Problems and Prospects
In our discussion of the capabilities of Indian Ocean countries to fulfil their aspirations we noted the constraints born of not only colonial legacy but also the heritage of traditions, values and social fabric that their age bestowed upon them. Basically it is the inner dynamics of these societies that inhibit their ability to achieve the coveted goals. The magnitude and constant proliferation of problems of all kinds add to the constraints these countries suffer from, which have been discussed in the preceding pages.

But constraints are overtly or covertly caused in no small measure by the presence and proclivities of foreign powers too. The role of these powers in this region, without doubt, is a function of both global power alignments and power equations, of course. All the same, the physical (essentially military) presence in the Indian Ocean of some of them also encourages tendencies in the countries of the region which aggravate—rather than alleviate—the constraints. Alternatively, is the physical foreign power presence in the region of no—or at best, marginal—consequence, so far as the constraints inhibiting fulfilment of aspirations of these countries is concerned? That is to say, even if the Indian Ocean was completely devoid of any outside presence, the countries of the region would nonetheless have experienced the impact of the outside powers, one way or the other—adversely or positively. For, the world of today has become so fashioned.

Let the two propositions be examined at some length.

The foreign powers that maintain a physical presence in the Indian Ocean are: the USA, USSR, UK, France, Germany, Japan and China.

United States

The USA has emerged from its isolation in world affairs as a mighty and omnipresent power steadily from early 1940s or so. Every dictate of public interest in the United States had always emphasized the importance of avoiding all entanglements that might involve it in foreign rivalries and foreign wars.1
The USA, thus effectively enjoyed her "splendid isolation" till a brief and temporary involvement in 1917 in the World War I, and her final entry in world affairs in 1941 on the side of the Allies in World War II.

The outbreak of World War I (1914-1918) in Europe took most Americans by surprise but they declared their aloofness in the beginning. As the war unfolded and expanded, this neutrality became a burden and America entered the war in April 1917. With the defeat of Germans and other central powers in 1918, most in America expected their country to revert to its traditional aloofness from European (in fact, world) politics. But the American President, Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world "safe for democracy".

The well known "Fourteen Points" the President mooted as a blueprint for a new world order based on conventions arrived at openly, along with the establishment of international organisations for preservation and promotion of world peace.

Accordingly, the Peace Settlement following the conclusion of World War I, resulted from and encompassed significant US contribution. For the first time in history, international organisations—the League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation and World Court of Justice—with membership of most of the sovereign states of the world were brought into existence in 1919 in pursuance of the American design for securing world peace. But a single vote in the US Senate prevented America from joining any of these organisations, or otherwise jumping into world affairs; and the USA withdrew into its shell of "splendid isolation". The USA thus abdicated the responsibility and share in the new international order envisaged by Wilson, in which America would play her full part defending the principles of freedom and justice, and ensure that the spiritual power of Democracy prevailed; for, this was "surely the manifest destiny of the United States".

This retreat into isolationism, however, did not mean an absolute withdrawal from world affairs. It meant a consistent refusal to make any political commitment infringing upon the USA's freedom of action.

The onset of the Second World War (1 September 1939) marked the culmination of the sweep of Fascist—Nazi and other (Franco's in Spain, Salazar's in Portugal)—dictatorships in Europe, the rise of Japanese
The 'Great Depression' in the USA (supra, p. 172) brought to office in 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the President, who gave a new turn to American foreign policy. The Communist regime and the USSR were recognized, and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were resumed, after a break of 15 years.

The war initially went disastrously for Britain and France and by about the middle of 1941 the German-Italian Axis had overrun virtually the whole of Europe. Hitler's Nazi Germany invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941, and the Soviet Union became an ally of Britain and France. The allies made desperate efforts to win over the USA to their side, but the latter finally joined them only after the Japanese devastating attack on Pearl Harbour (in the US territory of Hawaii) on 7 December 1941. The American role was decisive in the eventual allied victory in the War — which ended in Europe with unconditional German surrender on 7 May 1945, and in Asia with a similar surrender by Japan on 14 August the same year.

The US emerged as the most powerful country in the world at the end of the war: but for the outpost of Pearl Harbour its territory had not suffered a scratch of actual battle, its economy had got an unprecedented fillip by the war and thus was booming, and it had developed the atom bomb which made its military might unchallenged and invincible. Still, it realized as never before that the United States could not stand alone in a world where aggression anywhere threatened peace and was thus likely to hit the US interests elsewhere.

The war-time alliance (of Britain, the US and the USSR) was one of expediency and had materialized, essentially, with the sole objective of defeating the German-Japanese axis. Once that had been achieved, fissures started appearing and by the end of 1946 the erstwhile allies had become implacable antagonists. The US, Britain and France — the 'West' — found themselves holding the USSR — the 'East' — in deep suspicion and total distrust, especially when the latter through overt or covert active support had brought about the establishment of communist regimes in the states of eastern Europe.
The vertical split into 'West' and 'East' in the alliance, abetted by the 'march of communism' in Europe had become open and firm with the fall of Czechoslovakia to Communism on 25 February 1948. The Cold War was now in full swing permeating international politics, and was to hold sway over the minds, postures and policies of countries the world over till quite recently.

To American eyes, the Russian movement after the war into contiguous areas in Europe and Asia, the coordinated activity of communist parties elsewhere and systematic extinction of civil freedom wherever the writ of Kremlin ran—all began to appear as a new phase in global struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, with Stalinism now assuming the mantle recently relinquished by Hitlerism. As a champion of democratic system the United States, at first gradually and provisionally, then with mounted assurance and conviction, took the role of the guardian of world freedom.

The post-war fear of the expansion of the Soviet influence forced United States foreign policy to be global in character with the intent of containing the rising tide of communism. The main element of this policy, George F Kennan—the well-known American diplomat with deep knowledge and understanding of the USSR—suggested "must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies...The United States...must apply counter force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."

Away from Europe, elsewhere in the world, a spectacular feature of the postwar era was the nationalist awakening of the Asian and African people. The War had shaken the hold of the Europeans on their colonies. After the war when they tried to resume and reassert their control over the colonised, they encountered resolute resistance of strong nationalist movements in these lands. United States sympathized with nationalist yearnings: "I had always been opposed to colonialism". claimed President Harry S Truman; "I still believed in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of 'self-determination'.

Apart from Europe, the USA had hardly had any particular interest in Afro-Asia before the War. Even in trade and commerce, China was perhaps
the only Asian country towards which the US had a somewhat defined commercial policy and interest in that period.

In the Middle East too, it was the exigencies of war that obliged the USA to interest itself there.

Thus Asia assumed importance for the US only *after* the Second World War. Indeed, the American interest in Asia was the direct consequence of Cold War. The policy of containment\(^\text{15}\) —particularly after the success of Mao's Communist revolution in China (1 October 1949)— necessitated that the US assigned enhanced importance to Asia in its global calculations.

As a part of its global strategy for the containment and eventual defeat of Communism, the USA set out on a spree of military pacts, and aid and arms to its allies and adherents in Europe, Asia, Africa—all over the world.

In its sustained effort to prevent the extension of communism, United States concluded essentially military alliances as a means of parading and projecting its power. "The integrity of these alliances", to use the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1961-69), "is at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and, if it should be discovered that the pledge of United States is meaningless, the structure of peace would crumble, and we would be well on our way to terrible catastrophe".\(^\text{16}\)

By about 1950 the US indulged in plain *Realpolitik*; it projected itself as a leading—if not the sole— exponent of international security. Not only did it embark upon a programme of alliances for collective security or collective defense in Europe, Middle East and the Southeast Asia, under the Truman Doctrine, it also declared its support of "free peoples" resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by "outside pressures".

