The previous chapters postulated the critical nature of Marx's conception of ideology. Not every illusion or distortion is tantamount to ideology, but only those, which serve the relations of class domination. Those who are subjected to power relations, most often voluntarily accept their subordination. This point was first raised by Marx in his 1843-44 *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State* as the problem of "consent". This problematic refers to the power of ideology in pursuing and winning over those who can be potential rebels against domination.

We have also discussed that ideological strategies are not simply the result of the conspiracies of the ruling classes, but the creation of the more deep-rooted relations of social reality itself. Phenomenal forms generated by social contradictions make these contradictions incomprehensible. Ideology works as an eraser in the service of the domineering sections of the society. It constantly erases the traces of the process, by which a relation of domination is stabilised and naturalised in the minds of social agents. In this sense, ideology refers to those distortions or mystifications, which are motivated and maintained by various societal inequalities and other social pathologies. The language of ideology mystifies and excludes certain ideas from the mental universe of social agents. Therefore, it can be said that Ideology refers to those mystifications of thought that function in the interests of the dominant social classes.
However, post-Marx, the journey of the concept of ideology did not remain within the contours of the critical character of the concept. The neutral and the positive conceptions also became influential in the course of time. Within Marxist tradition itself, a fierce debate exists between the adherents of the critical and the neutral conceptions. One charge against the critical conception is that it encourages a top down approach, because the position of criticism is said to have be virtually elitist.

The notion of false consciousness, which is generally being linked with the critical conception of ideology, is also critiqued. The epistemological characterisation of ideology is not only rebuffed by those Marxists, who are supporters of the neutral conception, but also by the positivists, the American pragmatists, the postmodernists and other shades of philosophical-political thinking. One variant of epistemological definition of ideology has been the science/ideology polarity. In this line of thought, scientific understanding is counterposed to ideological thinking. Against this inherent scientism, emerged a position of historicism, which does not allow even the slightest distinction between science and ideology.

This chapter discusses how the critical conception provides a better explanation of ideology. We would argue that since the ideological process provides legitimisation to different forms of domination, the endeavour of exposition of ideology should be linked to the unmasking of the forms of domination. We have discussed in the previous chapter the modes of operation of ideology, which are also strategies of gaining legitimisation such as naturalisation, dehistoricisation, reification, and universalisations, etc. A process of mystification is inherent in all the forms of legitimisations. Hence, ideology-critique is related to the quest of demystification of the forms of domination. We would argue for the continuing relevance and usefulness of the act of demystification of the ideological strategies, which is compatible only with the critical conception of ideology.
For this, we would first deal with the distinction between the neutral and the critical conceptions followed by a critique of the neutral conception of ideology. In this context, the process of neutralisation of the concept would also be discussed. Thirdly, the charges against the critical conception, especially those related to the idea of false consciousness would be considered. The similarities and the difference between the concept of ideology and the concept of false consciousness would also be delineated. Fourthly, we would provide a criticism of the contemporary suggestion that the critical conception is possible without using epistemological criterions. Finally, the relations of the concept of ideology with the concept of science would be dealt with. The first section of this chapter discusses the neutral and the positive conceptions of ideology. The second section deals with the idea of false consciousness and its relation to the critical conception of ideology. The third section analyses the relationship between science and ideology.

4.1 THE NEUTRAL CONCEPTION OF IDEOLOGY: A CRITIQUE

This section deals with the neutral conception of ideology. We would present a comparison between the three conceptions of ideology, namely the neutral, the positive, and the critical. For this, it is necessary to outline the journey of the ideology from Marx’s critical conception to the neutral and positive conceptions. The neutral conceptions are employed, interestingly, on the one hand by Marxist scholars and parties, which loosely constitute “official Marxism”, and on the other hand by the positivist social sciences.1 This section also discusses the various ways in which the neutral concept is used, and presents a critique of the same.

Before moving on to the discussion of different aspects of the neutral conception of ideology let us first sketch out the routes taken by the notion of ideology for moving from a neutral/positive to the critical connotation and vice versa. After Marx, a complex process of neutralization of the concept of
ideology began, in both ideas and practice of the "Marxists" and in the realm of emerging social sciences.

The neutralisation of the concept is closely linked to the distortion of Marx's ideas by those who called themselves Marxist. One major factor was that the first two generations of Marxist scholars like Plekhanov, Lenin, the early Lukács and Gramsci were not acquainted with *The German Ideology*, one of the key texts by Marx and Engels on ideology, but also with the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of State*. Another reason was a crude systematisation and codification of Marx and Engels' work as a positivist and scientist system of thought, which surfaced perhaps also because of the pragmatic needs of the early revolutionaries. This problem lay not merely with the Stalinist School of falsification, but was embedded in the European revolutionary movement itself.

On the one hand, there emerged, the neutralisation of the essentially critical view of Marx's notion of ideology. On the other hand, there also emerged a formalistic notion of ideology with Karl Kautsky's idea of ideological struggle and party formation.

Lenin believed (as outlined in his *What is to be done?*) that the proletariat could not reach the level of revolutionary consciousness on its own. At the most, this can acquire trade-union consciousness. Nevertheless, trade-union consciousness is not revolutionary consciousness. This is a mere reflection of bourgeois consciousness. It can be said that the positive/neutral conception also contributed to the formalist (almost neo-Kantian) Kautskian, Leninist and Lukácsian line of substitutionism, in which communist party acts as a vanguard on behalf of the working class and the ideologists provide class-consciousness or ideology to the working class from without. The German socialist thinker Rosa Luxemburg (followed by the young Trotsky) had provided an early critique of such an approach.

