Till the close of the nineteenth century, sciences (including social sciences) were based on a mechanical one-dimensional theory of causation (cause and effect) which was formulated in the philosophies of idealism and materialism as teleology and determinism, respectively. Humanism was based on a platonic interpretation of history, which started with an absolute abstract idea (or external consciousness) which results in making of perfect individuality; it traced in history a logically determined unilateral movement towards that idea. Socialism, with its so-called materialist basis, traced an abstract pattern of economic relationship as the prime cause and deduced therefrom a sequence of logically predetermined structural developments leading towards the inevitable culmination of communism. Direct or inverse casualty was the law of movement, physical as well as social.

Nineteenth century experiments in light and atomic physics and investigation in mathematical astronomy, however, completely disfigured the symmetry of the Newtonian Universe. Twentieth century began with a revolution in the scientific perspective; the expression of that revolution was the Theory of Relativity. Reality now has come to be known as a multi-dimensional continuum of an indefinite series of point-events, and consequently the concept of causal relationship between units has undergone complete modification. At any moment, reality as known, offers an indefinite number of alternative probabilities.
of unstable adjustment. The relationship being multi-dimensional, knowledge can only be an approximation (though surely objective and increasingly comprehensive), and never absolute. All practical formulation of perspectives and methods may, therefore, be expressly made flexible to incorporate newly evolving variables – existing and identified as well as indentifiable and conjectured.

This new world perspective has led to the formulation of a more comprehensive method of inquiry and a more flexible approach to experience. Both induction and deduction are incorporated, after eliminating a priori dogmatism of the one and the absolute indeterminism of the other. Categories are constantly investigated in the light of new variables, and in the formulation both of the categories and of their prediction, the elements of relativity and multi-dimensionalness are incorporated. Such incorporation alone eliminates both metaphysical absolutism and empirical uncertainty. The new method bases systematization on probability and, in the human context, permits choice in the sphere of planning.

An application of this relativist method (which is the basis of the philosophy of Radicalism) to the study of the process of evolution both in its general biological form and in the specific human phase reveals that change has taken place in a plurality of ways. Survival and development, however, have all along depended on the degree of flexibility, integration and comprehensiveness of the units. Change, in so far as it becomes significant or progressive, is marked by the process of emergence of individual distincts out of homogeneous mass-entities. Individuation, on the one hand, implies internal integrity of an organism
and, on the other, its constant unfolding of possibilities of response to situational stimuli. The process of individuation, complemented by harmonious social relationships, gives to the organism greater ability to survive with increasingly lesser subordination to circumstances. Originally, the instinct for survival formed the basic incentive of individuation. Gradually, in the course of experience and organic development, this instinct is sublimated into a drive for individual freedom. A species in which both the organic constitution of the biological units as well as the pattern of relationships subsisting between them incorporate greater scope for individuation is more advanced from the point of view of evolution than one with lesser scope. Similarly, that society or civilization is superior to another which provides for increasing freedom for individuals and lessening discord and inhibition.

Freedom, however, cannot materialize except through co-operative effort of individuals to understand and control the environment. The more isolated is the individual, the greater its helplessness in the face of circumstances, and consequently the lesser its chances of moral integration and rational choice. Individual development without proper social organisation is illusory, both empirically and theoretically. The history of evolution before the emergence of *homo sapiens* is thus understandable in terms of species and never in terms of individuals. It is only as one enters the phase of human history that the movement towards individuation becomes a definite and decisive tendency in history. Mere social organisation, however, does not lead to individual development. It is only that type of organisation in which the individuals are not mere cogs in the social
machine, but form its dynamic and creative element, that freedom on a social scale becomes a reality.

The elimination of functionalism and inhibition and the emergence of harmonious distincts depend, on the one hand, on a correct understanding of the laws of existence (and consequent possibility of control over them) and, on the other, on harmonious and kinetically inclined organisation of individuals based on social irradiation of that understanding and of the various facilities that flow from it. Science and democratic society are, therefore, the ultimate correlates of individual freedom. Social progress is to be measured in terms of the relative development of science and its integration in social relationships and character.

The factors that stand in the way of continuous social progress, and that make for the recurrence of the phenomenon of jump or mutation, in human history, may be classified primarily under two heads. On the one hand, there is the factor of inherent biological inertia in the organism which takes the form of fear of freedom and preference for fixed groves. On the other hand, there is institutional inertia which takes the form of social vested interest. The first can be combated only through social renaissance and irradiation of knowledge; the dissipation of the second takes place through technological development and equitable distribution of power. Yet, a social renaissance, to be practicable, must base itself on a high standard of living for the common people which means technological progress and social control of power. The latter again, to have a sure foundation, must be synchronised with a social renaissance. The programme of social revolution, therefore, must
incorporate the task of cultural renaissance, technological advancement and politico-economic democratisation of power and control.

Social convulsions take place as old forms exhaust all possibility of peacefully adjusting themselves to the pressure of new forces and of resolving their internal contradictions or outgrowing their inadequacies. A social convulsion primarily needs two factors: the complete exhaustion of existing forms (ideological, institutional and technical) and accumulation of new forces to the point of physically forcing a break-up of the inhibitive bottleneck.

A convulsion takes revolutionary significance when the leadership of the subversive forces is consciously oriented by the incentives of greater individual freedom and better social harmonisation. A convulsive movement motivated in this way becomes a revolution proper when actually, through planned and cooperative effort, greater freedom and superior harmonisation are achieved through the creative emergence of new ideology, institutions and techniques. In such emergence, the role of reason or science and individuality is decisive, though it is also true that the structural setting for such emergence is determined by the existing technology and social institutions.