In Europe, the biggest and subsequently a key alliance backed by American military power, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established on 4 April 1949.\(^\text{17}\)

The alliance steadily grew in strength and significance as the bedrock of Western deterrence to potential Soviet aggression in Europe.
The Korean crises extended the Cold War to include Asia and in time the rest of the world too. This signalled the American interest and entry into the Indian Ocean.

The war in Korea tapered off to a stalemate and the USA, pursuing its policy of containment, actively sought allies in Asia to meet the Sino-Soviet communist combine. The Shah was installed back in power in Iran by the USA in 1953 (supra, p. 404), a mutual defense agreement was concluded by it in May 1954 with Pakistan, and Turkey had long been given the US protective shield (it had been receiving massive hardware even before it joined NATO formally in 1952). The USA was thus well-placed at this stage to canvass for military pacts.

The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, France, UK, and USA as members was established by the pact signed on 8 September 1954. To link it with NATO and complete the chain of encirclement, the idea of Baghdad Pact was mooted so on thereafter. The pact was formally concluded on 24 February 1955 with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the UK as its members.

The Coup d'état on 14 July 1958 in Iraq liquidated King Feisal II, his heir, and the Anglophile premier Nuri-es-Said, and brought to power the pro-Soviet Colonel Abdul Kerim Kassem. Iraq thus withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. Not only did the headquarters of the pact shift to Ankara in Turkey, the pact itself was transformed into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1959.

American interest, and entry, in the Indian Ocean region is thus to be seen as a kind of replacement, or filling in, for the erstwhile colonial powers: France, Britain, or the Dutch. As these powers weaken and find themselves unable to control or effectively influence the areas of their erstwhile dominance, a kind of power vacuum is seen by the USA to occur. The compulsions and commitments of the Cold War then oblige the US to move into these areas of the Indian Ocean indirectly and meaningfully through military pacts, bases etc.
This is evident in its most vivid and effective from in regard to the British withdrawal east of Suez from 1968 onwards.

Moreover, in the late 1960s the growing *detente* in Europe had also not mellowed enough the intensity of Cold War to encourage the US to disregard the military and strategic balance developed thus far *vis-a-vis* the USSR. It was absolutely unthinkable for the USA, therefore, that a 'power vacuum' in the Indian Ocean region be allowed, the more so when the Soviet naval and military capability were now surfacing there noticeably.

The US, accordingly, decided to build on the Indian Ocean Command\(^1\) it had created somewhat tentatively in November 1963, and the communication facility it decided in 1968 or so to develop at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago.\(^2\)

Simultaneously with this, the US also started pouring in military hardware into the Region. The massive arms transfers\(^3\) to its allies and others of the region by the US, bear an aloquent testimony to the American policy of assigning these countries the responsibility of regional security as well as that of combating Communism there.

### Table 5.1

**US Arms Sales in the Indian Ocean Region 1978-82**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of arms transfer (US $ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (Sanna)</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In return for the US military aid, and technological and managerial expertise, the Saudi Arabia, for instance, had sought to bring about a reduction of the Soviet influence in neighbouring South Yemen, (eventually helping to merge both South and North Yemen into Republic of Yemen in 1991) Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia etc.24

The Communist coup (April 1978) followed on 25 December 1979 by the advent in Afghanistan of Soviet armed forces aggravated the American apprehensions and responses in the Indian Ocean region. Revolutionary upheaval in Iran, eventually resulting in the ouster of the Shah and establishment of a fiercely anti-American Khomeini regime (February 1979) precipitated the concrete shape and role of the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)25 in the region. These overlapping, virtually simultaneous, developments afforded America the justification to commit itself in the Indian Ocean far more heavily than ever before.

Pentagon announced on 8 December 1982 the institution of a new Central Command (CENTCOM) "to protect American interests...stretching from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean".26 The command became operative within weeks of the announcement (on 1 January 1983).27

This array of steps taken by the US was to augment its power, so to speak, which was available from its explicit alliances with the countries in the Ocean like Thailand, Pakistan, South Africa, Australia, Singapore etc., in a number of which it enjoyed base facilities.

In addition to the military dimension just discussed, the US simultaneously devised for itself a rather substantial —and perhaps more penetrating and meaningful— economic role vis-a-vis the countries of the Indian Ocean region. Since practically all the countries there—excepting South Africa and Australia—have been desperate for their economic development, the USA has naturally appeared to them a very valuable source of aid and assistance. They have thus been the beneficiaries in this regard, in varying degrees, since 1950s or so. The table below illustrates the point.
Table 5.2

The US assistance (military and non-military) to the countries of the region.

(US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>2,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The range and quantum of the military and non-military American aid to the countries of the Indian Ocean region has been discussed exhaustively in a fairly wide-ranging literature on the subject.\textsuperscript{28} For our purposes, suffice it to say that apart from helping in the economic development of these countries, the aid aims to ensure too the political/systemic status quo there.

Juxtaposed with the economic development is the urge for modernization in all these countries — ancient, tradition-bound etc., as they are. Hence, their hunger for modern technology.

Accordingly, the Indian Ocean countries have had a very high component of technology transfer included in the aid package they received. In 1950, a broad remified administrative apparatus was created in United States, when the first state organization for scientific and technical aid to young states,
the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) was created. In 1961, a new organization, the Agency for International Development (AID), was created to redesign its technical policy with respect to the newly independent states. Through these agencies the US has extended its technical know-how and technological competence to many of the Indian Ocean countries. The most vivid illustration of the role of US technology in the region is in the realm of oil, of course. In the exploration, extraction, production, refining, etc. of oil in practically all the oil-producing countries of the Indian Ocean region—barring perhaps India—the American technology, assistance and control figure overwhelmingly.

Thus, oil of the Persian Gulf is practically in American hands, for the US superintends its production and flow rather effectively. The US itself perhaps does not need the Gulf oil so much but its allies and friends in Europe, and east Asia (especially Japan and Australia) depend heavily on it. This has therefore, resulted in heavy American involvement of all sorts in the Gulf and its oil.

It may be remembered, however, that the actual dealing in oil is done by the US-based/controlled MNCs, who rake in billions of dollars for the US from their investments in the commodity which in themselves run into billions.

Trade is another instrument that the US has employed in the Indian Ocean region. Starting virtually from a scratch in the 1960s United States trade with the countries of the region has grown into an enormous, lively network. As is illustrated in the table below.

Table 5.3
US Trade in the Indian Ocean region
(US $ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Imports from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6,347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S. Trade in the region has further grown during 1980's as is shown below.

Table 5.4
U.S. Trade in the region during 1980's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value Of Imports</th>
<th>Value Of Exports</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Currency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia &amp; Singapore</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia &amp; Singapore</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa 3,886.1 3,477.7 1985 Million Rands
Mozambique 2,110.2 616.0 1985 Million Meticais
Tanzania 656.0 115.0 1985 Million Shillings
Kenya 65.3 85.8 1986 Million K. pound
Somalia 154,082.0 6,970.0 1982 '000 Somali Shilling
Ethiopia 330,469.0 73,317.0 1985 '000 Birr
Sudan 1,608.1 22.8 1983/84 Million S Pounds
Egypt 1,295.7 33.5 1985 Million U.S. $
Israel 1,679,000.0 2,138,000.0 1985 '000 U.S. $
Jordan 128,045.0 - 1985 '000 JD
Saudi Arabia 12,352.0 12,393.0 1986 Million Riyals
Yemen No concrete figures are available
Oman 69,618.0 0.7 1986 (Million Barrels)
U.A.E. 1,032.0 667.0 1982/83 Million U.S. $
Bahrain 353.8 - 1982 Million U.S. $
Kuwait 158,592.0 - 1987 '000 KD
Iraq 126.0 - 1985 Million ID
Pakistan 17,890.0 8,115.0 1988/89 Million Rupees
India 19,610.8 23,317.4 1986/87 Million Rupees
Bangladesh 8,026.0 12,044.4 1987/88 Million Taka
Thailand 69,557.0 80,865.0 1988 Million Baht
Malaysia 7,669.4 9,611.3 1988 Million M$/ Ringgits
Indonesia 1,735.7 3,073.6 1988 Million U.S.$
Australia 8,529,821.0 4,652,074.0 1987/88 '000 A$
Sri Lanka 4,857,206.0 11683,648.0 1988 '000 Rupees
Madagascar 37,026.0 70,409.6 1987 Million MG Francs
Seychelles 31,548.0 - 1985 '000 SR


