CHAPTER THREE

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. PERSONALITY

One of the obvious facts about human beings is that they are all different. One need not go far to see these differences. Even in one's immediate social environment, one finds people who are friendly and others who are different or even hostile; people who are biosterous and others who are inhibitive and like to remain within themselves; some who are open-minded and radical and others who are less tolerant and conservative. The listing can be endless. It has been observed that when one thinks of a person the tendency is to construct an image of him made up of one's perceptions and understanding of him. The urge is to put together his characteristics to define him to others. Very often it is found that there are a lot of distinguishing features. And this may be termed as personality. It may also to be noted here that for some personality is the external appearance of a person; while for others it suggests positive qualities of someone who is enthusiastic, energetic and an interesting person to communicate. It may also describe someone who stands out in a crowd or a group and makes strong impression of his presence (makes his presence felt). For psychologists, 'an individual's personality is neither good or bad, jolly or dull, newsworthy or common place, but rather a description of all of his or her behavioural characteristics (Baron, Byrne and Kantowitz, 1977).

Recalling the premise that people are different, it may be worthwhile to study these individual differences, in terms of thinking, stimulus-response and behaviour patterns. Thus personality can be considered as a very significant aspect of the life of a person. It guides an individual to a network of his or her social relationships and also provides a 'window' to his thinking and acting. It is not only a psychological concept which transcends the cross-section of the functions of an individual but may also be considered as an integrating concept of psychology. It is, therefore, quite understandable that social scientists universally recognize and underscore its significance in human behaviour.
The complexity of personality makes it inevitable that its study will involve diverse approaches and, consequently, different outcomes. Basically, the study of personality is aimed at probing and answering questions like 'why do people act differently? In other words, the focus is on identifying the genesis of an individual's behaviour and explaining individual differences. One of the basic assumptions of many personality theories is that individuals behave consistently across many situations. This assumption is based on the belief that personality is a relatively stable part of the person that guides behaviour (Worchel and Shebilske, 1983). Human behaviour has intrigued philosophers and social scientists alike. Perhaps, among early attempts to provide an understanding of personality can be traced to Hippocrates' and Galen's contributions in 2nd century A.D. who enunciated the doctrine of four temperaments - the melancholic, the cholenic, the sanguine and the phlegmatic. It was an oversimplification in that people cannot be neatly pigeon-holed with four categories. A solution to that was provided by Wundt who pointed out that the four-way classification of Greeks could be accommodated by two independent and continuous variables of emotional responses: strength of emotions and speed of change. What Wundt called speed of response is now normally labelled as extraversion/introversion and his strength factor is now called emotional instability or neuroticism (Wilson 1977).

Theories of Personality: a historical perspective

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud elaborated the first all-comprising personality theory. He was convinced that behaviour was not a matter of chance but that each thing anyone said or did, or thought was determined by some identifiable cause. He was able to explain a great deal of mental functioning in terms of the three states of consciousness (consciousness, preconsciousness and unconsciousness). Later, he found it useful to describe a kind of mental map involving these regions or types of mental activity. He postulated that the primary region was Id. The Id is the original system of the personality; it is the matrix within which the ego and
the Superego become differentiated. The Id consists of everything psychological, that is inherited and that is present at birth, including the instincts. It seeks to gratify desires, irrespective of the fact whether it is in the realm of possibility and unmindful of the consequences associated with such efforts. Coming to grips with reality was described by Freud as the development of Ego. The Ego comes into existence because the needs of the organism require appropriate transactions with the objective world of reality. It involves perception, reasoning, learning and all other activities necessary to interact effectively with the world around us. The possibility of the fulfilment of the desire is seen, effects/consequences are worked out, obstacles are analysed, and challenges are perceived. The basic distinction between the Id and the Ego is that the Id knows only the subjective reality of the mind whereas the Ego distinguishes between things in the mind and things in the external world. The Ego is said to be the executive of the personality because it controls the gateways to action, selects the features of the environment to which it will respond, and decides what instincts will be satisfied and in what manner. In performing these highly important executive functions, the Ego has to try to integrate the often conflicting demands of the Id, the Superego and the external world. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Ego is the organized portion of the Id, that it comes into existence in order to forward the aims of the Id and not to frustrate them, and that all of its power is derived from the Id. It has no existence apart from the Id, and it never becomes completely independent of Id. The third and the last system of personality to be developed is the Superego. It is the internal representative of the traditional values and ideals of society as interpreted to the child by the parents. The Superego is the moral arm of the personality; it represents the ideal rather than the real and it strives for perfection rather than the pleasure. Id, Ego and Superego are not to be thought of manikins that operate the personality. They are merely names for various psychological processes that obey different system principles. They work together as a team under the administrative leadership of the Ego. The personality normally functions as a whole rather than as three separate segments.
Jung is acknowledged to be one of the foremost psychological thinkers of the twentieth century. Although Jung's theory of personality is usually identified as a psychoanalytic theory because of the emphasis it places upon unconscious processes, it differs in some notable respects from Freud's theory of personality. Perhaps the most prominent and distinctive feature of Jung's view of humans is that it combines teleology with causality. (Hall and Lindzey, 1978). According to him human behaviour is conditioned not only by individual and racial history (causality) but also by aims and aspirations (teleology). The total personality or psyche, as it is called by Jung, consists of a number of differentiated but interacting systems. The principle ones are the ego, the personal unconscious and its complexes, and the collective unconscious. The ego is the conscious mind. It is made up of conscious perceptions, memories, thoughts and feelings. From the viewpoint of the individual person it is regarded as being at the centre of consciousness. The personal unconscious consists of experiences that were once conscious but which have been repressed, suppressed, forgotten, or ignored and of experiences that were too weak in the first place to make a conscious impression upon the person. The contents of the personal unconscious, like those of Freud's preconscious material are accessible to consciousness, and there is a great deal of two-way traffic between the personal unconscious and the ego. A complex is an organized group or constellation of feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and memories that exist in the personal unconscious (Jung 1934). Collective unconscious is the storehouse of latent memory traces inherited from one's ancestral past, a past that includes not only the racial history of humans as a separate species but their prehuman or animal ancestry as well. The collective unconscious is the inherited, racial foundation of the whole structure of personality. The structural components of the collective unconscious are called by various names: archetypes, dominants, primordial, images, imagoes, mythological images, and behaviour patterns (Jung 1943). Jung (1921) distinguishes two major attitudes or orientations of personality, the attitude of extraversion and the attitude of introversion. The extraverted attitude orients the person toward the external, objective world; the introverted attitude orients the
person toward the inner, subjective world. These two opposing attitudes are both present in the personality but ordinarily one of them is dominant and conscious while the other is subordinate and unconscious. If the ego is predominantly extraverted in its relation to the world, the personal unconscious will be introverted.

According to Erikson's timetable, development proceeds by stages - eight in all. The first four stages occur during infancy and childhood, the fifth stage during adolescence, and the last three stages during the adult years up to and including old age. In Erikson's writings, particular emphasis is placed on the adolescent period because it is then that the transition between childhood and adulthood is made. What happens during this stage is of the greatest significance for adult personality. Identity, identity crisis, and identity confusion are undoubtedly the most familiar of Erikson's concepts (Hall and Lindzey, 1978). These consecutive stages, it should be noted, are not laid out according to a strict chronological timetable. Each stage is not passed through and left behind. Instead, each stage contributes to the formation of total personality. In Erickson's words, "...anything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole" (1968).

Rogers (1959) views personality in terms of 'self' - an organised, permanent, subjectively perceived entity which is at the very heart of all experiences. His basic conception of people is that they are all naturally open, honest and in contact with their feelings. Difficulties arise only because of interference from others. He feels that it is important to deal with people not from the viewpoint of an external observer who describes and clarifies but rather as someone who tries to see the world from the other individual's point of view. Rogers suggests that what you see is not a series of complex mental structures or an array of personality types but only one basic element - the self. The one primary aim is to maintain or improve oneself. Rogers calls this actualizing tendencies. Adjustment and psychological health are defined in terms of a realistic self-concept.
Earlier theories highlighted the typology of personality and tended to place people into "either/or" personality categories. A related approach occurs in trait theories, which try to determine the structure of personality by identifying relatively permanent qualities that people may possess. Trait theories of personality seek to avoid the limitations of type systems by accounting for both the diversity of human behaviour and the behavioural consistencies within the individual. They start with the basic assumption that one's behaviour is controlled not by the type of person one is but mainly by the wide variety of stable personality traits which each individual has to some degree or another. The idea that many combinations of trait strengths are possible accounts for both the uniqueness of the individual and the differences among people. The idea that the individual's traits are enduring explains the relative consistency in each person's behaviour over time and in many different situations. Thus dispositional theorists see personality as being made up of characteristics, such as traits, or needs within the person which guide the individual's behaviour. An individual's personality may predispose him or her to act in a certain way, but situational variables will also influence behaviour. Many personality theories assume that people tend to act the same way in many different situations. Research, however, has shown that situational variables may determine a person's behaviour. It, therefore, seems that personality factors predispose the individual to act in a certain way, but this predisposition may be overridden by situational factors (Worchel and Shebilske 1983). Situational factors may be interpreted as the expectations of the people around as also the demands of the situation and the perceptions of the situation by an individual.

Allport (1963) defines personality as the dynamic organization within the individual of these psychological systems that determine his characteristic behaviour and thought. He built his theory around traits. A trait is defined as a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behaviour (1961). The term trait was reserved for common traits, and he
referred to individual trait as personal disposition. Though he was able to devise a list of more than 4500 trait terms, he found that most people describe acquaintance in a matter of a few traits. Allport did not regard all traits as equally important. He used the term cardinal traits to refer to passions or motives that pervade many aspects of a person's life. He referred to less pervasive traits that reflect preferences and aversions as secondary traits. Thus Allport's influence upon the development of modern trait theories has been enormous but one of the problems with his approach is that one could spend a life-time describing a heap of trait names.

