Ambivalent change—political, social and technological—has been the outstanding feature of the 20th century affecting Indian societies and peoples like it has affected throughout the globe. Whereas the first half of the century witnessed elaborate campaigns of political and economic unification and assimilation culminating in totalitarian systems of suppression, in India it has paved way for the political independence of this country from the British Empire. But the latter half of this century has been emerging, not without its own contradictions, as a movement toward human freedom buttressed by a newly found sense of the dignity of the human person. At the end of 20th century, there emerged greater sensitivity to human freedom and the dignity of the human person has found expression in movements like the implementation of Mandal commission report and the political movements of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes demanding greater respect and greater role in the social life of Indian societies. Within this context, the present chapter raises the question as to how the humanization of social life is to be understood.

There are two principal dynamics in the present set of problems, namely, person and society. As society is the setting in which the person exists and acts, person and society seem closely interrelated and hence not very problematic. However, apparently there are two goals at which one should aim: the humanization of social relations in order to make them acceptable for the human being and favorable to her/his self-realization and the humanization of social relations in order to make one’s life really human and spiritualized. Though each of the two tasks initially begins with what seems indifferent, in practice, there appears to be different ways for Oriental and Occidental cultures.

The Theme: Humanization of Social Life

The theme ‘humanization of social life immediately directs our attention to the notion of person and extends the problematic on the theme ‘the place of the
person in society. The topic also is directed toward two special implications of that theme especially appropriate to our time. One is that the progressively generalized recognition of the lack of adequate attention of the distinctive dignity of the person in social life and its structures implies the need for social development and change. The second is that this need confronts us with some of the most profound dilemmas of life in ever more complex time.

Together these issues, there are a number of tasks. The first is to the grasp two dimensions of the challenge. The watershed events in Eastern Europe and China in 1989 drew the world's attention to the issue of human dignity. But these must not totally distract our attention from other types of challenges to the dignity of mankind more characteristics of other regions. Some are so violent and shockingly ruthless as to make them difficult to accept; others are so subtle and enticing that they may be easily accepted and thereby undermine even new found freedoms. Hence, it becomes necessary to look for root characteristics of our time which enable us to grasp with new insight the dignity of the person, to recoil from oppressions long accepted and to search for ways as yet unexplored in which to respond to the dilemmas of our times and in which even to advance and enrich the sense of what it is to be human.

Four theoretical steps may be suggested.

1. The first is to look into the Western tradition for what is has come to discover about the person, in particular: (a) for its constitution in Itself or, as it were, on its own two feet, (b) for its character as free and responsible, and (c) for its creative capacities to envisage to new possibilities.

2. The second is to look to the Eastern sense of unity for ways of healing the divisive conflicts of egoism. This could make it possible to look more directly at the corrosive forces destructive of social life and both to understand the dynamism of oppression and to gain our bearings for attempt to respond thereto.

3. Thirdly, it was suggested that the Trinity may constitute a model for combining the two, namely, the full integrity of the person that is yet lived in full communion with 'other'.

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4. Fourthly, a broad Christian anthropology which would project a theoretical framework for the humanization of social life.

Without such sense of what the person is by nature and should survive to be in fact, efforts to understand the situation could provide only a basis for despair, adjustment to the situation might be in fact only compromise, and compromise in turn might be capitulation to the vortex forces of human destruction. Hence, an effort to bring into focus some of the historical progress in learning more about the dignity of the person and the goals for a corresponding humanization of the relations between persons is a first and continuing task.

Socio-Political Dimension

The dignity of the person can be experienced not only positively, but negatively or by contrast. Hence, many mentioned ways in which the person is treated not as subject and hence as a free and responsible determinant of their actions, but as an object to be manipulated by others and utilized for goals or goods that are less than human.

In the social, political and the economic orders this can be experienced in many ways. It can be the concentration of power in the hands of the few leaving the vast number of people powerless over their fate. It can be the reality of empire as overriding entity which treats entire peoples as projects in order to assert its own goals and interests. In our more intellectual time it can be ideology which is willing to sacrifice the free expression of peoples in favour of its own constrictive sense of order, progress, production or unbridled competition.

This suggests work on a number of levels. First, a critical hermeneutics could make it possible to identify at various levels the patterns of interests and the social and psychological dynamisms which constrict free expression. Second, it may now be possible to achieve new understanding of what triggers and enables change, and, perhaps even more, what can guide change along paths which lead to a result that is truly democratic? After many decades when change was undoubtedly desired but was seemed impossible, great changes are suddenly afoot: what are the conditions and catalysts of such change? For this, studies of the
rhetoric of change whether in classical sources or contemporary situations might prove to be of special help in gaining insight into the way new vision is shaped, deep and broad human commitment constituted, and social consensus constructed.

**Socio-Cultural Dimension**

A first question in this area is how change can take place without descending into anarchy and chaos under the pressure of economic need, ethnic rivalries or simple lack of leadership? This direct attention toward the past in order to garner the considerable resources of restraint, civility, sacrifice and dedication in the tradition of the peoples. If we are to rise to this task our own stature will not do, we must stand on the shoulders of our forebears. If we are to have the needed adaptability the fixed patterns of scientific constructs will not suffice; hence it is important to survey the values of our culture in order that the profoundly humane achievements and commitments of our people might be engaged and promoted. And we must ask whether values influence policy; and if so whether these cases are remembered and institutionalized in the policy making process possible rather than being relegated to a secondary place in favour of national interest, security and the like.

Second, the resources of the various cultural traditions may hold special promise. Where some cultures have structured their modern institutions on a model of single competing individuals linked externally through a social contract, others, e.g. the Philippines, may have retained a greater emphasis upon deep bonds of community and harmony. This may an important resource for any effort to conceive a humanization of social life. The economic and industrial prowess of the so-called five small dragons along the Pacific rim suggest that modernity is not an univocous notion, that humankind possesses rich and varied resources for its humanization, and indeed that humanization of any one part of mankind may now depend upon a wise assimilation of ideas and examples from many sources.

Third, work toward the future requires models of society which can guide our efforts? We need to search for models of wholeness and open social cooperation in a pattern of subsidiarity in order, instead of mutual exclusion and
extensive marginalization, to maximize participation and responsible self-determination at each level. This would suggest a pervasive program of humanization and entitlement at all levels of social life.

Fourth, in this light the nature of science must itself be deeply reassessed. In the Kantian system the sciences work with universal and necessary terms. But humans work in science and make it an exercise of freedom in which human genius, creativity and commitment are important. This is true in physics and even truer in economics and medicine. In the field of communications a global network exists already. It will be a major task to safeguard in these appropriate individual, commercial, national and cultural interests. The recent effort of the United Nation to work out a global policy simply for information illustrates how difficult this can be. The humanization of modern social life cannot proceed without investigations of the human role in scientific work and the humanizing potentialities of scientific progress.

Religions and Ecclesial Dimensions

Finally one should look to the theological groundings of reality and cultures. The notion of a unitary source and goals gives a sense of personal dignity which takes the person beyond the position of being an object of social manipulation. At the same time it grounds in love that relatedness and brotherhood which go beyond measured legal requirements. This can suggest alternate horizontal models of social relation, even with vertical structures as, e.g., in the medieval utopian version of R.Lull and the contemporary indications of Vatican II. Further, the notion of redemption bespeaks forgiveness and reconciliation.

But what is the proper role of the church in a pluralistic society? How can it bring the message of an absolute grounding for human dignity to save it from subjection to a system or a state made by men, while at the same time it promotes the human freedom this entails? Are the two contradictory or identical?

Person: A Subject in One's Own Right

A major mode of dehumanization which affects contemporary efforts at modernization in all parts of the world is its tendency as scientific rationalization
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to reduce all to clear and distinct structures in which persons are considered only functional or as roles. The more properly personal dimensions of the human being, at first ignored, are crushed progressively whenever they disturb the machine-like system.

In responding to this modern threat it seems helpful to draw up the resources developed in Greek philosophy. In Greek the term persons appears to have reflected an actor playing a role by speaking through a theatre mask. If Athens was to promote human life—rather than killing off its Socrates—there was need for an understanding not only of roles, but of the persons who played those roles. This was progressively sculptured in the Academy and Lyceum.

First, there was need to distinguish between what came to be called accidents, namely the reality which existed in and by something else, and the subject of these accidents, in which they exist. This is the substance, the reality which exists in its own right or, as it were, stands on its own two feet. Progressively through ancient times, and especially through Christian philosophy's development of the sense of existence as the direct effect of the creative power of God, the subject came to be recognized as having three characteristics: completeness, independence and being the subject or source of actions.

When these are considered in substances which are persons, completeness would exclude reduction of the person to any of its dimensions after the manner of an idealism or a materialism. It would urge attention not merely to either mind or body, to either spirit or matter, but to both together as a whole. Today we would think also of the developmental character of the person and in any assessment of a situation give great weight to what would stunt or promote human realization in either or both of these dimensions.

