CHAPTER VIII

LIBERATION
The individual life in the worldly state is incomplete and points beyond itself. It has a goal to achieve, a purpose to fulfil and an end to realise. All systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka and the allied schools, maintain that the ultimate end of human life is to transcend the mundane life of travail. Liberation, emancipation or release is of highest significance from the view-point of supreme mission of human life. Removal of Avidyā, realisation of Brahman or Self and the state of supreme bliss is generally said as the state of liberation (mokṣa). Advaitic philosophers explain the concept of liberation with different approaches and viewpoints. Śāṅkara-cārya, explaining the idea of mokṣa says that the state in which after the removal of Avidyā the Jīva becomes Brahman is called mukti. This is the state of reality, non-duality, eternity and all-pervasiveness, the voidness of all sorts of modifications, eternal contentment, partlessness, self-illumination by nature and the state in which there is neither good nor bad and nor past, present and future. From this definition of mokṣa, it is very much evident that in the state of mokṣa, there is no duality, nonbondage of mine and thine, no feeling of big or small and no egoistic feeling at all and thus it is the state of supreme bliss which is ultimate Brahman.

1. अद्वितीयतिमार्गः I SLS, 4.
2. अद्वितीय मुक्तिविश्वः I B.S.S.B; III.v.52.
3. B.S.S.B; I.i.4.
However it may be noted that the realizer of Brahman or subject of liberation or the individual soul (Jīva) is basically Brahman and therefore, the problem of liberation of the Jīva is not real. As soon as the ignorance of the Jīva about Brahman disappears, the Jīva becomes liberated from the bondage of all worldly relations of name and form. This is just like a woman who searches her necklace here and there and finds in the end, wearing round her own neck. In the same manner, an ignorant person is not able to realize his own Self on account of Avidyā and as soon as the veil of Avidyā is removed with the help of tattvajñāna, the soul being free as it were from the cloud of ignorance bursts forth in its pristine glory. This self revelation of the soul is liberation. Hence liberation and bondage, both are based on Avidyā and therefore they are not real.

Knowledge contradicts ignorance when knowledge and ignorance concern themselves with the same objects. So ignorance about Brahman has to be discarded by the knowledge of Brahman. We should now see what the Vedāntin means by the knowledge of Brahman because Brahman can never appear in its fullness of being in empirical consciousness as an object. The possibility of knowing Brahman as the object of knowledge is thus for ever excluded. Yet we cannot say that Brahman is completely unknown and unknowable. Brahman is immanent in experience. It is expressive of nescience which screens it from our view. If

1. Mānasollāsa, II.56.
we have ignorance regarding it, this ignorance cannot hide it completely from our view but only its identity and its Bliss. Of such a transcendental Self, we can speak only in negative terms. Our description of liberation will be naturally in empirical terms which cannot express it better than as the negation of concrete experiences. But nobody can describe the net result of such a process of denial and negation in concrete terms. Śaṅkara himself has felt the difficulty of depicting the transcendental state of existence. Really any description of a transcendental existence in empirical terms will fall far short for our mind in any stage cannot form a right conception of it and language fails to describe it. Such an existence can only be hinted at as the object of the undivided mental consciousness modified in the form of identity. Madhusūdana says, "Though Ātman is not an object of knowledge, still the ignorance regarding Ātman is set aside by the undivided but indeterminate mental transformation. Brahman-intuition is release. Defined negatively, the destruction of bondage is release. Bondage consists in the conceit bestowed by the Jīva on the host of things, pleasurable and painful, that constitute the illusory world and release is attained through knowledge that discriminates things eternal from the non-eternal through the intuitive experience of the oneness of the Jīva and Brahman."

1. न कैः तदन्यः भिन्नियं वैद्यमानं शून्यं न वापृत्यं अवयावत्वात् 
न यह कैलात्मक न च ज्ञात्मक तथ तत्व प्रकटत्वात्। ।
Daśa-śloki, 20th śloka.
2. Advañita - siddhi, Chapter IV.
3. B.S.S.B; II.i.4.
The Naiyāyika contends that intelligence (buddhi) is knowledge which is an attribute of Ātman and that it is not the internal organ as the Advaitin opines. Vidyārāṇya urges that this contention is false, because the detached Ātman would never be bound to embodied life, if the internal organ, an effect of Avidyā did not limit it, false bondage could not be attributed to it, as redness of a japa flower is attributed to a crystal. Bondage is of the nature of nescience. It is terminable by the knowledge of Brahman. So it is not ontologically real. Bondage is the seed of misery and consequently suffering. Is bondage real or unreal? If it is real, it cannot be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman.

