CHAPTER – 2

IDEOLOGY, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND COMMUNICATION

This chapter discusses firstly the critical conception of Marx's theory of ideology. His conception of ideology can be identified provisionally from the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction* as inverted consciousness of an inverted world. From *The German Ideology* onwards, this inverted consciousness is understood as emerging from contradictory relations of production. Ideology is then said to be concealment of the matrix of contradictions of this inverted reality. This conception is intrinsically related to the legitimisation of class domination. This chapter questions whether ideology is merely a form of consciousness, or something deeper set in the reality principle itself. It questions the relation between ideology, consciousness and reality.

Thirdly, the challenges put forward by the linguistic turn to the theory of ideology would be taken into account. The following questions would be addressed: should the theory of ideology be unmoved by the current emphasis on language and communication by philosophy and culture theory? Should it leave the conception of consciousness in favour of a new linguistic understanding? Or, should the theory move on a middle path integrating both consciousness and communication for the explication of ideology? A third category of reality becomes important in arbitrating between consciousness and communication; hence a space would be given to the debate on the relation between reality and consciousness.
The first section of this chapter would discuss the methodological issues and theoretical presuppositions of Marx's conception of ideology. In the second section the process of inversion of consciousness and its relation to the realm of reality would be discussed, as these make the core of Marx's conception of ideology. The third section would deal with the interrelationship between the concepts of consciousness, communication, reality and ideology.

2.1 THEORETICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF MARX'S CONCEPTION OF IDEOLOGY

Marx treats ideology in a critical manner rather than a neutral method of analysis or a positive one. The process of legitimisation of class interests is the key feature of Marx's notion. For Marx, not every idea is ideological, but only those, which legitimise relations of domination. Marx espouses a critical sense therefore description or discussion of ideology for him is simultaneously an act of a critique of ideology. The exploration of ideology involves a critical demystification of class interests.

There are various notions of ideology constructed from Marx's writings. Two of them can be termed as key notions in the sense that he uses the term "ideology" in the reference to these. Both conceptions are available in The German Ideology and are developed in later writings. The first notion is related to inverted or distorted forms of social consciousness generated from the inversion of reality, which in turn screens the contradiction of relations of production. The second notion of ideology can be marked as legitimisation of sectional interests and relations of domination. We would argue that both notions should be viewed as two aspects of Marx's conception of ideology and thus these could be separated only for an analytical convenience.

At the outset, we wish to put forward some methodological issues, which arise during the discussions on Marx's theories in general and the concept of ideology in particular. Generally, Marx is held responsible for ideas that are not
his own, but of others like Engels, Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser, etc.,
the thinkers whose names are usually associated with his name. Marx never
used expressions like “scientific socialism”, “laws of dialectics”, “dialectical
materialism”, “class consciousness” and “false consciousness”. These concepts
attributed to him freely by not only those who are hostile to his ideas but also by
those who claim to be subscriber of his communist ideas.¹ The notion of “false
consciences” was introduced by Engels in his 1893 letter to Franz
Mehring.² This term, one may argue, has not appeared in the writings of Marx.
However, it is true that Marx’s conception of ideology entails falsity— not the
falsity of merely consciousness, but also of reality.

Another problem is that Marx does not give any clear-cut definition of
ideology and used the term in more than one way. Therefore, many a debates
centred not on what he said but on ‘what he might have said.’³ There are also
certain ambiguities and even contradictions in Marx’s various positions
surrounding the concept. For this reason, an attempt to present Marx’s view on
ideology necessarily involves a reconstruction based on his works, while
employing other available interpretation to elucidate them. However, it will
always be a matter of exegetical debates as to which interpretation is closer to
the original connotations and emphases.

Broadly, three methodical approaches are being distinguished for dealing
with Marx’s conception of ideology.⁴ The first is the synchronic reading that
denies any change of perspective or position in Marx and treats his whole body
of thought as a single coherent one. The second is the idea of a striking
“epistemological break” in earlier and later Marx, originally put forward by
Althusser and endorsed by a lot of scholars.⁵ The third is a diachronic reading
that denies any spectacular rupture in the theory of Marx.

Louis Althusser identifies a “pre-Marxist” problematic in the works of Marx
prior to 1845, namely On the Jewish Question; A Contribution to the Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right; Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844 and
The Holy Family. Althusserians believe that this was ‘a decisive epistemological
break with idealism, abstract philosophy, and philosophical materialism of his
time.'6 They claim that after this absolute break with the Hegelian dialectic and
theoretical humanism Marx developed a scientific and non-ideological theory of
history, society, ideology and science.

It can be argued that the simple binary of humanist versus scientific, or
historian versus structuralist, or Hegelian versus positivist Marx holds no
ground. However, this may be true for various camps of Marxists who
overemphasise any one aspect of Marx in the light of their own distinct
philosophical inclinations, cultural milieu, political goals and the nature of their
problematic.7 Of course, there is no doubt that certain ambiguities and
sometimes polemical style of writing found in places in Marx's work contributes
to such an understanding. Marx's free use of metaphors to elucidate his points
and his emphases, given on specific aspects accordingly to the nature of his
opponent's viewpoints also pose problems.

While using the expression "Marxism", we should keep in mind Marx's
famous comment to the French "Marxists" that 'all I know is that I am not a
Marxist.'8 Marx adhered to the critical sense of the term in his lifetime, but soon
ideology come to be explained in a neutral or positive sense and ironically
Marxism itself was declared as ideology by his followers. On the whole, the
term "Marxism" evokes many images— from an official ideology of an alleged
"socialist" state, and an all-encompassing world-view of the party to research
programmes. The meaning of the term “Marxism” is usually articulated by its
enchainment in a ‘specific series of equivalences’ such as social-democratic,
statist, Stalinist, radical, humanist, empiricist, Weberian, Kantian, Hegelian,
market economy, Western and so on. These inscriptions do not simply
supplement, but redefine in complex ways the primary meaning.9

The German Ideology, the birthplace of the Marx's notion of ideology, was
written during 1845-47. It can neither be counted as "pre-scientific" nor
categorised in the "scientific" phase of Marx. In this text, both Althusserians and
anti-Althusserians can find passages, which can be used against one other. It
can be asserted that the text is written before 1845 also contained a complex notion of ideology, 'linking it not to a simple reflective consciousness but to a form of praxis, a mode of being in the world which cannot be dismissed as a mere error of cognition.'

One should avoid, on the one hand the idea of any dramatic rupture in Marx's repertoire, and on the other hand a purely synchronic reading. A diachronic reading is possible, which sees the interconnections and overlapping between various stages of Marx's intellectual journey, without artificially juxtaposing the "scientific" moment against the "philosophical". Roy Bhaskar suggests that even in his later phase of writing, Marx frequently returns to Hegel and other philosophers; and also uses transcendental arguments in Capital volume-1 and elsewhere, especially in the distinction of labour and labour power and between use value and exchange value. There cannot be a clear-cut distinction between social science and philosophy. He observes that Marx reconstructs Hegel's notion of the alienation of the idea and chooses the category of labour 'as the foundational moment in human history' in 1844. Marx again returns to Hegel in 1857 and from the doctrine of the Notion (Begriff) in the third book of the Science of Logic, he develops the concept of capitalism as a process in motion in the Grundrisse. And again, he goes back to Hegel in 1867 in Capital Volume-1, which was written under 'the dominance of motifs drawn from Hegel's doctrine of essence, the second book of the Logic'. Here Marx develops a "paired oppositions" between essential relations and phenomenal forms.

We find ourselves in broad agreement with the suggestion of Jorge Larrain and R. Echeverria, of a logical pattern between three distinct phases of development of the conception of ideology in Marx. The first stage consists of Marx's early critique of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. He did not use term ideology in this phase, but the main features of the criticism of ideology appeared in the form of his 1843-1844 critique of religion, political theory, and the idealism of Hegel. The second stage commenced with the Theses on Feuerbach, in which Marx distanced himself decisively from Feuerbachian
materialism. In *The German Ideology*, the theory of ideology is discussed in explicit terms. In this text, he also established the main contours of the theories of society and history.

The third stage began with the production of *Grundrisse* in 1857 and extended to the writing of *Capital* and other works dealing with the concrete examination of capitalistic relations. In this period, the term "ideology" seems to have again vanished, but the idea developed in the discussion of commodity fetishism. The key texts for discussion of Marx's conception of ideology are *The German Ideology* (1845-47) and the first volume of *Capital* (1867). Among the other important texts *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), *The Holy Family* (1845), *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) and *Grundrisse* (1857) can be included.

Marx's theory of ideology should be distinguished somewhere from his general theory of production and reproduction of ideas and consciousness. There is a certain tendency of treating every aspect of Marx's social theory as his conception of ideology. For example Ian Craib presents the six conceptions of ideology in Marx: (1) ideology as alienation, (2) ideology as illusion, (3) ideology as imagination, (4) ideology as representation, (5) ideology as the accurate perception of one level of reality and (6) the economic determinist conception of ideology. This matches with the tendency of equating ideology with idealism or with treatment of ideas and consciousness as autonomous from life.

