CHAPTER - VI

Jīva & Iśvara
distinct points of view corresponding to the two kinds of definitions referred to earlier, the svārūpalakṣaṇa and the tātāsthalakṣaṇa. Introducing the Brahma-sūtras that follow 1.1. 1, he observes as follows: "Brahman is apprehended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of names and forms; in the second place, as being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatsoever." In his comment on B.S. I.1.14 the same view is reiterated quoting from the Prāṇaṇopaniṣad as follows: that which is the syllable, the āum, is both higher and the lower Brahman." The lower Brahman or the qualified Brahman is the same as the higher tādava, only it is qualified by certain names and forms for facilitating contemplation. Taken along with B.S. I.1.2, which defines the qualified Brahman or God as the source of the world, his pivotal position in the philosophy of Advaita becomes crystal-clear, for it is He, who fashions, controls, and winds up the drama of Sāṃskārica life. Of the two types of

1. Bhāṣākāra, B.S.I.1.11
2. Sākṣaṇe svābhāva, par hārā na śām kālakāraḥ. Praṇaṇopaniṣad, V.2.
4. Vāmāśvāya viṣṇuḥ. B.S.I.1.2.
definition of Brahman mentioned earlier, the accidental or ṭaṭasthālaksana alone is relevant to God according to Advaita. This definition is given in the aphorism jānātādyasyayataḥ.

Like Advaitins, even non-Advaitins admit the existence of God, who is omniscient and omnipotent. But their conception of God differs vitally from that of the Advaitin and while they reach their conclusion through bare reasoning, the Advaitin takes his stand on Scripture and utilizes such argumentation as is favourable to the declarations of Śruti. The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the universe must have a creator who knows all i.e. the material cause, etc. since it is a product like a house. But here the reasoning is not sound. There is nothing to prevent the world from having many creators or a non-omniscient creator. A house, verily, may be the product of many men and it does not require omniscience on the part of one who builds the house. The Yogas say that the law of continuity proves God’s existence. Vyāsa says that the law of continuity to power (Śakti) and Lordship (Aīśvarya) are the proof for existence of God. There are, we know different degrees of power and lordship and God

1. VPS, p.697.
is the highest embodiment of power and has unsurpassed Lordship. This argument of the Yogas is defective. Even some of those, who maintain that there is no Isvara say that there are deities which are the termini of the capacities for cognition and lordship. God, according to Patañjali is a particular Divine-Self (puruṣa-viśeṣa Isvara) and this Self transcends all the phenomenal actions and their results as well as all afflictions and troubles. Like the Jīva, he is intelligent and unattached. If like the finite Self, God be without attachment, how can he be the 'prime mover' of prakṛti. The follower of the Yoga has a ready answer to give. God is not an ordinary puruṣa, he is a puruṣa-viśeṣa, a distinguished soul. It is because of his supremacy that he directs the universe, controls the course of creation. Otherwise, the universe would be like a kingdom without a king, an army without a captain of the Lord, the Scripture declares the directorship of the universe in the text, 'For fear of him, wind blows; for fear of him, move the sun and the stars.' Since God is without the blemishes, which pertain to the Jīvas, he can well be the controller of the world. It is no doubt true that even

2. V.P.S., p. 698.
the purusas are by nature undefiled; but since they do not discriminate themselves from the products of prakṛti, say the Yogas, blemishes karmas etc. belong to them. This view is not sound. If God be only the foremost among the finites, he ceases to be a God with an infinity of perfections. Such a view of God would satisfy neither the philosophical intellect nor the religious heart.  

The Naiyāyikas believe that the Lord is the dispenser of the fruit of Karma such as merit and demerit and argue that in order that he may do his work he must possess knowledge of that fruit even as an earthly master should know the fruit of service before granting it to his servants. Now this inference does not distinguish the God from the deities etc., admitted by those who maintain that there is no Īśvara. The logicians predicate of the Lord such attributes like cognition, effort and desire and they regard these qualities as eternal. Īśvara differs from the Jīvas only in the nature of his attributēs, not otherwise. His attributes are eternal while those of the Jīvas are not. 'He has desires that come true, resolves that are real.' The extra-cosmic God of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika is inadequate since he is not

1. PD, VI. 105-108.
4. VPS, p.698.
5. PD, VI. 109-110 ; Chān. Up. VIII.i.5.
the material cause of the universe.\(^1\) And if God be not the material cause, he must be a conditioned, finite and imperfect being, limited by the material out of which he has to mould the universe.\(^2\)

However, the conclusion from the failure of independent human reason to establish the reality of God, is, of course, not that there is no God. Other means than mere ratiocination should be employed to reach certitude in regard to God.\(^3\) Indeed the idea of proof itself, applicable only to propositions, based on axioms and postulates, suggests that it is irrelevant to God who is no proposition but Spirit. It is this perception that informs the Vedântic insistence that janmâdyasya-yataḥ is not the formulation of an inference to God's existence. It just refers to the upanisadic realization that God is the reality whence beings here are born, by which, when born, they live and into which, on deceasing, they enter.\(^4\)