Some opine that real bondage is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman. Vidyārāṇya asks them whether such knowledge produces a peculiarity (atiśaya) called termination in its object or whether it produces a peculiarity in its abode. In the first alternative, he asks them whether such knowledge terminates the bound self or whether it terminates attributes in the bound self or whether it terminates the bound self’s agency of action and the like, which are opposed to its being infinite bliss knowable by it or whether it terminates unknownness in its object. The first, second and third alternatives are

1. WPS, p.215.
2. ibid p.23.
unteachable since the knowledge of blue colour of a multicoloured mango does not terminate its object or taste which inherits in the mango or yellow colour opposed to blue colour. The fourth subalternative is the Advaitin's view. In the second alternative, Vidyāranya asks whether such knowledge terminates its abode or whether it terminates the attributes in its abode or whether it terminates the attributes related to both its abode and object. The first subalternative is inadmissible, since the self wherein such knowledge abides would be destroyed every moment, if it were true. The second subalternative is illegitimate because the knowledge of a jar does not destroy the attributes in the self. The third subalternative is unjustified, since the knowledge of one's body does not destroy the self's relation to its body. The contention that real bondage is terminated by the knowledge of Brahman because of the Śruti, "Knowing Brahman, one attains immortality," is false, because the Śruti is indifferent to the reality or the unreality of bondage. Hence bondage is of the nature of nescience and unreal.

Śaṅkara defines liberation as of the nature of eternal, pure Brahman. Vidyāranya proves eternity of liberation in the following manner. Liberation is without origin and end. It cannot be accomplished by the act of worship of God.

1. VPS, pp. 22-23
2. VPS, p. 781.
because the Śrutis, "A released soul is released"; "Being Brahman itself, a Jīva attains Brahman," prove that emancipation is without an origin. The Śrutis, "A Jīva enjoys immortality through true knowledge"; "A Jīva abiding in Brahman attains immortality" prove that release is indestructible. If it had an origin, it would have an end. If it had an end, a released soul would be bound again. If liberation were accomplishable by an action like earthly prosperity, it would be related to a body, sense-organs and the like and it would be subject to increase and decrease. The contention that liberation is achieved in a disembodied state, because the fruits of karmas are various, is false because disembodied state is intrinsic to a soul and because it is not produced by an action. A soul is partless and cannot therefore have conjunction with a body. Nor can a soul inhere in a body since it is not the inherent cause of a body. Nor is a soul identical with a body, because it has a nature contradictory to that of a body. Because there is no real relation between them, disembodied state is natural to it, and its embodied state is caused by its false knowledge. False knowledge cannot be destroyed by actions. Disembodied release cannot be modified by actions, since the Immutable Ātman cannot be modified.

2. Brāhmaṇ. IV.iv.6.
3. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, Sūtra 38:1; "A soul's state is various, its effect is various, and its action is various." VPS, p.781.
6. ibid, p.783.
Vidyāraṇya proves that liberation is not attainment of Brahman, since it is always affected by an action. Brahman is ubiquitous and so always has contact with a Jīva. Its attainment of Brahman does not depend upon an action. The Śruti says, "A knower of Brahman attains the supreme Brahman": Some interpret it in the sense that a released soul attains Brahman in a distant region, free from modifications. But then the attainment of Brahman in that region is either the Jīva's becoming identical with Brahman or its existence in the region in its own form. Vidyāraṇya avers that attainment of Brahman is not becoming Brahman and that it is not production of another substance by a Jīva and Brahman, because then liberation would be destructible. Because liberation is eternal, because Brahman is ubiquitous and partless, another substance cannot be generated by a Jīva and Brahman. Attainment of Brahman cannot be a relation between a Jīva and Brahman, because no relation between them is possible. It cannot be identity since an atomic Jīva and ubiquitous Brahman cannot be identical with each-other. Nor can it be inherence or any other relation, for two different substances cannot have any other relation than conjunction. Conjunction always ends in disjunction. So a released Jīva would be separated from Brahman and be bound again.

2. VPS, p. 805.
3. नाति जीववर्त्तानाहामारंगार्थार्थसङ्कोचवर्तानां, मोक्षश्रेय \ । विनाशितव्यतिगतिः। ibid, p.805.
But the Sruti says, 'A released soul is not bound again.' So a released soul cannot be separated from Brahman. The Sruti says, "A released soul after attaining Brahman becomes the Lord of itself (svarat). This will lead to the undesirable contingency that there will be many Gods. So Vidyāranya interprets the Sruti asserting a released soul's attainment of Brahman as the manifestation of Brahman, its essential nature on the destruction of its nescience. This is the best interpretation from the standpoint of Absolute Monism. Further, a Jīva associated with its adjunct of nescience or internal organ, cannot go to Brahman in a region free of modifications. A Jīva is nothing but Brahman limited by nescience or internal organ. If a Jīva goes to Brahman, the region will be free of Brahman and Brahman in the transcendent region conjoined with the Jīva will be increased. So its going to Brahman in an upper region is an illusion due to the upward movement of an adjunct. An adjunct also cannot go to Brahman, because its stuff, Brahman is devoid of Brahman. A jar cannot move, for its stuff, earth cannot move. Hence a Jīva's movement to Brahman in a region without modifications is illusory like movement in a dream. So the attainment of Brahman preceded by action is not possible.