Independence for the person does not mean unconnectedness, for being material the person is sculpted out of the flow of material life and hence integrated and even integral to the development of the physical universe. At the same time, emerging precisely out of that universe and being constituted in its own right, the
person cannot be merely absorbed into, or reduced to, any other unity whether physical or social. Instead, as subject of action which affects not only others but oneself, the human subject is intimately and responsibly related to the whole which it must preserve and promote.

A Self-Conscious and Free Subject

Thus far we have been speaking about how the Greek tradition though ancient and medieval (i.e., classical) time evolved the characteristics of subsistent individuality which undergirds the sense of human rights. It showed that rights pertained, not to a society which at its discretion extended them to persons, but to persons themselves whose protection and promotion are an imperative for society.

The Greeks faced another task as well. That was to identify the level of the dignity and responsibility proper to the human person as such. This task becomes clearer when one notes that in the Greek mythic horizon, not only were humans subject to the will of the gods, but the gods, in turn, were subject to impersonal fate. It was liberation from this, rather than from mere physical necessity, which constituted the greatest development of the person through classical times. We face similar challenges in this century proportionate to the development of our technical prowess and its power for invasive and pervasive controls of spirit as well as body.

The project of Heraclitus for liberation from an impersonal fate required three components: (a) a universe that was under law and had a sense, (b) the ability of the person to obtain some understanding of that law, and (c) with these laws to be able to exercise command over their life. For Plato and Aristotle the powers of knowledge and command characterized the person and non-physical beings above mankind in the Christian Middle Ages, by evolving the way in which the person incarnates these principles and capabilities, philosophy provided essential understanding of personal unity and vision, goodness and love.

First, that the person has but one existence and one form or soul means both that one’s physical reality has human dignity and must not be coerced and that one’s spiritual dignity must exercised and realized in temporal and historical
modes. Second, the mode in which the laws of the universe are present to the person is not merely one of consciousness as with animals, but of self-conscious. This implies not self-centeredness, but an ability to grasp the reality and structure of things in a controlled scientific mode, to express this in a language and to shape it creatively as art. Finally, as not limited to matter, but spiritual, the person can transcend self and universe and be open to Being, Truth and Goodness Itself. In this relationship every good, as participating and imaging Goodness Itself, can be attractive; but because none of them fully matches Goodness Itself each engagement is free.

**Freedom and Creativity**

The phenomenologies developed in this century have made it possible to come to direct appreciation of the subjectivity which characterizes the person and the way in which the free exercise of this is itself the manifestation par excellence of Being and hence the essence of creative change.

This can be approached through Marcel’s critique of the subject-object relationship as the basic frame for epistemology: if in order to known the subject must be made an object it thereby loses its very subjectivity. Hence a new approach centered in the subject is required. The three Critiques of Kant constitute a more intricate approach to this subject. In the first he shows how the subject is at work in the very constitution of the objective necessary and universal laws of the sciences. His second Critique leads us to freedom as the source of the moral and hence social laws. The third Critique shows that if human freedom is not to be suffocated by the necessary laws of the universe then all must be considered is teleological or goal oriented.

But just how is the exercise of human freedom to be mediated to this teleology? If exercised ultimately according to scientific laws it will not be free, if exercised according to universal moral laws, even those given to ourselves, it will not be a creative centres for change. Hence, our imagination must range through reality considering all, both the actual and the possible. It must evaluate all according to our sense of what would befit and contribute to the constitution of a
life of harmony, beauty and peace. In these terms we must react with the full force of our personality involving our total being to its very roots.

At this point our creative human freedom becomes not only the source, but the model, mirror and norm of change that humanizes social life. This is not to say that our freedom is absolute; it is the Goodness itself that is the alpha and omega and whose love creates and dynamizes us at each moment. But we experience that love through the ways in which it is imaged or disfigured in the life of every person and community.

**Humanization of Life: The Occidental and the Oriental**

The Western world was successful in developing and perfecting social structures. In a number of Western countries, social relations are sufficiently humanized to ensure a high standard of life as well as social justice. It may be said that given such conditions, a genuine humanization of life was made possible there. In practice, however, we witness a prevalent consumerist mode of life according to which the self-realization of a person is primarily the possibility for a comfortable life, luxury being the ideal. Indeed, individual persons and small groups or communities can follow a really humanized way of life.

With regard to the Oriental cultural model, we may say that it is the personality, but not the social life, that is being humanized. In the case of Western cultural model, it is the social relations but not the individual human life that is being humanized. Thus, the issue of humanization of social life appears to be rather problematic and unsolvable. The components, which seemed complementary to one another theoretically, become incompatible in the practical level which can suggest certain pessimistic overtones. The pertinent and significant question is whether human dignity can be harmonized with social cohesion. If not, how can we talk about a meaningful understanding of human dignity and thus humanization of social life? In fact, this chapter is purported to inquire into the specificities of these issues. Therefore, to begin with the philosophical specificities as the prime concern, let us start with the concept of society.
Society

Etymologically, the term ‘society’ has its roots in the French word societe and the Latin word societas which have the same meaning of ‘companion,’ indicating the most basic common trait of the need to congregate (or even to relate) as human beings in this world. In a very broad sense, society could include humans and other beings as well. But we restrict ourselves to human society for our consideration here. There are two types of definitions of society: a) the functional definition, referring to a group of persons in reciprocal relationships whose interactions enable human to help and enrich to each other to fulfill one another’s interests and goals; and b) the structural definition, referring to all folkways, mores and institutions of habits, sentiments and ideas. In the sociological sense, ‘society’ could mean a group of people living in a particular territory whose language and culture are the same and are commonly shared for their benefit. By extension, this can be extended to the people of a region or a country or even the world at large. It is extended, in another sense, to mean a variety of political, cultural and scientific groupings and association such as economic, industrial, ethnic or Western infrastructure as well. This expression ‘society’ may sometimes refer to any organized voluntary associations of people for religious, charitable and patriotic purposes too. This term could mean any organized group of people joined together because of work, interests, etc., in common like a ‘medical society’. A few attempted definitions of a ‘society’ by famous thinkers here could serve to figure out its complex nature both in sociological and philosophical sense. The characterization and definition of ‘society’ by Talcott Parsons (1902-79) is ‘the total complex of human relationships insofar as they grow out of action in terms of the means-end relationship, intrinsic or symbolic.’ R.M. Maclver (1882-1970) and Page define ‘society’ as a ‘system of usages and procedures, authority and mutual aid, of many groupings and divisions, of controls of human behaviour and of liberties.’ G.D.H. Cole (1889-1959) would define ‘society’ as ‘the complex or organized associations and institutions within the community.’ Thus, in a larger scale ‘society’ is a both structural and a functional organization or system.
There are many criteria for terming something as a ‘society.’ Merely because of expansive nature of humans a society does not come about. Society is a relationship; but what is the type of relationship that the individuals have in and to a society? Is there an ontological status of society as such? Social action or interaction, social relation of co-ordination or co-operation, social order, social control and social organization or institution are the elements that are to be analyzed in the understanding of an abstraction of a reality called ‘society.’

Society is not tangible, yet, real and necessary. Maclver’s paraphrase of a society as ‘a web of social relationships’ opens up innumerable types of relationships which indicate a process of associating as humans. In this case, social relationships refer to reciprocal awareness, a ‘consciousness of the kind’ (F.H. Giddings) or a ‘we-feeling’ (Cooley) or a ‘common propensity’ (W.I. Thomas). Therefore, the factors that constitute a society are:

1. ‘Likeness’ (Maclver) that would start from kinship and move to nationality or one world. This resemblance could or should include ‘difference’ as well. This difference is subordinate to likeness in constituting social organization, and it is necessary. The ‘primary similarity and secondary difference’ could mean identity and common rudiments that go to make up a society;

2. Interdependence is another factor that is very much visible in the world today from birth to death of human beings. The basic idea here is to negate self-sufficiency of any human that it may lead to mutual influence and benefits. In philosophical view, this could mean any social relationship view; this could also mean any social relationship or communication which is so vital in any social system. It lays the path of mutuality and complementarity;

3. Co-operation is the next essential factor of a society. It avoids mutual destructiveness and effects economic gain. This underlines the importance of social action or interaction leading to mutual gains for individuals and the community as a whole. This factor is essential in maintaining unity through procedures; 4) Authority or control is the key factor for order in any society. It is essential to sort out conflicts that are bound to arise in any
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common living of more than two human beings. This does not discount basic freedom or rights of members of a society.

