APPENDIX
At first blush, it seems rather fanciful to contemplate India as a target for the application of containment; for it was economically backward, politically weak, and strategically peripheral. Why should the United States be at all bothered about it, with its hands full with more important issues, such as massive retaliation, rolling back Communism, liberation of captive peoples, agonizing reappraisals, and brinkmanship! No wonder that any discussion of the idea of containing India brings on disdainful yawns as also the change that arises from native psychological complexes.1

Nevertheless India as the pre-eminent power in the South Asian region was a prime candidate for such containment in the early 1950s; for the key characteristics of its foreign-policy behaviour then were its refusal to align itself with the Western bloc, its assertiveness on the global political scene as a nonaligned actor, its trenchant opposition to most US policies, and its implicit ambition to organize a bloc of nonaligned countries outside the US sphere of influence. More significantly, India attempted to play a subject role in international politics even as it endeavoured to overcome its inherent power weaknesses by politically mobilizing other Asian and African nations behind itself. On a whole range of world issues -- Korea,
China, Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the Japanese Peace Treaty -- India was at loggerheads with the United States at a time when the latter was the most important subject in the international system and was determined to remain so.

As a result the United States started regarding India not only as a continual irritant but also as an inveterate claimant to an independent role in international politics. Dean Acheson was visibly incensed by Jawaharlal Nehru’s activities on the world scene. As a respected American scholar pointedly observed, "A permanent state of irritation is the best summary description of Acheson’s attitude toward India". John Foster Dulles characterized India’s nonalignment not only as "an obsolete conception" but also as "an immoral and shortsighted conception". Acheson did not publicly condemn India for its nonalignment, but his attitude was "indistinguishable from Dulles". Nonalignment was an anathema to most Americans. American leaders like George Meany dubbed Nehru an "aide and ally" of Communism.

The United States took exception to India’s policy not only because it placed an obstacle in the way of the American effort to contain the Soviet Union but also because it attempted to create an additional world force, even if one not based on military capabilities. From the US perspective, India had arrogated to itself the privileges of
an independent center of power, thus contracting the US sphere of influence. The United States, therefore, pronounced India’s position unacceptable, notwithstanding the similarity in respect of some key political values of the two countries. Whether the United States was thus driven to a policy of containment, in part or in whole, of India as a rebellious middle power is, of course, a matter that ought to face the test, not simply of consistency with an analytical framework, but of evidence. However, evidence on motivation in international relations is no easy matter; for, in the struggle for power, nations must hide their real motives in order precisely to mislead adversaries and even friends. Public declarations, and even classified documents, about the objectives of policies are thus often a poor guide to real motives. The "SMOKING GUN" is not, therefore, likely to be always readily available to clinch a controversy; a considerable part of the case must rest on both logic and the totality of the evidence. Still, private and classified information would seem to be more credible as evidence on motivation than public statements.

Admittedly an examination of the published official documentation on the period prior to the announcement of the decision on military aid to Pakistan in February 1954 does not reveal any special targeting of India for such military aid. However, that does not necessarily mean the inadequacy of the analytical framework but perhaps points to the
limitation of the specific official documentation. An initial clue to the deficiency in official documentation was provided by Selig Harrison, who, in 1966, pointedly underlined the two-pronged approach of US decision makers on the question of objectives of the decision:

For the record John Foster Dulles defined the new military pact with Pakistan as part of the global collective-security pattern then being developed to meet an expected recurrence of conventional aggression by Communist ground forces throughout Asia. Off the record, Vice President Nixon defined the objectives of some elements in Washington more candidly in briefings with newsmen. Pakistan's readiness to enter into a military pact offered an opportunity, the Vice President felt, to build a counterforce to Nehru's neutralism in the Indian leader's backyard.8

As Vice-President, Richard M. Nixon was himself an important participant in the decision, which followed a moving speech he made before the National Security Council after a wideranging tour through Asia. (Curiously the documents published so far contain no reference to the role of Nixon in the decision by the Council, where he was reportedly a star performer). Nixon's admiring biographer, Ralph de Toledano, to whom Nixon opened his files, wrote that in that memorable speech before the National Security Council, Nixon expressed his feeling that "Nehru was contemptuous of flattery and respectful of strength" and forcefully urged military aid to Pakistan "as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India". He
further observed that Nixon was "convinced that India's neutralism was an outgrowth of the Prime Minister's belief that India could be a dominant force only if the rest of non-Communist Asia were weak and unarmed".°

These revelations only confirm what was already apparent through highly credible reporting in the mass media. By October 1953, India had become aware of US plans to provide military aid to Pakistan. When Nehru met Nixon in New Delhi in December 1953, he tried during his two-hour talk with him to dissuade the United States from arming Pakistan. The essence of his case was that US military aid would bring the cold war to South Asia and that Pakistan would in all probability, through overconfidence engendered by the change in the military balance on the subcontinent, resort to war. American Embassy officials told the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi, Escott Reid, that "Nixon had been impressed by the weight of these arguments". Apparently, Nixon left Nehru with the impression of a likely sympathetic hearing for his arguments, but this was exactly the opposite of what Nixon's real intent was.

