CHAPTER 3
The United States perceived India to be inclined towards western orientation on account of her economic dependence upon the western democracies. Apart from this economic factor conducive to western orientation, India's need for defensive alliance with the West was another compelling factor. The US believed that the Government of India was fully conscious of the country's military and naval weakness and its consequent inability to defend itself against foreign aggression or to keep open the sea lanes upon which it commercial life depends. India's continuing adherence to Commonwealth ties was another factor linking India to the West. Broadly speaking India had three ends in view in professing a policy of neutrality between East and West, while actually following a policy basically favourable to the West. First, the Indian government is profoundly aware of the country's limited capacity for self-defense and desires to avoid antagonizing unnecessarily a powerful neighbour (U.S.S.R.). Second, the declared policy of neutrality is designed to bolster up India's prestige internationally by attracting the support of minor states in Asia and Africa. Third, the professions of neutrality are designed to appeal to a wide spread Indian sentiment and thereby strengthen its popular support. The initial thinking in the American diplomatic circles was that Indian alignment with the U.S.S.R. in an East-West conflict was virtually
inconceivable on account of her dependence upon the West. Along with its professed neutralism was her aspiration to "Asiatic" leadership and a "Third Bloc", envisaging a combination of Asian nations under Indian leadership. Such a third bloc was suppose to be independent of the two major of "Power Blocs", capable of making Asian influence prominent in world affairs. An Asian bloc with India at its head would vastly strengthen her position as a world power and provide a basis for greater independence in world affairs. Pakistan was bound to contest any Indian effort to obtain such leadership. The US policy makers believed that the concept of a third bloc under Indian tutelage would have limited appeal and if at all it materializes with some nations of South and South-East Asia then it would be consonant with the broad objectives of US Foreign Policy in Asia.¹

Despite the above analysis by the US Intelligence Agencies, Truman Administration differed with India on a member of important issues, like the role of 'New Asia' in world affairs, the independence of Indonesia, the admission of China into the UN and the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952. The differences over Korean problem and policies accentuated the diplomatic differences between two countries even before Kashmir issue was referred to the UN. As a spillover of the Cold War the crisis in Korea found India and the United States taking quite different stands.
It was in 1947 when the Korean dispute was referred to the United Nations for arbitration by the United States.\footnote{2} Thereafter the Truman Administration worked to obtain the support of an important Asia country - India, despite its declared policy of non-alignment. During the Korean War the United States mobilized Western anti-Communist forces for security to create strategic positions of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Red China. These took the form of massive military aid to NATO countries and such alliances as the Japanese Peace Treaty. These moves had adverse implications for Indian non-alignment.\footnote{3} The Indian Government considered that this was in effect indirectly attempting to break this key element in New Delhi's policy and forcing India into the Western camp through Korea. Although at first India supported the American policy, New Delhi foresaw the far-reaching consequences of backing a policy with such military overtones. The United States resented this Indian resistance to its moves.

In proposing that the Korean question\footnote{4} be transferred from the Big Four to the United Nations, Washington\footnote{5} called for each occupying power to arrange its election in its own way followed by merger of the two zones with representation weighted according to the distribution of population. With the majority of the population in the South, the American plan would have guaranteed a unified legislature overwhelmingly controlled by the Southern
conservative elements friendly to the United States. In other words, Washington’s policy would have resulted in international sanctions far well under way - a unified Korea under United States control or a separate state in the South. For this reason the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko contended that occupation forces should withdraw from Korea and that Koreans should be given an opportunity to form their own government without allied aid or participation of the Allies. On November 14, the United States secured the sanction of the General Assembly for a temporary commission to observe the National Assembly elections which were to be held throughout Korea before March 31, 1948. The Soviets boycotted the vote, indicating that they would not accept any assembly decision on the issue.

The United States in the choice of the membership of the Commission seemed to have been guided by the political logic. It named diplomats and journalists from Canada, France, Australia, China, El Salvador, Philippines, and Syria, all of whom had close ties, if not alliances, with the United States and could therefore be expected to support the United States.

From the very beginning, India as a Third World nation, showed keen interest in Korea. The Indian Government viewed the whole problem as a symptom rather than a cause of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The ideological differences were considered by the Indians as the main factor but believed that there was still a chance for reconciliation. It supported the American resolution and agreed to serve on the United Nations Temporary Commission of Korea (UNTOK) hoping that its presence in the Commission would help bring the conflicting parties together for a solution. Washington realized the necessity of the support from such an important Asian power in the Commission, especially because of its declared policy of non-alignment. Aware of India’s support for its stand, the Truman Administration thought that it could also persuade India to take a pro-United States stand. In this respect it also understood India’s need for economic development and America’s power to cooperate to its own advantage. Indian representative KPS Menon was unanimously elected the Chairman of the Commission. After Menon’s election, UNTOK moved to Seoul to begin work. Menon on his arrival said that the goal of the Commission was to facilitate the independence and unity of Korea. He asserted with great optimism: the 38th parallel must be politically obliterated; it must be confined to the limbo of the past.... We have come here with no political prejudices, no ideological predilections. The States which we represent do not constitute a bloc". The political realities in the Korean situation complicated the task of the Commission. It found itself totally compromised by its complete dependence
on the American military government. The Soviets would not permit it to cross the 38th parallel, and in the south it was unable to consult any Koreans other than the followers of Dr. Syngman Rhee. As the UN Commission then later indicated in its final report, it "experienced considerable difficulty in making contact with the left-wing organizations, certain of whose representatives were to be found either in prison or under police surveillance".¹¹