What is the nature of the human composition of the forces of revolution, asks Sibnarayan Ray, a close associate of M. N. Roy.¹ In the phase of decay of an existent social order, none but the small group of people enjoying monopoly of power and privileges can have any direct

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interest in its forcible preservation. All the remaining members of society, but for their psychological inertia, have the possibility of participating in the work of subversion. Further, if the programme of the revolution is made sufficiently wide and flexible to promise expanding opportunity of freedom, security and service to the people as a whole, this inertia may also be broken and the entire society, except the few vested interests, may take direct part in the construction of the new order. The human composition of the forces of revolution is, therefore, not limited to any particular section of the society. The revolutionary organisation is not a mere class or sectarian body, but an organisation of the common people guided by reason and the desire for freedom.

It happens, nevertheless, that, while the basic and constant incentives of revolution are reason and freedom, the specific forces that press for new social forms may change with every new phase in social history. These forces are the human resultants of structural developments; they are the group or class correlates of institutional polarisations. Consequently, they have a specific proneness or urgency towards convulsion. This urgency, however, is instinctive and structurally determined and, left to itself, is not rational or creative. Further, the structurally crystalised group cannot by itself subvert the existent order. The ideology of such classes or groups must find a transclass social sanction by incorporating in the basic principles of human progress; it must also mobilise behind itself the organised support of the common people.

The supreme necessity, to achieve revolution, of bringing structural developments to human consciousness and of connecting them
to the principles of freedom and harmony in the form of revolutionary ideology, brings into relief a third contributory element in the human composition of revolutionary forces. The moral-ideological initiative of revolution can come only from such people who have outgrown in their character the influences of mass-inertia and homogeneity, who are real individuals capable of rational thinking and choice, sensitive to the logic of a situation, capable of creative response and moved by the ideal of freedom and human weal. Class-groupings which evolve mechanically in consequence of structural developments cannot comprehend such people. They are generally placed marginally in social polarisations. These men who, for lack of a better expression, may be described as the intelligentsia, constitute the agency through which the dynamism of ideas operates. It has become a common fashion, even on the part of the members of the intelligentsia themselves, to ascribe vacillation, treachery and opportunism almost exclusively to these marginal people. Yet the inquisition was fought not so much by traders as by the humanists. The anarchy and exploitation of laissez faire economy was opposed, at least in the beginning, not so much by the proletariat as by the theoreticians of socialism. Even the other day, Fascism was combated not so much by trade-unions as by the informal international body of progressive intellectuals, by teachers, artists, scientists, writers and other such people who are moved not by class-interest or personal gains, but by reason and the ideal of freedom.

The reason why intellectuals, philosophers or humanists are the indispensable factors of a revolutionary development may be stated thus: Instinctive reaction by itself can never be creative and hence cannot constitute the lever of progress. To free society from its contradictions,
inadequacies and inhibitive elements, proper comprehension of the same is essential. Further, social subversion, to be creative, must be preceded by clear and abstract visualisation of the principles and pattern of the new society to be brought into being, to work consistently and courageously against the might of the existent system; and for the realisation of the ideal, offers only a certainty of persecution and personal loss and no prospect of immediate gain. The essential qualities of a revolutionary, therefore, are rationality and understanding, creative imagination and moral idealism, sensitiveness and integrity. The harbingers of revolution can only be such people as are highly developed both morally as well as intellectually. Hence the important role of the intelligentsia in social progress.

According to Sibnarayan Ray, there are three distinct sources of revolutionary leadership. The first is the result of the general process of social polarisation whereby the entire people are potentially ranged against the vested interests. The second is the human correlate of the specific structural development antecedent to any particular social convulsion. Third, ever since mankind reached the stage of civilised social life, there has always been a section of highly sensitive, intelligent and socially minded people who can respond creatively to the anarchy, inadequacy and obsolescence of existing social institutions and codes. The combination of all these forces along with the structural developments alone can materialise the revolutionary possibility of a social situation.

2 Ibid.
Social revolutions are never inevitable. They are among the probables of institutional disequilibrium. Social revolution is not a necessary consequence of causal logic. Its agent-principle is rational choice and organized endeavour by the human constituents of social life. A mechanically caused structural convulsion, even if hypothetically probable, may have little evolutionary significance.

Roy persistently endeavours to drive home the point that materialism alone without any supernatural assistance is able to unravel the mystery of life. The origin of life cannot be kept shrouded in metaphysical secrets. It is in the process of the evolution of matter that includes the emergence of novelties. "Life originated as a novelty in the context of the physical universe." The purpose of a radical thinker is to stress and prove the point that philosophy should be freed from the shackles of subjectivism. One should look towards the results of modern physics, biology and psychology that enable us to free empirical theory of knowledge from that fallacy and ambiguity that have caused its degeneration into subjectivism. Thus, he declares: "As far as epistemology is concerned, we reject idealism categorically."

