conflict resolution initiatives. The United Front-led coalition government came to the power in India with HD Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister and Inder Kumar Gujral as the external affairs minister, in May 1996. The Awami League was voted back to power again after 20 years in Bangladesh and Sheikh Hasina assumed office as the Prime Minister. The Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh signed the historic treaty on the sharing of the Ganga waters in New Delhi on December 12, 1996 during Sheikh Hasina’s three-day state visit to India. Various factors and circumstances facilitated the conclusion of the historic treaty. Among the main factors are the efforts of the Indian minister of external affairs from 1995 onwards to find a solution to this problem, the courage and wisdom of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina in tackling the issue and realisation by the two governments that negotiation failed, relations might become worse than ever before. Therefore, it is a 30-year treaty with a

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provision for a review at the end of the five years or even at the end of two years if either party wants it.

Other important factors behind this success are – First, both the sides realised the urgency of the matter. They conveyed to each other the political commitment to address and resolve the issue on a priority basis. Second, serious discussions for arriving at a solution to the problem began only after the change of governments in the two countries taking place more or less at the same time. Third, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina showed the personal commitment to finding an acceptable solution to the Ganga water sharing issue. Her decision not to internationalise the issue pleased India. She took a major strategic risk for avoiding internationalisation of the issue. Fourth, IK Gujral’s attitude towards India’s neighbours had already been soft. The Gujral doctrine that India should be prepared to give more and get less rather than insist on reciprocity with its smaller neighbours has evidently been at work in forging the Ganga treaty. IK Gujral enjoyed vast freedom on foreign affairs issue under Deve Gowda’s Prime Ministership. Fifth, following the approach, Gujral provided a pleasant surprise during his September 1996 visit to Dhaka by telling the Bangladesh government that India no longer linked water to the transit issue. This was a major departure from Congress government’s long-standing policy to link water with a transit facility for Indian goods, which Bangladesh vehemently opposed.14

Sub-national politics also contributed in the conclusion of the Ganga treaty. West Bengal was the Indian state that would be most affected by an agreement. Thus, it was imperative for it to support any agreement over the Ganga waters. Sheikh Hasina strategically involved Jyoti Basu; the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, in the negotiation process. He also made a personal visit to Bangladesh in November 1996. He visited the Ganga dependent areas and held critically important discussions with politicians and officials. His party was a supporter of Deve Gowda’s United Front Government in New Delhi.

14 Ibid.
Bangladesh, India and West Bengal governments worked collectively to conclude a treaty in December 1996.¹⁵

Therefore, several factors facilitated the conflict resolution between India and Bangladesh. In the same way, there are several factors in Indo-Pak case that hinders the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Despite the existence of a long and impressive list of efforts towards conflict resolution, there are several complexities that have kept the Kashmir problem alive.

There is no lack of initiative towards conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. What is lacking, regrettably, is any worthy success. The following may be considered to be some of the reasons for the depressed state of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan.¹⁶

The inability of conflict resolution measures to effectively contribute towards the desired peace between India and Pakistan can be attributed to many factors. To start with, many Pakistani view Kashmir as part of the unfinished agenda of partition and a symbol of Indian high-handedness and clever manoeuvering. Pakistan feels they have been outwitted and cheated by India. Second, according maximum respect to agreed principles and agreements does not seem to be very common in the case of India and Pakistan. Different interpretations of agreements often tend to further facilitate the strengthening of non-compliance and non-adherence. It is often stressed that honouring the spirit of agreements is not as sacrosanct between India and Pakistan as it is among other countries of South Asia.

India – Pakistan clearly lacks the cordial spirit deemed essential for proper implementation of agreements and understandings. The third factor revolves around perceptions and negative images. Both India and Pakistan continue to entertain negative images of each other. The most prevalent view of India among the Pakistani elite and decision-makers is that of a hegemon

¹⁵ Ibid.
and bully. The Indian view of Pakistan is that of a theocratic and militaristic state.  

