CHAPTER 3

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS—A REVIEW

There are four distinct concepts in which disarmament is generally understood: (1) the penal destruction or reduction of the armament of a country defeated in war; (2) bilateral disarmament agreements applying to specific geographic areas; (3) the complete abolition of all armaments and (4) the reduction and limitation of national armament by general international agreement.¹ Disarmament in the first sense was enforced in ancient times and as recently as in world wars I and II. Disarmament in the second sense is symbolised by the agreement between the United States and the Great Britain which, since 1817, has kept the great lakes and the U.S.-Canadian border disarmed.² Disarmament in the third sense is considered to be a utopian concept advocated by certain individual thinkers and governments. In the fourth sense, its most frequent current use, it did not come before an international assembly until the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907.

The preservation of peace and promotion of disarmament became the two most important issues after world war I. The end of the Great War as it came to be called saw the birth of an understanding, seemingly universal at that time, that the war should not be repeated and the world must be brought back to normalcy.

The efforts however, to reduce, limit and proscribe weapons can be traced back to 600 B.C. when the Chinese States of Yangtze Valley tired of recurrent wars, entered a disarmament league thereby achieving for themselves peace for a long period stretching to almost a century. In the modern times, the Great Britain and the United States, adversaries in the war of 1812, agreed to enter into an agreement in 1817\(^1\) as mentioned earlier whereby they agreed to limit their naval power on the Great Lakes to three vessels each, of equal tonnage and armament, achieved peace which has lasted them for almost 170 years keeping the American Canadian frontier free of conflict.

Instances of successful arms limitation are few. The two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 failed in their efforts to curb the arms race which preceded world war I. Between the two world wars, the efforts were intensified with no lasting effects. For example, the 5-5-3 ratio introduced amongst the navies of the United States, Britain and Japan at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 remained binding only for a few years. By the end of 1920s, Japan had clandestinely started acquiring the power necessary for her ambitious adventures of 1930s and 1940s.

Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations committed its members to the proposition that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." To carry out this principle

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\(^1\)The Rush-Bagot Agreement (1817).
into practice seemed an arduous task and the efforts to resolve the issue, whether safety came first or the arms reduction, failed miserably with the Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries and the United States arguing that disarmament would produce security and France, Belgium and East European countries wanting to give priority to national security.

Efforts to bring in conciliation between the conflicting points of view continued and culminated in setting up of a preparatory commission to explore the possibilities of disarmament in 1925.

Efforts to enhance the security of nations also continued meanwhile and mention must be made of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. The Kellogg Briand Pact (1928) was another step in the same direction but failed to provide the much wanted security.

In the realm of disarmament, a spectacular plan was put forward by the then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Maxim Litvinov in 1927, offering total disarmament. It was rejected. However, the Soviets returned to it a generation later. An ambitious though comprehensive proposal was presented to the Disarmament Conference of 1932 by the U.S.A. It proposed drastic

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1. Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 proposed to do away with war by simply getting the nations of the world to denounce war as an instrument of national policy.
curtailment of armaments by land, sea and air. It came to be called the Hoover Plan after the name of the United States' President. However, this proposal also failed because no agreement could be reached on the basic issue of whether safety came first or disarmament. The world thus moved inexorably towards world war II, arming frantically and finally going through the ordeal.

In the aftermath of the second world war, disarmament emerged as the most important item on the agenda of international politics. The concern amongst the scientists, politicians, military personnel and the scholars, about the need to disarm or to control the spread of atomic weapons was discernible immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This concern was based on the belief that the atomic weapon was the "absolute weapon" which offered no adequate defence. It must, however, be noted that behind the scene efforts had been made even after the test explosion at Alamogordo not to drop the bombs on Japan.¹ However, that was not to be and the final act exposed the fragility of all concepts of security which had hitherto guided the conduct of nations, and the security of human kind stood imperilled as never before.

Disarmament assumed greater importance and became the imperative need of human survival when atomic energy came to be invested with new dimensions.² The scientific and technological advancement brought about better, more lethal and more accurate weapons, with better and faster

¹. See Chapter I, ADVENT OF THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, p.11.
². See Chapter 5, DISARMAMENT : AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE, p. 177-179.
modes of delivery, jeopardising the safety of any country in any part of the world. The problem acquired greater depth and magnitude with both space and the high seas being no longer immune from the ravages of large scale destruction which the new found weapons and the new delivery systems were capable of inflicting. Matters did not rest at that, the arms trade militarised the world and armaments acquired political clout. The armaments became an extremely powerful, albeit indirect, instrument in the hands of the nation which possessed and supplied them, to influence and direct policies and events in other parts of the world where such armaments were or could be supplied. Instances of internal unrest aided and abetted by the haves, became more and more frequent in the Third World countries.\textsuperscript{1}

Security continued to be undermined all over the world. Even in the case of super powers, possession of unprecedented power, and spectacular advancement, achieved in various fields has failed to provide or ensure security such as can be expected to endure. No power is immune from the repercussions of environmental effects of a nuclear war or safe from accidents; nor can the possibility of irresponsible use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups or desperate leaders be ruled out.\textsuperscript{2}

Attempts in this environment to achieve security have been confined largely to checking the arms race and to reducing and restricting military capabilities. It is perhaps inevitable, though unfortunate, that every

\textsuperscript{1}See Chapter II, ARMS AND INSECURITY OF NATIONS, pp. 49-51. Also Appendix IIB, Table-2.4.
\textsuperscript{2}See Chapter I, ADVENT OF THE ATOMIC AGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, pp. 30-32.
country considers its own security to be of paramount importance to the exclusion of others.'

Nevertheless there has been no dearth of attempts to salvage the situation. In the post-war years there had come into existence a realisation though short lived of the horrors of armaments, specially nuclear, which raised hopes of an international order based on mutual cooperation. It was like a silver lining in a dark cloud and it looked as though a new international order could be created before national rivalries in the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons would overtake the events. The first attempt made in the direction of regulating or controlling nuclear weaponry manifested itself in the 'BARUCH PLAN' (or LILIENTHAL PLAN) of June 14, 1946, followed by the Soviet 'DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION' of 1946 and the Soviet proposals made on June 11, 1947.