Examined epistemologically, mind is a state of consciousness of physical environment aroused as the reaction to consciousness. There is a causal connection and continuity between the mind of man and the physical world. If so, one may ask: How could the state of mind be caused by non-mental agencies? The external world consisting of

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diverse phenomena lies before us. It is apparent that man may know everything in the world, though this is a different matter that he comes into contact with a few of them. The result is a difference between objects and things. The two may not be identical ontologically. It implies that knowledge is both subjective and objective at the same time and there is no need for speaking of one's primacy over the other. "For epistemology the question of precedence is irrelevant. That is a question of ontology. Epistemology, must be simply guided by the facts that mind exists and that knowledge is conditional as much on the existence of mind as on that of matter."\(^5\)

Roy tries to integrate his theory of knowledge with the stock of scientific researches. When modern science shows that sensations are not only electro-chemical processes, independent of and anterior to mind in the history of organic evolution, but also actual events in the physical continuum called the external world, it becomes abundantly clear how knowledge is acquired. As he says: "Knowledge is possible because mind is highly developed, extremely complicated, state of consciousness, a property of living beings (of higher order) to react to external stimuli."\(^6\) It is, therefore, clear that cognition is a relation between mind and the world. As knowledge is both subjective and objective, both the co-relates - the knowing self and the world known - are equally important. In order to solve this problem, epistemology "must start from the ontological reality of mind as well as the external

\(^6\) Ibid, p. 199.
world. Knowledge is conditional, as much on the existence of mind as that of matter."\(^7\)

Roy makes an important distinction between knowledge and thought. Thought is mind's property whereas knowledge is a possession. The knowledge is in the mind, but it is knowledge of what exists outside the mind. Ontologically, it is not identical with mind. The fact that knowledge is acquired by mind, proves that it is not manufactured by mind, independently of the external world. Ideas are not the content of knowledge, contents of knowledge are external reality. Experience is the foundation of knowledge but knowing is not a purely empirical process. Mind selects, interprets, systematises, and co-ordinates empirical-material-sense data in rational and logical explanation of perceptual facts. This is called conceptual picture of the world."\(^8\)

But differently, sensation and perception are events in the physical continuum that includes the world through sensation and neural action to brain. The contact is not between two qualitatively different entities. As mind itself originates in the organic property of reaction to external stimuli, the last link-cognition is also a physical relation. Cognition is not like perception, and automatic organic reaction. Cognition is an interpretative, denotative, selective act; it is an intelligent reaction to stimuli. As Roy says: "Knowledge, in the end, results from the constant and continuous reference of precepts to their external sources, done variously through actions of daily life, planned experiment, intelligent observation, memory, logic, thought, and the

\(^8\) Ibid.
domination of the unconscious on all our conscious behaviour. Knowledge is a matter of logically tracing the lines of physical causality from the contents of immediate experience outwards. Precepts are purely empirical entities; Concepts are synthetic. The former are automatically given; the latter are consciously constructed. Knowledge is a conceptual scheme, born out of the insight into the nature of things, gained through critical examination, rational co-ordination and logical deduction of perceptual data."9

Man dies but the knowledge acquired by him survives. Things disappear in the abyss of time, but knowledge about them becomes human heritage unless it is destroyed somehow like any other thing. The existential reality of knowledge forms the basis of the development of all human forms what Roy terms the 'dynamics of ideas' - a perennial process that leads towards social progress and the making of its history. As a learned authority sums up: "Knowledge involves a knower, the mental act of knowing, it is something acquired by a mind. It will, therefore, be naturally determined by the subjective make-up of the knowing mind. It is, therefore, subjective to that extent. But it is also objective. It follows from the fact that knowledge is, after all, acquired. It is not manufactured by, the knowing mind. Thus, being subjective and objective both, it is the result of a relation of equally important ontological existences-mind and matter. But once knowledge is formed, it acquires the existential reality of its own."10

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Roy's theory of knowledge may be criticised on three grounds. First, though it is true that Roy refers to certain disturbances in our thinking as the impact of indeterminism upon science, of scepticism upon historicity and, to a limited extent, of analytic method on psychology, he definitely commits the mistake of identifying his epistemology with true empiricism. Though he plainly criticises Locke for his sense perception epistemology, we may find that he himself becomes an advocate of the same at a later stage. Our knowledge acquired through sense perception is a fact as mind itself is an organic entity and since it reacts to external stimuli, it becomes a means of production. Roy fails to take into his consideration this salient fact of human experience and behaviour that the perception of one man is different from that of the other. Philip Mairet was right in his affirmation that while a gardener would like to see a rose, a soldier a cross, man's perception depends upon the pre-existent element of his choice. "What is perceived is not the reflection of something objective which the mind duplicates within itself, it is the result of that something pre-existent and of the mind's recipient activity."

Second, Roy's theory of knowledge may also be criticised from the Marxian point of view. To a Marxist, Roy's epistemology looks like 'Idealist' theory of knowledge that Roy himself claims to have rejected. We find that man's relation with nature is the determining factor of Roy's epistemology; man's relation with society has nothing to do with it. Roy's concern is with man and the physical environment; it is not with man and his social existence. Thus, instead of agreeing with Roy,

one would like to admire Marx who tells us that knowledge arises, develops and is tested in social practice. A defender of Marx says: "At every stage and in all circumstances, knowledge is incomplete and provisional, conditional and limited by the historical circumstances under which it was built up, including the means and methods employed for gaining knowledge and the historically conditioned assumptions and categories employed in the formulation of ideas and conclusions."\textsuperscript{12}