1. ibid, p.806.
2. तत्साद भावात्मिकतिदिरिविधातिवत्तों विवरण त्वत्स्मृतेन भावधारणितिकणा। ibid, p.806.
3. VFS, p.811.
Vidyaranya proves that liberation is not purification of Atman because no excellence can be generated in It and because no taints can be removed from It. Nor can existing Atman be manifested by an action even as a mirror is manifested by rubbing out its dirt. Since Atman is devoid of action and since being Inner Spirit It is not the object of action of another entity, Atman is eternally pure and free of taints and cannot be purified by acts. If its taint is due to nescience, it cannot be removed by actions since It is inactive in as much as It is partless and ubiquitous. It cannot be removed by the action of other substances for they cannot act upon It because of their conjunction with It. If the taint is of the nature of nescience, it can be removed by true knowledge of Brahman and not by an action. The internal organ with its taints, love and hate, merits and demerits, is purified by meditation on God and other such acts. But the Self unassociated with an adjunct, which does not perform virtuous or vicious actions, which has no taints, merits and demerits cannot experience their fruits and cannot be purified by the aforesaid acts. So purification of the eternally pure Atman is not possible.

1. सत्स्कृतियेऽष्टि पि — — — — नित्यशुद्धसत्त्वायेद्र दौषामायांव। ibid.

2. तत्समान्तं सत्स्कृतिप्रयात्मनि संक्षिप्ति। ibid, p.812.
We conclude that Realization of freedom means the cessation of Avidyā. Ātman is itself free, bondage is only apparent. No doubt, Ātman is expressive of everything and does not contain in its transcendental nature anything to destroy ignorance for in so far as it is transcendental it has no relation with it and in so far as it is immanent, it is expressive of the manifold including Nescience. But it can destroy ignorance through the undivided and continuous modification of mental consciousness in its own form. Just as the Sun, which is expressive of pieces of paper, can burn them up when its rays are focussed upon them through a glass, similarly Ātman, which is expressive of a show of manifold being can destroy it and its cause Avidyā when it is helped by the contrary tendency of the thought of identity.
As to the first Brahmsūtra, 'Athāto Brahmacījñāśā', which gives the cue to the determination of the object and end of Vedāntic studies, Vidyāranya traces the origin of this sūtra to the Upaniṣadic injunction of Śravana to one who has completed Vedic studies as enjoined in the Vedic dictum Svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ and realised apparently the import of the Śrutis referring to Ātmādarśana, but his discursive faculty does not stop there as he tries to unearth the true implications involved in such knowledge viz. the competent subject, the true object and the real end. These, three anubandhas i.e. adhikārin, visaya and prayojana are hinted at in the Śrutis themselves but the logical thinker seeks the raison d'être of these Vedic truths in a dialectical form for which Bādarāyana initiated the logical method viz. nyāyaprasthāna in his Brahmasūtras by the first aphorism.  

The next question which is basal to the study of Vedānta is the discussion regarding the nature of injunction in the Upaniṣadic passage; "Ātmā vāre draṣṭavya śrotavya mantavyo nīdhyāśitavyaḥ." The dialectical process of Vedantic studies take their origin in the injunctive precept viz. Śrotavya. Vidyāranya has taken great pains

1. VPS, p. 16.
to show that the necessity of commencing Vedantic studies lies in the fact that the summum bonum of life appears in the true realization of Self (Atmadarsana) and hence the ways and means towards that goal are worth knowing. Thus though the perpetual injunction (nityavidhi) as envisaged in the vedic precept svādhyāyodhystavyaḥ is at the root of studying and understanding the vedas, still Vidyāranya holds that Realisation of the Self as the summum bonum of life is possible only through the injunction noted above. As to the ways and means indicated in the three steps, he takes śravaṇa as the principal one, the two others as auxiliary.

Here Vidyāranya strikes a new note by showing that the origin of Vedantic studies is in the injunction of śravaṇa though the perpetual adhyayana-vidhi gives the cue to Vedic studies in general. To him śravaṇa is the principal incentive towards Atmadarsana and manana and nididhyāsana are subservient to it. The school of Bhāmatī traces Vedāntic studies on the logical and dialectical plane to the adhyayana-vidhi as the studies of Mīmāṃsā have also the same injunction at their origin. Śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana are not the fountain-heads of the Vedāntic dialectical studies by way of injunctions. Nor even is śravaṇa the principal means towards Ātmadarsana. These pertain to the ken

1- अचार्यायां अचार्यादमृताय वेदान्तवाच्य विचार: कर्क्ष्य इति।
2- मन्नानिदित्वात्तामृत्यः फलोपकारं श्रवणं नामाभिन विधियत्व इति।

WPS, p.15.
WPS, p.3
of jñāna or knowledge, pure and simple, where no injunctive force can exist. Knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of it are fulfilled. Hence what these three stages can do is only to show the way towards Ātmadarśana only indirectly by focussing our attention on several indirect methods. Śravaṇa is responsible according to the Bhāmatī school, for an indirect knowledge of the Self, manana is also responsible for such knowledge, but by nididhyāsana which agenders constant concentration upon the indirectly realised Self, there arises an immediate knowledge of it. Hence nididhyāsana is the principal organ of the knowledge of the Self where Śravaṇa and manana are secondary. But all these three are never the object of any injunction but only objects of factual statement (vihitānuvādaka). Vidyāranya has taken enormous pains to establish his view that here in śravaṇa there is the stamp of a distinct vidhi even though it is meant for Brahmajñāna.

