“Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind” wrote Thomas Hobbes in his magnum opus “Leviathan” long long ago “as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.”¹ As to strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with him. No body believes that war is in any sense inevitable, but the tap roots of large-scale violence reach far down into the basic structure of societies and are shaped by human population, technology, and access to resources.

Man is critically dependent on his physical environment. As biological organisms, humans have certain basic needs, namely, air, food, water, and territory. In a growing population, there will be an increasing demand for basic resources. In addition to plants and animals required for food, human beings acquire other, harder-to-get resources; the technology of this acquisition brings about both environmental and social changes. A society that can produce electronic computers is likely

to be organized quite differently than a society in which steam engines represent the highest level of technology, and even more differently than societies with only crude hand tools. Advances in technology tend not only to increase the range and amount of resources available to a society, but to influence individual and social behavior as well.2

The more advanced the level of technology in a society, the greater will be the kinds and quantity of resources needed by society to sustain that technology and advance it further. At the same time, demands are likely to increase as technology alters a society's perception of its "needs." Each new level of technology influences manufacturing, transportation, and communication, creating social change and thus new economic and political institutions. Advances in technology, when combined with increases in population, often contribute to the dilemma of rising demands and insufficient domestic resources.

A society (especially one with a growing population) with insufficient resources within its own territory will be seriously constrained in its activities unless it finds some way of acquiring the resources it demands. Whether and how a society reaches for resources beyond its sovereignty is conditioned by location, level of population, level of technology, and the resources, technology, needs, power, and friendliness of neighboring states.

When demands are unmet and existing capabilities are insufficient to satisfy them, new capabilities may have to be developed. But a society can develop particular capabilities (including resources)

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only if it has the necessary existing capabilities to do so. Moreover, if national capabilities cannot be attained at a reasonable cost within national boundaries, they may be sought beyond. Any activity – selling wheat, buying oil, investing capital, increasing the labour force, or moving troops - takes on new meaning once it is extended in foreign territory.

There are three aspects of this process that must be distinguished: (1) the disposition extends activities beyond national boundaries (2) the particular activities that result from the disposition to act: and (3) the impact that these activities have on the people of another country and their environment.3

Lateral pressure can be manifested in many different types of activities, depending on the nature of the demands that are not being satisfied domestically and on the capabilities that are available. Lateral pressure is not likely to be expressed unless both demands and capabilities are above some threshold. A society may demand particular commodities that are unavailable domestically, but be wholly lacking in the capabilities - the capital, the credit, the commercial institutions, the shipping facilities, and so forth - required to obtain those commodities. In such a case, the demand for those commodities will not generate lateral pressure. On the other hand, a society may demand certain commodities (cotton and rubber, for example) that are unavailable domestically and have the capabilities for acquiring them. In this case, the combination of demand and capabilities will create the predisposition to reach beyond national boundaries to satisfy demands.

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Now, there are two major possibilities. The predisposition may be acted on - the desired resources are acquired - or the country may be prevented from doing so by another state. Thus, if a country demanding resources also lacks the naval or military capabilities necessary to overcome resistance by another country, the predisposition for lateral pressure will not be acted on.  

Virtually any mode in which lateral pressure is expressed - commercial activities, dispatch of troops into foreign territory, establishment of naval or military bases, acquisition of colonial territory, even missionary activities - may contribute to international conflict and violence. Obviously, however, some activities are more likely than others to lead to violence. Moreover, international differences in the extent and intensity of lateral pressure contribute substantially to international conflict.

Conceivably, a country generating many demands and possessing capabilities appropriate for pursuing activities abroad may "turn inward." It may not require any great amount of resources from beyond its borders; it may use techniques to uncover hitherto inaccessible resources or find new uses for its resources; it may locate sufficient capital investment fields at home; it may not require foreign markets for its goods; or it may exchange international competition for power, prestige, and status. It would be difficult, however, to identify modern, industrialized countries that do not manifest strong, extensive lateral pressure in some form.

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Today, as well as during the nineteenth century, business has often "gone abroad" for cheaper labour and resources, new markets and fresh opportunities for investment. As in the sixteenth century, today's foreign commerce may also be connected with a desire for national security, status, prestige, or military advantage. Lateral pressure can, therefore, be the outcome of both the public (or national) and private aims.5

National growth can generate a strong demand for greater growth and thus create ever higher demand for resources. Surpluses for such resources as labour and capital generate demands for further research and development, exploration, investment and other enterprise and growth.

The disposition towards foreign activities is not always sound economically. A nation's foreign policy may encourage foreign activities solely for national prestige. Foreign activities may be profitable only so long as the government, often at a huge cost to the taxpayer, protects trade routes and maintains a secure environment for overseas enterprises.

An industrialized country with strong military capabilities may extend its activities into (and even establish domination over) a country with a much larger population that generates comparatively higher demands, but which has a less advanced technology and lower level of industrialization. For example, although the population of India was

5 Vasquez, John, A., Classics of International Relations, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
larger than that of Britain, England enjoyed a considerable advantage over India by virtue of a difference in technological efficiency.

After the Renaissance, relatively few European countries (and, more recently, the United States and Japan) were able to extend their interests throughout the world. This expansion of interests was so widespread and long-lasting that it became institutionalized through colonies, protectorates, lease-holds, unequal alliances, client-state arrangements, and exploitative trade. Many white men thus inferred that they were innately superior, and were preordained to preside over and exploit societies with lower capability.

Although lateral pressure encompasses some of the propositions about imperialism put forward by J. A. Hobson, V. I. Lenin, and others, the two concepts are not synonymous. The demands of a capitalist economy may contribute to lateral pressure in important ways, but capitalism is not a necessary condition for lateral pressure; both pre-capitalist and socialist societies may generate lateral pressure. Similarly, although class conflict may contribute to lateral pressure, it is not a necessary condition.6

As a nation or empire extends its activities, and hence its interests, the feeling may develop among the leaders of such a state or the citizenry or both, that these "national interests" ought to be protected. National interests tend to be intensely subjective among those who define and proclaim them, so that it is often extremely difficult to predict which interests are likely to be defended by arms. The critical factor in determining the importance to a nation of an interest is not the

6 Ibid.
kind of interest, but the existence of the feeling that the interest must be defended (and then the intensity of this feeling, measured by the social costs that a nation is willing to incur in the defence of this interest).

The protection of national interests in far off places may lead to war between colonial powers and their subject populations, or to attempts at attracting, equipping, and financing local power elites benefiting from foreign control. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain, France, and Germany engaged in such activities throughout much of Africa and Asia. For example, the Afghan Wars were, to a large extent, manifestation of British and Russian expansionism in Central Asia. The history of French control in Indochina and British domination in Burma (Myanmar) and Siam (Thailand) offer other examples.

Large differences in capabilities between countries mean grossly unequal political and economic relations between them. In most cases of intensive interaction between societies, the nation with vastly greater capabilities tends to dominate the other, even when domination is not a deliberate policy. Such relations invite the domination and exploitation of the weaker country by the stronger. Differences in capabilities between major powers are likely to have a different meaning. When two or more major powers extend their respective interests outward, there is a strong probability that these interests will be opposing, and the activities of these nations may collide. These activities may be diplomatic, commercial, military, or so forth, and thus involve quite different levels of intensity. Depending upon the intensity, such conflicts of interests and activities may contribute to the outbreak of war between
strong countries, or between their client states, or both. The Fashoda Incident, the Moroccan Crisis, and the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 are examples of military confrontations resulting from conflicts of interest between major powers before World War.⁷

Collisions can lead to the withdrawal of one (or both) of the parties, an agreement between them, or continuing conflict. In general, the stronger the lateral pressure manifested by rival countries, the greater is the likelihood of the intensification of competition or conflict over territory, resources, markets, political or diplomatic influence, military or naval power, status, or prestige. Such behaviour tends to be characteristic of the international relations of powerful states and empires.

The more intense the competition becomes, the greater is the likelihood that it will lead to arms competition, crisis, or possibly armed conflict. Major wars often emerge from a two-fold process: internally generated pressures, and mutual comparison, competition, rivalry, and conflict on a number of salient dimensions. Each of these processes is closely related to the other, and each can be accounted for to a remarkable degree by the interaction among three variables: population, technology, and access to resources.

Thus, international competition and conflict are closely linked to domestic growth, with the result that a country's domestic and foreign activities are likely to be intensely interdependent just as domestic growth may contribute to a country's foreign activities, so its foreign

⁷ Ibid., pp. 258-259.
activities, in conflict with those of other countries, may generate further
domestic demands and growth.

States and empires do not stand still relative to one another in
population, technology, territory, resources, military capability, or
strategic advantage. Compared with each other, some are growing while
others are declining, and thus the condition of the international system is
perpetual change. A nation may find itself at a relative disadvantage in
the world competition for resources, markets, prestige, or strategic
superiority. In this eventuality, such a nation's leaders will look for
means of improving the nation's relative position. This may involve
increases in military or naval capabilities, or improvements in heavy
industry. One method of increasing capabilities is to secure favorable
alliances. Such bonds normally imply the pooling of some capabilities
for the maintenance of shared interests. In defence alliances, the partners
are able to complement one another's military capabilities.

Alliances are not always formed only to enhance national
capabilities. Alliances, treaties and other international compacts are
often concluded to end or moderate conflicts of interests. Although these
arrangements may ameliorate conflict yet they may also create conflict.
Whenever some compact is achieved between two nations not
previously allied, it is likely to damage relations between at least one of
the parties and any rivals, unless comparable compacts are made with
these. Under such circumstances, the alignment of one group of nations
may encourage other nations to create a competing bloc. Although
relationships improved between Britain and France after 1904 and
between Britain and Russia after 1907 as a result of alliances, none of
these three powers achieved alliance with Germany. In such a case, the amelioration of conflict among only some powers may be suspected of contributing in the long run to conflict among all the powers.

Broad alliance patterns (including distribution of capabilities within and across alliance boundaries) may define the structure of the international system. From the viewpoint of a nation's leaders, a strong or strategically placed ally may be viewed as organic to their own national power. A leading power may seek an alliance to prevent a growing power from overtaking it in some area, or a growing power may seek an alliance in order to overtake a stronger power. There is usually a price for alliances, however, since international compacts impose some constraints upon a nation's activities.