By doing this, one forgets that Marx's theory of ideology is not simply the sociology of knowledge, which was developed by Karl Mannheim using some of Marx's ideas. It can be said that the notion of circumstantial and existential determinations of knowledge constitute a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Marx's theory of ideology. Concepts of alienation, praxis, division of labour and social shaping of consciousness are prerequisite to the conception of ideology, but they themselves are not tantamount to ideology.
It is important to make a distinction between Marx's theory of ideas or consciousness and his theory of ideology. Nevertheless the fact is that there is a close relation between these two. It can be said that he does not treat every idea or thought as ideological; otherwise not only the problematic of change would be endangered, but also the dialectical notions like the "transcendence of alienation" (Aufhebung der Entfremdung) and the "negation of the negation" (Negation der Negation) would become meaningless.

Marx also presents a general theory of production and reproduction of ideas and social consciousness. This emanates from his critique of idealism and materialism of that time. Marx's treatment of ideology can be distinguished analytically between the level of social being or life-process and the level of social consciousness. He sees the process of alienation and fetishism at both the levels. But his treatment is not prospectively closed, so he sees the germs of negations in these very entities. In this way, non-alienation and de-fetishisation are intrinsically linked with the process of alienation and fetishism. Unlike Hegel he distinguishes between the processes of "realisation" (Verwirklichung), "objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) and alienation (Entfremdung). Therefore, there lies a conceptual space for "non-ideological" consciousness and ideas in Marx.

We can say that the conception of ideology is part of his broader theory of the formation of ideas or consciousness. His general theory of ideas consists of the materialist conception of history, which explicates the production and reproduction of ideas from the contradictory character of material practice. For this reason, it is necessary to discuss Marx's notion of praxis and its relation to the phenomena of alienation. In The German Ideology Marx comments:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men— the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, still appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the
language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.

It can be seen in the above passage that Marx first explains the production of ideas, conceptions, and consciousness and then applies the same approach to the ‘language of politics, laws, morality, religion and metaphysics, etc.’ These doctrinal realms, which came out after the surfacing of the division between physical and intellectual labour, constitute the core of the realm of the ideological. They then create an illusion of “autonomy” from the contradictions of class and other sectional interests.

As we have discussed in the last chapter, Napoleon Bonaparte had used the term ideology as abstract, erroneous and impracticable ideas. Before the writing of The German Ideology, the term ideology had already been employed by Heinrich Heine in German in the sense of a set of ideas, which are ‘detached from and out of proportion to empirical reality’.17

Marx gave the term wider and complex meaning. Marx does not see the locus of ideology merely in the realm of erroneous ideas or distorted consciousness. This was the major breaking point not only for the theory of ideology, but also for the social theory of that time. In this new approach sources of ideas or norms does not ascribe to any divine source, to the great minds of thinkers, visionaries, to the expressions like “spirit of the age”, “cunning of reason”, “absolute consciousness” and “objective mind”. The source of domination is not assigned simply to inadequacy, falsity, and the illogical nature of ideas.

Instead of all this, sources of ideology are bounded up dialectically with the real active life and existence of the individuals and with the context-sensitive and complex relationships of socio-historical circumstances. For this reason Marx’s theory of ideology cannot be a theory merely about consciousness and ideas. Otherwise, it will become an ideological theory about
ideology. For Marx the realm of ideology involves not only consciousness but also reality. Ideological illusions are not tantamount to empirical or logical errors but originate in the phenomenal form of reality itself. Thus, not only the representation of reality but certain aspects of reality themselves are ideological.

This approach of Marx can be compared to the views of the Enlightenment thinkers mentioned in the previous chapter. These thinkers hold that reason can chase away the errors generated by the prejudices, passions and interests of man and society. Terry Eagleton shows that this belief on the power of reason passes from the Enlightenment to later thinkers like Durkheim and Bachelard, for whom 'ideological habits and predispositions... are innate to mind'\textsuperscript{18}

Such types of views of the innateness of human nature are in fact actively manipulated in the service of the power relations. There has been a tendency of reducing human nature to any one of its dimensions, for example, to aggressiveness or egoism or jealousy or libido. A Dictionary of Conservative and Liberal Thought states:

One principal trait of human being highlighted by conservatives is its liability to act corruptly; not only selfishly, but wickedly; to abuse power, to lie and cheat and steal... It is claimed that human beings form themselves into societies, and in particular, they willingly submit to the authority of a sovereign, and the rule of law, because they fear the consequences of not doing so. The classic exponent of this conservatism is Hobbes, who held that the dominant political motive was a particular kind of self-interest, the fear of death.\textsuperscript{19}

In the same vein, liberalism claims that most of the criminal offences emerge from market imperfections like the demand-supply imbalance. Ideologues of capitalism also treat humans basically as lazy beings, who work only out of necessity or after incentives.

The doctrinal realms such as morality, laws, religion acquires the appearance of independence, but the source of their distortion lies not in the
erroneous or inadequate ideas, but in the nature of reality itself. In this context emerged a question: what role the critique of religion plays in the development of Marx’ theory of ideology? Marx asserts in his very early writings that ‘the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism.’ Earlier to The German Ideology, the germs of the conception of ideology can be discerned in his critique of religion and state. Unlike Feuerbachian materialism, for Marx religion is not simply an idealist fallacy or illusion, but has its genesis in and simultaneously is a compensation for an “inverted reality”, which is also termed as “deficient reality”.

Here Marx arrives at the one of the significant facet of his theory of ideology that reappears in his later writings in the forms of social reality whose very essence generates a phenomenal form, which in turn subjects humans to the ideological fetishes. We can see from the following passage of Marx that Althusser’s charge of dramatic and absolute break between earlier humanist and later scientific Marx is untenable. We produce here an excerpt of Marx from Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction (1844), which is often quoted only in parts and on this basis, it is declared that for Marx religion is only opium produced by ruling class for making the masses doped:

The basis of irreligious criticism is: Man make religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But, man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, an inverted world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal source of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence because the human essence has not acquired any true reality...

Religious distress is at one and the same time, the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people...
criticism of religion is, therefore, *in embryo*, the criticism of the vale of tears the halo of which is religion\(^\text{22}\)

This passage is important in many respects. It shows that from the very beginning Marx links the inversion of consciousness to the "inverted world". Secondly, he believes that religion will not disappear merely by atheist propaganda or critique of religion. Marx develops this insight later into the view that critique cannot take place merely at the realm of pure consciousness: 'the weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force'.\(^\text{23}\) Marx was in no hurry for writing an obituary of religion. As we have witnessed that religion not only survived but also thrived in the Soviet and other social-capitalist\(^\text{24}\) and authoritarian countries, named incorrectly as "really existing socialism". Here one can recall what Marx says in *Capital*:

The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of every-day life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to Nature. The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.\(^\text{25}\)

Marx asserts that not only religion but also ideology in general cannot be exhausted until the material conditions change. Marx often uses phrase 'mode of production of freely associated men' to express his vision of a post-capitalist society. A society divided into classes cannot get rid of ideology. Marx attributes ideology to class contradictions based on an inverted reality. In this context, Max not only criticises the religion but also the "secular" order of things. Following Marx's *On the Jewish question*, it is not the separation of State and religion, but the *Aufhebung* of religion and the State (along with commodity production) which remains the basis of a truly human society of freely associated individuals.\(^\text{26}\) Marx relates his criticism of religion to the criticism of alienation and dehumanisation in the secular realm:
The immediate task of philosophy, which is at the service of history, once the holy forms of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.27

In the fourth Theses on Feuerbach, Marx comments:

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice.28

This thesis echoes Marx’s criticism of abstract atheism, which according to him is unable to reach to the real problems posed by religious consciousness.29

While discussing the secular democracy of North America, Marx observes:

We no longer regard religion as the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore, we explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions. We assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular restrictions... We criticize the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form, apart from its weaknesses as regards religion.30

In the tenth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx states that ‘the standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.31 It has been suggested that in On the Jewish Question Marx links secularism with political emancipation (or the struggle of the rising bourgeois against feudalism) and distinguishes it from human emancipation, without which the former is necessarily incomplete.32
It is essential to deal with the tendency of over-concentrating on Marx's critique of Hegelian idealism and closing the eyes to his critique of Feuerbachian materialism. This leads many Marxists and especially those belonging to the tradition of Soviet version of 'dialectical materialism' to a mechanical and contemplative materialism. Conversely, attempts of humanist or Hegelian Marxists like Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch of accentuating the subjective and critical aspects of Marx slips into a kind of epistemological idealism, which is ignorant of the intransitive dimension of reality. What is the role of Marx's critique of post-Hegelian Feuerbachian materialism and of the Young Hegelians' idealism in the development of his thought? Marx observes:

When in the spring of 1845 he [Engels] came to live in Brussels, we decided to set forth together our conception as opposed to the ideological one of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience. The intention was carried out in the form of a critique of post-Hegelian philosophy.

