Chapter Three

THE SIDDHĀNTACINTĀMANI - A DETAILED STUDY

The Siddhāntacintāmani of Śrīnivāsa II which we have taken up for a detailed study is mainly concerned with establishing the point that Lord Viṣṇu forms both the material and instrumental causes of the world.

In the opening verse the author pays obeisance to the Supreme Brahman Who is advitiya (Who does not have a second entity as equal to Him) and Who has both Cit and Acit as His body. In the next verse he pays homage to Yatipati (King of Ascetics) i.e., Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, his own grandfather Aṇṇaguru (Aṇṇaya Dīkṣita-I as mentioned in the genealogical table in chapter I), his father (Śrīnivāsa Tātārya I) and his bhāsyaguru, Kamalānilaya Makhiśvara (i.e., Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita). He states that he could have easy access to all the śāstras due to the grace of his elder brother (Aṇṇaya II) and then undertakes to bring out the secret of the Vedāntas. In another verse he points out that this work is meant for those who, though they have learnt the
Siddhānta (of Viśiṣṭādvaita) in a general way, are not well-versed in the actual doctrines and concepts of the system.

Śrīnivāsa points out that the adorable Bādarāyaṇa, in the opening aphorism of his Brahmaśūtra (I.1.1): "athāto brahmaśvijñānā" states that one should make enquiry into the nature of Brahman. The Taitirīya text (Bhrigu. I): *tad vijñānasva* (you desire to know That) specifies what is intended by the word 'tad', which has been expressed in the preceding sentence itself, viz., *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*, etc. So it is clear that the scripture refers only to the causal character of the Brahman in relation to the universe, as the thing to be known. Keeping this in mind, Bādarāyaṇa framed the second rule thus: "janmādyasya yataḥ" (I.1.2) (Brahman is that from Which all the beings are born; that by Which they are sustained after being born, and that Which they enter, after reaching Him). Otherwise he would have composed the second aphorism thus: "janmādikāraṇam brahma" (Brahman is the cause of the origin, etc. of the universe). Even in the Atharvasikha text: "kāraṇam tu dhyeyah" (However, the Cause is to be
contemplated upon) only this (causal character of the Brahman) is implied as the distinguishing characteristic of the object to be contemplated upon. Moreover, jñāna (knowledge) conveys the idea of dhyāna (meditation) only. So the essence of this discussion is that jijnāsa means only the desire to know and that the distinguishing characteristic of the object desired to be known is nothing but the distinguishing characteristic of the object that is to be meditated upon.

The view that the Brahman is nirguna (without any attribute) held by the Advaitins is hereby set aside for the simple reason that unless the distinguishing characteristic of causality is clearly known, the concept of causality remains unknown. It is absolutely necessary that the principle that is pointed out in the Brahmasūtra as jijnāsya must have these characteristic features: (a) It must be the 'creator' characterized by a direct knowledge of the Material Cause of the universe viz., Cit and Acit which form Its body; (b) It must also have a desire to create; (c) It should actually perform the act of creation; (d) It should also possess qualities like
omniscience and omnipotence which are required to make It the
Efficient Cause.

By the same token, the view held by some that meditation
should be done on Brahman Who has "unreal" attributes is also
rejected. This is so because the specific characteristics which mark
the knowledge of the causal principle that forms the means of
liberation cannot merely be fictitious.

As a corollary the (Advaitic) view that the world is unreal also
stands rejected because the world which consists of the sentient
and insentient entities becomes the characteristic feature of the
causal principle as the Material Cause. So it has to be an eternally
real (pāramārthika) entity. "The view that one travels from untruth
to truth has been rejected elsewhere", points out the author.\(^{81}\)

Now comes the objection that one and the same entity cannot
form both the Material and Efficient Cause. According to the critic,
these two features should necessarily have two different loci.
That is why the Naiyāyikas define Nimittakāraṇa (Efficient Cause)

\(^{81}\) This is perhaps a reference to the work Vyāvahārikasatyatva-khaṇḍana-sāra by
Aṇṇayācārya II. See p. 39 above.
as that which is different from the *Samavāyikāraṇa* (Inherent Cause).\(^82\)

The terms *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *Upādāna Kāraṇa* convey the same meaning too. The difference between the stick which forms the Instrumental Cause of a pot and the lump of clay which constitutes its Material Cause is directly perceived. That is why the scripture need not speak about it. Even scripture cannot convey something which is opposed to direct perception. That is why the Mīmāṁsakas state that statements like "ādityo yūpaḥ" [Tai.Brā.II.1.56.2] (The sacrificial pillar is the Sun) and "kṛṣṇalarh śrapayet" [Ib.] (One should fry the iron balls) should be taken in a secondary connotation since the direct meaning is inconsistent with our practical experience. One can deduce that the Material and Efficient Causes are mutually different, with the help of the following inferential statements:

1. **Brahman cannot be** the Efficient Cause of the universe since **He is the Material** Cause like clay etc.

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\(^82\) Cf: *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Pratyākṣa Pariccheda, p.14: "*tadubhaya-bhinnam kāraṇam Nimuttakāraṇam*"
2. Brahman cannot be the Material Cause because He is the Efficient Cause like a potter.

Then we have the scripture (Śvetāśvatara IV.10): "One should realise Māyā as the Material Cause (Prakṛti) and Maheśvara as the One who has Māyā under His control (Māyin)" (i.e., He is the Efficient Cause).

In reply to the above, the author says: Neither Perception nor Inference can prove the difference between the Instrumental and Material Causes. For instance, a stick which forms the efficient cause for producing a pot, forms the material cause for the shape etc. that take place in the pot. That is why the definition given by the logicians for the efficient cause as "that which is different from the inherent cause" (samavāyikāraṇa) is not justifiable.

As a matter of fact there is no contradiction involved in one and the same entity being the material cause as also the efficient cause. Brahman does not form the material cause of the world in His essential nature because of the scriptures which declare that "He is without parts; without activity; peaceful, flawless and taintless" and "The supreme Lord is free from modifications, pure and
eternal". These texts declare that God is free from any kind of modification, which in the ordinary world of our experience, becomes necessary if an entity is to become a Material Cause. Modification means, attainment of a different state of existence in essence. Further, if what the critic says is true, then the world which has Brahman who is full of bliss as its Material Cause, should also become blissful, which, however, is not true. But the Lord becomes the material cause only when He is "qualified "by Cit and Acit. This qualification by cit and acit is again possible through "body-soul" relationship. This interpretation is supported by the Antaryāmibrāhmaṇa-section of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Mādhyandina recension) (III.7.3 ff.) commencing with the text: "He whose body the earth is.......; He whose body the waters are.........," etc. and ending with the passages: "He whose body the soul is ...."; "He whose body the Unmanifest is"; "He whose body the Indestructible" is; "He whose body Mrītyu (death) is......" etc. Further, the following words of great sages also confirm this truth: "The entire world is your body" (Rām.Yu. 120.25); "All of them are His body" (Vi. Pu. I. 22. 86); "All that is indeed the body
of Hari" (Ib. I.20.38); "That water which is the body of Viṣṇu"
(Vi. Pu. II.12.37).

This reference to the world as the "body" of the Lord cannot be
taken in a secondary sense because the definition of body given by
Śrī Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya (under II.1.9: na tu drśtāntabhāvāt)
(Not so. There is no inconsistency because examples illustrative of
the Brahman being unaffected by the evils both as Cause and
Effect are available), runs as follows: "yasya cetanasya yad
dravyaṁ sarvātmānā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam,
taccheṣatakasvarūpaṁ ca, tat tasya Śarīram".

("That particular substance which becomes fit for being
invariably controlled and supported by a conscious being for its
own sake, and which is subservient to it, becomes the body of the
latter").

This definition does not support such a contention (of
secondary signification). The author states that this point has been
clearly demonstrated in his other work, the Sāradarpaṇa.