Cattell's (1964) theory is also built on traits but his approach is nomothetic. Central to Cattell's point of view is the distinction between surface traits, which represent clusters of manifest or overt variables that seem to go together, and source traits, which represent underlying variables that enter into the determination of multiple surface manifestations. It is evident that Cattell considers source traits more important than surface traits. He makes hierarchical distinction between different classes of traits. He is considered a foremost exponent of factor analysis as a means of learning about personality traits. However, his extensive research has resulted in the grouping of human behaviour into 35 'trait clusters'. Cattell calls these clusters surface traits because they summarize the most obvious ways in which most behaviours are related. He regards these surface traits more as manifestations of personality than as the basic dimensions of personality itself. Through factor analysis of surface traits, Cattell further identified 15 more basic, underlying source traits of personality Cattell and others have examined the relationship between these personality source traits and behaviour. Another major theory in this tradition is the one propounded by Eysenck. Present investigation takes his model of personality as one of the variables under study. Therefore, Eysenck's theory will be discussed in greater detail later in this Chapter.

Singer and Singer (1971) viewed personality as a self, and a set of enduring dispositions which differentiate one person from another and which also give each of us some sense of uniqueness as well as commonality with the human race. Hence the
fact that person is mainly concerned with enduring characteristics of the individual i.e. traits rather than states, emerge clearly (Wilson 1978).

**Eysenck's Theory of Personality**

Eysenck's immense contribution to the understanding of personality has been much acclaimed. While, on the one hand, it helped in the development of a body of knowledge which is considered of substantial academic significance, on the other hand, it inspired a lot of research, interesting and useful. He developed his theory over the years (1947, 1957, 1960, 1969, 1980) and he had no hesitation in modifying it from time to time. Eysenck characterized personality as the sum total of the actual or potential behaviour patterns of the organisms, as determined by heredity and environment (1947). Thus he recognized the role of environment in the emergence of the final product termed personality. Later, he defined personality to be more or less stable and enduring organization of a person's character, temperament, intellect and physique which determines his unique adjustment to the environment (Eysenck 1960). In this definition he goes to the genesis of human behaviour by describing personality as consisting of four main sectors of behaviour patterns namely character (collective peculiarities, distinctive marks); temperament (individual characteristics affecting the manner of acting, feeling and thinking); intellect (faculty of knowledge and reasoning, understanding); and physique (physical constitution). Eysenck emphasizes the interactional aspect of these four sectors. It may, therefore, be contended that these four sectors the conative (character), the affective (temperament), cognitive (intellect), and the somatic (physique) cannot be viewed in isolation but in relation to one another. He also underscores the uniqueness of the individual behaviour, perhaps attempting to explain individual differences in behaviour patterns. He reinforces this by stating that there is some agreement that personality refers to some enduring disposition in the constitution of individuals and that it is basic reality underlying individual differences in behaviour (Eysenck 1965). Eysenck also points to a certain degree of stability and consistency in behaviour. Some researchers too have demonstrated a general
consistency in traits over long periods of time. At present the question of how consistent behaviour is across situation is still open to debate.

Like Cattell, Eysenck believes there are a small number of basic dimensions of personality that serve to unify and direct behaviour but he further argues that few basic types encompass a wide variety of traits (Eysenck 1984). Eysenck believes that people possess more or less of each type, with most people on the average range on each. Like Cattell, Eysenck uses a questionnaire and factor-analysis to identify personality dimensions. By dimension he means 'focal points of frequently occurring groups of characteristic concentration of correlated traits which exist along a continuum (Eysenck 1952). Through his research he detected two underlying personality dimensions, Introversion/Extraversion and Neuroticism. He even was able to relate these two dimensions to the four personality types identified by Hippocrates and Galen. More recently, Eysenck (1952, 1975; Eysenck and Eysenck 1968) added a third personality dimension, Psychoticism, that differentiates between normal and psychotic people. The advantage of the dimensional system over the category-based system is that individuals can be located at any point within the space defined by the two factors thus allowing a much greater range of discriminable personalities. Most people fall into the middle range on each of these dimensions, with only a few tending towards the extremes. (Eysenck and Eysenck 1964; Eysenck 1968; and Wilson 1978). Although Eysenck's theory is based on three above mentioned factors, he also points that there is an intelligence factor to personality that is independent of the first three factors. Furthermore, when he studies Psychoticism in isolation, other 'sub-factors' emerge that correspond to traditional psychiatric groupings (Eysenck 1961). Eysenck and Eysenck (1968) got together evidence to show that even the seemingly divergent system of Cattell (1956) and Guilford (1959) converge towards factors of Extraversion and Neuroticism derived by them. This contention was further reinforced by Adcock (1965) in his comparative analysis of Eysenck's and Cattell's work. He opines that Cattell's research supplements rather than opposes that of Eysenck. Further Brody (1972) and
Wilson (1978) after reviewing various theories of personality found Eysenckian theory of personality as the most satisfactory in explaining the sources of variance in personality.

On another plane, Eysenck argues that personality is hierarchically organized. People have specific responses or individual acts that may or may not be characteristic of them. These are at the lowest level of the hierarchy. People have habitual responses or characteristic patterns of behaviour that are repeated in similar situations. These are at the second level of the hierarchy. Finally, traits are inter-related sets of habitual responses. They are at the third level of the hierarchy. He goes on to propose another general level of personality organization, called the type, that is based on inter-relationships among traits (Eysenck 1967, 1984; Eysenck and Eysenck 1969, 1985). This hierarchy is graphically represented in the figure.

Eysenck's personality model is hierarchically arranged with specific responses or behaviors at the lowest level of the hierarchy, habitual responses at the second level, traits at the third level, and types (of which there are three: Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism) at the highest level. (After Eysenck, 1967).
Some conclusions about Personality

It may be useful to step back a bit and to draw some conclusions from the maze of ideas and theories explained in the preceding pages. First, it is obvious that human beings as biological organisms came into the world with built-in mechanisms which determine many aspects of behaviour. It may be said that much of human behaviour in both simple and complex societies involves efforts to satisfy these needs in various ways. Second, it is clear that we are influenced by and altered by our experiences from the time we are born. We are continuously learning in our interactions with our social and physical surroundings. We learn the appropriate ways to satisfy our needs and we learn to respond to those around us with trust or mistrust, love or hate, cooperation or competition, and so forth. Third, we continue to learn and to be responsive to our surroundings throughout our lives. Very few psychologists today would argue that basic personality patterns are set firmly and unalterably at birth or during the first few years of life. There are ways in which individuals behave in response to the factors operating in their immediate environment. A number of factors are constantly working on us which compel us to change our behaviour. The fact remains that whatever the causes, we continually change.

A quick view of the theories detailed earlier will indicate that trait and type theorists differ from other personality theorists in that they assume that personality can be described with a limited number of traits or dimensions. Type theorists assume that personality can be described in a small number of types. Although the exact number of types is a matter of heated dispute (Cattell 1986; Eysenck 1986) several researchers have found support for five basic personality factors (e.g. Digman and Inonye 1986; Fiske 1949; Norman 1963). Of course, despite their similarities, trait and type theorists differ in their emphasis on unique versus shared personality traits and on the physiological basis of personality. In addition, trait theorists, (such as Allport) favour an individualized, idiographic approach to personality whereas factor-analytically oriented theorists like Cattell and Eysenck emphasize nomothetic approach. The
theorists also differ in their emphasis on the physiological bases for personality differences. Although Allport, Cattell and Eysenck all assume that personality has a physiological basis, only Eysenck has produced evidence for the physiological bases of his personality types.

**Extraversion/Introversion**

Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1970) defines Extraversion as 'the act of directing one's interests outside the self' or 'the state of being concerned primarily with things outside the self, with the external environment rather than with one's own thoughts and feelings'. Similarly Introversion is defined as 'the act of directing one's interests inward or to things within the self' or 'the state of being concerned primarily with things within the self, with one's own thoughts and feelings rather than with the external environment.

As is well-known, Jung postulated the existence of a continuum from Extraversion to Introversion on which all human beings could be placed. He characterized Introversion as orientation toward the subjective, inner world of thought and feeling; and Extraversion as orientation toward the external world of things and people. His theory was partly built on the belief that people adopt one of two of these basic approaches or attitudes towards the world. Jung also took a positive view of people, believing that much of their striving was to reach goals and fulfill themselves.

Eysenck (1967, 1970, 1980) put forward a theory regarding the biological basis of Extraversion/Introversion. He maintained that Ascending Reticular Activating System (ARAS) is the structure in the nervous system that forms the basis for individual differences in Extraversion/Introversion. This formation is responsible for maintaining the cerebral cortex in a state of arousal in response to external stimulation. Eysenck postulated that this state of arousal is higher in introverts than extroverts. Gray (1970) said that in addition to ABAS, an inhibitory system, comprising of the orbital frontal cortex, form the basis of Extraversion/Introversion. Eysenck (1964, 1967
and 1977) held that this differential in arousal is responsible for most of the experimentally observed differences between introverts and extroverts.

Eysenck maintains that basic physiological differences interact with environmental factors to produce personality differences. For example, studies indicate that introverts and extroverts differ in their characteristic level of arousal (Eysenck 1970). Examination of levels of arousal in the reticular formation indicates that extroverts have lower levels of arousal and tend to seek out stimulation, whereas introverts have higher levels of arousal and tend to avoid external stimulation. Eysenck has further stated that individuals in whom excitatory potential is generated slowly and in whom excitatory potential so generated is relatively weak, are thereby predisposed to develop extraverted patterns of behaviour. Individuals in whom excitatory potential is generated quickly and in whom excitatory potential so generated is strong, are thereby predisposed to develop introverted patterns of behaviour. Similarly, Eysenck states, that individuals in whom reactive inhibition (I) is developed quickly and is of a strong nature and dissipates slowly are predisposed to develop extroverted pattern of behaviour. Conversely, individuals in whom reactive inhibition dissipates quickly are thereby predisposed to develop introverted patterns of behaviour (1957).