Marx's conception of ideology is generally linked with his critique of idealism. But in view of above discussion, it can be said that this is a lopsided picture. Marx was not just criticising the false consciousness but also the false or inadequate reality that underlies false consciousness. Ideology for him was not simply an epiphenomenal illusion to be remedied by correct knowledge. Neither can his theory be described as "reflection model". Michael Rosen explains Marx's theory of ideology firstly as reflection model and then as interest model. Doyle McCarthy characterises Marx's conception of ideology as "unreality" and says that 'ideologies are unreal for they obscure, distort, or mystify reality'.

Marx was very critical of the old materialist approach, in which 'knowing subject passively reflects the object with which it is confronted'. His approach of praxis or self-activity fuses the subject and object in one. Moreover, Marx distinguishes between appearance and reality and also between appearance and essence. On the reverse to the above claim regarding reflection model of ideology, Marx was of the view that reflection of manifested reality cannot grasp the "underlying real world".
It can be argued that Marx's theory of ideology is developed in contradistinction to idealism on the one hand and materialism on the other. Marx's method was not of a complete rejection or a total endorsement, but of a reconstruction of existing thoughts—a dialectical sublation or Aufhebung, a process of negating and at the same time preserving the inner truth of something. This was only after Marx's death that Engels regressed to the already trodden path and 'the polarised disposition of idealism and materialism is rehearsed.'40 Larrain rightly points out that for Marx the challenge of creating a new theory of ideas and consciousness was two-fold:

How to reconcile materialism with the fact that reality should not be conceived as given object which does not include the subject's activity; and how to reconcile idealism with the fact that being cannot be reduced to thought. While materialism makes consciousness a reflection of external reality, idealism makes reality the products of consciousness. Materialism splits up in two separate worlds what Marx thinks to be a unity whereas idealism dissolves one world into the other. Marx propounds a basic unity between consciousness and reality which nevertheless retains a distinction.41

Marx propounds his materialism by giving primacy to life over consciousness. In this context, he observes that 'Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.'42 Further Marx goes on to say:

The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.43

Lenin, Plekhanov and many later commentators draw the conclusion from the above that for Marx matter is primary and consciousness, thought, sensations are secondary and tantamount to reflections of the former. They developed a mechanical materialism, in which consciousness copies the material world. But the materialists had already reached this conclusion before Marx. Marx was not repeating them. He was not involved in mechanical juxtaposing of material against ideal.
We can see from the above-mentioned quotes that Marx actually used the expressions “life” and “social existence that determines their consciousness.” Elsewhere he also used phrases like “conscious being,”44 “real life-process”45 and “actual life-process”46. These terms incorporate ideational components of values, ideas and aspirations. Then what does Marx’s criticism aim at? In 1844 Marx observes:

We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and— thus their existence as such antitheses only within the framework of society; < we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.47

Marx’s criticism of idealism and materialism is composed of many features.48 Marx criticises Hegel for, what Roy Bhaskar calls an “epistemic fallacy”49, reducing being to knowing or consciousness. Marx also criticises the Young Hegelians for attributing the conceptions, thoughts, ideas an independent existence. He remarks:

The Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness.... They forget, however, that they themselves are opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are combating solely the phrases of this world.50

Marx also criticises the idealist impulse of, what Bhaskar names “the speculative illusion”51, separation of philosophy from social life. Marx observes that ‘the resolution of theoretical oppositions is possible only in a practical way, and hence is by no means a task of knowledge but a task of actual life; which philosophy could not resolve because it grasped the task only as a theoretical one.'52
Marx also disapproves of idealism for attributing the cause of historical change mainly or exclusively to the subjective agency or consciousness. His complaint against Hegel is that he presents autonomous ideas as subject of history. Marx observes: 'As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.'\textsuperscript{53} Marx's historical approach criticises on the one hand idealism, that is guilty of 'typical fault of philosophy' in granting the autonomous status to realm of ideas; and on the other hand, empiricism that is the 'endemic failing of common-sense.'\textsuperscript{54} Here it should be added that Marx was also against the tendency of rationalistic a-priorism and his dialectics was not empirically closed.

Marx puts "situated individuals" in place of "abstract individuals" and emphasises that 'men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.'\textsuperscript{55} In the Preface to \textit{A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy}, Marx says: 'Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life.'\textsuperscript{56} In other words, Marx's criticism of the Hegelian inversion of subject and object is directed against the putting of the absolute self-consciousness or God in the place of the subject, so that real nature and real man are transfigured as estranged predicate.

Before going to the discussion of the concept of praxis, we would take a short account of Marx's critique of the ontological and epistemological dualisms of Feuerbach's contemplative materialism. Marx's criticism of Feuerbach is important for the theory of ideology, as it is only after 1845, when Marx 'settles accounts with' his 'former philosophical conscience,' the concept of ideology appears explicitly in Marx. In the very first of the \textit{Theses on Feuerbach} Marx remarks:
The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the things, reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism— which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.\textsuperscript{57}

It must be noted that firstly, Marx acknowledges the contribution of idealism of that time for the understanding of the transformative activity of human beings. In the ninth thesis on Feuerbach, he says:

\begin{quote}
The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

This thesis can be read also as his contrasting of civil society to human society, a contrast that Marx draws between reified societies and de-reified emancipated societies. Here we shall discuss Marx’s emphasis on the process of production and reproduction and transformation of social life by the sensuous activity of man. Marx writes:

\begin{quote}
Certainly Feuerbach has a great advantage over the "pure" materialists in that he realises how man too is an "object of the senses". But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as an "object of the senses, not as sensuous activity", because he still remains in the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing conditions of life, which have made them what they are, he never arrives at the really existing active men, but stops at the abstraction "man"... He gives no criticism of the present conditions of life. Thus he never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it; and therefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the "higher perception" and in the ideal "compensation in the species".\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Marx emphasizes on the passivity, ahistoricity, and barrenness of erstwhile materialism and simultaneously exposes its entrapment in the subject-object dichotomy. Hegel stops at the ideology of absolute knowledge,
while Feuerbach stops at the ideology of human nature. Both fail to reach to the real active human being. In Marx’s dialectical approach, old materialism’s obsession with consciousness and matter was replaced by the problematic of theory and praxis. By this, Marx introduced a new standpoint in the theory of ideology. The examination of ideology is not limited merely to distorted consciousness or erroneous ideas but linked with the uncovering of the real basis of their activity.

One more point is emerged from Marx’s thought that it is not possible to overcome idealism without transcending contemplative or mechanical materialism. Materialism as a philosophical school tends to become another instance of onto-theology and scholasticism. Étienne Balibar describes this as ‘idealism in disguise’. One can recall here Marx’s pronouncement that ‘the dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Marx calls his approach as “practical materialism” in The German Ideology. It has been also identified as “social materialism” or “theoretical and practical materialism” or “practical or transformative materialism”. But after Marx, this relapsed into the dogmatic and positivist materialism. It should be kept in mind that Marx uses the phrases like “the Materialist Conception of History” only in counter-distinction to the idealist understanding of history. For a dialectical theory materialism is only an emphasis against the idealistic tendencies, which have renewed themselves presently in the form of varieties of post-modernisms. Marx declares as early as in 1844 that ‘consistent naturalism or humanism is distinct from both idealism and materialism, and constitutes at the same time the unifying truth of both.

On the whole, it can be said that the theoretical legacy of Marx presents before us a challenge to address a persistent tension and unease between various kinds of dualisms, transmitted from the old philosophical schools and which lead to reductionism. The nature of dualism and associated reductionism is such that it ultimately goes in the favour of idealism. Marxist theory has to be
wary of reduction of ‘philosophy to science, society or mind to nature, universal to particulars, theory to experience, human agency or consciousness to social structure.’ Bhaskar cautions that reductionism and resulted partialities can take the form of either “objectivism” or “subjectivism”. Objectivism includes the philosophical tendencies such as ‘metaphysics, scientism, dogmatism, determinism, and reification’; whereas subjectivism embraces trends of ‘positivism, agnosticism, scepticism, individualism, and voluntarism.’ We have seen the fate of soviet version of ‘dialectical materialism’, which becomes a new kind of onto-theology or ideology for the communist parties after Stalin’s counter-revolutionary coup in 1928.

The notion of praxis can be seen as Marx’s response to the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism. Marx sees human beings as a combination of “embodied” consciousness, and “embodied” feelings:

To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have sensuous objects outside oneself — objects of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer... Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being— and because he feels that he suffers a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.

Marx links his concept of “man” as an objective, sensuous being with the concept of practice. He was not only against common-sensical empiricism but also against theoreticist and scholastic language games cut off from practical questions. He does not advocate the abandonment of theory, but stresses that theory should not be taken as divorced from life-process. When he says ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’, he does not undermine the importance of interpretation but is critical of philosophising divorced from practice.