That Chairman of the Commission Menon was determined be remain independent of any outside influence could be seen when he said rather angrily at Seoul on January 21, 1948: "We would rather pack up and go home than be idle spectators of faked elections".¹² The representatives of India, Australia, and Canada clearly indicated that "under no circumstances elections held in one part of Korea could be termed as the National government of Korea".¹³ Thus unable to carry out the mandate, the Commission decided to consult the Interim Committee. Menon reflected the mood of disappointment and frustration when he said on the eve of his departure for New York to appear before the Interim Committee: "we are not an inquisitorial Commission; we are not a Commission with unrestricted terms of references.... In our facile optimism we hoped that it (38th parallel) be obliterated from the political map of Korea. We now realize that this is not an easy task. It is
still there as a sad commentary on the present state of international relations". He also commented before the Interim Committee in terms more explicit than those he had used earlier: "the Commission is but unanimous in thinking that a separate government which may be established in South Korea cannot be a national government so defined in the resolution of the General Assembly".

Washington was displeased with such remarks on the part of Menon. In an indirect fashion, it chose to apply mounting pressure on the Interim Committee which the Commission had come to consult. It lobbyed with members of the Interim Committee, and did everything possible to convince India, Canada and Australia of the need to support its resolution. It also sent out its most impressive legal experts, Phillips C. Jessup, to the Interim Committee. His words carried great weight among the many representatives who had training in international law, a field in which Jessup had a world-wide reputation. Since the Interim Committee was dealing with questions cast in legal term and was seeking in effect a legal interpretation of the whole Korean question, Jessup's words would necessarily have added value. Arguing that nothing unforeseen had occurred since the General Assembly adopted recommendations on Korea and that "the resolutions which established the UNTOK terms were inseparable, it was incumbent upon the Commission to observe
The first to support the American plan was T.F. Tsiang of Nationalist China. He implied complete acceptance of the American aim of establishing a government, although he stated that consultations should be encouraged. Phillipines too took a similar view. The French delegation also fell in line with the United States proposal. The Indian position in the Interim Committee represented a surprising change from its earlier stand. Its spokesman, Mr. Pillai, was unable to come to a definite stand. He said that "he was inclined to agree with views of both of those in favour of forming a national government in Korea on the basis of elections in South Korea alone and those who were opposed to the realization of such a plan".

Finally, however, Pillai came in favour of the United States resolution. The tables now had been turned on the UNTOK delegates who favoured consultations with the Interim Committee in the hope that they could prevent the establishment of a South Korean government. Menon vainly resisted, but ultimately had to agree to sanction the South’s venture in democracy. As he said on his return to Seoul "I am not convinced that the Interim Committee’s legal opinion is sound, still I would accept it for practical purposes.... We have had a political decision by a political body based on political considerations".
Menon's views on the election question were incompatible with those of his government as expressed in the Interim Committee. The Commission finally decided to observe an election in the South quite as an instrument of international politics, which, after all, it was designed to serve. The election was set for May 10 and the State Department account reported: "The responsibility for preparing the elections and conducting them fell upon the United States Army Military government in Korea which had the task of planning and preparing the mechanical details involved in a democratic election with which the Korean people are unfamiliar". The entire matter of the Commission's observation appeared rather farcical, for there were thirty UN representatives available to observe a population of 20 million.

Despite the Commission's lack of effective authority, it was at least able to report in increasing numbers the terrorist incidents. The implications of releasing the information concerning terrorism alarmed the French delegate who tried to keep the records confidential and the Syrian insisted that they be made public. Police excesses and wanton violence by bands of pro-Rhee Youths characterized the electoral campaign and the actual balloting. In the ten days preceding the election, 323 persons were killed in riots or police raids and more than
10,000 arrested.\(^{24}\) Despite this the State Department reported that "...almost eighty per cent of the eligible voters registered (on May 10) ... an estimated 92.5 per cent of these cast their ballots in an election characterized by public approval and enthusiasm".\(^{25}\) State Department figures ignored the fact that large blocs of the population were either barred from participating or boycotted the election and that many of those who voted did so under coercion.

