CHAPTER 2

ARMS AND INSECURITY OF NATIONS

Rarely in the history of human civilization have people or nations been fundamentally secure. A sense of insecurity has plagued humankind since times immemorial and continues to bedevil human relations in the present times.

During the last hundred years though the world has taken giant strides in the fields of science and technology, in making life better for more people, in the fields of medicine, transport and communication and so on, the conduct of human and international relations continues to be almost the same as it was in the early Greek City States in the 5th century B.C.\footnote{\textit{Polis} the Greek City State was a sovereign political unit with a fortified centre on a hill where the inhabitants took refuge from attack.} when the sense of insecurity generated infighting and resulted in self-destruction.

The insecurity of nations stems from a number of deep-seated though indistinct factors related to and often emanating from historical traumas, human nature and behaviour, religious faiths, political ideologies and national loyalties and objectives. The spectacular advances in the fields of science and technology more particularly, since the splitting of the atom and the unleashing of nuclear energy have added to the sense of
insecurity. Developments in other fields which have opened up vast new horizons and an almost total revolution in political thinking, instead of mitigating the sense of insecurity, have tended to impart further complexities to the situation.

The scenario presented by the post-war world is depressing indeed. While the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki did bring an end to the second world war, peace and security have still continued to elude humankind. The international scene in the post war years is marked by global militarization which has added a totally new dimension to international politics. In more concrete terms, presence of nuclear weapons and highly sophisticated conventional armaments; international arms trade; ever increasing military expenditures; proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons; transfer of these weapons and advanced technology to the Third World countries along with relentless research and development in the field of sophisticated weaponry and power-projecting interventionist policies pursued by super powers, can be termed as the main sources of insecurity of nations.

Scientists have estimated that super weapons in storage are capable of destroying all life on this planet more than 45 times over. Some idea of the arsenals maintained by world powers can be gleaned from Tables 1.1 to 1.8 appearing in Appendix IB.
The advancement that has taken place in the field of armaments in the last three decades has been mentioned in the first chapter as also the advancement expected to take place in the next thirty years.¹ The sense of insecurity has been continuously growing on account of the fact that armaments because of their ever increasing number, lethality and accuracy have become more and more fearsome. The continued accumulation of armaments which are becoming more and more sophisticated irrespective of whether they are owned by one or by several powers poses an unparalleled threat by escalating tensions in the international field thereby creating the possibility of a major war, which according to the latest researches into the subject, is more likely than not to turn into a nuclear war leading to a holocaust the like of which man has not witnessed.

What has been or is the cost of perfection and maintenance of these arsenals apart from their potential for total destruction of mankind? The burden which these arsenals impose on the nation states which are compelled to squander resources on weapons, which could otherwise be used for development is incalculable. Tables 2.1 to 2.3 in Appendix IIA provide the latest available data about military expenditure incurred by various countries of the world.

It will be seen that the levels of military expenditure incurred by different countries are mind-boggling indeed and so are the increases registered year after year. A few examples should suffice to bring home the magnitude of the diversion of material resources to armaments and defence. From $189,071 million in 1978, the expenditure incurred by the U.S.A. went up to $275,190 million in 1987, with the increase registered over a period of nine years amounting to around 45 per cent. Apart from the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. (for which the relevant data are not available) there are several countries spending more than $20,000 million every year on armaments. These are France (29,038), The Federal Republic of Germany (22,447), the U.K. (27,019) and Japan (20,482) with several countries in the Middle East particularly Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia following close on their heels. As a percentage of gross national product, the U.S.A.'s share continues to be the highest at 6.4, barring countries like Israel which have been spending between 21.0 to 29.7 per cent of their gross national product on military expenditure or countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria whose military expenditure as a percentage of the gross national product is also abnormally high.

Reduction in wasteful military expenditure and diversion of funds released thereby, for development purposes and for alleviation of poverty in the Third
World, is likely to brighten the prospects of the security of nations by reducing tensions at national levels and enhancing self confidence at international levels. However prevailing tendencies point towards mounting military expenditures and trade in arms\(^1\) which encourage competition and conflict further heightening the sense of insecurity.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons poses yet another formidable risk to international security. Apart from the fact that the presence of 50,000 war heads at the disposal of the five nuclear powers can destroy this world many times over the use of such weapons even on a limited scale is likely to set into motion forces which would turn the environment hostile for many generations with no life form being able to survive on this planet for thousands of years to come. The full implications, it seems, of the 'nuclear winter' have not really sunk into the consciousness of the political leaders. That the situations prevalent on the international scene encourage such proliferation is quite evident. A number of reasons why nations want to acquire nuclear weapons have been highlighted by various political analysts.\(^2\) These can be summed up as follows-

(i) Countries which do not have nuclear weapons nor are under the hegemony or the protective shield of a

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nuclear power, feel threatened and insecure when their adversaries have such power or are under the protection of a super power which would use its capability for their benefit, want to acquire these weapons to offset the imbalance thus created.

(ii) Countries may want to acquire them on account of the fear of adversary's nuclear capability or conventional strength.

(iii) Countries in possession of nuclear and conventional weapons keep on enlarging and improving their arsenals in order to deter an adversary.