D.P. Chattopadhyaya observes that in the process, the concept of ideology metamorphosed into two new forms: firstly, as the totality of forms of
social consciousness or ideological superstructure and secondly, as the political doctrine or the world-view associated with the interests of a particular class. Ideology now ceases to be an inevitable distortion and becomes a neutral concept pointing towards the political consciousness of the class, whether bourgeois or proletariat. The critical edge of Marx’s concept was lost and Marxism itself was declared as an ideology of the proletariat. “Ideology” shaped out of this process later took the form of an official doctrine and became the guiding dogma for the Soviet government and the communist parties influenced by it all over the world. A document of CPSU declared:

Marxist-Leninist ideology is a consistent expression of the vital interest of the working class, of all working people being at the same time a scientific theory that has been vindicated by the experience of socialist construction and presenting an objectively true picture of the world and as such is a good guide to action.

There was yet another route to the neutralisation of the concept. Karl Mannheim, a contemporary of Georg Lukács, mollified the critical core of Marx’s concept and equated ideology firstly, with psychological deceptions and scepticism that comes in the way to comprehending opponents’ view and secondly, with socially-determined partial-perspectival thinking or world-view. So now, not only legitimising knowledge, but also all kind of knowledge itself comes under the scope of ideology. The concept of ideology is de-linked from the phenomena of domination and legitimisation. Ultimately, relativisation of all standpoints leads to the dissolution of the concept of ideology into the sociology of knowledge. Terry Eagleton comments on the shift of Mannheim towards neutralisation of the term:

Mannheim to be sure, does not believe that such world-views can ever be non-evaluatively analyzed; but the drift of his work is to downplay concepts of mystification, rationalisation, and the power-function of ideas in the name of some synoptic survey of the evolution of forms of historical consciousness. In a sense, then, this post-Marxist approach to ideology returns to a pre-Marxist view of it, as simply “socially determined thought.”
This process of neutralisation was advanced further in the tradition of emerging social sciences, which were enthusiastic to examine every phenomena including ideology in a value-free manner. The phrase ‘action-oriented’ was introduced by Talcott Parsons and became a key term for explaining ideology within the practice of consensus theories. Ideas sustaining relations of domination and ideas opposing it, both are treated at par by this line of inquiry. H.M. Drucker remarks: ‘this way of looking at things presumes that all action orientations are morally and politically equivalent.’

Ideology now referred to relatively broad and articulate set of action-oriented ideas about politics and society.

Now we would focus on the various ways in which the concept of ideology is used. For the purpose of distinction, the neutral conception itself can be classified into three different ways. The first is the ‘the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life.’ This definition resembles the broader meaning of culture used in the discipline of anthropology. It refers to ‘the whole complex of signifying practices and symbolic process’.

This can be compared with the famous definition of culture, provided by an early anthropologist E.B. Tylor (1871), who comprehended culture as ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, arts, law, morals, customs and all other capabilities and habits acquired by men as a member of society.’ Raymond Geuss characterizes this way of using of the term as ‘the programme of an empirical study of human groups.’

It can be argued that this understanding of ideology is narrower than the general anthropological definition of culture, which includes all the material and ideational components, but wider than the restrictive sense of culture, which refers to artistic and intellectual expressions of a group or a society or an epoch. In its inclusive notion, culture for B. Malinowsky, is a total way of life and it includes the mental, social and physical means, which make life run its course. Right from Tylor to Boas, Malinowsky and Radcliffe-Brown, there are
many inclusive definitions of culture with different focuses and shades. As C. Kluckhohn and W. H. Kelly remarks that culture contains all those historically created designs for living, explicit, implicit, rational, irrational, non-rational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for behaviour of men.  

This conception of ideology can be termed the broadest and purely descriptive. In its use, one does not denounce or commend any group by saying that its members have an ideology. This conception not only contains shared beliefs, habits, attitudes, traits, etc., but also variety, diversity and conflict around these. The main weakness of this conception is that it is so broad that as an analytical tool it turns out to be useless and becomes almost synonymous to culture itself. A useful concept of ideology cannot be "coextensive with the general field of "culture", but lights up this field from a particular angle." Besides, this conception remains silent over the matrices of power and political conflict present within any society. It sketches ideology of a group at a very general level while ignoring specificity.  

The second neutral sense of the term is less general in its scope. Ideology in this sense refers to ideas and beliefs, which signify the basic existential dimension of a group, community, or class. William Sunderlin's definition of ideology belongs to this sense of the term: 

Ideology— the framework of ideas, beliefs, and values that structures our world-view— is a powerful force that governs our thoughts and emotions in a ways that we do not fully recognise and that may or may not be well-grounded in the reality.  

This use of the term is slightly different from the above-mentioned purely descriptive senses. Ideology in the purely descriptive sense comprises of all the characteristic beliefs, members of the group share; however, all members of the group do not necessarily share ideology in this narrower sense. In this sense, a group may have more than one world-view or ideology, such as economic ideology or religious ideology. Geuss has characterised this meaning of the term as "ideology as a world view." However, Geuss has used the term world-view in slightly different manner from its more general usage. Edward
Shils in the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* defined ideology as the positive and normative belief systems, which flourish in any human society.20

In this sense, world-view is not tantamount to an index of all the normative beliefs of a group, but is suggestive of a system of key beliefs, which pertain to the main aspects of human life such as death, mode of production, sexuality, etc. In this scheme, it is possible that particular group has economic ideology and religious ideology, but no political ideology e.g. those communities or cultures, where state formation has not taken place, particularly some of the *adivasi* communities.

It is clear from above that this conception is also used to convey the processes of societal differentiation and social stratifications. While the first descriptive sense expresses sum of the ideational aspect of a given culture or community, the focus of the second descriptive sense is more on differentiation and heteronomy within the given culture. This understanding of the term presupposes that a 'social organisation reflects a society’s predominant underlying cultural values and beliefs.'21 The sociological and anthropological studies of societies base themselves on the domains of 'the scientific or technological, the civic or more humanistic...'22

This neutral sense, however, is less general and more restrictive than first sense, which was 'coextensive with the general field of “culture.”' However, in this sense also, there is not any difference between an ideology and a belief-system or world-view. If every belief-system is tantamount to ideology, then what remains the usefulness of term ideology as different conception?