Before entering into an examination of this question it is worthwhile to discuss in a nutshell the implications of vidhi and its different varieties. The Mīmāṁsakas say that vidhi or injunction makes it obligatory upon man to perform an act which is not otherwise required to be performed. The nature of vidhi is to make known that
which is beyond any other means of knowledge as being conducive to a specific effect. There are three such vidhis viz. apūrva, nīyama and parisāṅkhya. Apūrva-vidhi enjoins an act for a specific purpose for which no other means of knowledge is ever capable of doing so. As an example they cite the injunctive precept-agnihotra jhūuyaț svargakāmah. Here by enjoining upon the person desirous of heaven the sacrifice of agnihotra, the Śruti becomes the sole means of knowing this cause-and-effect relation between the sacrifice and its effect, heaven. By nīyama-vidhi, it is suggested that out of several alternative means to get a desired result, only one is enjoined at the cost of others as is the case with the injunctive precept śṛ-vṛhiṇa-vahanti. Here to get the result of the separation of husks from rice in order to prepare sacrificial cakes, pounding of paddy is enjoined. Here other methods such as separation by nails having been the good alternative means to get the same result, only avaghāta is enjoined. In parisāṅkhya-vidhi we get an injunctive precept by which other probable alternative means of performance for a specific purpose are discarded so that one such alternative may stand. Example : pañca pañcha- nakhā bhaksyāh. Here the precept enjoins the eating of the flesh of only five five-nailed animals like the hare, by
entirely prohibiting by implication the eating of the flesh of others like the monkey, so that in the matter of the eating of the flesh of five-nailed animals, some alternative animals are prohibited as being unfit for consumption.

Niyama or Restrictive injunction has got primarily a positive significance either for empirical knowledge or scriptural instructions. A positive injunction to have recourse to one alternative facilitates the achievement of the task. The exclusion of the other alternatives follows by implication, as they are mutually incompatible. The adoption of one course of action naturally precludes that of the others from the nature of the case e.g. pounding is exclusive of other operations. But parisâñkhya has only a private significance. Here the alternatives are neither mutually exclusive nor incapable of satisfying the end, several or jointly. The very fact that is an express injunction regarding a course of a ction which naturally presents itself and for the adoption of which an express injunction need not be necessary, is such that, it makes obligatory that the other alternative courses are to be relinquished. In the example cited above, man has a natural tendency to satisfy hunger by consuming food. The express injunction that animal-food should be selected from these five types implies
the prohibition of others. The positive performance is not determined by this injunction but either by natural inclination or another precept. It only puts its seal of approval on select kinds and its purpose is only to ban the other kinds.

Vidyāranya has discussed at length whether at all any vidhi or injunction is plausible in the matter of Brahmadāsa and if so what kind of injunction it ought to be. As to the first question it is doubted whether any adṛṣṭaphala is possible in Brahmadāsa. The question arises from the fact that the nature of the vidhis is to egender some adṛṣa or apūrva in the specific act it enjoins so that the sum-total of apūrva in the whole act (like sacrifice) may be realised. Without reference to any such adṛṣṭaphala the vidhis lose all their injunctive force. Hence here in the matter of Ātmadāsana there should be recognised the presence of some such adṛṣa in the injunctive precept of śravana. But it is evident that no amount of adṛṣṭaphala is required in the present case where only known causes (like śravana) are sufficient. But Vidyāranya says that in Brahmadāsa also there is immense scope for adṛṣṭaphala, for it is to be achieved through the adṛṣa of all works merging

1. VPS, pp. 8-9.
into knowledge. These pieces of adṛṣṭa conduce to the
destruction of evils antagonistic to Brahmajñana as is
indicated in the Upaniṣadic texts like avidyāmisión tīrtvā,
tapasa kalamasam banti. Even in the vedic injunction
Svādhyāyo adhyastavyaḥ, the Mīmāṃsakas recognise the presence
of adṛṣṭaphala for the knowledge of dharma which otherwise
would not accrue if it were not known to be the result of
sacrificial acts known through the study of the Vedas by
which an adṛṣṭa accrues to the dharma. Hence all such
sacrificial acts pre-suppose the niyamadṛṣṭa in the study
of the Vedas. Vidyāranya refers to the passage¹ in the Gītā
viz. 'Sarvaṁ karmākhilaṁ Pārtha jñāne parimāpyate² and
shows that the word akhila over and above sarvam refers to
acts like śravaṇa etc., over and above sacrifices etc. Hence
all acts enjoined in the Vedas including śravaṇa are
conductive through their respective adṛṣṭa to the generation
of the sun-total of the knowledge of the Self,³ which is the
highest aim of Vedāntic studies.