The 'BARUCH PLAN'¹ was submitted by the United States to the United Nations. It proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority(IADA) which would control and inspect all nuclear facilities.It envisaged renunciation of national sovereignty in the area of nuclear weaponry and would lead eventually, it was hoped, to a renunciation of sovereignty over other kinds of armaments and wishfully

to a renunciation of the sovereign right of nations to wage war. Once the international control in terms of this plan was established, all stocks of atomic bombs possessed by the U.S. would be destroyed and henceforward the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes would be eliminated. The U.S. proposal also stressed the importance of according immediate punishment to those who tried to infringe the rights of the Authority and maintained that there should be no 'veto' to protect those who violated their agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. Later the U.S. also proposed that International Authority should have the exclusive right of ownership and operation of all facilities for the production of uranium 235 as well as plutonium and that the Authority was to be non-political, although its decisions were to have considerable degree of finality. Once this system of control and sanctions was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons would cease, existing stocks would be destroyed and all technological information would be communicated to the Authority. In other words, control would have to come first, atomic disarmament would follow. The BARUCH PLAN coming as it did from the United States which then was the only country possessing the nuclear knowhow and nuclear weapons, aroused a great deal of interest and hope but the proposals somehow became the subject of keen controversy in and outside the United Nations. And the

plan came to be ultimately vetoed by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it would undermine national sovereignty and amount to interference in the internal affairs of the States; also that the provision denying the right of veto was contrary to the Charter. It also appeared that the Soviet Union was not interested in negotiating points of detail. And thus the plan which could have ushered in a new era came to an ignominious end.

The Soviet Union, on its part, put forward proposals in the form of a Draft Convention which in a way reversed the U.S. proposal. The Soviet Union proposed\(^1\) instead of a supra-national authority with sovereign powers, a simple treaty\(^2\) prohibiting the ownership and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and providing for destruction of all existing atomic weapons within a period of three months. An international system of supervision of the implementation of these commitments was envisaged with infringements and violations being punishable by domestic legislation. The Soviet Union laid a good deal of emphasis on the concept that national power came first, international order second. In retrospect it looks as though a great opportunity of achieving a historic landmark was missed by mankind as soon as the Soviet Union rejected the BARUCH PLAN.

1. It was also known as the 'Gromyko Plan'. For details see Evan Luard (Ed.), FIRST STEPS TO DISARMAMENT, (London, Thames and Hudson, 1965) pp.16-20.
The basic differences in the approach of super powers to the establishment of a new international order continued to persist and the deadlock continued despite the fact that in 1948 at the insistence of the United States, the U.S. General Assembly approved the 'BARUCH PLAN' by an overwhelming majority.

In the period between 1945 and 1950, there were two glaring facts which heightened the cold war tensions and made any agreement impossible. One was the U.S. possession of the atomic power while the other was the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional armaments. It was these two factors which, more than others, accounted in a large measure for the difference in the approach of the two powers to the question of disarmament. Both tried to counter each other in these fields. During this phase divergent views and interests of nuclear and non-nuclear powers kept clashing with the fundamental differences centering primarily around the point whether destruction of nuclear stocks should precede prohibition or whether prohibition or control should precede destruction. Behind the facade of this divergence of opinion, there were more fundamental differences between the two powers which concerned the means to be employed for achieving the controls, and for the enforcement of the controls decided upon as well as the degree of control to be exercised.

In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic device. This was a dramatic development which
imparted a new dimension to the question of disarmament and international control. Even though the Soviet Union remained comparatively behind the U.S.A. in the quantity and versatility of atomic weapons, it had nevertheless achieved a sort of parity claiming at the same time the superiority, in the field of conventional weapons. There was thus a shift between 1950 and 1955, in the super powers' approach to disarmament. Discussions during this period became more specific, deeper in content and more detailed. This not only complicated the discussions but prolonged them as detailed and elaborate plans for gradual reduction in armaments started coming in from both sides. The Soviet Union accepted the need for a 'strict system of control' to enforce a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and a resolution to this effect was introduced by the U.S.S.R. in the General Assembly in November 1950. The U.S.A. and the western powers on the other hand brought forward proposals for simultaneous control of both nuclear and conventional weapons. The idea of extending the scope of talks on disarmament so as to include conventional weapons appears to have assumed some importance after the Korean War, \(^1\), which brought home the point that it was not always possible to use atomic weapons effectively in conventional warfare or against attacks with conventional weapons. A committee was set up in 1951, and in January 1952, a Disarmament Commission

\(^1\) India's initiative on this, in the U.N. and outside was taken on a non-partisan basis in order to diffuse the situation. India's amended version of the power draft resolution of Korean situation was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December, 1950 leading to negotiations in 1951 and armistice in July 1953. For details see P.N.Haksar (Ed.), NEHRU'S VISION OF ASIA AND THE WORLD,(Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1987).
came into being. It was entrusted with the task of preparing proposals for a draft treaty for the 'regulation, limitation and balanced reduction' of all armed forces and all armaments. While atomic weapons were to be totally abolished, the armed forces were to be reduced to the extent of providing only defensive protection. It was hoped that "effective international inspection with minimum interference in the internal life of each country" would be carried out. However, the Soviet Union continued to demand as a first step an unconditional ban on atomic weapons and insisted that any genuine disarmament proposal should include an international control organ within the Security Council which would be responsible for verification and inspection. Further it demanded that all permanent members reduce their forces by one third within a year of the signing of the proposed convention.

The next three years saw a number of concrete proposals from the West including specific force levels for particular stages of the plans. In a proposal by the U.S., the U.K. and France (1952) man power levels were laid down for the U.S., Soviet Union and China of 1 to 1.5 million and 700,000 to 800,000 for the U.K. and France and levels normally less than 'one per cent of the population' for other powers. In 1954 the U.S.A. accepted the right of veto of permanent members in the proposed U.N. Disarmament and Development Authority. The British and French governments also introduced proposals which
brought the West closer to the Soviet position on three vital points in as much as these Governments—

(a) Changed their original stand on the question of international ownership of nuclear materials and operation of nuclear facilities to finally abandon the demand;

(b) decided to accept overall control through the Security Council with the Veto power of the permanent members intact;

(c) agreed to accept prohibition before the beginning of any disarmament process.

Similarly the Soviet Union also made concessions and moved closer to the West's position in three ways. It—

(a) agreed to postpone the imposition of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons to a later stage in the sequence (so that the differences on this point were now virtually eliminated);

(b) accepted the idea of effective inspection on a permanent (rather than periodic) basis with unhindered access to all objects of control; and

(c) accepted a stage by stage reduction towards the same force level as the Western Powers had proposed.

It looked as though the differences which had dogged the negotiations so far were on the verge of being reconciled. Differences, however, arose over other issues.


which seemed to defy solution. The Soviets demanded the elimination of all foreign bases. This was not acceptable to the West. Timings and mechanisms of control needed to be clarified and the Soviet concept of objects of control was vague in that it seemed to exclude all objects which were undeclared. Again while the Soviet Union favoured 'veto' for every permanent member for deciding the use of nuclear weapons, the West wanted the use of nuclear weapons to be unfettered, to resist aggression.