Now let us discuss the third neutral usage of the term. Geuss describes this as ‘ideology in the programmatic sense’.23 One of the proponent of this conception Martin Seliger characterizes ideology as 'sets of factual and moral propositions, which serve to posit, explain and justifying ends and means of organised social action, especially political action, irrespective of whether such
action aims to preserve, amend, destroy or rebuild any given order.24 This conception has been influential in the social science circles of the Anglophone world including its post-colonial terrain, especially in the departments of political science.

There is a tendency to regard ideology as what Anthony Giddens calls ‘the forum of modern politics’.25 To political scientists, ideology denotes the realm of “isms” or political doctrines and movements such as Feminism, Anarchism, Marxism, Thatcherism, Conservatism, Nationalism, Liberalism etc. This conception is also used to indicate the ‘world view or belief system of a particular group, society, or historical era’.26 This conception focuses upon the supposed function of ideology, which is shaped by its action-orientations. Adherents of this conception discuss the benefit and detriment of all action-orientations and of ideology as such.

We can compare this functionalist use of the term with Lenin’s usage. In “Marxist” vocabulary, this programmatic sense is often characterised by the term world-view of the classes. As can be seen here, “world-view” contains dimensions that are more political. Nevertheless, in both the uses, functionalist presuppositions remain the same. For a Leninist too, every world-view or political doctrine is equal to ideology, whether that is bourgeois, proletarian, liberal, fascist, or socialist.

The programmatic sense of the term can be further subdivided into two parts. This classification is based on the observation that the neutral and the positive conceptions also have an implicit presence of negativity under one or the other pretext but are not ready to apply it to their own thoughts or on ideology per se. The programmatic sense-1 claims to study all the action-orientations neutrally, however while doing so it simply hides its own “action-orientations”, and inclinations. The programmatic sense-2 explicitly takes side of one particular ideology. “American” social science is an example of the first programmatic sense, which tries to hide its partisanship to US imperialism and capitalism. On the other hand, usage, which was prevalent among the
The notion of false consciousness has its own problematic. The trouble associated with the expression false consciousness is that 'it can convey both the idea of distortion and the idea that such distortion is an invention or a delusion of individual consciousness, a mirage without any base in reality.'

The phrase "false consciousness" invokes many problems. Another problem associated with the term "false consciousness" is that it misleadingly hints at the phenomena of empirical or logical falsity. These falsities can surely be part of any ideological mystification, but the condition of empirical or logical falsity in itself is not sufficient to make any discourse as ideological.

This confusion, which prevails with the idea of false consciousness, is essentially related to the positivist approach. The Marxian notion of false consciousness cannot be equated to the concept of empirical falsity. The Marxian notion of false consciousness does not require the falsity of statements or propositions. Not every lie, error, and manipulation is tantamount to ideology.

We would argue below that even empirically true or logically coherent assertion could be ideological. A statement or a proposition can be true in its empirical content, but false in its effect. The statement 'students of upper castes are meritorious as they scores more numbers in school examination than students of lower castes' may be empirically true, but this statement can be used falsely, because it can aggravate biasness towards Dalits and can create an altogether ideological construction of meritocracy. The statement 'women of today are more concerned about their independent career than peaceful family life' can be factually correct, but it would seem false if one challenge and demystify the notion of 'peaceful family life'. The same is the case with the statement: 'worker's strike caused a loss of two hundred crores to the nation's exchequer.' This statement of a government spokesperson on television can be empirically true. Nevertheless, if this 'true' statement is seen in a wider context of imposition of an anti-labour law by government after signing a trade treaty with an imperialist country, then this statement can be seen as an ideological one.
A statement or a proposition can be true to its objective contents, but can be very much ideological, if its discursive placement hides the motive of legitimisation of domination. Moreover, this applies to the reverse situation.\textsuperscript{41} An empirically false statement may not generate false consciousness, if it does not serve power relationship. For instance, statements such as ‘Shimla is a famous port’ and ‘Goa is known for its deserts and camels’ are false, but are not ideological in themselves. On the other hand, it can be taken into account that ideology also consists of false propositions. For example, ‘whites are more creative than non-whites’, ‘men primarily are rational and women are emotional’, and ‘brahmins are superior beings than dalits can be termed as very significant propositions correspondingly for racial, patriarchal, and brahminical ideologies.

Whether social or political standpoint is true to or false to its asserted content—does not make any difference to its characterisation as ideological. If it happens to be true, it is more useful for its ideological employment, because ideological process necessarily involves manipulation of norms and meaning. A position true to its asserted content can be manipulated more effectively, because it does have certain positive force. In this context Slovaj Žižek comments:

> The starting point of this critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth. When, for example, some western power intervenes in a Third World country on account of violations of human rights, it may well be ‘true’ that in this country the most elementary human rights were not respected, and that the western intervention will effectively improve the human rights record, yet such a legitimisation none the less remains ‘ideological’ in so far as it fails to mention the true motives of the intervention (economic interests, etc.).\textsuperscript{42}

We have discussed that false consciousness is neither unreality nor an empirical falsity. Then what is the meaning of false in false consciousnesses? We have seen above that statements or standpoints, which constitute ideological discourse, can be true to their objective content, but this does not
mean that these statements cannot have deceptive effects. This implies that at one level these statement can be true or false, but at the level of their consequence or effect, these are not to be true. In other words ideological discourses can be 'true in its empirical content but deceptive in its force, or true in its surface meaning but false in its underlying assumptions.'

It can be said that the positivist account of empirical reality is unsatisfactory regarding the phenomena of ideology, because it does not deal with the concealment of reality. Herein lies the advantage of Marx's approach to reality, which distinguishes between 'phenomenal forms of reality' and deep down essential relations.