Although, it is acknowledged that every human being is undoubtedly a social being, the need to know the origins of society is pedagogical. There have been numerous theories explaining the origin of society. First of all, there is the ‘divine origin theory’ that advocated that God created the society just like He created everything in this world. This theory gave rise to Divine Right theory in the course of time. Secondly, ‘force theory’ explains the beginning of Society as a result of stronger or superior physical force subjugating weaker people. In other words, physical coercion or force brought people together and made to live in a society. Thirdly, Sir Henry Maine (1822-88) brings in the ‘Patriarchal or Matriarchal theory’ denoting society as the expansion or extension of family system. He opines that society is the family writ large. Fourthly, the ‘social contract theory’ holds that individual willingly created society for certain ends by mutual or collective agreement. These ‘contractualists’ are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78). Extending this in further way, Adam Smith posits society as an artificial device created to foster a mutual economy. Finally, ‘evolutionary theory’ explains that society is not created or made but a gradual growth or evolution. The advocates of this theory, such as Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) subscribe to the view that the existing societies are due to various stages of development and that progress has been gradual. The critiques of the theories of origin of society negate the ideas of the first four theories and seem to prefer the last evolutionary theory as more reasonable for acceptance. Whatever be the types of society, be it tribal or agrarian or industrial or cosmopolitan, social thinkers and philosophers have always been critical of their origin and development.

The Platonic or Aristotelian sense of a society (always in reference to polis) has been transcended by Stoics to refer to individualistic and then more to cosmopolitan outlook. The Romans took it to another level of civilized world to free citizens. After Christian (Churches) thought of raising it up to transcendental aspects came the Hobbesian and Lockean sense of society as the plurality of
individuals in relation with achievement of their own interests. In this type of society, the kind of relationship that dominated the thought was exchange relationship leading to division of labour and economic benefits. The modern evolution of thought regarded society as human phase of organic evolutionary process. Later on, the common will (or general will) surrendered to sovereign state as a form of social institution (as proposed by Rousseau) came to be viewed as more of coercion of individuals. This was overcome by positivism and idealism that gave rise to a scientific notion of a theory of society but were bereft of metaphysical or ultimate ends of a society. With the clarifications by social theories such as Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920), the institutional and ‘rules-roles’ aspects of society (or even community) was bridged in terms of the relation with individuals. The Hindu sense of kudumbam is rhetoric enough to point to new features with regard to relationship, function and action in a society as that of members of a family. What is peculiar to Hindu thought has been the organization of society as hierarchical by caste system which is deeply rooted in the mind and ethos of this sub-continent.

The basic relationship between individual and society is interdependence. Although individual is a product of a society, both are complementary and should supplement each other. One aspect that contributes enormously in such complementary fashion is language. The natural aspect of a human is made manifest more clearly in the way he or she communicates through language. Moreover, for Parsons, the essential factors that go to make up a society as such in its social complex relationships are heredity and environment, culture, scientific knowledge and techniques, religious, metaphysical and ethical systems of ideas and forms of artistic expression. These different factors have to be kept in mind in all aspects of society and its construct. This is an indication of a state of mind or a pattern, not people or structure, which constitutes society. It is not a group but a process of relationships that makes up a social fact. Hence, society is a well-aggregated organism, an analogy that indicates the essence of a flexible system of relationships, order and control.
The Functional Pre-requisite of a Society

A comparative social science requires a generalized system of concepts which will enable the scientific observer to compare and contrast large bodies of concretely of different social phenomena in consistent terms. A promising step in furthering the development of systematic social analysis is a tentative formulation of the functional prerequisites of a society. Functional prerequisites refer broadly to the things that must get done in any society if it is to continue as a going concern, i.e. the generalized conditions necessary for the maintenance of the system concerned. The specific structural arrangement for meeting the functional prerequisites differ, indeed, from one society to another and, in the course of time, change in any given society.

This part of the chapter offers

1. A definition of a society on the most general level;

2. A statement of four generalized conditions,

   We seek to avoid the limitation inherent in defining the function of a social element solely in terms of its contribution to the survival or maintenance of the particular system of which it is a component. Structural analysis, which has recently undergone notable development, is prone to focus attention on static equilibriums. We consider what must be done in any society and hope our effort may be of use in considering the alterations that take the complete realization of any one of which would terminate the existence of a society as defined;

3. A list of the functional pre-requisites of a society. It seeks to justify the inclusion of each prerequisite by the demonstration that in its hypothetical absence the society could not survive, since at least one of the four conditions terminating a society would occur. There is no reason to believe that the list of functional prerequisites offered here is definitive. It is subject to revision with the growth of general theory and with experience in its application to concrete situation.
Any formulation of functional prerequisites depends for its categories on the theory of action employed. Our theory of action uses the concept of an actor whose orientation to his situation is threefold: cognitive, affective, and goal directed. The actor is an abstraction from the total human being. Many of the qualities of the human being constitute part of the situation, the set of means and conditions, within which the actor operates.3

Though the definition of the functional prerequisites of a society logically precedes the development of a scheme of structural prerequisites — which tell how the functional prerequisites may be met— in actuality the theoretic development of the two approaches is indivisible.

**Definition of a Society**

The unit we have selected for analysis is a society, such as a nation, tribe, or band, and not any social system in general. The statement of the functional prerequisites of any social system — a monastery, a church, or a town, for example — would be on too general a level for the present discussion, though it may be an important task. Furthermore, once the functional prerequisites of a society are outlined, it becomes easier to state those of other types of social systems, often by dropping certain prerequisites from the list, since most of these other types of systems are parts of a society (or result from the interrelations of two or more societies) and depend for their perpetuation on the existence of a society.

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*An society is a group of human beings sharing a self-sufficient system of action which is capable of existing longer than the life-span of an individual, the group being recruited at least in part by the sexual reproduction of the members.*

The identity and continuity of a society inhere in the persistence of the system of action in which the actors participate rather than in the particular set of actors themselves. There may be a complete turnover of individuals, but the society may survive. The individuals may survive, but the society may disintegrate. A system may change. Its persistence inheres in the fact that it maintains its separation from the
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situation, i.e. it inheres in the integrity of the organism, not in its fixity or unalterable character.

A system of action always exists in a situation. The viability of a social system and its recognition as a society within the terms of this definition depend upon the particular set of conditions in which it functions. Study of the system itself cannot alone determine whether the system meets the criteria of the definition. What is crucial is that a social system contains successful arrangements for meeting the chronic and recurrent features of its milieu.4

"Longer than the life-span of an individual" reminds us that a society must be able to replace its members with effectively socialized individuals from the maturing generation. The requirement of sexual reproduction excludes from consideration such groups (monasteries, cliques) as depend solely on types of recruitment other than sexual. But a society may be recruited in part by non-sexual means, e.g., by immigration and conquest.

The heart of the definition is "self-sufficient system of action." Its full meaning will be developed in the exposition of the functional prerequisites and in the next paragraphs. A number of questions are bound to arise in the reader's mind as to the application of the definition to particular social systems and also on the basis on which such an approach centres around.

A society is not a culture. Culture is socially transmitted behavior conceived as an abstraction from concrete social groups. Two or more societies may have the same culture or similar cultures. Though the Greek city-states shared similar culture patterns, each possessed a self-sufficient structure of action and is hence to be considered a separate society. One society may be composed of groups with some marked differences in culture. The union of agricultural, industrial, and pastoral groups in a single structure of action is an example. We discuss below the limits as to the amount of diversity possible and the conditions under which such diversity may occur without the disintegration of the society.

To some degree two different societies may possess overlapping personnel and even structural elements without losing their identity as distinct societies. The
fact that Englishmen live in the United States as diplomats and traders and function, in effect, as actors in both systems, does not destroy the identity or the self-sufficiency of the United States or of Great Britain as action-systems.

To be considered a society, a group need not be self-sufficient with respect to resources. It is the structure of action that must be self-sufficient. Thus, the United States is a society. While imports and exports are necessary to its maintenance, arrangements for foreign trade are part of its self-sufficient structure of action. It is this, and not the group of individuals, that is self-sufficient.

A series of difficult decisions about the relationships of various social system can be resolved by the introduction of point of crucial differentiation. When a social aggregate is not capable of providing a structure, structures, or parts of structures which can meet functional prerequisites in question, it is not to be considered a society. Thus, occupied Japan does not constitute part of American Society, since in the absence of American forces Japan would seem to be able to continue control and the legitimized form of force. The idea is that an American terms does not constitute a society because of its through participation in political, economic, value and other structures.5

The performance of a given function is prerequisite to a society if in its absence one or more of the four conditions dissolving a society results. This can be demonstrated clearly in some cases. Less clearly, but still convincingly, the non-fulfillment of certain other functions can be shown at least to foster one or more of the conditions negating a society. No specific action-pattern is prerequisite to the existence of our ideal typical society. We are concerned with what must get done in a society, not with how it is done.

A Provision for adequate relationship to the environment and for sexual recruitment.--- This includes modes of adapting to, manipulating, and altering the environment in a such way as (a) to maintain a sufficient number and kind of members of the society at an adequate level of functioning; (b) to deal with the existence of other societies in a manner which permits the persistence of the system of action; and (c) to pattern heterosexual relationships to insure
opportunities and motivation for a sufficient rate of reproduction. In the absence of 
these provisions, the group will suffer biological extinction through the death of 
the members or failure to reproduce or it will suffer absorption into another social 
system.