From New Delhi, Nixon went on to the Pakistan capital, Karachi, for a three-day visit. During that period, the NEW YORK TIMES correspondent Robert Trumbull cabled two dispatches which laid bare US thinking. Nixon clearly was the source of these dispatches even though their content was not specifically attributed to him. Trumbull's "informed
sources" averred to him that it was about time to put "an end to Washington’s patience with neutralism", of which Nehru was the chief proponent. It was their understanding that "Mr. Nehru’s neutralist influence, which often has embarrassed the United States and its allies, would be lessened if an Asian power outspokenly opposed to Communism were to gain a position of great prominence". The recommendation, therefore, was for the United States to assume "a position of greater independence in relation to the Indian Prime Minister".

Needless to recapitulate that there was basic opposition between the global power (USA) and the middle power (India): "His interests and what he believes to be India’s interests may not be to the best interests of the United States and the United Nations". The fundamental question related to influence; and here it was the other party that was charged with seeking undue influence, the argument being that Nehru "is not willing to allow any other government to be a pale rival to India in this area" through identifying India’s own interests with Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It was felt that "India’s diplomacy has been directed toward keeping her neighbours individually weak and divided among themselves, but internally stable and united under India’s leadership". This was precisely what gave rise to India’s conflict with the United States: "His
major rival for influence in South Asia is the United States. This explains his wary attitude toward Japan, Pakistan, and other Asian countries on close terms with Washington'.

The question, therefore, for Washington was to "determine whether India, a country often opposed to the United States in vital international dealings, is to obtain unquestioned dominance over this entire area, plus Africa, or is to remain merely the strongest individual power in an Asia-Arab-Africa bloc". A firmer course towards India was called for, and "an early practical step in that direction would be to strengthen the friendlier nations in this orbit, beginning with Pakistan". Nehru would no doubt protest, but "the basic reason for Mr. Nenru's opposition is that a stronger Pakistan, with all that this implies in the Moslem world, would threaten the dominance of India in Asia, the Near East; and Africa". A diplomacy based on power was then advocated towards Nehru:

He will be affected in his purposes by strength, decisive action, and people who can say "NO" with power to back it up. The United States must determine soon whether it is to the best interests of the free world to have India the only strong nation in this part of the world or to have a number of strong nations, with India stronger than the rest -- she merits that position if only because of her size -- but not dominance.9

Nothing could have with any more brutal clarity expressed the inherent conflict between the United States as
the hegemonic global Power and India as the rebellious middle Power, as also the means to be employed by the global Power to counter the pretentions of the middle Power to greater influence in the region. This was apparently no less true of the Republican Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Chester Bowles, who served as US Ambassador to India for some time under the Eisenhower Administration as a carryover from his previous posting under the Truman Administration, subsequently wrote:

Soon stories began to appear of behind-the-scenes maneuvering within the State Department and Pentagon for a review of the earlier negative decision. Of particular concern was the report that Secretary of State Dulles, exasperated by Nehru’s refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty that he (Dulles) had negotiated or to modify India’s nonaligned foreign policies, was in favour of the proposed building of the Pakistan military.¹⁰

Such views were not strictly restricted to Nixon or Dulles. Nor were they simply confined to an attempt at containment. This is obvious from the memoirs of the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi at that time, Escott Reid. Within days of the Nixon visit, a US official, presumably the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in New Delhi, met Reid and gave him an insight into the larger US design on the question of military aid. The argument of the CIA official was, in Reid’s words, as follows:

India was the only possible source of a mass army for the West in a Third World War. A military
agreement between the United States and Pakistan would isolate India. India would find that it would not be able to build up its armaments to match the increase in Pakistan's because the United States would put pressure on Britain not to provide arms, and would also see to it that India did not receive other essential imports from Western Countries.... These developments would weaken Nehru and the Congress Party and strengthen the Right-wing Hindu group, the Jana Sangh, some of whose members were prepared to support a military agreement with the United States. The objective of the United States in making a military agreement with Pakistan was thus to put India in a position where it had no recourse but to make a military agreement with the United States which would ultimately lead to India becoming an ally of the United States, and the source of a mass army for the West in a Third World War.11

Thus the United States sought through the policy of containment a more effective satellization of India. Reid went on to note that "the threat which was conveyed to me in this conversation that the United States might cut off essential supplies to India if India refused to enter into a military aid agreement was taken seriously by the business community in India". Again, at a lunch at the US Embassy in January 1954, he found the American Ambassador and his deputy pressing a British guest with access to high Indian officials "to large American military aid to Pakistan would not be that India would itself request military aid from the United States. Their tenacity in pressing this question confirmed my feeling that this was indeed the hope held by important groups in the American Administration".