More serious objections to the recognition of vidhi
in the context of Brahmajñana have been skilfully met by
Vidyāranya. Firstly, to recognise the existence of any
vidhi in the context in which the injunctive formula 'Ātmā

1. VFS, p.10.
2. B.G. IV.33.
3. तत्त्वं भवाणिः प्रक्रियाः तत्तत्त्वकालशु, प्रक्रियानस्तय
सवर्णस्वमन्यानशास्त्र ! VFS, p.10.
vāra.......' has been read, it will be antagonistic to what the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman as being the independent principle of Vedāntic knowledge; Brahman becomes dependent upon what is the primary meaning of the injunctive precept i.e. drṣṭavyah. The Mīmāṁsakas regard the suffix to be of the primary import while the prakṛti becomes secondary in significance. Brahman, too, becomes secondary and not independent for here darsana (the meaning of the prakṛti) is of the secondary significance while the meaning of the vidhi is of primary significance. Śaṅkara himself has refuted the presence of any vidhi in the context of Ātma-darśana.1 This charge does not stand for in recognising the presence of vidhi in the precept drṣṭavyah it is indeed true that Brahman becomes secondary in significance while the vidhi itself becomes primary. But when we consider that Brahman does not become subject to the import of vidhi in srotavyah we can very well recognise the vidhi in that precept. Brahman is always the Self-dependent principle of knowledge to which It becomes a Self-realized Goal. Hence in recognising vidhi in śravaṇa by regarding darsana as the goal of Brahma-hood where Brahman stands as the most primary principle we do not fall into any pit-fall of Mīmāṁsā dialectics.2

1. B.S.S.B, I.1.4.
2. फलतिन्य प्रथानुः श्रमवर्तनमूदिद्वार्य श्रवणविधाः

pu n kृदापिद दौष्टः I VFS, p.12.
There is another serious objection as the defect of vākyabheda in the same context is antagonistic to the real implication of the whole context. There are two kinds of ekavākyatā - padaikavā - kyatā and vakyaikavākyatā. As to the problem of ekavākyatā, the Māṃsakas have discussed whether we can reasonably attribute two meanings to a single prakarma or subject of discourse. The problem arises from the examination in the arthavāda adhikaraṇa wherein a detailed analysis as to the import of the arthavādas are read along with the vidhis. After prolonged discussion the Māṃsakas have arrived at the conclusion that such arthavādas have no independent imports of their own nor can they be reasonably said to have them; for that would imply splitting up of the import of the vidhi which primarily attaches itself to it in any prakarna. The general Māṃsāist standpoint as to the vidhi is that it has a śābdī bhāvanā viz. a three-fold reference to the explicit injunctive connotation in any particular formula such as the object (the which - kim), the man (the doer - kena) and the means (the how - katham). The arthavādas only express the praiseworthiness or not of a particular injunction - be it positive or negative and there the third element (katham) is only related to it as being eulogised or calumniated.
Vidyaranya has shown that this defect of vākyabheda has been accepted under special circumstances by some Vedāntins and Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras alike. The primary implication of the whole context and the secondary implication of the vidhi which is nothing but the generation of adṛśta have been recognised and there the vākyabhedadosa has perforce been held at bay. A particular of Vedāntins has recognised the implication of Brahmajñāna in the passage: 'tametaṁ Brāhmaṇā Vedānuvacanena vividīśanti yajñena,'¹ which is the primary implication, and also its secondary implication of yajña etc., as being enjoined in the Vedas has been recognised. Thus there is a twofold implication even in the primary import or Brahmajñāna here and as such no vākyabhedadosa is present. Similarly, the Bhāṭtas have recognised vidhi in holding the samīdh (sacrificial stick) over the sacrificial pot viz. sruv. Here the holding of the samīdh over the sruv has been accepted in the case of agnihotra sacrifice consecrated to gods though it is read in the context of pratāgnihotra where one should hold the samīdh under the sruv. Thus by the dictum vidhīstu dhārāṇeś purvavat,² there is a distinct vidhi in the uparidhārana of the samīdh. Prābhākaras, too have recognised separate vidhi in the same context.³

1. Brh Up. IV.42.
2. Māṁśa Sūtra III.iv.5.
3. तिरस्मो रागीर्षिः परेऽः Taittirīya Śāṃhitā, II.v.1.
Here in the context of dārśapūrṇāṁśa sacrifice there is a distinct vidhi in the performance of vratas by a woman in her menstrual course. This is indicated by the dictum prāgāparodbhānmalavadvāsaḥ.