With respect to the interactions between two rival countries, the difference between them on any salient dimension like territorial acquisition, trade, armaments, prestige, etc. can be a powerful factor in motivating further competition or conflict. An increase in the political, economic or military strength and effectiveness of one nation will tend to generate new demands in the rival nation and disposition among its leaders to increase appropriate capabilities. For example, if Nation A with a higher naval budget than Nation B adds further increments, Nation B is likely to increase its naval budget. Also, if Nation B with a lower budget tries to catch up with A, then the latter is likely to add increments in an effort to maintain its advantage.

National decisions are frequently thought of as being made in direct response to some perceived threat by another nation, or as steps directed towards certain widely shared and explicit goals, such as
"survival of country." But the processes involved in policy formation and action are often exceedingly complex. National decisions, even in an authoritarian state, are usually the outcome of communications - often indirect, subtle, and difficult to trace - among the heads of states, their advisers and agents, and the citizenry. Such data as levels and rates of change in population, technology, trade, investment, and colonial expansion are in every case the accumulation and aggregation of the effects of decisions made by individual human beings acting singly, in partnership, or in small groups.

Some of the major conflicts in the world that occurred after the Second World War are discussed below:

**The Korean Crisis**

To learn about the Korean war from a historical perspective, one can start early in this century with the victory of the Japanese over Russia in the Russo-Japanese war that ended in 1905 and their domination of Manchuria and Port Arthur followed by the Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910. The Japanese occupation of Korea lasted for 35 years until Japan's defeat and surrender on 25 August 1945.\(^8\)

In 1947, the UN declared that elections should be held throughout the entire country to choose one government to unify the country. The south rejected the proposal and held its own election and established an

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independent Republic of Korea in August 1947 with Syngman Rhee as its leader.

Then on 9 September 1947, the Russians proposed a mutual withdrawal of USSR and US troops from the peninsula. While making such a peaceful gesture, flows of USSR military equipment began to enter the north, bolstered by 25,000 vet Chinese troops from the Manchurian campaign to replace the withdrawal of USSR troops.

For American leaders who were tired of their troops in Asia, and did not want another conflict on the mainland, this offer of withdrawal came as an opportunity to extract themselves from a potentially costly and strategically unimportant situation which they considered Korea to be so. Withdrawal could go ahead. This American policy towards Korea, following World War II and the occupation of Japan by the US are linked. The adding of troops, equipment and money to Korea with the occupation of Japan and the rebuilding of its economy was financially too much for Washington to handle. Therefore, it was rationalized that Korea was outside of the US line of defense in Asia. In Sept 1948, with the support of the USSR, Kim Il Sung was elected prime minister of the new People's Republic of North Korea and the withdrawal of Russian troops began.

Such a policy made the 'Korea problem' convenient to hand over to the newly formed UN in May 1948. The UN goal was to unify the country, and if that failed, support for an independent government in the south was to proceed and the US could withdraw its 30,000 troops while

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providing limited economic aid to the newly formed Republic of Korea government. As US forces withdrew, however, a US military advisory group of 500 officers and men remained to train and equip the small ROK army. It was called the Korean Military Assistance Group, or KMAG, a well-trained and equipped ROK army of 100,000 troops was KMAG's goal. Once trained, 4 ROK divisions were stationed along the 38th parallel to defend against a North Korean People's Army - the NKPA intrusion.¹⁰

The reaction to the Communist attack called for immediate US action through the newly-established UN. Cognizant of the charge that he was 'soft on Communism', President Truman had to act decisively and strongly. However, he acted cautiously and in proportion to NKPA aggression because of the possible involvement of the USSR, chief supplier and supporter to the North Koreans, that could lead to an expanded war, even a possible World War III. He set limited objectives for US intervention, that is, to drive the NKPA back beyond the 38th parallel. Carefully, he even down-played the gravity of American and UN involvement by agreeing to the term 'police action' rather than war.

As a first test of the Cold War, the Communist invasion of the South had been turned around. Exacting revenge on the North by an invasion and takeover of their country remained unanswered. Underlying all planning was the question of the Chinese and their participation and what the USSR intended to do in the changing balance of military power. Would they possibly assist the NKPA and, if so, at what point?

Within America, those opposed to further involvement, were branded as being 'soft with Communism' and failure to check such aggression would encourage similar acts in other Asian countries. With consideration of the difficulties of winter warfare in the north on the minds of allied military planners, the question of continuing to the north became more complex. Syngman Rhee had his own reason for complete defeat of the north which was the possibility that the whole country would become his to lead.\textsuperscript{11}

UN forces continued to drive north towards the Yalu which was reached in late Oct. The successes of Inchon, the recapture of Seoul and winning of Pyongyang gave military planners like MacArthur a sense of over-confidence and arrogance. As on previous occasions, MacArthur's estimations of NKPA strength were much lower than reality. Based on such information, he assured the president that the Chinese would not enter the war, that NKPA resistance would end by thanksgiving and that his troops would be home by Christmas, a promise he would live to regret. While making such promises to Truman at a meeting held on Midway Island and assuring him that 'victory was won in Korea', 300,000 Chinese Communist forces - CCF, were pouring over the Yalu river into North Korea without the knowledge of the Allies.\textsuperscript{12}

Phase three thus began, with UN forces unprepared to face the onslaught and the bloodshed that was about to overwhelm them. With the entry of the Chinese, the political equation and military scope of the war changed and expanded greatly. US policy makers at the highest levels were forced to re-think America's role and the domestic and

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 122.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 150.
international repercussions of the developments. The support of the Chinese by the USSR added a far deeper dimension to the role of the UN.\textsuperscript{13}

MacArthur was shocked and astounded by Truman's order and reacted by saying that 'thousands of American lives' would be lost with the bridges left intact. One of his famous statements was uttered: 'in war, there is no substitute for victory. We cannot fight with one hand tied behind our back.' So great was his insult that he threatened to resign but his feelings of self-importance and vanity and the belief that the Army couldn't do without him overcame such thinking. Challenging the authority of the JCS and taking his case directly to the American people, MacArthur believed that UN forces were in 'grave danger' without the bombing. His strategy was successful and Truman had to yield under political pressure and authorized the bombing of the Yalu bridges.

However, to avoid a complete withdrawal from Korea, MacArthur recommended strategies designed to expand the scope of the war with provocative actions against Red China. Perhaps it was his way to retaliate against the Chinese or distract their attention away from Korea. The recommendations were for a naval blockade of the China coast; releasing the forces of Chaing Kai-shek on Taiwan to attack the Chinese in Korea and assisting anti-Communist guerillas on the Chinese mainland to fight the Communists. Such recommendations caused a greater loss of MacArthur's credibility among the JCS and the president, and created more doubts about his ability to command and his mental state.

Phase four of the war began in January 1951, when the CCF re-occupied Seoul and drove the Allies south along with millions of half-frozen refugees who crossed the ice-covered Han River with the troops. Phase 4 turned out to be the longest phase of the war, lasting 18 months. Their retreat, however, ended about 25 miles south of the city due to UN superiority in tanks and heavy artillery. And, starting in late Feb, the Allies began to turn the tide in their favour.  

As Allied forces were fighting their way back to the 38th parallel, the debate about how far they should go and if the NKPA and CCF should be destroyed took place. MacArthur, on the other hand, continued to insist on inflicting heavy losses on the Chinese with massive infusions of men and equipment until (here was an all-out) victory over the enemy at no-matter what the cost. He felt humiliated by what his soldiers had endured ever since the CCF forces crossed the border and aggressively pushed south. No doubt, his ability as a leader could have been called into question with such attitudes.

MacArthur's supporters blamed Truman for the frustrating status of the war while forgiving the general for defying the Constitution, which he clearly did. Ultimately, in the next Presidential election, Truman was bypassed as the nominee for the Democrats in favor of Adlai Stevenson who lost to Dwight Eisenhower, the hero of World War II. In a campaign promise, the former general said that he would go to Korea and bring the war to a conclusion.

From late June 1951, a UN strategy of a 'limited offensive' was to be followed, that is, defence lines were to be held without the taking of a

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additional enemy-held territory. Despite it, Americans advanced to an area called the Iron Triangle, located just north of the 38th parallel. There they engaged in savage fighting in which 60 Marines were killed in one week alone. Unlike previous battles, very little news coverage was given to this event and subsequent fights, indicating the indifference which most Americans had towards the war.

However, later the same month, Jacob Malik, USSR Ambassador to the UN, called for a cease-fire and peace negotiations on the Korean War. Such news was welcomed by Americans and provided hope that the US could leave Korea under honourable circumstances. By July, US casualties had mounted to 69,000 troops.\(^{15}\)

The back and forth course of the war had shown very little positive results because the stalemate in which both sides were at approximately the same point where they started. Without reports of newsworthy fighting for the newspapers in America, Korea began to drop off the pages, and historians in later years began to call it 'the forgotten war' and the term is still used today.

Soon after Malik's proposal, peace talks began on 10 July 1951, in Kaesong and lasted until July 1953. The warring armies continued to fight while peace talks were in progress. The violence, however, did not lessen as the casualty count continued to build and, at the war's end, was greater during the two years of the talks than during the one year before they began.

\(^{15}\) Frankel, Joseph, International Relations in a Changing World, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
As the negotiations began, no agreement was reached on an immediate cease-fire despite the static battle lines. The fighting continued as it would for almost two years. The first Communist demand was the insistence that the UN pull back to the 38th parallel from their positions north of it. Had the UN done so, there would have been absolutely no net gain. In reality, all sides - the Russians, Chinese and Americans wanted to end the conflict but the hostility was too great to reach an agreement.\textsuperscript{16}

After nearly two months of intense negotiations and bickering over petty issues, the talks were suspended for two months. Talks resumed after the two-month delay. A new site, Panmunjom was chosen because Kaesong was no longer acceptable to General Ridgway, the head of the UN delegation. The Communists seemed to offer an end to the fighting at the existing battle line and not at the 38th parallel. Ridgway was a hardliner who personally distrusted the enemy and insisted on the existing battle line. Even though the talks resumed, the fighting continued, much of it instigated by the Chinese in a failed effort to influence American voters with a military victory and thereby turn more public opinion against the war. Their efforts, however, turned into failure at the battle of White Horse Hill when more than 10,000 Chinese soldiers were killed.

The US was charged with engaging in bacterial warfare by dropping disease carrying insects over North Korean cities resulting in thousands of deaths. Though denounced by the US as propaganda, 39 American POWs who were pilots or flight crews 'confessed' to the

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 55.
charges after being tortured and brainwashed. The charge was never proven by an independent organization such as the Red Cross.