Extraversion was described by Eysenck (1969) as impulsive behaviour with sociable tendencies and Introversion as controlled and responsible behaviour. Extroverts tend to be outgoing, impulsive and uninhibited, having many social contacts and frequently taking part in group activities. A typical extrovert is sociable, likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to and does not like reading or studying by himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck out, acts on the spur of the moment and is generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready answer and generally likes change; he is carefree easy-going, optimistic and likes to laugh and be merry. He prefers to keep moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and loses his temper quickly, although his feelings are not kept under tight control and he is not always a reliable person.
The typical introvert is quiet, retiring sort of person, introspective, fond of books rather than people, he is reserved and distant except to intimate friends. He tends to plan ahead, looks before he leaps and distrusts the impulse of the moment. He does not like excitement, takes matter of everyday life with proper seriousness and likes a well-ordered mode of life. He keeps his feeling under close control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner and does not lose his temper easily. He is reliable, pessimistic and places great value on ethical standards. (Eysenck and Eysenck 1968). An introvert is an individual who shows a tendency to develop anxiety and depression syndromes and is characterized by the obsessional tendencies, irritability and apathy. His feelings are easily hurt, is self-conscious, nervous, given to feelings of inferiority, moody, constantly day-dreaming or socially isolated. His intelligence is comparatively high, vocabulary excellent and he tends to be persistent. Although his level of aspiration is high he tends to underrate his own performance. He is typically rigid and does not appreciate jokes.

The extrovert has little energy, narrow interests. He is troubled by stammers, aches and pains, and is accident-prone. His intelligence is comparatively low, vocabulary poor and shows lack of persistence. His level of aspiration is low and he tends to over-rate his own performance. He is not rigid and shows great inter-personal variability and enjoys jokes.

Lively sociable extroverts are liked better than quite, unsociable introverts, by both introverts and extroverts (Hendrich and Brown 1971). The similarity principle says that extroverts should like other extroverts but why would introverts like extroverts better. The study showed that extroverts were not only liked more but were also considered more interacting at parties, more nearly ideal in personality and preferable as leaders by both extroverts and introverts subjects. But introverted subjects did consider fellow introverts to be more reliable friends and more ethical people. The fact that extroverts are liked better by both extroverts and introverts may be explained by the greater friendliness and pleasantness expected from extroverts in social situations.
Eysenck (1947, 1960, 1973, 1977) pointed out that Extraversion should be considered as a type concept built up of several correlated traits such as sociability and impulsivity. George (1954) found extroverts to have tough-minded attitudes than introverts. Hildebrand (1958) also supported these findings.

With regard to jobs, Pervin (1980) found that extraverts prefer vocations involving interactions with other people whereas introverts tend to prefer more solitary vocations. It is, therefore, likely that youth workers who have to constantly interact with youth and community people over long periods may demonstrate extroverted behaviour patterns. In similar vein, Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) found that professional students scored higher on Extraversion than arts students. Bending (1963) found that introverts tended to prefer theoretical and scientific professions while extroverts were more suited to people-oriented jobs. Kolarikova (1985) in a study noted that differences between extroverted and introverted subjects were found more frequently than were differences between males and females. The differentiation of some objects of interest become apparent only in relation to Extraversion/Introversion (preference for different kinds of inter-personal contacts, adventure, sports) while that of other interests became evident only in relation to gender (women's preference for nature and art, men's preference for profit and advantage). The high degree of preference shown for social contacts in extroverted subjects may prove Eysenck's theory of Extraversion/Introversion from the standpoint of interest orientation of personality. Campbell et. al. (1982) found a positive correlation between Extraversion and preferred level of noise, preferred level of socializing opportunities and also to their related importance. Fox (1984) found that greater difference between extroverts and introverts exist in the desire for company in pleasant and enjoyable situation and in the desire to associate with strangers.

Terman and Tyler (1954) found that males scored higher on Extraversion than females. Eysenck (1956) reported that men generally lead in group activities, are slow, deliberate in movement, over conscientious, inclined to stop and think over things
before acting and like to take on new and important responsibilities. Women enjoy getting acquainted with new people, shrink from speaking in public, crave excitement, often feel miserable for no good reason, tend to take life seriously and enjoy entertaining people. Mohan (1975) in a project aimed at youth attempted to find differences in personality patterns of males and females. At the university level, both stabilize on Neuroticism but males were found to be extroverted and females to be introverted.

**Neuroticism**

The second major personality dimension posited by Eysenck (1947) was Neuroticism/stability. The causal basis of Neuroticism lies in the difference in autonomic arousal. A neurotic person is quick on autonomic arousal, is higher in drive too, and is over-responsive (Eysenck 1957). Eysenck (1963) is of the view that the differences between individuals in Neuroticism are mediated by inherited differences in the liability and excitability of the autonomic nervous system. Some persons are constitutionally predisposed to react strongly to the incoming stimuli while the others are predisposed to act much less strongly. The former may be referred to as neurotics and the latter as 'stable'. Neuroticism as contrasted to emotional stability is very much similar to anxiety.

Brody (1972) goes on to point out that individuals tend to respond to stress with the activation of specific parts of the sympathetic nervous system, regardless of the type of stimulation received, rather than responding with all the parts of the sympathetic nervous system simultaneously. He goes on to add that differences in threshold of activity of the visceral brain are presumed to be the physiological basis of individual differences in the Neuroticism - Stability dimension. Arousal of the visceral brain leads to the arousal of the reticular activating system (ARAS) but not the converse. As a result individuals with extremely low threshold for emotional arousal are high on Neuroticism; they also tend to be introverted because high levels of arousal of the visual brain
system lead to arousal of the reticular activating system (Brody 1972). Thus, 'N' which is conceived to be pre-disposition to strong autonomic activation also produces higher cortical arousal (McLaughlin and Eysenck 1967). According to Davis and Ture (1970) arousal state in an individual can affect his behaviour.

Neuroticism by which Eysenck implies drive complements Extraversion/Introversion in explaining behaviour patterns. It is considered as a general factor in motivation or striving (Hall and Lindzey 1978) and autonomic drive (Furneaux 1961; Eysenck and White 1964). Mohan (1976) attempts to relate drive on the motivational force to an individual's potential for learning. He suggests that the extent to which this motivational force will retain its energizing and directive aspects (and not become disorganizing and disruptive one due to emotional accompaniments) will determine the prediction of effects of Neuroticism on performance in learning tasks. On more or less same plane, Eysenck (1957) had earlier said that 'since it acts as a motivating agency, Neuroticism affects acquisition of efficiency. Thus one can deduce a certain positive relationship between Neuroticism and learning ability. Grief et al (1977) reports that neurotic introverts showed the worst results in both quality and speed on most of the items, independent of complexity and intelligence factor. Stable subjects and neurotic extroverts showed the best results. Muniz et al (1984) deduces a positive correlation between Neuroticism and movement time as the task difficulty increased. Furneaux (1961) found that there was a positive relationship between Neuroticism and attainment for university students. This seems to be confirmed by Mohan (1976) who states that the students scoring high at the university have high Neuroticism score. Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) found that mildly neurotic introverts do best at university level.

As indicated earlier, high Neuroticism scores are indicative of emotional liability and over-reactivity. High scoring individuals tend to be emotionally over-responsive, reacting strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and thus have difficulties in returning to a normal state after an intense, emotionally arousing experience (Ibrahim 1979). His strong
emotional reactions interfere with his proper adjustment, making him react in irrational ways (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975). Such individuals frequently complain of vague somatic troubles of minor kind such as headaches minor digestive disorders, insomnia, backaches, etc. and also report many worries, anxieties and disagreeable emotional feelings. Such individuals are predisposed to develop neurotic disorders under stress, but such pre-dispositions should not be confused with critical neurotic breakdown; a person may have high-score on Neuroticism, yet function adequately in work, sex, family and society spheres (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968, 1978). Eysenck (1952) emphasizes that the general nature of Neuroticism is assessed as instability, unadaptability, depressive moods, weak dependable attitude, narrow interests and symptoms of nervous breakdown. A typical high Neuroticism scorer is an anxious, worrying individual, over responsive and depressed (Ibrahim 1979).

Franks (1956) found a very high correlation of .92 between Neuroticism of Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI, Eysenck and Eysenck 1964) and Anxiety as measured by Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale. So, the two terms Neuroticism and Anxiety are often used interchangeably. Eysenck (1964) also found a high correlation between Neuroticism and Anxiety. Bull and Stromgen (1971) found very high positive correlation among Anxiety as measured by Cattell's Anxiety Scale Questionnaire, Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Scale and Neuroticism of Eysenck's Personality Inventory.

Rao (1966) found the nurses, teachers, and medical students showed comparatively high score on Neuroticism while engineering and science group got least score. Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) found that arts students scored highest on Neuroticism and professional students scored the least. It may be mentioned here that social sciences were more often chosen by females than males. Results by Lynn (1969), Mohan (1976), Eysenck and Eysenck (1978), Gulati (1982) show that females score high on Neuroticism than males.
Psychoticism

Eysenck (1952) postulated the existence of a third dimension of personality which was unrelated and independent of Extraversion and Introversion, and he called it Psychoticism. It referred to an underlying personality trait present in varying degree in all persons. It was also emphasized that if this trait is present in marked degree, it predisposes a person to the development of psychiatric abnormalities. It was argued that just as neurosis is a pathological exaggeration of higher degrees of some underlying traits of Neuroticism, so psychosis is one of Psychoticism. This hypothesis was based on two theoretical considerations:

i) Psychotic abnormalities are essentially continuous with normality;

ii) Neurosis and psychosis are entirely different and independent dimensions.

This hypothesis has received experimental support (Eysenck 1970). Eysenck and Eysenck (1972) found that this dimension could be measured reliably, independent of Extraversion, Introversion and Social Desirability. Earlier, Kretschmer (1925) has been given credit for putting forth the concept of Psychoticism. His two dimensions of personality were cyclothymia-schizothymia and normality - psychotic abnormality. Eysenck considered the former dimension similar to Jung's Extraversion-Introversion dimension. The latter dimension, however, was considered to represent a different quality of abnormality from the neurotic abnonormality treated by Jung. Eysenck used Kretschmer's concept of normality - psychotic abnormality as a model for his Psychoticism dimensions (Wakefield et al, 1976).