While diplomats debated the propriety of the elections,\(^{26}\) Rhee grasped the opportunity to strengthen his control over the South. On August 15, 1948, the American occupation of Korea came to a formal end, concluding as Paul Hoffman recalled a year later, "... a very bright spot in American history.... I am very proud of what the Army had done there, no only in its own field but also in the economic field.... I considered it a very good job and it is a pleasure to say so".\(^{27}\) America's formal responsibility for Korean politics was over, but the task of defining America's long-term relationship remained. The State Department knew more than enough to realize that Rhee was running a police state and in his MEMOIRS Truman revealed his dismay over the terrible repression as well as his belief that "yet we had no choice but to support Rhee".\(^{28}\) However, the Truman Administration described South Korea "as a test case for democracy in the Far East", noting that "the threat of communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained".
Steadily rising tension on the 38th parallel, leading to armed clashes of considerable proportions, intensified Rhee’s dictatorial and repressive rule. On June 18, John Foster Dulles delivered in the opening session of the Korean National Assembly a speech that had been approved and strengthened in Washington by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State. Dulles declared: "You are not alone. You will never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom". Rhee unquestionably found these words comforting; and he openly responded to Dulles: "If we lose these Cold War by default, we shall regain our freedom in the end by a hot war, regardless of cost of that I am sure". India found such talk from both Americans and Koreans as potentially dangerous and possibly leading to greater conflagration.

The Korean War may be regarded as compound of four distinct wars, each of which had different international implications. There was first of all a civil war between Communist and anti-Communist Koreans; though it would have naturally aroused strong sympathies abroad on either side according to the prevailing political ideology of each country, it would have been by itself an internal affair of Korea, not a war between States, and would not provide any justification for any external intervention. But the Korean civil war was also a war between Northern Korea and South Korea, two organized States which were divided by a clearly defined frontier, and one of which had been
brought into being under the auspices of the United Nations. This second aspect of the war gave the conflict an international character; it rendered possible an appeal to the United Nations and thus led to an extension of the war in which the United Nations as an institution, and in particular the members who voted for or accepted the Security Council’s resolution condemning North Korea, were ranged against the defiant North Korea. Finally, as a part of this general United Nations action against North Korea, but to be distinguished from it in its moral and political effect, was the actual military campaign, and later, mainly American, with the addition of British and Australian contingents, and, since the middle of October 1950 of Turkish, Philippine, and Canadian units. The decision of the United Nations gave the action to protect South Korea, the character of a universal enterprise transcending all divisions between the contingents or between East and West; except for the Communist States which had aided and abetted North Korea’s aggression, the whole world as represented in the United Nations was united in condemning it, and India’s vote at the crucial meeting of the Security Council was particularly significant in this respect. On the other hand, the fact that United Nations intervention in Korea had been carried out in the military sphere almost entirely by American and European troops had inevitably had the effect of making it appear to Asian minds as an external interference in Asia by non-Asians, and was even given color
to the allegations that the United Nations is merely being used as cover for a revival of Western Imperialism in a new form.

Communist propaganda had thus been provided with a very favourable opportunity for exploiting against the West those wide-spread sentiments and emotions summed up in the slogan 'Asia for the Asians'. The Soviet Union had in any case an advantage over the nations of Europe and the Americans in relation to feelings of pan-Asian solidarity, for whereas the latter were represented in Asia only by small communities which nowhere formed a majority of the local population, there is and was a belt of compact Russian settlement which extends across northern Asia to the Pacific and entitled Russia to claim membership among the peoples of Asia in a way that the British, French, or Americans could not. When to this basic advantage possessed by Russia was added a situation which ranged the military forces of a group of Western nations in battle against an Asia force on the mainland of Asia, without prominent participation of any Asian Army (other than the South Koreans) on the same side, the conditions of news publicity were strongly in favour of the Soviet so-called 'anti-imperialist camp of peace and democracy'. Although the initial defeats of the South Koreans were due to being taken by suprise and to lack of armoured equipment (with which the Americans had failed to supply them) rather than to any deficiency of morale or defection of troops on the Chinese model, it had been easy
to represent the course of events as the overthrow by popular, national forces of a reactionary regime which would have been quickly eliminated but for the interference of the Americans who resolved to control Korea, whether for economic exploitation or for building up a strategic base against the Soviet Union.

Asia had not indeed been unrepresented in the United Nations War effort: Turkey, Thailand, and the Philippines all promised military contingents at an early date, and shipping shortage rather than unwillingness appears to have been the cause of the delays in sending these expeditionary forces. But the two largest nations of non-Communist Asia, India and Pakistan, had expressly excused themselves from sending any military contingents at all though India, having voted in favour of the Security Council resolution on which the action in Korea was based, might have been expected to provide at least a token force, in her capacity as a great Power of Asia, to help in the common cause. Without, at this stage of the argument, enquiring into the reasons of India’s policy — it was recognized that it would have been difficult for India in any event to contribute an equipped force in those circumstances — it is sufficient here to state the fact of India’s abstention and to point out that it could not but detract seriously from the universality of the United Nations action.
This is not to say, however, that lack of cooperation in Asia should have deterred Western members of the United Nations from active intervention in Korea or that the campaign there had been politically a mistake. It is certain that the situation, whether from the point of the Atlantic Pact Powers or of the United Nations as a peace-enforcing institution, would have been for worse if no action had been taken and the Communists had been allowed to overrun South Korea without interference. Against any complications which may have arisen in Asia, from the expedition to Korea must be set the solid gain which resulted from the check to violent Communist encroachment on the non-Communist world, the demonstration of the capacity of the United Nations to act against aggression (at least when not paralysed by the Soviet veto) and the blow dealt to the myth of Communist invincibility. The last of these consequences had perhaps been the most important of all in view of the impression made on Asia by the successive Communist victories in China, which had been added as a reinforcement to the very widespread belief that Russia was the real victor of the Second World War, not only over Germany but also over Japan.