At this point the critic raises the following objection: The
Bṛhadāraṇyaka (III.7.9) states that the Vedas, Sacrifice etc. also
form the body of the Lord. It is clear that this statement cannot be taken in its primary significance because Vedas are in the form of sound which is a quality (guna) and Sacrifice is in the form of an action (kriyā). Thus both of them do not form a substance (dravya). Rāmānuja’s definition of a body specifically mentions only a dravya as forming the body. How can this be accounted for? It cannot be argued that the words "Veda" and "Yajña" refer only to the presiding deities because such an explanation is possible even with reference to the Earth etc., which are mentioned in the same Upaniṣad as constituting the body of the Lord. It is not possible to give secondary interpretation to the words of the scripture so as to suit the requirements of the definition of the body given by Rāmānuja. The critic argues that both the Śrībhāṣya and the Śrutiapraṇakāśikā on it are quite clear. A definition must be universal in its application. If the definition of body given by the Naiyāyikas: "Body is that which is a substratum of the activities, sense-organs, etc." is not applicable to Earth etc., then by the same token, the definition of Rāmānuja that only a substance (dravya) can form the body of a conscious being is also not applicable
universally. So one has to take both the cases as either primary in importance or both as secondary in significance.

In reply to this, Śrīnivāsa says that if one can negate the meaning of scripture with the help of fallacious arguments then one can even disprove the existence of Brahman by logic (as is done by the Buddhists). This would result in God's becoming a non-God. The word "Brahman" normally indicates the Supreme Brahman. But it can also refer to the individual self. How can one account for this? Does it mean that a Jīva and the Brahman are identical (as contended by the Advaitins)? Therefore, the word "dravya" used by Rāmānuja must be interpreted in such a way that there is no contradiction with practical reality and logic.

In the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa-section of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (III. 7) under reference, it is clearly stated that Earth etc. form the body of the Lord. This can be confirmed with the help of valid means like Abhyāsa (Repetition) and Upapatti (justification). In both the Kāṇva and the Mādhyaṇdina recensions of this Upaniṣad the statement "yasya prthivi ṣārīram" (He for whom the earth forms the body) is repeated several times. Therefore it is not
reasonable to take the word "Śarīra" in a secondary sense. Abhyāsa (Repetition) is one of the six pramāṇas accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas by which the intention of a given passage can be determined.

The six Pramāṇas are: Upakrama (opening statement), Upasamīhāra (conclusion), Abhyāsa (Repetition), Apūrvatā (Novelty), Phalam (the net result), Arthavāda (Laudatory statement) and Upapatti (Corroboration). The passages that precede the text "yasya prthivi śarīram" run as follows: "yaḥ prthivyāṁ tiṣṭhan, prthivyā antarah" (He who stands inside the earth and who controls it from within). Unless we take the intention (tātparya) into consideration, the connotation of the term "śarīram" cannot be understood all. Since there is no "pramāṇa" which shows Earth etc. as the body of the Lord, the characteristic called Apūrvatā (Novelty) is also there in this definition. The Mīmāṁsakas also accept Apūrva as the most important indicator in arriving at the import of scriptural passages. Without any specific reason one cannot brush aside the word "śarīram" as secondary in nature. Even the word "Brahman", for example, which denotes the
Supreme Being may, as stated earlier, be interpreted to mean the individual soul, the agent of actions, through secondary connotation. The argument can be extended further and the word Brahman may ultimately be interpreted as the "liberated Jiva" since, like the Supreme Being, he is also of the nature of bliss and full of knowledge that does not contract.

Further, there is no valid means of knowledge which refutes Earth etc. being the body of the Lord. There is a statement: "The sacrificer is a bundle of darbha-grass" (yajamāṇah prastaraḥ). Here, Perception directly contradicts the identify of the sacrificer and bundle of darbha. Such a possibility does not arise in the case of Earth, Water etc., forming the Lord's body since Perception cannot apprehend the Lord supporting Earth, Water etc. as their Soul. Likewise it may be argued that the world is independent because it is seen to be so by Pratyakṣa. But this is opposed to scriptures which declare that the world is controlled by the Lord and that it is dependent on Him. Another example is the erroneous perception that the Moon in the sky is of the size of the span of the palm between the thumb and the forefinger (prādeśa). But this is
disproved by Scripture which speaks of the vastness of the Moon, that it a place to which some of the departed souls go, etc.

The author explains that if there is contradiction between two Pramāṇas, one can understand the criterion behind it as follows: That phenomenon which can be proved otherwise (anyathāśiddha) is sublatable by that which cannot otherwise be accounted for (ananyathāśiddha). Thus statements in Grammatical Coordination (sāmānādhikaranya) like: "The sacrificer is a bundle of Darbha grass" and "Fire indeed is the Brāhmaṇa" can be explained otherwise too. One need not take as real the identity between Darbha and the Sacrificer on one hand, and between fire and the Brāhmaṇa on the other. The sāmānādhikaranya here cannot be understood literally since it is opposed to direct perception. This only proves the difference between the two entities involved. Likewise the statement "tattvamasi" (Chānd. VI.8.7) (That Thou Art) which involves Grammatical Coordination cannot be directly taken as establishing the identity between God and man. This is so because everybody has the experience of his/her being different from God. Also the above passage can be explained as based upon
the body-soul relationship subsisting between the living beings and
God. Therefore there is no contradiction in holding that Earth etc.
constitute the body of God on the basis of scriptural assertion.

The critic goes on to argue that in the wake of contradiction the
stronger (prabala) Pramāṇa will sublate the weaker one (durbala).
The strength of a Pramāṇa may be either due to its very nature
(svarūpa) or due to its character (svabhāva). The Āgama, being
impersonal (apauruṣeya), is relatively more powerful than
Pratyakṣa by virtue of its Svarūpa itself. The power of the Āgama
is also due to its characteristic features (svabhāva). Thus if an
Āgama text is seen to be in direct opposition to Perception, we do
not conclude that the scripture is invalid. We will only try to
establish its validity by explaining its import in a different way.
Since scripture disproves the Moon being of the size of the span
between the thumb and the forefinger (prādeśa), the Perception of
such a phenomenon can only be invalid. Further, the statement that
the Moon is of the size of "prādeśa" is only made by a man. Thus
Pratyakṣa becomes weaker in comparison with Āgama on two
counts: Svarūpa and Svabhāva. As such, Pratyakṣa cannot sublate the more powerful Śruti.

In reply to this objection Śrīnivāsa says that although it is true that the impersonal scripture (apauruṣeya) is more powerful than Pratyakṣa, it still depends upon Pratyakṣa only for making its own meaning known. Hence it is weaker than Pratyakṣa. The "upajīvya-upajīvaka" (the sustainer-sustained) relation between two Pramāṇas must be properly understood. For instance, Inference (Anumāna) cannot prove that Fire is cool to touch because of its direct contradiction by Perception. Inference depends upon Perception only for grasping Vyāpti (invariable concomitance). So it is only an Upajīvaka. Moreover, a more powerful means of knowledge and a weaker means of knowledge cannot be mutually contradictory unless there is a clear case of opposition between them, i.e., when they are to be applied at one and the same time to a single case. The Pramāṇas Pratyakṣa and Śabda cannot simply contradict and cancel each other like light and darkness. The contradiction is not due to their inherent natures as such, but due to the inconsistency that exists between the objects of those
Pramāṇas. Coming to the main issue, the author points out that the power of "tātparya-nimāyaka-liṅgas" (factors that determine the import of passages) like Upakrama and Upasarhāra is acceptable to all the Mīmāṁsakas.

To explain, Upakrama (the opening passage) sublates Upasarhāra (concluding statement). A specific statement (viśeṣa) contradicts the general (sāmānya). That rule which has no room at all (nirvakāśa) sublates that which has a scope to operate (sāvakāśa). The Naimittika (occasioned acts) and the Kāmya (acts done to attain desired results) sublate the obligatory (nitya) karmans. This kind of sublation of one Pramāṇa by another is dependent upon the relative strength of factors like Upakrama and Upasarhāra. The Grammatical coordination found in the text "tattvamāsi" can be accounted for even otherwise, on the analogy of the "śārīra-śārīri" relationship.

Therefore this cannot establish Abheda as opposed to Bheda which is a matter of direct perception. In so far as the independent existence of the world is concerned, although it is supported by Pratyakṣa, scriptural passages declare it to be dependent upon the
Lord only. This dependence is of course beyond the scope of the human ken of knowledge. So Pratyakṣa is incapable of establishing the independent nature of the universe, in opposition to the scripture. It is thus proved that there is no contradiction from the viewpoint of Pratyakṣa in Earth, Water etc., forming the "body" of the Lord.