A society, however, need not provide equally for the physiological needs of 
all its members. Infanticide, genocide, limitation of marriage, and birth control 
may have been regarded necessary to maintain certain societies. Which members, 
and in what proportions, are most important for the functioning of the society 
depends on its social organization. Every society needs enough adult members to 
ensure reproduction and to man the essential status positions.

A society must adapt to, manipulate, and alter its situation. Among the 
features thus dealt with may be chronically threatening aspects of the situation. In 
a dry region a society may employ techniques of food storage, irrigation, or 
nomadic migration. If neighboring societies are hostile, an army may be essential 
and the society thus dependent on the deliberate hazarding of some of its 
members' lives. The existence of Murngin society depends partly on the 
destruction of a portion of its adult males by chronic warfare. Residence is only 
one possible response to hostile neighbors. Certain "men-o-bush" tribes of New 
Guinea make but little resistance to raids. These raids, however, do not threaten to 
extinguish the society. Only if they do can such a passive adaptation be said to be 
inadequate to meet the functional prerequisite.

The inclusion of such apparently disparate features as maintenance of the 
organism, defense, and provision for sexual reproduction under one heading is by 
no means arbitrary. From the point of view of a social system, the nonhuman 
environment, the biological nature of man, and the existence of other societies are 
all part of the situation of action. To none of these aspects of the situation is 
passive adaptation the only mode of adequate relationship. Thus the biological 
basis of society itself is molded. Individuals have constitutional differences, but 
the latter are variously evaluated and dealt with by societies. The biological birth-
growth-death cycle is dynamic process in its own right, yet societies both adapt to 
it and modify it in a number of ways. In noting the necessity for a society to meet
certain biological prerequisites, we remark also upon the great plasticity of individuals. It is scarcely necessary to remark that, concretely, societies alter their modes of relationship to their situations; that technological changes occur, sometimes through loss, more often by invention and diffusion.

Role Differentiation and Role Assignment

This signifies the systematic and stable division of activities. We will treat under other headings role-learning and the sanctions perpetuating the role structure.

In any society there are activities which must be regularly performed of the society, is to persist. If they are to be done dependably, these extensive and varied activities must be broken down and assigned to capable individuals trained and motivate to carry them out. Otherwise everyone would be doing everything or nothing a state of indeterminacy which is the antithesis of a society and which precludes getting essential activities carried out. The universal problems of scarcity and order are insoluble without legitimized allocation of property rights and authority, and these, in turn, are unattainable without reasonably integrated rule-differentiation. While a given individual is often the locus of several rules, he can never combine all the roles of the society in himself. Age and sex differences impose a degree of role-differentiation everywhere; in some societies class and occupational are additional basis of differentiation. Arguments for specialization based on differential ability, while of great force in complex societies, have no clear bearing on societies so simple that any technique can be learned by any individual who is not feeble-minded. Whatever the society, activities necessary to its survival must be worked out in predictable, determinate ways, or else apathy or the war of each against all must prevail. Without reliable provisions for child-rearing activities and without their assignment to specific persons or groups, the society invites extinction, since children at birth are helpless. The absence of role-differentiation and of role-assignment thus makes the conditions negating a society.  

Society arises as a unification of many persons who strive conjointly for a common purpose. Its root is found as Heidegger comments lay in the openness of Being to beings. This Being is such that it embraces and supports all beings,
which exist only to the extent that they participate in Being. This is especially true of persons who depend totally on the event of the openness of Being within them. This appearance of Being within the person implies also that community with other beings at least is possible. An instance of what we mean is provided by the practice of mutual communication between persons who, in contrast to the mute bearing of animals, bring to each other that same openness of Being to itself. As the human person is a being in himself, so too he is a being with others. This means that he can never lose himself in others, but actually comes to possess himself. In fact, the more he is with others in the depth of his being, the more he is with himself. The opposite is also equally true: the more he is truly with himself in the depth of his being; the more he is with others. As Heidegger writes:

In so far as beings which linger a while do not entirely dissipate themselves in the boundless conceit of aiming for a baldly insistent subsistence, in so far as they no longer share the compulsion to expel one another from what is presently present, they let order belong. In so far as beings which linger a while give order, each being thereby lets (care) belong to the other, let’s pervade its relations with the others.\(^7\)

In the earlier part of this chapter, we have tried to show that the texture of human person is the texture of the human self. It is therefore equally true that only in this human world, a free man asserts his humanity and a society exposes its sociality. Therefore, it is important to measure every demand for a society and its organizations to transform it by the extent to which it is capable to serve the development of human person and his creativity in particular. In other words, it is only in a society that human persons can find his complete fulfillment. The aim of a society cannot impede or disturb the possibilities of the rise, development and application of consciousness but a liberation, which stimulates directly –by its common ends and values – and thus tends to enhance the individual feeling by a social value. The upsurge in violence in certain parts of our country is due partly to many people who remain full of emotions being forced down self-destructive avenues for their expression.
Social Life: Hard and Soft Systems

The problem under consideration is the most acute of our day, but its root goes back to the very origins of mankind for the whole history of mankind can be considered as its perpetual striving to humanize its life. Indeed, human nature is present in every human being like a substance of which every human being is formed, and when in each person it develops so as to attain a peculiar configuration, this process can be described as becoming humanized. For the human is an historical being inasmuch as one becomes a human being or is humanized by assimilating the spiritual content of the epoch in which he lives in society. The content includes ideas derived from the cognitive and ideological processes at the disposition of the society at one’s historical moment, as well as the values and the corresponding vision of the world which brings them into a system. This means that human nature in a given human being is shaped according to a definite cultural model. It is only shaped but not changed at its roots, however: hence it preserves all its initial and inherent essential characteristics. Human nature is then truly humanized, while including some inherited components.

Apparently programmed into one’s living nature is not only a striving for individual survival, but also an aspiration for the preservation of the species. Hence, along with the libido, there is also a specific drive toward competition which assumes a form acceptable to social life or to the model according to which human nature is shaped. Since Nietzsche this component has been called the will to power. Apparently this has some positive social meaning for it plays an active role, at least in the Western mode of life. At the same time, however, it is a destructive factor since its action is contrary to that of the spiritual factors. Being rooted in human nature itself, it is an ineradicable factor constantly influencing social life. If the history of mankind can be considered the ongoing humanization of social life, it can be described also as the continual dehumanization of social life due to the will to power.

Thus, a person may be said to dwell and act in two different systems at the same time. The first is the system of social mechanisms, laws and rules which regulates the flow of social life. One who enters social life looking for self-
realization is bound to play his social roles according to strict rules of the game: this is a kind of "hard" system. The second is the cultural system which, although notable in the spheres of architecture, art, etc. as embodiments of the creative power of human beings, is a realm of spiritual and subjective factors, based upon values. This is weakly structured and, compared with the first, can be defined over-all as a "soft" system. It is not without reason that we characterize it by such terms as the cultural "atmosphere," "flavor," etc. We are am inclined to use the term "cultural field" for it functions in a manner comparable to that of a gravitational field in which some kinds of trajectories are realized while others are prevented. Though both are possible in principle, more energy is needed to overcome the field's resistance to those which were not realized. Unlike the first system, this is sphere of the desirable and favorable, but not of the necessary.

Both systems are part of the regulation of society, but act in different manners. In the first, one is the set of roles one plays, in the second, figuratively speaking, one is a personality with an individual system of values, that is, one is an individual human being. Acting through the set of subjective factors, the soft system appears far weaker than the hard one upon which the Western world seems inclined to depend, though the soft systems are no less important than the hard, however, and no hard system is possible until a sufficiently high cultural level has been achieved.9

Note that a high cultural field is essential for the existence of a democratic system. Democracy is intended to ensure a broad spectrum of rights for citizens and to make possible effective affirmation of the person in society. Whereas personal dictatorship would enable but one to achieve the latter to the maximum degree, democracy is a social structure intended to balance the opposed strivings of various men and to deaden their will to power. Yet its mechanisms would be ineffective if the energy of its citizens were to be directed mostly to the achievement of personal dictatorship for then a powerful mechanism of suppression (indeed, a dictatorship) would be required to keep order in society. Hence, social structures seem ineffective unless an inner mechanism, based upon a
system of personal values and capable of deadening the will to power, has been built in. It is precisely the cultural field which includes such a system of values.

**Person, Consciousness and Sociality: The Epistemological Insights**

The human person as a conscious individual is not only characterized by his affectivity, motility and activity but also by his sentient awareness of himself as a centre of consciousness. In other words, as a centre of consciousness, one becomes responsive to the other without altering one’s consciousness; To be open to the world therefore means to be involved in, engaged in, concerned about and affected by the world, that is, I make an ongoing participation in the events of the human world. To become conscious means to find oneself thrust into, and participating in, a world of place (society) and events and persons. The texture of consciousness therefore is the texture of the human world; this is the phenomenological position in a non-phenomenological language. For an Indian, “Mumbai”, November 26, 2008 “Terrorists’, and ‘Pogroms’ are a unity of consciousness.