It had been difficult for political commentators (analysts) in the West to take seriously the fantastic Russian boasting about having beaten Japan, for it is so obvious, an insular Power depending on maritime
communications, was decisively defeated in the sea-air war in the Pacific, even before the coup de grace was delivered by the atomic bombs, so that the six days of Russian warfare in Manchuria, when Japan was already negotiating for surrender, made no difference to the result. But the peoples of continental Asia are essentially landsmen, with little or no understanding of sea-power which, after all, continental Europeans frequently under-estimated, and it should be recognised that the loss of prestige which the Western nations suffered from the initial success of the Japanese in overrunning territories from the Solomons to the Bay of Bengal was never made up by the victories which in the end wiped out the Japanese navy. Except for the British counter-invasion of Burma there was no Western military campaign on the mainland of Asia, and the surrender of large, unbeaten Japanese armies in Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China, and China was something of a mystery to Asia spectators. But the Communists were ready with an explanation; it was the intervention of the omnipotent Soviet Union which had forced Japan to capitulate after the feeble Americans and British had been struggling vainly against Japanese militarism for nearly four years.

In Malaya the Communist guerillas (equipped with British arms) carried on propaganda in the villages by means of theatrical performances; in one of the stock plays a
strutting, tyrannical little man representing Japan got the better of everyone until at least a heroic figure representing Russia appeared and knocked him out with a single blow of his fist. This is crude propaganda, but it is the kind which exerts influence on the masses of Asia. Gradually, since the commencement of the Korean war, there had been built up over the last five years a belief, affecting ever wider circles, that Communism is an irresistible force, that the powers of non-Communist world are weak and irresolute, and that it was the part of a wise man, whether he is attracted by Communism or not, to reinsure himself with what is destined to be the winning side. In all countries and at all times the Vicar of Bray had been a familiar figure of politics, but such adaptability is above all characteristics of societies which have no tradition of political liberty and are accustomed to submit to victorious power as carrying its own justification. Because of the political landslide which was threatened in Asia by the Communist triumph in China, and might well have been precipitated by the spectacle of an unopposed Communist conquest of South Korea, it has been of the greatest importance that the West had shown the capacity to use armed force successfully on a large scale in a Far Eastern crisis. The attraction and appeal of Communism in Asia will remain, but at least it can no longer impose itself with the argument that the Western powers cannot, or
dare not, hit back. Strategically also, victory in Korean
must have greatly strengthened the position of the Atlantic
Pact nations, for as long as Japan remained disarmed, her
security must continue to be one of the principle concerns
of American, and less directly of British, policy, and this
security would have been gravely threatened by complete
Communist control of Korea.

Already, with the Communist victory in the Chinese
civil war, the whole coastline of Eastern Asia facing the
Japanese islands was in the hands of the Sino-Russian bloc
except for South Korea. If South Korea also had fallen, the
Communist pressure on Japan would have been enormously
increased. In addition to the facilities provided by South
Korea as a springboard for a possible future invasion of
Japan, Japan’s capacity for resistance to Communist and
willingness to cooperate with the United States would have
been very seriously diminished by the moral effect of the
spectacle of unchecked Communist advance so near to Japanese
shores, by the economic leverage of Communist control over
the foreign market most closely linked with the Japanese
economy, and by the conversion of the large Korean community
resident in Japan into a most dangerous fifth column. The
rescue of South Korea had averted these dangers, and it had
also done much to convince Japanese opinion (which as a
result of the apparent uncertainties of American policy was

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beginning to doubt it) that, if Japan were to continue a policy of cooperation with the West, American protection could be relied upon in an emergency.

Nevertheless, when all the above mentioned items in the credit account have been added up, it remained a fact to be faced by Western statesmen and publicists that Western armed intervention in any part of Asia, without substantial agreement with the principal independent nations of Asia involved great risk of alienating general Asia sentiment and opinion in a manner which may have ultimately played into the hands of Moscow. If there was one idea which, quite apart from Communism, had taken hold of politically conscious minds from Lebanon to the Pacific, it was that the age of Western colonial and semi-colonial ascendency in Asia was over, and that the Asian peoples must now be allowed to work out their own destinies without interference from Europe or America. Anything which looked even remotely like a new imperialist expansion of the West immediately aroused suspicion and hostility in countries which had experienced in the past a greater or lesser degree of Western tutelage.

Since the collapse of Japan, India and China had been rivals for the leadership of purely Asian Asia, that China, having 'gone Communist' and concluded a treaty of military alliance with Russia, should have given support to the aggression of North Korea was only to be expected; no Communist State, without deviation into Titoism, could have
done otherwise. But India, as a non-Communist State, which at that time was threatened internally by Communist activity in Burma and Tibet, might have been expected to counterbalance the attitude of China.