Last, herein we find a confusing hotch-potch of idealist and materialist epistemology. As pointed out in relation to other theories of Roy, so, here too, we find an injudicious mixing of materialism and idealism. We find that in Roy's epistemology, the mind "starts manufacturing ideas, and that too without any fresh raw material. Only a geometrical line (that has no width) separates Roy’s mechanist epistemology from idealism. The half-hearted Materialist Epistemology bridges the gulf between Roy's Mechanist Cosmology and Historical Idealism."\textsuperscript{13} A little after, the same critic adds: "No path is left for Roy round these pitfalls of subjective or objective idealism. He refuted himself. He could have extricated himself from this cobweb of confusion, if he had accepted that not 'only the object is Mind-Dependent, but mind itself is Object-Dependent; and here the Object with capital 'O' would mean not only physio-chemical laws but also socio-historical conditions. Dialectical Materialism could save his skin, but he had abandoned it."\textsuperscript{14} D.C. Grover says: "Roy may be right in thinking that there is no \textit{apriori} method of proving the existence of

\textsuperscript{12} Maurice Cornforth, In Defence of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p 89.
things, but he fails to appreciate that there are forms of probable interference which must be accepted although they can not be proved by existence. Roy's theory is rendered difficult by the fact that it involves psychology, logic and the physical sciences, with the result that confusion is frequently noticed. One makes an unsuccessful attempt to find in Roy's theory of knowledge a characteristic of complete process from stimulus to reaction. Roy thus confuses two problems which are quite distinct - that of knowledge and that of the nature of reality.15

What remains for a defender of this great philosopher of radical humanism is to appreciate that we cannot deny the objective existence of the physical world while laying down a theory of knowledge. Our epistemological contributions must be in consonance with the discoveries and inventions of science. A philosophical controversy or confusion can be avoided or evaded, if a thinker has a clear understanding of and an aptitude for knowing modern scientific researches. Roy's epistemology may thus not be identified with the epistemology of a rank idealist like Plato or Kant who dared dispute the existence of the external world. As Roy counsels: "The results of modern physical research, supplemented by the latest contributions of biology and psychology, enable us to free the empirical theory of knowledge from the fallacy and ambiguity which caused its degeneration into subjectivism."16

The historical method as a special way of approaching social studies assumes that there is, in the nature a pattern or a law of

development, which can be exhibited by a proper arrangement of subject-matter. For the necessity of history is a synthesis of logical implication, of causal relationship, and of enlarging purpose. Properly studied, history provides the principles for an objective criticism, immanent in the course of development itself, which distinguishes the true from the false, the significant from the trivial, the permanent from the transient: in short, what Hegel was accustomed to call the 'real' from the merely 'apparent'. This holds true for the entire social evolution or for any other phase of its civilisation. As such, “it is possible to present an orderly evolution of law of economic institutions, of philosophical or scientific thought, or of government.”¹⁷ What is striking, in this direction, is that “it is not imposed on the subject-matter by the investigator but is inherent in the facts themselves once they are put in a proper order. The special work of historical insight consists in bringing to light this pattern which is, of course, concealed in a welter of facts and it is for this reason that historical and theoretical studies are connected.”¹⁸

So far as the study of historiology is concerned, Roy finds his place in the category of Thucydides, St. Augustine, Vico, Bousset, Bacon, Descartes, Hegel and Marx. It is a different matter that Roy's theory of history is neither purely idealist nor purely materialist; it has a character of its own, and keeping which in view it may be given a separate identity, and thus termed 'humanist historiology.' Roy discovers the driving force of human history in man's urges and ideas conditioned

¹⁸ Ibid.
by material factors. There is, therefore, "an element of eclecticism in his philosophy of history." Roy abandons any doctrinaire position, since he advocates a synthesis between idealism and materialism, conceptual knowledge and empirical thought. It is, indeed, a peculiar feature of Roy's historiology that by merging psychology into physiology, he "bridges the gulf between physics and psychology and thereby reconciles the dynamics of matter with the dynamics of ideas."  

According to Roy, history, as the record of man's struggle for freedom, only on a 'higher plane', becomes co-operative and collective. Man is the maker of history. The history of man is not an inevitable or predetermined process, though it is possible to discover in human history an intelligent principle with reference to which different events may be related to each other and their social significance assessed. It is a record of the past as well as present and the close relationship between the past and present tends to show that social events are interlinked causally, not arbitrarily. History, as Roy says, is not a 'chaotic conglomeration of fortuitous events'. "The past is to be studied for a rational explanation of the present. The discovery of a rational connection between the past and the present of the human race shows history as an evolutionary process. Consequently, it becomes possible to

deduce some general laws governing historical events that would enable us to discover the hidden springs of human action.  

Two essential points emanate from what we have said above. First, history is a record of past and present - and the two phases of time are not arbitrarily but causally connected with each other. Whatever has happened in the past or happens in the present takes place owing to certain causes. The purpose of a historical investigator is to see that the causes can be understood by human intelligence. Second, though human history, like natural history, is a determined process, it is self-determined. There is nothing like absolute determinism. “There are more than one determining factors and they mutually limit their role of operation.” Roy, thus, refutes the doctrine of absolute determinism that lays down the belief that everything that happens has a definite cause or causes and that could not have occurred differently unless something in the cause or causes had also been different.