The 1955 Geneva Summit discussed the Soviet programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons along with a British proposal on joint inspection of forces confronting each other in Europe and also a French proposal for reduction of military budgets and using the savings to assist underdeveloped countries. A U.S. plan for 'open skies' to guard against surprise attack was also discussed. Under this plan the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange blue prints about the strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations. Verification of information was to be accompanied by ground observation and by mutual unrestricted aerial reconnaissance. The Soviet Union

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considered this to be control without disarmament while the United States maintained that an effective method of inspection and control was the first requirement of an agreement.

In the course of the next few years the stance of the super powers changed again. The U.S.A. continued to enjoy superiority during this phase and the Soviet Union maintained its better position in the field of intelligence and missile technology. The policy which both powers pursued was that of maintaining or safeguarding the advantages which each possessed. Hence all the talks/proposals which came up during this period were conditioned by the desire on the part of the U.S. to prevent the Soviet Union from catching up in stocks of weapons, while proposals emanating from the Soviet Union sought to prevent the West in catching up in intelligence. Apart from this both the powers by now were considerably disillusioned about the prospects of comprehensive disarmament. This resulted in their attention being turned to measures of arms control. A lot of discussion took place in this direction and finally culminated in 1958, in a number of conferences outside the aegis of the United Nations. The first of these conferences was the result of the international concern which had been growing ever since the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had appealed for a 'Standstill
Agreement' on nuclear explosions, in 1954,\(^1\) after the U.S. test explosion of a hydrogen bomb which resulted in a Japanese fishing boat the 'Fukuryu Maryu's contamination by radio-active fall-out. A great outcry was the outcome in and outside\(^2\) the Indian Parliament when the news of contamination came. At this juncture Nehru called for a 'Standstill Agreement' for nuclear bomb testing and had his views forwarded to the United Nations Secretary General in April 1954. The proposal was repeated at the U.N. General Assembly by Krishna Menon in October 1954. This concern resulted in a number of conferences outlining an extensive system of controls and discontinuance of nuclear weapons, outside the aegis of the United Nations. The efforts continued until 1962.

Another conference on the question of prevention of surprise attacks took place during this period. Unfortunately, it could not arrive at any conclusion and proved to be a total failure.

No agreement, as is evident, could be reached on any single arms control measure during the first eighteen years following the world war II (with the exception of the 1959 Treaty for the Demilitarization of the Antarctic), though elaborate proposals were made for general and complete disarmament by both the super powers.

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1. For details see Shyam Bhatia, op. cit., p. 56. Also United Nations Documents D.C. 44.
For the fourteenth General Assembly session of the United Nations in 1959, the ice was broken when the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev proposed the following disarmament programme:

1. Disbanding of all armed forces—land, naval and air—and prohibition of their establishment.
2. Destruction of all forms of armaments and military supplies.
3. Elimination of all warships, military aircraft and all other types of military equipment.
4. Abolition of all nuclear weapons, including hydrogen bombs, prohibition of their manufacture and destruction of their stock-piles.
5. Abolition of all military missiles and prohibition of their manufacture.
6. Prohibition of production, possession and storage of the means of chemical and biological warfare.
7. Abolition of all military bases in the territories of foreign states.
8. Cessation of all military production.
9. Termination of all military training and abolition of military service.
10. Abolition of war-ministries, general staffs and all other military establishments and organisations.
11. Discontinuance of all military expenditures.
12. Prohibition of war propaganda.
13. Retaining of strictly limited national police forces for preservation of law and order.
14. Establishment of an international control organ, in which all countries are represented, for the purpose of surveillance of such general and complete disarmament.

The programme was meant to be carried out over a period of four years. Revolutionary in approach, comprehensive in character and far reaching in its implications, the programme was nevertheless too idealistic to be practicable. It was followed by counter proposals by the West, (the U.S., the U.K., France, Canada and Italy) in the form of a 'Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World' in March 1960. The Plan visualised three distinct stages in a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Stage One-
(a) Establishment of an International Disarmament Organisation (IDO).
(b) Requirement that the IDO be informed in advance of the launching of artificial satellites and other ballistic missile launchings.
(c) Submission of full and accurate information to the IDO on the size of armed forces.
(d) Initial reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under IDO supervision and verification.
(e) Submission of full and accurate information to the IDO on military expenditure.
(f) Joint study of control and verification procedures-including prohibition of the launching of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons in outer-space, prior notification of missile launchings, public announcement of missile launching sites and manufacturing of fissile materials other than prescribed amounts for use for peaceful purposes, prevention of surprise attacks and so forth.

Stage Two-
(a) Implementation of verification measures devised

in the joint studies undertaken in Stage one, including aerial surveillance, ground inspection and other measures to prevent surprise attacks with suspension of production of nuclear weapons and conversion of the facilities for such production of peaceful uses, on condition that an adequate control system has been established and progress has been made in reduction of conventional armaments.

(b) Reduction of the strengths of the U.S. and Soviet armed forces to 2.1 million men each.

(c) Verification of information provided on military budgets.

Stage Three-

(a) Enlargement of the functions of the IDO and establishment of an International Police Organisation.

(b) Gradual reduction of all armaments to the minimum requirement for maintenance of domestic law and order.

(c) Prohibition of production and stock-piling of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons and eventual destruction of all such stock-piles.

(d) Prohibition of the military exploitation of outer-space.

(e) Control of the manufacture and stock-piling of military missiles and eventual destruction of such stock-piles.

(f) International control of military budgets.¹

The proposals of the Soviet Union and those of the United States contained everything that could be required for the attainment of the goals of disarmament/arms control. However no serious negotiations took place and

only lip service was paid to the high ideals and aspirations underlying the proposals. In 1959, following a decision of the foreign ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee was set up with East and West represented in equal numbers which achieved nothing. It was followed by an Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). ENDC was in fact an extension of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament with reorganised negotiating functions. It was set up in 1962. Eight non-aligned members were added to the original ten to bring the number to eighteen. In 1969 it became the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) with a membership of 26 nations. Its membership was expanded again to 31 in 1975. All these achieved precious little and the basic pattern of distrust between East and West continued to prevail.