On all counts then, the American involvement in the Indian Ocean is multi-layered, multi-faceted, deep and dynamic, and one that has recently become one of global significance as witnessed in the recent war against Iraq. Till about the mid-1980s, the US presence provoked a corresponding Soviet response, but in the Gorbachev era this too has subsided considerably, leaving the field entirely to the US. But that was not so, from 1968 till mid-1980s, as we shall see presently.
The size and location of what till recently [25 December 1991] was U.S.S.R or the Soviet Union traditionally promoted the belief that it was essentially a "land power", with scant interest and low capability in maritime activity. Some of the Czars of Russia might have vaguely thought of the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, some in the Soviet leadership too might have spared a thought for this Ocean while drawing the picture of a global communist revolution. But the fact remains that at the end of the World War II, the Indian Ocean touched but marginally, if at all, the Soviet consciousness or policy.

The reasons are not far to seek. The Ocean was still a 'British Lake', in that the image —howsoever bruised and battered by the war— persisted that Britain continued to be the 'master' of this Ocean. For, the Royal navy was virtually the only force that effectively ploughed these waters, and the network of the British naval bases from Perth-Singapore to Aden-Suez to Cape Town was effectively operative. Almost the entire littoral of the Ocean, alongwith vast hinterland composed much of the British empire; and the empire was very much intact. Even when the empire started dissolving in the tide of Asian nationalism, and much after that the British navy's dominance of the Indian Ocean remained unchallenged right up to mid-1960s.

In this scenario, with its virtually non-existent naval capability, and natural pre-occupation with Europe and with its stupendous post-war reconstruction, the USSR just could not afford the hazard of sparing a serious thought for the Indian Ocean. Iran happened to be the only Indian Ocean country that touched the USSR, in interaction with which naval matters had no place whatever.

Soviet Union was traditionally a land power with scant naval power. After the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Communist regime, by mid-1930s, became uneasily aware that its potential enemies such as Germany, Japan, Italy and others seemed to regard big navies as essential to their political ambitions. Naval construction was thus started, and by the outbreak of World War II, more than 200 naval vessels were being built in Russian shipyards —including 10 cruisers, 45 destroyers and 90 submarines. But the battleships were never completed and the carriers not even laid down. The war gave a
massive blow to the newly conceived naval expansion as well as the sea-worthy Soviet Navy.\footnote{36}

Strangely, the Soviet military leadership chose to draw a conclusion from the war that navy should play a subordinate role, as an auxiliary to the Red Army. The fleets were confined to the coastal zone, controlled by the troops.\footnote{37}

Stalin at this stage regarded the naval forces as a symbol of great power status and its role remained almost neurotically defensive. His death in 1953, however, released the USSR from some of its defensive paranoia. In 1955 Khrushchev appointed Admiral Sergei G Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. A young and politically reliable Gorshkov was known for his enthusiasm for missile technology, atomic submarines, and flying torpedoes. In fact, Gorshkov took up a massive naval build up in a very short period and converted the Soviet land power into a well-reckoned sea power.\footnote{38} since then the visibility of Soviet naval power steadily increased.\footnote{39}

From 1945 to about mid-1960, Soviet Union spread its political ideological influence too. The countries released from the colonial yoke in Asia and Africa were considered by Soviet leadership as ideal for influencing; demonstrating a strong naval power on the oceans and by giving them whatever military and economic aid. In this way Soviet Union tried to project itself as an alternative to Anglo-American capitalist system—equally powerful and successful.

However, till 1967, Britain still maintained about 80,000 troops in Singapore and Malaysia and another 30,000 in Aden and the Persian Gulf. More than one-tenth of British defense expenditure went to Southeast Asia, and between 1948 and 1967 British forces took part in more than twenty local conflicts around the Indian Ocean.\footnote{40} But the growing British involvement in Europe and restrictions on government expenditure led in 1967 to a sudden decision by the Labour Government to complete the military withdrawal from east of Suez by the end of 1971.\footnote{41}

There was great anxiety on this decision in the West because the Soviet influence—political and economic—was growing in the Indian Ocean littoral, Soviet Navy had already multiplied a lot and was able to operate in the
'blue waters' even without touching shores for months, and above all there was little sign from the Americans that they intended physically to fill the gap which may eventually be filled by the Soviet Navy.

The fear was not unfounded, as in March 1968—just about two months after the British announcement to withdraw—a small but sophisticated Soviet task force spent four months showing the flag in Madras and Bombay, Karachi, Colombo, Basra and Umm Qasr (Iraq), Bandar Abbas (Iran), Mogadishu (Somalia) and Aden—15 ports in all—before returning to Vladivostok. Towards the end of the same year (mid-December) a more ambitious exercise was planned when more than two dozen Soviet ships, including a number of space tracking and recovery vessels, gathered near Seychelles. The total Soviet ship months, thus rose from 20 in 1968, 31 in 1969 to 44 in 1970, apparently stabilizing at 42 in 1971.

This considerable Soviet naval presence, though not a match to the Western navies, greatly alarmed the West. British Prime Minister Edward Heath at a press conference in New Delhi on 10 January 1971, referring to the Soviet role in West Asia, described the Soviet Union as "expansionist". He stressed that safeguards were necessary against the expansion of Soviet power in Indian Ocean. It was a matter of serious concern to Europe, which is interested in keeping open her trade routes to Asia and Australia.

The Soviet naval penetration and presence in Indian Ocean waters brought the other Cold War contestant to the area for the first time. The Commonwealth prime ministers assembled at Singapore in their annual conference (in January 1971) viewed this as the descent of the Cold War and its murderous potential to the very door steps of Afro-Asia. Hence the Sri Lankan move for making the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace".

The Soviet Union, however, had its own interests in the region. It wanted to establish a favourable environment to secure its Southern borders. Indian Ocean is the only ice-free sea route which connects the European Soviet part with its Far Eastern component, and is therefore of great national economic importance. Secondly, the USSR carried out wide-scale scientific research in the Indian Ocean which was of value to it. Finally, a number of former colonies in this region maintain friendly relations with Soviet Union,
and their destiny is not a matter of indifference to it. Accordingly, since 1968, Soviet Union has kept a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and has supplemented it with various treaties of mutual cooperation and defense with the individual countries of the region. Under these treaties, Soviet Union gave considerable military aid to the countries of the region like Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and India.

Soviet support to these countries was never fixed or on a permanent basis, but it mattered a great deal to the Soviet Union as to the kind of regime these countries had.

By 1974, the Soviet Union had significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. Its major bases were Berbera (Somalia) which it had to abandon in 1977, and most of the forces there were shifted to Aden and Iraq, Umm Qasr (Iraq), and Aden, Hodeida and Socotra Island (parts of erstwhile South Yemen) also had Soviet forces. Besides, Soviet Union secured a large network of mooring buoys (fleet anchorage), which provided means for replenishment and repair of Soviet ships and necessary rest for the crew, in Mauritius, Seychelles and Mozambique etc.

But the persistent Soviet efforts did not succeed in establishing even a single full-fledged naval base in the Indian Ocean.