Such a position cannot be controverted even by Inference because there is no indicator which is invariably concomitant with the probandum (that which is to be proved). Further even Anumāna becomes sublatable (Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa i.e., Bādha) because of its contradiction with scripture. Nor is there any contradiction to this position by another scripture simply because no such scripture exists.

At this point the critic objects saying that the Earth, Water etc. cannot be proved to be the body of the Lord because of the contradiction with scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be Nirguṇa (without any attributes), Aṣārīra (without a body) and Nirdoṣa (without any blemish). There are innumerable scriptural statements such as: "akāyam", "apāṇipādaḥ", "paśyati acakṣuḥ"
(Śvet. III.19) "sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca", "niṣkalaṁ, niṣkriyarh" etc. which contradict the view that Brahman has body, senses etc. If the Lord has Earth, Water etc. as his body, how can He be referred to as being free from attributes, defects, body, etc.? Further the passage of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: "He who stands in the Earth..." etc. cannot be taken in its literal sense because there are other passages which pronounce that the Lord has no support (nirādhāra) and no abiding place (apratiṣṭha). He abides in His own glory (sve mahimni pratiṣṭhitah). Further the Lord is said to be all-pervasive. So how can He be said to exist inside the Earth? Further, terms like "prthivī" and "ākāśa" cannot be taken to mean merely Earth, Ether, etc. because this is another statement in the same context which says that the Earth does not know Him (yam prthivi na veda) and that the Ether does not know Him. How can the insentient Earth be said to be "unable to know" the Lord? This is a clear case where the presiding Deity of the Earth is meant. Further if Earth has consciousness, then it becomes a living being. One living being cannot become the body of another living being. This is opposed to direct perception. One
can only say that it is because of the dependence of an entity on a conscious being, it is referred to as the "body" of that being. So it is a clear instance of secondary importance (gauṇa).

This argument is set aside by our author who states that one Pramāṇa which is anyathāsiddha (that which can be proved otherwise) cannot sublate the scriptural statement which speaks of the Lord having Earth etc. as His body. There is a statement which declares that no living being should be injured (na himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni). But this prohibition becomes applicable only to those cases where living beings are killed just for the sake of fulfilling one's personal desires (rāgaprāpta-himsā). It has no power to prohibit śāstraic injuries such as offering animals in sacrifice like Agniṣoma. If the sentence "na himsyāt..." is applied in its full force, then there will be no scope for scriptural sanction of animal sacrifice. So the śāstra becomes invalid.

Likewise scriptures which declare that the Lord has no body etc. must be interpreted to mean that the Lord has no body caused by His past karmans. Scripture does not try to contradict the Lord having the Earth and Water as His body. Scripture which tries to
make known to us supernormal phenomena cannot be expected to say one thing in one place and contradict the same in another, like a mad person. Otherwise the scriptural statements such as "Neither Sat nor Asat existed at that time", "He does not have the body and the senses", cannot convey any conclusive opinion at all. Likewise the statement that the Lord is "nirguna" cannot sublate His attributes such as Omniscience, Having all the desires realised, etc. The word Nirguna only means that He does not have undesirable qualities (heya-gunas) belonging to Prakṛti. The upshot of this discussion is that there is no contradiction in the Lord's having the universe as His body.

It may be contended that the passage "na ha vai saśarīrasya.." indicates that association with body is invariably concomitant with evil. As such it should be admitted that Lord also has sufferings since He has the universe as His body. The author points out that the particles "ha vai" found in that text confirm that suffering is caused by a body which is the outcome of karman. This is admitted on all hands. For instance, although a criminal and a police officer are both present in the same prison there is a major
difference between the two. The criminal is being punished because of his crimes in the prison whereas the officer is not subject to it. So like the association with prison, association with the body alone cannot be the criterion for equating God and man. The Muṇḍaka passage (III.1.1) "Two birds of beautiful plumage sitting on the same tree..." clearly demonstrates this point that although both the individual self and the Supreme Self are sharing the same body, it is the former that suffers and the latter shines supreme in his beatific nature.

Further, the sentence "eṣa te ātmā antaryāmyamṛtaḥ" (Bṛh. Up. V.7.3) which is repeated at every step declares that the Lord is the Antaryāmin and that He is immortal. This means that He does not in the least, have any kind of association with undesirable qualities consequent upon His being inside the human body. There are two things to be noted: (1) that which is well-known in the ordinary world of mortals (loka-prasiddha) and (2) that which is well-known in scriptures (śruti-prasiddha). When both these occur at one and the same time it is only the former that takes precedence over the other. Therefore statements like "guṇāḥ guṇeṣu varītante" (Gītā
XIV.23), and "daivi hyesa guṇamayi" (Ib. VII.14) refer only to the three qualities of Prakṛti viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. So whenever the word "guṇa" is heard, one automatically thinks of the three qualities only which belong to Prakṛti. Therefore when the Lord is referred to as "nirguṇa" it only means that He does not have any quality that is the product of Prakṛti.

The Chāndogya passage (VIII.1.5): "apahatapāpamā vijarah" etc., first of all negates the presence of undesirable qualities in the Lord and then goes on to declare that He is having auspicious attributes (satyakāmaḥ, satyasāṅkalpaḥ). Those which become the counter-correlatives of negation (pratiṣedha-pratiyogins) are only positive virtues. By this we can also conclude, the author points out, that those who contemplate upon Brahman as having no qualities, form, etc. (nirālambana) cannot really go ahead with their contemplation because of its impossibility. In addition, all such passages which ordain meditation on Brahman as possessing innumerable auspicious attributes will also turn out to be invalid. At this juncture the critic may say that on the analogy of seeing the bigger star and then the smaller Arundhatī with its help (because
of its apparent proximity) \((sthūla-arundhatī-nyāya)\), and on the analogy of showing the Moon to a child by first pointing to a branch of a tree which appears to be close to the Moon \((sākhā-candra-nyāya)\), all the passages speaking of Brahman as having qualities \((saguna-vākya)\) are useful only to arrive at the Ultimate Truth that Brahman is without any quality \((nirguna)\). This argument is beside the point, says the author, because noticing a bigger star is not contradictory to one's sighting the smaller Arundhatī. But according to the Advaitin awareness of Brahman as having qualities is diametrically opposed to the concept of Brahman being devoid of qualities. It is as preposterous as contending that the perception of darkness is useful for the perception of light.

Likewise, scriptural passages which declare the Brahman to be devoid of gross body, hands, feet, eyes and so on are to be interpreted to mean that He does not have a body which is a product of \(Prakṛti\), with which we are familiar. A number of texts such as "\(na karmāṇā vardhate, no kaniyān\)" (Tai. Āra.) and "\(na tasya prākṛtā mūrtih\)" (Varāha Purāṇa 75. 44) refer only to such a
feature. A Smṛti text (Āpastamba XX.4) also declares that "all the
living beings form the body of the Lord who abides in the cave of
their heart". Scriptural texts like "acakṣuḥ", "apāṇipādaḥ" etc.
first of all concern themselves with only those features which
come to the mind quickly. Therefore those words deny the presence
of a "laukika" body for the Lord, but not that of His "alaukika"
body.

The statement that the Lord is free from defects does not
contradict His having Earth, Water etc. as body because it is only a
material body that is subject to defects. Earth, Water etc. have been
taken up as bodies by the Lord out of His free will (svecchā) and as
such, they cannot be considered as the result of His past karman.

The author also points out that the scripture which speaks of the
Lord as forming the Material Cause of the world, like the passage
which speaks of His immutability must be taken as valid, and that
they both must be understood in their respective spheres without
any contradiction.

The critic further argues that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text (III.7.3):
"He who stands in the Earth .." will only point to the Lord's being
dependent on the Earth, Water etc., for His existence. "But is it possible"? asks the author. The Lord is the Self that controls bodies such as Earth and Water. He is said to be inside them like the thread that sustains beads or gems, forming a garland (sūtramanī-nyāya). Therefore the two sentences "He who stands in the Earth" and "He who is inside the Earth" clearly point out that while the Lord is inside the Earth, He is the cause of the essential nature (svarūpa), existence (sthiti) and the activity (pravṛtti) of Elements like Earth and Water. This interpretation alone will justify the Lord's having these Elements as His body.