It would not be fair to conclude that all these negotiations were a total waste because something did emerge out of this long and protracted background of talks, in the form of treaties for arms control and disarmament measures. It would be worthwhile to look into some of the broad aspects of the treaties signed at multilateral, bilateral and regional levels.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY

The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959 in Washington and entered into force on 23 June,
1961. It prohibits the use of the Antarctic area, for military purposes, nuclear explosions of any kind, or for the disposal of radio-active waste material.\(^1\) It also provides for an inspection system to guarantee against militarization of the area. The most positive contribution of the Treaty to world peace is its suspension of territorial claims of nations to Antarctic South of 60° South latitude for the duration of the treaty. A review of the Treaty is scheduled in 1991. It is generally felt that it would be in the interest of the world community to keep this treaty in effect indefinitely. Apart from that, the Antarctic Treaty is an important preventive measure, the first of its kind, in the sense that it has helped to prevent the use of the empty expanses of the Antarctic as a nuclear testing ground or a nuclear weapon base. Its significance cannot be denied.

Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Republics, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America are the signatories to the Treaty.

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\(^1\) It is similar to the 1920 Treaty. (Pre-World War II) regulating the status of Spitsbergen which prohibits the establishment of any naval base or the construction of any fortifications in Spitsbergen (A group of islands lying North of Scandinavia).

Article I lays down that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. Nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material are prohibited by Article V(1) of the Treaty.
PARTIAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

This treaty was opened for signature on August 8, 1963 and came into force on October 10, 1963. It prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater or in any other environment where explosions would cause radio-active material to fall outside the territorial limits of the State conducting the test. Though the Treaty has considerable environmental significance, its significance for nuclear disarmament should not be over-estimated. The capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weaponry had already reached a point where underground tests were quite sufficient. France and China did not sign the treaty and they continued "testing" in the atmosphere. Apart from this, the underground tests permitted under the Treaty do release radio-active products into the air to some extent. However, to a limited extent the Treaty lowered the tensions between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as well as protected the atmosphere and the oceans from uncalculated hazards in addition to checking military rivalry in outer space.

The Treaty was signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at

1. Article I. 1(a) and (b) stipulate that no nuclear tests as would cause radio-active material to fall outside the territorial limits of the country conducting such tests shall be carried out.

Article I.2 deals with the environment clauses refraining each of the parties from causing, encouraging or participating in any nuclear test explosions in any of the environments described.
Moscow and these are referred to as "Original Parties". The list of other countries which signed and ratified it is given in Appendix III A.

TREATY ON OUTER SPACE AND CELESTIAL BODIES

This treaty which came into force on October 10, 1967, prohibits objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction from being placed either in orbit around the earth or on any celestial body other than the earth.\(^1\) It is not as definitive as the Antarctic Treaty in its scope in spite of prohibition of "establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies",\(^2\) in the sense that it does not demilitarize the areas to which it pertains. Its prohibitions also do not cover ICBM flights or "Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems" (FOBS). Weapons of mass destruction have not been defined and also technologically speaking both the super powers have not sacrificed much in the sense that the disadvantages of placing such weapons of mass destruction in outer space outweigh their military usefulness. Demilitarization of outer space is a far cry as long as ballistic missiles exist in weapon arsenals and satellites for command, control, communications and

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1. The official title of the Treaty is: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.
2. Article IV of the Treaty.
intelligence (C³1) operate in space. However, the treaty checks to some extent unrestricted military developments and is of unlimited duration. Depository Governments were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

TLATELOLCO TREATY

The Treaty of Tlatelolco¹ has the distinction of establishing the first nuclear weapon free zone in densely inhabited territory of Latin America. The only other zone that also covers inhabited territories is the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, created by the Treaty of Rarotonga which entered into force on December 11, 1986.

The genesis of the Treaty of Tlatelolco can be traced to the Joint Declaration of April 29, 1963, of the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Equador and Mexico, in which they announced that their governments were willing to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which they would undertake not "to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices." Six other Latin American States-Costa Rica, EL Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay joined seven months later in submitting a draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly requesting for such technical facilities and help as they

may require with a view to achieving the aim of denuclearization of Latin America. Intensive efforts of several years culminated in the final draft of the Treaty, which was submitted for approval on February 12, 1967. It was unanimously approved and subscribed to by the representatives of 14 out of its 21 members. The U.K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China and France are the more important of the signatories which are mostly states from Latin America and the Carribean. Presently, more than two decades later, the number of signatories stands at 26 of which 23 are already parties to the Treaty. It has also been ratified by Brazil and Chile, but is not in force for them due to certain reservations. Argentina has signed it but not ratified it. Belize and Guyana have statutory difficulties in signing it and a number of newly independent Carribean States-Dominica, St.Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St.Kitts and Nevis have yet to accede to the Treaty.

The Treaty merits attention as the first serious attempt to create a nuclear free zone in sovereign territories. However, due to certain ambiguities, the Treaty, it is claimed, is not fully capable of achieving the desired goals.\(^1\) Firstly, it permits nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and secondly, it does not explicitly forbid the transit or transport of nuclear weapons. Some of the geographical provisions of the

Treaty are imprecise and some signatories including the U.K. and the U.S.A. have reserved their right to reconsider action in the event of aggression.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)\(^1\) signed on July 1, 1968 by 103 States prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to any recipient; prohibits help in developing nuclear weapons; prohibits the receipt of such transfer or such help directly or indirectly.\(^2\) The States party to the Treaty also "undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's Safeguard systems for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices".\(^3\)

A number of countries do not consider it a disarmament measure as it tends to sustain the privileged position of nuclear powers who go on adding to their arsenals and clamour that the rest of the world should not go nuclear. The very concept of the NPT therefore, is considered by several countries to be faulty. While it prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons

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1. For the text of treaty see Appendix III B.
2. Article I of the Treaty.
3. Article III.1 of the Treaty.
by an overwhelming majority of States, it tolerates the retention of the same weapons by a privileged few. In this sense it is assailed as discriminatory in nature. All the non-nuclear states who are a party to the Treaty have in reality assumed the main burden of the obligation. Nevertheless its importance for reducing the likelihood of greater international instability caused by an increase in the number of nuclear powers is undeniable. India is not a party to this treaty.¹

THE SEA BED TREATY

The Treaty² was drawn up after intensive consultations extending over a period of two years 1969-1970 in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. The draft Treaty was finally submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its twentyfifth session and was adopted by it in May 1972.

It envisages prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed of objects equipped with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It does not apply to the sea-bed within the territorial waters nor does it restrict the activities of nuclear submarines equipped with Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Neither does it restrict the deployment of weapon systems other than nuclear or mass-destructive. Forty two States are party to it. Though its scope is very limited as far

¹For details see K.Subrahmanyam, "India's Role in Nuclear Disarmament", INDIAN AND FOREIGN REVIEW, 22(2), Feb. 15, 1985, pp. 11-12; and Maj.Gen.D.K.Palit, P.K.S.Namboodiri, PAKISTAN'S ISLAMIC BOMB,(New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979) pp. 64-83: and also Chapter V-DISARMAMENT, AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE.