Moreover, the major impediments faced by India and Pakistan in establishing a workable peace process is as follows:

- A bitter legacy of distrust.
- Lack of necessary political will on both sides, coupled with the notion that most of the time governments at either side are brought under immense pressures to maintain rigid postures. Thus in the absence of a serious official dialogues and rising popular frustration with governments posture, the problem has remained still alive.
- Divergence in the viewpoint of the two sides in their respective assessment of Confidence Building Measures where India on the one hand, refuses to discuss and negotiate on Kashmir, considering it undisputed, an integral part of the nation as well as an example of India’s secular legacy. Pakistan, on the other hand, considers that the proposed confidence building measures or peace processes are not only insubstantial but also fail to address “core issue” troubling the sub-continent.
- The experience of bilateral dialogue too has been less than gratifying. What has been termed as a ‘Joker-clause syndrom’, the proposals have been made by one side with the fore knowledge that these would be unacceptable to the other seem to be right in view of ground realities in Indo-Pak case. This proneness of negotiations to lapse into

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bureaucratic wrangles has prevented them from moving into serious and sustained efforts at conflict resolution.²⁰

- A very significant factor is that of India and Pakistan’s divergent security perceptions.

- A multilateral forum is also missing, which can be instrumental in eradicating mutual hostilities. The status of the region’s only exclusive forum SAARC has been reduced to nothing more than a coffee club for the respective heads of the seven south Asian states. It does not have the provision for discussing bilateral problems plaguing the member states.

- The role of a domestic political actors, India and Pakistan, which in spite of inheriting a common political heritage have treaded opposite political course.²¹

Rajen Harshe discusses that since India cannot conceive of losing Kashmir, there are several internal complexities, which have kept the Kashmir problem alive. There is a growing demand from human rights groups to protect the civil rights of the people of Kashmir who are victims of state terrorism.²² In this context maximum transparency on the part of the Indian government may bolster the Kashmiri people’s confidence in the Government of India. Moreover, allegiance to India is certainly not synonymous with allegiance to the existing government at the centre. Hence the people of Kashmir must be made to feel free to air their views like other citizens, on Indian politics. Governments in New Delhi will have to be more receptive to the ethnic and cultural identities of Muslim and Hindu communities in Kashmir. For religious sentiments alone can hardly give full expression to their urges. For instance, Muslims as well as Hindus constitute the Dogras of Jammu. The paharis too have people from both the religions while the Ladakhis include

²⁰ Ibid.
²¹ Malik, no. 18, p. 224.
Buddhists as well as Muslims. Only the Gujjars are entirely Muslims. It would be difficult for India to rule over Kashmir democratically without being sensitive to its plurality of identities. Without grasping such pluralities it is almost impossible to get even a rough idea of Kashmiri identity.\footnote{23} In addition to managing the day-to-day problems of governance, India has also had to encounter the threats posed by several terrorist outfits tacitly backed by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate. Moreover, the alleged presence of Taliban mercenaries from Afghanistan in Kashmir has caused grave concern to India’s security community. The potential of terrorist outfits to generate the flow of arms and drugs across India could also prove subversive from the standpoint of the Indian Union. Irrespective of these threats to India’s security, sensitivity to the plight of the people in Kashmir as also the project to reconstruct Kashmir is the dire need of the hour.\footnote{24}

Happyman Jacob describes various reasons ailing peace processes between India and Pakistan. A glance over the many initiatives regarding peace or conflict resolution through track-two diplomacy that had taken place over the years would confirm that most participants in peace initiates, apart from some exceptions in the recent years, are the ‘usual suspects’, namely retired bureaucrats or professional peace-lovers. Many tend to have their own set notions and ideas about Indo-Pak relations and peace building. Moreover, they also have a fixed constituency which is no way is broad. It is interesting to listen to track – two activists saying to one--another, ‘look, the world is so small’ meaning that they keep coming face to face all the time in such meetings.