Immediately after the North Korean attack, India voted for a U.S. sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council, calling for the cessation of the movement across the 38th parallel and authorized military resistance to the invasion by a UN force. This force was composed largely of Americans, with smaller contingents from a few other countries. India refused to provide any troops but it did dispatch an ambulance unit. When General MacArthur was contemplating a push north of the 38th parallel, India's representative in China, Sardar K.M. Pannikar sent a word of caution, that this action would bring the Chinese into the fray, a prophetic warning that the Indian Government immediately conveyed to the US authorities; which they ignored. In January 1951 India was the only non-Communist nation that voted against the US sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly, condemning the Chinese invasion of Korea and calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal north of the Yalu river by China.

India kept calling for an end to the military operations in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the question. When the question of the repatriation of the North
Korean POW reached an impasse, India agreed to assume direction of the United Nations Repatriation Commission and its representatives military and civilian discharged this difficult task in a way that can acclain general approval with some dissenting voices, especially in the US. However, India had taken up an ambiguous, neutral position which had been highly embarrassing for the nations which had undertaken the task of enforcing the Charter and punishing an act of unprovoked aggression. But it would be also the height of unwisdom to indulge in recriminations against India for a policy which, as a sovereign State, she was fully entitled to pursue in accordance with her leaders' judgement of what the situation required at that time, when the Korean War was in progress. Rather it was essential for the Western nations, and especially for Britain, as a fellow-member of the Commonwealth, to have understood the various factors shaping Indian foreign policy, the difficulties which faced the statesmen in New Delhi, and the obstacles which had to be overcome before close cooperation with India in the international field was possible.

There was first of all - and it should not be under-estimated as controlling principle in India policy - Gandhi’s legacy of Pacifism, resulting in conviction that world peace can ultimately be maintained by conciliation rather than by any kind of defensive combination, and that India’s mission is to stand apart from the two great rival
camps in the contemporary world and mediate between them. American critics found this attitude lacking in realism; they pointed out that India herself has not renounced the use of arms and the successes of Gandhi’s ‘non-violence’ were won, not against a totalitarian State of Nazi or Soviet type, but against a regime which itself had set moral limits to the use of force. The Indian feeling on this matter, however, was a deep and genuine one and it inclined India towards making a pacific settlement of international disputes even when it meant to a great extent letting the aggressor ‘get away with it’.

There was secondly - a factor affecting the policy of Pakistan as well as of India - the unsolved problem of Kashmir as a restriction of freedom of action beyond the confines of ‘the sub-continent’. If India and Pakistan could once had reached a real agreement with each other, they would have jointly made a mighty force for peace in Asia, but, as it was, their strategic resources were concentrated on precautions against each other. But apart from the tension on the Indo-Pakistan border, which must continue as long as the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, Kashmir had affected Indian policy over Korea in another way also. The United Nations Security Council in its endeavors to settle the Kashmir dispute did not make the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from Kashmir a condition of negotiation over the
future of Kashmir or the holding of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite. The Indian opinion considered that the insistence on the military surrender of North Korea as a preliminary to a political settlement in Korea was inconsistent with this precedent. The effect had been, on the one hand, it stiffened the Indian attitude on Kashmir (which was that total withdrawal of Pakistan forces must precede any plebiscite) and on the other, it opposed the prosecution of war in Korea because the United Nations was not applying measures of coercion to Pakistan.

The problem in Korea was wrongly made parallel to problem in Kashmir by India. The possibility of friendly relations with China also weighed with India before in respect of its attitude over Korean problem. The idea behind the Indian policy towards China was that sooner or later, despite the principles then proclaimed in Peking, the ties between China and Russia were likely to be loosened and that it may be possible to form an Asian bloc led by India and China, which would be an effective ‘third force’ in world affairs. Friendship with China thus tied in with the basic Indian conception, mentioned above, of a peacemaking, mediatory role between the two great Power-blocs headed by America and Russia respectively. The calculation about China was indeed not very remote from the hopes of a future ‘Titoist’ trend of Chinese policy which were entertained by influential circles in London and Washington. But is has to
be admitted that nothing had happened to support such expectations, and there was a danger that disastrous sacrifices of principle and interest may have been made in pursuit of a hope which may have in the end proved illusory. The Indian Government in particular may have found that a resolve to avoid giving offence to the new dynamic rulers in Peking would not obtain a guarantee against adventures for the extension of 'people's democracy' in areas much nearer to India than Korea. These factors prevented full cooperation between India and the United States.

The North Korean army moved across the 38th parallel about 4:00 A.M. on June 25, 1950. Security Council met on the same day to discuss the attack. The United States introduced a resolution in the UN calling North Korean to withdraw back to the 38th parallel and cease hostilities. It also requested the members of the UN to render every assistance in carrying out the resolution. On the night of June 25, Truman met his leading State and Defense Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Acheson directing the meeting. In his MEMOIRS Truman suggests that "...no one could tell what the state of the Korean army really was on that Sunday night". He was aware that the event had generated a crisis atmosphere throughout the United States. Over the following days Dean Acheson advocated stern measures to get appropriations from a
hostile and indifferent Congress. He far outpaced the military in advocated stern measures. "No one can say what would have come of these projects, if the North Koreans had not marched south on the 25th June, 1950", a senior official anonymously recollected the following year. Acheson does claim also to have been concerned about what the United States failure to intervene might do to global prestige on which the plausibility of its military deterrents depended. In a vital sense, the United States confronted the cirsis in Asia keeping in mind the problems of Europe, as well as the impact of its policy on other Asian countries. Leading American decision markers did not and could not slight the interrelated nature of American foreign policy. Seeing great significance in the Soviet atomic bomb explosion in August 1949, they responded with the January 1950 decision to proceed with the hydrogen bomb, hopefully to recoup the offensive capacity that the Soviet A. Bomb was about to neutralize. Then came the NSC-68 proposals, advocating the tripling of defense and military spending. Washington was also to decide on increased United States troops in Europe and massive military aid to NATO countries in the hope that this infusion of dollars could sustain United States exports in the wake of the Marshall Plan.