2. VPS, p.698.
3. "The only strong argument for the reality of God is one that appeals to the reality of the intuitions of mankind. No logical proof is available."
To a true Advaitin, the universe is an illusion brought about into existence by ajñāna. Hence the idea of its genesis appears to be false and it is useless to expatiate on that subject. But to an ordinary man, the existence of the universe is as real as the existence of the cogniser Jīva. So long as the cogniser considers himself as such, his cognition of the universe exists along with the knowledge that the universe is existent. Therefore, like the objects of the universe, the universe also has to be fitted into the cause and effect system of everyday experience. Thus the topic of the genesis of the universe is quite relevant even in the system of Advaita-Vedānta. Moreover, in order to establish the oneness of existence, an Advaitin has to explain the false appearance of the world by showing its so-called relation to that absolute existence. This leads to the development of Vivarta theory of creation. But other philosophical systems have different theories regarding this genesis and they also try to find out the material, the efficient cause of the universe. Even in Advaita-Vedānta, particularly among some of the post-Śaṅkara Vedāntins, there we find differences of opinion regarding the theory of causality.
As for example, Vācaspati says that Jīva is the material cause of the universe and Avidyā as supported in Jīva is the instrumental cause. On the other hand Vidyāranya, expounding the Vivaraṇa view says that Īśvara or Brahman qualified by Māyā is the material cause of the world. The world cannot be thought of to be a product of the Jīva, for all Jīvās who are qualified by agency and enjoyership and are of the nature of name and form fall within the product. He says that it is true that from the viewpoint of projection or Māyā, Brahman is liable to be involved in the category of cause as well as of ground, but whether Brahman is the direct or indirect cause of the world, that should be ascertained.

2. VPS, p.666.
Now what kind of causality is recognized in respect of the Lord? Is it efficient causality alone or material causality alone or both? The first and second alternatives are not possible. Since if Īśvara were either the efficient or the material cause alone, he would be finite infinitude being impossible for him. Hence it must be admitted that he is the material cause as well as the efficient cause.

There is no unintelligibility whatever in the material cause being itself the efficient cause. The world has a material cause which is non-different from the efficient, since it is generated as preceded by knowledge, like the happiness, misery, attachment, aversion etc., present in the self. That the dual causality belongs to Īśvara is supported by the scriptural text which declares efficient causality in "That desired," and material causality in "May I become many".

The dual causality is declared of Brahman as its qualification per accidens, only in the view of the doctrine of illusory manifestation. The material causality of Brahman consists neither in origination, as by the primal atoms nor in transformation as of primal Nature. The Vaiśeṣikās and others who hold the view of absolute creation say that

1. See - B.S.S.B, I.iv.23.
something originates from something else as cloth from threads; and they attribute the creation of the world to the conjunction of primal atoms. The Sāṅkhyaśas and those who are in sympathy with their view of transformation characterize the world as a transformation of Primal Nature, as curd is of milk. When a thing attains a state, which is different from its present one, it is called transformation; when a thing, while not abandoning its prior state, appears to be of a different state, it is known as illusory manifestation. "That change, which is of the same grade of reality as the thing, is transformation what is not of the same grade of reality is illusory manifestation; or change which is of the same nature as the cause, is transformation; the effect, which even without being non-different from that (cause) is yet difficult to state apart from that, is an illusory manifestation; such is the distinction between transformation and illusory manifestation. Brahman can be neither the originating cause nor the transformed cause. What is partless by nature cannot originate something de novo; nor can it get itself transformed into something else. If Brahman were to abandon the earlier form and get transformed into another, then subsequent to creation,

1. PD, XIII, 6-9.
it will cease to exist as of the nature of knowledge and bliss. The opponent may contend that Brahman modified into the world at the time of creation again gets transformed into knowledge and bliss at the stage of dissolution. This contention is false because Brahman being of such a nature as to be modified into the world, a soul cannot attain release because of the absence of Brahman to be worshipped. Further, Vedic testimony about creation such as, "The unborn self, the great, the firm"; etc., predicates immutability of the self as opposed to transformation. And Brahman is immutable for it is partless.

It may be objected that a partless entity also is modified. Gold is modified into a necklace indirectly through its atoms in which it exists, as conjunction is inherent in a part of the whole. So the conjunctions of the parts of a whole produce a modification of it into another entity.

Vidyārāṇya Muni, asks what modification is. A modification is either being made of parts lumped together owing to conjunctions of the parts, which are different from their previous conjunctions, as a lump of clay assumes the form of a jar or being made of parts lumped together by the addition of other parts to its parts as milk is  

2. WPS, p. 678.
transformed into curd by the addition of a sour coagulating substance or assuming a different state like the growth of a young man to an old man or assuming another form like the trunk of a tree assuming the form of a pillar or conjunction with a different entity like an atom conjoined with another atom and becoming a dyad or motion like water becoming a current in a river or acquiring different qualities like a green mango becoming ripe or producing a different substance tinged by its material cause. Vidyāranya urges that modification cannot be of the nature of any of these processes. The first and second alternatives are not possible since a partless entity cannot have such modifications. The third and fourth alternatives also are not possible, because if Brahman is modified in such ways it cannot become Brahman again and so a soul cannot be released. An old man cannot become a young man again. A pillar cannot become the trunk of a tree again. The fifth, sixth and seventh alternatives are not possible, since the definition of modification are too wide Ether is conjoined with another substance but is not modified. A bee moves, but is not modified. A cloth being dyed with a red dye is not modified into another entity. The eighth alternative also is not possible because the modification of parts due to the modification of the whole is indescribable. Further, are the parts of gold modified