It can also be said that ideological discourse can be true in its surface meaning, but cannot be true in its discursive configuration. Discursive configuration of an ideology would be revealed only in the critique of ideology. Ideology-critique should be able to expose the context of legitimisation, in which a particular discourse is embedded. Here it can be argued that ideology does not consist of merely rationality or cognitive elements. The ideological discourse acquires its power from affective sources including emotive and conative elements. Ideology is not only a matter of describing reality, but also a matter of emotions such as will, hope, nostalgia, fear, reverence etc.

Louis Althusser was one of the propounders of this position. He sees ideology as a lived relation, i.e., a pre-reflective or unconscious relation with the world, rather then a representation of the world. Ideology cannot be tied exclusively either to reason or to unreason. Ideology cannot be reduced to either rational, cognitive realm or to normative and affective realms. This type of distinction from either side is itself a case for ideology. As we have shown, that the fact/ value distinction is itself an ideological strategy.

Can an ideology be false and rational at the same time? Only if rationality is construed as the 'sense of internally coherent, consistent with the available evidence and held on what appear to be plausible grounds.' We are asserting
the critical conception of ideology, in which the description of ideology is intrinsically a critique of ideology. A critique must necessarily involve epistemic arguments among other things. Cognitive errors or inadequate rationality of ideological discourse can be exposed by using various criterion of 'cognitive defects', such as: 'inconsistency, oversimplification, exaggeration, half-truth, equivocation, circularity, neglect of pertinent facts, false dichotomy, obfuscation, misuse of "authoritative" sources, hasty generalization, and so forth.'\textsuperscript{47} However, it is not necessary that all criterions should be present in every ideology.

As far as the question of subjective feelings of an individual as an bearer of ideology, is concerned, we have shown in the previous chapter that ideology does not pertain to the realm of an individual's consciousness, her/his whims or ego-centricity. Ideology only consists of forms of social consciousness. However, analysis of ideology can be done at the institutional level as well as at the level of the strategic conduct of individuals.

Now the question emerges how normative statements could be true or false. We have discussed that ideology should not be seen as statements or propositions. The realm of ideology operates at the level of discursive configuration, where normative sanctions operate with the force of signification. Analytically an ideological discourse can be seen as constituted by the elements of norms, meaning, and domination. The meaning can be vulnerable to the judgement of falsehood. It is difficult to maintain that ideological or to say any discourse is made up of only normative elements or descriptive elements. The separation of descriptive and normative languages may be useful for analytical exposition, but social discourses are not detachable on the line of a binary opposition of fact and value or descriptive and normative. More over, normative positions are not exempted from "judgemental rationalism". For example, the norms of racial, casteist and gender pride and prejudices can be evaluated as false.
As has been discussed above, ideological discourse presents a mix of descriptive and prescriptive statements, for example in a patriarchal ideology, sexist norms, and arguments are supported by the description of women as biologically and intellectually weak. Racist ideology tends to describe non-whites as lazy, idle; and even sanctions and utilises the science of genetics. Brahminical ideology presents "merit", which is a social construction, as "inherent" and "natural". This approach of denigrating certain social populations as naturally and psychologically inferior is the strategy of many ideologies such as racism, casteism, communalism, religious nationalism, and orientalism.

The question before us is how to retain a critical concept without being trapped in either relativism or in ideology/science dichotomy. We would argue that it is possible to employ a critical conception without outrightly rejecting epistemology and simultaneously without subscribing to a science/ideology distinction. It can be asked that why do we not shun epistemology all together and employ a critical conception which criticized power relations normatively. Anthony Giddens and John B. Thompson argue for a functional version of the critical conception, which avoids any epistemological criteria.

Against this position, it would be argued that without any cognitive criteria the critical conception of ideology is unattainable. In this regard, it would also be argued that the epistemological criteria should be redeemed from the ideology/science distinction and equipped with the ideology/critique distinction. However, this does not espouse an abandonment of the realistic position. On the contrary, this position upheld realist approach against an epistemological unreality.

Before discussing the functional approach of Anthony Giddens and John B. Thompson, it would be beneficial to classify varieties of critical conceptions. The critical conception of ideology can be classified by using Raymond Geuss' typology of three ways of answering the question, what constitute the ideologically false forms of consciousness? A form of consciousness can be ideologically false in virtue of: (a), 'some epistemic properties of the beliefs
which are its constituents'; (b) 'its functional properties'; (c) 'some of its genetic properties.'
These three senses of the critical conception can also go together in various permutations and combinations.

Now we would consider the critical conception of ideology based on functional properties of consciousness. Anthony Giddens and John B. Thompson argue in favour of this sense of the term. Giddens defines ideology as those aspects of symbolic orders, which 'are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups.'
John B. Thompson defines ideology in the following way:

The concept of ideology can be used to refer to the ways in which meaning serves, in particular circumstances to established and sustain relations of power, which are systematically asymmetrical—what I shall call relations of domination. Ideology, broadly speaking, is *meaning in the service of power*.

It can be seen that in these definitions emphasis is not on any epistemological falsehood. These definitions are critical of ideological discourse, because it serves or legitimizes relations of power. This is a *functional* explanation of the concept of ideology. This conception criticizes ideology because its consequences are negative. According to this conception, legitimization and sustenance of domination are key functions of ideology. This conception of ideology holds that any symbols-system per se cannot be characterized as ideological. It becomes ideological only when it serves relations of power. It means that same set of ideas or symbol-systems can be ideological in one context and non-ideological in another context.

Reformulation of the concept of ideology as 'meaning in the service of power' has certain merits. It distances the concept of ideology from the structuralist and representationist paradigms. It can be recalled that Karl Marx considered the same bourgeois discourses as non-ideological, when these were exposing feudal legitimizations and as ideological, when these tended to conceal the newly emerging contradiction between bourgeois and proletariat.
It can be argued that there is a contextual criterion implicit in Marx's work, i.e. the concealment of class contradictions. We have argued that ideology as inverted consciousness, for Marx, is linked to inverted reality and inverted reality indicates to the presence of social contradictions. In Marx's scheme, socio-political reality provides the context, which can make any discourse ideological. This inverted reality necessarily entails an inadequate or distorted consciousness. It means that Marx never shunned the cognitive criteria in favour of functional or contextual criteria of characterization of ideology.