In the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx says that “thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other.” At this point, we would go again to the question that when Marx’s method involves the transcendence and supersession (Aufhebung) of both materialism and
idealism, then why does he prefer the expression “practical materialism”. Why does he not go for an alternative expression “practical idealism?” Even though he himself stated in *Theses on Feuerbach* that active side was developed from idealism.

One reason is that the emphasis of idealism on the role of consciousness, reason, spirit, morals and ideas ultimately leads to the education of the peoples, but not to the structural transformation of the existing affairs. It was the fallacy of not only idealism, but also of the nascent empiricist materialism, which we have discussed in first chapter in the example of Bacon, Holbach and others. What this variety of materialism did in opposition to idealism was a simple replacement of mind with matter. But mind, then, still thinks on behalf of matter, because subjectivity is cannot be explained on the basis of matter.

The concept of practice breaks the binary of mind and matter. For Marx ‘all social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.’ Marx also distinguishes between the categories of praxis from labour and links the latter to the concepts of alienation and fetishism.

**2.2 INVERTED FORMS OF CONSCIOUSSNESS AND INVERTED REALITY**

In the previous section, we have discussed that Marx did not conceptualise ideology as a mere reflection and asserts the “realistic” dimension of ideology. However, there exists such type of thinking which suggests that Marx focuses exclusively on consciousness. John Lechte says that Marx links ideology to ‘what people think, rather what they feel, or what they do.’ This type of reading of Marx is possible only when one sees Marx in epistemic isolation without placing the notion of ideology in the overall context of his thought.
At the beginning of this chapter, we had provisionally presented Marx’s conception of ideology as inverted forms of social consciousness, which emerge from and then conceal the contradictions of an inverted reality. Hereafter, we would examine this conception in more detail on the basis of the above discussion on theoretical presuppositions of Marx’s notion of ideology. This conception sees ideology as a concealment, which is part of, and the effect of the social relations of the given time. In *The German Ideology*, Marx uses the terms like inversion, concealment, illusion, etc. for denoting the process of perceiving an inverted or alienated reality as natural or normal.

This generates some questions. What is the meaning of inversion? Does inversion operate at both the realms—consciousness and reality? If reality is already inverted, then does inversion in consciousness involve a double inversion? Related to this is the crucial question that if consciousness and reality both are ideological, then does the distinction between ideas and reality collapse in the scheme of Marx? Does Marx’s attempt to break the subject-object binary solve this question or further complicates it? Can Marx’s “practical materialism” explain the phenomena of emergence of a critical consciousness? From where does critical consciousness of reality come? Does this need a transcendental realm or some kind of meta-reality out of and above the present reality? In this context, Marx maintains:

Not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process... Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence.\(^79\)

In this quoted passage Marx uses the phrase ‘ideological reflexes and echoes of this real life-process.’ Does the metaphor of “echo” suggest a notion of ideology as ‘a distant echo of a deeper reality?’\(^80\) This quote can be read by
putting it together with the insistence that inverted consciousness corresponds to an inverted reality. But then: if consciousness were simply the products or "sublimates" of the given material life process, then how could there be a criticism of the existing state of affairs?

Hegelian Idealism tried to answer this question from the principle, which holds that the actual is rational and it is reason (Vermunft), which actualises or realizes itself in the world. For Hegel reality is nothing but the movement or dialectical unfolding of the absolute mind. Old Materialism, however, opposes the reduction of materiality of the world to the realm of the "Idea". But at the same time, it can be said, that old materialism fails to answer aforementioned question satisfactorily. Its reduction of ideal into material ultimately relapsed into the dualism of reason and material world, a mark of contemplative materialism. This dualism disallows the unity of materiality and reason.

On the reverse, Marx's approach does not deny the unity of actuality and reason, but inverts the Hegelian perspective by starting from social reality. For Marx all ideas, critical or uncritical arise from social reality itself. Marx says: 'in direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven.' In reference to this comment, D.P. Chattopadhyaya makes a remark that material grounding of ideologies can be agreed upon, but this is 'only one half, the ascending half, of total truth. The other half the descending half is equally important.' He asks: is materialist existence self-explanatory? Chattopadhyaya suggests that explanation of existence can come from either philosophy or science. Explanation can come even from ideology.

For Marx, says Chattopadhyaya, 'causal relation between the super-structure and the sub-structure, via the mid-structure of the pyramid, is creatively circular or dialectical, not unilateral.' It means that Marx does not deny the causal efficacy of ideas; however for him material reality is causally more influential. We can also recall here that exact relation of Marxism to the realm of philosophy and science has been a matter of controversy. It is clear
from it that Marx does not disprove the casual efficacy of the consciousness or the 'descending half'. But at the same time he contends that consciousness does not emerge out of the blue, but arises from real conditions that are contradictory in nature:

Even if this theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc., come into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing productive forces; moreover, in a particular national sphere of relations this can also occur through the contradiction, rising not within the national orbit, but between this national consciousness and the practice of other nation.86

Marx also says that 'The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class'87 Here Marx argues a point that surpasses both idealism and dualistic materialism. He insists that criticism is not the property of ideas or consciousness only. Marx's dialectical approach asserts the unity of being and non-being, in which every identity emerges from a process of negation. No social form or being is absolute because, 'there is a continuous mediation of identity and difference, subject and object, which also engenders them.'88 Sean Sayers explains Marx's aversion of the positivistic conception of actuality:

Negation, opposition and criticism do not need to be brought to the world by the thinking subjects from the outside. The social world already contains negative, critical and contradictory forces within it. Nor is this criticism embodied merely in ideas or ideals. It exists first of all in fact.89

This discussion leads us our attentions to two other questions. First, why does Marx adhere to a critical conception of ideology? Second, why does not Marx take interest in the "ethical" criticism of capitalism and why does he count morality with ideology at all? At this point, we would deal with the first question. The negative conception of ideology is related to Marx's dialectical method, which explains the process of change in the terms of the negation of negation, i.e., a process of becoming.
Existing power relations of society always try to maintain status quo and inertia. However, at any point of history, the emerging contradictions expose and make vulnerable the stabilizing forces and ultimately lead to the conflict of class interests.\textsuperscript{90} Ideology is the part of this interplay as it 'makes the present looks unassailable or unsurpassable.'\textsuperscript{91} If ideology reinforces the positive or present power relations, then ideology-critique 'involves a practising of negativity: a critical assault on the illusion that things can resist change and are not in-process or that they benefit all universally rather then privileging particular groups.'\textsuperscript{92}

The above discussion answers only one part of our initial question as to how reality itself can be treated as inverted or ideological. It explicates the emergence of critical consciousness from the contradictions of reality. But the question remains that, is there any distinction between ideological reality and ideological consciousness? In the preceding sentence, we have used the adjective "ideological" along with the nouns "reality" and "consciousness". Marx uses the term ideology in both the ways in his texts— ideology as noun and "ideological" as adjective.

It can be argued that the term ideology expresses forms of social consciousness which includes a range of significations and symbolisations from commonsensical ideas, narrative forms, opinions to more or less coherent system of ideas, whereas the term "ideological" suggests the actual context, in which any idea or consciousness can appear. It is real life-process, which provides the context in such situations. Likewise, there can be ideological and non-ideological aspects of reality and consciousness.

Here it must be emphasised that ideology involves not the whims or ideas of individuals, but only those ideas, which have social prevalence and social acceptability. In other words ideology involves socially shared beliefs or "forms of social consciousness"\textsuperscript{93} The distinction between ideology and ideological avoids the pitfalls of equating ideology with reality, while retaining the possibility of an "inverted reality", where reality itself generates its phenomenal forms
which results in the creation of ideology. It implies that ideology as forms of social consciousness can be explicated only through the reference of material institutions, apparatuses and rituals; but the materiality of ideology does not entail that these institutions themselves are tantamount to the phenomena of ideology.94

Now it seems that reality cannot be equated with ideology. However, there can be an idealized-reified reality or an “inverted reality”. But have we not already distinguished between ideological and non-ideological forms of consciousness? So is the classification of reality into two parts the same as with consciousness? Then, what exactly is the difference between idealized-reified reality and ideological consciousness?

We have mentioned D.P. Chattopadhyaya’s suggestion that for Marx the causal relations between the super-structure and the sub-structure operate via the mid-structure. Here notion of mid-structure is very important and refers to the processes of operation and competition of the market, which constitutes the mediation between inverted consciousness and inverted reality.95 The concept of mid-structure also surpasses the dualistic and mechanical interpretation of base and superstructure. One can recall the role of notion of mediation in the overcoming of the binary of material and ideal.