Then another objection is raised by the critic that the one who is all-pervasive (sarva-vyāpaka) cannot at the same time remain inside (antara) the Elements. Śrīnivāsa says that since the Lord is all-pervasive he can be present both within and without the elements and there is no contradiction at all. Without giving up contact with the space inside, the Lord can be present outside also and this is the speciality with Him (asādhāranya). Otherwise the "antaradhikarana"(Br.Sū.I.1.21-22) will have no relevant subject at all for discussion.
Another objection levelled by the critic is that one living being is not seen to form the "body" of another living being. This is not correct, says Śrīnivāsa, because the phenomenon of a living being constituting the body of God is not a matter of direct perception for anybody. The inference of the nature: "A living being cannot form the body of the Brahman because he is a conscious being" etc., is as fallacious as the inference which tries to prove that the human skull is white because it is the limb of a living being. Such an argument is of no use in the present case dealing with the topic of God having the universe as His body.

Another objection is that the passage "sadeva somya idam agra āsīt ekameva advitiyam Brahma" (Chând. Up. VI.2.1) first speaks of Brahman as qualified by duality (dvaita) and then speaks of there being no second entity (dvaitabhāva). Therefore ultimately the scripture denies the reality of Earth, Water and the like, even as one realises and declares the unreality of silver in a shell. However, this is not acceptable, says our author, because the word "advitiya" (without a second) only negates the existence of another homogenous entity (sajātiya-dvitiya-rāhitya). Yāmuna in his
Siddhitraya ("Sarhvitsiddhi") makes the following declaration:

"When we say that the Cola Emperor is without a second (advitiya) in this world, we only intend to deny the existence of another Emperor equal to him. We do not deny the existence of his children, servants, wife and others." Patañjali the author of the Mahābhāṣya also states that "when a man is asked to find a second bull to match one bull already present, he will naturally look for an animal belonging to the same species (of bull), but not for a horse or a donkey."

The critic, however, says that in this passage (ekameva advitiyam) which involves Grammatical Co-ordination, the absence of a second entity is already conveyed by the expression "ekameva". So the word "advitiya" will become futile. But according to the Siddhāntin the expression "ekameva" is significant because it speaks of the Lord alone as having the world of Cit and Acit as body, which is indicated by the later passage of the same Upaniṣad, viz., "tadaikṣata bahu syām" (It reflected: Let

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me become many). So Abheda-texts cannot dispute and deny Brahman's having the world as His body.

Passages like "dvā suparnā" (Mundaka III.1.1) and "jñājñau dvāvajau" (Śvet. I.9) clearly distinguish the Jīva from the Supreme. "One is omniscient and the other, ignorant. They are two. One is the Ruler and the other, the non-ruler." Passages speaking of the identity of God and man such as "Tattvamasi" (Chānd. VI.8.7) and "Aham Brahmāsmi" (Br. Up. I.4.10) are in Grammatical Coordination. They cannot deny the difference that exists between the Lord and the world.

According to the rules of interpretation favoured by Jaimini also, passages which speak of Bheda between God and man cannot be considered to be weaker compared to the Abheda texts just because the latter texts come later. Among Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya, Prakaraṇa, Sthāna and Samākhyā, each succeeding principle is actually weaker than the previous one because of the remoteness in its import.

It is thus clear that Earth, Water and the like, primarily constitute the body of God on the basis of proofs like Abhyāsa and
Upapatti. Then what about their qualities like Rūpa and Rasa?
Śrīnivāsa says that although they are also under the control of God by virtue of their being His body, the qualities themselves cannot form His body. So the Bhāṣyakāra has employed the word "dravya" (substance) while defining the word "śarīra" while explaining the aphorism (II.1.9): na tu drṣṭāntabhāvāt.

This is the definition: "yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantuṁ dhārayitum ca sākyam, taccheṣataikasvarūpaṁ ca, tat tasya śarīram..". Explaining this, Vyāsācārya (Sudarśana Sūri) points out (in his Śrutapraṅkāśikā) that the words "Veda" and "Yajña" spoken of in the Brhadāraṇyaka as forming the body of the Lord only refer to the presiding deities of those entities. They actually denote a quality and action (respectively). They are not "dravyas". So strictly speaking, they do not form His body. That śabda (Veda) is only a quality has been justified by Vedānta Deśika in his Nyāya-siddhāñjana.

The crux of the problem is that Brahman becomes the Material Cause of the universe when He possesses Cit and Acit as His body which have assumed such a subtle condition that does not allow
any distinction in terms of Name and Form. The same Brahman becomes the Efficient Cause (Nimitta Kāraṇa) also when He has the Saṅkalpa (Will) which is congenial for such a situation (to create). As such there is no contradiction in the Brahman being both the Material and Instrumental Causes of the world.

Anumāna cannot prove the difference between the Material and Nimitta Kāraṇas in relation to the universe because even Perception which is the basis for Inference, cannot grasp this difference. No Inference can disprove Brahman's being the Material Cause of the world. The Śvetāsvatara text (IV.10): "māyāṁ tu prakṛtim vidyāt, māyinam tu maheśvaram" also does not point out something which is other than Brahman as the Upādāna. It only means that Brahman who has the body comprising Prakṛti which is subject to modification as the Material Cause, also controls it, and that He becomes the Efficient Cause as well. This is indicated by the two words "māyinam" and "maheśvaram". The Gītā (IX.10): "mayādhyakṣena prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram" also points out Brahman as the soul of the universe. There is no text which points out the difference between
the Nimitta and Upādāna Kāraṇas in relation to world-manifestation.

At this point the critic may again argue that there may be no contradiction between an Efficient Cause and Material Cause as such, but there is no valid proof to confirm that Brahman Himself is both the Causes. Perception cannot prove it because it does not operate in matters which are beyond the scope of the senses. Since Pratyakṣa has no scope, Anumāna which is based upon it, also cannot deliver the goods. There is also no scriptural text which can prove this beyond any doubt. However, the Taittirīya text: "yato vā imāni bhūtāni" etc. may be interpreted to mean that Brahman can be the Nimitta also. The word "yataḥ" in the Ablative Case need not necessarily refer to Brahman as the Material Cause also. Thus for example, the statement "daṇḍāt ghaṭo jāyate" (a pot is produced because of a stick) does not mean that stick is the Material Cause of pot just because of the employment of the Ablative Case.

To this objection Śrīnivāsa gives the following answer: The Ablative Case in "yataḥ" is ordained by the Pāṇinian rule (I.iv.30) :"janikartuh prakṛtiḥ" (The prime cause of the agent of
the verb *jan* [to be born] is called *Apādāna*). Then by the general rule (II.iii.28) "*apādāne pañcami*" the Fifth Case is employed. The Ablative here (*yatḥ*) cannot be accounted for, unless the word "*yat*" forms the *Upādāna*.

To explain, the Ablative Case in "*yatḥ*" does not merely refer to a cause in general. There is no rule which ordains such a case. If it is a mere cause then the sūtra "*hetau*" (II.iii.23) (when a word denotes cause it takes the Third Case Suffix) applies. The aphorisms starting from "*dhruvam apāye apādānam*" (I.iv.24) and ending with "*bhuvah prabhavaḥ*" (I.iv.31) ordain the designation "*apādāna*" (Ablation). But it is only the aphorism "*janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*" that makes Brahman the *Upādāna*. Strictly speaking, the aphorism "*dhruvam apāye apādānam*" (I.iv.24) (A noun whose relation to an action is that of a fixed point from which departure takes place, is called Apādāna or Ablation) cannot be applied here because the universe, at the time of its origination, did not and could not "depart" from Brahman since He is all-pervasive. Therefore "*janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*" is the only aphorism that can be applied to this case. The word "*prakṛtiḥ*" (Prime Cause) means the
Material Cause only. This word is popularly used in cases like a lump of clay and a nugget of gold which undergo modifications. In the scriptural text "māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt" also the word Prakṛti can only mean the Material Cause. The etymology of the word Prakṛti is "prakaroti iti" (Prakṛti is that which undergoes a variety of changes). It is thus clear that Prakṛti can only be the Material Cause but not a cause in general.