The function of a historiologist is, therefore, not only to see that there are factors, more than one, that play their part in the making of human history; he should also examine as to why one particular factor played its significant, even decisive, part at a particular period. Neither Hegel nor Marx could lay down a correct historiology for the simple reason that while the former laid emphasis on the role of 'ideas', the latter did the same for 'matter'. It is, therefore, an arrant nonsense to conceive historical determinism as purely economic and ideas as merely superstructures as Marx had done or the vice versa as was done by Hegel. As he says: "At any period of history, there are many alternative

23 Ibid., p. 9.
24 Ibid., p. 287.
possibilities of development, but that uncertainty is about the future; in the past, history has taken one of the many possible alternative sources; historiology explains why one particular course was preferred; recurrence of certain specific causes of a preference in different parts of the world allows formulation of some laws of history.”

A peculiar combination of idealism and materialism is evident here when we find Roy saying that ideas themselves are biologically determined, but once the biologically determined process of ideation is completed and ideas are formed, they continue to have an autonomous existence. Thesis VI of the Principles of Radical Democracy says: "Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the awareness of environment. But once they are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws. The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolution." It is clear that history does not follow the Marxian pattern of dialectics; it is a movement from homogeneous masses to the evolution of distinct individualities experimenting in various forms of harmonisation between themselves.

In a way, Roy lays down the doctrine of two inter-connected histories by suggesting that even though ideas and social development are parallel processes, they influence each other. The two parallel processes, material and ideal, compose history though both are independent of each other. They act and react on each other, though they are not causally connected. In other words, Roy takes both subjective and objective factors into his consideration and thereby repudiates all

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26 Ray, Sibnarayan, Radicalism (Calcutta: Minerva), 1958, p. 82.
partial or one-sided theories of social progress. "Religious doctrines and philosophical ideas can be greatly influenced by the operation of social factors, but they are never brought about by the latter, do not originate in them. They have their own history, past and future." 27

In order to present a more sophisticated description of the humanist historiology of Roy, it may be added that his theory of history is contained in his attempt to bring about a reconciliation among three elements what he terms reason, romanticism and revolution. In the first place, he uses the term treason in a very comprehensive sense. Human mind is necessarily rational in essence that informs man to believe in certain constant values and to question all others in order to establish their legitimacy. The roots of reason are embedded in the physical existence of man. There is nothing mysterious or mystical about human nature. It is, for this reason, that man, as a rational creature, always endeavours to correct himself in response to his new discoveries and inventions. Reason, in fine, is the reflection of the law of nature through human intelligence. It is the rhythm of the cosmos.

Allied with the attribute of reason is the element of romanticism that inspires man to be free. It refers to the passionate belief in the creativeness of man. Man desires to be more and more free and what inspires him to conceive and struggle for this reason is the romantic view of life. Romanticism, therefore, has its own important contribution to the making of history, since it refers to "the urge or will of the man to break all the chains that bind him in order to realise his freedom." 28 In other words, romanticism "is an impetuous urge to get the desirable.

27 Ibid., p. 89.
28 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 15.
Man, however, can not create history simply with this urge. Along with this impetuous will to freedom, man also possesses reasoning power which has a sobering effect. This reasoning power reveals to man his strengths as well as his limitations. Man can make history when the romantic will to freedom is sobered by the rational consideration as to what is possible.”

Roy, however, makes a distinction between true and false romanticism. Romanticism is false when it tends to emphasise irrationalism, intuition, imagination and fantasy against rational thinking, or when it goes to the extent of sacrificing individual at the altar of some collective ego as was done by Rousseau. It is true when it is intellectually disciplined and thereby refers to the burning faith in the creativeness of man. In other words, while false romanticism refers to an appeal to the heart, true romanticism refers to an appeal to the head and, as such, imagination and enthusiasm are not buttressed on a solid foundation of knowledge and critical realism.

It is true that romanticism leads to revolution. As such, revolution is both a rational and a romantic concept. "Romanticism tempered with reason, and rationalism enlivened by the romantic spirit of adventure, pave the road to successful revolutions.” Thus, a new philosophy "is born out of the spiritual heritage of mankind to herald a reorganisation of society. The human-will supplies the energy and the reason shows the way; one supplies dynamism and the other gives direction. Thus reason

and romanticism can be fitted into a single revolutionary process."  

Human history is made more by human brain than brawn. Man's brain is also a means of production; it produces ideas which are more iconoclastic of commodities. And revolution presupposes iconoclastic ideas. "It is an experience of history," says Roy, "that invariably a new ideology rises to herald a new social order. New ideas inspire action for the destruction of established economic relations and the creation of new ones."  

Such a view of Roy contradicts the principles of Marxian historiology. If the ideas of men were wholly determined by the environment or economic mode of production, man would have remained a slave of the latter. On the contrary, man becomes free by his ability to conceive new ideas and by his attempt to change himself and the society accordingly. "It has become axiomatic that environment shapes man. But a humanist will prove that men can shape their environment."  

Thesis 11 of the Principles of Radical Democracy says: ‘Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is the continuation on a higher level of intelligence and emotion of the biological struggle for existence.’ Then, Thesis V says: ‘The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a wrong interpretation of materialism. It implies dualism whereas Materialism is monistic philosophy. History is a

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determined process, but there are more than one causative factors. Human will is none of them, and it cannot always be referred directly to any economic incentive.’

Roy not only presents a theory of history having a peculiar amalgam of materialism and idealism, he also tries to show an application of his philosophy of history to socio-political events. In particular, he refers to the Renaissance and Reformation movements that entailed the termination of the Middle and inauguration of the Modern Ages. It was the richest period of human history in which reason dominated the minds of the people who were involved in a successful struggle for existence. Instead of having faith in the canons of religion and mysticism, people looked towards pagan antiquity and questioned the basis of their social, political and economic institutions. It thus became, what is known, the Age of Reason or the Era of Enlightenment. To Roy, the events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries signified the triumph of romanticism by virtue of man's struggle for existence being based on the premises of reason.