Apparently cognizant of the Administration's thinking, Senator Fulbright warned that the military pact with Pakistan was basically an anti-Nehru tactic "designed
to force his hand". The aim of US military aid to Pakistan was not simply containment of the Soviet Union, or collective defense in the Middle East. It had India specifically as its target. Nehru was thus not wrong in his perception that US decisionmakers "imagine that an alliance between Pakistan and the US would bring such overwhelming pressure on India as to compel her to change her policy of nonalignment". Interestingly the US Ambassador, George V. Allen, within less than a month after the decision on military aid, directly linked it to the intended setbacks to Nehru and his foreign policy. In a secret cable to Washington he stated:

This decision had been (a) serious defeat for Nehru. I hope with time it will undermine his entire concept of neutralism in this region. If this develops it will be a major victory for US policy. We should try to find way in which price we pay for such victory is cut to minimum. The price might well be permanent impairment of Indian -- American relations and alienation of Indian goodwill for indefinite period.... I know the vigor with which those who find Nehru exasperating will argue that we should not cater to him in any way. I believe, however, that we may well let our own feelings do us a disservice if we fail to look beyond the present.

The link between the decision on military aid and the motives specifically relating to India is clear from the evidence (though much of it is unofficial). However, one does not have to rely merely on verbal testimony to discern the intentions of US decisionmakers. Here it is noteworthy

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that the weapons-mix of military aid provided to Pakistan left no doubt that it was directed at India. The Government of India brought this to the attention of the United States, but of no avail.\textsuperscript{15}

To apotheosize Soviet containment as an explanation for the activities of the United States in different regions of the world would, however, be to ignore the autonomous importance of regional factors in US calculations about its own drive for influence and control. Of course, any decision that moves through a complex bureaucratic process is likely to involve multifold ends. But sufficient and compelling evidence has been advanced on the US decision to provide military aid to Pakistan to demonstrate that considerations of rivalry for influence with the regional Power, India -- quite independently of containment of the Soviet Union -- were involved in the decision, Pakistan, bolstered by military aid, was intended to serve as a local counterweight on behalf of the United States against India even though the aim was sought to be mystified through its association with collective defense in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{16} From the perspective of the US attempt to build local counterweights against regional rivals, the containment of the Soviet Union appears as only a subcategory of the general category of containment on the part of a hegemonic global Power, aimed at all actual or aspirant independent centers of power.
In addition to the foregoing motivation the end of American Thermo-Nuclear Monopoly with the Russian Progress in detonating the atomic bomb and making inter-continental bombers capable of striking the strategic centres of military establishments and industrial production in the United States created a sense of urgency in 1953, to have bases in and around communities powers - Russia and China. President Eisenhower with his military experience concluded that Pakistan with its bases was essential for American security and therefore announced military aid to Pakistan on February 25, 1954. The flow of military material and sophisticated weapons to Pakistan was subsequently cemented with the signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan on May 19, 1954. Accordingly it was agreed that the US would supply necessary 'equipment, material, services or other assistance' to Pakistan and that the Government of Pakistan would not make use of such assistance 'for purpose other than those for which it was furnished'. Pakistan also agreed to provide to the United States base facilities in Peshawar from where her (US) planes could carry on spying and reconnaissance activities against the Soviet Union.

To assuage Indian resentment Eisenhower declared that:

Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. I can say that if our aid to any country including Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression, I
will undertake immediately in accordance with my constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with Congress on further steps.

In spite of this assurance, the American-Pakistani alliance increased Indo-U.S. hostility, undermine regional stability and led to Indo-Soviet intimacy.\textsuperscript{17}

Subsequent events leading to Indo-Pak War of 1965 and 1971 proved that Pakistan unsuccessfully used American weapons against India and Eisenhower's assurances remained a pious wish.
REFERENCES


9. Ibid., pp.102–103 and NEW YORK TIMES, 9 and 10 December, 1953.


As Bowles States: The Indian Government pointed out that the military equipment that we were giving to Pakistan had no relevance to our alleged military objectives. If the Pakistan Army were actually designed to become part of a United States-sponsored defense system to discourage a Soviet or Chinese military movement through the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush Mountains, it would be seeking equipment appropriate for fighting in the mountain areas. However, the equipment we supplied Pakistan—tanks, motorized artillery, and the like—was suitable for use only on a relatively flat terrain, in other words, on the plains of North India. Moreover, from the outset, the Pakistan Government had itself made clear that it had no quarrel with either the USSR or China and privately admitted that its military build-up, in fact, directed against India. Bowles, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941–1969, p. 480.