²The official title of the treaty is The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.
as disarmament implications are concerned, it does provide an important limitation and prevents the ocean floor from becoming an area of discord.\textsuperscript{1}

The first Review Conference on the operation of the Sea-bed Treaty took place at Geneva between June 20 and July 1, 1977. All the forty two members party to it attended it. Final declaration of the Review Conference gave an assessment of the Treaty's general effectiveness. The Soviet delegation expressed its readiness to engage in negotiations for agreement on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. This was reaffirmed in the second Review Conference held at Geneva from September 12 to 23, 1983.

Unfortunately, the Governments of some States in order to achieve military superiority have preferred to follow a course of exacerbating international tension and further intensifying the arms race, rather than follow a policy of strengthening detente. This attitude has bogged down the negotiations on further steps leading to complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

There were 73 States party to the Treaty after the Second Review Conference took place in Geneva in September 1983.

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Opened for signatures on April 10, 1972, it came into force on March 26, 1975. This Treaty prohibits the development, production, stock-piling, acquisition or retention of biological agents or toxins for military purposes or of weapons designed to use such agents. In a sense, it can be said to be the only example of achievement thus far of disarmament with respect to a particular system of weapons. It is argued that biological weapons are uncontrollable and liable to rebound on their user, which is why, the agreement came to be made without much difficulty. There have been several allegations that biological weapons have been employed by some of the belligerents in regional conflicts, the allegations have been verified by the U.N. fact finding missions which have confirmed their use in the Iran Iraq War (1980-88). By the end of 1984, the Convention had been ratified by 100 countries. The depository governments are the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

First Review Conference was held at Geneva from March 3 to 21, 1980. The Second Review Conference was convened in 1986 which decided to hold in 1987 an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States Parties. The Ad Hoc Meeting was held at Geneva from March 31 to April 15, 1987.

ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION, 1977

This Convention on Prohibition of Military or Any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques prohibits the use of environmental modification techniques with long lasting or wide spread effect, for military or other hostile purposes. These are techniques for changing, through deliberate manipulation, of natural processes. It was opened for signatures at Geneva on May 18, 1977 and entered into force on October 5, 1978. The terms 'long lasting', 'wide spread' which were used in the Convention were not properly defined and therefore provided a loophole. The usefulness of the Convention is confined to general affirmation. It is difficult to enforce.

AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES

An Agreement for which the Secretary General of the United Nations was designated depository, entered into force on July 11, 1984. It states, that the moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It also stipulates that while exploring and using the moon, states, parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment (Article 7). The Agreement is in accordance

1. During the negotiations the term 'wide spread' meant encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; 'long lasting' referred to a period of months and 'severe' was to be interpreted as involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural or economic resources or other assets.
with the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The proposal was made at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) to contribute to the control and verification of international arms regulation and disarmament agreements, about which till 1984 no progress had been made. The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to receive major attention both within and outside the United Nations in 1987. However, there was no breakthrough in efforts to achieve the object. At the forty second session of the General Assembly a single resolution 42/33 was adopted urging the Soviet Union and the United States to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TREATY

The need to control and finally ban the nuclear armaments has been given top priority in disarmament negotiations. Control of conventional weapons though considered important and crucial to world peace has comparatively remained in the background. It is a kind of paradox that while the world has been struggling to ban nuclear weapons, all the wars that have been fought since

1 The official title of the treaty is Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
the advent of the atomic bomb have been fought with conventional weapons. The global annual military expenditure on such armaments is estimated to account for over 80 per cent of annual military expenditure.¹

Escalating accumulation of conventional weapons, unprecedented growth in arms transfers, the frequency of use of conventional weapons by developing nations and their destructive and destabilizing effects, specially at the regional level and the qualitative advancement which has blurred the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons are some of the causes which have focussed attention on the issue of conventional disarmament since the 1980's.

All this concern, culminated in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects along with its three annexed protocols, on December 2, 1983.

The Convention provided for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land mines, and booby traps and prohibits entirely the use of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. It is the first international arms regulation agreement

negotiated at a United Nations Conference. The Convention and its Protocols represent a significant step in efforts to prohibit or at least restrict the use of certain categories of weapons. As of the end of 1987, 28 countries had ratified it.

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

Commonly known as the Rarotonga Treaty, it was opened for signature on August 6, 1985 and entered into force on December 11, 1986.

This Treaty prohibits its parties from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing or having control over any nuclear device inside or outside the zone. It also forbids their carrying out nuclear testing and commits them to refrain from and prevent the dumping of radio-active materials at sea anywhere within the zone. The Treaty of Rarotonga, makes the South Pacific the second populated region, after Latin America,\(^1\) a nuclear free zone. By the end of 1987, the Treaty had been ratified by 9 states.

The Treaty expresses renewed faith and support for the idea of the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones which it is believed would, greatly assist in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately promote nuclear disarmament.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Disarmament negotiations have been carried out at bilateral levels as well. A number of such agreements have been signed by the U.S.A. and the

\(1\).See Treaty of Tlatelolco, p. 101.
U.S.S.R. Some of the important ones are listed below. The first three agreements viz., Hot-Line Agreement, 1963; Nuclear Accidents Agreement, 1971; and Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas pertain to establishing direct link between the super powers, providing immediate information regarding any nuclear accident that might have taken place and promoting conditions of safety on the high seas to avoid conflict lest it should escalate. The other agreements, the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I(SALT I), 1972, SALT II 1979, and the I.N.F. Treaty 1987, deal generally with arms control and nuclear and conventional disarmament measures.

'HOT -LINE 'AGREEMENT 1963

This establishes direct communication line between the two super powers in emergency. It was extended to the U.K. in 1967. There were some improvements in the Agreement made in 1971 and 1978. These provide that each government should take the responsibility to make arrangements for the communication link on its own territory which should function continuously and should promptly relay messages to the head of the government. It was specified that the link should comprise of:

(i) two terminal points with tele-type equipment;

(ii) a full time duplex wire telegraph circuit routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow; and

(iii) a full time duplex radio telegraph circuit routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow.
If the wire circuit should be damaged or interrupted, messages would be transmitted by the radio circuit. Advancement in satellite communication technology subsequently increased the reliability of the 'Hot-Line'.