The critic then examines various usages found in some poetic compositions and even in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya to prove his point that the word "prakṛti" could only mean a cause in general (kāraṇa-sāmānya). But our author disproves all these arguments by going into a detailed examination of the position of grammatical aphorisms found in several works like the Mahābhāṣya, the commentary Pradīpa on it by Kaiyaṭa, Prakriyāmañjari (Name of Ānanda-pūrna-vidyāsāgara Muni’s Commentary on the Kāśikāvṛtti [commentary on Pāṇini’s Aśṭādhyāyī] of Jayāditya and Vāmana) and Padamañjari (Name of Haradatta’s Commentary on the Kāśikāvṛtti). He also sets aside the view that the word "yataḥ" of the Taittirīya text contains the suffix "tasil" which is used
normally to convey the sense of all the case-suffixes (sārva-vibhaktika-tasil). He contends that while the sense of Ablation is naturally and consistently available, there is no justification in going to "tasil" to yield the desired meaning.

Further, the Taittirīya text under discussion "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayantyabhisamviśanti" refers to all the living creatures going towards their Prime Cause (prakṛti) and entering It. Here there are two words: "prayanti" and "abhisamviśanti". "Prayanti" is not an inflected verb ending with the verbal termination "tiṁ" (tiṁantam). It is the present participial form (śatrarthaka) qualifying the noun "bhūtāni". "Abhisamviśanti" is the only verb here. Otherwise, if "prayanti" is also taken as a verb then there will be the contingency of accepting two different sentences beginning with the word "yat". Our author says: "prayanti - praliyamānāni santi bhūtāni, yad abhisamviśanti - yadavasthām prāpnuvanti".

The author also clarifies that in the Viśistādvaita Siddhānta, Pralaya is not of the nature of total destruction of the entities leading to a total non-existence (abhāvātmakaḥ layaḥ) as in the
Nyāya system. It is the phenomenon of the product attaining the same state of the causal factor (ekatva-avasthā-āpattirūpah). He corroborates this by quoting from some Upaniṣads and the Viṣṇupurāṇa (cf. VI.4.18: "agnyavaste tu salile"). The explanation that "yataḥ" has the Ablative Case Suffix conveying the sense of Material Cause is also corroborated by another passage of the Taittirīya: "ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante" (All these beings are indeed born out of Ānanda). Further, the merger of the living beings is possible only in their Material Cause, but not in their Efficient Cause.

The author also argues that the Material Cause alone is quite well-known to be the source of various living and non-living entities. The aphorism "janikartuḥ prakṛtīḥ" has been formed by Pāṇini only after taking into account, this kind of "projection" of objects from their Prime Cause. Giving a different meaning to the Ablation is therefore, not warranted. For example a person can infer fire on a mountain after seeing the smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. In other words, it is only after ascertaining the invariable relation (vyāpti) between the probans and the
probandum one can infer and arrive at the conclusion. This is the natural process of Inference. Likewise one can understand the sense of Ablation used in the word "yataḥ" only after observing the process of evolution of entities from their material causes. It cannot be otherwise. If this is not accepted then it becomes impossible to ascertain the meaning of various case-suffixes that we come across in the Kāraka section of grammatical texts.

Thus for instance when we read the passage "jyotiṣṭomena savargakāmo yajeta" (Let one desirous of heaven perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice) we understand the karaṇatva (instrumentality) of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice because of its Instrumental Case-ending (tṛtiyā vibhakti). Likewise, the Second Case affix in "vrihin avahanti" (She pounds the paddy), the Fourth Case in "maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍam prayacchati" (He gives the staff to Maitrāvaruṇa), the sense of Ablation in "āgrayaṇāt grhnāti" ("He receives from Āgrayaṇa" [Āgrayaṇa means the first Soma libation]), the sense of the Sixth Case in expressions like "dīkṣā somasya" (Initiation of Soma), the sense of location in the expression "same yajeta" (One should perform a sacrifice on the
even ground) etc., will not become intelligible at all. Behind the employment of every Case-ending there is what is called "lokaprasiddhi" (popular usage among the people of the world) also. But the critic argues further that Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya has actually observed in his commentary on the aphorism "janikartuh prakṛtiḥ" that the aphorism "dhruvam apāye apādānam" can be set aside (idamapi sūtram prayāāhyātum śakyam). He cites usages like: "goloma-avi-lomabhyāṁ dūrvāḥ jāyante"(The dūrvā grass is generated from the hairs of the bulls and sheep) and "apakṛāmanti tāḥ tebhyāḥ" (They come out of those things).

Śrīnivāsa replies that this contention of the critic can be accepted to be sensible if the passage "yato vā" can also be brought under the scope of the aphorism "janikartuh prakṛtiḥ". Brahman being all-pervasive, the universe which is invariably associated with Him never "comes out" separate from Him in the process of creation. Therefore the objection is ruled out.

Further it must be stated that what Patañjali has stated is only based on the general day-to-day observation in practical life.
Normally whatever is generated from a source comes out of it and becomes a different entity. But each system of Philosophy has its own interpretation of origination. In the Vaiśeṣika system for example it is held that a product comes out of its cause, being inseparably associated with paramāṇus (subtle atoms). "Is it actually a case of kārya leaving its source"? asks Śrīnivāsa.

The Sāṅkhya System speaks of the origination and destruction of an entity as the manifestation (āvirbhāva) and disappearance (tirobhāva) of that entity. Therefore an effect need not necessarily leave its source as it comes out of it. That is what Kaiyāta has also stated. Even in the case of a product coming out of its Material Cause, it is not a hard and fast rule that the effect should always be distinct and separate from its cause. Such a thing will not take place when the entire material gets transformed into the object. That will happen only when a portion of matter gets transformed as the product. In the case of the world coming out the Lord also only such an interpretation is possible. There will be a modification of only a minute portion of Lord's "body" which is qualified by Cit and Acit. So there is no contradiction in our interpretation.
In our system (Viśiṣṭādvaita) in so far the creation of the Universe is concerned, Brahman is admitted as the Material Cause qualified by Cit and Acit. "Separation" of the product viz., the gross universe from that primordial cause (God) takes place in the process of creation. But by the word "separation" (viśleṣah) absolute separation from the source is not meant. For example when we say the śara-grass has grown out of a mountain-peak, the grass does not totally leave its connection with the mountain-top. In the case of the Brahman who is all-pervasive, He becomes the Upādāna Kāraṇā possessing the subtle Cit and Acit as His body. So the employment of the Fifth Case Suffix in the sense of Ablation is quite justifiable.

Even granting that the Fifth Case is used to convey the simple sense of causation, the expression "yato vā" can be taken as a restatement (anuvāda) of the two concepts of being the Efficient Cause and the Material Cause. The case of Pralaya has already been explained as the attainment of the state of the "prime cause". The expression "yena jātāni jīvanti" makes it clear that the world has its life totally determined by and dependent on the Cause. It is
thus clear that there can be no other Nimitta here apart from the Brahman. So "yataḥ" conveys here both the senses of Nimitta and Upādāna. By this our contention that Brahman is the Material Cause gets all the more confirmed.

The concept of "knowing everything by knowing the One" (ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam) can also go well with our position that Brahman becomes the Material Cause. The knowledge of the Nimittakāraṇa does not lead to a knowledge of all the effects. By knowing the stick for example, we do not know a pot which is entirely different from the stick. But once we know the Material Cause we will also be able to know the products generated by that cause. "The lump of clay which I saw in the morning has itself become the pot, pitcher etc. in the afternoon", we say.

But the critic goes on to say that if there is no difference at all between the Material Cause and its effects then the declaration that the "Knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of all" becomes inconsistent because there is nothing which can be referred to as all (sarvam). One may say that the difference between the Material Cause and its effects lies in one belonging to the previous portion
of time and the other, to the subsequent part of time. One is marked by the form of the lump while the other is seen to be a pot and the like.

Even then the difficulty persists because the knowledge of one does not lead to the knowledge of the other. Since Brahman is known, there being nothing else to be known (apart from Brahman) all other entities become more or less known (as being identical with Brahman). This is the view of the critic. But our author maintains that there is no difference between the Material Cause and its products. Still we have to account for a variety of products having different shapes related to different periods of time when they appeared. Those products are not altogether different from the material cause. Although the material cause is one, products like pot and pitcher are mutually different. This difference can be traced to the difference in the state of existence of clay. If cause and effect are totally different from each other, then the Chāndogya declaration that "the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all" cannot be accounted for at all.
At this stage another objection is raised that although the knowledge of Brahman leads to the knowledge of the Acit (insentient) entities which are the products, the Cit (sentient) entities which are not actual products, cannot be known. So how does the knowledge of the One lead to the knowledge of all? This question is set aside by the author on the ground that only One qualified entity can become the Material cause of the qualified products. Sentient living beings, strictly speaking, cannot become the kārya (products). But even this is possible through a modification of their nature brought about by the expansion and contraction of their knowledge which is called Dharmabhūtajñāna (Attributive Consciousness). At this point another question is raised by the critic: If the knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of all, then by knowing Brahman one should be able to know the liberated souls such as Ananta and Garuḍa whose knowledge is never contracted, they being the Nityasūris (ever-liberated souls) waiting upon the Lord in different capacities. The author replies that what is normally meant is that the knowledge of the universe is conveyed by the words "idam" and "sarvam". So even if
Guruḍa and other ever-liberated souls are not known through "ekavijnāna" there is no harm in it.