(iv) To avoid a costly race in conventional armaments, a country might like to acquire these weapons as a comparatively cheaper alternative.

(v) Some nations might want to acquire them in order to project their power, goaded by aggressive and ambitious desires.

(vi) Enhancement in prestige and greater negotiating potential may also provide an incentive for acquisition of such armaments.

The problem of proliferation of weapons and war technologies has yet another dimension. Most of the literature on the subject highlights the implications of such proliferation at horizontal level only, the vertical dimension is often ignored. Vertical proliferation which refers to development and multiplication of newer categories of nuclear weapons incorporating qualitative
improvements has an even more dangerous potential for adding to the insecurity experienced by nations. This has serious far reaching implications in as much as vertical proliferation tends to encourage horizontal proliferation.

The transfer of conventional armaments of sophisticated technology to developing countries offers another formidable source of insecurity to the nations. There have been unprecedented advancements in the field of conventional weapons over the past four decades. The range and the accuracy and the lethal power of these new weapons have long surpassed the traditional boundary lines and increased the risk of war and its possible escalation into a nuclear war in a number of interconnected ways. Jasjit Singh has mentioned four of them which are briefly listed below.

(i) The transfer of non-nuclear conventional armaments places at the disposal of recipient countries means of delivery which can be used to deliver nuclear payloads. The General Dynamics F16 Fighting Falcon combat aircraft is an example. The 155 mm howitzers and 8 inch guns have dual capability i.e. they can deliver conventional as well as nuclear warheads.

(ii) The transfer of conventional arms helps the nuclear weapons programme of the recipient countries when such transfers are justified by the donor countries on account of their own strategic interests being involved. In such cases at times the rules of safety and disincentives for nuclear proliferation are thrown to the winds. The waiver of Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act by the U.S. while transferring sophisticated arms to Pakistan is an example.

(iii) The present high explosive and destructive capability along with accuracy of non-nuclear weapons is likely to increase the pace of warfare and enhance the risk of miscalculations. In case one of the adversaries possesses, nuclear weapons, the risk to resort to nuclear weapons to avert defeat by non-nuclear weapons of the adversary is very much there. The situation is likely to worsen if the super powers are involved in such a conflict.

(iv) Weapons of sophisticated technology, when transferred from a super power to a Third World nation create strategic linkages between the supplier and recipient countries; increasing the risk of involvement of the super-powers in regional conflicts and wars.¹

"The overall impact of non-nuclear arms transfer, therefore", as Jasjit Singh puts it "is not only the deterioration of security environments and lowering war-thresholds, but also increase in the risk of use of nuclear weapons".²

2. Ibid. . . .
It is not only the transfer of conventional weapons and sophisticated technology which upsets the security environment, other indirect means of intervention of super powers by way of sending military advisers, training of third world military personnel and the transfer of military intelligence to client states seriously endanger the stability and security of states, the region concerned or the states involved. Intelligence sharing specially during the recent years made possible by advanced technology in the fields of communications has acquired disturbing proportions in the sense that sharing of intelligence by super powers with their client states can alter local or regional balance of power and can prove to be as important a factor in creating and enhancing insecurity as the transfer of sophisticated armaments.

The research and development being carried out primarily by the advanced countries in the field of fusion though justified on the ground that it is likely to provide abundant energy to meet the requirements of energy hungry world has a strong military role. Mention in this respect may be made of laser technology which has received great publicity as a source of energy but which in fact has been used mostly for nuclear weapon research.
An early as in 1975, the head of weapon activities of the U.S. AEC said of laser fusion:\(^1\)

"People go around town saying it is an energy programme but that's something that came along only after energy research got popular... what we are doing now, developing basic laser technology, is equally applicable to military and civilian aspects. But really, this is a military programme and it always has been..."

Similarly nuclear energy is being used by advanced countries extensively for military purposes. Powerful and compact reactors are in the offing to power future battle stations and surveillance satellites in space.

All in all the sense of insecurity of nations has not only continued to persist but has been greatly aggravated largely because of the arms race spiral. If the spiral continues the developed nations would be starving their people to fatten their rockets.

Ever increasing activities ostensibly for peaceful purposes in space are a cause of great concern to developing nations who do not possess the means and technology to make use of space for promotion, protection and preservation of their own national interest. This sense of insecurity was expressed in no uncertain terms

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in The Stockholm Declaration of the Six Nation Initiative in the following words:

"Military competition must not be introduced into new fields. Space belongs to us all, and the number of countries growing more and more dependent on the benefits of the peaceful utilization of outer space is increasing. It must not be used for destructive purposes.

There is still time to prevent an arms race in space. We call on the parties to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to strictly abide by that Treaty. We also reiterate our call for a complete banning of anti-satellite weapons. Specifically, and as an interim measure, we propose, an agreement banning the testing of such weapons."