The collapse of the Nationalist China made imperative for Washington the need to evolve a new strategy within its Asia policy. It energetically blocked Communist
China's admission to the United Nations, despite the Indian government's pleas to recognize the Red China's government. It also decided to consolidate Japan's role as an ally and a balance to Asia's radicalism by signing a peace treaty with Japan, to which New Delhi refused to sign. So what was significant about American policy at this juncture was not that it was vague but that it was precise. It was in this context that one could understand Truman's June 26th declaration ordering the use of air and sea forces up the 38th parallel, stationing the seventh fleet off Formosa, and speeding aid to the French in Indo-China. Although India supported the practical implications of the United States policy after Truman's declaration. The Indian Government concluded that instead of meeting the specific problem of Korea, Truman was broadening the crisis. It inferred that the United States role in the Korean crisis would push her into confrontation with Communist China and the Soviet Union, thereby forcing India into the Western Camp, ultimately resulting in the surrender of non-alignment.

Determined to maintain its non-alignment even in the context of the new situation presented by Truman's declaration, New Delhi made its position on Korea unambiguous. Nehru declared in a press conference in July 1950: "When it appeared that the scope of operations might extend beyond Korea, we felt this was wrong and we would not
associate ourselves with it". Ironically the warning of the crisis in Korea could prove damaging to America's broader security policies by reducing the Western European governments' fear of a possible attack. MacArthur, who never ceased to regard the Orient as America's new frontier, was designated as Commander of all UN forces in Korea, leaving in his hands complete control over the situation. India provided no armed forces, suggesting other methods of settlement. The option that Truman refused to exercise at this time was a negotiated settlement of the war. On July 1, the Indian Ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, proposed a package compromise on Korea. The Chinese Communists would replace Chiang on the Security Council, the Soviet Union would give up its boycott, and the new Security Council would mediate the dispute. Panikkar's plan was also a broadening one and it was a highly pro-China package deal—all very useful to India's interests.

The Chinese agreed to the Indian proposal. On July 13, 1950, Nehru addressed identical letters to Dean Acheson and Stalin, appealing to them to take advantage of the situation, since the Chinese had accepted. USSR agreed on its part to end its boycott. Dean Acheson dismissed the whole proposal with increased irritation. He wrote to Nehru: "We do not believe that the termination of aggression from North Korea can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before
the United Nations". During these weeks Truman had authorized a major increase in United States troops in Europe and urged NATO members to follow suit. Administration figures demanded continued high levels of military spending and pressed to consolidate America’s immense global military and economic power.

Meanwhile American forces landed at Inchon and threatened the North Korean forces from their rear. On July 30, with the enemy in the retreat, Rhee’s troops crossed over the 38th parallel. MacArthur called on North Korea to surrender unconditionally. Startled at these new developments, Nehru voiced his opposition to the crossing of the line: "We are of the opinion that every effort should be made to bring the Korean dispute to a conclusion and that it would be wrong to adopt military operations when peaceful methods can bring the necessary results.... Therefore, we think that the UN forces should not go beyond the 38th parallel till after all other means of settlement had been explored".

The Chinese now unequivocally passed the word through Indian Ambassador in Peking, Panikkar, that China would intervene in the war if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel as well. Washington ignored this warning, and it also proceeded to secure UN sanctions to continue its armed struggle.
The United States resolution was carried in the United Nations 47-5, since the United States had in its support the votes of the Latin Americans too, representing 45 percent of the assembly, the West European powers heavily dependent on the United States financially and such other clients as Turkey, Thailand, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Philippines, India abstained from voting.

On the same day, October 7, the United States troops crossed the parallel. Three days later, Peking radio warned again that China would enter the war. The Chinese started amassing troops in Machuria, "the privileged sanctuary". In the encounter that followed, the American forces had to retreat. When a reporter asked President Truman whether the United States might use the atomic bomb in Korea, he replied: "there has always been an active consideration of its use". A clarification later that day reiterated the thought that he might indeed authorize the use of the bomb. New Delhi was alarmed at this development, and its reaction was sharp and immediate as it was in many other capitals of the world. India began to see the Korean War less and less as a vital demonstration of collective security and more and more as an American-Kuomintang threat to reopen the Chinese Civil War and to resettle one of the greater stakes in the Great Power rivalry. It was surely in the light of this background that the several priorities in India’s policy took place.