Thompson and Giddens, both speak against the employment of any epistemological criteria. Let us see their arguments in favour of their positions. Thompson says that his position avoids the tendency of thinking of "ideology as pure illusion, as an inverted or distorted image of what is "real." The position of ideology as pure illusion, he says, is inspired from Marx and Engels' passage in which they compare ideology to the workings of a camera obscura. Thompson argues that symbolic forms through which we think and communicate with others are not like 'some ethereal other world, which stands, opposed to what is real: rather, they are partially constitutive of what, in our societies, "is real".'

Thompson's argument is directed against the idealist position, which considers consciousness as unreal. It does not engage with Marx's position. In the beginning of this section, we have discussed a similar passage of Paul Hirst, in which he mixes up ontological falsity with epistemological falsity. And it has been already argued in previous chapter that for Marx ideology is not tantamount to pure illusion, or empirical or logical error. Anthony Giddens says:

Now I want to reject any definition of ideology as falsity, as non-science or as "poor science"—The concept of ideology should not be formulated by comparing or contrasting it with the achievement of science—I want to reject the argument that ideology can be defined in reference to truth claims. And I also want to reject the idea that ideology can be defined in terms of any specific content at all.
In this passage, Giddens makes two claims. The first advocates for the de-linking of the concept of ideology from science. The second rejects the reference to truth claims and even to any specific content. It should be remembered that Marx's characterization of ideology was not based upon the criteria of 'non-science'. It is true that many theorists, Marxist as well as non-Marxist, juxtapose ideology with science. This includes Karl Popper and Louis Althusser; however, they have different definitions of science. Giddens' position regarding science has a strong back up after Frankfurt School's (more prominently Habermas') argument that science in the form of technocratic consciousness became the prime ideology for the maintenance of late capitalism.

Giddens' first assertion is based on tenable grounds. Problem arises with his second assertion. Giddens blurs the distinction between epistemological criteria and ideology/science opposition, which is in fact only one of the various epistemology criterions. He says that 'I mean to deny that the concept of ideology can be defined in terms of the epistemological status of the ideas or beliefs to which it refers, that is, in terms of their "scientificity." At another place in the same article, Giddens accepts that 'he does not want to say that the analysis of ideology can escape epistemological issues altogether.'

Nevertheless, at the same time he does not spell out the 'special epistemological difficulties', which comes with the freeing of the notion of ideology from its characterization as "non-science". However, a confrontation with the difficulty of epistemological questions concerning the "conceptuality" or "circularity" of knowledge would be a necessary step for such formulations, which claims to free the concept of ideology from its epistemological burdens.

We have already discussed that the functional argument was not absent in Marx. He too was concerned with the consequence of ideological discourse as a legitimisation of class domination. However, these functional arguments were not isolated from comprehensive critical approach to the question of ideology. It should be kept in mind that we are concerned here with only the
functional explanation and it should not be confused with the functionalist standpoint. Functionalism is a status quist approach and based on the presumption that society is a self-maintaining system. Its parts have various needs, which have to be fulfilled for attaining equilibrium. The functionalist account of ideology argues that ideology fulfills systems' needs and thus is indispensable to the system. This approach explains the role and function of ideology in terms of pre-determined needs of the social system. Contrary to functionalist position, we are concerned with the question: how ideology conceals the social contradictions and legitimize oppressive relations.

Giddens and Thompson have not clarified that how they are able to disconnect epistemological issues from the critical conception. If one says that the particular form of consciousness legitimizes certain power relations, then it is not clear how it can happen without manipulating the norms and meaning in favour of relations of dominations. Characterizing ideology as a legitimizing discourse without employing epistemological criteria leads to another difficulty. It cannot be forgotten that Foucault and other post-modernists also criticize the legitimizing discourses, but since they did not uphold the epistemological critique, ultimately it leads them to the abandonment of the concept of ideology altogether.

Now we would come to the possible reasons, which led Giddens and Thompson to renounce the epistemological critique of the ideology. It is not surprising that this account of ideology comes after the postmodernist's offensive stand on rationality, truth, and realism. The postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches targeted the idea of false consciousness. At such time when the notions of reason, truth and possibility of correct knowledge are under attack, not only postmodernist but many Marxist such as Alex Callinicos, Goran Therborn and Joe MacCarney choose 'to drop the epistemological issues altogether in favour of either neutral conception of ideology or functional-sociological sense of ideology.'

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4.3 IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

One of the responses of Enlightenment thinking to the question of ideology was seeing ideology as non-science or falsity. Ideology was also seen as a poor science or illusion in the guise of science. As has been discussed in an earlier chapter that this conception had its roots in the Enlightenment belief that the task of reason was to unmask prejudices and errors of tradition. We have discussed the thought of Francis Bacon in this regard. The sociologist August Comte, who is one of the founders of positivism, developed the discipline of sociology with the aim of replacing ideological thought imbued with metaphysics and tradition. Comte believes that there are three stages of theoretical development: ‘The theological’ or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive.”

Emile Durkheim also drew a distinction between ideology and positivist science. For Durkheim sociology as a science of facts must be free from ideological thinking. In his The Rules of Sociological Method, ideology stands for ‘an irrational obstruction to scientific knowledge.’

The most articulate polarisation between science and ideology emerged in the writings of two thinkers of the twentieth century. Ironically, of these, one belongs to the Marxist camp, viz., Louis Althusser. The other belongs to the anti-Marxist camp, viz., Karl Popper. Both wanted to demarcate clearly between science and non-science. For Althusser, Marxism and psychoanalysis were the leading instances of science, but the same were the worst examples of ideology or pseudo-science for Popper. Both wanted to relate the problem of ideology to the question of science and rigorously tried to separate science from other discourses. The pitfall of this implicit scientism was the belief that science has universal character, is always sensitive to truth, and is constantly self-correcting. It followed from this that science could not be ideological.