The security policies pursued by the super powers since the advent of the atomic age instead of lessening tensions have tended to aggravate the sense of insecurity of nations and have become increasingly aggressive and interventionist in nature. This phenomenon has become more apparent since the late 1970s, to be precise since 1978, the year which is considered to mark the beginning of the second cold war. An analysis of the different aspects of armed conflicts since the end of world war II highlights a number of interesting facts with far-reaching implications. These are that the super-powers and Europe have remained free from such conflicts—a fact which is substantiated by the details given in Appendix IIIB in Table 2.4. Secondly, most of these armed conflicts

1. Adopted on 21 January 1988 at Stockholm by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and by the First President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

have been consciously aided and abetted by the super powers. This has been made possible by the unprecedented power at the disposal of the super powers which they have projected through overt and covert intervention in the affairs of various states, through coercion at times, through temptation to offer more aid, sophisticated armaments and advanced technology in order to maintain a certain status quo or to tilt the balance in their own favour or to acquire bases for themselves. They have by doing this not only promoted their national interest, but have also tried to extend their security domain and pushed the areas of conflict further away from their own territories to distant Third World countries where the resultant sense of insecurity and/or continuity of existing conflicts create an unending demand for armaments providing to the super powers not only economic advantage but political clout as well.

The intervention of great powers in regional and local conflicts has been a common occurrence since 1945. There have been hundreds of such incidents in which external powers have tried to influence the outcome of events in the so-called Third World countries by way of military intervention.

Between 1945 and 1956 the incidents of intervention which occurred involved sizable military operations conducted primarily by western powers. In the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, American and Western armed forces were used extensively. The Soviet armed intervention during this period was however relatively insignificant.

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1. Britain, France and other Western nations contributed military units to the Korean conflict.
In the period between 1957 and 1966 there was a steep rise in Western intervention and the first stirrings of the Soviet involvement became discernible. The American forces fought in South East Asia and the Caribbean and then in Indo-china in 1965. Armed forces of other Western countries were also committed in the Third World during most of this period. France fought in North Africa until 1963; Britain and Netherlands fought in Indonesia until 1965 and British forces made their presence felt in support of various regimes in the Middle East. British, French and Belgian troops continued to influence and sometimes to determine the outcome of conflicts in their erstwhile colonies.

According to a study made by Kaplan the Soviet Union used military power in the Third World during this period, at least 16 times in far flung places like the Congo, the Levant and South-East Asia.

In the post 1966 period while the western intervention declined to some extent, the Soviet intervention became more pronounced and frequent. Nevertheless American forces were used in the Middle East, in a number of states in Africa and South-West Asia. Other western states maintained a certain amount of aloofness militarily. There were stray incidents however such as the use of Belgian troopers in Zaire's Shaba Province in 1978 or the rescue by German commandoes of a hijacked Lufthansa air craft in Mogadiscio in 1977.

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France remained the one exception and continued to intervene at times to maintain and at times to restore order in Chad, Shaba, Mauritania, and to install a new government in the Central African Republic.

The Soviet Union also continued to make use of military power in the Third World. Kaplan's study has listed as many as 50 incidents of the Soviet military intervention in the Third World since 1967.\(^1\)

Apart from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has been actively involved in Africa and the Middle East particularly in the Arab Israeli conflict. In Africa, apart from intervening militarily, the Soviet Union has made its presence felt by way of paying naval visits and other seemingly benevolent military activity to influence political developments and military outcomes.

It is true that this policy of intervention apart from generating insecurity for the Third World countries has increased the insecurity of nations practising it. In practising this policy of intervention it is obviously difficult to foresee or ascertain the response of states on whom it is practised. Possibility of miscalculation of such response can lead to consequences which can be unpleasant and embarrassing. A state when it is pushed too far and finds its very survival threatened or its vital interests jeopardised can retaliate with any means at its disposal, be they in the form of crude nuclear

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weapons or cheap chemical or biological weapons. The use
of force for defensive purposes is permitted by the law
of nations and cannot be questioned. This retaliation can
escalate into a full fledged war including use of nuclear
warheads or can cause not only peripheral damage
militarily to the super power concerned but also
irreparable damage to its prestige and standing on the
international scene. Unsuccessful intervention by the
great powers can provide them with an incentive to use
nuclear weapons of low-yield, tailored to minimise the
high risk and high costs involved. This fear, in turn
provides the poor countries also with the incentive to
acquire nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass
destruction to counter such pressures from the super-
powers. Some writers have even argued that it would be
better if all the countries acquired nuclear weapons.¹

It was suggested to Gandhiji by some of his
American friends that the atom bomb will bring in Ahimsa
(non-violence) because its destructive power will so
disgust the world that it will turn it away from
violence. Gandhiji's reaction was characteristic when he
said that this was like a man glutting himself with
dainties to the point of nausea and turning away from
them only to return with redoubled zeal to violence after
the effect of disgust is worn out.² The fact remains
that the presence of nuclear weapons itself is a threat

¹Kenneth N. Waltze, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, more
may be better", ADELPHI PAPERS, No. 171,
²Homer A.Jack (Ed.),THE GANDHI READER,(Madras, Samata
to the security of nations. If a situation like Vietnam were to arise again, the possibility of using nuclear weapons would be definitely on the cards. Casper Weinberger, the U.S. Secretary of Defence was asked in the context of the Vietnam war if he would have recommended the use of nuclear weapons to which he gave the following revealing reply:\(^1\)

> It is still possible, I believe, to fight some wars using conventional forces that don't involve nuclear weapons; but I think that you advise potential opponents in advance that you do not intend to cross certain lines, that you have almost assured another Vietnam... Any time you get into a war the possibility that you will use every weapon available has to be left open."