As such, Roy regarded Renaissance not as a product of economic development but purely a cultural outburst having its own history and continuity that could be traced to the days of Greek civilisation. As he says: "The Renaissance was a phase of man's age-long struggle for freedom, and freedom is an ideal concept. It was a chapter in the cultural history of mankind which had its own logic and its own momentum. The Renaissance was inspired more by the humanist, rationalist and scientific ideas of the ancient Greek civilisation than by the economic
interests and political ambitions of the medieval trading class." The humanists of this period welcomed the message of ancient Greeks received through the Arab scientists and philosophers and they also drew upon the native tradition of pagan antiquity as well as the thought of Roman figures like Cicero and Seneca. Whereas Renaissance meant man's struggle for freedom on the intellectual plane, Reformation did the same in the religious sphere. The main assertion of Martin Luther King was on the freedom of the Protestants. The two stable elements in the thought pattern of the Reformation were protest against authority and emphasis on the individual. "These two and particularly the emphasis on the individual and individual conscience entitles the Reformation to the honour of heralding the struggle for freedom in general and not only the struggle for freedom from the ecclesiastical authority."

It is for this reason that Roy differs from Laski who endorsed that "what produced liberalism was the emergence of a new economic society at the end of the Middle Ages." To Roy, the rise of liberalism should be attributed to the 'needs of that society'. Herein occurred continuity of ideas culminating in the two great movements. Humanism did not rise in response to the demands of the traders, it developed to meet the urgency of the spiritual crisis. As he forcefully asserts: "In order to trace the roots of Liberalism and Democratic ideas, and to

appreciate their true significance, one must not begin with any preconceived notions but be guided by the logic of the evolution of thought, by the objectivity of the dynamics of ideas themselves. For centuries, the pattern of thought had been cast in the religious mould. Modern science itself was inspired by the teleological view of law-governed universe. Rationalism was born in the theological schools of Middle Ages. Modern social and political ideas similarly grew out of the historical background of religious controversies and metaphysical speculations of a disinterested intellectual pursuit. The speculations of the sixteenth century about the origin of civil society not only undermined Christianity by an implicit rejection of Biblical doctrine; it also laid down the foundation of Liberalism and democratic political theory.\textsuperscript{38} It is clear that Roy tries to reconcile the vital role of human ideas in history with the philosophy of materialism. He avoids the fallacies of both-extreme materialism and extreme idealism and endeavours to steer a middle course taking into account all the diverse factors of history, material as well as human, with an emphasis that one factor has more significance at one period of social development. History thus becomes a science, though a social one. In his Synopsis prepared on the eve of the Study Camp held at Dehradun in 1946, it was stated by him: "History becomes a science; not indeed an exact science of the order of astronomy and physics, nor experimental like chemistry; history, as a science, is analogous to geology; historical knowledge is inferential; a picture of the past drawn on the basis of knowledge resulting from a study of relics, documents, inscriptions, monuments etc.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., Vol. II, p. 80.
assisted by philosophy, paleontology, archaeology and other branches of investigation in circumscribed fields."39

Roy's theory of history may be criticised on these grounds: in the first place, it may be said that Roy's humanist historiology represents a queer admixture of materialism and idealism. Marx is contradicted when Roy asserts that ideas are not to be identified with the superstructures of the forces and relations of production and distribution and, at the same time, he (Marx) is allowed to reappear when Roy asserts with equal vigour that the forces making for progress in the beginning grow within the established order of things. It is for this reason that one ardent follower of Roy comments that the economic interpretation of Marx is not rejected or replaced, 'it is balanced with due recognition of ideational and individual factors.'40 What creates difficulty in this regard is that Roy, in a zeal to cover several factors in the making of social history, spreads his net too wide, with the result that it "appears that he makes use of all these meanings, one at a time, according to the exigencies of the situation."41 A critic of Roy goes to the extent of saying: "This is not historiology but the denial of the possibility of any historiology."42

If we carry this point further, we may say that Roy either shows a misreading of history, or he tries to fit in his own ideas in a plan hastily drawn by him. One may find faults with his interpretations of the Reformation and Renaissance movements wherein he thoroughly

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40 Ray, Sibnarayan, Radicalism, op. cit., p. 25.
42 Ibid., p. 98.
ignores the role of social and economic factors. Even anti-Marxist authorities endorse the point that the ideals of these two great movements of European history "followed and not preceded the observed facts and changes in life." As Burns says: "Individuals had freed themselves from medievalism before artists and poets claimed self-development as right, or thinkers formulated a philosophy of Renaissance." As one critic goes on to say: "Roy wanted to change facts by his opinions. He did not try to adjust his opinions to the facts of history; on the contrary, he wanted the facts of history to adjust themselves to suit his opinions."

Next, it may be added that Roy's theory of history is based on his obsession for romanticism, i.e., man's will to remain involved in a struggle for existence in order to achieve the ideal of freedom. So deep is his passion that the entire history of modern Europe becomes, according to Roy, a record of struggle between the spirit of the Renaissance and the spirit of Reformation. Confining his attention to these two events, he goes to admiring everything that enables man to conceive new ideas and then make an attempt to change the society accordingly. Like Rousseau, he commits the mistake of expecting too much from human nature. As a result, the difference between true and false forms of romanticism, as he so clearly affirms, is blurred and what remains of it (romanticism) is that it becomes identical with anything that is 'strange, unexpected, intense, superlative, extreme, unique etc.'