Now the question of relationship between science and ideology would be taken up. On this question, there have been broadly three types of responses.
The first sees an exclusive antagonism between science and ideology. For the second view, there is no difference between both the realms. Science is just another kind of ideology. The third view sees neither opposition nor identity between science and ideology. This simply accepts that there is a certain difference between the two realms. The question of relationship between ideology and science is a very complex one, because there are numerous conceptions and meanings attached to both the terms.

Different notions of ideology suggest a different kind of relationship to science. The same applies to the conception of science. For example, the Leninist positive conception of ideology blurs the difference between science and ideology, so that a 'scientific ideology' can be conceptualised. However, from other positions the expression 'scientific ideology' is nothing but paradoxical. This expression presupposes a very exclusive meaning of science. The ideology, which serves the interest of the bourgeoisie is said to be unscientific, whereas ideology, which serves the interest of the working class is described as scientific. This involves a very arbitrary understanding of science. History shows us that the prefix 'scientific' is being used to legitimise all type of whimsicalities associated with the State-capitalist rule of the "Soviet Union".

Is ideology "the other" of science or the same as science? This has been the crucial question for the debates of the critical conception of ideology. Related to this is the question that can there be a relationship between science and ideology other than inclusion and exclusion. There can be three logical possibilities of the relationship between these two realms: Science against ideology, science as ideology and science different from ideology.

Mostly the term science is used to denote the realm of natural science. Science usually does not denote the social or human sciences. How important is the term 'social' in social sciences? How scientific are social sciences? These are the basic questions pertaining to the philosophy of social sciences. However, these questions are also important for understanding the relationship between science and ideology. The relationship between natural sciences and
social sciences also reflects the debates over the relationship of the realms of natural and social. There have been two types of theoretical responses to the question of relationship between natural and social. The first is scientism, which tries to put the natural outside of the realm of social and historical. The second is historicism, which tried to appropriate the natural into the realm of social and historical. These two tendencies have been dominating the debates on the nature and relationship of natural and social sciences. Both the tendencies have been equally in force in Marxist and non-Marxist circles.

Larrain suggests that the relationship of science and ideology can also be seen as based on the relationship between natural and social sciences. We have discussed above that there can be three logical schemes of possibilities of relationship between science and ideology: relations of exclusion, relations of inclusion, and relations of overlapping. It would be useful to know how this logical scheme actually unfolded historically. Jorge Larrain suggests a three-fold scheme, while A.V. Afonso presents the history of relationship between natural and social science in four stages. We would generally refer to both the accounts while discussing the question of relationship between science and ideology. The changes, which took place in the relation of the natural and social sciences, have some bearing on the relationship between science and ideology.

The first stage was the foundational movement for the social sciences. In the period of Enlightenment humanism, the analysis of "human action" became the new subject matter of epistemological reflection and philosophizing. In this period, metaphysics was scorned at, but was not regarded as nonsensical. Simultaneously empirical methods were appreciated and promoted but did not become the only valid method in social inquiry. From the first stage of "philosophise empirically," a new stage of positivism began. Jürgen Habermas characterised this transition as 'the replacement of epistemology by the philosophy of science,' in which 'knowing subject' is dislocated from the system of reference. Positivism as the philosophy of science is 'philosophical
only insofar as is necessary for the immunisation of the sciences against philosophy.\textsuperscript{72}

The epistemology from Immanuel Kant to Karl Marx accepted the subject of cognition in the form of consciousness, ego, mind, and species-being \textit{(Gattungswesen)}. The notion of subject changed considerably within this period, but always retained the concept of synthesis as the basis for the validity of statements. However, in the times of positivism, when epistemology deforms into methodology, 'it loses sight of the constitution of the objects of possible experience; in the same way, a formal science dissociated from transcendental reflection became blind to the genesis of rules for the combination of symbols.'\textsuperscript{73} Based on Habermas' account of positivism in \textit{Knowledge and Human Interest}, it can be said that this process generated three kinds of effects, i.e., objectivism, scientism, and technological triumphalism.

Objectivism can be referred to as a philosophical approach concerning methodology. Richard J. Bernstein has pointed out that objectivism can be associated with the search for an Archimedean point, that refers to a ‘permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, and goodness of rightness.’\textsuperscript{74} Habermas links it to the suppression of the awareness of the knowledge-constitutive interests of ones' thought. When objectivism was succeeded in the concealment of the a priori constitution of facts, then it began to delude the sciences 'with the image of a self-subsistent world of facts structured in a law like manner.'\textsuperscript{75}

Scientism can be referred to as a general approach towards the imagined and magnified capacities of the sciences. Immanuel Wallerstein sees scientism as the claim that science is self-referential and does not need philosophical grounding, that science is value-neutral and extra-social, and that science is the only valid knowledge.\textsuperscript{76} This implies that any theory of knowledge, which does not substantiate the parameters of methodology of science, would
become simply non-sensical. It can also be said that if one imagine a narcissistic self-image of science that would be scientism.

The position of positivism involves a paradox. Positivism does not see the validity of knowledge outside the system of empirical sciences, but paradoxically it had emerged firstly as a new philosophy of history. August Comte presented it as the third stage of individual and species' intellectual development. Comte's arguments of defence of positivism themselves do not follow the empirical criterion. These paradoxes expose the intentions of early positivism: 'the pseudo-scientific propagation of the cognitive monopoly of science.'