Finally, in the spring of 1953, after the death of Joseph Stalin, there were signs of hope as the Communists became more flexible. Whether Stalin's death and the influence of the USSR was directly related to the change in attitude is not fully known. However, in April, both sides agreed to “Operation Little Switch” which was the exchange of wounded and sick PoWs on both sides, that is 6,670 Communists and 684 UN prisoners including 149 Americans.

Despite the opposition of Syngman Rhee who resisted peace of any kind with the Communists and tried to undermine the process, “Operation Little Switch” went ahead, followed by “Operation Big Switch”, the major exchange of all PoWs on both sides.\(^{17}\)

After months of negotiations, it was agreed that repatriated prisoners held by the UN were free to choose to return to Communism or be turned over to a commission composed of neutral nations. After further questioning by Communist officers to try to persuade them to remain, they were free to go to a non-Communist country.

In the Big Switch exchange, which proceeded after the signing of the cease-fire, 12,773 UN PoWs including 3,597 Americans, 7,862 ROK, 945 British, 229 Turks and 140 others were returned. For the Communists, 75,823 PoWs were returned, including 70,183 NKPA and only 5,640 Chinese. Even up to the last days of the war with the final agreement near, a major Communist offensive against ROK positions

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 122.
was undertaken, only to be driven back by a massive artillery response. Although 27 July 1953 was agreed upon for the signing of the cease-fire, fighting continued during the final hours before 10:00 am, the hour of signing.

There is much that can be said about the war. The casualty figures were enormous and very tragic: at least 2 million Korean civilians and 2.4 million casualties on both sides, which shows that 4.2 million men, women and children were killed or wounded with families destroyed. The country, north and south, was almost completely devastated.

Differing political systems, which the fighting was all about, remain essentially the same on the Korean peninsula which remains divided in two almost along the same line as it was before the war, a 151 mile long Demilitarized Line. Only a small gain of about 1,500 square mile; above the 38th parallel is now in the south's hands that wasn't theirs before the war. The added territory is hardly worth what it cost.¹⁸

**Indonesia**

After the liberation of Indonesia from Japanese troops, the Indonesian nationalists set-up a republic and declared independence. So the Dutch government launched military attack on Indonesia. The matter was brought before the Security Council by the Indian representative and a ceasefire was arranged. Both the Dutch government and Indonesia accepted good offices of the committee of Australia and Belgium. Australia on behalf of Indonesia and Belgium on behalf of the Dutch

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 209.
carried on negotiations for peace. In January 1948, an eighteen-point settlement programme was accepted but this agreement was violated by the parties and there was further clash. The Security Council called for cease-fire and established UN committee to settle the issue. The Dutch government was asked by the Security Council to recognise the Independence of Indonesia which she did on 27th December 1949.19

**Greece**

British troops were in Greece at the end of the Second World War and were supporting the conservative provisional government. The Soviet Union challenged the presence of British forces and contended that Britain was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece and the military presence of Britain was threat to peace. The matter was referred to the Security Council, which simply took notice of the views expressed. The Greek question became serious when the neighbouring countries helped the guerillas against the Greek government. The Security Council appointed a commission of investigation. On the Greek question, the UK and the United States were on one side whereas the Soviet Union was on the other side. It was observed that the Security Council could be paralyzed in the exercise of its security functions by the use of veto power. However, the Greek case could not be regarded as a triumph for the UNO but it set a precedent for increased reliance on

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the General Assembly in future disputes in case Security Council is para
ysed by exercise of veto power.20

**Issue of Merger of Trieste**

According to the Italian peace treaty after the end of the Second World War, Trieste was internationalised and the Security Council acceded responsibility for its government. In the meanwhile, Trieste was occupied by joint Anglo-American and French troops in Zone A whereas the forces of Yugoslavia had occupied the Zone B of Trieste. In 1948, the USA and the UK expressed their desire to revise the treaty and handover the territory to Italy. In 1953, an Anglo-American plan to handover Zone A to Italy was announced. Marshall Tito, the head of Yugoslavia government threatened to march into Trieste. In the meanwhile, Italy and Yugoslavia reached an amicable solution by which Italy occupied Zone ‘A’ and Yugoslavia occupied Zone ‘B’ of the disputed territory.21

**Cuban Missile Crisis**

The Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath was the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War although the crisis itself was short, it was so intense that it absorbed the entire attention of President Kennedy and his closest advisers. The Cuban missile crisis, the "sixteen days in October," ending with the Kennedy-Khrushchev "agreement" of

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October 28, 1962, has been studied extensively by scholars and has been described in a variety of published works.

According to Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, in May 1962, Soviet Union conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering the emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. He also presented the scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.22

After obtaining Fidel Castro's approval, the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba. On October 16, President John F. Kennedy was shown reconnaissance photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba. After seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States administration, during which Soviet diplomats denied that installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba, President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military weapons from arriving there. In response to the threat, the US military began a rapid mobilization for possible use against Cuba. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to Fort Stewart. In the short span of two weeks, the population of the post rose from 3,500 personnel to over 30,000.

22 Deustch Merton, The Analysis of International Relations. op. cit., p. 154.
During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other communications, both formal and "back channel." Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 indicating the deterrent nature of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long rambling letter seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it or its proxies would not invade Cuba. On October 27, another letter to Kennedy arrived from Khrushchev, suggesting that missile installations in Cuba would be dismantled if the United States dismantled its missile installations in Turkey. The American administration decided to ignore this second letter and to accept the offer outlined in the letter of October 26. Khrushchev then announced on October 28 that he would dismantle the installations and return them to the Soviet Union, expressing the trust that the United States would not invade Cuba.

Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers also be removed from Cuba, and to specify the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba. A second dangerous crisis emerged over the removal of Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba, which the United States insisted were "offensive weapons" and thus subject to the October 28 agreement. By January 1963, it was clear that no formal agreement would result.23

Vietnam War

US involvement in Vietnam began during the administration of Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), which sent US military to South Vietnam. Their numbers increased as the military position of the Saigon government became weaker. In 1957, Communist rebels -- Viet Cong -- began a campaign of terrorism in South Vietnam. They were supported by the government of North Vietnam and later by North Vietnamese troops. Their goal was to overthrow the anti-communist government in the South.

John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) decided to commit American support troops to South Vietnam. Four thousand troops were sent in 1962. After John Kennedy was murdered, Vice President Lyndon Johnson served the last fourteen months of Kennedy's term. He then was elected to his own full term. It began in January 1965. Much of his time and energy was taken up by the war in Vietnam. By early nineteen-sixty-four, America had about seventeen-thousand troops in Vietnam. The troops were there to advise and train the South Vietnamese military.

Under President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968), US intervention mushroomed both militarily and politically. Johnson asked for a resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all necessary measures" the
President might take to repel armed attacks against US forces and prevent further aggression.\textsuperscript{24}

Under the strategy developed by General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, American divisions would seek out and destroy North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (South Vietnamese Communist) formations, while air power carried the war to the North, attacking both the will of Hanoi's leaders to continue the fight and, to an increasing extent, their ability to do so. The list of targets expanded to include transportation, oil storage, and the nation's few industries. In theory, Westmoreland's strategy of search and destroy would force the Communists to expend supplies and thus make the logistics establishment in North Vietnam all the more vulnerable to bombing.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1966, more than 200,000 troops were committed to Vietnam. The United States escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543,000 troops in April 1969. American forces in Southeast Asia operated under some stringent restrictions, including being forbidden to invade enemy territory in North Vietnam and, for many years, likewise being barred from ground operations against enemy sanctuaries in bordering Laos and Cambodia. The "body count" of Vietcong killed was the centrepiece of the American approach to waging the war, conducted through search and-destroy operations in remote jungle regions. By 1966, it became increasingly clear that this strategy of attrition was not

\textsuperscript{24} Frankel, Joseph, International Relations in a Changing World
Allison, op. cit., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{25} Russett, Bruce and Haivey Stars, World Politics: The Menu for
Choice, op. cit., p. 135.
working and could not work because of the enemy's capacity to replace losses far higher than those the allies were able to inflict.

The political challenge of the war stemmed from the belief of the rural Vietnamese that the Government of Vietnam will not stay long when it comes into an area, that the Government was indifferent to the people's welfare, that the low-level officials were tools of the local rich; and that the Government was excessively corrupt from top to bottom. The American search-and-destroy military operations didn't solve these problems, and were at best irrelevant to security in rural Vietnamese villages. At worst, indiscriminate aerial attacks and artillery fire exacted a toll on village allegiance to the Saigon government.26

Concern that China might react as it had done fifteen years earlier in Korea argued powerfully for relying on air power rather than invasion to convince Hanoi to call off the war in the South. Having turned to air power, the Johnson administration chose to apply it in a gradually escalating fashion. President John F. Kennedy's earlier success in compelling the Soviet Union to withdraw bombers and ballistic missiles from Cuba bred confidence in the gradual application of force.

The individual services, for the most part, controlled their own air arms. The Army maintained control of its large helicopter fleet as organic air assets. Marines followed their traditional organizational path of assigning an Air Wing to each Marine division. The Navy maintained complete control of its air assets and Admiral Sharp, as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC), implemented the Route Pack

26 Vasquez, John, A., Classics of International Relations, op. cit., p. 320.
system for all air operations over North Vietnam. General Clay, the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander, was assigned coordinating authority for deconflicting air operations, but he felt that the existing command arrangements (route packaging and assigning the air component only to coordinating authority) did not provide a sound means to control the overall air effort.

The Route Pack system divided responsibility within North Vietnam into seven different geographic areas, with the Air Force and the Navy each receiving responsibility for portions of the route packs. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the naval component of Pacific Command (PACOM), maintained control of carrier air assets. Even within the Air Force there was no single air commander. Seventh Air Force, was responsible for Air Force air operations in Vietnam, while Thirteenth Air Force, was responsible for Thailand, and Strategic Air Command (SAC) never relinquished command or control of its B-52 bombers.

The targeting process further complicated this patchwork of responsibility. Targets were selected in Washington by a small team on the joint staff and approved only at the presidential level. The result was a major misuse of air power. Air power application came to be simply the servicing of targets, with little regard for whether or not they were the "right" targets, and without an air campaign plan. Service parochialism dominated the air effort. Lacking a single responsible air commander, a clear set of objectives, and a common concept of operations, even the most skilled operations of the separate components tended to work at cross-purposes and give respite to the enemy.
Initially, most Americans backed Washington's Vietnam policy. A dangerous situation seemed to be developing, one which the US government referred to as the "domino theory" -- if South Vietnam were allowed to fall to communism, so eventually would the rest of Southeast Asia. But as the war dragged on and a military victory appeared more and more elusive, public opposition became more vocal.