1 VPS, pp.675-677.
into a necklace? Or are they modified into another substance appropriate to a necklace? Or, do they assume another state appropriate to a necklace? The second and third alternatives are not possible, since the parts are not perceived to become a substance different from a necklace or to assume another state different from a necklace. The first alternative also is not possible, for a necklace is an effect of a whole lump of gold and not of its parts. If it were produced by the parts of Gold, the Nyāya doctrine of an effect as a new beginning would be true. The contention that the parts of gold cannot enter into a necklace is invalid since they can enter into it through the whole lump of gold. The contention that a whole abiding in its parts cannot be modified without a modification of the parts is false, because a dyad is produced and destroyed through its component atoms are neither produced nor destroyed. Or, let there be a modification of the parts, yet their modification is due to the modification of the whole and so it is not an example which proves the modification of Brahman.¹

What is the proof for Brahman's being partless on the strength of which it is said to be unmodifiable?

¹ WPS, p.679.
Vidyārāṇya replies that Vedic testimony is the proof for Brahman’s being partless. Further, Brahman’s being made of parts is indescribable. If Brahman consists of parts, either both the whole and the parts are self-manifest or either of them is self-manifest. In the first alternative, neither the parts nor the whole is known by the other, and so neither knows Brahman to be composed of parts. In the second alternative, the whole and the parts cannot be so related to each other, like a jar and self. A jar is known by self but not by its part or whole. Hence Brahman is partless and is not modified into the world, but appears to be the world appearance.

The fundamental soundness of these arguments against the theory of transformation is recognized by the Advaitin and so he moves on to the higher plane of the vivartavāda according to which the world is not so much a transformation as a misreading of God, the world-ground. This misreading is of course a consequence of the nescience of the interpreter vis-a-vis the nature of the world-ground. In this context the full significance of the expression avidyākalpitā nāmarupe occurring in the definition of Māyā

1. सावधसप्तप्रध वाटक प्रत्येकद वराप 1/ ibid, p.680.
2. तौवं निरवव्य भ्रमन न परिचय, किंवत विवकसित होत । ibid, p.681.
3. B.S.S.B, II,i,27.
becomes evident. This stresses the fact that the partless spirit or God cannot really undergo any transformation as 'the names and forms', the seeds of world's multiplicity are only ascribed to Him, due to the Jīva's ignorance and do not constitute His very nature, svarūpa; therefore, this impure and inert world is only a misreading of God by the ignorant Jīva and the objections urged earlier do not in any way apply to the divine world-ground.
The disputants do not agree as to what the material cause of the world is. Vidyāraṇya refutes the views of the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya, the Mādhyamika, and Cārvāka in this context. The Sāṃkhya regards prakṛti as the material cause of the world. All effects are modifications of the material cause, which is common to them, as earthen pots are of the nature of earth as their material cause. All effects are modifications of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas constituting prakṛti, the material cause, because they are limited, many, and of the nature of modifications like earthen pots. Vidyāraṇya offers the following criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. Internal pleasure, pain and delusion are perceived as different as external objects (e.g. a jar). So the reason of the inference is not proven. Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes sattva, rajas and tamas as pleasure, pain and delusion respectively. They are feeling-stuff. It is contended that the reason is proven, since the modifications like a jar and the like of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion are causes of the experience of these feelings in the adjunct of consciousness which manifests them, as a face, an archetype, reflected in the adjunct of a mirror, is the cause of the experience of it.

1. VPS., p.688.
This contention is false, because if that were so, one object would be experienced by a person as of a triple nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. It is contended that one object is perceived as of the nature of one guna because of the unseen principle (adrṣta). This contention is false, since the unseen principle cannot regulate the capacity of an entity. It cannot make a stone soft. The Śāmkhya argues that limitedness also is due to an entity. The argument is false, since in that case prakṛti and soul, which are eternal would be limited and effects. But the Śāmkhya regards them as unlimited and eternal. Similarly manyness and modifications as reasons may be shown to be irregular. A rope made of two long and wide pieces of contracted cloth would not be an effect. So the Śāmkhya view is wrong.

The Nyāya holds that an effect is produced by substances of less dimension than its dimension and that it is ultimately made of atoms.1 Vidyāraṇya refutes it by a counter-argument: the disputed dyad is produced by a substance made of parts, because it is made of parts, like a jar.2

1. विमत्त कार्यस्य स्वप्रकृतिः प्रकृतस्य पूर्वायेत्यम्।
   कार्यस्यस्यात्, परदीप्ति प्रदीप्ति परमात्मानूत्तमान। कार्यस्यात्।
   ibid, p.689.

2. ibid, p.691.
The Madhyamika argues that an effect is preceded by an absence because its previous state is not perceived, though it is capable of being perceived and so produced by the Void, like the Self imagined by the opponents. Vidyāranya refutes it thus: the Madhyamika’s reason of the inference is unproven, since the previous state of a jar, a lump of clay, is perceived.