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43 Ibid., p. 118.
and it "hungers for the thrilling and the marvellous and is, in short, incurably melodramatic."46 Thus a critic comments that "in his attempts to reconcile 'true romanticism' with rationalism, Roy, in fact, killed the true spirit of the romantic movement."47

Finally, it is said that Roy formulates his humanist historiology as an alternative to the Marxist interpretation of history. He, however, remains unsuccessful in this direction. Though inherent with certain mistakes, the economic determinism of Marx is still considered as an acceptable doctrine and that may be utilised for drawing a peculiar type of horoscope of social history. The role of ideas in the making of history cannot be taken to the extent of sacrificing the role of social and economic factors. What is striking at this juncture is that Roy, apart from ignoring the significance of economic factors with a view to contradicting Marx, goes to the length of eulogizing one who had a perverse view of human nature. It is, therefore, no less surprising that he lauds Machiavelli as a humanist and a cosmopolitan. "It is surprising that to Machiavelli, with his intensely perverse and pessimistic concept of human nature, Roy in his enthusiasm should have ascribed a humanist and a cosmopolitan character."48

In fine, Roy's humanist historiology seeks to do away with the preponderance of any irrational trend of human thought represented by Marxism, Idealism, Fascism or any other collectivist social theory. As a

48 Varma, V. P., Modern Indian Political Thought (Agra: Luxmi Narain Aggarwal), 1994, p. 467.
remedy to it, he evolves, as he so proudly claims, a new principle of explaining the mode of social development that revives the traditions of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and also adjusts them to the conditions of the twentieth century. Historiography thus becomes the science of explaining the progress of society towards 'new humanism'.

The sociological historiography of Marx as well as the metaphysical historiography of Hegel stand contradicted, whereas some of the essential ingredients of both stand assimilated in another respect. As a general principle, Roy admits the importance of both - human ideas and social factors - though he gives precedence to the former in a quite anti-Marxian manner. The net result is that Roy may be considered "as an idealist among the idealists, and a materialist among the materialists."49

PRINCIPLES OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

1. Man is the archetype of society. Co-operative social relationships contribute to develop individual potentialities. But the development of the individual is the measure of social progress. Collectivity presupposes the existence of individuals. Except as the sum total of freedom and well-being, actually enjoyed by individuals, social liberation and progress are imaginary ideals, which are never attained. Well-being, if it is actual, is enjoyed by individuals. It is wrong to ascribe a collective ego to any form of human community (viz., nation, class, etc.), as that practice means sacrifice of the individual. Collective well-being is a function of the well-being of individuals.

2. Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is the continuation, on a higher level of intelligence and emotion of the biological struggle for existence. The search for truth is a corollary thereof. Increasing knowledge of nature enables man to be progressively free from the tyranny of natural phenomena, and physical and social environments. Truth is the content of knowledge.

3. The purpose of all rational human endeavour, individual as well as collective, is attainment of freedom, in ever increasing measure. Freedom is progressive disappearance of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels of a mechanical social organism. The position of the individual, therefore, is the measure of the progressive and liberating significance of any collective effort or social organisation. The success of any collective endeavour is to be measured by the actual benefit for its constituent units.

4. Rising out of the background of the law-governed physical nature, the human being is essentially rational. Reason, being a biological property, it is not the antithesis of will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a common biological denominator. Historical determinism, therefore, does not exclude freedom of the will. As a matter of fact, human will is the most powerful determining factor. Otherwise, there would be no room for revolutions in a rationally determined process of history. The rational and scientific concept of determinism is not to be confused with the teleological or religious doctrine of predestination.
5. The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a wrong interpretation of Materialism. It implies dualism, whereas Materialism is a monistic philosophy. History is a determined process; but there are more than one causative factors. Human will is one of them, and it cannot always be referred directly to any economic incentive.

6. Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the awareness of environments. But once they are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws. The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually. But in no particular point of the process of the integral human evolution, can a direct causal relation be established between historical events and the movements of ideas. (‘Idea’ is here used in the common philosophical sense of ideology or system of ideas). Cultural patterns and ethical values are not mere ideological super-structures of established economic relations. They are also historically determined by the logic of the history of ideas.

7. For creating a new world of freedom, revolution must go beyond an economic reorganisation of society. Freedom does not necessarily follow from the capture of political power in the name of oppressed and exploited classes and abolition of private property in the means of production.

8. Communism or Socialism may conceivably be the means for the attainment of the goal of freedom. How far it can serve that purpose, must be judged by experience. A political system and an economic experiment which subordinate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary collective ego, be it the nation or a class, cannot possibly be
the suitable means for the attainment of the goal of freedom. On the one hand, it is absurd to argue that negation of freedom will lead to freedom, and, on the other hand, it is not freedom to sacrifice the individual at the altar of an imaginary collective ego. Any social philosophy or scheme of social reconstruction which does not recognise the sovereignty of the individual, and dismisses the ideal of freedom as an empty abstraction, can have no more than a very limited progressive and revolutionary significance.