President Johnson believed that the United States had to support South Vietnam. Many other Americans agreed. They believed that without American help, South Vietnam would become communist. Then, all of Southeast Asia would become Communist, too. As Johnson's term began, his military advisers told him the Communists were losing the war. They told him that North Vietnamese troops and Viet cong forces would soon stop fighting. On February sixth, however, the Viet Cong attacked American camps at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The Johnson administration immediately ordered air attacks against military targets in the north.

In March 1965, the first American ground troops arrived in South Vietnam. Congress supported the president's actions at that time. However, the number of Americans who opposed the war began to grow. These people said the war was a civil war. They said the United States had no right, or reason, to intervene. For six days in May, the United States halted air attacks on North Vietnam. The administration hoped this would help get the North Vietnamese government to begin negotiations. The North refused. And the United States began to build

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27 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
In December 1965, the United States again halted air attacks against North Vietnam. Again, it invited the North Vietnamese government to negotiate an end to the fighting. And again, the North refused. Ho Chi Minh's conditions for peace were firm. He demanded an end to the bombing and a complete American withdrawal. Withdrawal would mean defeat for the South. It would mean that all of Vietnam would become Communist. President Johnson would not accept these terms. So he offered his own proposals. The most important was an immediate cease-fire. Neither side would compromise, however. And the fighting went on.

Johnson strongly defended the use of American soldiers in Vietnam. In a speech to a group of lawmakers, he said: "Since world war two, this nation has met and has mastered many challenges — challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba. We met them because brave men were willing to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who carry our colours in Vietnam this very hour."

On 31 January 1968, combat erupted throughout the entire country in the Tet [new year] Offensive. Thirty-six of 44 provincial capitals and 64 of 242 district towns were attacked. They even struck at the American embassy in the capital, Saigon. Once the shock and confusion wore off, most attacks were crushed in a few days. During

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those few days, however, the fighting was some of the most violent ever seen in South Vietnam. Fifty-thousand Communist soldiers were killed during the Tet offensive. Fourteen-thousand South Vietnamese soldiers were killed. And two-thousand American soldiers were killed. Thousands of Vietnamese civilians were killed, too.

On 31 March 1968, the President spoke to the American people on television. He told of his proposal to end American bombing of North Vietnam. He told of the appointment of a special ambassador to start peace negotiations. And he told of his decision about his own future: "I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office -- the presidency of your country. Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president."29

Hanoi had suffered a military defeat in the Tet Offensive, but had won a political and diplomatic victory by shifting American policy towards disengagement.

By 1969, the unsatisfactory results in Vietnam compelled U.S. leaders to reconsider their approach to the Cold War. Consequently, assumptions regarding Cold War adversaries were revised. In their own strategic innovation, Nixon and Kissinger transformed the nature of superpower relations, inaugurating detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Recognizing the United States' altered economic and strategic position, Kissinger introduced the concept of "interdependence" to explain significant

29 Ibid.
changes in American relations with the less-powerful countries of the world. Such developments led many observers to conclude that the Cold War had ended. Others believed that the change was one of form rather than substance. Some Cold War assumptions and appearances had changed, in their view, but superpower confrontation remained the basis of international affairs.

By the spring of 1972, the Vietnam War was at a low ebb. The 1968 Communist Tet Offensive had given way to a gradual winding down by mid-1969, and after the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, there was little fighting in South Vietnam. Yet, while the United States was in the process of withdrawing its forces from a war that was becoming increasingly unpopular with its citizens, the North Vietnamese were rebuilding their forces in preparation for another massive offensive in hopes of overrunning the southern half of the divided country. In April 1972, heavily armed North Vietnamese divisions crossed into the South at several points, including from out of Cambodia.

Beginning in late 1972, National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger's negotiations with North Vietnam began to move seriously towards a settlement. To build up the military of South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird initiated “Project Enhance Plus” on 20 October 1972. The Pentagon ordered rush deliveries of some $2 billion worth of military equipment including over 600 aircraft. The program gave South Vietnam the fourth largest air force in the world, with over 2,000 aircraft. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China maintained larger air forces. By this time, South Vietnam had also floated the fifth largest navy in the world.
(with 1,500 ships) and fielded the fourth largest army in the world (with 1.1 million troops).

Nixon resumed bombing of North Vietnam in response to the North Vietnamese in 1972, Easter offensive, and mined North Vietnamese ports and bombed Hanoi and Haiphong in late 1972. Such pressure was intended, at least in part, to force North Vietnam to sign an armistice. In early 1973, the United States, North and South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong signed an armistice. American military activities in Cambodia and Laos, which had continued after the cease-fire in South Vietnam went into effect, ended in 1973 when Congress cut off funds.

South Vietnam's military defeat tended to obscure the crucial inability of this massive military enterprise to compensate for Saigon's political shortcomings. Over a span of nearly two decades, a series of regimes failed to mobilize fully and effectively their nation's political, social, and economic resources to foster a popular base of support. North Vietnamese main force units ended the war, but local insurgency among the people of the South made that outcome possible and perhaps inevitable.30

The setback suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War was rooted in a failure of strategy. Indeed, perhaps no war in American history shows more clearly both the difficulties of making sound strategic judgments and the dire consequences of a lack of clear strategic vision.

The Vietnam War thus provides a cautionary tale for American political and military decision-makers about the crucial importance of thinking clearly about strategy. By incorrectly relating military strategy to national policy and by improperly understanding the nature of the conflict, the United States exhausted itself against a secondary enemy in South Vietnam. The American failure in Vietnam also stemmed from trying to fight a traditional conventional war when the conflict's nature demanded a counterinsurgency effort. Top military commanders, unable to fathom the problem, refused to implement such a strategy despite evidence of its effectiveness.

Issue of Congo

In June 1960, Belgium granted independence to Congo. But immediately after independence, a secessionist movement under Moise Tshombe was launched and as a result of this, Katanga, a rich province of Congo seceded from Congo. The Prime Minister of Congo Patrice Lumumba opposed the secessionist movement and opposed Moise Tshombe who became the self-styled head of the government of Katanga. This state of affairs triggered a civil war and there was every possibility of foreign military intervention. Congo was engulfed in throes of disorder and her Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated in cold blood. In order to bring about the unification of Congo, UN military force was sent there. A large number of Indian troops participated in the peace keeping operations of the UN military force in Congo. The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, was killed in air crash while he was flying to Ndola in North Rhodesia for peace talks in September 1961. He was succeeded by U Thant. The UN
forces had to face considerable difficulty in effecting the unification of Congo by ending the secession of Katanga. However, under the direction of U-Thant, the Secretary General, Katanga, the break-away province, was incorporated into Congo through UN military action. Tshombe became the Prime Minister of Congo subsequently. The Soviet Union accused the USA and UK of complicity in the plot to saddle Mr. Tshombe to power and refused to bear the expenses incurred on the peace keeping operations of UN military force in Congo. However, after the elapse of a short time, Mr. Tshombe was ousted and General Mobutu became the Head of government of Congo in 1966.31

Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa

In the first session of the General Assembly, India complained that the government of the Union of South Africa had enacted certain discriminatory laws to the disadvantage of the people of Indian origin there. For example, Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act of 1946 placed the people of Indian origin in a disadvantageous position. India requested the General Assembly to recommend that the government of South Africa should abandon the policy of apartheid and enact legislation in conformity with the principles of UN Charter. South Africa contended that the matter lay within her domestic jurisdiction. This view was rejected by the Assembly which called upon the parties to settle the matter peacefully. But the disputants failed to reach an agreement. On May 14, 1949, the General Assembly asked India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to hold a round table conference and explore the ways and means to settle the issue. But the differences

continued to persist. The parliament of South Africa passed yet another stringent measure known as Group Areas Act. The sixth session of the General Assembly provided for the establishment of Commission to help the disputants in solving the long standing controversy. The Assembly also called on the South African government to suspend the implementation of the Group Areas Act since it was based on the doctrine of racial discrimination. The seventh session of the UN General Assembly commenced in 1952 and it set up UN Good Offices Commission to arrange negotiations between India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa but the Commission did not succeed in its mission because the South African government insisted that the Commission had no jurisdiction in the matter. In June 1955, the UN Secretary General designated ambassador Louis de Faro of Brazil to assist the parties. India and Pakistan agreed to co-operate but the South African Government declined to collaborate. In December 1955 and again in November 1956, the General Assembly appealed to the parties to negotiate but the Union of South Africa refused to respond to the appeal. The Assembly recommended later the economic and trade boycott of South Africa. Unfortunately Britain and the United States had adopted partisan approach to question of imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions on the racist white regime of South Africa which had the audacity to flout the world public opinion. However, the UNO had also failed to force South Africa to dismantle the edifice of apartheid because of continued support of the Western Powers to the White regime there.\footnote{Deustch Merton, The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., p. 78.}
Civil War in Cyprus

Cyprus is an Island republic in eastern Mediterranean with a population of about 6 lakhs including 77% Greeks and 18% Turks. The trouble started in Cyprus with the demand raised by Greek Cypriots for union with Greece. The Arab nationals were opposed to this plan and so both the communities clashed in 1965. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon all the states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The situation in Cyprus deteriorated again in November 1967. Ultimately, three peace makers representing the USA, the UNO and NATO brought about an agreement in Cyprus. This agreement provided for withdrawal of Greek and Turkish expeditionary forces from Cyprus, UN guarantee of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and disarmament of all armed forces in Cyprus except for a 5000 strong police force. On July 16, 1974, President Makarios of Cyprus fled when a coup was staged against him. Turkey then intervened in favour of the Turkish Cypriots and landed her troops in Cyprus. The UN General Assembly adopted resolution asking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. UN emergency force was stationed in Cyprus and Indian military officers participated in peace keeping operations there. President Makarios was able to regain his authority and refugees returned to their homes. In 1977, the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots had agreed to set up a federation in Cyprus.33