Psychoticism is perhaps most consistently linked with crime. A high scorer may be described as being solitary, not caring for people, he is often troublesome, not fitting in anywhere. He may be cruel and inhuman, lacking in feeling and empathy and altogether insensitive. He is hostile to others, even to his own kith and kin and aggressive even to loved ones. He has a liking for odd and unusual things and a disregard for danger; he likes to make fool of other people and to upset them.
Socialization is alien to both adults and children. Empathy, feelings of guilt, sensitivity to other people are notions to which they are indifferent. This description refers only to those who are at the extreme end of the score. However, those who are nearer the middle range show these behavioural traits to a much less degree. Sehgal (1979) found that Psychoticism is related to emotional instability and the behaviour of high scoring individuals is characterized by suspicion, anxiety, frustration and tension.

Eysenck and Eysenck (1973) asserted that there was a close relationship between Psychoticism and masculinity. Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) found that men scored more on Psychoticism than women and men were more psychopathic deviates than women. Aggressiveness and hostility, two main contributors to Psychoticism are traditionally male characteristics. It is, therefore, no surprise that men are generally high scorers on this count. Misra and Misra (1980) reported that men were more psychopathic deviates than women. Differences were found to be significant. Malhotra (1981) too confirmed this finding. Mohan and Tiwana (1986) in a study reported that the creative writers were higher on Psychoticism than the normal population. Mohan and Datta (1987) in their study on doctors reported that professors scored the highest on Psychoticism followed by lecturers, legislators and readers.

**Lie-scale (Social Desirability)**

The 'Lie' (L) Scale was first incorporated in the Eysenck's Personality Inventory (EPI) to facilitate detection of faking and Eysenck and Eysenck (1964) concluded that it did successfully identify individuals 'faking good'. Eysenck and Eysenck (1963) assumed that an increased tendency to lie is associated with Introversion. Verma (1977) appears to support the view that this is a powerful independent feature of personality which needs to be studied in its own right and not as a mere response bias to be corrected. It is suggested that those, who have the tendency to act in a socially desirable (or approved) way, score high on Lie-Scale. This tendency may be traced to 'a desire to conform to social norms' (Edwards 1959) and to project 'ideal self'
Further, a person may deliberately try to fake or tell a lie. This set of 'motivational distortion' as it is sometimes called (Cattell 1965) can be experimentally induced in actual life situation of high motivation, like selection interviews (Cattell 1965; Michaelis and Eysenck 1971). A person may also score high on the Lie-Scale as a result of poor insight (Michaelis and Eysenck 1971). This poor insight may be due to either low level of intelligence or because of a marked error of judgement. The scale may also measure some stable personality factor which possibly denotes some degree of 'social naivete'. However, too little is known about the precise nature of this scale (Eysenck 1976).

A series of factorial and experimental studies have been carried out to investigate the nature of this scale in some detail (Eysenck and Eysenck 1971). The scale possesses considerable degree of factorial unity, with individual items having high loadings on this factor, and no other.

Many investigations have reported a very poor correlate between Lie-scores and sex of the subject. Eysenck (1976) found women to score higher on L-scale. Heilbrum (1965) stated that high Social Desirability responses provided more valid and reliable records. Braun and Gomez (1966) said that when subjects attempted to conceal their faking, a smaller percentage made to Lie-score. Orwin (1971) stated that there was no consistent results on low Social Desirability scores. Eysenck and Eysenck (1978) obtained .90 test-rested reliability on Social Desirability for males and .61 for females, its internal consistency was .81 for males and .79 for females. Recent work of Mohan, Eysenck and Eysenck (1989) shows that the importance of this dimension of personality.
B. VALUES

Looking at the myriad meanings people ascribe to values, it is evident that the task of defining values is quite difficult. No single definition can bring out the wide-range of implications values have for human beings and for their interaction with others in the society. A broad, comprehensive conception of value has the advantage of calling attention to possible value elements in all behaviour save the most instinctive or automatic. A narrow definition may have the virtues of specificity and definiteness but may lead to errors if the excluded phenomena are not taken into account through concepts closely related to the idea of value. It may, however, be worthwhile to look into some of the elements which may help in the understanding of 'values'.

The term values may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions, and attractions and many other modalities of selective orientation (Pepper 1958). According to Williams (1963), values are considered as potent determinants of human behaviour. Both these definitions highlight the selective quality of the values, providing direction to the behaviour of an individual. They represent the philosophy of life. It seems that all values contain some cognitive elements (although some definitions do not include this), that they have a selective or directional quality, and they involve some effective components. Values serve as criteria for selection in action. Value-as-criterion is usually the more important usage for purposes of social scientific analysis (William, 1960). When most explicit and fully conceptualized, values become criteria for judgement, preference and choice (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 1968). Hall and Lindzey (1970) say that 'when we speak of placing a high value upon a particular idea or feeling we mean that the idea or feeling exerts a considerable force, investigating and directing behaviour'. According to Rokeach (1973), 'to say a person has a value is to say that cognitively he knows the correct way to behave or the correct end-state to strive for. Values, as standards (criteria) for establishing what should be
regarded as desirable, provide the grounds for accepting or rejecting norms for conduct.

It is obvious that before making a choice of an act or behaviour, an individual would make some sort of judgement or evaluation of the act or behaviour. The values will provide standards or the criteria against which such acts or behaviour would be assessed. An individual will not always do what he or she wants but what is more desirable in the given situation or the context. One of the more widely accepted definitions in the social science literature considers values to be conceptions of the desirable, influencing, selective behaviour. In this restrictive definition, a distinction is made between what is denied and what is desirable, the latter being equated with what we ought to desire; values regulate 'impulse satisfaction in accord with the whole array of hierarchical enduring goals of the personality, the requirements of both personality and socio-cultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living (Kluckhohn 1951). Values are standards of desirability that are more nearly independent of specific situations (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 1968). An individual does not confine the judgement or evaluation of his or her own acts or behaviour but also extends this process to acts and behaviour of others, irrespective of the fact that whether he or she is a part of this interaction. People do prefer some things to others; they do select one cause of action rather than another out of a range of possibilities; they do judge the conduct of others (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 1968). French and Lesser (1964) contend that values can influence self-conscious behaviour choices and evaluation of others.

A certain degree of consistency is attached to these values. Allport (1935) saw values as simply enduring attitudes about a class of observations (as opposed to a single object) held by a mature individual, one who had thought about and organized the attitudes into a comprehensive system. The value system is based on the individual's own organization of his attitudes. Values persist in the individual because they become a part of his sense of identity (Erickson 1963). Values are enduring
beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or state of existence that is personally and socially preferable to alternative mode of conduct. Moreover, a value, unlike an attitude, is an imperative to action, not only a belief about preferable but also a preference for the preferable (Lovejoy 1950). Kluckhohn (1955) states that members of various cultures develop values concerning solutions of certain problems. Thus, each society has dominant value orientation which relates to getting of solutions to problems growing out of human situation.

Values, motives and beliefs are the constituents of the behaviour of an individual and are, therefore, related terms. However, it may not be easy to bring out a clear-cut distinction because all these terms because they refer to factors that need to be taken into consideration to investigate and understand human behaviour. However, an attempt can be made to do so in general terms. Values are not motives. Many particular motives may reinforce commitment to a given value. A given value may have a strength that is relatively independent of any particular motive, though it remains in some sense a function of the total motivational system (Kluckhohn 1951). Related to the measurement and definitional distinctions between motives and values is Raynor and McFarlin's (1986) discussion of 'affective' vs. 'information' value. Affective value refers to the emotional functioning and information value to the cognitive functioning of personality. An event or anticipation of event can provide positive or negative affective value in its answer to the question, how good or bad do I feel about myself or can provide positive (clear) or negative (unclear or ambiguous) value in answer to the question. Sorrentino, Short and Raynor (1984) suggest that the TAT measure of motive is actually a measure of affective value -- pride in accomplishment or shame over failure. Researchers have increasingly argued that cognition should not be studied separately from motivation - that the 'cold' cognitive-view and the 'hot' motivational view be incorporated into a 'warm look'. (Sorrentino and Higgins, 1986) at behavioural prediction. These investigators suggest that cognition and motivation are synergistic and Rokeach (1973) states that values (cognitions) give expression to
human needs (motivation). It has also been suggested that values can shunt motivational arousal or energy in one direction or another. Laboratory studies carried out by Biernat (1989) support the thesis that motives and values are uncorrelated, separate, personality constructs. Her evidence also suggested that the motive-value interaction pattern may differ when respondent behaviours are considered. No clear and consistent motive-value interaction pattern emerged in predicting either operant or respondent behaviour (Biernat 1989).

Values as empirical elements in human behaviour certainly arise out of human experience and hence may be affected by any conditions, including social conditions, that affect experience. (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 1968). It is, therefore, apparent that the process of the formulation of values is influenced by a number of forces present in the environment, which include social and cultural ethos, political organisations and economic institutions. Once established, however, values also operate as independent variables, channelizing reactions to prior innovations and serving as a basis for further innovations (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 1968).

It is the rare and limiting case if and when a person's behaviour is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value. Such a value would represent an 'absolute preference' (Wright 1963). More often, an individual's acts or behaviour are guided by a cluster of values which co-exist in him. These values cannot deemed to be compartmentalized and existing in isolation to one another. The actual content and boundaries of any particular value will be affected by its changing relation to other values (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 1968). It is, therefore, likely that there may be situations in which these values are compatible to one another and, as a result, no conflict may arise between the values. Thus it will be easy for an individual to make a choice, in terms of behaviour, or to ascribe a particular worth to an act or behaviour. Even in cases where conflicting values are of unequal strength, it is easy to deny the less important one and to bolster the more important one --- a process that Festinger (1964) describes as 'spreading of the alternatives'. However, when conflicting values
are of approximately equal strength, denial and bold bolstering are no longer plausible solutions to trade-off dilemmas (Abelson 1959, 1968). People must turn to more effort-demanding strategies such as differentiation (distinguishing the impact of policies on conflicting values) and integration (developing rules or schemata for coping with trade-offs between important values) (Fishkin 1983; Thurow 1980).

Another aspect of values is that it is possible that in a given society, there may be conflict or opposition to certain values. Under conditions of rapid social change, special strains are placed upon value integration. When serious conflicts arise over basic values, it is doubtful that either suppression or compromise is effective in producing new integration as is the expansion of interests to rearrange and recenter values priorities (Allport 1959).