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Prime Minister Clement Attlee was disturbed at the Truman declaration and flew to Washington on December 4. The American leaders informed Attlee that they would isolate China diplomatically, keep it out of the United Nations and provide military assistance to surrounding Asian nations. The exchanges were sharp, and Attlee thought Acheson's persistence in Korea and refusal to negotiate, highly belligerent. Nonetheless Attlee achieved the goal of his visit: Washington promised to avoid a nuclear war with China.

Once again, on December 9, the Indian diplomat Panikkar, revealed that China was ready to negotiate on Korea as part of larger Far Eastern discussion. But Washington turned down all these proposals. The initial American response in fact was to label the Communist China as an aggressor. Washington argued that the Chinese had categorically rejected various UN proposals which, in mid January 1951, China was actually quite ready to discuss. On January 11, the United States rammed through a resolution in the UN, declaring China as an aggressor, the Western allies, as the WALL STREET JOURNAL put it, "voting under the lash". The Indian Government expressed its strong disapproval of the action of the United States.

At the beginning of 1951, Washington favoured continuing this war. Truman spoke to the Congress on April
19, repeating his call for military victory in Asia. He spoke of the need to employ Chiang’s troops on the mainland and to strengthen friendly relations with Japan. Many observers in Washington interpreted Indian opposition to American diplomatic maneuvering as hostile to the United States. Some even claimed to see communism in Indian non-alignment. Congressman Cox affirmed: "India to all intents and purposes had already embraced the doctrine of Communism". Congressman Rankin joined Cox in declaring Nehru "the Communist leader of India". India’s voting record in the United Nations and its refusal to join the United States in condemning China as an aggressor in Korea were among the arguments put forward by these Congressmen. Senator Knowland characterized India’s idea of neutrality as "against the United States". Indian non-alignment was ruthlessly discussed in all its aspects. Joseph N. Negreen, in a letter dated June 1, 1951, reminded Truman of "the deaf ear India has turned on our appeal in Korea before the United Nations". John Foster Dulles has euphemistically called India "the so-called neutral".

Later, the Korean war entered a military deadlock. The atom bomb could not be realistically used and without it the UN forces could not hope to win a victory. During May, Washington was ready for an armistice. The UN Secretary General Trygvelie and most of America’s European allies openly favoured an armistice. After protracted negotiations,
the ceasefire was achieved in June 1953. Immediately thereafter South Korea denounced India for "trafficking with the Communists". Washington strongly opposed the inclusion of India in the Korean political conference, for the US delegate Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., cryptically commented: "In view of the known attitude of the Republic of Korea, the participation of India would jeopardize the success of the conference".

Thus United States - Indian relations reached a crisis stage. The experiences of the Korean War left a legacy of suspicion between the United States and India which were to last for years to come.
REFERENCES


4. From 1910 to 1945 Korea formed a part of the Japanese empire, and Japan dominated its political and economic life. After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union occupied Korea in accord with their agreements at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam; see Douglas W. Reeve, The Republic of Korea (1963). At ambiguous and offhand comments: "...in due course Korea shall become free and independent". Foreign Relations of the United States (Conference in Berlin) I, 309. At Yalta, Roosevelt suggested a trusteeship period of twenty to thirty years, and Stalin concurred, though adding that "the shorter the period the better". By August 10, most of North Korea was in Soviet hands. American troops lended in South Korea on September 8, and the United States proposed a demarcation line at the 38th parallel (see Dean Acheson's testimony in the MacArthur Hearings (Part 3, p.2, 104). The arrangement was said to have been dictated by considerations of military expediency. The final communique issued after the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 spelled out a detailed plan for Korea. The choice was unfortunate because Korea's Japanese-built industries lay in the North, while the bulk of her population resided in the South. The Moscow decision was an unpopular one in Korea because it decided that Korea should be held as a Joint Trusteeship for a period of five years. Trusteeship when translated in the Korean Language would be the same as the Japanese protectorate of 1905. The resentment was exhibited in anti-trusteeship demonstrations in Korea in January 1945. The American occupation forced headed by General John R. Hodge landed and ignored the people's government. On October 10, the United States military government proclaimed itself to be the only national government in South Korea and called for an end to "the irresponsible political groups" and to "the necessity to use force in dealing with these ruffians and communists". Foreign Relations of the United States (1945) VI, 1070. On February 14, 1946, a Representative Democratic Council sponsored by the United States military government and headed by the just-returned Syngman Rhee was turned. See Alfred
A joint United States-USSR commission was set up under the terms of the Moscow decision. The Joint Commission reached a deadlock and adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946. The principal reason for deadlock was the dispute over which Koreans to consult. The Soviets insisted that the Commission could not consult with Koreans who opposed the Moscow agreement providing for five years of trusteeship, thereby excluding the rightist groups. The Americans demanded that they consult each Korean Organization and assume them to be of equal importance, regardless of the size of their memberships. The right was fragmented into hundreds of parties, some comprising no more than a family. The deadlock in the joint commission frustrated the objectives envisaged in these declarations. Such a case of reference had not been taken with other unresolved questions. See Gordenkar, "The UN and the Peaceful Unification of Korea".