The possibility of using with some advantage low yield tactical weapons in a country far from ones own and a near certainty that the adversary super power will not retaliate to escalate such a limited action into a full fledged nuclear war can also be an incentive to a super power to indulge in such an adventure. In October 1981, President Reagan had expressed the view that the use of tactical nuclear weapons against military forces is feasible without necessarily escalating to a strategic nuclear exchange.\(^2\)

The threat postures adopted by the super powers are another source of insecurity of nations. Forces specially designed for interventionist policies, which

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can be deployed almost instantly are a cause of great fear. The Rapid Deployment Force of the U.S. is a case in point. Apart from that, the satellite technology, the C³I and the up coming SDI programmes enhance the insecurity of nations. The deployment of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world, by the super powers is designed precisely to further this policy of intervention through threat postures. Brookings Institution has listed as many as 19 instances when the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons. During the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the nuclear powered, nuclear capable USS Enterprise had sailed into the Bay of Bengal (December 1971) in a threatening posture. If at that time India had nuclear weapons, this could not have happened. These threatening postures are therefore serious and apart from adding to the prevailing sense of insecurity, in fact encourage proliferation(horizontal) of nuclear weapons.

Jasjit Singh has rightly stated that:

"Threat of use of nuclear force represents the highest water-mark of international insecurity short of actual use of such weapons for the threatened nation."

While the super powers by following interventionist policies have generated insecurity in the world environment, the erstwhile colonial powers have also imposed certain weaknesses on the Third World countries by arbitrarily dividing the ethnic groups at

the time of their departure thereby creating artificial boundaries which provide a breeding ground for unrest and instability. These in turn endanger the security of countries concerned at national and at times if other neighbouring countries are involved at regional levels. Conditions prevailing in such countries provide an ideal environment for intervention by super powers when rival groups seek help from them to increase their own influence vis-a-vis the other party.

It is something of a paradox of history that while peace has always been regarded as a blessing and its opposite i.e. war a scourge, mankind has sought peace and security through the medium of war.

According to Sivard,\(^1\) at least 200 wars have been fought in the 20th century of which 120 have been fought after the second world war. The end of 1986 saw as many as 36 armed conflicts\(^2\) in progress around the world, with five and a half million soldiers from 41 countries i.e. a quarter of the world's 165 nations directly involved in fighting. Many additional countries were indirectly involved in the conflicts through sale or supply of weapons, military hardware, military advisers, base facilities or for providing sanctuary to rebels. These


Of the 36 conflicts in progress at the end of 1987, four started in the 1940s, seven in the 1960s, seventeen in the 1970s and eight in the 1980s.
conflicts have taken place in the Third World with the exception of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Five conflicts have taken place in South Asia, eight in the Far East, five in the Middle East, eleven in Africa and six in Latin America. Most of these conflicts have been guerrilla struggles within nations. The Iran-Iraq war was the only major conventional war, other conventional conflicts between two nations being the Vietnam-China, and Ethiopia-Somalia border conflicts.

Practically all these conflicts have been long drawn affairs and owe their origin either to a sense of insecurity in general or to such factors as differences based on ideology, or issues related to minorities, religion and the ethnic composition of people living on the borders. Israel suffers from a continuous sense of insecurity stemming from the hostility of the muslim states which are not quite reconciled to its existence. An independent state of Palestine has been proclaimed and also recognized by several countries but despite overtures of peace and recognition by the PLO of Israel's right to exist and its renunciation of terrorism, the Zionists remain unconvinced and no lasting settlement seems to be in sight. The other factors have indirectly contributed to the escalation of the internal discords into hostilities and war between neighbouring countries. Cases in point are the Middle East conflicts between the Kurdish tribes on the one hand and Iran and Iraq on the other, the former having escalated after the

start of war between Iraq and Iran; the intensification of fighting in Angola in recent years; the long simmering ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka which more recently, assumed menacing proportions resulting in the involvement of Indian troops and which despite change of government and formulation of fresh policies aimed at reconciliation of warring groups and agreed withdrawal of Indian troops, shows no sign of abatement and conflicts involving Sikhs in India and Muslims in Philippines. The reluctance of the South African minority government to part with power or to give up its policy of apartheid has become a festering sore.1

Conflicts presently raging around the world have varied in the degree and intensity of violence, from thousands dying on a single day in the Iran-Iraq War to hit and run insurgencies in such places as Malaysia. The common criterion used to define a full-scale war is a conflict in which the death toll exceeds one thousand. During 1987 in almost all the conflicts the death toll had exceeded that level.2 The casualties were not confined to combatants, with the civilian populations being equally prone to death and devastation; in fact in several areas there have been deliberate plans and attempts to kill greater number of civilians. The conflicts have triggered devastating famines, breakdown of medical and social services and led to serious disruptions caused by the movement of refugees.

2. Ibid.
A broad genesis of the conflicts and some factual details, such as the casualties suffered etc. are given in the Appendix IIB in Table 2.4.