Classification of Values

Different psychologists have classified values differently. Spranger (1928), the pioneer authority on values, was of the view that the personalities of men are best known through the study of their values. He gave six types of values viz. the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political and religious. His premise is that every individual will have a mixture of the values, regardless of the state he is in. However, his theory has some inadequacies. He does not visualize person who will have no values. Further, his classification does not provide for those whose main aim is to live the life as it comes, without ascribing any meaning or relevance to it. These people may be concerned with the appropriateness and suitability of their actions and behaviours in terms of the situations confronting them, without bothering for the fairness or justification of their actions. They may look for advantages which accrue to them. His classification also excludes those who have hedonistic philosophy of life, looking for pleasures. The six values are:
Theoretical Values

The theoretical man is engaged in the relentless pursuit to discover truth in its absolute form, and to become aware of the life, which is meaningful and unblemished. In this attempt to realize his goal, he strives to find order and discipline in the world and likes to organize the knowledge which he accumulates or gathers in the process into a system which facilitates its understanding and analysis. He is inclined to perceive or know things or objects as they are, identifying similarities and dissimilarities which characterise these things or objects. However, he is not interested in formulating his judgements as to their appearance, features and usefulness in the context of life. In brief, he interacts with things or situations at cognitive rather than emotional or feeling level. He is rational, endowed with reason and unwilling to accept things which lack a rational or experimental basis. Scientists, philosophers and scholars test high in theoretical scores.

Economic Values

The economic man's main interests and concerns centre around the gains and uses he can draw from any object or thing. To start with, this man will seek satisfaction of his physical or biological needs. But, later, this overwhelming concern for self-preservation and interest in utilities will extend to all aspects of his life, the personal and the business world. This will affect the patterns of his life associated with production, consumption of goods and accumulation of tangible wealth. Obviously, he will be guided more by practical considerations in all his acts or behaviours. Businessmen, business executives and salesmen are usually high on this factor.

In view of his overriding concern for gains or benefits accruing out of the things which he does, it is not surprising that the attitude of an economic man frequently comes into conflict with other values. He will be interested only in
that education and knowledge which is of direct use to him and he will regard the unapplied knowledge as wasteful and irrelevant and not worth pursuing. It is, however, to be noted that great engineering and technological feats are the result of the demands economic men make upon science. The intense desire to assess the worth of everything in terms of its utility comes into conflict with aesthetic value except when he sees commercial gains in art. Even in his personal life, an economic man would want to accumulate for himself material comforts and luxuries of life, while convincing himself with the thought that what he is looking for in life is beauty. In the context of his relationship with people, he would like to outdo them in the amassing of wealth and material goods rather than attempting to dominate this relationship or serving them. He will confuse his religious values by regarding wealth as his idol. Even if he is a traditional believer in God, he may do so because he considers Him as the giver of gifts and wealth and responsible for his prosperity and other tangible blessings.

Aesthetic Values

The aesthetic man sees his highest value in form and harmony. For him the worth of an object or thing is to be measured in terms of its beauty and blending with the environment, something that appeals to the eye and soul. Each single experience that comes his way is to be evaluated from the standpoint of grade, or fitness. He believes that life unfolds itself in a series of events and situations and each single event is capable of being enjoyed for its own sake. He himself may not be a creative artist but his chief interest is in the artistic episodes of life. This value differs substantially from theoretical or the economic values, as an aesthetic man's main concern is with the diversity of life and its abstract beauty and not either with similarities of experiences or with the material goods. In fact, he considers the values which thrive in a business and commercial world as repulsive and not worth the life. For him truth and beauty are synonymous
although his main interest is the latter. In his social transactions he may be more interested in persons rather than in their welfare or the social processes. As a result he tends towards individualism and self-sufficient. Aesthetic persons may consider power and pomps as a form of beauty and splendour but they will be opposed to the use of this power for repression of individuality or exploitation of people. In the context of religion they see the manifestations of beauty in the religious experiences.

Social Values

The man with strong social values or motives has a great deal of love and affection for people. He is keen to relate to people and tends to be sympathetic, kind and suave. He is interested in the good or welfare of the people and is willing to be helpful. He is unselfish. He regards theoretical, economic and aesthetic altitudes as either intangible or abstract or cold and inhuman. For him people and his relationship with them is precious. Thus in contrast to the political man, he would want to nurture love as the only suitable form of human relationship. In its extreme form, social value may so overwhelm a person that he or she may become highly sentimental in his or her relationship and may, sometimes, be unable to deal with human problems in a realistic and practical way. On the other hand, those who are low on these values may shy away from meeting people and interacting with them and thus tend to be cold, unacceptive and impersonal. Social workers, teachers, and members of the clergy of all faiths may be high in social values. Spranger adds that in its present form the social interest is selfless and tends to come closer to religious attitude.

Political Values

The primary concern of a political man is to acquire power which he uses for his own ends and not for the good of the people. He would like to have power over others as this enables him to control the behaviour and actions. Thus he would
like to have relationships in which he is the dominating element, manipulating others to realize his own objectives. It is not necessary for a political man to be a politician, but even in other vocations and activities he carries his overwhelming desire for power and control. It may, therefore, be observed that leaders in all fields will score-high on political values, but a difference needs to be made between power used for social or public purposes and power used purely for personal ends and for increasing the area of influence in order to be able to control others. If there is great component of the former, people may not resent but if the emphasis is on the latter, sooner or later people may oppose it because not all would like to be controlled.

**Religious Values**

The highest value of the religious man is unity. Spranger defines the religious man as one whose mental structure is permanently directed to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfying value experience. He is mystical, and wishes to understand the universe as a whole, to relate himself to its embracing totality. Some religious men operate within themselves and seeks to uphold the sublime and noble aspects of life through their religious experiences. They participate actively in the realization of the objectives connected with these aspects of life. A religious man looks for something divine in every experience or situation confronting him. The 'transcendal mystic' would like a communion with the higher reality through self-denial and meditation. He may withdraw himself from the normal process of life. Those who score high on this factor tend to be religious in the broadest sense, although they may not belong to any particular religious group and may not participate actively in formal religious activities. They tend to have high ethical values and a somewhat mystical attitude toward life.
C. ALTRUISM

Helping others, especially those in distress, is not only considered 'a good turn' or moral act but socially a responsible behaviour. According to Berkowitz and Daniel (1963) the social responsibility norms prescribe that people should help those who are dependent upon them. In almost all the religions also, there is special exhortation to the followers to help the poor and the needy and a helping act is considered godly or religious. People who do not help others are called selfish.

Many investigators use the terms 'altruism' and 'pro-social behaviour' interchangeably. These terms are used to describe a wide spectrum of behaviours ranging from helping an old person cross the street to saving the life of a drowning stranger; from chasing a killer and getting him arrested to helping an injured person to get on his feet. Therefore, these terms may denote a heroic deed or a seemingly mundane or casual act. However, many researchers distinguish between prosocial and altruistic behaviour. Prosocial behaviour refers to acts that bring benefits to other people. These acts are aimed at producing, maintaining or improving the physical and psychological welfare and integrity of others (Staub 1978; Wispe 1978). Prosocial behaviour can involve actions that are planned and formal or spontaneous and informal; and may require direct or indirect aid-giving (Smithson, Amato and Paerce 1983). Prosocial behaviour could result in benefit to another person without there being any real intent to help. Or there could even be some material gain expected by the initiators of the behaviour. They may be motivated by a desire to get something in return, or by nothing more than the personal satisfaction of having helped. The only requirement for a behaviour to be labeled prosocial is that it be 'other-directed in a positive sense' (Wispe 1978). Altruism, on the other hand, can be termed as a special kind of prosocial behaviour. Altruism is typically defined as action carried out with the intent to benefit others without the desire to receive benefit from others in return (Berkowitz 1972; Rushton 1980; Staub 1978). Unlike instances of helping behaviour where a person may be tempted to help because the costs are low and the possibility
for receiving material or social benefits are high, altruistic behaviour involves helping, 
even by taking grave risks, even though the act is not likely to be rewarded, recognized 
or even appreciated. While some forms of helping may involve selfish motives, the 
altruistic act is selfless (Saks and Krupt 1988). A similar tone underlines the definition 
of Latane and Darley (1968). They define altruism as any behaviour which benefits 
another in need regardless of the helper's motives. Leeds (1963) opines that an 
altruistic act is an end in itself. It is not directed to gain. McCauley and Berkowitz 
(1970) affirms this by defining altruism as behaviour carried out to benefit another 
without anticipation of rewards from external sources. Internal satisfaction or a feeling 
of fulfilment after committing an altruistic act is not excluded.

According to Freud, the superego develops as a child learns values (differentiating good from bad) from his or her parents and cultures. These values are 
internalized and become part of the individual, serving as ideals and internal sources 
of rewards and punishment. The necessary conditions for such strong internalization 
of values include exposure to a set of standards in the context of a close, loving parent-child 
relationship (Staub 1975). Prosocial behaviour was thought to be determined by 
this process initiated by the development of superego. Freud borrowed the commonly 
accepted idea of 'conscience'. An alternative way of conceptualizing the growth of a 
conscience and internal standards is through cognitive development. Both Piaget 
(1932) and Kohlberg (1969) have proposed that as a child grows and interacts with the 
environment, there is a natural progression from primitive notions of morality to highly 
sophisticated ones. Piaget observed, for example, that small children are confused 
about the difference between their own perspective and that of others. This 
egocentrism is not compatible with behaviour involving altruism and empathy for 
others. As children grow older, they begin to grasp the fact that there are other 
perspectives besides their own. It has been suggested by Rushton (1976) that this 
process can be speeded up if the child has the opportunity to engage in role-playing 
behaviour and thus gain the ability to see the world from different perspectives. It
should be noted that these stages of development are found to be influenced to some degree by culture (Salili, Maehr and Gillmore 1976). Kohlberg (1964) proposed a theory of the development of moral judgement which depends on the increasing ability of the child to understand complex situations. Research supports the notion that as children grow older they progress to higher levels of cognitive development and different sorts of moral reasoning, but these cognitive differences do not seem to be particularly helpful in predicting actual altruistic behaviour (Emler and Rushton 1974; Rushton and Weiner 1975). A theory of moral conduct developed by Hogan (1973) combines the idea of cognitive development and the kind of internalization process emphasized by Freud. He describes several dimensions of morality based on development and internalization; he points out the consequences of the various patterns that can emerge when some dimensions are stronger than others. Hogan thus describes prosocial behaviour as a somewhat complex combination of independent characteristics.