Habermas argues that positivistic elimination of the philosophical concept of knowledge could have proved very risky for science, as from where now science attain meaning, without which it would have become irrational and meaningless. The trick positivism played to surmount this crisis was the supply of meaning to the enterprise of science from without empirical methodology—from the perspective of philosophy of history itself. Positivism thus seeks the meaning of science from the basis of the historical genesis of modern scientific inquiry and consequential institutionalized scientific progress. The loss of subject's reflection upon it is being compensated by the phenomena of scientific-technical progress. In a smart move, positivism, and what somewhere Roy Bhaskar called "technological triumphalism" presupposed mutual legitimisation for each other. In this context, Habermas observes:

Because the concept of knowledge became irrational, the methodology of the sciences and the scientific rationalization of life conduct must interpret each other reciprocally. This is the real job of early positivism. It justifies the sciences' scientistic belief in themselves by constructing the history of the species as the history of realization of the positive spirit.

It can be seen from the above discussion that positivism was established supposedly on the ground of exclusion of non-science including ideology from the realm of science. However, the spirit of scientism and the binary of science
and ideology went much further than the positivism of Vienna school. The structuralist Louis Althusser, the rationalist Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos—all can be described as post-empiricists, but they share with empiricism the idea of dichotomy of science and ideology. If positivism's criterion for the separation of ideology and science was the principal of verifiability, for Popperian rationalism, it was the concept of falsifiability, and for Lakatos' rationalism, it was methodological falsificationalism.

Karl Popper himself did not like the tag of "positivism", but effectively his theories have a compromise with positivism. Apart from the key role of sense experience, arranged by experimental methods, in refutation, he shares with positivism the principle of the unity of scientific method. He believes that method of natural and social sciences are the same. He goes to the extent of saying that 'a social technology is needed whose results can be tested by piecemeal social engineering.' Jorge Larrain has pointed out the legitimizing function of such theoretical position:

In equating social facts with natural facts they tend to absolutize the existent structure of society as though it was a natural law. In other words, they disregard the historical character of social reality and thus can easily become an apology of the status quo.

Now we would take up the third stage of the relationship between natural and social science. If in the stage of scientism social science were modelled on the natural sciences, in the third stage social sciences were deliberately separated from natural sciences. The key claim of this stage is that 'social sciences, by their very nature, are hermeneutical and their conclusions essentially contestable.' Not only the relationship between natural and social sciences has changed, but also the hermeneutical method has extended to the domain of natural sciences.

Among other things, the philosophies of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyeraband had contributed to this transition. Nonetheless, the historicist tendency was present even at the peak of positivism. The historicist tendency in social sciences came in reaction against scientist tendencies and took
inspiration from the old tradition of German historicism. But the extension of phenomenological and hermeneutical inquiry into the domain of natural science can be said to be a post-Kuhnian phenomena. After shaking of the foothold of "science", historicist understanding took strength in social sciences as well.

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend’s approach is called conventionalism. It has three key features: Firstly, theories or statement of science are not portrayal of external reality, but are “artificial construction” made by scientist. Hence, they are neither true nor false. Secondly, there is no universal or rational criterion for the selection of a theory, instead it is chosen by subjective criterion. Thirdly, there can be no empirical data or theory-neutral observation of sensory data.

Kuhn believes that a scientific research is undertaken with some theoretical framework or outlook, which he named as paradigm. Selection of a paradigm is not the matter of rational criterion, but is based on social convention. That is why the distinction of science and ideology is also based on social convention. Thomas Kuhn challenged any possibility of objective knowledge. For him a scientific paradigm is not more than ‘a value system, an ideology.’

Paul Feyeraband went further and claimed that there is no distinction between science and ideology. Science is simply one ideology among many ideologies and no ideology can claim to be better than the other ideology. Feyeraband’s position has been described as “permissive anarchism.” Feyerband’s theories are also vulnerable to the relativist’s paradox. David Morrice suggests that there is a difference between Karl Mannheim and Paul Feyerband on this count. Mannheim tries to deny the problem of relativism in the name of relationalism, whereas Feyeraband on the one hand puts forth a distinction between relational judgement and relativism, but on the other hand announces that intellectual should not be afraid of relativism.
There is an interesting phenomenon, in which positivism, rationalism, and conventionalism entail each other and sustain each other’s arguments. The reason for this is that some theories take extreme stands, which are difficult to hold on and slips into the other. David Morrice argues that the seeds of conventionalism can be seen in the accounts of Popper and Lakatos. Popper’s moral relativism considers ‘all moral judgement as unjustifiable human decision’. Lakatos also believes that human decisions involved in sciences are not themselves scientific or rational. Thus Popper and Lakatos’s rationalism was based on an epistemological relativism, which ultimately leads to the theory of incommensurable paradigms in Kuhn.87

Leszek Kolakowski sees conventionalism as the manifestation of the self-destructive tendency of positivism itself. Positivism in its attempt to search the ground for knowledge in experience falls into the trap of an infinite regression, which paradoxically can be broken only by taking recourse to an a priori element, which is the idea of convention in this case.88 But there is also a reverse process. David M Walker remarks:

Just as positivism’s search for a final basis of experience for knowledge must fail and end up in the adoption of conventions, so the flaws of conventions, principally their lack of a secure basis, lead conventionalism back into the arms of positivism. Positivism offers a model from which to draw conventions.89

Based on above discussion, it can be said that extreme positions of inclusion or exclusion of natural and social involve the risk of either infinite regression or of the liar’s paradox, characteristic of relativism. We have seen that if social is included or assimilated in the realm of natural than ideology and science becomes the opposite of each other. This is a scientistic fallacy. And when the natural world is excluded from the realm of the social then ideology and science become the same. This is a historicist fallacy.

There remains yet another possibility. This can be put like this— when the natural and the social intersect each other, then we find an intersecting relationship of science and ideology. Afonso suggests that there is a fourth
stage of the relationship between natural and social sciences, in which misplaced attempts of seeing the relationship between the two domains as the relationship of similarity or contrast are finally overcome. This is attained after the releasing of the conflictual tension between the "analytic" and "phenomenological," and after the realisation that perceptual judgements are both hermeneutical and causal, a position which avoids both objectivism and gross subjectivism. This position visualizes a different relationship between the social and the natural.