The modern psychologies of consciousness – including neuro-psychology, bio feedback, behaviourism, and the transpersonal approaches – have made many fundamental discoveries in the past 30 years which have enabled us to diagnose and even correct many neurologically based deficits in consciousness, to expand and develop our personal consciousness, as well as to better explain the underlying brain processes which support consciousness. But the task of phenomenology of consciousness is a different one: that is, to describe consciousness in its own terms – without leaving the confines of the human, experiential world. An understanding and explanation of this human experiential world takes us to Edmund Husserl and to the notion of inter subjectivity.

The history of humankind provides two major considerations of inter subjectivity. In chronological order, these are by Aristotle and Hegel/ Marx. Both consider sociability, inter-subjectivity or the political character (politeia) of human beings as givens, that is to say, as matters of fact: for both the socio-political character of human beings goes without saying. The central object for analyses, in
one case, is how to reach happiness in the midst of political life: in the other case, assuming the history of humanity to be the history of class struggle, it is how to realize freedom through overcoming exploitation, so that in history human beings instead of their alienating products can come to the fore.\textsuperscript{10}

**Phenomenological Elements of Sociality**

The constitution of inter-subjectivity occupies a considerable place in Edmund Husserl's work.\textsuperscript{16} Here we would trace in summary the way in which Husserl sees human sociality is constituted vis-à-vis inter-subjectivity. In various texts and periods, four modes can be distinguished. In general, inter subjectivity is constituted via analogy, coupling or placing ourselves in the place of the other and with them living the shared situation. The two first modes are found particularly in the Cartesian Meditations, the two last modes appear in the Phanomenologie des Intersubjektivitat. It should be noted, however, that the four modes are barely suggested in his works and are by no means extensively developed: nevertheless, I would extrapolate his indications along the following lines:

a) The other is conceivable as an analogue of each person's own sphere\textsuperscript{11}, so that the other appears as a modification of us. Hence, analogy is the first mode in which we refer to others; it is always after and in accord with what constitutes our own sphere or property. Here, "property" connotes the real and possible experiences already had or taking place at the present moment, not its judicial meaning.

(b) Coupling (Paarung) reflects that the contact of encounter with the other is always present and living and can be either individual or social. This kind of association is established on the basis of the body, that is, of physical contact of any kind. It is through an interchange of the objective senses and of what is given therein that the other acquires for us a reality of his or her own.

(c) By the same token, the other is given as long as we place ourselves intuitively in his or her position or, literally, "in his or her shoes" (the term used by Husserl is Hinver-set-zung).\textsuperscript{12} This mode is similar to analogy, but differs in that we do not start from our own experiences but try to understand the other's
experiences “as if” we were experiencing them or had ourselves experienced them. Essentially, we carry out imaginary representations, for we cannot count on our own stream of lived experiences or our own memory about them.

(d) Finally, the other appears effectively as an other and not merely as an image or resemblance of our having common lived experiences. Even better; we can assert without any doubt that the other acquires greater reality for us the more living experiences we have had or are having with him or her; this appears valid for encounters with others, whether an individual or a group.

The givenness of the other as a mode of sociality when understood phenomenologically is the constitution of the other, that is, the way in which we have a non-objectifying and non-objectified knowledge. The study of constitution is therefore of the way in which the meaning the other had for us before reflection becomes clear. In other words, constitution takes place a-thematically and is the very process of living. Alongside this constitution we can speak also of a transcendental constitution through which we understand the process through which the non-thematic experience of the other becomes a problem. In this way the problem regarding the world’s objectivity is brought to the fore and corresponds to the problem concerning the community of subject.

Husserl calls “Entropathy” (Einfühlung) which is the experience through which the other is given to us. Entropathy is a manner of a presentation in which what is given to us in an experience is not just a thing (Ding) or mere animal, but a personal subject provided with a body charged with expression and meaning referring both to one’s personal biography (“stream of consciousness) and to a tradition and surrounding cultural world in which one has been living and from which one emerges.

The study of entropathy demands extreme care, so much the more because it is possible to distinguish a twofold entropathy, one authentic and the other inauthentic. Inauthentic entropathy (uneigentliche Einfühlung) for Husserl is any naturalizing experience or comprehension of the other as alongside oneself and part of a natural world susceptible of explanation in terms of causality that is, of functionalism, behaviorism, and social engineering and social cybernetics. In
contrast, Husserl focuses upon authentic entropathy (eigentliche Einfühlung) through which truly personal and human experiences (Geistesiges) come to the fore. These result from reflection upon one's own actions jointly with reflecting upon what follows from them in the sphere of affecitivity, producing results and life. Husserl is concerned with inauthentic entropathy only in order to clarify authentic entropathy, for it is in the latter that philosophical reflection makes clear what constitutes the properly human character of every person, community and culture.

In Husserl's analyses these topics are severely fragmented, but remain mainly at the level of phenomenological epistemology, their relation to practical philosophy remains at best a mere suggestion. As for Husserl practical reason is secondary, it is not possible to find these topics in analyses of practical problems that remain the task of each of us.

Society arises as a unification of many persons who strive conjointly for a common purpose. Its root is found as Heidegger notes lies in the openness of Being to beings. This Being is such that it embraces and supports all beings, which exist only to the extent that they participate in Being. This is especially true of persons who depend totally on the event of the openness of Being within them. This appearance of Being within the person implies also that community with other beings at least is possible. An instance of what I mean is provided by the practice of mutual communication between persons who, in contrast to the mute bearing of animals, bring to each other that same openness of Being to itself. As the human person is a being in himself, so too he is a being with others. This means that he can never loose himself in others, but actually comes to possess himself. In fact, the more he is with others in the depth of his being, the more he is with himself. The opposite is also equally true: the more he is truly with himself in the depth of his being, the more he is with others. As Heidegger writes: In so far as beings which linger a while do not entirely dissipate themselves in the boundless conceit of aiming for a baldly insistent subsistence, in so far as they no longer share the compulsion to expel one another from what is presently present, they let order belong. In so far as beings which linger a while give order, each being thereby lets (care) belong to the other, lets (care) pervade its relations with the others.15
In the earlier part of this chapter, we have tried to show that the texture of human consciousness is the texture of the human world. It is therefore equally true that only in this human world, a free man asserts his humanity and a society its sociality. When we think about the relevance of philosophy, or so to say, why philosophy, then the radical question that concerns any philosophical thinking is pertaining to these issues. Therefore it is important to measure every demand for a society and its organizations to transform it by the extent to which it is capable to serve the development of human consciousness and creativity in particular, which I would say only philosophical thinking can ensure. In other words, it is only in a society that human consciousness can find its complete fulfillment. The aim of a society cannot impede or disturb the possibilities of the rise, development and application of consciousness but a liberation, which stimulates directly –by its common ends and values – and thus tends to enhance the individual feeling by a social value. The upsurge in violence in certain parts of our country is due partly to many people who remain full of emotions being forced down self-destructive avenues for their expression.

Thus, there is an authentic philosophical problem with regard to the comprehension and articulation of the relation between consciousness, society and values. It regards the possibility and necessity of speaking meaningfully of a social, cultural or generic consciousness at the corresponding levels. Whatever the possibility of an answer by philosophy, it is necessary to point out the consequences and the implications which are directed to the life of individuals in community, their realities and possibilities. They are not simply theoretical or matters of preference or of pre-established interests of certain groups or certain value considerations. The point is to make life ever more possible at exemplary levels with criteria and standards of quality, that is, with universally desirable values. Accordingly, this chapter has focused to accord with this view for an explicit thematization of the possibilities for individuals and society.
II

Social Life and Humanization: Issues of Theory and Practice

The second part of the present chapter is purported to examine and relocate the rational and axiological foundations of certain dilemmas that can bring about changes involved in the process of the humanization of social life in a country like India. For third world countries in general and India in particular, the problem of humanization and social life is a pressing one since the answer to this question determines the social, economic and political structures and relationships that should be put in place in order to achieve a humanized society.

Indian society understands man as an individual situated in a social body. The person is recognized as such by society with corresponding duties and privileges. In view of such an understanding, the analysis of Indian society provides complexities that are a challenge to theorizing. It consists of traditional realities, legacies of Islam and colonial Institutions and practices. These and yet others form the rock-bed of contemporary Indian society. In this regard, India and its caste-based society becomes a more appropriate instance as the laboratory for the consideration of a ‘theory of humanization’. Toward an orientation of this task, let us begin by exploring the meaning of person by contrasting it to a number of other notions. It may serve us as guide posts for a series of positive (if not negative) and progressively deepening insights regarding the nature of the person, his role as an instituting subject and as the constituting consciousness (his self-fulfilment).