Some of the salient features of the armed conflicts in 1987 need to be noticed: (a) There probably have never been as many wars as there are today nor so many combatants armed with such highly destructive weapons; (b) because of the nature of most of these wars, civilians are exposed to greater risks and are dying in greater numbers than ever before; (c) numerous local conflicts carry within them the potential for escalating into regional wars or super power confrontations. It is also evident that super powers have a stake in these conflicts, in fact quite a few of these conflicts are proxy wars fought from behind the scenes. The United States is a major supplier of arms to 16 countries engaged in conflict and the Soviet Union to 14. Apart from the super powers, some of the developing countries notably Brazil, Egypt and North Korea have supplied arms to combatants, thereby complicating conflict resolution.¹

All these factors have combined to add to the insecurity of nations.

Despite the grim scenario, there is discernible in the conduct of international relations realisation of the fact that the security and the preservation of the State

are matters of paramount importance. In fairness, it must be said that conscious of mounting insecurity, the States have tried to develop a sense of security vis-a-vis each other, by employing a number of means perceived by them as most suitable to their national interests. The concept of security which has meant different things to different people and has still not been bound into an all comprehensive definition has been employed in its various partial connotations by various countries at different periods of times. This process in fact dates back to pre-historic times. Going into the details of the concept as it existed and developed in the ancient past is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is of interest to note how during the post war years it has developed and undergone perceptible gradual transformation. It is relevant to the present study in the sense that the concepts of balance of power, deterrence, collective security, neutrality, non-alignment, common security and disarmament, widely used to promote security during the post-war years owe their

1. Prof. Frederic H. Hartman for example defines security as "The sum total of the vital national interests of the State". He goes on to explain that "a vital national interest is one for which a state is willing to go to war either immediately or ultimately." This shows that the concepts of national security are likely to vary from state to state in proportion to the concepts of vital national interests that any given state would entertain at any given time.


On this theme also see - K.J. Holsti, WHY NATIONS REALIGN, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1982)

He has replaced the concept of national interest with that of 'objective' which according to him "is essentially an image of a future set of conditions which governments through individual policy makers aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing and sustaining the behaviour of other states."
origin to this deluding concept. The first three viz., balance of power, deterrence and collective security concepts have wittingly or unwittingly promoted arms race and escalation of confrontation. Being based as they are on the concept of 'power' they have in spite of all intentions to the contrary stimulated threat postures, increased tensions on the international scene and made security more vulnerable and fragile. Neutrality, non-alignment, common security and disarmament on the other hand have derived strength from the concept of peace. Neutrality stands neutralised in the present world scenario and the concept of non-alignment is faced with new challenges. However, these concepts have imparted a new direction to the world community in their search for security. The concepts mentioned above are briefly discussed hereafter to ascertain if they have really generated/enhanced security or escalated tensions to create or enhance insecurity.

1 Various political thinkers have approached the concept of security through different means. E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgentheau who belong to the realist school approach the problem through 'power'. The idealists approach it through 'peace'.

According to a U.N. study on disarmament and concepts of security, the 'concepts of security' are the different bases on which states and international community as a whole rely for their security. Examples of concepts are balance of power, deterrence peaceful co-existence and collective security-disarmament and arms limitations are the policies- There is no clear cut distinction between a concept and policy.
BALANCE OF POWER

The term 'Balance of Power' stands for a type of international relations in which one nation or group of nations protects itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. The most detailed analysis of the mechanics of the balance of power was written by the Indian political philosopher Kautilya in the 4th century B.C. Intrinsically the balance of power is a universal phenomenon: wherever a number of autonomous social units seek to maintain their autonomy in relation to each other, they do so by pitting their power, either individually or jointly, against that of their competitors. The political world of the 19th century saw a number of balance of power systems. The predominant among them being the European, the American, the Indian and the Chinese. These continued to function independently to a great extent till the beginning of the 1st world war.

The world wars I and II brought about a sea change in the concept of the balance of power system. At the outbreak of world war I, the main weights in the balance were still predominantly European, Great Britain, France and Russia in one scale, Germany and Austria in the other. At the end of world war II, the centre of world politics shifted from Western Europe to the United States, Eastern Europe and Asia. The post war period saw the emergence of a bipolar balance of power in which the principal weights were the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. around whom several other nations clustered to form two
blocs competing with and opposing each other. The balance of power during this period was sought to be maintained primarily by acquiring more weapons and increasing threat postures which caused greater insecurity and less balance. The concept nevertheless served the purpose of providing a basis for the formation of military alliances. During the post war years, as a result, the concept culminated in the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) in April 1949 and May 1955 respectively. In subsequent years the U.S.A. concluded various forms of alliances with more than forty countries in the world and the U.S.S.R. with ten.

The concentration of power in the hands of two nations had led to the pursuit by them of a global world policy aimed at acquiring more and more weapons. With their already available nuclear arsenals they have turned all human beings into helpless hostages. What has really occurred as a consequence is a total disintegration of the world security system in which the concept of balance of power has lost its relevance. And it goes without saying that the post-war developments leading to the emergence of power blocs and the post war alliance systems have not only failed to eliminate the dilemma of insecurity of nations but have further enhanced it by following policies of confrontation and discord.