So there is a clear case for the Advaitins to recognise the implications of vidhi in āravaṇa although there is the apprehension of vākyabheda for such recognition of the secondary import of vidhi in the primary import of a particular context is accepted in other systems, specially in both schools of Mīmāṃsā. The long and short of the whole argument boils down to the fact that vidhi can be recognised in a particular sentence which is of secondary import although it is read in the context of a particular section bearing the primary import. The defect of vākyabheda does not stand in the way of understanding the full implication, if we train our eyes to fix on what is primary and what is secondary in a particular context. Other vākyas may be appended to the primary vākyas of a particular section, yet separate vidhi and separate implication of a secondary nature may be recognised in the former without least violence to the primary implication of the whole section.

2. तत्सादां वाक्यं वाक्यं दुर्दश्चिन्तितं को तद्दर्शन? MVS, p.13.
Vidyārāṇya has hinted at the injunctive character of āravaṇa by referring to a different āruti-passage avoiding the clear one upon which our discussion started. He has referred us to the passage: 

\[ \text{tasmād Brāhmaṇaḥ pāndityam nirvidya bālyya ...........maunaṁca nirvidyātha Brāhmaṇaḥ.} \]

Here the words pāndityam, bālyam and mauna refer respectively to āravaṇa, mauna and nīdidhyāsana and they have been described as the means to become Brāhmaṇa i.e. Ātmadārśī. Thus Vidyārāṇya has shown us that even if we do not regard the commonly accepted passage i.e. srotavya etc. as being the source of the vidhi, we may well accept this passage as such. Saṅkara has also explained the terms pānditya, bālya, and mauna as referring respectively to āravaṇa, mauna and nīdidhyāsana. Vidyārāṇya has moreover substantiated this position by showing that the repetition of the vidhyāyaka vākya with regard to āravaṇa as srotavya etc. and 

\[ \text{tasmā Brāhmaṇaḥ pāndityam nirvidya bālyya tīṣṭhāset etc.} \]

in the same branch of the Brāhmadārāṇya Upaniṣad is meant for giving the force of validity to the injunctive character of āravaṇa.

Vidyārāṇya has brought in a very fruitful discussion about the possibility of niyama vidhi in the Vedic precept: 

\[ \text{Ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ srotavyo nīdidhyāsitaṃvyaḥ.} \]

The


restrictive character of the śravaṇavidhi is evident from the fact that the alternative means to Brahmajñāna viz. śravaṇa, restricts only itself for the realization of the end and hence the other alternative methods are excluded by implication. This is the true significance of Vidyārāṇya’s analysis of the possible unforeseen merit (adṛṣṭa) attaching itself to śravaṇa in order to be able to restrict itself as the sole means towards the goal of Brahmajñāna. This discussion has been made above and it has been shown that in the matter of Brahmajñāna too, there is the scope for such adṛṣṭaphalā helping an alternative means to restrict itself only towards that goal. Vidyārāṇya has tried to show from the opponents’ point of view that there is the impossibility of recognizing a niyama vidhi in śravaṇa, for he points out that in the matter of Brahmajñāna there is never any possibility of other alternative methods than those enunciated in the Śruti viz. śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. The knowledge of unqualified Brahman dawns upon the aspirant through an intuitive realization made possible by these Vedic injunctive processes. To this apparently strong charges of the opponents, Vidyārāṇya adduces the arguments from the Advaitist standpoint to prove that the possibility of niyama vidhi is in no wise impaired by such a charge, for
he shows that though there is no possibility of other alternative means for the knowledge of unqualified Brahman, yet those alternative means are possible in the matter of Brahmajñāna as such and therefore are excluded by implication from the field by the restrictive character of āravāna. He shows that even in ordinary cases of niyamavidhi, as the pounding of paddy, there is also from the viewpoint of real sastric injunction no possibility of other alternative means for the fact that pounding alone is accompanied by the unforeseen merit which makes the paddy capable of being used in the sacrifice and such paddy to be a part and parcel of the sacrifice, should therefore be the object of pounding and of no other means. Hence other alternative means too, are not logically possible in the case of such paddy, the husks of which are desired to be separated. Hence Vidyārānya concludes that even so in nirvīṣeṣṭajñāna the alternative means are either unnecessary for the establishment of the niyamavidhi in āravāna or are to be regarded as possible in Brahmajñāna as such (as known by mind etc.), as the alternative means to separate husks of the paddy consecrated to some sacrifice are possible only generally in paddy as such. This analysis of Vidyārānya, therefore, brings out that the Advaitist admission of niyamavidhi in āravāna is justifiable.
In Vedanta, there are two states of mukti - the Jivan-mukti and the Videha-mukti. The attainment of Brahman-bliss need not synchronize with the decease of the body. The Jivanmukta is he who is released even while being embodied. There is for him the persistence of the body until the fruition of the residue of prarabdha-karma. A Jivan mukta does all actions for the welfare of others in a natural way, though he is neither interested in good nor in bad. Although he lives very much in this world of duality, yet he lives in the waking world like one in the state of suşupti and therefore he realizes nondualism in dualism. And though he performs many actions, he is not attached to anyone. It can again be emphasized that for a Jivan mukta, the external world of name and form does not end, it remains as before. What ends is the viewpoint of duality of the Jivan mukta. This is the Vedantic philosophy of life which can be said as quite practical and meaningful for social welfare and upliftment. This is the philosophy which teaches us to become a great man, a man of human service and a true servant of God.