Cārvāka holds that an effect is produced by nature. Vidyāranya refutes his view that: He asks whether an effect is produced by itself or whether it is produced without a cause. The first alternative is untenable, since it involves self-dependence. The second alternative also is inadmissible, since if an effect were produced without a cause, then a jar would simultaneously be existent and non-existent in that it does not depend upon gradual production. Cārvāka contends that if according to the Advaita Vedāntin gradual production by a cause is natural, then his doctrine also is naturalism and that if it depends upon another cause, this view will lead to infinite regress. If gradual production by a cause is admitted to be due to difference in time, the order of time is natural and so this view will be naturalism. If it depends upon another cause, it will lead to infinite regress. Vidyāranya urges that this contention is false for the following reasons. The capacity of entities in bringing about gradual production is independent of other causes or

1. ibid, p.689.
2. ibid, p.694.
its dependence on other causes is needless. The first alternative is admitted by the Advaita Vedāntin. In the second alternative, dependence on another cause is either not perceived or is inexplicable, though it is perceived. The first alternative is untenable, for it is contradicted by perception. A potter's dependence on a wheel and a staff in producing an earthen jar is proved by perception. The second alternative also is inadmissible, because according to an advaitin, inexplicability of all appearances is not a flaw, but a decoration. Further Cārvāka maintains that earth, water, fire and air are the four elements, that perception is the only pramāṇa and that naturalism is ontologically valid. In order to prove these theses he has to adduce reasons which have causes. If he does not adduce reasons, his theses are unproven. If they are held to be valid because they are experienced, he accepts the Advaitin's doctrine of indescribable phenomena. So Cārvāka's view is false. Hence Brahman appears to be the world appearance.

1. *qgifttqfrufwi qrifrfr wpit s i*
2. ibid, p.696.

ibid, p.696.
The Vivaraṇa School of Advaita Vedānta maintains that Āvidyā is co-eternal with the Brahman and when pure consciousness is reflected in Āvidyā, it is called the individual Self or Jīva. The Brahman itself is ever-transcendent and the Brahman as witnessing consciousness (sākṣā or bimba) is Īśvara and the Brahman as a reflected consciousness (pratibimba) is Jīva. These three concepts have come into existence on the basis of Ātman’s nature of false relationship with Āvidyā. This being so, pure self is the essence of Īśvara and Jīva. On this point there is unanimity among different teachers of the Advaita Vedānta school, but they differ in establishing a kind of relationship between the Lord or Īśvara and the individual Self or Jīva. Some of them consider both the Lord and the Jīva to be reflections of Brahman. Some others regard the Lord as the prototype and the Jīva as his reflection. Still others maintain the Jīva to be intelligence defined by nescience. Yet others maintain that the Jīva is neither a reflection nor nescience-defined intelligence but that it is Brahman which has forgotten its infinitude. Vidyārānya records these views at the end of the seventh varṇaka in the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha and says that all
of them are final positions. Some Advaitins, he declares draw a distinction between Māyā and Avidyā regard Brahman, the prototype who is endowed with the energy of Māyā, as the cause and the Jīvas as reflections, each separately conditioned by Avidyā. The author of the Brahma-siddhi advocates a subjectivistic view. According to him, the Jīvas themselves create the world due to delusion. They are separately deluded in respect of Brahman envisaging it as of the form of the world, because of their own nescience. Their worlds correspond and are not identical. Each Jīva is circumscribed by its own creation. Each one is involved in a circular panorama. Brahman, however is spoken of as the cause, figuratively, because it is the substrate of the world. There is also another way in which the subjectivistic view is set forth. Brahman alone through its own Avidyā is said to manifest itself illusorily in the form of the world as in dreams etc!

Among post - Śaṅkara Advaitins, there has arisen a controversy over the way in which the Jīva is to be regarded. Mainly there are three theories, namely Ābhāsavāda, Avacchedavāda and Pratibimbavāda in this connection. Now we take up the three separately for a critical appraisal.

1. VPS, pp. 736-737.
Suresvara is an advocate of the theory of Abhasavāda. He holds that Brahman is reflected on Avidyā. It appears as being identical with this reflection which is represented as the cause of the manifold. It is the witness, the innerscient. The same principle, when it appears as being identical with reflection cast upon mental consciousness or intellect is called Jīva. Both Īśvara and Jīva are reflected consciousnesses and as such are appearances.

This theory makes a distinction between consciousness in itself and consciousness in reflection. The former is free, the latter is in bondage. How then can we consistently speak of the attempt on the part of the latter to get salvation, for it is in complete bondage. Freedom is attainable only when the bondage is apparent and illusory. Since the theory under consideration makes Ātman completely free and the personal self quite distinct from Ātman in being a reflected consciousness, this reflection cannot be logically said to be striving after freedom, for it does not understand that freedom is its being. This contention has been refuted by the author of the Vārtik. The Ātman itself appears to be in bondage

1. Siddhāntabindu, p.113.
2. ibid, p.113.
because of its being associated and mistakenly identified with the reflection. The possibility of its being reflected is its bondage and the removal of this possibility is its freedom.

(g) 'Avacchedavāda'

Avacchedavāda is maintained by Vacaspati Mīśra. He regards every finite conscious unit as a mode of the substance. It is not reflection of consciousness upon anything. It is rather a limitation of consciousness by something external viz. Avidyā. Just as the sky seems to be limited, made definite and characterized as the pot-sky, (ghaṭākāśa), room-sky (maṭhākāśa) etc., similarly consciousness, so long as Nescience exists, is not seen in its integrity and appears as divided in parts and modified by its upādhi. Through the cosmic Nescience consciousness appears in the form of modes, without implying any real division in its being.