The arrangement has evidently turned out to be useful. It has been used several times by Washington and Moscow during times of stress (in 1967 and in 1973 in the Arab Israeli war). In 1966, France signed an accord establishing a direct communication link between Elysee Palace and the Kremlin. A direct communication line was set up between the Kremlin and 10 Downing Street in 1967.

NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AGREEMENT 1971

Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to inform immediately about any nuclear accident taking place which could create a risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without its causing damage.

PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS 1972

This bilateral agreement provides for measures to assure the safety of navigation of ships of the
The ABM Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States signed on May 26, 1972 prohibits the deployment of ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) Systems for the defence of the whole territory of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. or of an individual region, except when expressly permitted. Permitted deployments are restricted to two sites in each country—one for the protection of the national capital, and the other for the protection of an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) complex. The centres of the two deployment areas for each party must be at least 1300 Kms apart. No more than 100 ICBM interceptor missiles may be deployed in each ABM deployment area. ABM radars should not exceed specified numbers and are
subject to qualitative restrictions. The parties may not transfer to other states, and not deploy outside their national territories, the ABM systems or components thereof which are limited by the Treaty. The Treaty is accompanied by agreed and unilateral statements, as well as common understandings. It came into force on October 30, 1972.

In 1974, in a Protocol to the ABM Treaty, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. introduced further restrictions on ballistic missile defence. They agreed to limit themselves to a single area for deployment of ABM systems.

One particular point to be noted in the Treaty is that the agreed limitations concerned anti-missile systems in the form in which they existed. At that time they were quite unreliable and patently inadequate for preventing nuclear warheads from reaching the target. Their modernization was allowed apart from the development of ABM systems based on other physical principles than the systems limited by the ABM Treaty. In a statement attached to the Treaty, the parties merely agreed that in the event of such new means of anti-ballistic missile protection being created in the future, their specific limitations would be subject to discussion and agreement.

A lot of progress has already been made in the development of new ballistic missile defensive
concepts—like in the fields of target detection, recognition, tracking and interception. With the laser technology coming in, it would be possible to destroy incoming missiles with laser beams. All these along with the SDI constitute a latent danger to the ABM Treaty. Although of unlimited duration, the Treaty is subject to review at five year intervals. It can be denounced on six months' notice.¹

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY I (SALT I)

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) also signed on May 26, 1972 came into force on January 30, 1972 provides for a freeze for a period of five years on the aggregate number of fixed land-based launchers and ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines. The conversion of land based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types, into land based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs is prohibited. Strategic bombers are not covered by the limitations.

According to the Protocol which is an integral part of the Agreement, it is specified that the U.S.A. may have not more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines, while the U.S.S.R. may have not more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.


The Interim Agreement was to expire on October 3, 1977. However, in September, 1977, both the powers formally declared that they would refrain from any action which went against the provisions of goals of the Agreement.

Some discrepancies are apparent in the Treaty. The specifications of land based launchers capable of firing ballistic missiles at a range in excess of 5,500 Kms are vague. The Soviet Intermediate Range rockets capable of reaching the territories of the United States' European Allies and other countries but incapable of reaching the U.S. territory are not included. While quantitative restrictions have been laid down for both sides, there are no restrictions in the Interim Agreement regarding improvement of the quality of weapons, on the survivability, accuracy and range. The agreed replacement procedures have made it possible for the parties to substitute modern models for obsolete types of weapons and the number of nuclear war-heads each missile can carry has not been circumscribed at all. Hence the absence of qualitative restrictions reduced the value of the Agreement and the arms race continued to be fuelled by technological advancement.

VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD

The negotiations to improve matters continued further in Vladivostok. From a joint summit meeting
held at Vladivostok, both the super powers issued a joint statement establishing the principle of equal ceilings on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The agreed limit for each side was 2400 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Launchers (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Launchers and Heavy Bombers. Of these 2400 delivery vehicles, only 1320 launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) would be allowed. Under these ceilings both the powers were left with the freedom to compose their forces according to their wishes.

Disagreement occurred, however, on the question of limiting the so called 'Backfire' aircraft and the 'Cruise Missiles'.

In March 1977, the U.S. proposed a new and more comprehensive proposal which went beyond the Vladivostok formula. It aimed at reducing significantly the nuclear arsenals of both the powers as well as it sought to impose strict restrictions on the deployment of new systems and on the modernization of existing ones. The proposal imposed greater limitation on the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons programme than it did on the US plan, hence it was immediately rejected by the U.S.S.R. However, negotiations were resumed at Geneva and a new

1.'Back fire' is the NATO designation for a modern swing wing twin engine Soviet bomber. The TU 22M which is deployed for theatre and anti-ship roles but which on certain flight profiles(high altitude, low speed) or with in flight refuelling can have an inter-continental capability.
2.'Cruise Missiles' are pilotless vehicles, which can fly at very low altitudes and can be air, ground or sea launched.
framework was adopted that permitted long term agreement on limits below the overall Vladivostok ceiling which became the structure of the SALT Agreements reached two years later.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY II (SALT II)

SALT II signed on June 18, 1979, set for both the parties an initial ceiling of 2400 on ICBM Launchers, SLBM Launchers, Heavy Bombers and Air to Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) capable of a range in excess of 600 kms. This ceiling was to be lowered to 2250. A sub limit of 1320 was imposed on each party for the combined number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped for long range (over 600 kms) cruise missiles. Moreover, each party was limited to a total of 1200 launchers of MIRVs, ICBMs and ASBMs and of this number, no more than 820 may be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs.

A freeze was also introduced on the number of re-entry vehicles on current types of ICBMs, with a limit of ten re-entry vehicles on SLBMs and limit of 10 re-entry vehicles on ASBMs. An average of 28 long range Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) per heavy bomber was allowed, while current heavy bombers could carry no more than 20 ALCMs each. Ceilings were also established on the launch weight and throw weight of...
light and heavy ICBMs. The following bans were imposed:

(a) On the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs with one exception for each side;
(b) on building additional fixed ICBM launchers;
(c) on converting fixed, light ICBM launchers into heavy ICBM launchers;
(d) on heavy mobile ICBMs, heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs;
(e) on surface ship ballistic missile launchers;
(f) on systems to launch missiles from the sea-bed or the beds of internal waters;
(g) as well as on systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons from earth orbit, including fractional orbital missiles.

The Treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 1985.