For Marx ‘the question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice.’96 Mediation is a category of Hegelian dialectics. Hegel discusses alienation as an ‘externalising mediation of activity’, whereas Marx while discussing the alienation of self-activity focuses on the ‘historically specific and transcendental second order mediations of money, exchange and private property.’97 While discussing these mediations, it can be said, Marx introduces the notion of double inversion, in which inverted relationship between material condition of life and ideas are thrown up by the structure of inverted reality itself.98
Let us deal with the meaning of ideological inversion in Marx. The following passage of *The German Ideology* has been the point of fierce debates and contestations:

Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.99

This passage poses mainly two problems. The first, is consciousness merely a reflection of existence? This relates to a point, we have discussed earlier that Marx disassociates himself from the alleged mechanical model of Feuerbachian materialism on the basis of the notion of praxis. The second, what does the process of “upside down” or “inversion” refer to? What are the sources of these processes?

Marx discusses the idealist inversion of subject and predicate in dealing with the phenomena of religion and state. Here it seems that inversion lies in the process of granting autonomy to these realms. For Marx, however, these are based on class civilisations which themselves are based on inverted realities. Marx comments that ‘if in their imagination they turn reality upside-down, then this in its turn is the results of their limited material mode of activity and their limited social relations arising from it.'100

The metaphor of “camera obscura” has brought about much confusion. This metaphor indicates to optical illusion. The literal decoding of it leads to a simplified notion of ideology as pure illusion. Therefore, the camera obscura metaphor should be read in association with other metaphors used by him regarding ideology, e.g., the real life-process as the basis of ‘ideological reflexes and echoes’. These metaphors convey a sense that the notion of independence of ideas from reality should be questioned.

Marx uses metaphors such as “inversion of reality” and “camera obscura”, but he does it while steering clear of two political fallacies, prevalent in the
political field: first, the idea of the unawareness of the masses or some common weakness of human nature; second, the idea of overcoming illusion through education or inculcations. Marx brought in the notion of division of labour for explaining the 'gap between "life" and "consciousness", the contradiction between "particular" and "general interests", and, lastly, the intensification of that contradiction in the establishment of an autonomous, though indirect, mechanism of power.

The notion of division of labour and other terms of mediation, which are mentioned above explain the process of how real life produces ideology, which after coming into the existence, actively divorces itself from its source, i.e., reality. This implies that the inversion of reality and the autonomisation of the intellectual spheres, in which reference to the real origin or ideas is erased, come side by side. This is the reason that ideology-critique, as it was envisaged in The German Ideology, emphasise the need of the study of logical and historical genesis of ideas. Conversely, if one sees ideas as the source of history, s/he, in a sense, dissociates the ideas from social circumstances.

Étienne Balibar calls this the 'constitutive gap between consciousness and reality', which takes shape on the basis of the historical and social division of labour. In this process, consciousness remains dependent on its social existence, which sets its general orientation but at the same time obtains an increasing independence from social being, 'to the point where it caused an unreal, fantastic "world" to emerge. The notion of "constitutive gap" can also be linked not only to the power but also to the vulnerability of ideas and abstractions— a phenomenon described by D.P. Chattopadhaya as "descending half". How do ideas gain power? The circular and dialectical relation between sub, mid and super structures is discussed above. Ideas gain power not simply from themselves, but from the 'forces and circumstances, which they are able to seize upon.'

Marx comments in The German Ideology that from the moment of division between material and intellectual labour 'consciousness can really flatter itself
that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real: from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc.\textsuperscript{105}

The position, which emerges from this discussion, is that the process of inversion involves two moments simultaneously. In the first moment, it inverts reality and in the second moment it presents ideas as autonomous from their material existence. It implies that ideological language not only hides the real social contradiction, but also systematically excludes them from thought.\textsuperscript{106} In Terry Eagleton's words, ideological process involves 'a double movement of inversion and dislocation. Ideas are assigned priority in social life, and simultaneously disconnected from it'.\textsuperscript{107}

We have discussed in last section that for Marx the formation of ideas or consciousness is directly interwoven with the material intercourse, the language of real life. In \textit{The German Ideology}, Marx distinguished between real and illusory ideas and hints that the reason of the illusoriness of ideas lies simply not in the process of knowing but in the \textit{limitation of human praxis} itself. In \textit{The German ideology} Marx says:

\begin{center}
If the conscious expression of the real relations of these individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality upside-down, then this is the result of their limited material mode of activity and their limited social relations arising from it.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{center}

This limited mode of practice provides the basis for inverted social reality and inverted social consciousness. It can be said that the limited mode of activity refers to the alienation of activity or labour; to the process of division of labour; and to the domination of dead labour, in the forms of money, property, etc. over living labour. The limited mode of activity generates ideas, which conceal and thus reproduce the social contradictions in the interest of the ruling class.
Marx built up the notion of inversion into a complex one in *Capital*, where he deliberated on the concept of commodity fetishism. Marx's early writings contain the notions of money and private property as reified inversions:

*Money* as the external, universal *medium* and *faculty* (not springing from man as man or human society as society) for turning an *image* into *reality* and *reality* into a *mere image*, transform the *real essential powers of man and nature* into what are merely abstract notions and therefore *imperfections* and tormenting chimeras, just as it transforms *real imperfections and chimeras*—essential powers which are really impotent, which exist only in the imagination of the individual—into *real essential powers and faculties.*

Marx characterises private property as 'the *product* of alienated labour and that on the other it is the *means* by which labour alienates itself, the *realization of this alienation*." In his later writings, Marx explicated the process of fetishism. These writings are very important for the discussion of his conception of ideology. In *Capital*, Marx comments:

A commodity, therefore, is a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character stamped upon the product of that labour, because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves but between the products of their labour... It is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things."

Commodity fetishism is a specific feature of the capitalist mode of production. Economy based on capital destroyed the traditional ties and relations of pre-capitalist societies to the extent that in place of traditional communities 'money becomes the real community.' In the course of this transition, the social conditions move from the personal relations to the impersonal and reified relations. The very process of exchanging money for a commodity in market hides 'the conditions of labour and life, the sense of joy, anger, or frustration that lie behind the production of commodities, the states of mind of the producers.'
In pre-capitalist societies the 'relations of domination and servitude' or the relation between lordship and bondage essentially involves the fetishism in relations between human beings. In these societies productive activities were not guided by the market. In this context, for explaining the relationship between king or lord and its subjects, Marx remarks in *Capital* that 'One man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king.'

But in capitalist societies, relations of personal dependence dissolves into a system of market, in which participating individuals seem independent. Thus social relations between human beings assume the form of relations between things. So in this way, the fetishism of humans, characteristic of feudalism turns into the fetishism of commodities in capitalism. How did this process take place? In capitalism, relations between human beings appear as the relations between “free” people, conscious of their egoistic interests. This semblance of freedom is created through the mechanism of market, under which people, those are free to sell or buy and are legally equal, enter into a contract of exchange.

Here it should be recalled that the concept of fetishism is not confined to the commodity, but is applied to all forms of capital including private property, means of production and money. The abovementioned mechanism of “free exchange” runs through money, more specifically capital, which hides the social relationship between things and becomes the sole representative of social labour. With the replacement of money by signs such as note, currency, coins, credit, etc. money becomes able to manifest itself as ‘a mere symbol, an “arbitrary fiction” sanctioned by the “universal consent of mankind.”’ The operation of money is the prerequisite for the exchange of commodities in capitalism. If commodities have exchange values, ‘money, for its part, seems to be exchange value itself.’

The fact of the exploitation of labour time, an intrinsic feature of the capitalist production relations, is concealed by the ‘appearance of free

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exchange in the sphere of circulation. This concealment is achieved by the presentation of economic relations as relations of freedom, equality and collective interest at legal, political and ideological levels.

In this site of ideology, the wage worker looks like a free citizen and the state machinery appears as the ‘classless’ upholder of the citizen’s rights and the rule of the law. Étienne Balibar characterises bourgeoisie ideology as ‘a legal system based on contract and other elements with a bearing on the circulation of commodities.’ In this sense, ideology is an essential part of the capitalist mode of production. That’s why fetishism does not involve a simple but a complex or “overdetermined” inversion of subject and object. Hereby fetishism is not seen merely as the opposite of reality, but as an indispensable part of social reality of capitalism. This is a facet of reality, which at the same time suppresses certain parts of reality.

Marx explains this process of mystification of reality:

Everything appears reversed in competition. The final patterns of economic relations as seen on the surface, in their real existence and consequently in the conceptions by which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to understand them, is very much different from, and indeed quite the reverse of, their inner but concealed essential pattern and the conception corresponding to it.

It emerges from this passage that ideological conceptions shared by the bearers and agents of capitalist economic relations in their real existence are the reverse of their inner but concealed essential patterns. Here we can see the distinction of ‘real existence’ of economic relations and its ‘inner but concealed essential pattern’. Marx criticised those who perceives ideology as mere illusion:

Hodgskin regards this as a pure subjective illusion, which conceals the deceit and the interests of the exploiting classes. He does not see that the way of looking at things arises out of the actual relationship itself; the latter is not an expression of the former, but vice versa.
The most crucial inversion inherent in the reality of capitalism is the domination of dead labour over living labour. Now we would discuss how the process of inversion takes place.\textsuperscript{124} It can be said that the inversion of reality refers to the inversion of subject and predicate, whereas “inverted reality” implies the existence of contradictions and dissonances in real social relations. The presence of contradiction is manifested at the surface level of reality, e.g., at the level of exchange in the market or at the level of wage contract between capitalist and labour.