Arab-Israel Wars

During the First Arab-Israeli War (1948-49), an Egyptian invasion force of 7,000 men crossed the Palestinian border at Rafah on the Mediterranean coast and at Al Awja (Nizzana) farther inland. They soon reached Ashdod, less than thirty-five kilometers from Tel Aviv. But by the time the first truce ended in mid-July, the Israelis had reinforced their positions, beating off Egyptian attacks and recovering territory to protect Jewish settlements in the Negev. By the fall of 1948, the Israelis put Egypt's 18,000 troops deployed in Palestine on the defensive and penetrated the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt and Israel concluded an armistice under United Nations (UN) auspices at the end of 1948 and later agreed on a cease-fire line that generally followed the pre-war boundary between Palestine and Sinai.\(^{34}\)

After President Gamal Abdul Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal in July 1956, the British, French, and Israelis began coordinating an invasion which triggered the Second Arab-Israel War. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis struck across Sinai towards the canal and southward towards Sharm-al-Shaykh to relieve the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. At the crossroads of Abu Uwayqilah, thirty kilometers from the Israeli border, and at the Mitla Pass, Egyptian troops resisted fiercely, repelling several attacks by larger Israeli forces. British and French forces bombed Egyptian air bases, causing Nasser to withdraw Egyptian troops from Sinai to protect the canal. At the heavily fortified complex of Rafah in the northwestern corner of Sinai and at other

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points, the Egyptians carried out effective delaying actions before retreating. Egypt vigorously defended Sharm-al-Shaykh in the extreme south until two advancing Israeli columns took control of the area. At Port Said (Bur Said), at the north end of the canal, Egyptian soldiers battled the initial British and French airborne assault, but resistance quickly collapsed when allied forces landed on the beach with support from heavy naval gunfire.35

In the eleven years leading up to the Third Arab-Israel War in June 1967 (also known as the Six-Day War), the military had been intensively trained for combat and outfitted with new Soviet weapons and equipment. Despite these preparations, the war proved to be a debacle for Egypt.

On February 4, 1971, Sadat announced a new peace initiative that contained a significant concession: he was willing to accept an interim agreement with Israel in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. A timetable would then be set for Israel's withdrawal from the rest of the occupied territories in accordance with UN Resolution 242. Egypt would reopen the canal, restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which had been broken after the June 1967 War, and sign a peace agreement with Israel through Jarring. Sadat's initiative fell on deaf ears in Tel Aviv and in Washington, which was not disposed to assisting the Soviet Union's major client in the region. Disillusioned by Israel's failure to respond to his initiative, Sadat rejected the Rogers Plan and the cease-fire.

35 Ibid.
In May 1972, President Nixon met Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev, and Sadat was convinced that the two superpowers would try to prevent a new war in the Middle East and that a position of stalemate—no peace, no war—had been reached. For Sadat, this position was intolerable. The June 1967 War had been a humiliating defeat for the Arabs. Without a military victory, any Arab leader who agreed to negotiate directly with Israel would do so from a position of extreme weakness. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union were urging restraint and caution. However, the United States refused to put pressure on Israel to make concessions, and the Soviet Union, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the June 1967 War, had no influence over Israel.36

On October 17th, Arab oil producers announced a program of reprisals against the Western backers of Israel: a 5 percent cutback in output, followed by further such reductions every month until Israel had withdrawn from all the occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinians had been restored. The next day, President Nixon formally asked Congress for US $2.2 billion in emergency funds to finance the massive airlift of arms to Israel that was already under way. The following day, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia decreed an immediate 10 percent cutback in Saudi oil and, five days after that, the complete suspension of oil shipments to the United States.

Israel was shocked and unprepared for the war. After the initial confusion and near panic in Israel followed by the infusion of United States weaponry, Israel was able to counterattack and succeeded in

crossing to the west bank of the canal and surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. With the Third Army surrounded, Sadat appealed to the Soviet Union for help. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin believed he had obtained the American acceptance of a cease-fire through Henry Kissinger, (United States Secretary of State). On October 22, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire by all parties within twelve hours in the positions they occupied. Egypt accepted the cease-fire, but Israel, alleging Egyptian violations of the cease-fire, completed the encirclement of the Third Army to the east of the canal. By nightfall on October 23, the road to Suez, the Third Army's only supply line, was in Israeli hands, cutting off two divisions and 45,000 men.37

The Soviet Union was furious, believing it had been double crossed by the United States. On October 24, the Soviet ambassador handed Kissinger a note from Brezhnev threatening that if the United States was not prepared to join in sending forces to impose the cease-fire, the Soviet Union would act alone. The United States took the threat very seriously and responded by ordering a grade-three nuclear alert, the first of its kind since President John F. Kennedy's order during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The threat came to naught, however, because a UN emergency force arrived in the battle zone to police the ceasefire.

Meanwhile, Syria felt betrayed by Egypt because Sadat did not inform his ally of his decision to accept the cease-fire. Two days after

Sadat had accepted the ceasefire, President Hafiz al Assad of Syria also accepted the cease-fire.

Neither side had won a clear-cut victory but, for the Egyptians, it was a victory nonetheless. The Arabs had taken the initiative in attacking the Israelis and had shown that Israel was not invincible. The stinging defeats of 1948, 1956, and 1967 seemed to have been avenged.

In Egypt, the casualties included about 8,000 killed. The effect of the war on the morale of the Egyptian population, however, was immense. Sadat's prestige grew tremendously. The war, along with the political moves Sadat had made previously, meant that he was totally in control and able to implement the programmes he wanted. He was the hero of the day.

Negotiations towards a permanent cease-fire began in December 1973. In January 1974, Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel. On January 18, the first disengagement agreement was signed separately by Sadat and Golda Meir. A second disengagement agreement was signed on September 1, 1975. The agreement provided for a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and limited the number of troops and kinds of weapons Egypt could have on the eastern side of the canal. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Abu Rudays oil fields in Western Sinai, which produced small but important revenue for Egypt. Egypt also agreed not to use force to achieve its aims, a concession that in effect made Egypt a non-belligerent nation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the price for its agreement, Israel extracted important concessions from the United States. Kissinger's secret promises to Israel included meeting Israel's military needs in any emergency, preserving Israel's
arms superiority by providing the most advanced and sophisticated weaponry, and pledging not to recognize or to negotiate with the PLO.38

On June 5, 1975, the Suez Canal was reopened. This was a great moment for Sadat, not only politically but economically, because the canal provided Egypt with considerable revenues.

The stark defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war gave new popularity to Palestinian resistance groups organised among the Palestinian refugee community. These groups took control of the Palestine Liberation Organization, formed in 1964 by the Arab states. Yasser Arafat, head of the Fateh group, became the Chairman of the PLO. The PLO became the institutional vehicle for attracting and directing the national aspirations of the Palestinians, and quickly established itself as the central force in the Palestinian Diaspora. The Summit of Arab Heads of State in Rabat in October 1974 recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The United Nations General Assembly bolstered his status by inviting Arafat to give a speech before it on 13 November 1974; the same General Assembly session admitted the PLO as an observer at the UN and its specialised agencies.

Until the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in 1990, Arab, European and American leaders introduced various initiatives for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although none of these achieved a breakthrough, many of their suggestions served as the basis for the

Middle East Peace Conference that was convened on 30 October 1991 in Madrid.

At the end of the Madrid Peace Conference, the delegations from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the joint Palestinian Jordanian delegation agreed to hold rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, which began in late November and December 1991. Secret Palestinian-Israeli talks also commenced on 20 January 1993 in Norway. On 9-10 September, Chairman Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and on 13 September, the two leaders signed the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington, D.C. The Declaration of Principles introduced significant changes in the governance of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under that agreement, the parties agreed to Israeli military withdrawal from portions of Palestine, where control was to be assumed by the Palestinian Authority (an entity distinct from the PLO). These arrangements were to endure for a five-year interim period, during which the parties were to negotiate and implement a permanent status agreement. Issues deferred to the permanent status negotiations are borders, security arrangements, water, Jerusalem, refugees, relations and cooperation with neighbors and settlements.39

Israel's first military withdrawal, beginning in April 1994, ceded control over the West Bank town of Jericho and approximately two-thirds of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. Under the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995, the Israeli

army re-deployed from all the large Palestinian towns in the West Bank (except Hebron) as well as from other smaller towns and villages. The Interim Agreement created three categories of areas in the West Bank: Area A, where the Palestinian Authority had authority for public order and internal security; Area B, where the Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for public order for Palestinians while Israel ensured internal security; and Areas C, where Israel maintained exclusive control. Israel also maintained exclusive control over borders, external security, Jerusalem and settlements.

Under the Interim Agreement, Israeli military forces were to carry out three further redeployments from all areas of the West Bank other than specified military locations, Jerusalem and settlements. These were to be completed by July 1997, although by January 2000, Israel had not completed its second redeployment.

On January 20, 1996, Palestinians of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip elected an 88-member Palestinian Legislative Council as well as the President of its Executive Authority. Following Israel's opening of a tunnel under the Sharm-al-Sharif, the holiest Islamic site in Palestine, demonstrations and armed clashes broke out over a four-day period leaving 62 Palestinians and 14 Israelis dead and 1,600 Palestinians and 50 Israelis wounded. Despite the tense relations that prevailed during the government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the two sides initialed the Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997 which provided for Israeli redeployment from 80% of Hebron, while Israel maintained control over the portions of the city in which Jewish settlers lived.
Palestinian-Israeli relations were also negatively affected by Israel's rapid expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in Palestinian occupied territories, which occurred in the face of Palestinian and international condemnation. In February 1997, the government of Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, announced its intention to construct a Jewish settlement on Jabal Abu Ghneim, south of Jerusalem. This settlement, which reinforced the ring of Jewish settlements around East Jerusalem, prompted fierce confrontations between protesters and Israeli troops on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, an angry reaction from the Palestinian Authority and a several months-long breakdown in peace negotiations. This hiatus ended with the signing of the Wye River Memorandum on 23 Oct. 1998, which provided for the implementation of the second phase of further redeployment from the West Bank and for heightened security-related obligations on the part of the Palestinian Authority.40

The Netanyahu government, which signed the Wye River Memorandum with great reluctance, quickly bowed to internal political pressures and declared Israel's refusal to implement the Wye River Memorandum, plunging Palestinian-Israeli relations into a new state of crisis. Netanyahu's defeat by Ehud Barak in Israel's May 1999 elections led to improve relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel signed the Sharm-EI-Sheik Memorandum on September 4, 1999 which established a timeline for the implementation of outstanding commitments of existing Palestinian-Israeli agreements, including further redeployments, prisoner releases,

the construction of the Gaza Sea Port and the opening of West Bank-Gaza Strip safe passage corridors. Israel conducted two phases of further redeployments from 7% and 3% of the West Bank in September 1999 and January 2000, respectively, in accordance with the obligations of the Sharm-EI-Sheik Memorandum. At the end of the latter redeployment, 11.3% of the total area of the West Bank was comprised of Area A and 25.6% of the West Bank comprised Area B, while the rest (63.1%) remained under exclusive Israeli control.