Problem of Humanization at the Practical Level

One of the problems that makes humanization difficult is the geographic diversity and linguistic diversity of the people. In a country of twelve hundred millions people with diverse cultural background and different languages, it is really unconceivable to imagine the finality of humanization problem. If language determines the way we think, conceptualize the world, and relate to people, how the humanization of diverse and pluralistic social lives is possible is still a question to be answered.
While the Hindu culture is predominant, it would violate the freedom of other ethnic cultures if its ideology were made the basis for humanization and social life. The tendency to reduce all cultures to a unity should be avoided. There must be a plurality which allows freedom for local knowledge and cultures to grow.

Problem of Humanization at the Theoretical Level

Even if India had claimed to have a homogeneous culture, it does not follow it can serve as the ideal basis for the humanization of Indian social life. There could be some aspects of it that are dehumanizing. Therefore it must be open to criticism and to contributions from other cultures. To determine, however, which parts of native culture to retain and which to abandon and what to borrow from other cultures, we need an ideal and theoretical concept of humanization of the whole man and of society.

But what it means to be human is a difficult theoretical question. Some may suggest that community as an essential aspect, others may suggest the unity of individual egos in a Transcendental Consciousness. But there are those who would consider such an ideal of humanization really a dehumanization. Would that all human beings agreed on a common concept of what it is to be a human being! Plato in his Republic attempted to give us a view as to how social life can be constructed by basing it on a concept of a humanized individual as one who is just. By justice he meant the interdependent and harmonious relationships of the three parts of the human soul, namely, the rational part, the spirited part and the appetitive part. Society is the individual writ large, hence, society must have three classes of individuals, the rulers, the auxiliaries and the producers. But this utopian view of humanization and social life has never been realized; in fact, it has been severely criticized as elitist. Aristotle followed Plato and provided his own view of the humanized man as the pursuit of happiness by the fulfillment of all his potentialities, but especially of his rational faculties. The ideal man for him was the contemplative man. In the middle ages, we had Christian humanism, a representative example being that of Thomas Aquinas for whom man can only be fully humanized by aspiring toward the supernatural. As a result, the social arrangement was a collaboration of church and state for the promotion of spiritual
life. We do not need to go further in our review of some significant theories of humanism. In recent times we have Marxist humanism and democratic capitalism. The question is, what is a humanized individual or community upon which Indian society should pattern itself?

Sociological question - how is society to be methodologically understood? Is the primary category the community or is the individual? Do we start with atomic individuals each pursuing their self-interest who then decides to form a society through a social contract? This view would then determine the function of government as an arbitrator of the various conflicting self-interests. Or do we start with the community in which individuals fulfill themselves by pursuing a common good?

**Psychological question** - Is humanization self-sufficiency and autonomy or participation and belongingness? Can one be humanized if he participates in society only for the sake of his self-interest? Or is an individual humanized only if he identifies with and pursues the common interest? Can one be humanized if the whole is not humanized?

**Ethical question** - how is freedom to be conceived? In the individualistic view of freedom, a distinction is made between the individual and society such that freedom pertains to the individual while society is seen as a threat or as a circumscriber of that freedom. Hence, freedom, in the individualistic view, can be secured by demarcating a private sphere for the individual which is free from the encroachment of society. In contrast, in the holistic view, "only in community (with others has each) individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible."

**Ecological question** - If we have obligations as individuals, nations and species to the rest of the evolving universe, to the environment, to future generations, how can we be humanized if we violate these obligations by raping the environment, depleting natural resources and forgetting to provide for future generations of Indians?

**Political question** - can Indians be humanized purely as citizens of a nation or must they become citizens of the world? Teilhard de Chardin among others
believes that the age of nations is past, that because of scarce natural resources and the threat of nuclear holocaust we need a different organizing principle. If it is true as was argued by some that virtue determines belief, that action and praxis determine political culture, then it is important that we know what virtues to inculcate. We cannot have a national life that is closed to world society, to ecological problems, to the Transcendent. Such a life would not be virtuous, hence, humanized.

Our own view of true humanism is based on unity, harmony and integration. To be humanized is to be in harmony with nature, with fellowmen and with the idea of Transcendent. To be in harmony means to be in an I-Thou relation with nature, with fellowmen so as to constitute a "we" relation as opposed to an "us-and-them" relation. The sense of community as a "we" consciousness which was developed by some people should be extended to the whole universe. Hence, to be humanized is to develop a cosmic sense, a sense of belonging with the cosmic community. Social life includes for me social life with nature and with the Transcendent and not only with one's fellowmen. One cannot have a truly humanized social life if it is confined merely to one's own family and country while millions in the world are poor and starving, and when this social life is obtained at the expense of the exploitation of others and the pollution of the earth. This personal view of humanization is in the realm of the "soft" cultural field, as opposed to the hard system of socioeconomic and political structures. The problem is what sort of cultural concept of humanization are we to use in determining how to humanize social structures?

**Humanization and Human Rights**

Given the practical problem of diversity of social life in India and the theoretical problems of determining what it is to be human, it is impossible to arrive at a concept of humanization in the fullest sense of the term which would respect the values of the various cultures and subcultures in the Indian societies.

What we need is to derive common elements of humanization from various cultural fields which will serve as criteria for determining the shape and form of
social structures and judging the degree of humanization in various societies. The common denominator we will propose is human rights. Thus a society is humanized when human rights are attained by all members of society. The ontological foundation of human rights, as George McLean has suggested in his paper, is subsistent individuality.\(^{23}\) Of course, this minimalist definition of humanization is subject to criticism precisely for being minimalist. But this is also its strength in allowing freedom for each individual to pursue what he believes to be the ideal man. It allows freedom for both secular humanists and religious humanists to pursue their own brand of humanism.

The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights furnishes us with a working list of these rights which any individual regardless of race, religion, etc. must have. These human rights maybe divided into three, 1) civil rights, 2) political rights, and 3) economic and social rights. Civil rights are mainly claims against the state. They include freedom of speech, association, religion, movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest, right to private property, etc. Political right means the right to a voice in the government of the country, hence, a claim to a control of the state. And economic and social rights, which are of recent origin, mean claims to benefits from the state. These include an income consistent with a life of human dignity, the right to work, the right to equal pay for equal work, the right to social security against illness, old age, unemployment and death of the breadwinner, etc. What is missing in the UN declaration is the right of subjected ethnic groups and native or aboriginal peoples to self-determination and to their traditional way of life.\(^{24}\)

Having narrowed the concept of humanization to the pursuit of human rights, we can now interpret the recent historical changes in the eastern European countries and in the Third World countries as a process of humanization. In the case of India, the important and urgent problem of humanization is the pursuit of not only economic and social rights but providing a status to all individuals devoid of his caste and ethnicity. After nearly sixty five years of independence, Indian
people continue to be in the grip of caste consciousness. Historically, India has been surviving as a civilization for millennia with closed groups divided by caste, creed and language. Although India is said to have a long tradition of pluralistic culture, in terms of religions, philosophies, languages and life-styles, yet it was a group of people which have been bound down by the authority of Smrti, Achara, Dharma shastras and Dharma sutras that enabled the Indian societies to develop a philosophy of exclusion and made a section of people as untouchables and deny them the rights as persons and very often their existence as individuals. The traditional social value of Varna dharma, which has been operating the social consciousness of this country, resulted to a segregation of the majority of people in the hierarchic pattern of social arrangement restricted the interaction between individuals belonging to various groups. Since the status and opportunities of the individual were coupled with the Jati (caste) that he/she belongs to by birth and one’s birth itself is theologically conditioned by the past karmas that one performed in the previous births, oppression towards these groups were made easy and theologically found correct. The age-old Indian concept of Dharma which was interpreted in terms of Varnashramadharma by Manu, Prasastapada and Kautilya seldom provided a place for the majority group of people, who were called Sudras and Dalits. In terms of consciousness this has been reflected in the various Hindu literatures (Sanskrit), which had denied accessibility to this group of people. The effect was a reduction of anvikshiki (philosophy) to the higher castes or the Brahmins who had been able to systematically reject reason that is philosophy including any deeper and authentic sense of human freedom and humanization of a society. Resultantly, the Indian concept of Dharma underwent a series of interpretations and conveniently used as a theological weapon for the suppression of the human spirit. Down the centuries these broken ones (Dalits) were imposed enslavement by the powerful interpretations of the apparently harmless exegesis and footnotes of the doctrines like Dharma, Karma, Svadharma, Nishkama karma and Mahayoga,

Such an outlook and world-view engineered to look upon women as inferior to man in intelligence. In Anusasana Parva, Yudhishtira asks Bhishma
why this is so. He replies that a woman is naturally a temptress and a lurer; she is not endowed with the strength of will to resist temptation, and therefore always stands in need of protection by man. (43.19) A menstruating woman and a woman who has delivered a child were equated with a corpse and an outcaste by this oppressing philosophy, which has not generated an outlook for equality, freedom and social justice. Even in this modern age, this particular attitude towards women conditions the mental framework of people in some parts of this country. Women were condemned to a most humiliating position in the age of the Smritikars.25

The theme “humanization of social life” requires an effort at clarification to which the Hindu approach may both make its own distinctive contribution and at the same time constitute an alternative perspective, enabling others to reassess and approach anew their own positions.