The strength of the Soviet naval force in the ocean since 1968 fluctuated. The first Soviet task force to come to the Indian Ocean in March 1968 consisted of one Sverdloc-class cruiser accompanied by one guided missile destroyer, one submarine, and one Pevek-class oiler. Larger task forces were sent to the Ocean on specific occasions: like the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 when the US 7th fleet entered the Bay of Bengal, to lend support to Pakistan; or during the Arab-Israel war of September 1973. In both these cases, the Soviet objective seemed to be to shadow the US task forces in the Ocean.

The Soviet presence combined together anti-submarine area familiarization, assistance to local powers, shadowing of Western naval forces, and a modicum of flag showing around the Indian Ocean area. What was lacking was any evidence of the maintenance of a task force designed to
interfere with mercantile traffic, tanker or other, on the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean.  

Naturally, the Soviet presence in this region was multifaceted, and multi-level: it has sought to cover military, economic, political and ideological aspects.

a) Military aspect

Soviet Union helped a few states in the Indian Ocean with military aid, supplies, and military advisors etc. For example, during 1955-1974, if deliveries to Egypt and Syria—not strictly Indian Ocean States, in our opinion—are excluded (which alone accounted for 45 per cent of the total Soviet supplies to the Third World), then some 90 per cent of Soviet military supplies were directed to the Indian Ocean or immediate hinterland states.  

In the years 1955 to 1979, the split up of the Soviet military aid was: Middle East $ 24,445 million, South Asia $ 5,410 million, and East Asia 890 million dollars. The individual recipients of the aid (of the entire Soviet bloc) during 1955-1980 (in US $ million) was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Yemen</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significantly, a majority of countries that signed treaties (of friendship and cooperation) with Soviet Union, are in the Indian Ocean or its immediate hinterland.

Forced out of Sudan and Somalia in the 1970s, Soviet Union developed Marxist Ethiopia as a friend and client. It not only pledged US $ 4
billion in military hardware but also provided logistics and advisory support. In turn, Ethiopia permitted Soviet military access to its key ports and air fields. Soviet Union has maintained a small naval support base in Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea. Large arm deliveries and Soviet military advisors were extended to Mozambique when that country was fighting overt and covert Portuguese colonialism.

Moscow’s support to the Marxist regime in South Yemen was a major focus of Soviet efforts to expand its influence on the Arabian Peninsula. But the merger of the North Yemen left little place for the Soviet Union in this area.

In the Persian Gulf, Iraq was the major recipient of Soviet arms supplies. In 1985 and 1986 alone—during the Iran-Iraq war—Iraq received $3.5 billion in Soviet arms and equipment as well as continued services of almost 1,000 Soviet military advisors.

In South Asia, India continued to have "special relationship" with Soviet Union but such relations are between co-equals. There was no question of playing the proxy of the other. India purchased bulk of its heavy armoury from Soviet Union including fighter aircrafts, submarines, transport air crafts and surface-to-surface missiles.

Nevertheless, floating Soviet fleets were never been large enough—or supported on a scale—which could be adequate for achieving far-reaching naval objectives. The Soviet navy presented just a combination of flag-showing force and area familiarization detachments—a mix of SSM, SAM and ASW ships—attempting to match the Western polars and/or carrier naval forces; it may have had additional political objective of securing denuclearization of the Indian Ocean. In comparison, the United States had more surface warships in terms of capacity, or for anti-submarine warfare, or for sheer size for showing the flag exercises.

It is thus obvious that the Soviet Union always showed a tendency to restrict a naval competition in the Indian Ocean. USSR also seemed anxious—more so after the far-reaching internal changes and challenges it faced at home (since 1985)—for a naval limitations agreement, especially in the Indian Ocean, so as to cope with the increased defense demands in other regions.
b) Economic, Technological aspects

Soviet Union, like the United States, established economic/technological cooperation with the countries of the Indian Ocean region. It extended economic aid and technical help to select—'friendly'—countries. The initial gesture was in the form of small-scale economic credits to neighbouring Afghanistan in 1954. This was followed by an agreement with India in 1955 to construct the Bhilai Steel Complex, and later to assist in building Bokaro Steel Mill. In 1956 Soviet Union offered to finance the construction of the first stage of Aswan Dam in Egypt.59

With the end of Khruschev era (1964) Soviet economic policies seemed to be based on economic rationality, i.e., towards mutually advantageous relations. Accordingly, it set up joint ventures in India, Iran and the Gulf countries.60

Among the economic ties the Soviet Union established, included trade, aid and technical cooperation. It rendered help in geological prospecting, training of personnel from these countries, and transfer of Soviet experience in planning and management to them. Assistance was also rendered in setting up iron and steel mills in India, Pakistan etc.

In 1971, Soviet Union and Iran signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation providing for the exchange of scientific/technical information and scientists. Collaboration was also mooted in combatting plant pests and cattle diseases, reclamation of salty soils and marsh lands, use of solar energy and medical research. In 1972, both the countries concluded a 15-year treaty providing for economic, scientific and technical cooperation in the development of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, oil, gas, petro-chemical and chemical industry, mechanical engineering, agriculture, irrigation and fishing, planning and construction of power installations transportation, prospecting for oil and minerals and vocational and technical training. Thus, by 1979, Iran had built around 100 industrial units with Soviet assistance.61

Scientific and technical collaboration with India included the peaceful uses of atomic energy, space exploration and electronics, steel works, heavy mechanical engineering, heavy power machinery, oil drilling and refining and electric power plants.62
The developing countries—including the countries of Indian Ocean region—in the early 1980s, counted 1,700 industrial enterprises, electric power stations, hydropower plants and other projects built with Soviet assistance. In 1975, it supplied about 87.8 per cent machine and equipment needs of Bangladesh, 86.3 per cent of PDRY, 70% of Iran and Pakistan and 30 to 40 per cent of India and Ethiopia. It has also signed long-term programmes for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation with India in 1979, Mozambique in 1981, Ethiopia in 1984 and Madagascar in 1986.

The geographic distribution of Soviet aided projects in various Indian Ocean countries was as on 1 January 1982 is shown below:

Table 5.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Under Agreement</th>
<th>Total Put into operation</th>
<th>Industrial enterprises Under Agreement</th>
<th>Industrial enterprises Put into operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDRY</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Soviet trade with the countries of the region has also grown over time.

Table 5.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970 (million roubles)</th>
<th>1980 (million US $)</th>
<th>1986 (Million roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exports to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports (Import)</th>
<th>Exports (Export)</th>
<th>Value (Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>244.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>509.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>279.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>268.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>242.0</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,233.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>345.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ideologically/politically, Soviet perception of these states changed over time. During the late 1940s and 1950s Soviet Union gave almost decisive
importance to ideological considerations. Under its drive to set up 'People's Democracies' in countries of the region, Soviet Union preferred to help only those that corresponded, or showed willingness, to the Marxist-Leninist (socialist) concepts and to build on the socialistic pattern.

Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, ideological experiments receded for a time in favour of more balanced relations with a larger number of states. In the course of this development, plain utilitarian considerations of an economic and strategic nature gained the upper hand. For instance, in early 1970s, Soviet relations with Iran and Pakistan grew, inspite of the latter's membership of western alliance system.65

Nevertheless, its setback in Egypt (Abrogation by President Sadat of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty in March 1976) led to a resuscitation of ideological considerations, though more orthodox ones this time. Soviet Union endeavored to form Moscow-aligned cadres, particularly in armed forces in Africa; Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mozambique provide instances of this. But this did not last; Soviet experts and advisors were unceremoniously dismissed and expelled from many of these countries for trying to help coups or disturb their political systems.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 and propounding and promoting the twin policies of 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost'66 in Soviet Union marked inter alia drastic changes in Soviet foreign policy perceptions and pursuits, globally and regionally. From 1985 onwards, therefore, the country severely cut down its defense forces, commitments and expenditure,67 to the point that the Warsaw Pact was wound up on 1 July 1991,68 along with the dissolution of COMECON on 28 July 1991.69 Soviet forces voluntarily withdrew from practically all eastern European countries.

