SUMMARY
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The Second World War brought India into the orbit of American attention in a significant and sustained way. India occupied a strategic position in the Allied war effort against the Axis Powers. Even before the Pearl Harbour and their actual participation, the Americans realized the strategic importance of India, and the valuable contribution she could make to the war effort. F.D. Roosevelt's administration was compelled to respond to the demands of the Indian Freedom movement. In defining its policy towards Indian nationalism, the U.S. dilemma was to choose between supporting a prized ally and aiding a nationalist movement seeking independence from that ally.

F.D. Roosevelt was known to be a supporter of greater concessions to India, leading to independence. This position was appreciated in India and was often referred to by Nehru and other leaders. However, Roosevelt was hesitant to press too hard the Indian cause because of the fear of offending British sensibilities. Wartime encounters do not provide ideal conditions for balanced relationships between the countries. The goodwill toward the U.S. generated in India during the Second World War continued into the post-war period, during the events leading to India's independence in 1947. Even before independence, the Truman...
Administration raised the level of the official contacts from that of Mission to Embassy at Delhi in 1946 on the occasion of the establishment of an interim government headed by Nehru in India. Later on during the crucial phase of Cabinet Mission Plan negotiations State Department unsuccessfully tried to persuade Indian National Congress to accept League's interpretation of the Mission Plan to avoid partition.

After Indian Independence the U.S. approach to India became more systematic and less personal. Preferring to concentrate on the problems of Europe and East Asia, Truman generally left the affairs of South Asia to his subordinates. Truman never conveyed the sort of personal interest in India that his predecessor had managed to embody; even if he had been inclined to, the new President's personality did not easily lend itself to popular identification with idealistic causes.

After independence an uneasy relationship developed between the two. The interest in India by the U.S. and the goodwill in India towards America during the Second World War and the immediate post war years were soon dissipated to a considerable degree, or atleast faded away as independent India and the U.S. pursued different paths and had different priorities. The U.S. an emergent super power, became absorbed with the cold war with the Soviet Union and had little time for India or any of the other weak, emerging
states in the non Western World. India was preoccupied with the problems of the nation building, especially with trying to repress the violence and bloodshed that accompanied partition and independence to integrate the princely states into the Indian Union.

In late 1947, shortly after India and Pakistan became independent, the dispute over Kashmir flared up into warfare between the two nations in the subcontinent and became internationalized when in early 1948 India brought the question before the United Nations Security Council. India was quite unhappy with the position taken by the U.S. on this question, which it regarded as anti India and pro-Pakistan. Hence, virtually from the emergence of the Indian nation, Kashmir and relations with Pakistan generally were sources of recurring tensions, between the two countries. Inspite of India’s strategic location on the chessboard of global politics, the sub continent’s importance to the U.S. national security seemed to be peripheral and more a matter of potential rather than immediate interest. Given its limited interests in the Indian sub continent, the U.S. put arms embargo on both India and Pakistan and it supported the U.N. negotiations.

Simultaneously business circles and congressmen like Emanuel Cellar, were lobbying for American participation in the Indian market through a bilateral
treaty of commerce. The first U.S. attempt to seek a commercial treaty with India started in 1939 and lingered on till the end of the war. With Indian independence and liquidation of Empire preferences and privileges the U.S. renewed its quest for a treaty. The Truman Administration was of the view that until and unless a treaty between the two nations is signed, the U.S. business interests could hardly be expected to participate extensively in trade and commerce in India. A new draft was made of the proposed treaty and sent to New Delhi. The "Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and India" was presented by the U.S. ambassador to the Government of India on Feb. 7, 1948. The discussions were yet to take place when the U.S. Government got a bolt from the blue in the form of the first Industrial Policy Resolution of April 6, 1948. Because of this, many articles of the proposed treaty needed clarification. Lengthy negotiations were held intermittently throughout Truman's Administration but without any success.

Nehru visited America for the first time in Oct. 1949. He came, he said in an address to a joint session of the American Congress on "a voyage of discovery". His visit attracted considerable attention and public interest. His meetings with Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were apparently disappointing to both the sides. "Nehru was proud and suspicious. Truman was indifferent and
condescending". Acheson later wrote that Nehru, "Came in a prickly mood, annoyed by what he called ‘American Intervention.’ --- he was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal". Inspite of his praise for the U.S. in his public utterances, Nehru was uncomfortable during his sojourn.