9. The State, being the political organisation of society, its withering away under Communism is a utopia which has been exploded by experience. Planned economy, on the basis of socialised industries, presupposes a powerful political machinery. Democratic control of that machinery alone can guarantee freedom under the new order. Planning of production for use is possible on the basis of political democracy and individual freedom.

10. State ownership and planned economy do not by themselves end exploitation of labour; nor do they necessarily lead to an equal distribution of wealth. Economic democracy is no more possible in the absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence of the former.

11. Dictatorship tends to perpetuate itself. Planned economy under political dictatorship disregards individual freedom on the pleas of efficiency, collective effort and social progress. Consequently, a higher form of democracy in the socialist society, as it is conceived at present, becomes an impossibility. Dictatorship defeats its professed end.
12. The defects of formal parliamentary democracy have also been exposed in experience. They result from the delegation of power. To make democracy effective, power must always remain vested in the people, and there must be ways and means for the people to wield the sovereign power effectively, not periodically, but from day to day. Atomised individual citizens are powerless for all practical purposes, and most of the time. They have no means to exercise their sovereignty and to wield a standing control of the State machinery.

13. Liberalism is falsified or parodied under formal parliamentary democracy. The doctrine of laissez faire only provides the legal sanction to the exploitation of man by man. The concept of economic man negativates the liberating doctrine of individualism. The economic man is bound to be a slave or a slave-holder. This vulgar concept must be replaced by the reality of an instinctively rational being who is moral because he is rational. Morality is an appeal to conscience, and conscience is the instinctive awareness of, and reaction to, environments. It is a mechanistic biological function on the level of consciousness. Therefore, it is rational.

14. The alternative to parliamentary democracy is not dictatorship; it is organised democracy in the place of formal democracy of powerless atomised individual citizens. The parliament should be the apex of a pyramidal structure of the state reared on the base of an organised democracy composed of a countrywide network of People's Committees. The political organisation of society (the State) will be coincident with the entire society, and consequently the State will be under a standing democratic control.
15. The function of a revolutionary and liberating social philosophy is to lay emphasis on the basic fact of history that man is the maker of his world - man as a thinking being - and he can be so only as an individual. The brain is a means of production, and produces the most revolutionary commodity. Revolutions presuppose iconoclastic ideas. An increasingly large number of men, conscious of their creative power, motivated by the indomitable will to remake the world, moved by the adventure of ideas, and fired with the ideal of a free society of free men, can create the conditions under which democracy will be possible.

16. The method and programme of social revolution must be based on a reassertion of the basic principle of social progress. A social renaissance can come only through determined and widespread endeavour to educate the people as regards the principles of freedom and rational co-operative living. The people will be organised into effective democratic bodies to build up the socio-political foundation of the post revolutionary order. Social revolution requires, in rapidly increasing number, men of the new renaissance, and a rapidly expanding system of People's Committees, and an organic co-ordination of both. The programme of revolution will similarly be based on the principles of freedom, reason and social harmony. It will mean elimination of every form of monopoly and vested interest in the regulation of social life.

17. Radical democracy presupposes economic reorganisation of society so as to eliminate the possibility of exploitation of man by man. Progressive satisfaction of material necessities is the precondition for the individual members of society unfolding their intellectual and other finer human potentialities. An economic reorganisation, such as will
guarantee a progressively rising standard of living, is the foundation of the Radical, Democratic State. Economic liberation of the masses is essential condition for their advancing towards the goal of freedom.

18. The economy of the new social order will be based on production for use and distribution with reference to human needs. Its political organisation excludes delegation of power which, in practice, deprives the people of effective power; it will be based on the direct participation of the entire adult population through the People's Committees. Its culture will be based on universal dissemination of knowledge and on minimum control and maximum scope for and incentive to scientific and creative activities. The new society, being founded on reason and science, will necessarily be planned. But it will be planning with the freedom of the individual as its main purpose. The new society will be democratic - politically, economically as well as culturally. Consequently, it will be democracy which can defend itself.

19. The ideal of Radical Democracy will be attained through the collective efforts of spiritually free men united in the determination of creating a world of freedom. They will function as the guides, friends and philosophers of the people rather than as their would be rulers. Consistently with the goal of freedom, their political practice will be rational, and therefore, ethical. Their efforts will be reinforced by the growth of the people's will to freedom. Ultimately, the Radical Democratic State will rise with the support of enlightened public opinion as well as intelligent action of the people. Realising that freedom is inconsistent with concentration of power, Radical Democrats will aim at the widest diffusion of power.
20. In the last analysis, education of the citizen is the condition for such a reorganisation of society as will be conducive to common progress and prosperity without encroaching upon the freedom of the individual. The People's Committees will be the schools for the political and civic education of the citizen. The structure and function of the Radical Democratic State will enable detached individuals to come to the forefront of public affairs. Manned with such individuals, the State machinery will cease to be the instrument in the hands of any particular class to coerce others. Only spiritually free individuals in power can smash all chains of slavery and usher in freedom for all.

21. Radicalism integrates science into social organisation and reconciles individuality with collective life; it gives to freedom a moral, intellectual as well as a social content; it offers a comprehensive theory of social progress in which both the dialectics of economic determinism and dynamics of ideas find their due recognition and it deduces from the same a method and a programme of social revolution in our time.

22. Radicalism starts from the dictum that "man is the measure of everything" (Protagoras) or "man is the root of mankind"(Marx), and advocates reconstruction of the world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free men, by the collective endeavour of spiritually emancipated moral men.\(^{50}\)