Concomitant with these and other wide-ranging developments in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and the resulting world scene, the Soviet role and possible stake in the Indian Ocean region too declined. This is dramatically borne out by the position and the activity—if any—the Soviet Union took in the recent 42-day Iraq-US war over Kuwait (17 January to 28 February 1991). The Soviet posture in this event contrasted sharply with that in the 8-year Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) where the USSR provided hefty
military and other assistance to Iraq (*supra*, p).  

Fact is that the Soviet Union got so heavily preoccupied in coping with unprecedented threats to its systemic structure --indeed, its very survival as the state it has been for the last 70-odd years-- that it could hardly spare a thought or effort for anything else in regard to the rest of the world. Moreover, the Soviet military, economic capability too suffered erosion to such an extent that it just could not afford to sustain its earlier Cold War role in world affairs. Finally, the ideology it had propounded and passionately propagated in the last seven decades lost much of its sheen and appeal.

Under the circumstances it was no surprise that corresponding with these trends, the Soviet presence and position was eclipsed manifestly in the Indian Ocean region. And since 25 December, 1991, the erstwhile Soviet Union has dissolved and ceased to be. Its disappearance as a colossal actor, a superpower, from the world scene has removed it not only from there, but also from the Indian Ocean region as a factor of any consequence.

Accordingly, apart from the presence and over publicised US-USSR 'rivalry' in the Indian Ocean and the lands framing it, which has now totally evaporated, note has been taken of the nominal, or at best supplementing presence, of some of the former colonial powers and some new aspirants. Among the former colonial powers, Great Britain and France and those among the new aspirants Japan and China have displayed involvement in the Indian Ocean and its region. In our opinion an occasional German showing in these waters and some military and economic transactions by Germany with some of the Indian Ocean lands does not merit any serious discussion.

In sharp contrast to the pre-1950 position, the British role in the Indian Ocean from about early 1950s has steadily reduced to a mere formality. The French can be denied even that description. We will thus quickly run through the post-war scenario of Britain and the Ocean here.

Great Britain

'Master of the Indian Ocean' till the Second World War in every sense of the term, Great Britain suffered a serious decline in its position not only in the world at large but also in this region. Its naval supremacy in the
Ocean was challenged by Japan to the extent of securing a humiliating surrender of British bastion of Singapore, and occupation of Burma and Rangoon, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal. The battering the British navy was receiving in other theatres of war (North Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean etc.) too depleted through diversion the British naval strength in the rest of the Indian Ocean.

In the post-war Indian Ocean the British navy could not muster its pre-war strength and stronghold, largely also because of the emergence of independent nations in the region. Still the British naval capability—such as it was—dwarfed the others, for it was the only meaningful force there. (supra, p259)

The British decision (January 1968) and the actual withdrawal (1971) from the Indian Ocean was a recognition of the fact that the world and the times have changed for Britain. No longer will Britain be an independent military factor in the Indian Ocean. Its role from now on would essentially be political-commercial, or auxiliary, if at all, to the American naval presence in the region.

Thus while winding up its naval establishment in the Gulf it fostered formation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 (supra, p15) and its withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore left a token 'police-strength-troops' at Hongkong. Britain has however made on occasion significant role in the Indian Ocean. For instance, its membership of the military pacts in the region—the SEATO and CENTO—enabled her to do so. In the Afghan embroglio too the British diplomatic contribution was not entirely small or useless.

But the major British activity in the region in the entire post-War period has been commercial or that encouraging/helping economic development there. The trade links Britain had and still has are mainly with erstwhile British colonies. Major trading partners in the region being South Africa, India, Singapore and Australia, apart from the oil exporting Gulf region. British investments are also mainly centered in South Africa and the Arab countries of the region.
Britain has thus cultivated special relations with some of the Indian Ocean countries whose leadership looks at the world through British eyes. Above all, the long colonial links have made Britain a temporary or permanent home for a large number of individuals from the Indian Ocean area. However, the overall British policy has faced a decline after 1971 and it has played a role secondary to United States in the affairs of the region.

**France**

In the days of British mastery of the Ocean, France really did not matter. For apart from minding some insular specs of territory in the western Indian Ocean (Reunion, Comoros, Djibouti etc.) the French activity in the Indian Ocean did not amount to much. After 1970s, with the attainment of independence by these, the French position and presence has become even less than a formality.

However the French dependence of Gulf oil retains its interest and sometimes invites its visible activity, as for instance the role of its action by the French troops during the Mecca Mosque crises or the French role in Iran-Iraq conflict etc.

France, however, tried to enter into partnership to develop nuclear technology with Pakistan. In 1977-78 it agreed to deliver a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel to Pakistan but under the US pressure it was cancelled. In early 1982 France and India agreed for the delivery and manufacture under license of 150 Mirage-2000 planes from which France earned $3,000 million. France also agreed to deliver enriched uranium for a US-built reactor in India.

**Federal Republic of Germany**

The German role has been almost exclusively commercial or transferring of technology and bilateral economic relations. Its relations with individual countries and political presence has been clearly shaped and strengthened by the provision of development aid and by semi-official organisation dealing with cultural and educational exchange. Thus during
1960s and 1970s FRG became one of the leading economic partners of the Indian Ocean countries. This was mainly due to its economic competitiveness and the image it projected of itself as a western industrial state encouraging development.\textsuperscript{80}

German trade has continuously increased with the oil-producing countries. Exports to Iraq, for example, rose by 740 per cent in 1974 and even more later. The petro-dollars of other Gulf states were invested in German firms substantially. However, after the revolution in Iran (1979) German firms were expropriated and large orders were discontinued. The war between Iraq and Iran also hit the German economic interests.

India has continued to be a key Third World country for Germany. Both have cooperated in various industrial sectors. This trend was more prominent in 1950s and 1960s. However, Indo-German industrial collaboration could not become wide ranging due to India's legislations in regard to foreign industries.

The unification of the West and East German states into a single Federal Republic of Germany since 3 October, 1990, has pushed the Indian Ocean region down in the list of new Germany's priorities, and it is likely to aggravate in the years to come.

German relations with the ASEAN countries have also been essentially economic but such links are basically at organisational level \textit{i.e.}, between EEC and ASEAN. In 1979 EEC shared 15 per cent of ASEAN countries' trade and 14 per cent of the total investment.\textsuperscript{81} This may now go down further.

In effect, thus, the post-war FRG engaged itself mainly in economic cooperation, industrial collaboration and trade and investment in the Indian Ocean region. It never sought to play a military role there, though it did supply defence equipments and expertise to few like Iraq in the region.

\textbf{Japan}

The Japanese naval activity in the eastern Indian Ocean during the Second World War attracted worldwide attention for much of it was so dramatic and unexpected. But the war and the nuclear punishment crippled
Japan as a military power perhaps for all times to come. Japan has had no military aspirations whatever since then in Indian Ocean or anywhere else.

But as an economic super power that it has emerged into, the Japanese commercial, trade and aid and technological interests in the Indian Ocean region have mounted by the day. For its security interests and protection of trade Japan relies on US and other Western powers. During the early 1970s—Arab-Israel war and oil crises—and the Kuwait war in 1991, Japan closely coordinated with the measures and policies of the West.

Japanese trade and technological/industrial links touch virtually all the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

Having 'white' status in South Africa, Japan is its third biggest market importing raw materials like platinum, chrome, asbestos, manganese and uranium. South Africa is fourth largest importer of Japanese goods. Other black African countries also extensively trade with Japan which is equal to that of South Africa.