This theory differs somewhat from the doctrine of reflection where Jīva is a reflection, taken for reality through non-discrimination; in Vacaspati's theory Jīva is the limitation of consciousness and one can attain liberation on putting off the sense of limitation due to ignorance.

1. SLS, p.157.
Pratibimbavāda

Prakāśtman Yati is the chief exponent of the theory of reflection (Pratibimbavāda). This theory is almost the same as the Ābhāsavāda. It is different only in the conception and interpretation of reflection. Ābhāsavāda regards the reflection as unreal in itself and we are asked to leave it off by concentrating our thought upon the essence and by drawing it away from the reflection. Prakāśtman holds that what (consciousness) appears in reflection is true, though the reflection is false: so that it is in itself true, though false as a reflection. The theory which regards reflection in itself as false is ordinarily known as Ābhāsavāda, while the theory which maintains that reflection as reflection is false but is true in essence is known as Bimba-Pratibimbavāda.

Vidyārānya, an advocate of the Vivaraṇa view, explains the notion of Pratibimbavāda as thus: the Jīva is a reflection of intelligence present in egoity and since there is no difference between the prototype and the reflection, the Jīva is non-different from Brahman. The reflected face in a mirror for example is not other than the prototype. It is identical with the original

face, with certain taints such as facing oneself, being located in the mirror etc; superimposed thereon. The experienced difference between what is present on one's shoulders and what is present in the mirror is removed by the recollection of oneness in the form "This face is mine". Vidyārūya shows the arguments, logically tenable, in favour of the impossibility of the pratībimbasa as different from the bimba, in so far as such a difference is sublated from the very fact that an entity, existing outside, has a shadow inside a particular medium like water or mirror. Further, if there were difference, reflection would not be possible. What is called reflection is neither a seal imposed on the mirror by the face, nor is it a transformation of the very parts of the mirror due to the proximity of the prototype. The reflection is not a seal because it is not always seen that the prototype and the reflection are of the same size and because there is no conjunction between the face and the mirror. He has tried to show elaborately that if there were a real parināma of the reflection on the parts of the mirror, it would have endured even when the original counterpart would be removed. But that is far from the

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1. V. P. S., p. 220.
2. ibid., p. 221.
3. ibid., p. 221.
4. ibid., p. 221.
The reflection changes from the variations in posture movements and presence or absence of the man whose face is reflected. The reflection of the face on the mirror cannot also be said to go out as soon as the original counterpart itself changes from the place as in the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika theory which explains the destruction of an effect due to the change of the cause or condition responsible for a particular effect (nimittapāye naimitikasyāpyapāyaḥ). The favourite example in this regard is that of the 'knowledge of mutuality' (apekṣābuddhi) that is responsible for the appearance and disappearance of the knowledge of twoness (dvitvabuddhi). Knowledge of twoness ever involves that there are two mutually dependent entities to give rise to such a knowledge. This knowledge of mutuality is what they conceive as responsible for the appearance and disappearance of the knowledge of twoness. But such a view is hardly tenable, for even though the nimitta (cause or condition) is sometimes absent from a place, its naimitika can go out temporarily but nevertheless that does not really mean that it is due to the absence of the nimitta? for it is well observed that when a

10 न सत्त्वं नामित्तापायद्वयं सर्वाय।।

ibid, p.222.
different effect intervenes, the cause or condition is merely intervened in its latent forceful potentiality by that temporary effect, when a matting which is rolled up for, say, years together is spread out by the hand, the spreading lasts so long as the temporary saṃskāra (potentiality) done with the hand is operative, after which the more powerful saṃskāra of being rolled up, say, for months, again operates; otherwise if the absence of the temporary saṃskāra of out-stretchedness meant the rolling-up of the matting there would have always been the rolled-up state generated by the more formidable saṃskāra of years. Thus the rolled-up state being temporarily checked is generated again by that formidable saṃskāra and not by the mere absence of the out-stretchedness of the matting. Vidyāraṇya shows that on the showing of this analysis it will be clear that the reflection of the fact upon the mirror should persist even after the original counterpart is removed, for that image has a strong saṃskāra to rise up, being reflected on a mirror many times. If that be the case, there should not be anything to stand in the way of its persistence, - even if a different image is reflected, for that different image is merely a temporary check for the original image strongly and frequently imprinted on a particular mirror (say, the image of my face daily on my own mirror). But that would be an absurd
contention for no one can say with definiteness that the reflection of his face on his own mirror is a persistent factor of experience. Moreover, merely because of the proximity of the face, the parts of the mirror cannot get transformed into the form of the face; otherwise a sculptor, when he wants to fashion an image out of mirror-material, would only bring the prototype into the proximity of a mirror, instead of engaging in such activities as chiselling etc. Further, the transformation in the form of a facial reflection is not sound, because when the mirror is felt through touch by the hand, it is an even surface that is cognized and not the condition of having depressions and prominences like the eyes, the nose etc. Hence there is not another face in the mirror. It is the prototype that appears as if in the mirror.