In an in-depth study of the inconsistencies and dilemmas of NATO security policy, Herbert Wulf maintains that security policy in NATO as well as WTO is based on a

1.Dr. Herbert Wulf is Research associate at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, FRG.
self defeating principle, the compulsive build up of weapons is considered as the only means to guard against the opposing military alliances' evil intentions. Security is understood almost exclusively as an investment in weapons and increased military posture. In reality however, the larger the investments on both sides, the larger the self imposed insecurity and the more likely the calamity this insurance tries to insure against. It is like the man who is obsessed with the danger of a meteor strike; he steadily increases the thickness of the roof of his house until it collapses, with his family inside.1

DETERRENCE

Deterrence as a concept aims at dissuading a potential adversary from initiating war, by threatening to use force to stop him from gaining his objective or to punish him if he does so. It also seeks to make the adversary realise that the risks and costs involved in aggression will far exceed any gains hoped for by him. Accordingly, the modern concept of deterrence has evolved into something quite close to the traditional role of military force in the pursuit of national objectives.

It must be conceded that the concept of deterrence has demonstrated its importance and usefulness over the years. Even though it may not be quite correct to attribute the absence of war in the last 44 years to "deterrence" alone, the fact remains that its contribution in that direction cannot be minimised. Europe did not have a long tradition of peaceful coexistence before the first nuclear device was detonated and there has been no dearth of the conflict potential, with Germany divided, city of Berlin exposed and vulnerable, the overthrow of governments in Eastern Europe, Soviet intervention in the neighbouring countries, ideological and political confrontations, presence of massive armed forces on the European soil. These factors could well have led to a conflagration. If nuclear deterrence has achieved this, it must be said to be an effective instrument for keeping the peace. While the importance of deterrence in conventional as well as nuclear fields cannot be over emphasized, the doctrine has serious flaws. Since the very idea is based on force, it has provided a basis for unrestricted arms race not only nuclear but also conventional and with qualitative advancement in the field of weaponry, the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons has been reduced. Thus instead of creating conditions of peace and security deterrence has increased the insecurity of nations by increasing the possibility of proliferation of
nuclear armaments due to its total dependence on nuclear capability. The very manner in which nuclear weapons have been integrated into the military establishments of major powers and thereby into the fabric of international affairs goes to show the fact that there is a clear intention to use these weapons in case the potential adversary does not heed the warning or the threat. There is no such thing as a fully deployed weapon system which is a bluff or else deterrence would cease to exist.\(^1\)

Although the concept has come under severe criticism and its utility is being increasingly questioned, it has remained, in the absence of any other security arrangements the only way to seemingly preserve the uneasy calm, while threatening mutual destruction.

Deterrence based military policy pursued by the NATO and the WTO has been assailed as highly dangerous and counterproductive in the sense that the threat to use nuclear weapons is self deterring. Both the powers possess the second strike capability and hence both stand to lose in the event of a real war.

There is also a fallacious belief in the possibility of a limited nuclear war. So far no convincing arguments have been advanced to show that the use of nuclear weapons could reliably be expected to

\(^1\)See Brassy's CHOICES NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR DEFENCE OPTIONS(The case against continued Nuclear weapon deployment),(London,Defence Publishers 1987) pp. 9-11.
The search for a first strike capability has led to an arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in quantitative and qualitative terms thereby adding greater destabilizing factors to the already existing problems. In war fighting conditions both sides would be relying on entirely untested capabilities. The command control systems themselves would be under attack. What would happen, no one can foresee. The question of fighting a limited nuclear war seems quite absurd and besides the point. Once started, no civilian or military commander would possibly be able to terminate it.

All traditional concepts of 'defence' or 'war' become devoid of meaning when it comes to nuclear weapons. No weapons can constitute a defence for any areas, no side can achieve victory, no instruments of devastation can be called weapons in any traditional sense and mutual instantaneous destruction cannot be called war. Mutual nuclear deterrence therefore is a dangerous myth which "propagates its own accelerating technologies, spans its own vested interests committed to their exploitation and generates its own conceptual justification for their development into fully deployed weapon systems".

1. See Brassy's CHOICES, NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR DEFENCE OPTIONS, op. cit., p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 16.
All is not well with the NATO alliance as is made out by the media. Rivalry and disagreements and tensions have been there all through between the political military establishments in the United States and Western Europe. These increased sharply after the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles. Even the public opinion strongly opposed the deployment of new missiles—millions of people at the beginning of 1980s marched in London, Rome and Bonn, Amsterdam and Washington to protest against the deployment.

European powers also feel that though both the super powers are not immune from attack, they do their best to keep their territories out of an armed conflict and to ensure that such a conflict remains as far from home as possible. For Americans a limited nuclear war in Europe might be dangerous, for Europeans it means destruction. The defence of West European territory, its people, its societies or ideologies by risking the use of nuclear weapons is absurd. Whatever is intended to be defended will most likely be destroyed.¹

Hence the Western European countries look forward to a return to detente as well as favour 'a more independent posture' and the 'transfer from North American to European hands of a greater share of the burden of European defence, along with .. .. .. .. .. a greater share of responsibility for decisions.'²