At the surface level, relations between wage labour and capital appears as free and equal. From the standpoint of the market it seems that the source of surplus value is not labour, but the circulation of commodities and likewise it seems that the source of profit is the difference between the investment or cost and the selling price of the commodity.

Here we have discussed the two stages of inversion: the first, inversion as constituent of reality itself; the second, the way in which this inversion reveals itself at the surface or phenomenal level of reality. Now we would explore the third stage of inversion in the context of our earlier question that what is the distinction between idealized-reified reality and ideological consciousness. At the third stage, this phenomenal level is reflected in human consciousness and gets the form of ideological consciousness, in its both version— one more spontaneous or commonsensical and the other in the form of doctrine propounded by ‘ideologists’ of the class. On the basis of this discussion on the process of inversion it can be said that ideology cannot be perceived merely as an intellectual failure or speculation.

We have mentioned above Marx’s distinction between real existence and concealed essential patterns of economic relations. Larrain calls it ‘a level of appearances constitutive of reality itself.’\textsuperscript{125} Rancière calls it a form of reality in which real movement disappears.\textsuperscript{126} These expressions indicate towards a reality, which is inverted and reveals itself in phenomenal forms that conceal the essence of it. But these phenomenal forms are not unreal. These are real
appearances. In this fetishised relationships inversions lie at the base of appearance and inner realities. Slovaj Žižek explains that this appearance emerges out of a certain misrecognition, in which 'what is really a structural effect, an effect of the network of relations between elements, appears as an immediate property of one of the element, as if this property also belongs to it outside its relation with other elements.'

Ideology consists, David Hawkes claims, 'in an inability to recognise the mediating function of representation, in assuming that it is an autonomous sphere, and thus mistaking the appearance for the thing-in-itself'. But two things should be recollected here: first, Marx in no way restricts the idea of ideology to the epistemic illusions or cognitive defects, second, Marx was concerned with only those misrepresentations, which sustain inverted or fetishised reality or relations of dominations.

It seems that for Marx ideology is a multi-layered phenomenon. It expresses itself firstly, in generative mechanisms of consciousness inscribed in concrete modes of production, e.g., commodity fetishism, secondly, in 'means of intellectual production', which can be construed as the Ideological State Apparatuses: media, courts, educational and religious institutions, family and other establishments, and thirdly, in theories, doctrine and arguments propounded by active ideologist. All these levels or sites of operation of ideology are closely related.

On the basis of above discussion on the process of inversion, it can be said that ontological dimension is as important as epistemological dimension for the theory of ideology. In other words, it can be said that phenomena of ideological exists at three interrelated levels: firstly, at the level of unmediated reality or reality-in-itself, secondly, at the level of mediated reality and thirdly, at the level of social consciousness.

The above-mentioned distinction can be upheld by employing Marx's distinction between real objects and thought objects presented in *Grundrisse*.
On the basis of this distinction, Roy Bhaskar later develops the concept of intransitive and transitive dimensions of reality. He suggests that Marx distinguished between objectivity (externality) of the real object independent from our knowledge of them and objectification. Here objectification involves two meanings: first, as 'the production of subject' and second as 'reproduction or transformation of a social process'. Externality of object refers to intransitive dimension and objectification in both the senses refers to transitive dimension of reality. Transitive dimension emphasises on the social and historical character of knowledge and depends on the praxis of human beings.\textsuperscript{130}

In this sense the real object is the intransitive object of knowledge, whereas thought object or real social object involves the transitive process of the activity of knowledge. Bhaskar says: 'for Marx social practice is a \textit{condition}, but not the \textit{object} of natural science; whereas it is \textit{ontologically}, as well as \textit{epistemologically} constitutive in the social sphere.'\textsuperscript{131}

2.3 IDEOLOGY: AFTER THE COMMUNICATIVE TURN

History of social and human sciences in the twentieth century has been marked with a particular phenomenon, which is generally denoted in the vocabulary of "turns". The various disciplines of social studies have witnessed cultural turn, linguistic turn, discursive turn, hermeneutic turn, interpretative turn, communicative turn, etc. One thing is common in all nomenclatures, i.e. the emphasis on the importance of \textit{meaning} in social and human sciences. Representation, culture, language, practices, text, and discourse become the new buzzwords of academics. The main argument is that culture is not the collection of ideas, rituals, or things, but is a process of production in circulation of meanings. This perspective presents the process of \textit{communication} or the production and reception of meaning as the central feature of a culture. Communication becomes possible because members of the same culture share certain linguistic and cultural codes.
There is a freshness of approach in this perspective, but this standpoint was not altogether absent from the writings of thinkers like Sigmund Freud or Karl Marx. What was more radical in these “turns” was the emphasis that all the facets of cultural life or practices can be modelled on the working of the language. In eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, an attempt was made to model the social sciences based on sciences including mechanics and physics. This attempt, no doubt, had given a new explanatory power to the social inquiry that time, but with course of time it has been realized that ultimately the domain of the social cannot be studied as domain of nature. Simultaneously, social sciences can neither replicate not mimic the paradigms of natural sciences.

It can be said that one of the consequence of the emphasis on language has come as a “reverse” determinism in the social and human sciences. Earlier reality has been placed under the dominance of the natural sciences, but now it is positioned under the supremacy of the language. Again, this novel emphasis initially gave a new explanatory power but later on, it was trapped in the extremes. This can be termed generally as the social constructionist approach; however, there are many different positions within the constructionist approach as well. In general, this approach ‘distinguishes between understanding meaning as against understanding causes.’

This approach criticises the hitherto existing social theory by terming them as “reflective” or “mimetic.” It argues against them that meaning is not just given in the object; hence, it is wrong to hold that in-built meaning of the objects is reflected in the language. The “intentional approach” was also being criticized on the ground that language is not private to speaker or author but is essentially social, or communicative— bent on (to borrow Habermas’ phrase) “Communicative action”. Language involves and shares codes.

The constructionists argue that meanings and interpretations are constitutive of the things. In other words, things and phenomena do not have any inherent meaning, but they are made to speak and to mean. This approach paves the way to study many aspects of culture as language. Now myth,
science, photography, fashion, technology—everything can be studied as a process of significations. This marks "a shift from "language in the world" to "the world as constituted by language"."\textsuperscript{134} The march of language does not stop, however, at the level of 'objects', but reaches to the inner most core of the speaker or the author, i.e. subject. In this context AV Afonso comments that hermeneutical interpretations in social or human sciences 'begins to recognize "self" as being formed by language or that self or person emerges from the network of speech.'\textsuperscript{135}

Long before the emergence of the philosophy of language and linguistics associated with Ferdinand De Saussure, Vienna Circle and structuralism, the problematic of the hermeneutics of suspicion had taken place in Germany in the writings of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. These thinkers have a lot of difference in their approaches, but in their own distinct ways, they pointed to the limitations of reason and consciousness. If for Marx meanings are distorted by the process of alienation and fetishism, for Nietzsche meanings are manipulated by the will to power. Freud presented the scene of the unconscious and desire, which are repressed beneath the conscious structure of meaning. The charge of intentional or reflective fallacy on these thinkers holds no ground. However, it has sometimes critiqued that their acknowledgement of the dimension of language was neither explicit nor satisfactory.

The Marxist problematic has been accused of neglecting the dimension of language in social inquiry. The Marxist theory of ideology was criticized for seeing ideology as a form of consciousness. For example, Michael Gardiner alleges that this theory is 'succeeded to a form of individualistic psychologism' and 'presupposes an integrated, self-defining subject'.\textsuperscript{136} Another criticism labelled against Marxism is that it portrays ideology as worldview or belief system of a certain class or social groups. The general neglect of the relations of ideology and language was also criticized.\textsuperscript{137}
It can be said that as far as Marx's theory of ideology is concerned all the above criticism are misplaced. First of all, Marx's conception cannot be linked to any kind of individualistic psychologism or intentional fallacy or self-defining subject. We can recall here from previous sections of this chapter Marx's criticism of idealism and contemplative materialism. On the matter of consciousness, there was a crucial difference between Marx and 'all the post-Kantian rationalist and idealist philosophers.'\textsuperscript{138} While later take the properties of things-in-itself as unknowable, Marx emphasises on the revelation of underlying social relations by demystifying and unmasking the "thing". For Marx the abstract essence is quite knowable, otherwise, as he famously says that if appearance and reality always coincided, there would be no need for science.\textsuperscript{139} Marx breaks the binaries of subject-object and material-ideal in his concept of praxis.