Vidyārāṇya, then goes on to examine the objections of the opponents that the Advaitist contention of the oneness of the original counterpart (bimba) and its image (pratibimba) is untenable, for these objectors show that even posterior recollection of the oneness is not warranted to prove the real oneness of the two, as there is well such posterior recollection of the oneness is an illusory silver (as on a piece of shell). To this forceful objection, Vidyārāṇya

1. VPS, p.223.
2. ibid, p.224.
3. ibid, p.224.
brings out the real nature of illusory objects and the absence of oneness between the substratum and the superimposed. His analysis of bādha (negation) brings out the full implications of the Advaitist theory where the superimposed is the creation of avidyā and hence illusory (prātibhāṣaīka). He shows that negation of the superimposed makes it wholly negated in its own nature, when, for example a piece of shell is falsely cognised as a piece of silver, the latter is negated, not as being absent at that particular place and time, but as being wholly an illusory object that is merely cognised falsely having no real nature of its own. If this be the basic principle of negation from the Advaitist standpoint, it becomes evident that it does not merely postulate a relation that is false, and necessarily which is negated afterwards, but recognises the intrinsic falsity of the object itself. Hence Vidyāranya very rightly analyses the difference of the nature of negation that is made in the case of a reflection, here Vidyāranya shows that there is merely the posterior knowledge of the absence of any image on a particular adjunct, say, that of my face on the mirror which does not necessarily entail that the
image is intrinsically false, but merely suggests that it is the image or reflections of an original counterpart with which it is in oneness. The disappearance of the image of my face does not therefore mean that the image in itself is false or the adjunct (mirror) is false, for neither the image nor the mirror is negated but is only shifted from the original places to show that the bimba is the only substratum for all image to appear images that are all in essence one with it.

The function of the adjunct, then, is to create the bifurcation, but as the image is bifurcated from the counterpart, there is some kind of a power or potency, that is responsible for this phenomenon though unnatural. This is the true philosophy of Āvidyā or nescience, the mother of all difference and diversity. The totally illusory is that which is superimposed on some substratum as in case of shell-silver. Hence the pratibimba, though not different from the bimba, has the appearance of a distinction, however unwanted it may be. This distinction of bheda is, therefore, totally false and what should be negated is this wrong ascription of bheda on abheda of the distinction of a pratibimba on its unity with bimba.
Thus, Vidyārānya has shown that there is no necessity to postulate the falsity or negation of the pratibimba on the ground of scriptural passages like 'Tat Tvam Asi' which seem to be unjustified if the Tvam is not negated by Tat. His analysis shows that such passages do not postulate the negation of the Tvam but only the unity of the two concepts Tat and Tvam - the only Reality. Like posterior recollection of a previous experience as 'So'yam Devadattaḥ', these Śruti-passages merely indicate that the verbal distinction involved in Tvam is merely syncreticized with its unity with Tat, as the previous experience of space, time etc. along with Devadatta is syncreticized with his perception of unity in the present context. Hence while Jīvatva is negated as being the false creation of Avidyā, the Jīva as non-different in essence from Brahman is merely realized as such and never negated. To substantiate the trend of arguments in this regard, we can refer to the Śruti-passage: 'Jīvapetam vāva kiledām mriyate na Jīvo mriyate' wherein it is stated that Jīva is eternal being non-different from Brahman.

1. VPS, p.226.
2. ČVĀM. Up. 6.11.3.
and can therefore never die; what die are the false associations of body and senses that are left out as being unrelated in any way to the essentiality of the Jīva. Padmapāda also suggests this Advaitic interpretation by saying that if there were any such negation, the form of negation would have been "Thou are not", but it is simply "Thou art that". From this syncretic realization, it is rather clearer to hold that the Tvam-element is really the Tat-element not different from it; only the false associations of accretions are there due to the inherent Avidyā.

Vidyārañya, following his predecessor further goes on to analyse the nature of the pratibimba to show that its appearance cannot be denied if there be an adjunct in contact with the bimba. The bimba has an appearance on an adjunct if the power of Avidyā is operative and even then it cannot be said that the pratibimba should cease to appear when we have knowledge of the bimba as the only reality. He first goes on to dismiss the objection of the Prābhākaras that there is no such thing as a pratibimba over and above the pratibimba, which being recognised without its relation with the trunk (grīvā) appears on the
reality, for though the real incentive to such appearance is no doubt, Avidyā pertaining to the percipient consciousness, yet there is a material adjunct like water or mirror which rakes it up. Thus when such raking up takes place, ātmāvidyā transforms itself into the appearance of the image. In Sopādhika bhramas therefore, when the percipient consciousness has no direct knowledge of itself as the substratum of Avidyā responsible for the appearance of the image, mere knowledge of the reality of one aspect of the appearance (the bimba) cannot dispel the other aspect of it (the pratibimba). Thus in nirūpādhika bhramas like the appearance of the silver upon shell, the direct knowledge of the shell is sufficient to dispel the ignorance covering up shell-consciousness and hence as soon as the shell-consciousness is revealed, the ignorance covering it up and responsible for the appearance of the silver is no longer there. Thus there is a deep-rooted metaphysical theory to support the epistemological position brought out by Vidyārāṇya to support the continued experience of the image in sopādhika bhramas. In such cases, therefore, the appearance of the image can be expunged only when the material adjunct
(like water) is removed so as to make for the percipient consciousness to have the immediate knowledge of itself as being the seat of the nescience responsible for such appearance. The Jīva therefore, as a reflection of Brahman, ceases to appear only when the adjunct of Avidyā responsible for its duality in time and space is removed, thus vouchsafing for the direct knowledge of the self or Brahman as the dispeller of any reflection outside itself. The role of the adjunct, therefore, is not a whit unimportant, for it is the most important medium for the appearance and disappearance of the image to retard or reveal the direct knowledge of the Self. In nirūpadhika bhramas, Avidyā veiling up the object-consciousness creates something other on it and hence the superimposed comes and goes when that nescience is dispelled, even if the self be not known directly as the ground of all nescience. The knowledge of the piece of shell without any Avidyā is enough to show that there is no silver that illusorily showed itself upon it. The piece of shell might be pushed forward to be related with the pramātr-caitanya to be brought out in its own direct experience (visaya-pratyakṣa) when the pramātr-caitanya also may be regarded as worthy of direct
experience for the directness of the shell, but such far-flung epistemological steps are warranted in nirūpādhika bhramas as in sopādhika bhramas where the object consciousness is in no wise veiled, yet there is the appearance of the image.