Śrīnivāsa then goes into a detailed discussion of various scriptural passages and concludes that only the qualified Brahman can become the Upādāna and Upādeya. Only then the knowledge of the One can lead to the knowledge of all other things. To start with, the Brhadāranyaka texts, "He for whom the Earth forms the body; Avyakta forms the body; Ātman forms the body; Akṣara forms the body" etc. clearly point out that Cit and Acit constitute the body of Brahman. Then we have to realise that all words referring to the body must culminate and terminate in the Self which is qualified by those entities. Then terms like Sat, Brahman etc. which are noticed in passages discussing causality should all be taken to refer to a specific Deity namely, Nārāyaṇa. Then scriptures like the Śvetāśvatara point out that the word "Brahman" refers to One who is qualified by the Cit and Acit entities. The Śvetāśvatara text (I.25): "Bhoktā bhogyaṁ preritāraṁ ca matvā, sarvāṁ proktam trividham Brahman etat" spells out the
Tattvatraya (Cit, Acit and Isvāra) which constitutes the world-phenomenon.

Therefore even in the passage: "yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante" etc., all the words refer to qualified entities. The world which comes out from the Brahman (upādeya) in the form of Cit and Acit in its gross state is also implied in this process. So both the Upādāna and Upādeya are qualified. All other passages like "Tat tejah aiksataō, Œtāh āpah aiksanta" etc. refer to Tejas, Water, etc. as having the Saṅkalpa (to create). This clarifies the point that Brahman who has these Elements as His body is possessed of the Saṅkalpa to create. Otherwise how can Tejas, Water, etc. which are insentient can ever be expected to desire to become many? In other words Brahman Who is qualified by that substance which has a previous state of existence, becomes the Material Cause in relation to Himself as qualified by that very substance which assumes the subsequent state of existence. The Chāndogya text reads: "aḥam imāḥ tisrāḥ devatāḥ anena jīvena ātmanā anupraśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāni" It becomes possible for Name and Form to get related to the Lord when He enters the
Elements with the help of the Jīva who is His own self. In our normal experience we see that a father does not enter his son to give him a name and form. But the scripture declares: "Tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat" (Having created that, He entered that itself). This makes the point clear that only after entering the Elements the Lord divided the entities as Sat (the living) and Tyat (the non-living i.e., the insentient). All these go to prove that qualified Brahman alone becomes Upādāna and Upādeya. Thus the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of every thing else.

Another point clarified by the author is that a Material Cause should undergo modifications to evolve as a product. Being eternal, Brahman and Jīva do not undergo any essential change and hence there is no Upādānatva for them. However, a kind of change in the form of the expansion and contraction of Attributive Consciousness will take place in the individual self. This will not be there in the case of the Lord whose knowledge never contracts.

The point to be noted is that Upādānatva can accrue only to an existent entity but not to a non-existent entity. Acit can become a product by undergoing a change in its essential nature (svarūpa).
In the case of Cit and the Brahman there can be a change in their characteristics (svabhāva) only. The scripture also explains that an existent entity (sat) cannot come out of something which does not exist (asat). Utpatti (origin) is nothing but the attainment of a different state of existence (avasthāntarāpatti). The Grammarians also speak about modifications that take place in a material cause. Patañjali says: "Gold which is in a particular (ornamental) shape may become a nugget. This nugget is melted to make a necklace. Again the necklace is melted to make "svastika"-shaped ornament. Again a lump of gold can be shaped as kundalas (earrings). It is only the form that keeps changing but not the substance. The substance remains as it is."

When a Jīva who is eternal and impartite assumes a change in his characteristics through Attributive Knowledge, he becomes an effect. His becoming a product of creation is nothing but the expansion of his Attributive Knowledge which was, prior to creation, in a contracted form. It cannot be contended that indirectly the qualities of the body such as happiness, misery etc. will also affect the soul. The question is whether the body is
inseparable from the soul and is dependent on the soul for its existence, or whether it is separable and thus is independent. For instance, suffering belonging to the body may be taken as affecting the soul also because body is an 'inseparable attribute' (arpthak-siddha višeṣaṇa) of the self. It is not so in objects such as a stick and an ear-ring which a man may wear, but which are separable from him. Thus the Brahman may become a Material Cause in the primary sense through the medium of Cit and Acit which form His body. Here again there is a twofold control exercised by the Lord - control through the subtle Cit and Acit, and control through the gross Cit and Acit. But in any case, it is the Lord alone who controls the universe.

One more objection crops up at this stage: If a qualified entity becomes the Material Cause for another qualified entity then there will be mutual admixture of the natures of the three categories viz., Cit, Acit and Īśvara. The answer is "no". When a cloth is woven with threads of different colours like white, black and red, it is those threads alone that form the Material Cause of those portions of the cloth that have specific colours. There is no room for any
confusion arising out of the mixture of variegated threads. Likewise here also, when the Lord is in one qualified form (having the subtle Cit and Acit as His body) He becomes the Material Cause for another qualified form of His (having the gross Cit and Acit as His body). There is no room for confusion here. So the Cit-aspect becomes the Upādāna for the Cit-product; the Acit-aspect becomes the Upādāna for the Acit product and the Brahman-aspect becomes Upādāna for the Brahman-part of creation.

In the Chāndogya passage (VI.8.4-6): "saṃmulāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratīṣṭāḥ" the expression "saṃmulāḥ" (having their source in Sat) only conveys the idea that Sat which means the Lord, qualified by Cit and Acit becomes the Material cause of the living beings. The Upādānatva of the Lord is therefore by becoming the substratum for a state of existence which is "sadvāraka" (through a medium). This is the interpretation given by Sudarśana Sūrī in his commentary on the Śrībhāṣya on the relevant Upaniṣadic text, says Śrīnivāsa.

In the Ārambhaṇa-section (Br. Sū. II.1.15-20) both the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra have pointed out that cause and
effect are not mutually different. This can be explained only by taking the Cause as Viśiṣṭa (qualified). In the light of this we have to conclude that the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of everything else, only when they both are taken as "qualified" in the form of the Upādāna and the Upādeya. The aphorism "Prakṛtiṣca pratijnā-drṣṭānta- anuparodhāt" (Br. Śū. I.iv.23) (Brahman is also the Material Cause because there can be no stultification of the proposition and the examples illustrative of it) points out that God is both the Material and Efficient Cause of the universe. Only then the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of the other. The examples given there such as clay and pot, etc., become significant only on such an interpretation.

The author then explains the Chāndogya passage "utra tam ādeśam aprākṣyah.." (VI.1.3) (Did you seek to know about the Sovereign Ruler?) Here the word "ādeśa" means the "Sovereign Commander" but not "instruction". The Grammarians also point out that the verbal root "diś" prefixed by "ān" indicates "prasāsana" (command); but when it is prefixed by "upa" it means "upadeśa" (instruction). The author sets aside a prima facie
view that "diś" means only "pronunciation" (uccāraṇa). But the word "praśāsana" means control. In this connection the author throws light on semantics. He says that the usage of words is two-fold: (a) that of the cultured (educated) people (ārya) and (b) that of the uncultured (uneducated) (anārya). When both these usages come up for application in one and the same context, the usage of the cultured (educated) persons (āryas) alone is taken as valid. For instance the word "pīlu" by popular consent, means a "tree" but in the usage of the uneducated it means an elephant". Both the meanings are of course correct but the former is primary and the latter, secondary. When there is an occasion for the application of both, the meaning of "tree" gains precedence over the other meaning, i.e., "elephant".