In this context, it can be recalled that Marx's insights about the relationship of the social and the natural is able to avoid both the extreme tendencies, discussed above. But in the course of history of ideas, his dialectical insight got suppressed as Marxism after Marx was hegemonised by either positivism or historicism. For the recovery of Marx's dialectical insight into the relationship between natural and social and ideology and science, the above mentioned 'fourth stage' played a crucial role. For Marx human beings are part of nature. The history of society is situated within natural history, which in turn could be intelligible only with reference to social history. A. Schmidt called this relationship "differentiated unity."

Above-mentioned scientist and historicist positions on the relationship of science and ideology either discuss these realms in terms of truth and error or treat them as a certain kind of symbol systems or set of beliefs. For them legitimisation of domination is not the basic criteria for the characterisation of ideology, whereas for Marx ideology is intrinsically linked to legitimisation of class domination. We have discussed earlier that for Marx ideology is not tantamount to cognitive or logical errors. Ideology cannot be overcome by taking recourse to science or even to the exercise of critique.

If one starts from Marx's critical conception of ideology and the dialectics of social and natural history, then a dialectical understanding of the relationship of science of ideology can be arrived at. In this understanding, there remains a possibility of non-ideological errors or metaphysics and also there can be non-
scientific truths. The sphere of knowledge could not be exhausted between the neat division of science and ideology. Ideological strategies involve some kind of cognitive illusion or discursive deception, but ideology is not made up of error totally. We have seen in the last section that true statements can be very much a part of ideology. Moreover, for effective legitimisation of power relationship every ideology uses some truths. Ideology takes the resources of rationality in the form of rationalisation. Reason and unreason both are among the ingredients of ideology.

Scientistic and historicist approach themselves proved ideological. If one approach believes in the ideology-free nature of science, for other science is equal to ideology. Both positions fail to notice that science as a body of knowledge can both legitimise and de-legitimise power motives according to the context given. Hence, science can be both ideological and non-ideological contextually.

Scientists and positivists including the Marxist variety face a difficulty in comprehending how science can be employed ideologically, when science is sensitive to self-correction and applies the tests of objectivity over itself from time to time. They ask if science’s nature of incompletion in itself does not entail that scientific knowledge is historical and repairable.

The historical nature of science does not imply that scientific truths are not objective in a historical context. Again, objectivity would also be a subject matter of interpretation. Objectivity of science does not entail that scientific statements are true and objective in every condition. Natural science entails universality, but only within its delimited sphere. The observation of Ian Angus can be applied in this regard. A scientific truth, for example truth of physics, may be true within its delimited and specialised sphere, but when it is extended beyond its legitimate sphere and is applied to 'the determination of the society as a whole', then it turns into being ideological.
One example of this is the science policy of governments or social policies based on science. Not only is science a social product, but its use, employment or consumption is determined in the sphere of social and political, which is outside of a legitimate sphere of any single science or set of sciences. There must be an analytical distinction between science in itself and science in society. The existing power relations not only influence the course of science's development, but also utilise it as a trusted pool of resources for legitimisation of power relationships. A science as a body of social knowledge can be sure of itself at any given time. But it must always be under the scanner of the critique of the power relationship. A critique of a particular scientific truth would tend to transcend its delimited sphere of knowledge.

It can be recalled that at one time "racial discrimination" and "caste differences" were scientifically justifiable as much as "Newton's law of Inertia" and "Ptolemy's Flat earth."93 If racist ideology's earlier claims of biogenetic inferiority of blacks are now discredited even scientifically, then it begins to talk about "the ineradicable cultural pathology of blacks."94 We conclude this chapter by citing the remarks of Richard J. Bernstein:

As Marx cautions us, it is not sufficient to try to come up with some new variations of arguments that will show, once and for all, what is wrong with objectivism and relativism, or even to open up a way of thinking that can move us beyond objectivism and relativism; such a movement gains "reality and power" only if we dedicate ourselves to the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founding in dialogical communities.95

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Some Marxist scholars, who cannot be termed as orthodox or official Marxists such as Stuart Hall also use this term.
2 D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx: Integral Sociology and Dialectical Sociology, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1988, p. 274.

3 See ibid, p. 274.

4 This conception is developed mainly in Lenin's What is to be done and Georg Lukács's History and Class Consciousness.


10 See Eagleton, Terry, Ideology: an Introduction, p. 28.

11 See ibid, p.28.


14 V.S. Upadhyaya and Gaya Pandey, History of Anthropological Thought, p. 347.


17 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, p. 29.


22 See ibid p. 11.
38 See ibid, p. 22.

41 See ibid.


44 Tommie Shelby, 'Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,' pp. 165-167.

45 See Eagleton's discussion of this standpoint in Terry Eagleton's *ideology: an Introduction*, pp. 18-21.

46 See ibid, p. 25.

47 Tommie Shelby, 'Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory', p. 166.


49 See ibid p.13.

50 Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, p. 188.


52 See ibid, p.9.

53 See ibid, pp. 9-10.


56 Here I refer to 'ideology and Consciousness', which is fifth chapter of ibid.

57 See ibid, p.186.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.


63 See Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, p. 185.


65 This is based on Jorge Larrain's argument. See Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, pp. 172-176.

66 See ibid, pp. 174-176.
68 Ibid, p. 74.
69 Jorge Larrain, Concept of Ideology, p. 191.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, p. 68.
75 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 69.
77 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 71.
78 See ibid, p. 72.
85 See ibid, pp. 101 and 103.
86 Ibid, p. 104.
88 See the discussion of Leszek Kolakowski’s argument in David M. Walker, Marx, Methodology and Science, p. 126-127.
89 Walker’s this comment in based on the argument of Schnädelbach. Cited in ibid, pp. 127 and 135 n. 59.