Altruism as Reinforcement Behaviour

From the point of view of learning theory, prosocial responses occur because they have been rewarded in the past. If an individual goes to the aid of a stranger in distress, for example, he may do so because earlier such responses have been associated with positive reinforcement. Thus altruistic behaviour depends, to a considerable extent, on the individual's reinforcement history. In addition to direct influence, people are also guided by expectations about future rewards and punishment. As altruistic intentions can arouse unpleasant expectations, one's perceptions of this unpleasantness may interfere with prosocial actions (Pomazal and Jaccord 1976). One prediction that stems from the reinforcement conceptualization is that prosocial behaviour can be increased or decreased by associating rewards or punishments with it. Moss and Page (1972) conducted a field experiment and the results indicated that positive reinforcement for one act of helping led to a much greater tendency to help a second person than if the first helping behaviour elicited a negative
response. A motorist saw a hit-and-run victim lying by the road, groaning for help, slowed but passed by without bothering to do anything. When asked why he did not take the victim to the hospital, he replied, "I did not want to get into trouble with the police. My friend did this and he was harassed for months by the police through persistent questioning and visits to police stations". This example can be multiplied. It seems clear, then, that helping can be made to vary as a function of reinforcement. Findings consistent with these were reported in a laboratory investigation by McGovern, Ditzian and Taylor (1975). This does not, however, resolve the dilemma because if an altruistic act is considered selfless, where is the question of rewards and punishments. The easy answer is that the person gains a feeling of well-being or is motivated by internal, intangible goals that cannot be defined in material terms.

Altruism and Empathy

Empathy has long been implicated as a factor in the expression of altruism. Feeling empathy for someone in distress appears to increase the desire to help that person (Krebs 1975; Coke, Batson and McDavis 1978; Toi and Batson 1982). Before one answers questions related to empathy-altruism relationship, it may be useful to understand some conceptual distinctions. Hoffman (1981) says that there is evidence from the field of evolutionary biology which points to the fact that humans have the necessary neural structures for empathy, which is thought by many to be an important mediator of altruism. Empathy has been defined differently by different investigators. Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright and Jarvis (1968) define it as the ability to infer accurately the feelings of other people. Thus empathy becomes primarily a cognitive skill. For others, however, empathy is more than that. Batson and Coke (1981) term it as an observer's congruent emotional response to the perceived welfare of someone else in some particular situation. It is also the tendency to experience vicariously the emotions others are feeling (Feshback 1978, Hoffman 1975). The latter definition accords a more important role to empathy in promoting altruism since it implies that an empathetic person would be motivated to help another person in need. When people
feel an empathetic reaction, they experience the other's distress as their own (Wispe 1986; Hornstein 1982). As in the reward-cost approach, empathy theorists believe that the physiological arousal resulting from the distress of others motivates a person to help.

Further, several researchers (Batson and Coke, 1981; Batson, Darley and Coke, 1975; Hoffman, 1975) have suggested that empathetic emotion leads to motivation directed toward the altruistic goal of increasing the other's welfare. This suggestion has been called the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson and Coke 1981). If valid, the empathy altruism hypothesis seems quite important. It contradicts the common assumption in psychology that all motivation, including all prosocial motivation, is ultimately directed toward the egoistic goal of increasing one's own welfare (Wallach and Wallach 1983). Batson and his colleagues (Batson et al 1981; Toi and Batson 1982; Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas and Isen 1983) found that if helping is moderately costly and empathy is low, then agreeing to help is far more likely when escape is difficult as when it is easy. But if empathy is high, then agreeing to help is as likely when escape is easy as when it is difficult. These findings are consistent with the claim that empathy evokes genuinely altruistic motivation to reduce the other's distress (Fultz, Batson, Fortenback, McCathy and Varney, 1986). Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) have stated not only that empathy is a critical factor mediating prosocial actions but also that the relationship has been amply supported in research. It seems generally clear that by inducing empathy in a specific situation, we can increase the likelihood that altruistic behaviour will follow. However, matters are less clear when we consider altruism as a disposition or trait. Research studies carried out on children have not established emphatically a correlation between empathy and altruism. However, when dealing with adults, this correlation is clearer (Mehrabian and Epstein 1972, Davis 1983a). Since there seems to be a relationship between empathy and subsequent helping, it seems logical that if we could raise empathy levels through training, we could increase the incidence of altruism.
Situational determinants of helping behaviour

Although research in this area has been going on for many years, the whole phenomenon of helping behaviour received wide attention due to a dramatic event in 1964 when a murder took place in New York city in the early hours of the morning and none of the onlookers provided direct or indirect help. This led the researchers to begin analysing the reasons which were behind the seeming apathy or indifference to the ghastly happening. Investigators studied a large number of situations to determine how powerful the elements in them were in activating the potential for helping.

Situations that clearly reveal someone in need of help are more likely to prompt people to step forward with assistance than those situations that are ambiguous. An experimental demonstration of this phenomenon has been provided by Clark and Word (1972). It was found that the likelihood of subjects offering help was significantly lower in the ambiguous situation. Similar results were shown by Solomon, Solomon and Stone (1978) in both laboratory and field settings. In many situations which are perceived as ambiguous and vague by an individual, other people may help in defining and interpreting the situation, thus removing the ambiguity. Other persons may be used for social comparison, that is we observe how they are reacting, and use their responses as cues to our interpretation (Festinger 1954). Through a number of studies Darley, Teger and Lewis 1973; Shotland 1985;) it is possible to conclude that (i) when immediate social comparison is not possible, the presence of others leads one to define ambiguous situations as nonserious, and (ii) in general, the more ambiguous the situation, the less help will be offered. Clark and Word (1974) concluded that 'any factor that creates ambiguity inhibits bystanders from engaging in effective action. Yakimovich and Saltz (1971) demonstrated the effect of ambiguity on prosocial behaviour. Ellsworth and Langver (1976) found that 'helping increases if the victim stares at the bystander but only if the situation is not ambiguous.
Darley and Latane (1968) proposed that individuals who are alone when an emergency situation occurs will behave differently from individuals in a group. They created interesting experimental situations and concluded that prosocial behaviour is inhibited by the presence of others. Latane and Darley (1970) argued that 'the presence of other bystanders makes it less likely that any one person will help'. They proposed three complementary explanations. If others are present, we are slower to act because we are concerned about their evaluation of our behaviour (our perception of a situation as an emergency requiring help may look foolish). Secondly, we watch others to see how they are acting. If everyone is trying to be 'cool' and 'nonchalant', then a whole group may fool itself into believing there is no emergency. Third, knowing that others are available to help, one may like to shift the responsibility to help to others, with probably no one helping. Thus according to Latane and Darley model the greater the number of people who witness an emergency situation, the less any single individual feels the pressure to help. Diffusion of responsibility reduces the guilt associated with not helping.

Other things being equal, people are more likely to offer assistance when the situation is one of emergency. Recently, Jane and Irving Piliavin and their colleagues (Piliavin and Piliavin 1972; Piliavin, Piliavin and Rodin 1975; Piliavin et al. 1982) have proposed a fuller model of helping that not only deals with the presence of others, but also offers a glimpse into the head (and the gut) of a potential helper. According to their model, the observation of an emergency is an emotionally arousing experience that is unpleasant and unsettling. This arousal increases with five factors: i) the severity of the emergency; ii) its clarity; iii) physical closeness; iv) the degree of identification, similarity, or psychological closeness one feels with the victim; and v) the length of time one observes the emergency. In the initial formulation of Piliavin and Piliavin (1972) in the case of severe emergency, the most typical response would be to offer indirect rather than direct assistance. In the light of research findings, however, the model was revised to suggest that the path of least resistance might be not a
physical but a cognitive one (Piliavin et al. 1982). Other things being equal, people are likely to offer assistance when the emergency situation unfolds immediately before them or when their exposure to it is prolonged (Staub and Baer 1974). They also found that when a supposedly distressed person collapsed to the street right in front of a bystander, help was more likely to be forthcoming than when the person fell down across the street from the bystander. Research has also shown that people are more likely to help when they know just what kind of help to provide. When a person recognizes the nature of the emergency and also possesses the required skills, the likelihood of helping is significantly enhanced. A simple demonstration of this principles comes from the work of Schwartz and Clausen (1970). A reputable appearing victim generally has a better chance of getting helped than disreputable victim, but people are also more likely to help others who are like themselves. This posit was experimentally suggested by Emswiller, Deaux, and Willits (1971). There is also the so-called just world hypothesis. People get what they deserve, so if they do not receive help it was probably because they did not deserve it (Lerner 1980; Lerner and Simmons 1966). Myers (1987) has noted a particularly vivid example of this phenomenon. Ryan (1971) has referred to this kind of thinking as blaming the victim and has noted that it can inhibit the development of sympathy. Finally, the norm of reciprocity comes into play. If a person has given help to others in the past, then this ‘helping person’ is more likely to get help in the future. In the present-day culture, females have been assumed to be the weaker sex, and males have been expected to help them whenever possible. Pomazal and Clora (1973) constructed a situation of a stalled car on the roadside and found that when a victim was a female, approximately one car out of every four that passed stopped to offer assistance but when the victim was male, only one car out of fifty stopped. Also, those who helped were almost all males.