The permanent status negotiations formally started in May 1996, although serious discussions commenced only in earnest in November 1999. As of January 2003, no concrete progress had been made in the negotiations. Meanwhile, several issues still plague relations between Palestine and Israel, including continued Israeli settlement activity, the presence of hundreds of Palestinians in Israeli jails and Israel's Judaization policy in Jerusalem.

Afghanistan War

More than two decades after its commencement and over a decade after its cessation, the Soviet-Afghan War remains an enigma in the West. Earlier, successful Soviet military interventions in the Ukraine (1945-1951), East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) and intermittent Soviet military pressure on Poland demonstrated that the stark military power of the Soviet state was an irresistible tool of Soviet political power. The West was thankful that nuclear deterrence maintained the Cold War balance and reluctantly
accepted Soviet intervention within its socialist commonwealth and in the Soviet border regions as one cost of that balance.\footnote{Deutsch Merton, The Analysis of International Relations, op. cit., pp. 184-185.}

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a repeat of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. For months after the invasion, hardly a political or military expert in the world doubted that Afghanistan was now forever incorporated as a part of the Soviet Empire and that nothing short of a large-scale global war could alter the status quo.

And global war was most unlikely as both super powers intended to avoid it. Some Westerners recalled the British experiences in Afghanistan and waited for a Soviet "Vietnam" to emerge, but most Westerners believed that the Soviets would ultimately prevail. Some even projected their European fears to southern Asia and envisioned a bold Soviet strategic thrust from southern Afghanistan to the shores of the Persian Gulf, to challenge Western strategic interests and disrupt Western access to critical Middle Eastern oil.

The initial active resistance by the Afghan military was confined to a short battle against the Soviet Spetsnaz unit storming the Presidential Palace. However, the stunned citizens of this geographically isolated land immediately rose to defend their land. In defiance of the wisdom of conventional warfare, the citizens armed themselves, gathered into loose formations and began to attack and sabotage the superior occupying force's personnel, installations, depots and transport with any available weapons (to include flintlock muskets).
Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion, (on the night of 23 February 1980) almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice "God is Great". This open defiance of the Russian generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside. The Afghan warrior society sent thousands of warriors against their northern invader.

Communist power was established in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978 through a bloody military coup. President Nur M. Taraki, the new president, announced sweeping programmes of land distribution, emancipation of women and the destruction of the old Afghanistan social structure. The new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly new government was immediately challenged by Armed resistance fighters. The Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began to disintegrate as bloody purges swept the officer ranks. In March 1979, the city of Herat rose in open revolt. Most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki advanced and occupied the city while the Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Over 5,000 people died in the fighting, including some 100 Soviet citizens. This event may have led the Soviet General Staff to start intervention planning. Soldiers, units and entire brigades deserted due to the resistance and by the end of 1979, the Afghan Army had fallen from about 90,000 to about 40,000. Over half the officer corps were purged, executed or had deserted. In September 1979, Taraki's Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, seized power and executed Taraki. Amin's rule was no better and the Soviet
Union watched this new communist state spin out of control and out of Moscow's orbit. The Soviet Politburo moved to stabilize the situation.

The Soviet Union had significant experience with stability operations to maintain its socialist empire. Their experiences in subjugating the Hungarian revolution of 1956 (where they suffered 669 killed, 51 missing and 1540 wounded) led to improved methods and techniques. In the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Army lost a total of 96 killed. The elements of their invasion plan included the establishment of an in-country Soviet military and KGB element to assist the invasion force and the production of a cover or deception operation to divert attention away from the future invasion. A General Staff group would tour the country in advance of the invasion, under some pretence, in order to assess and fine-tune invasion plans.42

When the invasion began, the in-country Soviet military and KGB element would disarm or disable the national military forces. Airborne add Spetsnaz forces would spearhead the invasion and seize major airfields, transportation choke points the capital city, key government buildings, and Communications facilities. They would seize or execute the key government leaders. Soviet ground forces would cross into the country, seize the major cities and road networks, suppress any local military resistance, and occupy the key population centres. A new government would then be installed, supported by the armed might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed

42 Ibid.
Forces. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksly A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. General Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G. Pavlovski, CINC Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 officers on a several weeks long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan. General Pavlovski had commanded the invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The invasion of Afghanistan was launched on Christmas eve, not a major Muslim holiday, but a time when the Western governments were not prepared to react. Soviet advisers disabled equipment, blocked arms rooms and prevented a coordinated Afghan military response. Soviet airborne and Spetsnaz forces seized the Salang tunnel, key airfields, and key government and communications sites in Kabul. Soviet Spetsnaz soldiers killed President Amin. The Soviet ground invasion force crossed into the country, fought with a few pockets of Afghan military resistance and occupied the main cities while the Soviet government installed their Afghan puppet regime.

The Soviets expected the resistance to end here, but it had only begun. The ability to rationalize an intolerable situation that pervades the West did not hold in the mountains of Afghanistan. The Afghans' values, faith and love of freedom enabled them to hold out against a superpower, even though they suffered tremendous casualties in doing so.
The Afghan war was fought under four General Secretaries Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov and Gorbachev. Many senior Soviet military officers want to blame the Afghanistan debacle solely on the Soviet political leadership, yet there were high ranking military accomplices who carried out Politburo directives without protest. And, although many in the West view Gorbachev as a liberal democrat and point out that he ordered the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the bloodiest years of fighting in Afghanistan (1985-1986) were though under his leadership.

Ideologically, the Soviet leadership was unable to come to grips with war in Afghanistan. Marxist-Leninist dogma did not allow for a "war of national liberation" where people would fight against a Marxist regime. So, initially the press carried pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphanages—and did not mention that they were also engaged in combat and filling those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press had only reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that time, the 40th Army had suffered 6,262 dead and 9,880 combat wounded. Soviet solutions for Afghanistan were postponed, as one general secretary after another weakened and died and the military waited for a healthy general secretary who could make a decision. It was only during the last three years of the war, under Gorbachev's glasnost policy, that the press began to report more accurately on the Afghanistan war.

The Afghanistan War forced the 40th Army to change tactics, equipment, training and force structure. However, despite these changes, the Soviet Army never had enough forces in Afghanistan to win.
Initially, the Soviets had underestimated the strength of their enemy. Logistically, they were hard-pressed to maintain a larger force and, even if they could have tripled the size of their force, they probably would still have been unable to win. Often, they could not assemble an entire regiment for combat and had to cobble together forces from various units to create a make-shift regiment. Base-camp, airfield, city and lines of communication (LOC), security tied up most of the motorized rifle forces, but still, the mujahideen constantly interdicted the road and pipelines supplying the Soviet and Afghan forces. The Soviets were never able to completely control their LOCs, although their forces were performing an important international mission. Consequently, they were never able to consistently transport sufficient supplies into the country to support a larger force.43

Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of West Asian history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fueled by twentieth-century border disputes. Many observers, however, believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense of vulnerability.

Saddam Hussain, despite having made significant strides forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership

would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geostrategic vulnerabilities--Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, for example. In this respect, Saddam Hussain's decision to invade Iran has historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged in frequent battles with the peoples of the highlands.

The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and schisms, border disputes, and political differences contributing to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries-old Sunni-versus-Shia and Arab-versus-Persian religious and ethnic disputes, to a personal animosity between Saddam, Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the war in an effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state.44

Iraq and Iran had engaged in border clashes for years and had revived the dormant Shatt-al-Arab waterway dispute in 1979. Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to Iranian shore as its territory, while Iran insisted that the thalwega line running down the middle of the waterway--negotiated last in 1975, was the official border. The Iraqis, especially the Baath leadership, regarded the 1975 treaty as merely a truce, not a definitive settlement.

The Iraqis also perceived revolutionary Iran's Islamic agenda as threatening to their pan-Arabism. Khomeini, bitter over his expulsion from Iraq in 1977 after fifteen years in An Najaf, vowed to avenge Shia victims of Baathist repression. Baghdad became more confident,

however, as it watched the once invincible Imperial Iranian Army disintegrate, as most of its highest ranking officers were executed. In Khuzestan (Arabistan to the Iraqis), Iraq intelligence officers incited riots over labour disputes, and in the Kurdish region, a new rebellion caused the Khomeini government severe troubles.

The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in relations occurred during the spring of 1980. In April that year, the Iranian-supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack on Tariq Aziz, Ad Dawah was suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of Culture and Information, Latif Nayyif Jasim. In response, the Iraqis immediately rounded up members and supporters of Ad Dawah and deported to Iran thousands of Shias of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the executions of presumed Ad Dawah leader Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Baqr-al-Sadr and his sister.

In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector near Qasr-e-Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. A few weeks later, Saddam Hussein officially abrogated the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced that the Shatt-al-Arab was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action and hostilities escalated as the two sides exchanged bombing raids deep into each other's territory, beginning what was to be a protracted and extremely costly war.

Baghdad originally planned a quick victory over Tehran. Saddam expected the invasion of the Arabic-speaking area of Khuzistan to result
in an Arab uprising against Khomeini's fundamentalist Islamic regime. This revolt did not materialize, however, and the Arab minority remained loyal to Tehran. On September 22, 1980, formations of Iraqi MiG-23s and MiG-21s attacked Iran's air bases at Mehrabad and Doshen-Tappen (both near Tehran), as well as Tabriz, Bakhtaran, Ahvaz, Dezful, Urmia (sometimes cited as Urumiyeh), Hamadan, Sanandaj, and Abadan. Their aim was to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground—a lesson learned from the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War. They succeeded in destroying runways and fuel and ammunition depots, but much of Iran's aircraft inventory was left intact.43

Iran's resistance at the outset of the Iraqi invasion was unexpectedly strong, but it was neither well organized nor equally successful on all fronts. Iraq easily advanced in the northern and central sections and crushed the Pasdaran's scattered resistance there. Iraqi troops, however, faced untiring resistance in Khuzestan. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq may have thought that the approximately 3 million Arabs of Khuzestan would join the Iraqis against Tehran. Instead, many allied with Iran's regular and irregular armed forces and fought in the battles at Dezful, Khorramshahr, and Abadan. Soon after capturing Khorramshahr, the Iraqi troops lost their initiative and began to dig in along their line of advance.