SALT II Agreements had some serious shortcomings. The numerical limits on strategic nuclear forces had been set very high. There was a remarkable compatibility between the treaty limitations and the projected strategic nuclear weapons programme of both sides. Destabilizing element of the strategic nuclear forces like the MIRVed, ICBMs had been allowed to increase in number; the Treaty permitted the number

of the U.S. and the Soviet MIRVed ICBMs taken together, to increase by more than 40 per cent from the time of signing the Treaty to the end of 1985. The U.S. Senate did not ratify SALT II under conservative pressure owing to "the presence of the Soviet Grand Combat Unit in Cuba, the Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa" and subsequently, the Afghanistan episode. However, on December 27, 1979, the United States announced that, on a reciprocal basis, it will not under-cut the Treaty provisions.

The negotiations carried out at bilateral level by the two super powers culminated in the INF Treaty which is discussed later at the end of the chapter.

In addition to the bilateral negotiations dealing with nuclear weapons, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have held talks on limiting conventional and chemical weapons as well as negotiations for reducing tensions and averting the risk of war in times of crisis. These are listed below:

(a) Both the powers decided to initiate full scale discussion on the issue of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union, in an important move, suggested that the two sides exchange scientists, or that the two countries should set off atomic blasts at each other's nuclear testing sites in order to improve verification;
(b) the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. made some progress in resolving the differences on methods and means to implement a 50 per cent cut in strategic (inter-continental range) nuclear arsenals. Recently on September 23, 1989, Soviet Union announced its readiness to drop its demand, that the U.S. should first limit its antimissile system or the SDI before any agreement or further reduction of nuclear weapons can be effected;

(c) rapid progress has been made at the multilateral Geneva Conference on Disarmament on drafting a ban on chemical weapons production;

(d) the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact countries decided to start a dialogue on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in the vast area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

ARMS CONTROL UNDER REAGAN AND GORBACHEV

Ronald Reagan came into power in the Fall of 1980 all determined to "rearm America". SALT effort was denounced by him as totally ineffective and during the first eighteen months of his administration no progress was made in the arms control process. Indeed Pentagon was given the permission for increased military spending.

The first issue that came in front of the administration was that of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces in Europe. The NATO in 1979, decided to pursue a "dual track" path to counter the Soviet


The Soviet Union has accepted site inspection of its chemical plants. The United States on September 25, 1989 offered to destroy 98 per cent of its chemical weapons over an eight year period, provided the Soviet Union joins the ban.
Union's growing arsenal of Intermediate Range Missiles. The SS4, SS5 and the SS20 missiles of the Soviet Union were aimed towards Western Europe. The NATO decided to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union or else they would start deploying American manufactured Pershing II and Cruise Missiles on allied territory, if no agreement could be reached by December 1983.

The Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig pledged in September 1981, not to spare any effort to conclude an agreement before the NATO deadline. Talks opened in Geneva on November 30, 1981. Reagan also offered his "Zero Zero option" meaning that if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS4, SS5 and SS20 missiles, NATO would cancel the deployment of Pershing II and the Cruise Missiles. However, differences proved to be irreconcilable. The two chief negotiators at Geneva tried to resolve the impasse on their own during a private conversation in July 1982.¹

In May 1982 came the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) proposals outlined by President Reagan. The basic aim of these proposals was to "break the mould of past negotiations which concentrated on

¹ This came to be known as the "Walk in the Woods". The US chief negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kritsinsky drove to a secluded mountain top in the Jura range near the French border, where sitting on a log they arrived at a joint compromise agreement, which was however, rejected by both the Governments.

Strobe Talbott, DEADLY GAMBITS, op. cit., p. 127.
limiting strategic offensive arms at high levels", and to improve strategic stability through substantial reductions in the more destabilising strategic offensive arms.¹

The initial proposal called for both sides to reduce the number of land and sea-based missile warheads by about one third to 5000 and to reduce the number of deployed ballistic missiles to no more than 850, a cut of one half for the U.S.A. and somewhat more for the U.S.S.R.

The START proposals were further modified to include the recommendations of the Commission on Strategic Force (Snow Craft Commission). While the goal of reducing each side's ballistic missile warheads to 5000 was reaffirmed, the overall limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles was relaxed. These changes were included in the Draft Treaty presented by the US on July 7, 1987.² Later in October the same year, under pressure from the Congress, Reagan incorporated the build down concept which called for retiring older weapons as a corollary to modernization with the aim of reducing the total

¹The chief negotiator Edward L. Rowny, outlined the basic aims. He spoke in June 1984 before the Royal United Services Institute of London. See Mary H. Cooper, ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, Vol.1(8), p. 163.

²For latest objections to START see Dan Quayle, (Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee) "The Pitfalls of STARTing Now", THE RUSI JOURNAL, Summer 1988, pp. 47-51.
number of war-heads over time. The Soviet Union rejected the modified proposal and refused to agree to a resumption date for START.

The end of 1983, saw the breaking down of arms control talks. It seemed confrontation had once again replaced the spirit of detente and cold war had returned. Possibilities of global disarmament and security had receded into the background. In the first five years of his term as President of the United States of America, Reagan succeeded in creating an atmosphere of confrontation, and all hopes of bridging the wide gaps between the positions of the super powers seemed a far cry.

A new era of change was ushered in, in the affairs of the world, and the Soviet Union with the exit of ailing Soviet leader Chernenko in March 1985 bringing to an end, the era of the old guard in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev entered the scene all determined to bring in sweeping changes in the internal affairs of his country and externally in the affairs of the world. In his approach to world affairs, he combined rare dynamism with foresight which was coupled with his determination to set the course of history right. For this, the most important task before him was to create the right atmosphere, which he did by taking confidence building measures first at home in the form of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' and then on the world scene.
His policy of 'glasnost' was reflected in his speeches as well as actions, while the multilateral arms control deliberations were being held at the Conference on Disarmament\(^1\) which centred around basically three main subjects—

- (a) Suspension of nuclear weapon tests and the conclusion of a treaty banning such tests in all environments;
- (b) the prohibition of the production and possession of chemical weapons; and
- (c) the prevention of arms race in outer space,

the Soviet Union announced on July 29, 1985, "in an endeavour to facilitate the cessation of the dangerous competition in the build up of nuclear arsenals", a unilateral halt to all its nuclear explosions (both for military and non-military purposes). The moratorium was to last till January 1, 1986. The Soviet Union extended it further for a period of three months on January 15, 1986. A thaw in the East-West relations had set in and a new philosophy of peace and security which rested on the age old important truth that no country could enhance its security at the expense of others and a nuclear war could not be won and hence should not be fought

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1. Conference on Disarmament is the multilateral negotiating body of the international community. It was constituted in 1978 and had its first session in 1979. Its predecessors were The Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament and The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.

was discernible. The goal of nuclear disarmament, which had hitherto seemed unattainable, and utopian became desirable and also feasible. Gorbachev further proposed a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons by the two super powers during his visit to Paris in October 1985. This was followed by his offer in January 1986, of a comprehensive programme to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of this century. In June 1986, Gorbachev along with other leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries appealed to reduce conventional forces by 25 per cent in the early 1990s.