7. UNDOC A/C 1/235 GAOR, Second Session, First Committee Amex 16, p.608; see also DS, Korea, 1945 to 1948: A Report on Political Developments and Economic Resources with Selected Documents Washington, 1948), 9. See also Gordenkar, "The UN and the Peaceful Unification of Korea".


16. Menon reported that there had been consultations "at the highest levels", UNDOC A/AC 18/SR, 19 March 11, 1948.


18. French delegate Guy de la Tournelle predicted that consultations with the government in South Korea would have a good effect on public feeling in both zones. Hitherto his colleagues in Korea had prudently abstained from any work on reference to the Interim Committee.


22. McCune, Korea Today, 228.

23. Ibid, 228.

24. DS, Korea 1945 to 1948. 15; McCune, Korea Today, 228-30; Gordenkar, The United Nations, 94-106, Voice of Korea, June 1, 1948, 287-88.


26. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings; Korean Aid.

27. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p.329.

29. See the well researched interesting work by Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (New York, 1972). The writer, in his analysis, though sympathetic of the Truman Administration and apologetic of Eisenhower, reveals several details of Dulles' foreign policy. It was a critical reappraisal of Dullesian diplomacy.

30. Indeed at MacArthur's headquarters on the day the war broke out, John Gunther reported, "One of the important members of the occupation was called unexpectedly to the telephone. He came back and whispered, "a big story had broken". The South Koreans have attacked North Korea". See John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (New York, 1951), p.166. Scholars, like D.F. Fleming and I.F. Stone, argue that Rhee started the war with the covert support from Chiang and Washington. They point out that the North Koreans had everything to gain by waiting, while Rhee had everything to lose. See D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins*, 1960-1971 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961).

31. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p.331.


33. One of the major themes in post-war history is Washington's Search for a military doctrine sufficient to translate the United States immense technological and economic power into mastery over elusive and ever changing political realities. After the war, the major challenge to the United States in the world was economic rather than military until 1950. By 1947 as Truman and his advisers planned further military reductions and strove for a balanced federal budget, American leaders felt confident they possessed decisive and naval superiority over the USSR and given their far superior productive capacity, they were not likely to lose their military lead. By the end of 1947 Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the Finletter commission that "Our security is not merely ability to contribute to the reconstruction of the world, and that is why I say our military requirements have to be filled into the pattern of what we do toward the other larger result in other words reconstruction of society". (See President's Air Policy Commission Records, Truman Library, Box 17, HSTL). After World War II, the United States was strong and the Soviet Union was
weak militarily. The US perceived a powerful western European potential and military bloc essentially in the same light at that of an autonomous economy in its region. Its main objective was to integrate tendencies toward independence in a way that would complement and reinforce American power and larger global objectives rather than compete with them. Dulles barely conceded his belief that Russia was the last of NATO concerns: "I do not know of any responsible high official, military or civilian", he told the Senate Hearings in early May "... who believes that the Soviet now plans conquest by open military aggression". The major problem as he defined it was Germany. Berlin had been an American victory (See US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings: North Atlantic Treaty, 81: L, April-May 1949 (Washington, 1949), 343.

34. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope. See the statement of Truman "I know that in our age Europe with its millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network is still the key to world peace". Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p.360.


36. New York Times, October 17, 1950. Robert Trumbull reported in the New York Times, August 27, 1950: "Indications at present are that Pandit Nehru wants to keep clear of Formosa question". He quoted one Indian official saying that "it is a pity that Formosa got mixed up with Korea".

37. MacArthur told one reporter "There can be no compromise... we must help anyone who will fight the communist. I would help the devil if he could come to this earth and to help fight the communists", MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p.321.

38. B.N. Rau, SCOR, 5th Year, 474th Meeting, June 27, 1950, 3. The action in Korea, though a UN action in initiation and authority, was not genuinely international in control, for it was simply conferring legitimacy on the United States actions.

40. Nehru wrote: "India's purpose is to localize the conflict and facilitate an early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council... and with the help and cooperation of other peace loving nations can find a basis for terminating the conflict". Documents on International Affairs, 705-7-8.


42. Documents on International Affairs, p.710.


45. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p.350.

46. DS, American Foreign Policy 1950-55 (Washington, 1953), II 2583; see also Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964); Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), 373.

47. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 395; see also Ibid., 384-88; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 471-75; DSB December 11, 1950, 425.


50. Ibid., 239; see also Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 383, 391-93.

51. Former President Herbert Hoover also demanded that China be declared an aggressor. See S.C. Mudumbai, "United States Foreign Policy towards India 1947-54", p. 124.


53. For a discussion of the diplomacy during the period, see Panikkar, In Two Chinas, 118-24.

55. U.S. Congressional Record, 1951, 97, Part 4, p.5618.

56. Ibid, 5813.

57. U.S. Congressional Record, Part 8, 10743.

58. A total of 143 references to India were made in the Congress and as many as twenty articles relating to India were inserted in the Congressional Record of the Congress. See U.S. Congressional Record, 1957, 94, Part 4, 3511.


61. Ibid.


63. Indian note of August 23, 1957.

64. Ibid.