Same is true of the countries belonging to the WTO. Citizens in both military alliances are living in a state of common insecurity.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Security has also been sought and is still sought in the concept of collective security which was for the first time enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Later it was incorporated in the U.N. Charter. The high contracting parties of the League agreed to abide by the principle of collective security as incorporated in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 16 of the Covenant. A look at the text reveals at once the flaws of the system and the consequential failure of the concept. Like the other concepts of 'Balance of Power' and 'Deterrence' the concept of 'Collective Security' is based on the use of force. The means envisaged for employment were, the severence of economic and political relations with the aggressor state as well as the collective use of force against it. However, in the Covenant of the League can be seen the gradual development of the idea of security as a matter of collective concern. For the first time security rose above individual and national concerns and official recognition was accorded to the idea of achieving security through collective action on the part of the states pledged to help each other against the aggressor. The concept seemed attractive and prima facie
sound; however the relations of international politics nipped it in the bud right at the outset. Besides, the concept suffered from other very serious flaws.

In the words of Morgentheau-

"By the very logic of its assumptions, the diplomacy of collective security must aim at transforming all local conflicts into world conflicts. If this cannot be one of world peace, it cannot help being one of world war. Since peace is supposed to be indivisible it follows that war is indivisible too. Under the assumption of collective security, any war anywhere in the world then is potentially a world war. Thus a device intent upon making war impossible ends by making war universal. Instead of preserving peace between two nations, collective security, as it must actually operate in the contemporary world, is bound to destroy peace among all nations".

Although the League of Nations, as ill luck would have it, turned out to be a failure, a useful purpose was nevertheless served by it in establishing a starting point. The U.N. Charter after the second world war picked up the last threads and tried to improve upon the concept. At Dumbarton Oaks where the first draft of the Charter was considered, the concept of 'Collective Security' was incorporated into the Charter through an elaborate set of legal political systems of the United

Nations. Main responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security was vested in the great powers— the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, China and France through their permanent membership in the Security Council.

The founding fathers of the U.N. sought to establish a security system for the world on three basic elements, viz.

1. Refraining from the use of force as a means of solving disputes between states;
2. Indivisibility of world peace and active involvement of all members of the international community in efforts to prevent acts of aggression or to restore world peace; and
3. Compliance with the decision of the international authority competent to determine a breach of the peace and measures to be taken.

The concepts on which the collective security system was sought to be based however suffered a setback at Yalta. Disagreement arose with regard to the system of voting when deciding on collective action. While the U.S.A. and Great Britain were content with a two thirds majority on all substantial matters and a simple majority on procedural matters, the U.S.S.R. would not accept anything less than unanimity on all questions of importance even in cases when a party to a dispute was a member of the Security Council. Stalin's stance was
adopted and incorporated into Article 27 of the Charter. This left the Security Council, the main organ of the United Nations, a helpless body to ensure and preserve peace and security, in the absence of unanimity amongst the members.

It looks as though the system of collective security could not sustain itself. Regrettably none of the basic elements underlying the concept of collective security achieved any degree of compliance and the world remains a strife ridden arena where reckless show of force dominates the scene. The concept of collective security for want of providing much sought for security died a natural death and the world got rid of the concept which was enhancing insecurity of nations by way of making 'war' a universal phenomenon.

The search for newer methods seems to have found expression in the renewed interest in the age old concept of neutrality and non-alignment. The concept of common security came as a culmination of this search. Disarmament and arms control are the direct consequences of these concepts while peaceful co-existence is the desired goal. This brings us to the concepts of Neutrality, Non-alignment and 'Common Security'.

NEUTRALITY

The concept of neutrality in simple terms means that the states wanting to practise neutrality shall not take part in the quarrels of other states. While the 19th century Europe from 1815 onwards when wars were limited
and there were no rigid bloc structures provided a congenial setting for the practice of neutrality, the concept has become obsolete in its traditional sense and has lost most of its value in the 20th century on account of the absolute change that has occurred in the concepts of war and peace. War in the 20th century is not a game which concerns only the belligerents. While in the 19th century the neutral status of a country could be guaranteed by one of the contestants or at times by both, no such guarantee is worthwhile or feasible in the present times for obvious reasons. The concept of neutrality stands assailed also by the principles underlying the international political organisations of the 20th century. Both, the League of Nations and the United Nations were set up on the premises that "peace is indivisible". No loyal member of the organisations could remain neutral in the case of a Threat to the Peace, Breach of a Peace or Act of Aggression. All members were expected to apply diplomatic economic or even military sanctions against the established adversary. In short neutrality came to be thought of as a betrayal of the common interest and seemed to lose relevance in the context of the common problems faced by human kind.

NONALIGNMENT

Non-alignment is a more recent concept which emerged as a response to the atomic bomb and the cold war in the post war period. The main focus of attention of the movement has been on decolonisation, non-interference
in the internal affairs of states, disarmament, non-involvement in the cold war and the strengthening of the United Nations Organisation. The concern for a new international economic order and the protection and preservation of environment as also the concern for human rights, rejection of all forms of exploitation, apartheid and even zionism apart from other concerns mentioned above, have invested the movement with an all embracing humane character. However the relevance of non-alignment seems to be somewhat diluting in the present world scenario where the recent developments point towards mingling of the East and the West with definite overtures being made suggesting dismantling of the power blocs (WTO, NATO). The movement has only been able to provide moral support to the parties and has in no way enhanced their security or strengthened it by any chance.