The Jivan mukta has to live in this world even if he has realized Brahman, for enjoying the fruit of his previous actions (prarabdha-karmans). Though knowledge of truth destroys Avidyā, the material cause of all karmas without exception, still it does not remove prarabdha-karma, since it is itself the fruit of that

1. श्रीमलालाताकारे जटिलम्याप्याराम् श्रीमृद्धिप्रतिमानुचर्त्य जीवनयुक्तिर्लय।

VFS, p.362.
The continuance of the body even after the destruction of nescience is intelligible on the analogy of the potter's wheel rotating for some time till the momentum is spent even after the propelling rod is removed. As the fragrance of a bucket of flowers continues for some time even after the removal of flowers from it, owing to the force of its impressions, so false knowledge of duality continues for some time owing to the impression of Avidyā which sustains prārabdha-karmas. According to the logicians, the effect continues for a while after the removal of the cause. In the case of momentary effects it may be admitted that they remain only for one moment after their causes are destroyed. But in respect of the body which is a product of beginningless nescience, we must allow a considerable lapse of time before it can be finally resolved.

Prakāśātman gives the following account of embodied liberation. Most Advaitins admit embodied release after the immediate knowledge of Brahman. The opponent objects that there cannot be the knowledge of duality in embodied life after the destruction of Avidyā and its effects—merits and demerits. Prakāśātman replies that because the body, the sense-organs and the internal organ continue to exist after the immediate experience of Brahman, their cause—appropriate merits and

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1. 2. ibid, p.360.
3. PD, VI.54.
demerits (karma) must exist. It is objected that the experience of the identity of a soul with Brahman and the experience of duality cannot co-exist with each other after the destruction of Avidyā and karmas. Prakāśātman replies that sometimes there is the experience of the identity of a soul with Brahman in superconscious trance and that sometimes there is the experience of duality due to the flow of prārabdha karmas. The Śrutī asserts that the knowledge of Brahman has not the power of destroying Prārabdha karmas, which have begun to bear fruits. It is objected that a living person endowed with a body cannot acquire the immediate knowledge of Brahman, that its power of destroying all past karmas and future karmas except prārabdha karmas is not admitted, and that all karmas are destroyed by the immediate knowledge of Brahman. Prakāśātman replies that the Śrutī and the Śāpti assert that Vyāsa and others achieved immediate knowledge of Brahman in embodied life due to prārabdha karmas and attained embodied liberation. A knower of Brahman has a semblance of the experience of duality for his actions are not motived by attachment, aversion and desire. It is objected that Avidyā cannot have an impression. Prakāśātman replies that Avidyā is false knowledge and that it has an impression like odour, a quality which has an impression.

1. PPV, p. 284.
2. प्रारंभिक मायात्म्य तत्तपदार्थं तत्त्वारं रूपायं संवैधितः। भ्यासांतिनिधिः व तत्त्वारं रूपायं अपरिवर्त्तितः। PPV, p. 284. Also see VPS, p. 868.
3. PPV, p. 284.
Atman is the abode of Avidyā and its impression. Avidyā is the material cause of all effects other than an impression of Avidyā. Though Atman is not the material cause of an impression of Avidyā, it is the abode of an impression of Avidyā as it is the abode of Avidyā. There is no opposition between Atman being the abode of an impression of Avidyā and not being its material cause, as there is no opposition between Atman being the abode of Avidyā and not being its material cause.

The continued experience of Brahman gradually destroys the impression of Avidyā, and when it completely destroys the impression, the body falls and disembodied liberation is achieved. Vidyāraṇya, following his predecessor, also maintains that the experience of the identity of a soul with Brahman and the perception of duality are not simultaneous but successive in the state of embodied liberation. The knowledge of Reality has made accrual of sins in future impossible. Even if it be possible, they are destroyed by daily experience of Reality.

Vidyāraṇya discusses the question whether a soul's relation to a body is due to merits and demerits (karma) or whether it is due to Avidyā. If it be due to karmas, they are either natural to Atman or due to the body. They are not natural to Atman, because It is devoid of action. They are not due to the body,

1. ibid, p.105.
2. VPS, pp. 867-68.
because this view will involve interdependence: karmas depend on the body; the body depends on karmas. If a stream of a series of karmas and a series of bodies be admitted in order to avoid interdependence, this view will amount to the concept of a series of blind persons leading another series of blind persons. If it be urged that there is no opposition between them as between a series of seeds and sprouts, then there will be no difference between a body and Ātman, which is well-known. So Ātman's relation to a body is not due to karmas, but due to Avidyā. It is destroyed by the knowledge of Reality. A knower of Brahman is not bound again. Though the knowledge of Reality destroys Avidyā, which is the material cause of karmas, it cannot destroy Prārabdha-karmas because the knowledge is produced through a body due to karmas.