Heavily dependent on Persian Gulf states for oil, (72% at present) Japan has tried to diversify this dependence especially after 1973 oil embargo. Japan is a big exporter of automobiles, electronics and computers to these countries. Japan started joint collaborations with India and Pakistan, two most important markets in South Asia.

Southeast Asia was of prime interest to Japan because of its proximity to it, Malacca Straits—between Malaysia and Indonesia—which is the important waterway for Japanese trade and as a source of raw materials and markets. After the initial hangover of Second World War, Japan tried to shed away its image of 'ugly Japanese' and built up economic ties. In 1978 this region represented 20 per cent of all Japanese investments. Japanese firms have quite successfully competed against the US and European multinationals there. Thus building a viable economic network of interdependence.

Australia could not be a Japan's trading partner till 1977 when a bilateral treaty was concluded between the two providing political and economic cooperation. Since then Australia has been Japan's most important market and source of vital raw materials.
Thus Japan has fully come out of the trauma it faced during the Second World War and has slowly—with its soft pedalling diplomacy—emerged as an important economic partner of the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

**People's Republic of China (PRC)**

The PRC's interest and role in the Indian ocean has been virtually exclusively political. Insofar as the champion of the Afro-Asian Third World, China has endeavored export of Maoism (the Chinese version of Marxism) to such countries of the Indian Ocean region as would respond especially to Soviet efforts in this regard. Particularly after the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960s the PRC's campaign in Afro-Asia has been essentially in the nature of canvassing for a competitor of Soviet Marxian campaign. Its cultivation and active support of Pakistan is a major landmark in the PRC's diplomatic offensive in the Indian Ocean region.

In terms of trade and technology transfer in the Indian Ocean region, China has little to show. Its ambitions in the region have therefore been exclusively political/ideological.

What, then, is the range and rigour of problems facing the region as a whole, and its constituents individually, and what seem to be prospect, not merely of solving the problems but also of developing of newer capabilities by them? Whatever view one chooses to take of these circumstances—negative or positive— at least four inferences can certainly be drawn. First and foremost, the disappearance of Soviet Union from the stage of global international politics, and being succeeded by fragments of its former self not a single one of which seems capable of filling the role of the Soviet Union, will impart greater mobility as well as vulnerability to the Indian Ocean states. The corresponding enhancement of the stature and sweep of the USA is bound to effect the course of development and demeanour of these countries. It is not possible to draw the exact picture of the augmented American involvement here, but clearly while the dependence of Indian Ocean constituents on the USA is likely to increase in practically all respects, the USA's own policy and practice vis-a-vis these constituents is likely to become more independent,
pragmatic and possibly circumspect.

Secondly, intra-regional interaction among the constituents of the Indian Ocean region is bound to be greater and freer, for the perception of their respective interests now is not likely to be affected or warped by the US-USSR equation of the moment, as it used to be in the past.

Thirdly, the option of these countries in matters of trade, technology and expertise to be imported would multiply and become more complex. And finally, in this scenario, India's role, responsibility and contribution to the capacities and capabilities of the constituents of the Ocean are likely to mount, as we shall see in our next and final chapter.

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NOTES

1 The idea of avoiding involvement in non-American affairs and rivalries goes back to the earliest days of United States. Successive American presidents from George Washington (1789-1797) onwards advised their countrymen not to involve USA in "entangling alliances". Even before the USA had come into being, John Adams—who became first the Vice-President (1789-97) and then the second president (1797-1801) of the USA—had said in 1776: "We should separate ourselves as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European politics and wars". Adams, Charles F (ed): THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (Boston) vol. II, 1856, p.505; Dulles, Foster Rhea: AMERICA'S RISE TO WORLD POWER 1898-1954 (New York) 1955, p.2 ff; also see, "Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796" in Smith, Gaddis: THE AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (New York) 1969, pp. 66-69.

   The fifth US president, James Monroe (1817-1825) reiterating such US role further elaborated it in 1823 in what came to be known as the "Monroe Doctrine" which laid down that not only will the USA not involve itself in European quarrels, but would—resist militarily, if need be—all foreign interference or intervention (by foreign power and powers) in the USA as well as the entire continent of the Americas. For details see, Ibid., pp.8-9; Bemis Samuel Flagg: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (New York) 1949, pp. 382- 408; May, Ernest R: THE MAKING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (Cambridge Mass) 1976.

2 President Wilson initially believed that "it was a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes can not touch us..." and that "We must be impartial in thought as well as action..." For details see, Deconde, Alexander: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (New York) 1971, p.440.

3 For the causes of the US entry into the World War I. See, Ibid., pp. 440-59.

4 Wilson believed that major allied powers were democratic. The peace of the world must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. He disclosed after the War on 11 November 1918, "It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of a just democracy throughout the world". Quoted in Ibid., pp. 459 & 469.
President Wilson in his message to the Congress on 8 January 1918 spelled out these fourteen points. The points emphasized on open conventions of peace, no private international understanding and diplomacy in public view; absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters alike in peace and war; The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations; Adequate guarantees given and taken that the national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety; A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. The points also suggested that a general association of nations must be formed under specific conventions for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. For full details see, Smith, op. cit., pp. 82-84; Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste: FROM WILSON TO ROOSEVELT, Foreign Policy of the United States 1913-1945 (Cambridge Mass) 1963, pp. 73-79.


7 During the 1920's, while rejecting the membership in either the League of Nations or the World Court, the USA, nonetheless, took the lead in campaigning for disarmament, supported the movement for the outlawry of war, tried in every possible way to gain control over the world's strategic oil reserves, and sought to increase foreign investments and expanded her trade and commerce. For details see, Ibid., p. 244.


9 The situation at the end of the Second World War saw a radically transformed relationship between US and the rest of the World. It emerged as most powerful state in a shattered world. The war had left the international order in a condition of derangement. The axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) were vanquished, the European allies—especially Great Britain and France—battered and exhausted, and the colonial empires faced with imminent dissolution. Great gaping holes appeared in the structure of world power. And only two states—United States, and to a lesser but still significant degree, the Soviet Union—had the political dynamism, ideological confidence and military strength to flow into these vacuums of power. See, Dallek, Robert: THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD POWER, A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (New York) 1973, p. xxviii.

10 The United States was dismayed by Russia's arbitrary and at times brutal policies in central and eastern Europe and Russians were alarmed by the efforts of US to confine the secret of the atom bomb to itself. The US refusal to assist USSR in developing the "ultimate weapon", coupled with the pre-war American hostility towards them, confirmed their view that they must regard the United States as an enemy after the war. Thus the pre-war distrust, not only continued after the war, but became acute because of tremendous increase in power of both the US and USSR. For the causes of split in the Alliance, see, Deconde, op. cit., pp. 653-88; Graebner, Norman A: AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER, A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (New Delhi) 1984 pp. 107-45.

11 The cold war initially centered on the use of USSR military forces to install Communist governments in Eastern Europe. These Soviet actions ran counter to the US government's insistence upon the right of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe and raised fear that the USSR, after gaining control of Eastern Europe, would try to communize the whole of Europe.

USSR, on the other hand—due to its enormous losses and thus weakness, during the war—looked upon Eastern Europe as a buffer as well as a bulwark against invasion from the West. The Soviet leaders considered US objections to Soviet actions in Poland, Hungary
and Romania a betrayal of Wartime understandings about spheres of influence in Europe.

The announcement of US Marshall Plan (June 1947) to restore the faltering economies of Western Europe prompted a series of riposte from the Kremlin. In February 1948, the democratic government of Czechoslovakia was overturned by a communist coup and in May that year Soviet authorities severed all Western land-access routes to Berlin. The unending process of this brinkmanship led to the formation of many military treaties headed by US and Soviet Union.