Now the word "ādesa", by convention, means only "command". When the suffix "ghaṅ" is added, it means "the one who commands", i.e., "the commander". Commanding is the distinct and unique feature of the Lord. This commanding takes place by His entering into the hearts of the living beings. So the

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84 Lexicons gives the following meanings for the word "pīlu": arrow; atom; insect; elephant; stem of the palm; flower; group of palm trees; a kind of tree.
Lord becomes the commander only in a *qualified* way, i.e., when He enters the Jīvas as their Inner Controller. The passage, "*antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ sāstā janānām sarvātmā*" (Tai.Āraṇyaka III.29) supports this view. This is corroborated with the help of the "Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa" of the *Brhadāraṇyaka* already alluded to. Otherwise, if the Lord commands like a king, being "outside" the people whom he controls then there is no need to say that He "enters" the Jīvas. The qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) Lord alone controls the living beings. So the Chāndogya statement that knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all, concerns only the Lord with attributes. On this analogy, even passages where the "*anupraveśa*" of the Lord is not explicit, as for instance in the *Brhadāraṇyaka* text "*etasya vā akṣarasaya praśāsane Gārgi! sūrya-candramasau vidhrtau tiṣṭhataḥ*"(III.8.9) one has to understand that the Lord's "*anupraveśa*" is *implicit*. The aphorisms "*akṣaram ambarāntadṛṣteḥ*" (Br.Sū. I.iii.8) (The Supreme Lord is declared as the support of what is even beyond ākāśa = *Prakṛti*) and "*sā ca praśāsanāt*"(Ib. I. iii.9) (That power of supporting things beyond ākāśa is due to His supreme prowess) declare that for supporting
Ether, Water etc., the Lord displays His power of rulership. This again depends upon His entering into the Elements only after which He controls and supports them.

At this point another question is raised by the opponent: "Are both the cause and effect qualified (viśiṣṭa)?" The author answers in the affirmative. He says that this can be proved by means of "śrutiyaṛthāpatti" (Presumption arising from the incompatibility of what is heard in the scriptures). So both Kāraṇa and Kārya must be accepted as qualified. The word "idam" (this) of the Upaniṣad (Chāndogya VI.2.1: sadeva somya idam agra āsīt) should therefore be conceived as indicating a "qualified" entity. When we say that "Devadatta is dark in complexion, youthful and having red eyes", all the features which belong to his body ultimately do qualify the self of Devadatta also.

The critic has one more objection: "The Śrutis speak of the immutability of the Brahman. But when He becomes the universe, modification is inevitable. How can this be accounted for?"

85 The Upaniṣadic text "tarati Śokamātmavat" means "One who knows the Self crosses misery". Unless the self is "presumed" to be eternal, one cannot be expected to get beyond this world and attain the state of liberation (which is free from misery and is full of bliss). This is an instance of what is called Śrutiyaṛthāpatti (Presumption arising from the apparent inconsistency of the scriptural meaning).
reply Śrīnivāsa states that to become a product, an already existent entity will undergo a series of states and stages. When Brahman becomes the effect, He will also attain different stages of existence -- not directly, but through the medium of Cit and Acit. Undergoing modification is twofold: (a) sadvāraka (through a medium i.e., indirectly) and (b) advāraka (without a medium, i.e., directly).

When an insentient matter like clay undergoes modification in its very nature (svarūpa) it is without any medium. A pot for instance, when exposed to heat will attain a different colour. This modification has taken place not in its svarūpa but in its svabhāva (characteristic). A mango becomes ripe and undergoes a necessary modification in its svabhāva. Coming to living beings who are all embodied, they pass through different stages or states of existence such as leanness, fatness, boyhood, youth, old age etc., through the body itself. In addition, the person concerned also thinks/says thus: "I am lean"; "I am fat", "I am a boy"; "I am a youth" and the like. All these references will go as far as the soul itself which abides in the body. In the case of great sages like Saubhārī who assumed (fifty) different bodies by giving up the
stage of being singular in number, such a change has to be traced to the body itself.

In the case of Brahman who attains different states of existence through the medium of Cit and Acit which form His body and thus constitute His inseparable attribute (aprthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa), the change that takes place is primary but not secondary. By saying so we are not going against the scriptures which declare the Lord as free from modifications. Brahman can also be said to undergo different "stages of existence" when He becomes the antaryāmin with Cit and Acit in their gross form. It is also to be understood that when Brahman undergoes change through Cit and Acit the defects found in them do not affect Him at all.

Another point discussed here is that an embodied person like Devadatta becomes a "qualified" entity. Features like fairness of colour and youth which belong to his body can also apply to Devadatta in a primary sense. In the same way in the case of the Lord who has Cit and Acit as His body, it is only as a "qualified person" that He becomes the cause. Consequently all these states of existence pertaining to His body will apply to Him, a
"qualified" Being. This has been explained in detail by the author with quotations from the Śrūtaprakāśikā. Sudarśana says that the essential nature of a person can never be a pure, unqualified substantive. Only when it is qualified (viśīṣṭa) it becomes the essential nature of that person. For instance, the essential nature of a pot is not mere clay. It is something qualified by "pot-ness". The attribute which enters into the nature of an entity is not a mere attribute. It is an attribute that has invariably become associated itself with the substantive.

All words which denote the body should culminate in Brahman who is the ultimate import of all words. There is between the bodies and the Lord, the relationship between the controlled and the controller, which results in the body-soul relation. That is how Mahat, Ahaṁkāra etc. which are different stages of existence of Prakṛti, constitute the Lord's body and thus form the essential nature of the "qualified" Brahman. It is in this sense that Brahman forms the Upādāna Kāraṇa. This can be verified through several Pramāṇas. But the changes found in Cit and Acit do not take place in the essential nature of God. Therefore we have to understand
that it is His body consisting of Cit and Acit which forms the material cause.

Although Brahman becomes the Upādāna of the world (Upādeya), one cannot see the quality of "Brahmatva" in the world as one can see clay-ness or gold-ness in products like pots and earrings. The answer to this doubt can be given with reference to the Ārambhaṇa-section of the Brahmaśūtra (II.1.15-20). The Upādāna and the Upādeya are both qualified (viśīṣṭa) and hence there is no contradiction here.

Another objection that may come up is that if the product is accepted as the "body" of the Brahman, then by the same token Brahman also should become the body of Himself. This lands one in the fallacy called "ātmāśraya" (self-dependence). On the strength of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which declares Earth, Water etc. as the body of the Lord, we can understand that only a product like Earth and Water can become the body of the Lord and there is no contingency of Brahman becoming the body of Brahman Himself. Here we have to keep in mind that words like Sat, Cit and Īśvara are called "niśkarṣaka" (distinguishing terms). All other
words like Śarīrin and Ātman are called "niśkarṣaketara" which cannot point out the entities distinctly. In the reference to Earth as the body of God, the word Śarīrin does not refer to any qualified entity and so there is no defect of self-dependence. The critic points out that the Siddhāntin has explained the word "ākāśa" in the text "ākāśādeva sarvāṇi bhūtāni samutpadyante" as referring to the Paramātman through etymology, which is not correct. But the Siddhāntin says that Brahman with mere "ākāśa" as His body does not become the Material Cause. He becomes the Upādāna only when He has the "qualified ākāśa" as the body.

The resourceful critic comes up with another objection now that Cit and Acit when they form God's body, do not have the capacity to become inconceivably large. Therefore the One qualified by such a body cannot be referred to as Brahman. The Siddhāntin answers that this is a ridiculous argument. The "pravṛtti-nimitta" of a pot for example is "ghaṭatva". Even then the word "ghaṭa" automatically refers to that entity which is qualified by "ghaṭatva". So there is nothing wrong in holding that when Cit and Acit are mentioned as bodies, they refer to the "qualified" Brahman alone as He is related to them in the capacity of their soul. Brahman thus becomes the general cause of
everything in this world. Based upon the scripture "satyam jñānam anantam Brahma" (Tai. Ānanda. 1) we take up "satyatva" etc. as becoming the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman. It automatically points to Brahman as the qualified entity. Expressions in Grammatical Coordination become justified only in this manner. It is not correct to say that the universe cannot be considered as the body of God. We have already answered that based upon the "pravṛtti-nimitta" (cause or ground for using a particular expression) one can understand the meaning of every entity through primary significance itself. Words like "sthūla" (fat) and "nīla" (blue) although they are adjectives (vīšeṣaṇa), they are also capable of referring to qualified entities (vīśīṣṭa) viz., a fat person and a blue-hued object respectively.