Piliavin and Piliavin (1972) suggest that the person (the helper) takes a decision based on an immediate assessment of the rewards and costs for helping and
not helping. Will taking action entail serious risks? Coming to the aid of someone being mugged raises the possibility that you yourself may be attacked. Assisting a confused elderly couple to find the right subway train results in being late for an important appointment. Darley and Batson (1973) studied seminary students and also found that increased personal cost reduces the likelihood of help. Many experimental studies confirm that as the costs of helping increase, people are less likely to provide aid (Midlarsky and Midlarsky 1973; Ungar 1979). Helping may range from direct to indirect forms of help. The possible responses are presented in the model below:

**Costs for direct help**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Intervention</strong></td>
<td>People choose to intervene by helping in a direct manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect or Little Intervention</strong></td>
<td>People may call for others to help or use other indirect means. If they do not help, they are likely to redefine the situation by disparaging the victim, which justifies little intervention.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Variable Responses</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived norms and other situational factors determine the amount and type of helping.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Low</strong></th>
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<td><strong>High</strong></td>
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**Typical Responses as a Function of Costs for Direct Help and for No Help**

When the costs for helping are low and the need for aid is great (upper left-hand cell), direct help is most likely given. When the opposite occurs (lower right-hand cell) little help is given. In the other two cases, the potential helper experiences some degree of conflict, and the amount of helping is affected by a range of other factors, such as personality and situation. *Source*: Adapted from Figure 12.1 of J.A. Piliavin, J.F. Dovidio, S.L. Gaertner, & R.D. Clark III (1982). Responsive bystanders: The process of intervention. In V.J. Derlega & J. Grzelak (Eds.), *Responsive cooperation and helping behavior: theories and research*. New York: Academic Press.
From earlier discussions, it is clear that the specific characteristics of situations play a major role in determining how people react to others in need. It will now be valid to turn one's attention to personality characteristics that may affect individuals in their helping act. Basically, the question is whether or not certain traits or characteristics of individuals are related to altruistic behaviour consistently across situations. While the evidence is not firmly assertive and the question remains controversial, it does appear that there is some relationship between certain personality characteristics and the degree to which a person engages in helping behaviour.

A number of social psychologists who have studied prosocial behaviour have been primarily interested in the situational determinants of helping. They seemed to be quite sceptical about the roles of personality variables. Some have offered reasons why personality factors might not be as closely related to prosocial behaviour as we might expect (Latane and Darley 1970). For example, the impact of the situation may be so strong and so immediate that the individual does not have time to debate. Personality dispositions such as self-confidence, needs, and the like are swallowed up in the demands of the pressure-packed now. Also there may be opposing personality characteristics operative at the same time. A person empathetic or sympathetic to a cause may be so shy that he feels inhibited to come forward and give money for charity. These disclaimers notwithstanding, there is evidence that after all personality variables may have a role to play in the helping behaviour. It is being recognized that inclusive focus on situations or person-variables as explanations of behaviour may be insufficient (Mischel 1984). It is emphasized that person and situation variables need to be considered. This recognition has also extended to the domain of helping behaviour (Gergen, Gergen and Meter 1972; Staub 1978).

For personality researchers, the altruistic motive is studied in terms of dispositions to empathize with needy people (Schwartz 1968; Mehrabian Epstein 1972; Schwartz 1973, 1974; Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hanson and Richards
1978), (Davis 1983a, 1983b, 1983c), or to feel a sense of personal responsibility for others' welfare (Schwartz 1968). While empathy may be viewed as a situational factor affecting helping behaviour, it turns out that there are substantial individual differences between people's characteristic levels of empathy, some people are more empathetic than others, regardless of the situation (Feldman 1985). People who are characteristically high in empathy are more apt to provide help to someone experiencing distress than those low in empathy. Working on the previous research (Schwartz 1968; Stotland et al. 1978) which focussed on the motivational role of empathy within the altruistic personality, Romer, Gruder and Lizzadro (1986) found that both altruists and receptive givers (nurturant types) may be more empathetic than selfish and inner-sustaining people (succorant type), at least with regard to empathetic concern, fantasy and perspective taking (Davis 1983c). Nevertheless, because the succorant types were also less empathetic in terms of fantasy, altruists might still be the most empathetic and selfish people the least empathetic of the four types (altruistic, receptive - giver, inner - sustaining and selfish). Romer, Gruder and Lizzadro (1986) further suggest that altruists are more socially responsible than other types including receptive givers. This is consistent with the helping orientation model of these researchers, because receptive givers would not be likely to take responsibility for others' welfare unless they were to be compensated for their efforts.

It may be worthwhile to mention other personality characteristics which may determine, in varying degrees, the helping behaviour. One assumption underlying Kohlberg's theory of reasoning is that moral judgements are reflective of general orientation to morality, and that such judgements ought to be related to actual, overt helping behaviour in social situations. One of the rewards for engaging in prosocial behaviour is the social approval that an altruistic person receives (Baron and Byrne 1977). Individuals are found to differ, however, in the extent to which they are motivated to seek such approval. Staats (1975) hypothesized that individuals with high approval needs would be more likely to help others than individuals with low approval needs. This seems to confirm the earlier suggestion of Crowne and Marlowe (1960).
that subjects who strongly needed social approval behaved in a prosocial manner to the greatest extent when such behaviour could be seen and applauded by others. McGovern (1976) has found that those who received high scores on a 'fear of embarrassment' test were less likely to help than those with low score.

Moods and Altruism

Our feelings influence many of the things we do, and prosocial or altruistic responses seem to vary in part, depending on whether we are feeling 'nice and fine' or 'low and dull'. Evidence to support the general idea that feelings determine helpfulness was first provided by Isen (1970). She proposed that an individual's feeling state at any given moment would affect prosocial responses towards a stranger. Through an experiment it was found that subjects who found a dime in a phone booth coin return slot were more helpful than subjects who found no money (Isen and Lewin 1972). In a subsequent experiment with children, Isen, Horn, and Rosenhan (1973) found that success led to increased generosity while failure led to decreased generosity among children as well as adults. Later researches, quite consistently, indicate that people who are in a good mood are more likely to help than those who are in a neutral or negative mood (Rosenhan, Moore, and Underwood 1976). And the magnitude of the experience which puts an individual in a good mood need not be great. Other researches find that even pleasant weather - such as bright and sunny day - puts people in a good mood that ultimately promotes helping behaviour (Cunningham 1979). To investigate the temporal aspects of mood on helping behaviour, Isen, Clark and Schwartz (1976) conducted a study and concluded that when a good mood was generated through a happy experience, people were more likely to help, but as the time passed, the effect of the happy experience faded off and the desire to help also progressively went down. Why should being in a good mood evoke greater helping behaviour? One explanation is that the positive experiences may inspire pleasant moods, which in turn affect what people are thinking about and the nature of memories evoked by the situation. In turn, their decision to help is going to
be affected by those positive recollections, and so helping is more likely to occur (Isen, Shalker, Clark and Korp 1978).

Given the consistency and clarity with which positive moods are associated with greater helping, it may be reasonable to expect that negative or unpleasant moods might be associated with decrease in helping. However, the evidence for this proposition is considerably less consistent than for the relationship between good moods and increased helping. Some research (Underwood, Berenson, Berenson, Cheng, Wilson, Kulik, Moore and Wenzel 1977) supports this notion, but the work of Cialdini, Darby and Vincet (1973) negates it. One reconciliation of these conflicting findings has been suggested by Thompson, Cowan and Rosenhan (1980) who propose that the nature of the relationship between helping and negative moods depend on whether people's attention is focussed on themselves or on other individuals. When attention is focussed on themselves, negative moods are likely to produce less helping. On the other hand, when their attention is focussed on the problems of someone else (failures, etc.) the negative mood that is evoked may bring out increased helping behaviour. It appears, then, in some instances that negative moods may actually increase altruism - at least in cases when the situation prompts on individual to focus attention on the plight of a needy person. Moreover, other researches show that those in a bad mood will be apt to help if the helping is easy to carry out and potentially of large benefit (Weyant, 1978), if they are responsible themselves for being in their bad mood (Rogers, Miller, Mayer and Duvall, 1982) or if they think helping will relieve their bad mood (Manucia, Baumann and Cialdini, 1984).

Altruistic Personality

Is there an 'altruistic personality?' According to Baron and Byrne (1977) prosocial behaviour consists of those responses which have no obvious benefits for the benefactor but which are beneficial to the recipient. Staub (1974) has constructed what he calls a 'composite prosocial orientation' index. He argues that personality characteristics also affect helping behaviour, and they may modify the influence of
probably represents, primarily, a way of looking at, of thinking about, other people's welfare, and one's own responsibility toward other people. Rushton Chrisjohn and Fekken (1981) have, like Staub, argued that there is a personality trait of altruism. They state that 'such people are consistently more generous, helping, and kind than others'. Rushton (1980) used the concept of Baron and Byrne (1977) and applied the term altruism to helping-produced by compliance with internalized social or personal norms. He spoke of an 'altruistic personality'. He also concluded that individual differences in paper-and-pencil measures of empathy, moral reasoning and social responsibility can predict altruistic behaviour in specific situations. To buttress these conclusions, Rushton et. al. (1981) have developed the Self-Report Altruism Scale (SRA). To assess the validity of the SRA, Rushton and his colleagues compared subjects' scores on the scale with peer ratings of altruistic behaviour. They found highly significant relationships. An altruistic personality behaves consistently more honestly persistently and with greater self-control as compared to the non-altruistic ones. And a consistently altruistic person is likely to have an integrated personality, strong feelings of personal efficacy and well-being and what generally may be called integrity (Rushton 1980). Work on the 'altruistic personality' or on 'prosocial orientation' seems promising in demonstrating what so many sensed - that is, that some people are, over a range of situations and time periods, more likely to offer help than are others.

In India, very recently some work in the field of altruistic behaviour has been published in which self report method has been used. Mohan and associates reported researches on different groups i.e. adolescents, doctors, engineers, lawyers and others and suggested a positive relationship with the personality measures. Present investigation furthers this work in the field of youth work.
D. CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The cross cultural perspective has been included as an important dimension of the study which covers eight countries of the Asia-Pacific region namely Australia, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Sri Lanka. It was envisaged that as cultural factors related to youth work and to the personnel responsible for the promotion of youth activities, in these countries are different, some valid cross-cultural differences in terms of the three determinants of the study i.e. personality, values and altruistic behaviour may become discernible.