India was faced with a major food shortage in 1950-51 that forced Nehru to swallow his pride and turn to the food-surplus nation, the U.S., for emergency relief. Unfortunately, this opportunity for an upturn in Indo-U.S. relations was not generally recognized or graciously seized upon in the U.S. The Congress was in a recalcitrant, and from Indian perspective, an unfriendly mood. The amount that was allocated - $ 189.7 million, fell considerably short of the amount required by India; and it was not approved until several months of carping debate in the Congress, during which many critical remarks were made about India and Nehru's foreign policy, which the Indians greatly resented.

As a spillover of the Cold War the crisis in Korea in the early 1950s found India and the U.S. taking quite different stands. Immediately after the North Korean attack, India voted for a U.S. sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council, calling for the cessation of the movement across the 38th parallel and authorizing military resistance to the invasion by a U.N. force. This force was composed
largely of Americans, with smaller contingents from a few other countries. India refused to provide any troops and dispatched an ambulance unit. When General MacArthur was contemplating a push north of the 38th parallel, India’s representative in China, Sardar K.M. Pannikar sent word that this action would bring the Chinese into the fray, a prophetic warning that the Indian Government immediately conveyed to the U.S. authorities; and that they ignored. India was the only non-communist nation that voted against the U.S. sponsored resolution in the U.N. General Assembly, condemning the Chinese invasion of Korea and calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal north of the Yalu river by China. India kept calling for an end to the military operations in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the question. When the question of the repatriation of the North Korean prisoners of war reached an impasse, India agreed to assume direction of the U.N. Repatriation Commission and its representatives — military and civilian, discharged this difficult task very well but dissenting voices were heard in the U.S.

However, in the spring of 1952, an upturn in Indo-U.S. relations began. Much of the credit for this improvement is due to Chester Bowles, who served in India as the U.S. ambassador from the fall of 1951 until shortly after the Eisenhower Administration assumed power in Washington in early 1953. He did more than any other
American to interpret America to India and India to America. He was invariably an advocate of greater U.S. economic assistance to India and he constantly emphasized the need for Truman Administration to overcome its lack of understanding of Indian aspirations. As a result India began to receive massive U.S. economic aid despite their differences on various international issues.

When his tenure was coming to an end, India and the U.S. had differed on a number of important issues, in addition to differences over the role of the *New Asia* in world affairs, the independence of Indonesia, the admission of the People's Republic of China into the U.N. and the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, which India refused to sign by not taking part in the San Francisco Conference. Another problem cropped up between India and the U.S. adding another hurdle. The Truman Administration was seriously and actively contemplating the possible inclusion of Pakistan in a Middle East defense pact. Many administration planners considered the defense of the Middle East as one of the Nation's strategic objectives. Truman Administration believed that Pakistan could make significant contribution to the achievement of that objective. Secretary of State Dean Acheson put the matter bluntly in a memorandum on the mutual security programme: "Pakistan's need for assistance is correspondingly great and equally urgent and it is essential
as well as there be maintained a justifiable ratio between aid to India and Pakistan. Unless we are prepared to accept the possibility of Pakistan’s alienation". When Chester Bowles became aware of the U.S. plans, rumours were in the air in New Delhi that Washington was contemplating to include Pakistan in the proposed Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Both the Government of India and Bowles complained to Washington with much vehemence. Bowles was of the opinion that the inclusion of Pakistan would bring Cold War to the subcontinent, increase Pakistani military power, jeopardize Indian security and lead inevitably to another downturn in Indo-U.S. relations. He warned Washington about the likely regional ramifications of such a commitment. The officials in the ‘lame-duck’ Truman Administration tried to convince the aroused ambassador that as yet no decision has been taken which was technically true. But an impressive strategic rationale for an American-Pakistani military relationship had already been established, with grave consequences for the Indo-U.S. relationship in future. This rationale was inherited and acted upon by the Eisenhower Administration.