12 Dallek, op. cit., p. xxix.


14 Although the ideology of US was basically anti-colonialist, its post-war record on colonial question was inconsistent. At times it sided with the colonial powers, as with France in opposition to Algerian nationalists in 1950s, and at other times it supported the nationalist cause. See, Robert C, Good,"The United States and the Colonial Debate" in Wolfers, Arnold (ed): ALLIANCE POLICY IN COLD WAR (Baltimore) 1959, pp. 224-70; Philip W, Well, 'Colonialism as a Problem in American Foreign Policy', World Politics, vol. V, October 1952, pp. 86-109; Truman, Harry S: MEMOIRS (New York) vol. I, 1955, p. 275.

15 At the end of the World War II, the establishment of the United Nations (24 October 1945) with USA as its founder member seemed to promise a new era. But in the years following, the hopes for 'one world' faded as the dismal realities of the post-war world became patent. Europe and Far East were plunged into economic and social chaos. The war had wrought political disorganization and destruction of the earlier balance of power. The power vacuum created by the demise of Nazi Germany intensified the struggle for power between the US and the USSR —facing each other with growing distrust. Restoration of peace in Europe and framing of treaties for the defeated Axis states were balked for months by Soviet intransigence. Pleadges of promoting politically democratic governments were disregarded. Indeed, Eastern Europe was shut off behind an "Iron Curtain" by Stalin's Soviet Union.


17 Initially NATO was established with 12 member nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, and USA. Greece and Turkey joined it in 1952, FRG in 1955 and Spain in 1982. The key article of the treaty (Article 5) provides that an armed attack against one or more of them...shall be considered an attack against them all. The alliance conformed to the right of collective defense (Article 51 of UN Charter) and was also to promote political, social and economic ties among members. For details see Moore B T: NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (NEW
The organization was what may be called a Pacific version of the NATO, formed with the purpose to maintain a united front against potential aggressive actions by Communist bloc nations and it committed the member states to act together if any one of them was attacked or subverted. However it created no joint military forces or commands.


19 Signed in Baghdad between Turkey and Iraq the pact was joined by UK (4 April) Pakistan (23 September) and Iran (on 3 November).

The pact however never had a permanent military staff or troops. Its main activities were in the field of economic development and technical cooperation. It built road and rail links and a high frequency radio telecommunication network connecting key cities in the member states. It also carried on research in health, science, agriculture and mining.


22 A horse-shoe shaped coral atoll is the southernmost atoll of the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The island of Diego Garcia was detached from Mauritius by the British to form a part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). After the British decision to withdraw from the east of Suez the island was transferred to US control. The United States developed it first as a communication station and later a massive naval base.


23 In 1974 United States sold a lot of arms to the countries of Middle East with US $ 4 billion to Iran and $700 million to Saudi Arabia. In 1976 total sale to Iran increased to $ 10 billion and to Saudi Arabia 6 billion; in 1977 US military aid amounted to Indonesia $46 million, Malaysia, Thailand (alongwith Philippines and Taiwan) $168 million, Bahrain, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (alongwith Afghanistan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal and Tunisia) $53 million. Military aid was also given to Kenya and Ethiopia.

See, Sharma, Madan Lal, op. cit., p. 42; Girling, op. cit., p.130.

24 By providing financial help to South Yemen, Saudi Arabia brought about a decrease in Soviet influence there. It persuaded Somalia to end its dependence on Cuba and Soviet Union in November 1977. Saudis also helped Sudan to buy arms to fight the Communist-backed threat it perceived from Ethiopia. Sudan expelled soviet military experts in may 1977 Saudi Arabia also gave aid to Jordan and Pakistan etc.

See, Girling, op. cit., p. 129; Bernard, Gwertzman, "Saudi Arabia, Mideast Power


27 Operational Zone of this Command included Nineteen littoral states of the Ocean stretching from Pakistan through the Persian Gulf and red sea to Somalia. Rapid deployment force alongwith a Marine Division and other units were put at the disposal of CENTCOM. See, *ibid.*, pp. 85-86


29 Technology has been transferred from US to the developing countries via universities, laboratories, visiting experts, books, journals, technical experts and the like. Much, especially industrial technology, is transferred through commercial firms in the form of products and processes. See USA, in ESCAP National Papers for UNCSTD, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Since November 1961, a major part of American aid to the less developed countries has been disbursed and administered by the agency. The agency is divided into four bureaus covering geographical areas -- Africa and Europe; Middle East and South Asia the Far East; & Latin America. See Arnold, H J P: AID FOR DEVELOPMENT (London) 1966.


32 "He who controls the Indian Ocean is going to control the economy of the world as long as oil is needed to run the economy of the world". According to the US Department of Defence, oil is "the most prominent and disturbing example of its dependence. 'For that reason alone. our interest and involvement in the Middle East and Persian Gulf are bound to be substantial...'. (Department of Defence 1979 Annual Report, 2 February 1978, Washington, p.16)

President Carter substantiated it further when on 23 January 1980 he declared: ... an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force". CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 3814 (Washington) 26 January 1981, p. 201

For significance of Persian Gulf oil, see, Thomas Stauffer, "The Geopolitical Significance of Persian Gulf Oil", in Amirie, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-58

33 For an account of the investment and stakes of these MNCs in the Gulf oil, See, Shiva Ramu, S: MULTINATIONAL FIRMS (New Delhi) n. a. , pp. 64-71; Ghosh B N : POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEOCOLONIALISM IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES (New Delhi) 1985, pp. 66- 89: Aitken, Thomas J : A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS(New York) 1962

34 The Russian inability to intervene successfully in the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) particularly impressed them with the value of long-range surface forces in something of the same way that the Cuban missile crises was to do later in 1962. Stalin thus advocated to have a navy 'equal to that of any foreign power'. And like the German navy, it was to include battleships
and carriers. See, Fairhall, David: RUSSIAN SEA POWDER (Boston) 1971, pp. 180-81.

35 For details see, SOVIET SEA POWER, Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington) 1969.

36 Soviet navy played a marginal role during the war. In the Baltic they were quickly trapped in the Gulf of Finland, where they were largely reduced to providing artillery support. In the Black Sea, naval units fared only a little better especially in mine-laying. Same was the case with its Northern and Pacific fleet. For details see, Fairhall, op. cit., pp. 181-82.

37 Quote 'The 'lessons' which influential Soviet strategists chose to draw from all this confirmed the Navy in a subordinate role as an auxiliary to the Red Army. Its primary mission was once again to be the 'active defence' of the coastline' Fairhall, op. cit., p. 82.

38 From 1955 onwards Soviet Union built cruisers, air-craft and helicopter carriers, submarines and nuclear submarines with a host of other new classes of warships. For details see, Ibid., pp. 179-202.

39 Chronologically, in 1961 Soviet warships carried out modest exercises in the Norwegian Sea instead of merely shuttling between the Northern and Baltic fleet areas. In 1962, ships from the Black Sea ventured out into the Atlantic and joined the Northern Fleet in the Arctic. In 1963, a group of Soviet warships circumnavigated the British Isles. In 1964, Soviet ships spent part of the year in Mediterranean and this exercise was repeated with more ships in 1965. In 1967, the Mediterranean squadron was made permanent and after the June 1967 Arab-Israel war, Soviet warships steamed into Alexandria (Egypt) and its research vessels began to survey the Indian Ocean. In 1968 a Soviet naval squadron showed up in the Indian Ocean and 1969 Soviet Mediterranean Squadron became numerically superior to US Sixth Fleet, See, Ibid., p. 206.