Another objection crops up at this point. Words referring to the great Elements like Earth and Water do not come within the purview of the definition of body. The word "prthivi" used in the "Antaryāmyadhikarana" of the Brhadāraṇyaka is not the simple Element but only the Element which has been evolved as a result of Pañcikarana (quintuplication), says the critic. But the author says that there is no proof in support of such a contention.
There are people who do not agree with the doctrine that the words referring to the 'bodies' of Devadatta and Yajña-datta for instance, culminate and terminate in the Supreme Self (Paramātman). The author tells such critics that they must first educate themselves about texts like: "dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā" (Mundaka III.1.1) and "pūḥ prāṇinah sarva eva guhāsayaasya" (Apastamba XX.4). Here it is clear that all the living beings constitute the body of God. The Lord alone controls them after entering into them. So all the creatures become the body of God directly. The material bodies of these creatures, however, become the Lord's bodies indirectly.

Another question is as to how Earth, Water etc. can form the body of God and become the means of "enjoyment" (bhogopakaraṇa) for Him because He has already realised His desires in full (avāpta-samastakāma). He has nothing to accomplish through those bodies, observes the critic. This question is preposterous, says Śrīnivāsa. Even the liberated souls are said to have realised their desires in full. So says the Chāndogya [VII.26.2]: "sarvam ha paśyah paśyati; sarvam āpnoti sarvataḥ" (The wise one sees every thing and attains everything in full). The
Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad (I.1.) says: "sa ekāki na rameta" (He, being alone, may not feel happy). This means that before creation, the Lord had no means to divert Himself and that He assumes Earth etc. as His body with a view to divert Himself. So it must be understood that assumption of bodies is not for the sake of His own enjoyment but for the purpose of performing certain acts through the bodies of the jīvas so as to exhaust their past karmans.

Now comes up another objection: Since the Jīvatmans are atomic (āṇu/sūkṣma) subtle and impartite, the Lord cannot enter inside those Ātman. As such they cannot form His body. Śrīnivāsa replies that what is meant by the Lord's being inside the Jīvas is that He has with those Jīvas a very intimate relationship (drvha-sambandha). This is what is meant by being the Lord's being the "antaryāmin". This "inner pervasion" (antarvyāpti) in relation to Earth, Water, Self, etc., is nothing but having a strong and abiding relationship with those entities in such a way that controlling them from inside becomes feasible and possible. For an all-pervasive

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86 It may be noted that the critic here is an advocate of the Vaḍagalai sect. For a detailed account of the eighteen doctrinal differences between the Teṅgalai and the Vaḍagalai sects, see Dr M. Narasimhachary, Basic Concepts of Śri Vaiṣṇavism, pp. 26-29.
principle like God, entering within entities by giving up the space outside does not become possible.

The Chândogya passage declares that the Lord entered the three Elements Earth, Water and Fire with the Jìva who is same as Himself: "anena jìvena ātmanā anupraviśya...". He then wanted to classify them in terms of Names and Shapes (nāmarūpe vyākaravāni). Now the question is as to how can the Lord become the agent of "nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇa". The answer is quite simple. The word Jìva may mean the Jìva alone in a very general sense. But the statement: "yasyātmā śarīram" has already been interpreted to mean that the Jìva also becomes the body of God. So when the Lord enters the Elements he does so through the medium of the Jivas who constitute His body. Therefore there is no difficulty in understanding the act of "nāma-rūpa-vyākaraṇa" in relation to the Lord.

Thus the Chândogya declaration that "the knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of everything" (ekavijnānena sarvavijnānam) has been conclusively established by the preceding arguments. When it is said that the knowledge of Brahman leads to
the knowledge of the world, this will not happen unless both Brahman and the world are of one and the same essence. Śrīnivāsa explains the text "vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam" (Chāndogya VI.1.4) (Modification and name are attained by clay for the purpose of speech only. It is all clay only) following Rāmānuja's interpretation found in the Śrībhāṣya (under II.1.15) and the Vedārthaśaṅgaraḥ.87

There is another passage: "kartāramiśat puruṣat Brahmayonim" (Mūḍāka I.1.3) which unequivocally declares that the Lord is the Nimitta Kāraṇa ("kartāraṁ") and the Upādāna Kāraṇa ("yoni"). One cannot contend that the word Yoni only means a Kāraṇa as in the expression "śāstrayonitvāt" (Br. Sū. I.1.3). If that is so, then the word "kartāram" which conveys the same meaning, will become redundant. This idea can be confirmed by the subsequent portion of the same scripture: "yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ca" (Mūḍāka I.1.6) (Even as a spider makes and withdraws its web). The illustration of spider (ūrṇaṇābhiḥ) ably justifies the point that the Lord Himself is both

87 See Vedārthaśaṅgaraḥ (Eng. tr. by Dr S.S. Raghavachar), p. 10
the Material and Efficient cause. Bādarāyaṇa has also used the word "yoni" in the aphorism, "yoniśca hi giyate" (Br. Sū. I.4.28) (Brahman is also the Upādāna Kāraṇa because he is declared to be the source of the world). The word "yoni" is popularly used in the sense of Upādāna only. Although in some passages like "apsu yonir vā āsvah" (The horse is having its origin in waters) and "yajamāno vā agner yonih" (The sacrificer is indeed the source of Fire), the word "yoni" just means a cause in general but not a Material Cause. Still we have to go by the meaning of the word as understood from a majority of instances. We cannot give up the more popular meaning just because a word is used in a different way in a few instances.

Śrīnivāsa then quotes passages from Manu "āsididarm tamobhūtam...vividhāḥ prajāḥ" (I. 5-8a) from which it is evident that before creation Tamas alone was the body of the Lord and that it was indistinguishable. The Lord became its soul. Then everything became manifest and manifold according to his infallible Will. Śrīnivāsa says that we have to take into account all
such passages which speak of the causality of Brahman and conclude that Brahman alone is the Upādāna Kāraṇa.

One has to apply the maxims: "sarvasākhāpratyaya-nyāya" and "sarvavedāntapratyaya-nyāya" here. What is meant is this: Different branches of Veda speak about rituals like Agnihotra with different characteristics. We have to gather all such scattered references, correlate them and conclude that Agnihotra and such other rituals have all the characteristics mentioned in different contexts in different recensions of the Veda. Śabara in his commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śūtra (II.iv.32) observes: "sarva-sākhā-pratyayaṁ, sarva-brāhmaṇa-patyayaṁ ca ekam karma codyate" (The ritual ordained in different recensions and different Brāhmaṇas is only one). The ritual is not ordained for the sake of a single person (na caikam prati śiṣyate).

Likewise we have what is called the "Sarvavedāntapratyaya Adhikaraṇa" in the Brahmasūtra (III.3.1-5). According to this, Meditation (upāsanā) taught in all the Vedāntas is one only because there is no distinction regarding the injunction relating to it in all the Vedāntas. The Bheda and Abheda Śrutis have to be
properly interpreted keeping the "body-soul-relation" in view. All the Vedânta passages have their sole import in Brahman being the Upâdâna Kâraṇa. That Brahman is the Upâdâna can again be established on the basis of the text: "kâraṇam tu dhyeyah" (Atharvaśikhā) (The cause has to be contemplated upon). The word "kâraṇa" here refers to Brahman as the Upâdâna and Nimitta. According to this scripture one has to contemplate on the Cause. Contemplation results in "sākṣātkāra" (direct vision). This results in liberation. All this is not possible unless Brahman, the object of contemplation and direct perception is not the Nimitta and Upâdâna in one.

Śrînivâsa also applies the "six principles" by which the import of passages in the Sadvidyā section of the Chândogya can be ascertained. He points out that the pramânas viz., Śruti, Linga, Vâkya, Pakaraṇa, Sthâna and Samâkhyâ are helpful in confirming the same idea. He quotes profusely from the Śrutis and Brahmasûtra in support of his contention. He concludes the discussion and incidentally the work itself, by saying that a close examination of the term "Nârâyaṇa" used in the Mahopaniṣad,
Manusmṛti and other texts confirms the view that Lord Nārāyaṇa alone is the Upādāna and Nimitta Kāraṇa of the universe. This is the concluded opinion of all the Vedāntas.