The concept of ideology as world-view of classes became a prominent theme in the writings of Lenin, Georg Lukács, Althusser, and others. It is said sometime that Marx did not propound a theory of class-consciousness, but only of the class aspects of consciousness.\textsuperscript{140} Lastly, it must be emphasised that the subject matter of language did occur in Marx's writings. Marx had anticipated the function of language when he discussed the material and praxical inscription of consciousness. The problematic of the "suspicion of meaning" was present in Marx as ideology involves a hidden or disguised reality and concealment of social contradictions.

Marx did not present a full-fledged account of language and his treatment of it can be termed as sketchy and unelaborated. However, if one sees his remarks on language together with his emphasis on the impossibility of pure consciousness as consciousness is enmeshed in the active life process and praxis, then Marx's theory presents enough ground for "future" theorization of relations between ideology and language. Marx says in \textit{The German Ideology}:

\begin{quote}
We find that man also possess "consciousness". But even from the outset this is not "pure" consciousness. The "mind" is from the outset afflicted with the curse of being "burdened" with matter,
\end{quote}
which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of 
air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as 
consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that 
exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist 
for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, 
the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a 
relationship, it exists for me: The animal does not "relate" itself to 
anything, it does not "relate" itself at all. For the animal, its relation 
to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, 
from the very beginning a social product, and remains so long as 
men exist at all. 141

Bernard Flynn comments that in this remark:

Marx distances himself from an entire tradition of Western 
Philosophy that views language as merely the external envelope 
of thought fully formed within consciousness. He asserts a much 
more immediate connection between signifier and signified than is 
traditionally claimed. 142

Nevertheless, generally structuralism and poststructuralism ignore Marx's 
contribution towards the theorization of language. Marx posits a dialectical 
relationship between language and reality in the above passage. For him 
language and consciousness are necessarily afflicted with practical activity, 
which exists in capitalist society in its alienated form, deformed by divisional of 
labour. This passage also presents language as a material or practical form of 
consciousness.

Another insight in this passage is that language as practical or real 
consciousness is relational in character. It emerges out of "relations" and exists 
in "relations." In this sense language presupposes "the intercourses" or to say 
communication with other persons. The emphasis on language as practical 
consciousness also suggests that the phenomena of consciousness involve shared meanings, which occurs and transforms during intercourse with other 
men. The emphasis on communication and more widely on "intercourse" gives 
the discursive aspect of human life a materialist foundation. The ignorance of 
the process of communication as the material medium later gives the 
philosophy of language an idealist turn.
For Marx both consciousness and language are inescapably social, processual, relational, and context-bound. However, both are not the same entities. Language and consciousness mutually presuppose each other. Consciousness makes its appearance in the forms of ‘agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language.’ However, unlike the structuralists and poststructuralists Marx does not dissolve the category of consciousness into language. This is a mistake, which led poststructuralists towards total decentring of subject and finally towards a complete absenting of subject.

On the contrary, Marx sees a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, which avoids on the one hand the extreme of a fully conscious and responsible human being (the fallacy of humanism and anthropocentrism), and on the other hand the extreme of dissolution of the concept of subject (the fallacy of poststructuralism). For Marx reality ontologically exists comprised with the human subject. Material existence/ real life-process structures human beings, which in turn shape life-process. At the practical of material level, he sees both language and consciousness as inter-subjective entities. Here, dialectics of three entities involve— reality, consciousness, and language. For Marx human being’s relationship to nature and to its environment is essentially “inter-subjective.” At another place in The German Ideology, Marx remarks:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men— the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appears as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else then conscious being, and the being of men is their actual life-process.

Here Marks, outlines the theory of not only of production and of reproduction of consciousness and language, but also of subjectivity. The
production of language at first is interwoven with the immediate sensuous reality and material intercourse of human. Only later due to the division of labour language could dissociate itself from real intercourse of humans and even could 'flatter itself that... it is really conceiving something without conceiving something real.'\textsuperscript{145} We have discussed in the last section that before this moment of disengagement from the world and the formation of 'pure' theory, language could not create ideology.

This position also indicates that theory alone is not capable to understand the actual operation of ideology. For knowing ideology, the starting point must be "real men"— their actual living, thinking, feeling, and their material intercourse. Here also comes the need of the inquiry into their language, their communication, the distortion of language and communication that appeared because of division of labour, alienation, commoditisation, phantasmagoria, and other structural inequalities. It can be said that this line of thought is furthered in Habermas' theory of systematically distorted communication. Another way from here went towards the psychological enquiry of ideology. As the noted psychologist Michael Billig observes:

Marx and Engles were proposing that an understanding of ideology should have an important psychological dimension, for ideology is reflected in the feelings, views, and life patterns of 'real' people... Theorists today often accept that a theory of ideology should incorporated a psychology of the unconscious, in order to understand how the subjects of ideology have internalised forces of distortion that will curtail, channel or recreate desires, wishes, etc.\textsuperscript{146}

Let us now move to the contribution of the Bakhtin Circle in understanding the relation between ideology and language. It should be mentioned that V.N. Voloshinov's \textit{Marxism and the Philosophy of Language} (1929) came \textit{much before} structuralism and the alleged "linguistic turn" of social sciences. Normally, the term 'linguistic turn' denotes a shift from language as an instrument to language as foundation for social enquiry. Bakhtin circle's writings were the first systematic study of language from a Marxist angle. Mikhial Bakhtin formed this circle in the Leningrad School of Soviet semioticians. P.N.
Medvedev and Voloshinov were its other members. There is a debate among historians that whether Bakhtin himself wrote the books and articles in the name of Medvedev and Voloshinov for deceiving Joseph Stalin's terror machine. We would not go into the details of this controversy and would treat their writings individually and at the same time as parts of their group Bakhtin circle.

Bakhtin, Medvedev and Voloshinov presented a materialist approach to literature, language and ideology, while at the same time avoiding extremes of objectivism and subjectivism. They propounded an inter-subjective approach to these matters. Medvedev discards the claims of a completely autonomous subjectivity:

> All ideological things are objects of social intercourse; not objects of individual use, contemplation, emotional experience, or hedonistic pleasure. For this reason, subjective psychology cannot approach the meaning of the ideological object.\(^{147}\)

The approach of the Bakhtin Circle also avoids economic reductionism and mechanical materialism characteristics of the Marxism of Second International. Ideology for the Bakhtin Circle is not just the reflection of economic base, but its meaning is accented in the process of communication. They see a process of intersection of subject and object or of consciousness and social world at the sites of signs. However, this sign itself is not a mental creation but is totally objective in character:

> Every ideological product (Ideologeme) is a part of the material social reality surrounding man, an aspect of the materialized ideological horizon, whatever a word might mean, it is first of all materially present, as a thing uttered, written, printed, whispered, or thought. That is, it is always an objectively present part of man's social environment.\(^{148}\)

The material presence of sign does not suggest that this sign is always already given. Rather, the sign emerges and grows historically and socially. In this way, the Bakhtin Circle breaks the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism. Voloshinov comments:
Every ideological sign—the verbal sign included—in coming about through the process of social intercourse, is defined by the social
purview of the given time period and the given social group.\footnote{149}

Another and perhaps most novel aspects of Voloshinov's theory is his "multi-accentual" approach. For him ideologies are not the kind of nameplates, fastened to the class positions. It can be seen that this approach avoids the Leninist position of treating ideology as world-view of different classes. Voloshinov sees language or sign systems as the common denominator for different classes. Different classes use the same resources of signs. Therefore, language and signs become the sites, where different classes or social interests intersect and confront with each other. Voloshinov remarks:

Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community, which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communications. Thus, various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of class struggle. The social \textit{multi-accentuality} of the ideological sign is a very crucial aspect. By and large, it is thanks to this intersecting of accents that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the capacity for further development.\footnote{150}

Signs become the arena of the ideological struggle between competing social interests. A certain sign is reproduced, circulated, and exchanged with such push and pulls by antagonistic social interests that it is affected by ideological accents. It can be said that by asserting that different classes use same signs, but with different ideological accents, he avoids the trap of the "class consciousness" approach of the Lukács and some other Marxists.

We referred earlier that Marx's project involves the \textit{dialectical interrelationship between reality, consciousness, and language}. A contemporary theory of ideology can be built based on this dialectics, in which all the three entities intersect each other, but neither of them is, reducible to the other. It can be said that loss or undercutting of any one dimension from the social inquiry results in an one-sidedness. If disparaging of the dimension of consciousness and language can lead to objectivism and scientism, the loss of
the dimension of reality can lead to relativism and historicism. Likewise, deficit of the dimension of language can lead to intentionalism, psycholism, and subject-object dualism, whereas lack of the dimension of consciousness leads to the dissolution of the category of the subject.