Prārabdha-karma perishes by enjoyment. Both the released and the bound have alike to reap the consequences of their prārabdha. Both have to walk in a path strewn with thorns; but while the enlightened walk with shoes on, the ignorant have no such protection to enable them to pass unhurt. The vulgar are led astray by their whimsical moods, whereas the wise regard themselves as witnesses and not victims of their moods. Two travellers wend their way on the same road;

1. तत्त्वात्मनं अविनिमित्तः परिवर्तितं समस्तं: किनत्वविद्यायाभ: | VPS, p.866
2. तय तत्त्वात्मानमिवल्यः | ibid, p.866.
and both of them are equally fatigued. But while one of them knows that the destination is near and so he quickens his pace in the hope of reaching it soon; the other being heavy of heart and not knowing that his place of rest is nigh, plods on with staggering steps.

Knowledge is not the destroyer of prārabdha, since it does not bring about the resolution of the world. It reveals only the illusory nature of the universe and by that the latter is not resolved. Just as people, while not denying the fact of a maginal show, know it to be fictitious, the knower of truth, while not discarding the enjoyment generated by prārabdha possesses the cognition of the illusoriness of the world. The obstinacy of prārabdha is in compelling the Jīva to enjoy pleasure and suffer pain and not in postulating the reality of the objects of enjoyment. Knowledge and prārabdha are not contradictories, since they have different contents like the colour and taste of a substance.

If the body were to fall off even at the time of release, then there would be no preceptor to teach Advaita. And if there be none to teach, how are the study and realization of Advaita principles possible? If it be asserted that true knowledge is incompatible with the cognition of duality, then sage Yājñavalkya and others would not have been preceptors.
If the non-cognition of duality were the criterion of release, then all beings should be released in sleep. If in sleep there be no release because of the non-existence of true-knowledge, then knowledge of the true and not non-cognition of duality is the cause of release.

The Jīvan-mukta lives in the world but he is not of it. He is compared to a child or a lunatic since he has no conceit in his actions. To his synoptic vision there is neither action nor agent, neither enjoyment nor enjoyer. He revels in the bliss of non-difference that has not come to be, but which was, is and will ever be. When the enjoyment of such prārabdha-karmans is over, the Jīva has to keep off his body and then there remains no question of birth and death for the Jīva. This is the state of Videhamukti.

An Appraisal.

But we must be careful not to make any difference in the conception of freedom, be it liberation complete or liberation in life. The conception of freedom is identically one. It does not matter whether it is immediately followed by the forsaking of flesh or by the continuity of it, as it makes no difference in the quality of water being water, be it calm or wavy. Freedom is one and identical implying the transcendence

of Atman over flesh, whether Atman is conceived to be existing in or out of flesh. Once one attains the spiritual vision, the possibility of confusion of Atman with body, of reality with appearance, dies for ever and whether the empirical facts enter into knowledge or not, the vision of truth is never lost. Had there been any possibility of enjoying the concrete joys of life in a state of liberation in life, there would have been a chance of difference in the conception of freedom. One who is liberated in life has no cause of either enjoyment or depression for pleasures or pains of flesh (just like one who forsakes the body in liberation). So far as liberation is concerned both are equally free, for both have realized the conception of Self as one undivided bliss.

The mukta who has transcended nescience is not affected by the ruffle of the empirical life. If he be discomfited at any time, it is due to his aversion to the objects of sense. That he is not in tune with the enjoyment of the world is patent from the fact that he gets disgusted with it very soon. Desires do not multiply in his case. Desire is like a burnt seed impotent to produce fresh sprout. In the case of the ignorant, desires do not die with enjoyment. Fulfilled desires bring in fresh ones. Like fire fed by fuel, they grow more and more. But enjoyment which is combined with discernment does not breed
new desires. The sun of knowledge scorches the seed of desire making it ineffectual to sprout forth and yield fresh fruits.

The desire of the mukta is unproductive because he knows the worthlessness of the desired object. Just as fried grains are useful for eating and not for sprouting, similarly the desires of the knower of truth give him slight enjoyment, but do not entail in their train any more of their kind. The karma which has begun to take effect perishes when it has borne its fruit. Since prārabdha is the cause only of enjoyment it dies with the destruction of its product. There can be misery only when there is the delusion that the object of enjoyment is real. The person who possesses true knowledge is devoid of such delusion; and hence he is not bound by his prārabdha. Apprehending the world to be of an impermanent, indeterminable nature, comparable to the dream and the phantasmagoria, how can the released be attached to it? Who, except those who are perverse will drink poison after knowing its fatal consequence? When the illusory nature of the world is well cognized, attachment to sense-objects ceases along with the cessation of the cognition of reality in them.