Peace initiatives suffer from extreme elitism. Most issues discussed in track-two diplomacy come across as ‘elitist’ to most common people. The track-two activists never discuss other mundane issues.\footnote{25} Indeed, while

\begin{itemize}
\item Harshe, no. 22, pp. 55-56.
\item Sagarika Ghosh. “People to people contact is simply not reaching out to real people”, The Indian Express, July 4, 2003.
\end{itemize}
discussing such mundane issues may not solve the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, it does, nonetheless, help create a peaceful constituency. But there is a clear lack of ‘Peace constituency’ in both the countries.26

Bureaucracies in both India and Pakistan are unyielding resolute to such an extent that they totally shut themselves to most non-official initiatives. As a result, they are not used to taking anything unofficial seriously, often contributing to the eventual failure of track-two initiatives. Moreover, media in Pakistan and India, both English and vernacular, are no liberators. Most of the time it is the media in both the countries, which zealously spoil the peace initiatives in the region including track-two ones.27 There is a lack of atypical reporting on Indo-Pak relations or peace initiatives, official or otherwise.

There is a lack of an urge for peace within the minds of both the parties. One damaging myth that prevails in the minds of many peace and track-two activists in the region is that people in general want to have peace between India and Pakistan. But, in fact, this is not true. If that is true, how did politicians in both the countries win the elections on the basis of communal platform? Here the main point is about the circumstances that most people in the region live in.28

After having a cursory glance over the factors, which are responsible for non-resolution of Kashmir, conflict. One can conclude that all such factors, which were present in the relations of India and Bangladesh, are not available in the case of India-Pakistan relations. The factors, which have a great impact on Indo-Pak relations, are something different. In fact, in the conflict between India and Pakistan along their common border, among all these factors, five factors are of particular importance:

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26 Jacob, no. 16, pp. 179-180.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, p. 182.
The international boundaries separating India from Pakistan were determined primarily on the basis of theocratic (rather than geographic) considerations. One result is that Pakistan lacks strategic depth of its vulnerable northern and eastern borders. Thus, Kashmir assumes particular geo-strategic importance for Pakistan.

In a dispute between theocratic state and a secular one, it is particularly difficult to find common ground.

The danger of nuclear exchange is omnipresent. The possession of nuclear weapons has quite possibly reduced the risk of conventional war, but possession of nuclear weapons does not stop low-intensity wars and terrorism.

Based on captures militants and documents, India alleged that Pakistan is actively supporting the various militant foreign and indigenous groups engaged in cross-border terrorist activities in Kashmir. Pakistan denies this and maintains that the allegations presented are unproved and that the Kashmir movement is an indigenous fight for freedom.

Despite earlier bilateral peace talks between the governments and efforts by NGOs, the stand taken by both sides have not appreciably changed. As terrorist raid on the Indian Parliament building on 13 December 2001 has led to a full-scale deployment of the two armies on their respective sides of the border. Pakistan has offered to hold talks with India primarily on the core issue of Kashmir. This has been rejected by an Indian precondition that state sponsored cross-border terrorism should cease before a meaningful dialogue could take place. As the impasse continues tensions between the two countries remain dangerously high.

P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Iftekharuzzaman, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1996) and Sushil K. Pillai, Border Conflicts and Regional Disputes: Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia (New Delhi, 2002).
However, in the absence of the factors, which were present in the Indo-Bangladesh case, the conflict resolution approach in Indo-Pak relations cannot be considered as inapplicable. In face, the conflict resolution approach in Indo-Pak conflicts strengthens the viewpoint that cooperation and mutual understanding, like India and Bangladesh, facilitate peaceful resolution of the conflicts, without making use of violence and war. Continuous efforts in the direction of conflict resolution would bring the issue towards permanent solution. As in spite of presence of favourable factors in Indo-Bangladesh relations, the Farakka issue remained in contention for over two decades before its resolution by the Indo-Bangladesh accord in 1997. In the same way, the Kashmir has impeded by normalization of Indo-Pak relation since their coming into form.

Therefore, past experience in conflict resolution shows that ‘an evolutionary step by step approach seems to work best’. Thus the conflict resolution helped in bringing peace through converting the volatile nature of the issue into normal one. It paved the way for further steps towards the permanent resolution of the conflict.