Tehran rejected a settlement offer and held the line against the militarily superior Iraqi force. It refused to accept defeat, and slowly began a series of counter-Offensives in January 1981. Both the volunteers and the regular armed forces were eager to fight, the latter

45 ibid.
seeing an opportunity to regain prestige lost because of their association with the shah’s regime.

In July 1982, Iran launched “Operation Ramadan” on Iraqi territory, near Basra. Although Basra was within range of Iranian artillery, the clergy used "human-wave" attacks by the Pasdaran and Basij against the city's defences, apparently waiting for a coup to topple Saddam Hussein. Tehran used Pasdaran forces and Basij volunteers in one of the biggest land battles since 1945. Ranging in age from only nine to more than fifty, these eager but relatively untrained soldiers swept over minefields and fortifications to clear safe paths for the tanks. All such assaults faced Iraqi artillery fire and received heavy casualties. The Iranians sustained an immense number of casualties, but they enabled Iran to recover some territory before the Iraqis could repulse the bulk of the invading forces.

By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet materiel, and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly acquired T-55 tanks and T-62 tanks, BM-21 Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to prepare Soviet-type three-line defense, replete with obstacles, minefields, and fortified positions. The Combat Engineer Corps proved efficient in constructing bridges across water obstacles, in laying minefields, and in preparing new defence lines and fortifications.

Throughout 1983, both sides demonstrated their ability to absorb and to inflict severe losses. Iraq, in particular, proved adroit at constructing defensive strong points and flooding lowland means to stymie the Iranian thrusts, hampering the advance of mechanized units.
Both sides also experienced difficulties in effectively utilizing their armour. Rather than maneuver their armour, they tended to dig in tanks and use them as artillery pieces. Beginning in 1984, Baghdad's military goal changed from controlling Iranian territory to denying Tehran any major gain inside Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq tried to force Iran to the negotiating table by various means. First, President Saddam Hussein sought to increase the war's manpower and economic cost to frail. For this purpose, Iraq purchased new weapons, mainly from the Soviet Union and France. Iraq also completed the construction of what came to be known as "killing zones" (which consisted primarily of artificially flooded areas near Basra) to stop Iranian units.

Late, in March 1986, the UN secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar, formally accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iran. Citing the report of four chemical warfare experts whom the UN had sent to Iran in February and March 1986, the Secretary General called on Baghdad to end its violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons.

On 08 January 1987, Operation Karbala Five began, with Iranian units pushing westward between Fish Lake and the Shatt-al-Arab. In late May 1987, just when the war seemed to have reached a complete stalemate on the southern front, reports from Iran indicated that the conflict was intensifying on Iraq's northern front. This assault, 'Operation Karbala Ten', was a joint effort by Iranian units and Iraqi Kurdish rebels. They surrounded the garrison at Mawat, endangering Iraq's oil fields near Kirkuk and the northern oil pipeline to Turkey.
Ironically, Washington used the Stark incident to blame Iran for escalating the war and sent its own ships to the Gulf to escort eleven Kuwaiti tankers that were "reflagged" with the American flag and had American crews. Iran refrained from attacking the United States naval force directly, but it used various forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run attacks by small patrol boats, and periodic stop-and-search operations. On several occasions, Tehran fired its Chinese-made Silkworm missiles on Kuwait from Al Faw Peninsula. When Iranian forces hit the reflagged tanker ‘Sea Isle City’ in October 1987, Washington retaliated by destroying an oil platform in the Rostam field and by using the United States Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) commandos to blow up a second one nearby.

Within a few weeks of the Stark incident, Iraq resumed its raids on tankers but moved its attacks farther south, near the Strait of Hormuz. Washington played a central role in framing UN Security Council Resolution 598 on the Gulf war, passed unanimously on July 20; Western attempts to isolate Iran were frustrated, however, when Tehran rejected the resolution because it did not meet its requirement that Iraq should be punished for initiating the conflict.

In early 1988, the Gulf was a crowded theater of operations. At least ten Western navies and eight regional navies were patrolling the area, the site of weekly incidents in which merchant vessels were crippled. The Arab Ship Repair Yard in Bahrain and its counterpart in Dubayy, United Arab Emirates (UAE), were unable to keep up with the repairs needed by the ships damaged in these attacks.
In response to Iranian missile attacks against Baghdad, some 190 missiles were fired by the Iraqis over a six week period at Iranian cities in 1988, during the 'War of the Cities'. The Iraqi missile attacks caused little destruction, but each warhead had a psychological and political impact -- boosting Iraqi morale while causing almost 30 percent of Tehran's population to flee the city. In the fall of 1988, the Iraqis displayed in Baghdad captured Iranian weapons amounting to more than three-quarters of the Iranian armour inventory and almost half of its artillery pieces and armoured personnel carriers.⁴⁶

The Iran-Iraq war lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980 until August of 1988. It ended when Iran accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to a 20 August 1988 cease-fire.

**Bosnia Crisis**

The Bosnian crisis was a major challenge for both the European Union and the United Nations. Tensions built up slowly before and during the year of revolution in Yugoslavia in 1989. Old issues such as federalism had no more been resolved in socialist than in royal Yugoslavia; there were North-South tensions based on cultural and economic factors, and the overall economy was stagnant.

The death of President Tito in 1980 emphasized the departure from leadership of a generation united by the Partisan effort in World War II, leaders who believed in the benefits of unified socialist

endeavor, and preferred it to regional rivalry and ethnic competition. By the 1980s, Communist leadership was subject to question, opening the way for alternative political and economic forms.

Yugoslavia's awkward constitutional arrangements were one factor leading to trouble. As a concession to critics of the Serbian centralism of the 1930s, post-1945 Yugoslavia had six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro) in a federal relationship, plus two autonomous regions within Serbia (each of them intended to safeguard minority rights, for Albanians in Kosovo, and Hungarians in Vojvodina).47

In the face of small-scale dissent and criticism in 1966, Yugoslavia reached a turning point: the regime had to decide to what extent it would suppress or tolerate its opponents. Tito opted for grudging toleration of dissent, but anti-regime critics failed to adopt that same toleration for themselves, as they played up inter-ethnic suspicion and jealousy. Efforts to accommodate federal and regional interests by changes in the constitution also backfired. Through a series of constitutional amendments in 1974, the six republics and two autonomous regions gained important powers to veto legislation. Prior to his death, President Tito also instituted a system by which the office of president was intended to rotate in turn among representatives of each of the regions. These steps had the effect of granting powerful political authority to regional political figures, and weakening the centre of the federal political system.

47 Chabra, H. K., Relations of Nations, op. cit., p. 74.
In Croatia, the period after 1966 saw revived discussion of Croatian nationalism. This movement began among students, but by 1971 figures inside the Communist Party were circulating proposals for the secession of Croatia. At this point, Tito stepped in: offending organizations were suppressed and several people went to jail.

Tensions were particularly strong in Kosovo, an autonomous region with mythic importance for Serbs but a majority Albanian population. In 1981, protests about bad conditions at the Albanian University in Kosovo led to a brutal crackdown against ethnic Albanians by the Serbian-led police.

Situations of this kind fueled Serbian radicalism among intellectuals. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences wrote a memorandum that strongly criticized Tito and the Communist state for anti-Serb policies, noting that 30 years of Communism had left Serbia poorer than the north. The report also condemned "genocidal" anti-Serb policies in Kosovo, where the 10 percent Serb minority was said to be oppressed by the Albanian majority. The Academy offered the idea of a Serb state as a solution. The idea of a Serb state was adopted soon by Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic was a product of the Yugoslav Communist system: a party official, trained in the law, head of a large state owned gas company. When the period of "revolution" came in 1985, Milosevic took advantage of it to rename the Serbian Communist Party and convert it into a nationalist organization. At the same time, his use of state power prevented real alternative forces from becoming viable options in Serbia. His centralist and pro-Serb agenda also persuaded reformers in Slovenia and Croatia that it would be dangerous to remain part of a Yugoslav state that might be dominated by Milosevic.
and a Serb majority. This was the position at the beginning of 1990, with new leadership in place across Yugoslavia, and the country beginning to slide into disunity and war.

After the revolutions of 1989 swept Eastern Europe, a sense of new possibility entered Yugoslav political life. All elements felt confident that they could throw off unwanted features of Communism, but the definition of what was to be lost varied from place to place.

In January 1990, the League of Communists (the Yugoslav Communist Party) split along ethnic lines, and ceased to be a unifying national force. In that same month, violent riots in Kosovo reached new levels, with several dozen people killed. The JNA (the Serb-officered Yugoslav National Army) intervened to restore order. Because this episode led to fears that the JNA would become a tool of Serbian interests, the effect was to move the other nationalities farther toward secession.

In the spring of 1990, Slovenes and Croats took concrete steps towards setting up new forms of political power. In April, there were free elections in the two northern provinces. In Slovenia, a Centre-Right coalition won and began work on a new constitution that claimed the right to secede from the federal state. In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union, a conservative nationalist party, took the largest share of seats in the April election. In Serbia, on the other hand, the results of a June 1990 referendum favoured keeping a single-party state and curbing ethnic autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the very policies that were fueling Slovene and Croat efforts to distance themselves from Serbia.
In August 1990, minority Serbs in the Serb-majority Krajina district of Croatia (a "frontier" area on the border with Bosnia) began to agitate for autonomy. They argued that if Croatia could leave Yugoslavia, they, in turn, could also leave Croatia. To prevent Croatian interference in a planned referendum, local Serb militias made up of trained army reservists set up roadblocks to isolate the Krajina region. In Serbia, Milosevic announced that if Yugoslavia broke apart, there would have to be border changes that would unite all ethnic Serbs in a single political entity. Serbia cracked down on Albanian agitation.

Such steps alarmed Slovenes and Croats, and propelled them towards independence. The two republics organized local militia and armed their police, despite warnings from the JNA and anxiety among Croatia's Serbs, who recalled the use of local police by the Ustashe to round up Serbs in 1941. In March 1991, in Croatia entity proclaimed itself an autonomous Krajina, which was recognized by Milosevic. In clashes over control of local police stations, people were killed in that area.

In May 1991, a Croat was due to become the new Yugoslav President under the scheme of rotation, but Serbia refused to accept the change. This act set aside the last chance for a solution through constitutional means. In June, both Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. Debates over the "legality" of such moves played out against a background in which all sides chose to ignore inconvenient parts of the old constitution.