From these elaborate discussions as to the real implications of the negation of false knowledge of associations which Jīva as pratibimba are endowed with. He first shows as unfounded the objection against the impossibility of negation of such false knowledge because of the Jīva's being a pratibimba of Brahman not as a false entity but as one in essence with It, whence even the direct knowledge of unity may, as has been explained above, not be able to dispel the false knowledge of associations. He shows that in the case of the appearance of Jīva, there is an essential difference from the ordinary pratibimbas like the facial image, for in the latter cases they are all unconscious and cannot be dispelled without the physical removal of the material adjunct like the mirror; but in the former case of Jīva, he is always conscious and therefore any true knowledge will automatically dispel the false associations with which the Jīva, is connected much like the associations falsely ascribed to the facial
image as being turned toward the man whose face is reflected. In such cases the unconscious image and its associations are removed not by mere real knowledge but also when the material adjunct is removed. The conscious character of the Jīva is undisputed unlike the unconscious image, for the latter cannot move of itself without the movements of the bimba whence it is clear to say that it is never a conscious agent. It cannot also be argued that the bimba, i.e., Brahman should have the real knowledge, for it is the bimba like the man (Devadatta) whose face is reflected that is the real possessor of such knowledge. Here also this essential difference of the character of Jīva as conscious must needs postulate that it is not the claim of the bimba or counterpart as bimba to possess true knowledge as in the case of the reflection of the unconscious image of the face; it is the agent, who as conscious possesses the false knowledge, that should also possess the True Knowledge eclipsed by false associations and as appearing otherwise; and this postulation is with regard to the conscious Jīva - falsely associated as severed from Brahman in its accretions. Ajñāna or Avidyā can never veil an unconscious entity and hence it is never in need of any dispelling of it. The ordinary material adjunct like the mirror or water, which is incontact with the bimba merely

1. VPS, p. 230.
creates a duality in the image perception in which sense it is false. But neither the image is the possessor of any ajñāna, nor the original bimba the possessor of any right knowledge; for both are inert, unconscious entities which can never have any false or true knowledge. In the case of the Jīva, however, he has a special privilege of being conscious and this privilege makes him the possessor of the false knowledge of duality due to false accretions related with him. Though he is non-different from Brahman, yet it is he who loses sight of that unity and though one in essence, falsely identifies himself with duality or plurality of body, mind etc. The reflection as reflection is, therefore, never false, for it is not different from Brahman, but the Jīva reflection is somewhat unique in character than ordinary reflections. The consciousness that is in the Jīva is veiled as being severed from Brahman, but the facial image is not so veiled, nor the face itself, for, it is, as has been already brought out, the consciousness of the percipient subject which is, under the influence of material, adjuncts, subjected to an Avidyā (atmamoha), thus vouchsafing for the duality of the images to appear. Hence in such cases the images have nothing to do with the dawning of right knowledge, nor is the bimba or face as such concerned in any way with such an advent. The pratibimbas linger on inspite of the dawning of right knowledge and the bimbas also
are not prevented from being reflected by such dawning of right knowledge so long as the material adjunct is there it is only the conscious percipient as pramāṇa who is directly the enjoyer of any fruits of false or true knowledge inspite of the fact that there is a reflection or there is none. Thus Vidyārāṇya's analysis of the dawning of right knowledge carries us direct into the heart of Advaita Metaphysics and epistemology by showing that not because of the fact that a particular entity, say, Brahman is the original from which there is a reflection, say, of Jīva, should there be a recognition of its being the possessor of false knowledge as well as true knowledge, for no other cases like those of the facial images can prove that the bimbas are such entities. It is the nature of Avidyā to cling fast to consciousness and not to any mere bimba. Hence it is the nature of tattvajñāna to rise in that which is under the spell of ajñāna. Thus considered, it is no good logic to hold that Brahman, the bimba is the possessor of true knowledge, for ajñāna does not directly affect it. Here, however, we may consider the plausibility of such an argument; for it is well-known that in Advaita Vedānta, it is the Brahman as Pure consciousness, that is declared as being the substratum of ajñāna when ajñāna is said to cling to consciousness, it is the consciousness as

1. अवस्तु ब्रह्मचारिणानि प्रवः वा मुग्नवा।
   सम्प्रवेदनस्तव दक्षिणमेव सम्प्रज्ञानेन सा निवासति।