Although culture may be interpreted in different ways, but in the context of the study, it refers to those things that are shared within a group or society; shared truths (that is knowledge and belief); shared values, shared rules about behaviour, and material objects that are shared in the sense that they are widely used or recognized. Obviously what matters is that the people within a society agree on a certain reality, a certain set of knowledge and beliefs. Thus shared knowledge and beliefs and not reality determine human behaviour. And as these shared values, etc. change, it can be said that cultures do and can change overtime.

It is widely accepted that language spoken in a society reflects that society's culture to a considerable extent. And in the countries included in this study, different languages are spoken. In fact, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka are multi-lingual societies. Thus the larger culture may even constitute of a number of subcultures. Besides shared values, culture also involves shared expectations about behaviour, referred as social norms. These social norms may be derived from the folkways and mores (informal) or notified through law (formal). These norms, whether formal or informal, that are held in common in one culture are different from those in another culture. Chinese, Indian, Malay, Bengali, Sri Lanka and Western cultures have their own informal norms of behaviour. Work ethics may also differ. Laws governing
the social, political or economic institutions are also different. For example, laws provide stringent penalties for violation of civil code of conduct in Singapore.

Culture and social structure are also closely related. An important element of social structure is that of social institutions, which, in turn, are made up of society's environment. The concept of society environment includes the full range of realities to which the society must adapt. There is the physical environment, the social environment and, finally, the technological environment. The high-rise culture, a product of geographical considerations, of Hong Kong and Singapore, are distinct examples of physical environment affecting the culture of society as a whole in these countries. Similarly, technological advancement of a country is considered to be closely related to its culture. The high technology of the developed countries of the western world has undoubtedly influenced the cultural dynamics of these countries. Functionalists see social structure and culture as reflecting adaptation to this total environment, and believe that this accounts for variation in culture and social structure from place to place and over time. However, these differences are in response to the needs of the environment conditions. It is imperative that culture has to be understood from the point of view of those who form part of this and it is not possible to provide any yardstick or standards of measurement. It must, however, be noted that sometimes, especially if environmental changes are very fast, culture is slow to change and this may result in a condition which sociologists call cultural lag. It is likely that in some societies, the larger culture may consist of a number of sub-cultures, based on religion, class, caste, ethnicity or even the place of residence (rural/urban). These sub-cultures will have some common and some distinct features from the large culture. While these sub-cultures may provide a sense of identity and serve as a source of adaptation, they may sometimes erode the unity of the society and thus adversely affect the composite culture. Ethnic or communal strife are examples of the latter and it is observed that a lot of efforts of government and non-government agencies working with youth are directed towards preventing the dysfunctions of these sub-cultures. And when these
cleavages (between different sub-cultures) are overlapping rather than cross-cutting sub-cultures become so opposed to the larger culture that sociologists call them counter-cultures (Roszak 1969).

In recent years, researches and analysts have shown increasing interest in data emanating from different countries (and cultures). These studies while underscoring the differences, also caution one against attempting universalization of behaviours. And in trying to explain these differences, one may be tempted to go into various cultural processes or the phenomena. A cross-cultural study in psychology helps the analyst to extend the range of possibilities in behaviour differences, thus widening the horizons. The knowledge that a certain aspect of development creates predictable behaviour for all societies is the ultimate goal of behavioural research. A second benefit of cross-cultural approaches is that we can avoid assuming too much about human nature. A cross-cultural perspective allows one, in short, to extend both the kinds and the range of variables to investigation (Whiting 1968).

Cross-cultural researches, however, should identify valid cross-cultural differences so that erroneous interpretations are avoided and a cultural perspective is established before data are analysed and interpreted. The very notion of cross-cultural comparison has to be questioned if it is held that the meaning of behaviour can only be understood in the context of the culture in which it occurs. However, many psychologists do make cross-cultural comparisons, and attempt to make them as appropriately as possible. (Poortinga and Berry 1989). Cultural dimensions differ from country to country in many ways and so do the factors in influencing them. Therefore, when observing a difference on some dependent variable the researcher is often not in a position to rule out alternative explanations and to ascribe the difference to some specific antecedent factor (Poortinga and Berry 1989). A number of researchers have advocated the inclusion of antecedent variables in cross-cultural research as a way to facilitate the interpretation of cross-cultural differences (Sechrest 1977; Poortinga and Malpass 1986; Implicit or explicit in their writing, these researchers have taken what I
term an individual-level analysis in their interpretation of cultural differences in psychological data (Leung and Bond 1989). Poortinga (1989) says that central to the dichotomy is the question whether a certain aspect of behaviour is culture-specific or whether it can be considered to be universally present. Triandis (1972) argues that to the extent that the salience of a domain is different in two cultures it may not be appropriate to make cross-cultural comparisons unless they are made at a higher level of abstraction on which a common dimension can be found.

There are also difficulties at the level of data analysis. It can be questioned whether psychological instruments measure the same aspects of behaviour in different cultures (Poortinga and Berry 1989). As Poortinga and Van de Vijver (1987) have observed, many tests were originally developed in the West and then exported to other parts of the world. Non-western respondents are likely to score lower on these tests. However, Malpass and Poortinga (1986) have argued that inequivalence of data increased strongly the probability that cross-cultural differences would be found. They stated that the high probability of finding differences in the long run would tend to have cumulative effects on our insights about the impact of cultural variation on behaviour. After citing studies of Lincoln and Zeitz (1980) and Markham (1988), Leung (1989) concludes that the culture-level approach is capable of generating theories that are coherent and psychologically meaningful. The culture-level analysis should be taken more seriously in theoretical as well as empirical work in cross-culture psychology. It is, therefore, clear that while data emerging from cross-cultural studies may be meaningful, some caution needs to be exercised in their analysis and interpretation.

Among recent cross-cultural research studies are Eysenck et al. (1977); Eysenck (1982); Eysenck and Chan (1982); Magen (1985); Barret and Eysenck (1984); Eysenck and Jamison (1986); Eysenck and Kay (1986); Eysenck and Long (1986); Osche and Plug (1986). In view of the importance of cross-cultural psychological studies, International Journal of Psychology brought out a special issue on 'Cross-
There is good evidence that various countries differ with respect to the major dimensions of personality (Psychoticism - superego control; extraversion-introversion; neuroticism - emotional stability) which appear to emerge from many different factor analytic studies of personality inventories carried out in many countries (Royce 1973). A review of the whole field is given by Lynn (1981) who has himself made an outstanding contribution to the field of cross-cultural studies through the use of demographic indices for the measure of national differences in personality (Lynn 1971; Lynn and Hampson 1975, 1977). Etemadi (1977) investigated the differentiation of personality traits among groups of college students with different socio-cultural backgrounds and concluded that cultural norms were among the most effective determinants of the core of personality. Significant differences in terms of aggression, dominance, responsiveness and emotional stability were noted between 'American Personality Type' and "Iranian Personality Type".

Eysenck, Adelja and Eysenck (1977) administered Eysenck Personality Questionnaire to Nigerian and British respondents. Analysis indicated that Nigerians scored higher on Social Desirability as well as on Psychoticism and Extraversion but lower on Neuroticism. Investigating through the same test, Iwawaki, Eysenck and Eysenck (1977a) found that as compared to English children, their Japanese counterparts scored significantly higher on Psychoticism scores but did not differ appreciably with respect to Extraversion, Neuroticism and Lie scores. Eysenck, Humphery and Eysenck (1980) studied the personality differences among Australian and English subjects and found Australians scoring higher on Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism but lower on the Lie Scale. Eysenck and Long (1986) found when comparing Singapore and British norms, only Social Desirability seemed to be considerably different in the two countries with Singaporeans scoring rather higher than the British. Elaborating they indicate that there is a very real societal
differences between Britain and Singapore, is undeniable. Singapore as a society is quite regimented and disciplined as far as the social order is concerned. They consider this not unusual and seem to confirm what Eysenck (1983) suggested tentatively that the L-scale norms may vary in predictable fashion according to the permissiveness of the culture in question. For instance, India (Eysenck, Gupta and Eysenck, 1986), Eastern European countries and Uganda (Eysenck and Opolet 1983) have considerably higher Social Desirability than those countries including England, Hong Kong (Eysenck and Chan 1982) and Denmark (Nyborg, Eysenck and Kroll 1982) where permissive society reigns. In their study with English and Egyptian children, Eysenck and Abdel-Khaled (1989) find that probably the main difference cross-culturally can be seen in the elevation of the Social Desirability means of the Egyptian children, which is not at all unusual in our experience of these cross-cultural studies. The explanation offered by Nyborg et al (1982) is to the effect that the permissiveness of the culture under review might have some bearing on the level of Social Desirability displayed by the subjects. This hypothesis, however, needs to be tested.

Eysenck (1982) states that there is evidence that different cultures and nations differ with respect to the major personality dimensions of Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism and the question arises as to the possible causes of these differences. There are three major types of theories put forward in this connection. The first of these would relate personality differences to such aspects of the environment as the climate, the type of country involved, etc.; Lynn (1971) has formed such a hypothesis and gives factual evidence in support. The second type of hypothesis would favour accidental features in the history of a given population, such as winning or losing a war or remaining neutral; Lynn and Hampson (1977) give some evidence to support this view. It seems likely that both the first and the second hypotheses play a prominent part in the differences between scores on personality tests for different nations. However, there is also a third possibility, namely, that there are genetic differences between population and that these are linked in some way to the observed
differences in personality. In addition to the numerous studies carried out by Eysenck and Eysenck and their collaborators in which the EPA (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975) is used in measuring Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism, there are numerous other studies, reviewed by Lynn (1981) using the earlier EPI (Eysenck and Eysenck 1965) which gave scores only for Extraversion and Neuroticism. In addition there is the important work of Hofstede (1976, 1980) which is only concerned with Neuroticism. Lynn (1981) and Eysenck (1982) have shown that there is quite good agreement between Eysenck's neuroticism scale scores for different countries, and Hofstede's anxiety question scores. Mohan, Eysenck and Eysenck (1989) provide appraisal of the work of Mohan and associates using Eysenck Personality Questionnaire on different groups of subjects of Indian and foreign origin. This large sample provides ample basis for developing a comprehensive viewpoint.