Beyond situationally specific behavior, ‘humanness’ is a deeper principle or value which one ought to realize in full freedom for oneself and others. The need for ‘humanization’ bespeaks the reality of the inhumane; it suggests that the humane is the natural state of life and that the impediments to this must be removed.

One impediment might be to attempt to realize life: (a) only in terms of the subject, or (b) only in terms of the object, or (c) only in terms of the relation of subject and object. A unity of (a) and (b) would point to personal moral development and self-respect, that of (a) and (c) would point to social equality, freedom and dignity in society. Throughout unity emerges as central.

Another impediment is the identification of humanness with ego, according to which the individual person is seen in contrast to other. An analysis of the various states of human consciousness, especially that of deep and dreamless sleep, suggests rather that humanness is self or consciousness (prajna), which becomes myself (visva) by acquiring the I or ‘ego’ in the state of wakefulness. Hence, humanness in essence and ultimately is active consciousness. It is the distinguishing Ego which in our daily experience conceals this consciousness and/or projects it in a different manner. Hence, the task of humanization is
correction of the Ego. For this one must know why and how it functions as it does, which, in turn, requires knowledge of the full story of the Ego.

The ego or individuality can turn in two directions. If it turns to opposition toward others and isolation it cannot but lose its existence, annihilate itself and disturb the process of nature. Hence, it must turn toward others in an attitude of cooperation and peace. In this the ego must not lose its individuality within the total Ego, lest the whole process be futile. Instead the process must promote the reality of individuals in a way which leads to unity. The key to this is ultimately to enable the reality of ultimate consciousness to emerge within each individual.

It should not be though that this is merely a matter of human beings in contrast to the whole of nature. In the contrary, this same dynamism is basic to nature at each level from the formation of atoms to that of mega social structures.

At the second level the problem is that the lack of coherence in social life renders problematic the straightforward expression of humanness. In order to find a solution one needs to know how the essentially good natural process is manipulated in accordance with the private Egos of different individuals. ‘Relation’ exemplifies this: though by nature relation promotes the process of nature, one tries always to manipulate relation in order to use it for one’s own benefit. One cannot maintain the same concern he shows for himself with his family, and it is even worse with the others, for the private functional ego works over enthusiastically for self preservation. Similarly, such good things as colonies, communities, society, religion, law and state policies which promote human unity by arresting the function of the private Ego, ultimately become manipulated for class division, power, domination, and exploitation.

One task is to balance the private Ego with the public Ego after making corrections in social life. The ultimate quest is to conceive the world community on a single platform for if one does not join with the process of nature one not only destroys oneself but also disturbs the whole process and becomes a hinderance for the development of humanity. Thus, one ought to be responsible for one’s own sake and for that of others as well.
The major suggestion that we want to make here regarding the “humanization of the social life” is that the course of the evolution of revolutions in the history of social change will not end in itself. Therefore, while one thinks about the articulation of social structures one ought to keep in mind that the goal should be the perfection of the person. This means that everything involved in the articulation of social structures, such as, the social, political, economic, educational, and psychological aspects should be directed towards the goal of human perfection, for without individual perfection the real freedom of the individual cannot be exercised. One may argue that every theory has its own end, i.e., a person’s benefit, but this can be questioned. Where do all such political goals end? In fact, they never end, or they may end in total destruction. For instance, one could have argued that the prefect articulation of social structure was to attain socialism, but could socialism or any such social goal constitute an end in itself? Next this also will undergo the dialectical process of evolution of revolutions, which continues till all men are perfected. True freedom cannot be exercised by man merely in terms of law, politics etc. Therefore, it is very important to keep personal perfection as a goal for all aspects of social life.

What, then, are the requirements for changes in the Indian societies that can be expected to permit the highest measure of assertion of human consciousness deprived of caste consciousness? If consciousness is the creative centre of society and value, then it may be generally stated that what is called for are conditions which enable the greatest possible number of individuals to evolve, develop and assert their own personalities i.e.; to reach a situation in which man has created a complex system of values both personal and oriented towards the society. These values should be of such a nature that man feels fully integrated, fulfilled, and self-confident and bears an attitude of trust and esteem towards oneself and others. One must not feel the necessity of resorting to self-defense reactions vis-à-vis the society. What we are trying to emphasize is that a social system, which possesses human values with the sole criterion of one’s caste, cannot safeguard the individual requirements and cannot create a social atmosphere of co-existence. Individual requirements are those related to upbringing, education and the
possibilities of social self-assertion, of making oneself socially useful. The basic requirement, we argue, is based on those complex qualities of self-confidence and self-assurance which is lacking in the marginalized groups in this country. It is this complex alone that will ensure both the assertion of human consciousness and its harmony with the society.

This involves both persons and groups. As the basic constituent of any society, the person is essential but ambiguous, for one can turn inward in a self-centred manner as happened for centuries in this country. Hence it is important to add that any resolution of the social problem requires that the individual be endowed with dignity not because he happened to born in a superior caste but which includes one’s emotional life as well as intellect and will. It regards the possibility and necessity of speaking meaningfully of a social, cultural or generic consciousness at the corresponding levels. Whatever the possibility of an answer by philosophy, it is necessary to point out the consequences and the implications, which are directed to the life of individuals in community, their realities and possibilities. They are not simply theoretical or matters of preference or of pre-established interests of certain groups or certain caste considerations. The point is to make life ever more possible at exemplary levels with criteria and standards of quality, that is, with universally desirable values. Accordingly, the above considerations suggest that the value base of Indian society needs to be founded on a set of conditions for practical reason, but rather in the actual processes of life. What is required is a sense of the common good that one can relish and accommodate to the civic virtue. In this light, caste superiority is not merely meant as a realm of egoistic self-interest by a small margin of people who are directed to vandalize a huge section of people and their semi-conscious survival and thereby marginalize the majority of people of their self-esteem and self-assertion. What is required is multiple relations of solidarity wherein each person ought to perform public responsibilities in order to develop intermediate spheres of active participation in the social order and, by implication, to correct conditions of excessive authoritarianism or weakness on the part of the state or of the superior castes and of injustice in the economic and social order. Hence, a progressive
humanization of life in the third millennium will mobilize the freedom/equality of the marginalized groups and women in this country, which can pervade, transform and inspire all phases of social life. Let us sum up by enlisting the following points:

1. It is argued that political, social and economic transformation of Indian societies will not yield to the desired results, if there is no simultaneous progress in the moral transformation of a society. Even after 65 years of independence, we are increasingly becoming clear that these changes have to be pursued together.

2. The humanization of Indian societies cannot be discussed and understood without taking its moral element into account. The moral force is a motivating force for solidarity and associational values that entice citizens to achieve social goals together. It gives people to an ideal to strive for and a sense of belonging. But in the post independence India, a majority of people who were fondly called ‘untouchables’ were not permitted to be a part of the decision making not only in the arena of the powers that be but also in the place of their birth. As a result, the humanizing aspect loses its importance as a basic value that any society nourishes and fulfills in its search for values and truth as a reason for social involvement and as a motivation to live a dignified life and if necessary to suffer for this cause.

3. A central element in the humanization debate, in the Indian context, is the desire to return to the concept of equality and social justice. But unfortunately, even in the post-independence India, Jati is a criterion of making one as the part of a society/ community, where respect for human rights as a condition for human society is reckoned. Thus, it is contended that the conditions prevailing in this country, despite having attained political freedom, yet to achieve human freedom as the Indian societies are overshadowed with casteist and its metaphysical trappings where an individual is recognized in terms of his caste or ethnicity. A civic culture is supposed to provide resources for motivating persons in order to develop
their capacities proper to such citizenship. Now the question is: Can the existing normative doctrines, unquestioningly practiced in India, provide the liberal political ideas of freedom and equality devoid of their casteist and metaphysical trappings? An answer to this question may perhaps define the most formidable, intellectual, cultural and social changes that post-independence India faces with regard to the humanization of Indian societies.

MODERNIZATION

Capitalism and Modernization

By modernization we mean the industrialization of a nation by means of advanced technology. Modernization can be achieved within any economic system be it communist or capitalist and within any political system be it totalitarian or democratic. But the recent historical changes in the eastern countries of Europe under the Soviet bloc and for the majority of third-world nations, it would seem that modernization can best be achieved within a democratic and capitalist society. Hence, Third World and Eastern European countries look to the west as model.

Capitalism and Communal Values

In importing the method and technique of capitalism, there is a danger that also its ideology of individualism is imported. According to C.B. Macpherson, the ideology of capitalism is based on the "early liberal notion of the individual as a being prior to and rightfully independent of society or community." In contrast to this ideology, Macpherson believes that "we shall need to recognize that the individual can be fully human only as a member of a community."