To frustrate Slovene independence, the JNA seized the customs posts on the borders of Slovenia. After fighting between Slovene militia
and the JNA, there was a stalemate. JNA units were blockaded in their barracks, too powerful for the Slovene forces to attack, but without access to the gasoline they needed to move. Perhaps because there were so few Serbs in Slovenia, Serbia conducted a policy towards that state that was very different from that adopted towards Croatia. Under a negotiated settlement, the JNA units (consisting by now of Serbs alone) withdrew and allowed the Slovenes to secede. In Croatia, the war escalated instead. Fighting began with guerilla warfare in Krajina between the new Croatian armed forces, local Serb militia, and elements of the JNA stationed there.

In early March 1992, a majority of Bosnians voted for independence in a plebiscite, but split along ethnic lines, with many Serbs opposing such a step. Immediately after the voting, Serbian local militia set up roadblocks that isolated Bosnia's major cities from surrounding, Serbian-dominated rural areas. Many Serbs left cities like Sarajevo, and a Bosnian Serb parliament was set up.

In April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began a methodical effort to seize control of as much territory as possible, especially in the eastern part of Bosnia, as a step towards a possible union with Serbia. Self-proclaimed "Chetnik" gangs-that included criminal elements, backed by JNA units, used terror tactics to drive Muslim villagers out of their villages, so that many arrived as refugees in larger cities like Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Sarajevo. Serb units seized roads and began a siege of Sarajevo, shelling the city and using snipers to kill civilians.

The Muslim and Croat advance appeared to have stopped only because the West told them to do so: by then, the Croat Muslim
federation was in control of just over half of Bosnia. Milosevic failed to intervene, and the Bosnian Serbs found themselves alone and vulnerable.

For the first time, all sides now simultaneously believed that no further advantage lay in store for them through more fighting, and for that reason were willing to talk. After a hiatus of 18 months, peace talks resumed and led to a treaty signed in November 1995, which was to be enforced by 60,000 NATO troops. If this does mark the end of the war, it will have ended with some 250,000 people killed out of a pre-war Bosnia population of 4.4 million, over half of whom have become refugees.48

Gulf War

In March, 2003, American and British forces began the Second Persian Gulf War, a conflict which became popularly known as "Gulf War II" or the "Second Iraq War," or some other designation. The U.S. government called this conflict "Operation Iraqi Freedom." Regardless of what it is called, this conflict was by far the first truly major war of the 21st Century. While considered by many to be another part of the "War on Terror," it was in many ways separate and unique in its own right. In scope of preparation and potential consequences, the new war in Iraq by far overshadowed the earlier invasion of Iraq or even Afghanistan. It will be useful to briefly look at the Gulf War of 1991 before considering the more recent conflict with Iraq.

There were three basic causes to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. First, Iraq had long considered Kuwait to be a part of Iraq. This claim led to several confrontations over the years, and continued hostility. Also, it can be argued that with Saddam Hussein's attempted invasion of Iran defeated, he sought easier conquests against his weak southern neighbors.

Second, rich deposits of oil straddled the ill-defined border and Iraq constantly claimed that Kuwaiti oil rigs were illegally tapping into Iraqi oil fields. Middle Eastern deserts make border delineation difficult and this has caused many conflicts in the region.

Finally, the fallout from the war between Iraq and Iran strained relations between Baghdad and Kuwait. As we saw above, this war began with an Iraqi invasion of Iran and degenerated into a bloody form of trench warfare as the Iranians slowly drove Saddam Hussein's armies back into Iraq. Kuwait and many other Arab nations supported Iraq against the Islamic Revolutionary government of Iran, fearful that Saddam's defeat could herald a wave of Iranian-inspired revolution throughout the Arab world. Following the end of the war, relations between Iraq and Kuwait deteriorated; with a lack of gratitude from the Baghdad government for help in the war and the reawakening of old issues regarding the border and Kuwaiti sovereignty.

It may not be out of pace here to recall that as early as 1961 Iraqi President Qasim had threatened Kuwait, invoking old Ottoman claims. At that time, Britain had supported Kuwait, and Iraq was persuaded to climb down from its demand. In March 1973, Iraq had occupied as-Samitah, a border post on Kuwait-Iraq border. Dispute began when

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Iraq demanded the right to occupy the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warah. Saudi Arabia and the Arab League convinced Iraq to withdraw.

In 1990, amid growing tension between the two Persian Gulf neighbors, Saddam Hussein concluded that the United States and the rest of the outside world would not interfere to defend Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly seized control of the small nation. Within days, the United States, along with the United Nations, demanded Iraq's immediate withdrawal. U.S. and other UN member nations began deploying troops in Saudi Arabia within the week, and the world-wide coalition began to form under UN authority.49

By January of 1991, over half a million Allied troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Gulf region. Intense diplomacy between U.S. and Iraqi officials failed to bring an Iraqi withdrawal, so, on January 16, 1991, Allied forces began the devastating bombing of Iraq and her forces in Kuwait. The Allied bombing sought to damage Iraq's infrastructure so as to hinder her ability to make war while also hurting both civilian and military morale.50

To counter the air attack, Saddam ordered the launching of his feared SCUD missiles at both Israel and Saudi Arabia. He hoped to provoke the Israelis into striking back at Iraq, which when theorized would split the Arab nations from the anti-Iraq coalition due to the ongoing hostility between Israel and the Arab world. Israel came very close to retaliating, but held back due to President George Bush's pledge to protect Israeli cities from the SCUDs. As a result of this promise,  

49 The Tribune, Chandigarh, 03-08-1990
50 The Times of India, New Delhi, 17-11-1991.
U.S. Patriot missile batteries found themselves deployed in Israel to shoot down the SCUDs. Another result of the SCUD launches was to divert Allied air power from hitting the Iraqi army to hunting for the elusive mobile missile launchers. Even so, the Allied air strikes and cruise missile attacks against Iraq proved more devastating than expected.

Despite the crushing defeat and subsequent Shiite and Kurdish rebellions, Saddam's government retained a strong grip on power in Iraq. As a result of the cease-fire terms, Iraq had to accept the imposition of "no-fly zones" over her territory and United Nations weapons inspection teams sifting through her nuclear and other weapons programmes. The economic and trade sanctions begun during the war continued for over a decade, contributing to severe economic hardship in Iraq.

There were several basic reasons for the Second Iraq War between a United States-led coalition and Iraq in 2003. First, there was the lingering tension and hostility left over from the war of 1991, in which Iraqi occupation troops were forced out of Kuwait. As a result of that war, the Iraqi government had agreed to surrender and/or destroy several types of weapons, including SCUD missiles and various Weapons of Mass Destruction (WOMDs).

Prior to the onset of the war, the Peace and Anti-War Movement in North America and Europe grew and conducted many large-scale demonstrations against President Bush and the plans for war. In the United States, a well-organized Pro-War Movement was formed in order to challenge the anti-war activists and to support the President and the
U.S. military. For some time at least, it appeared that President Bush had completely succeeded in his mission and Iraq could easily make the transition to a democratic regime. However, recent trends indicate that the transition may not be very smooth and Iraq may well be heading for internal disturbance and active resistance to the allied occupation.

The capture of Saddam Hussain by the Coalition forces on 13 December 2003 marked the successful completion of the campaign against his regime. However, the circumstances and the condition in which he was captured showed that Saddam Hussain could not have been leading and organising the resistance against the coalition forces. In all probability, the resistance was being directed by the Jehadi and fundamentalist groups. If these trends continue, then there is a possibility that, in due course, Iraq will go the same way as Iran after the fall of the Shah regime there.51

There is general agreement about a desirable broad direction – that international order should ensure freedom from a major war, economic growth without disastrous ecological effects and some minimum human rights. There is, however, basic disagreement about the appropriate means for securing these major objectives, as expressed in the varying lines of contemporary conflict. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to expect that any rationally designed major international policies would command general acceptance. In the light of the post-war experience, it seems, nevertheless, quite realistic to expect that actual or anticipated severe crises in specific fields and on specific issues may lead to global or regional action and ultimately institutionalization. If the

51 The Tribune, Chandigarh, 14-12-2003.
experience of the European Community can serve as a guide, in the longer run it seems likely that the states will delegate some of their authority upwards, although this is likely to take place in an erratic fashion and not according to a blue-print, and also to be obstructed by reassertions of national sovereignty.

It is relatively easy to classify factors which will determine the future shape of the international system— they fall into the categories of functional needs, political will, and a residual group of random though often important elements— but it seems impossible to evaluate with any degree of certainty how these elements will shape and interact. One possible line of development is a substantial increase in the hitherto limited impact of movements directed towards a world order: the pacifists; the ‘Greens’ concerned with ecology, especially nuclear pollution; organizations concerned with human rights; last but not the least, the various theoreticians who advocate a complete change of perspective in our thinking about international relations, taking us right away from the focus of state-centred power politics towards some form of world order. The theoreticians include not only Utopian idealists but also thinkers with extensive high-level military or political experience who have in the course of their work become pessimistic about the present and the future unless some fundamental change takes place. Although it is hard to deny that some of these alternative approaches exhibit elements of common sense and even wisdom, they tend at least by implication, to be normative. Inevitably, ‘world order’ is an ideologically laden notion and agreement on its pursuit inevitably brings us back to the clash of ideologies attempting to define its moral basis and thus, ultimately, to the conflict between the superpowers. What is
often passed off as an ecumenical movement above all ideologies merely skips over the underlying basic disagreements.

At the same time, one should remember that preserving with the conventional power-political approach is likewise, by implication, normative: it assumes the basic continuation of the status quo. To avoid the obvious dangers of closing one’s mind to the necessity of adaptation and change, it is essential to maintain as open-ended an approach as possible; to prevent a tyranny of the present, one needs both to study its historical origins and to probe into the possibilities for the future, often supplementing the analysis with some alternative approach.

In sum, it is hard to accept the idea that the conventional power-political model merely represents the past, the remnants of which linger in the present, whereas the alternative approaches represent the future. We cannot foresee how much of these new perspectives will materialize, although it would be foolish to deny that some of them are already making an impact on the operation of the international system; it is possible that this impact may greatly increase, although, as has been argued, scarcely leading to an international government. Consequently only a vague and impressionistic prediction is possible about the shape of things to come at the end of the century: it seems likely that the international system will remain pluralistic and untidy, with states continuing to play a leading though probably increasingly more circumscribed role.