40 See, L W Martin, "British Policy in the Indian Ocean", in Cotrell and Burrell, op. cit.,

Britain was a member of CENTO and SEATO. In 1964, Prime Minister Harold Wilson designated the Himalayas as Britain's strategic frontier. In 1965, BIOT was formed in the Central Indian Ocean. This showed that Britain still valued its erstwhile area of dominance inspite of its weakening economy, and military might. See, Braun, op. cit., p. 93.

41 The conservatives energetically opposed this decision principally with the argument that military means were required to safeguard the considerable remaining British investments and trading interests in the Indian Ocean states -but, when they came to power in 1970, they were only able to modify these plans in a few minor areas. See, Ibid., p. 94.


43 This exercise involved units of four Soviet fleets. From Vladivostok, a group including missile destroyers and auxiliaries came westwards through Malacca Straits, linking up with a squadron assembled from the European fleets, including two submarines, which made long haul round the Cape of Good Hope. Ibid.,


45 In a similar vein General Hans Kruls, Editor-in-Chief of NATO publications, once remarked: "NATO was alarmed about Russia's growing interest in the Indian Ocean...Indian Ocean is one of the lifelines of the world and at the rate Russia is expanding here, it will soon be possible for her to cut this lifeline to the West and South Africa". Cited in Bhasin, V K : SUPER POWER RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (New Delhi) 1981, pp. 52-53.

46 Sri Lanka circulated at the Conference a memorandum in this regard. The substance, if not the details, of the Ceylonese proposal was endorsed by all who spoke except the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the Australian Premier John Gorton.

The Indian Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, said that the freedom of the seas could not be the preserve of any one power or powers...It is clearly a matter of concern to the entire international community and principally to the littoral states around

47 For details see, D. Nikolayev, "For peace and Security in the Indian Ocean", *International Affairs* (Moscow) no. 9, September 1979, p. 58; also see, Bhasin, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

48 Soviet Union signed such treaties with Egypt on 27 May 1971 (It was unilaterally abrogated by Egypt on 15 March 1976); India, 9 August 1971; Iraq, 9 April 1972; Somalia on 11 July 1974 (It was unilaterally abrogated by somalia on 13 November 1977); Mozambique, 31 March 1977; Ethiopia, 20 November 1978; South Yemen, 25 October 1979. For list and detail; see, Kapur, Ashok: THE INDIAN OCEAN, Regional and International Power Politics (New York) 1983, p. 184.

49 Jukes, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-78.


53 For such treaties with Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq and India, see, Imam, Zafar: TOWARDS A MODEL RELATIONSHIP, A Study of Soviet Treaties with India and other Third World Countries (New Delhi) 1983, pp. 107-08.

54 'Soviet Military Power 1987', *Strategic Digest*, vol. XVII, no. 6, June 1987, p. 1109.

55 South Yeman received more than $ 3.5 billion in military equipments from the Soviet Union, and in 1987, some 1,000 military personnel provided maintenance, training and support for Soviet military activities. In return, USSR used port facilities of Aden. *Ibid.*, p. 1115.


59 In October 1958 USSR extended $ 100 million credit for the first stage of the Dam. In 1960 another $ 225 million for the second stage of the Dam was extended. Agreement was also signed to build Alexandria shipyard and steel plant etc.


61 These included Steel Works, machine building factory, Trans- Iranian gas pipeline, a hydroelectric station on Araks river, and about 23 vocational and technical training centers. See, Richardson, Jacques: INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (Mt. Airy, Maryland) 1979, p. 127.


64 During 1981-1985 the developing countries put into operation 525 industrial enterprises and other projects built on investment basis, including 29 big power generating units with a total capacity of 3,000 megawatts, 3,800 km of power transmission lines of high voltage, 8 cake furnace batteries, 6 blast furnaces, 12 steel making converters, 9 big rolling mills, 940 km
of trunk pipelines and about 2,500 km of rail tracks. It helped reclaim about 300,000 hectares of land and construct 111 educational establishments. See, Zevin, Leon and Teodorovich, Tadeush: SOVIET UNION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Economic Cooperation Principles and practices (New Delhi) 1988, pp. 45-47.

65 Braun, op. cit., p. 47.

66 Perestroika signified the restructuring the Soviet economy and is described as a "revolutionary qualitative transformation" of Soviet society. "Perestroika" Gorbachev described, "is a revolution. It involves radical changes on the way to a qualitatively new state..."

Glasnost signified a new openness, which is the essential means of the reforms perestroika envisions. About glasnost, Gorbachev added, "We want more openness about public affairs in every sphere of life...People are becoming increasingly convinced that glasnost is an effective form of public control over the activities of all government bodies, without exception and a powerful level in correcting shortcomings..."


67 Gorbachev initiatives were aimed at: to rebuild arms control and disarmament mechanisms based on a genuine drive to rid the planet of its overkill burden of nuclear weapons; to disperse and resolve Third World conflicts; to construct regional peace structures guaranteed by super powers and; to plant the reality of an integrated world at the center of foreign policy thinking of the major world governments, Sec, Gupta, Bhabani Sen, op. cit., p. 33.

68 The Times of India (New Delhi) 2 July 1991, p. 11.

69 The Sunday Tribune (Chandigarh) 30 June 1991, p. 11.

70 Perestroika and Glasnost unleashed a revolution of rising expectations in the Soviet people. As the system became more open, the change became more severe and swift which finally led to the demands for independence from highly centralised authoritarian Soviet regime. It became difficult for the country to remain united. The hollowness of the system built over the military strength was exposed.


At the announcement of withdrawal Singapore's Prime Minister was upset. However, after his London visit, in the same month he got assurance of air defence for Singapore. Malaysia proposed a Five Power Pact including Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. The defence plan was finally approved on 15 April 1971 in London. See, Singh, K Rajendra: POLITICS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN (Delhi) 1974, p. 83.

73 Rais, Rasul B: THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE SUPER POWEERS (New Delhi) 1987, pp. 30

74 See, Braun, op. cit., pp.97-98
75 In 1985 British imports from Australia valued (pounds sterling) 741 million, India 435.5, Israel 404.0, Saudi Arabia 496.3, Singapore 441.3 and South Africa 9,898.0 million. Exports to Australia valued (pounds sterling) 1,373 million, Egypt 470.5, Iran 525.6, Iraq 444.7, Israel 434.5, Oman 489.9, Saudi Arabia 1,249, Singapore 612.9, South Africa 1,009.2 and UAE 621.3 million. See, EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1988, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 2790.

76 Island of Reunion lies about 800 km east of Madagascar in the Western Indian Ocean. First occupied by France in 1642, Reunion became an overseas Department with a status of a region. Mayotte forms part of the Comoros archipelago in the Mozambique channel—between island of Madagascar and east coast of African mainland. Since the Comoros unilaterally declared independence in July 1975, the population of island voted in favour of retaining links with France in 1976. Since then it has been administered separately by France. However, the independent Comoran state has claimed Mayotte as part of its territory. For details see, *Braun, op. cit.*, p. 101; THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1987, vol. I *op. cit.* p. 1103;

77 Djibouti is located in the Horn of Africa at the southern entrance of the Red Sea. The island was under France since 1859 and in 1945 (then known as French Somaliland) was proclaimed an overseas territory. In 1967, it was renamed the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas. Demand for independence of the land accelerated during 1960s and 70s thus gaining independence on 27 June 1977. For details see, *Ibid.*, p. 907.

78 In November, 1979 the Grand Mosque of Mecca (Kabba) was occupied by about 250 followers of Juhaiman Ibn Seif al-Oteibi, a Sunni extremist who had come to proclaim a Mahadi on the first day of the Islamic year 1400. The siege continued for two weeks until the extremists were defeated; 102 insurgents and 127 Saudi troops died. See, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1983-84, *op. cit.*, p. 541.