The search for security has finally culminated in the concept of 'Common Security' as propounded by the Report of Palme Commission.

COMMON SECURITY

'Common Security' as a concept tries to tread the middle course between the realists and the idealists and is based on cooperation, and on communication and confidence building measures as against power, force, diplomacy and competition. It aims at realizing that survival is the prime concern of all nations which
transcends all ideological, political and economic interests at the nation-state level. What is common must be pursued in cooperation with each other irrespective of narrow national concerns. The concept also recognises that the modern war specially with nuclear weapons has changed the very concept of war. The losses outweigh any possible gains. The only protection against nuclear devastation is the avoidance of nuclear war itself. It also recognizes that security of nations is indivisible in the present world. Nations are totally interdependent and security on the individual nation state level is not security in the real sense. Hence the nations have to work together towards achieving security at the international level. The Palme Commission arrived at the following common understandings:

(i) ALL NATIONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY: All states have a legitimate right to security. The security needs of one state must not be defined in such a way as to undermine the legitimate security needs of others. Definitions of national security which require the subordination or subjugation of other states and peoples are not legitimate. Security implies not only freedom from war and from the threat of war but from any form of covert or overt intervention. The security of small states is as important as that of large ones.

(ii) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN SELF DEFENCE IS NOT A LEGITIMATE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY: The right to use military force in self defence is recognised and reaffirmed in the Charter of the United Nations. However, the use of force to gain
security at the expense of other states is unacceptable. Competitive open-ended accumulation of weapons by nations aggravates political conflicts and increases the risk of war and can lead to less rather than more security. This has never been more true than in the nuclear age.

(iii) SECURITY SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN COMPREHENSIVE TERMS: Security policies can no longer be concerned with peace defined merely as the absence of war but must deal with the inter-relationship of military and non-military elements of security. It is essential to address underlying political, social and economic problems. Policies centred on military strength have diverted attention from problems of political disorder, apartheid, denial of the right to self-determination and unequal distribution of resources. The threat of war cannot be dealt with effectively without a prior analysis of and effective measures directed at the roots of international tensions. Consequently a comprehensive approach to security has become essential and security is equally important at the national and international levels.

(iv) SECURITY IS THE CONCERN OF ALL NATIONS: Nuclear weapons have transformed the conditions of security. No nation can escape the threat of proliferating challenges to global security. As all nations are subject to the ultimate threat of annihilation, all must have a say in the quest for international security. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon states, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.
(v) THE WORLD'S DIVERSITIES SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY: The world has over 160 independent states with wide differences among them. In the nuclear age, the interest in survival must transcend differences in ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems. Political conflicts and contending interests among states must not be allowed to over-ride the collective interest in survival. It will never be easy to create attitudes of tolerance between political systems based on contradictory ideologies. But the constant threat of war prevents the realization of higher political goals in all nations. Consequently, it is vital that security policies be adjusted to reconcile national and international security interests. Ideological differences should not be transferred to inter-state relations.

(vi) DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATION IS AN IMPORTANT APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: The arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has reached an unprecedented level. To avoid the risk of nuclear war, it is necessary to reverse the nuclear arms race. Those powers which possess the most important nuclear arsenals have the capability of destroying mankind. Other types of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons and the maintenance of large arsenals of conventional weapons add to the dangers facing the world. The arms race impedes the realisation of the purposes of the United Nations. Arms limitation and disarmament have thus become the most urgent task facing
the international community. No effort should be spared to promote disarmament negotiations. Agreement to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons should be such as would reduce mutual fears and mistrust and assist in the improvement of political relations between countries.¹

To sum up, the foregoing analysis shows that a sense of "insecurity" is all pervasive: it has plagued mankind since its inception and is likely to continue. Efforts therefore have to be directed towards reducing and lessening the sense of insecurity and thereby producing conditions of peaceful co-existence. The prevailing sense of insecurity—though genuine in majority of the cases—is sometimes a cloak or a cover for aggrandisement; it has led to confrontations and wars which despite the spectacular advances registered by mankind in all spheres of human activity have shown no signs of abating. Methods employed to achieve security have ranged from cutting the right hand of every male between the age of twelve and thirty, by Changiz Khan and complete physical extermination of whole communities as of Jews by Hitler to the adoption of sophisticated methods like Balance of Power, Deterrence, Collective Security and the likes. While the former have been short lived and a total failure, the latter also have become either irrelevant or proved effective only in a limited way. Humanity indeed requires new methods and new approaches to give it a

chance to survive. In the words of Charles Yost:

What is now required of the nuclear states is agreement at least on the following measures: a cessation of all testing, including underground testing, a cut-off in all production of nuclear materials for weapon use and a rapid diminution of existing stockpiles; a prompt and steady reduction in the deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles wherever they are. What is required of all states is agreement on the limitation of conventional arms and armies, on a total prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and on reasonably effective systems—we cannot expect and should not seek perfect systems—for inspecting and enforcing these agreements.

In the early years of disarmament negotiations, the American and the Soviet Draft Treaties as we shall see in the next chapter contained all these stipulations but somehow continued to gather dust. It is only recently that a definite reversal of the trend has become discernible.