There is a tendency in poststructuralist thought of disengaging the question of language and consciousness from the question of deep structures of mode of production. This is a turn again in the direction of idealism. The categories of subjectivity and consciousness cannot be replaced by the concepts such as discourse, signification, etc. The important question is to see the *intersection and interpenetration* of these concepts. Consciousness can be seen as a mechanism of internalization of words or "a kind of inner speech." However consciousness is not only "within" the subjects, but also around and between the subjects.\(^{151}\) Voloshinov's treatment of language and consciousness was an attempt to 'break down the dichotomy of the psyche as individual and ideology as social. They are, in fact, interpenetrative in a dialectical interplay of inner and outer signs.'\(^{152}\)

Voloshinov in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* stresses on the dialectics of inner and outer experience, the interplay of subjectivity and social mediated through the process of signification. He says that in each speech act 'subjective experience perishes in the objective fact of the enunciated word-utterance, and the enunciated world in subjectified in the act of responsive understanding.'\(^{153}\) His dialectical approach intended to rupture the dichotomy of consciousness as individual and ideology as social. Words, in the form of inner word, function as the primary unit of the consciousness—a form of inner speech.\(^{154}\)

If Saussure's emphasis was on the *langue* (language), Bakhtin School's emphasis was on the *parole* (speech). His main concern was the analysis of speech act or verbal communication. The realm of communication and meaning is not completely autonomous from the outer world, which was the fallacy of poststructuralists. Rather, distinct repertoires of different social groups of the
society follow a classification of the forms of verbal communication, which directly associated with the hierarchies of the social order. Language in use is closely related with the conflictive and complex social practices. Word and world enters into a relationship of interdependence and mutual conditioning, where the world of the words is an essential feature of the words of the world.

For Althusser ideology is the practice of subjectivation. Subjects are constructed through ideological subjection or interpellation. Althusser's anti-humanist theory locates ideology not in the sphere of consciousness, ideas, or actions, but in the materiality of practices, rituals, and state apparatuses. Subjects for him were no more that the "effects" of society. Interestingly these "effects of society" becomes "effects of power" in Michel Foucault and other poststructuralists. In Foucault's main works, the subject becomes the intersecting site of multiple decentring discourses.

The decentring of subjectivity had two consequences. The first is the loss of agency for an individual subject. The second is the objectivist reduction. We have discussed in the last section that Marx's concept of praxis broke down the dichotomy of subject and object, and material and ideal and presented a dialectical understanding of the non-reduction of different aspects of social totality. Marx's main criticism of the tradition of mechanical materialism was that it lacks the theory of "sensuous human activity." As the materiality and sociability of the individual does not exhaust its individuality, the same is applicable to the domain of consciousness. In this context Larrain comments:

Consciousness is not imposed on subjects from without because it is social; rather, it is internal to the subjects because it is social. The separation between subjectivity and objectivity cannot apply to consciousness because consciousness is both at the same time: it is internal only because it is social, and it is social only insofar as it is internal.

Anthony Giddens has seen the relationship of consciousness and language from a different angle, which can be important for the theory of ideology. He distinguishes between practical consciousness and discursive
consciousness. This formulation breaks the structuralist dualism of conscious and unconscious, which is inherited from the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussurian dualism holds that 'either something is conscious (discursively available) or else it is unconscious.' For Giddens discursive consciousness involves that knowledge which actors can express on the level of discourse. Whereas practical consciousness refers to tacit stocks of knowledge, which actors cannot express discursively but which underpin the social activity. Giddens says:

There is a vital sense in which all of us do chronically apply phonological and grammatical laws in speech—as well as all sorts of other practical principles of conduct—even though we could not formulate these laws discursively (let alone hold them in mind throughout discourse). But we cannot grasp the significance of such practical knowledge, if we interpreted it separately from human consciousness and agency, or what I shall all the reflexive monitoring of conduct that is entire to human activity: if we place an epoche upon the conscious and the practical.  

It can be said that this formulation also rejects the artificial distinction between consciousness and language. It also rejects the thesis of the abandonment of the concept of consciousness. Contemporary theory of ideology must be conversant with the achievements of the philosophy of language. Ideology cannot be conceptualized only in terms of set of ideas or belief systems. Nevertheless, at the same time ideology cannot be confined at the level of language or communication. A complex and non-reductionist conceptualization of ideology is possible based on the critical conception, which we find primarily in the writings of Marx, which deals with the process of ideology at the level of strategic conduct of actors and at the level of institutional analysis; at the level of discursive consciousness and the level of lived experiences of actors; at the level of doctrine and at the level of common-sensical or every day forms of consciousness.
NOTES & REFERENCES

1 One of the reasons behind this trend is the tendency of discussing Marx's views completely via the positions of other scholars or thinkers. In the history of ideas, one should distinguish ideas of a thinker from social-political movements associated with his name, and also from ideas or deeds of his followers, not only with reference to Marx but also regard to other thinkers. The history of ideas shows us that there may be multifarious and often contradictory receptions of ideas of one person in his lifetime and also afterwards. There cannot be a single interpretation of any philosopher.

2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 690.


5 This includes particularly N. Poulantzas, M. Godelier, E. Balibar and J. Mepham.

6 Mardin Keshmiri, 'What is This Thing Called Ideology?: on Marx's Method of Thinking'. Available at http://www.isf.org.uk/ISFJournal/ISF4/WhatisThisThingCalledIdeology.htm

7 On the basis of distinct philosophical orientations, many different, yet overlapping and often conflicting strands of Marxism can be identified. Such as Hegelian Marxism of Lukács, Korsch; existentialist Marxism of Sartre; phenomenological Marxism of Merleau-Ponty; analytic Marxism of Cohen, Torrance; positivist Marxism of Della Volpe and Colleti; neo-Kantian Marxism of Adler, Bauer and Hilferding; structuralist Marxism of Althusser, Godelier; critical realist Marxism of Bhaskar, Norris; Lacanian Marxism of Žižek; and so on. In this list can be included expressions like Western Marxism, Soviet Marxism and the Yugoslav praxis school. Conflict and divergence between vanguardist Marxism of Lenin, Stalin, Mao and various kinds of movements of self-management like factory or workers council are well known. For the detail discussion of various schools of Marxism see Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 3 vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978; D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Sociology, Ideology and Utopia: Socio-Political Philosophy of East and West, Brill, Leiden, 1997; Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kieman and Ralph Miliband (eds.), A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Maya Blackwell, New Delhi, 2000 and Robert A. Gorman (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Neo-Marxism, Mansell Publishing Limited, London, 1985.


9 Here I used the concept of 'mode of hegemonic articulation', put forward by Ernesto Laclau and discussed by Žižek. See Slovaj Žižek, 'The Spectre of


12 See ibid.


22 See Karl Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law', pp. 175-176.

23 See ibid, p. 182.

24 I follow the analysis of Paresh Chattopadhyaya and Paul Sweezy and others who identify these societies as social or state capitalist as all the characteristic of capitalism like commodity production, exploitation, surplus value, the separation of legislative and executive powers and the existence of a parasitic state existed there. A new class benefited from the system. The mode of production of these societies corresponds to the description by Marx as 'capitalism without the capitalist'.


27 Karl Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law', p. 176.


31 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 5.


39 See ibid, p. 53.

40 See ibid, p. 46.


43 Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 21.

44 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘The German Ideology’, p. 36.

45 See ibid, p. 36.

46 See ibid, p. 37.

47 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosop hic Manuscripts of 1844, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 103-104.

48 My arguments on Marx’s critique of idealism and materialism generally based on Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming reality, Verso, London, 1989. I also find useful following works: Jorge Larrain, Marxism and Ideology; Philip Hodgkiss, The Making of Modern Mind; Derek Sayer, The Violence of Abstraction: The

49 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, p. 133.
50 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 30.
51 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, p. 133.
52 Marx quoted in Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, p. 128.
53 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 37.
54 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming reality, p. 135.
56 Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 21.
57 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 3.
58 See ibid, p. 5.
65 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 3.
69 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, p. 126.
70 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 144.
71 Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, p. 131.
72 See ibid, pp. 131-132.
73 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 146.
74 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 5.
75 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 100.
77 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 5.
79 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, pp. 36-37.
82 Ibid.
83 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 36.
86 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 45.
87 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 60.
90 Diana Coole, ‘The Dialectics of Real’, p. 119-120.
91 Ibid, p. 119-120.
92 See ibid, p. 120.
94 For similar kind of argument, see ibid.
96 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, p. 3.

99 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 36.

100 See ibid, p. 36n.


102 See ibid, p. 46.

103 See ibid, pp. 36 and 43-44.

104 See ibid, p. 44.

105 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 45.


108 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘German Ideology’, p. 36n.


110 See ibid, p. 77.


113 See ibid, p. 101.


120 Étienne Balibar cited in ibid.

121 Ibid, p. 93.


Ibid, p. 80.


See ibid, p. 142.


See for whole argument ibid, p.66.


Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, ‘German Ideology’, pp. 43-44.


Ibid, p. 25.


149 Ibid, p.45.
153 V.N. Voloshinov cited in ibid, p. 171.
154 See ibid, p. 170.
157 See ibid, p. 96.
158 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, p.5.
159 See ibid, p. 25.