According to Macpherson, the Third World has always recognized that humanization can only be fully achieved in community. The paradox, as Macpherson puts it, is that for the sake of modernization, the Third World countries are now going to sacrifice communal values. Permit me to quote him at length:
Paradoxically, that recognition now seems more likely to be generated within the Western countries than in the Third World. Paradoxically, because one would expect that the priority of community would be a more natural assumption in the Third World countries, which are closer to the pre-capitalist idea that one’s humanity was more a matter of one’s membership in the community than of one’s freedom from the community, that the greatest human right was the right of belonging to the community, and the severest deprivation was to be cast out. But what has happened is that the Third World countries, in so far as they are struggling against their previous subservience to the West, have had to use Western ideological weapons. They have had to base their claims in the world forum, on their need to promote the modernization which would permit the enhancement of the individual. Aboriginal people threatened with submergence within First World countries do still invoke community values, but the Third World has largely given in to the Western values. Their search for rapid economic development has put them under strong pressure to abandon community values.28

The dilemma is one of trading off communal values for individualistic ones in order to achieve economic freedom. What sort of individual does capitalism need and require for economic growth?

Capitalism becomes a means of maximizing market and consumer man. With the right of private property as inalienable, the individual can develop his full potentialities. The individual needs a private space or sphere within which he feels free against the encroachment and interference of society which is seen as a threat to this freedom.

For the success of capitalism, a certain kind of individual is needed. As Andrew Mclaughlin observes,

Capitalism requires a competitive individual, one who gets his satisfaction from outdoing others. Capitalism does not run on love and cooperation. The second value required of capitalism is materialism, or the idea that one becomes happy by possessing more and more material things. Both of these values make a
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person who is willing to sacrifice most of his waking time to either working to earn money to buy things or using the things he buys.29

Thus, for capitalism to thrive, it is necessary that there be increasing demand for goods and never-ending consumption.30 This requirement of economic freedom leads to another dilemma.

Capitalism and Third-World Ecology

Should Third World countries sacrifice the environment for the sake of economic freedom through capitalism? Is this not humanization at one level which is achieved by dehumanization at another level? In Third World countries, the danger of pollution or the depletion and waste of natural resources, though more severe than in Developed countries, is not considered neither the most urgent nor the primary problem. Whole forests are cut down and logs sold to get dollar exchange for capital investment. Foreign companies from First World countries contribute to the ecological problems in the Third World by relocating their polluting industries in the Third World.

Capitalism and Civil Rights

Another dilemma caused by the necessity to attract foreign investors is the violations of distributive justice and civil rights. Native workers are paid very cheaply and thus exploited. To keep production high and uninterrupted, the right to strike for higher wages is made illegal. Hence, the government uses the language of trade-off to legitimize bans on strikes. But the language of trade-off is mere rhetoric to hide the fact that it is really an exchange of the civil rights of the majority for the economic rights of the native elite and foreign investors.

It would seem that the imperative of capitalism which is the unlimited accumulation of private property (capital) is at odds with the requirement of economic and social rights. To implement the latter would reduce the accumulation of capital. Thus, we have another dilemma of humanization here. The right to unlimited accumulation of property is a civil right which is at odds with economic and social rights.

End of Communism and the Costs of Globalization

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It is a part of the history now that the collapse of communism in the countries which were previously controlled and proscribed by an entity called U.S.S.R has accelerated the path of globalization. Consequently, it may be a partial truth that the development problems in the state formations of the Second, Third and Fourth worlds really have vanished so that one could speak from an undifferentiated point of view about a globalized world. But such a globalized world has produced and is producing its own cultural narcissists who are able to systematically downsize the 'other'. The 'other' may be anything that sounds economically viable, socially unsociable and philosophically hollow. Hence, we may make certain observations that will help us to critically analyze as well as to question the economic, political, social and cultural costs of globalization, which may be enlisted as the following:

1. The process of globalization has enabled an almost unhindered capital around the globe. Stock exchange speculators, with their high capacity gambling power assisted with technological assistance, have proved governments that they are the ones who really rule the world. Consequently, governments have become highly dependent on the availability of external capital. Global markets are now the judge and punish national economic policies. Accordingly, position of the countries have become weakened and generated a socially ruinous competition among countries. Thus, what is visible now in the social life is that there is much unrest because the number of marginalized people is getting increased.

2. The second feature resulting out of the globalization process is that the number of jobs in the market is getting minimized due to the heavy dependence on machines and the technological development. According to the experts, there is a possibility within a few years of managing the entire world production with a population of 20% of the economically active world population. In the developing countries, we find an acute shortage of jobs even to those people who are highly educated including those who are technically well trained.
3. The globalization process has managed to locate and operate multiple chains of companies of the developed countries in underdeveloped countries so that they can improve the ratio of profit. Inherent economic necessities have shown that countries with lower wage levels, poor social security standards, amenable regulations with regard to environment protection etc. attract international companies. To put the matter differently, the third world countries have become the best dumping place of industrialized countries and their unwanted 'deposits'.

4. One of the visible and outstanding features that emerged out of globalization process is the weakening of labor unions in many countries and especially in India. The C.E.O. of an international company has become the presiding deity who cannot be questioned or even argued with. The power of multinational companies because of their financial clout as increased tremendously. These corporations are able to influence government policies in their favour in the developing countries. Resultantly, there emerges hostility in various forms within organizations. Generally, this process has accentuated more losers than winners.

5. Consequent upon the process of globalization, jobless and frustrated youngsters become radicalized and form guerilla groups to fight against the existing state and its oppressive machinery. One can possibly doubt that many of the current political situations in India in the form of increased Naxalism and political turmoil are but the outcome of greediness betrothed in globalization.

6. In countries like India which is multi-cultural and multi-ethnic in its character and outlook, the conflict lines between rich and the poor very often correspond with membership to a particular ethnic or religious group. Recent developments in India's cultural, social, political and economic aspects have shown that there is already a structural patterning of Indian societies which are formed in terms of religion or minority groups or the marginalized. Consequently, groups such as the Dalits, minorities and the economically deprived sections have identified themselves as the 'other'
parts of Indian cultural self as they were known to be the oppressed and broken. (Dalit)\textsuperscript{31}

**Conclusion**

How to solve the dilemma of modernization and humanization is a difficult one. Can capitalism be modified so as to preserve community values? Or is not a socialist economy better able to preserve community values? But what is the point of preserving community values if people are starving and poor? These are difficult questions for which we have no answers. We fall back on fundamental philosophic questions: What is true humanization? Is an affluent country more humanized than a poor starving country? Is an industrialized economy more humanized than an agricultural economy where people are able to feed themselves though quite poor in modern amenities?

There is a very real possibility that the developed countries may begin to realize that a no-growth economy may be a way of preserving the environment and of recovering more humanistic values, developing countries are still emphasizing materialism, self-interest, and competition which may result in economic growth and modernization, perhaps, but at the cost of humanistic and cultural values.

Clearly, a democratic form of government allows for the greatest freedom of all members of society to be humanized the way they want to. But if humanization at the economic level means an economic system that would maximize production but at the same time distribute goods and services more equitably, we do not know what economic system is best.
Notes and References


2 Thus all societies must allocate goods and services somehow. A particular society may change from one method, say business enterprise, to another, and say a centrally planned economy, without the destruction of the society of a society but merely with a change in its concrete structures.

3 Neither the nature of the dependence of our formulation on this theory of action nor the theory of action itself can be further elaborated here.

4 This point receives further treatment below. A social system need not be copper plated to meet the definition of a society. Natural catastrophe may terminate a concrete society. Such an event does not represent a failure to meet the functional prerequisites but is rather to be considered the result of change in the nonhuman environment beyond the limits assumed here as the setting of a society. Many concrete societies have been assimilated by the expansions of group with which these societies had little or no previous contact. This, too, represents an alteration in the situation of the society beyond the limits within which it had been meeting its functional prerequisites.

5 There is no intention of making the political variable the sole criterion for the decision as to what constitute a society. The nature of economic ties and the degree to which value system are shared and the like are also crucial in making the differentiation between two systems of action.

6 It is worth re-emphasizing that a given society may at one time contain arrangements for maintaining its distinctness from other societies that form part of its situation. We would not therefore say that the society thus absorbed hard never be a society, that in a situation is showed a relating inadequacy of one of its functional prerequisites that resulted in its absorption. (Refer The Functional Prerequisites of a Society by D.F. Aberle, A.K. Cohen, A.K. Davis, M.J. Levy, Jr. F.X. Sutton).


9 Ibid. p. 33

10 Velassery, Sebastian, Casteism and Human Rights, Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005, p. 72

11 Cf: Hua I. No. 52, Hua XIII, No. 9

12 Cf: Hua XIV, p. 317

13 Ibid p. 317

14 Cf: Hua XIII, pp. 547-548

15 Heidegger, Martin Early Greek Thinking, op. cit. p. 47


See his *Human Energy*, p. 37.

See Michael W. Foley, "‘Coming to Value’ is More Important Than ‘Having Value’: Building Democracy in the Contemporary Mexican Peasant Movement," in Volume II of this collection.


ibid.

ibid.


ibid, p. 226.