PPV, p.110.
self that is veiled by it. At least, the Vivarana school does not admit any difference between the locus and object of ajnāna, for it is Brahman that is both. The Bhāmatī school, however regards the Jīva as the locus of ajnāna. Now if such be the metaphysical position of the two schools, how can Vivaranakāra consistently maintain that it is the Jīva that is the locus of ajnāna as well as that of right knowledge? To answer such an awkward situation, we should do well to understand that the admission here by the Vivaranakāra of Jīva as the locus of ajnāna to support that right knowledge should belong to him (Jīva) seems trying to substantiate the difference of the Jīva from the ordinary images as that of face on mirror to show that it is a conscious entity granted that it is Jīva— which is in ignorance and with right knowledge Brahman, in the interpretations of his school, reflects as the Jīva, thus making for the duality of appearance in the latter; the latter however, is non-different from the former. Hence all duality necessarily being illusory is the product of ajnāna clinging on to Pure consciousness; when that veil goes away, right knowledge is unveiled and unprojected dawns.

The speciality of the pratibimbatva of Jīva is further brought out by Vidyāranya when he shows that as in ordinary cases of images like that of the face upon the mirror, the image stays on as long as the upādhi (mirror) is there, inspite of real knowledge of unity of the face and the
image having dawned in the man, so in the case of the Jīva-reflection it might be of the same nature of non-negation of duality even after the real knowledge of unity, had the Jīva been of the same nature with the facial image. But the Jīva having no material adjunct like the mirror save the out-and-out false avidyā there cannot be any moment of false knowledge when the root-cause of all such knowledge i.e. avidyā is totally destroyed at the dawn of the transcendental knowledge of unity.

The character of the Jīva as reflection is finally brought out by Vidyārānya by an appeal to proofs of perception as well as ādute. He dismisses the possible objection that Jīva being limited by blind nescience cannot be the conscious seat- that is in essence not different from pure consciousness- for the possibility of any ajñāna or posterior r tattvajñāna; similarly also he finds no reason in the argument that Brahman being All-pervasive cannot be reflected by limited nescience. The Jīva is a reflection by ordinary experience of his conscious nature that is only acted upon by the limited knowledge wrought by nescience; otherwise it is not different in any way from All-consciousness- it is not in any way limited as unconscious by the nescience that acts upon it. The nature of Jīva as a reflection is moreover substantiated in the different strata of Vedāntic literature viz. the

1. न जीवं प्रतिविम्बले माननावः, अन्यशृङ्खलायेत //
   मुँहेज्ञानयुक्ते नास्ति।।
   व.प. 231।
sruti, the smrti, and the sutra (Brahmasūtras). Brahman can be reflected on Avidyā as Jīva in the same way as all pervasive sky studded with stars appears as reflected on a limited watery surface. Reflection of the all-pervasive is possible if there is an adjunct to work upon the all-pervasive entity to make for its appearance, that is not in essence different from it; had the reflection been different altogether from the reflected, we could question whether the reflected all-pervasive entity should at all be reflected on an adjunct as limited. But when the reflected entity is not an entity as to be different altogether from the image which is reflected, who can question the plausibility of the image appearing on a limited adjunct but not on that account being limited by it? Limitation is not real in the all-pervasive entity even appearing as circumscribed, for this is a characteristic created out of the false bifurcation of the limited and the limiting where in fact no such bifurcation is ever true either in the one or in the other. Thus the reflection of Brahman as Jīva should be recognized on all hands as the most authentic proof of the real unity of all existence.

2. Brahmapindu, 12.
Incidentally there is a criticism in the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha of the avaccheda view. If the Jīva, like pot-ether, be defined by an adjunct, it is asked, does Brahman too exist in the midst of the adjunct of the Jīva or does it not? If it existed, there would be a duplication of intelligence in the adjunct of the Jīva. But no such duplication is seen in the case of the ether in the pot. And if Brahman be non-existent in the adjunct, it would cease to be the omnipresent controller of all. Therefore, the Jīva is not defined by an adjunct like pot-ether. The example of pot-ether is given in the sacred teaching in order that the non-attachedness of the self may be understood. Scripture has no purport in establishing the Jīvahood of the defined. The duplicated existence of intelligence, however, is not a defect on the view of the Jīva as a reflection. Just as in the midst of knee-deep water there exists both the natural ether that is of the volume of the water and the reflected expansive ether, in the adjunct of the Jīva, namely, egoity, there may intelligibly be present both the original and the reflected intelligence. Thus the Vivaraṇa view is that the reflection is of the nature of the real prototype and that illusoriness belongs to the character

of being a reflection and of the difference, error etc.
which bring about that character. Hence we conclude in
the words of Prakāśatmayati that the doctrine of reflection
is better than that of limitation.

In the end, we may say that these theories are not
to be taken seriously for they are attempts to clearly
represent the nature and position of Jīva by analogies.
Śaṅkara does not lay any emphasis upon these conceptions.
Indeed, there are passages in his writings which can support
all the three view-points mentioned above, and it were the
later ācāryas or the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, who tried to
establish their own theories by refuting the opponents'
theory and interpreting the analogies of the Śruti in their
own way. It does not really matter whether the example of
the pot-defined ether be given or the analogy of reflection
be cited. What the preceptors of Advaita aim at teaching
is the non-difference of the Jīva from Brahman.

1. PPV, pp. 65-66.
2. See, T.M.P. Mahādevan : The Philosophy of Advaita,
p.220.