At the historic Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, Gorbachev agreed with Reagan to eliminate long range ballistic nuclear missiles in the next ten years in case United States continued to adhere to the ABM Treaty for the same period and limited the Star Wars Programme to the laboratory only.

The Reykjavik Summit, during October 1986, brought to light the extent to which agreement could be reached over the issues of nuclear arms control, though it broke up in disagreement over the issue of Star Wars (SDI). The scope for reduction in armaments seemed to be breathtaking indeed. The two sides agreed to eliminate all but 100 war-heads each on land based intermediate range nuclear forces. They also agreed to reduce within five years all strategic
nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent (those with ranges above 5,500 kms). All strategic nuclear arsenals were to be eliminated in the following period of five years. The Summit though considered to be a failure was in fact far from being so, as the subsequent events proved. The initiative again came from the Soviet Union when she decided to delink Star Wars issue from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) issue. The Soviet Union agreed to eliminate short-range missiles along with the INF and also make the ban a global one instead of just European.

THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE TREATY(INF)

The INF Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987, by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It consists of a preamble and 17 articles. It also includes a Protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty and a Protocol regarding inspections relating to the Treaty as well as a Memorandum of Understanding on data giving the locations, numbers and characteristics of each side's Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles. The two Protocols and the Memorandum form an integral part of the Treaty. It provides for the destruction of more nuclear weapons, than have ever been eliminated by any agreement. Strict measures have been devised to check on each party's disarmament progress through on site inspection. Other measures to be used for

verification, comprise Spy Satellites which would watch the missile sites, factories and transportation systems.

The INF Treaty states that each side shall eliminate all its medium range missiles and launchers so that after three years neither would have such missiles, launchers and support facilities.

The elimination procedure will be done in two stages. The first will end 29 months after the treaty enters into force. By that time the number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of medium range missiles of each side would not be able to carry more than 200 war heads.

By the end of the second stage, not later than the three year deadline, all medium range systems should be destroyed.

Concerning shorter range missiles, neither side should have these weapons after 18 months, from when the Treaty takes effect. This only really affects the Soviets as it is they who shall eliminate shorter range systems. Nevertheless, both sides are prevented by the Treaty from producing and testing shorter range weapons.

A separate article of the Treaty deals with mutual verification. The sides shall have the right
to on site inspection, both within each others' territories and in those of the countries housing the weapons. They shall also have the right to start the inspection of all missile sites, support facilities, and elimination sites 30 days after the Treaty takes effect. They shall not however have immediate access to missile production centres.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration.

The significance of the treaty cannot be under-estimated, though a lot of criticism has been directed towards it, dismissing it as a 'three per cent solution'. In one of his articles Alexander Haig, who was the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces (1974-79) and the Secretary of State under Reagan, thinks that "the agreement has gone too far yet it does not go far enough. It eliminates a vital part of NATO's deterrent before we have assured that other parts of the deterrent can bear the increased burden. And it mistakes the elimination of weapons for the strengthening of our power to prevent war".¹

However, it cannot be denied that the accord symbolizes the supremacy of 'disarmament' approach, as compared to the arms control approach which aims at managing the arms race rather than eliminating it. Elimination of even three per cent of the nuclear arsenals is not something to be ignored. It can be a useful first step forward, in the direction of

complete disarmament. The significance of the INF Treaty lies in the fact that it has eliminated a whole range of nuclear weapons and it could set the tone for a much wider progress in the disarmament process.

The I.N.F. Treaty of 1987, was in a way an outstanding event marking an epoch in the history of disarmament. It appeared that humanity, more particularly, the super powers had started taking a sober look at the price they had paid for conflict and decided it was time to cry a halt. 1988 witnessed not only a continuation but an intensification of the efforts made. In more ways than one, it turned out to be a year of greater understanding, fewer recriminations, less of hatred, and greater triumphs in the realm of peace. The Soviets began to withdraw their forces in Afghanistan (total withdrawal being completed in early 1989); the Vietnamese started leaving Cambodia; Iran and Iraq who had engaged in a relentless war over a period of 8 years, in which no holds were barred and which witnessed the use of poison gas agreed to a cease fire which has endured; the Cubans agreed to leave Angola; and South Africans were prepared to move out of Namibia. The great armies of the East and West were poised to shrink, after Gorbachev visited the United nations and made a unilateral offer about the troops and tanks that he would demobilise. In 1988, hope returned to mankind...
that the world can be rendered a safer place, more open to straight talk and more congenial to truth. The last Soviet jamming of Western radio broadcasts ended, and the Voice of America even opened an office in Moscow.

The I.N.F. Treaty and the changes which have come about in the relations between the super powers, primarily on account of the bold initiatives taken by Gorbachev coupled with the progress registered in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) have improved political relations between the super powers: progress on settlement of regional problems in Kampuchea, Angola and Afghanistan, and in bilateral issues between the Soviet Union and China are positive signs of encouragement. Even so the proposition that the trends which have set in, will also moderate conflicts in all other parts of the world, more particularly in the Middle East and South Asia has to be greeted with a certain amount of caution. This is primarily because the nature and character of the conflict is different: the United States and the Soviet Union share no common border, and therefore do not covet each other's territory. Their dispute is not based on ethnic antagonism or religious fanaticism, nor are the two super powers plagued or tormented with bitter memories of defeats inflicted by the other. On the other hand antagonisms in the Middle East and South Asia are influenced
primarily by these factors. These areas therefore call for greater efforts to fashion a new and enlightened non-proliferation approach. The new strategy must tackle sources of regional conflict and the underlying motivations for security, status and prestige that lead non-nuclear states to pursue nuclear weapon options. One particular feature of conflicts in these areas, is the large scale increase of ballistic missile delivery systems, and of chemical weapons which call for resolute action, not only from Western Europe but also from Soviet Union and China.

A method of collective action which is better than war, for the resolution of conflicts, all the world over, at various levels (local, national, international) with the participation of all the nations of the world is indeed imperative. Disarmament negotiations have hitherto been oscillating from the desire to settle old scores to an over-riding desire for peace; from distrust and suspicion to constructive dialogue; from an impulsive search for narrow national security to common security for all and again from limiting the destructive capacity to balancing it; from controlling to completely eliminating it. Formidable constraints have been encountered, all along in the long march of history and still continue to hamper the efforts, directed towards the achievement of a new world order—just and peaceful. Some of the important constraints are discussed in the next chapter.