CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGY, REVOLUTION, HISTORY

Solzhenitsyn has been at the cutting edge of contemporary Russian history for about forty years now. He is not only a chronicler of his times but also an intellectual with a keen historical sense who has predicted the splitting up of the former Soviet Union. His sense of Russian history encompasses the whole span of time ranging from Czarism to the present. Solzhenitsyn's vision of history at the earlier stages functioned at a synchronic level, so much so, that he recognized Stalinism as the warped offshoot of the Russian Revolution, responsible for the stringent regime that succeeded Lenin. Later this perspective gained a more diachronic dimension. Solzhenitsyn was able to see beyond Stalinism, and even affirm with conviction that the war of 1914 was indirectly responsible for the deplorable state of Russia during the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods. Solzhenitsyn's patriotic feeling for Lenin also underwent a radical change. It is this acute sense of history that has helped Solzhenitsyn to predict the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union. Further Solzhenitsyn's exiled life in the West has helped him to read contemporary world history in the light of his awareness of his own country's history. In evaluating the history of his country, Solzhenitsyn's focus was on the role of revolution in Russia. When we think of the term
'History' we immediately relate it to the past, endowing it with an all-subsuming authority. We tend to idealize 'History' as a kind of grand narration, and simultaneously visualize battles, bloodshed, conquests and defeats. Last but not the least, the subject of history is aglow with its several eruptions. We define these eruptions, which are in effect disruptions, as 'revolutions'. Solzhenitsyn is able to feel the pulse of these disruptions. The relationship between history and revolutions is complementary. The link between the two is 'ideology' which is the fuel for a revolution. History has shown how ideology often misfires when mishandled. A feeling of disillusionment sets in when the noble causes of a revolution go haywire and the very process gets thwarted. This brings us to the question of the validity of a revolution. The nature and concept of a revolution derived from the course of the major revolutions of the past help diagnose the backfiring of a revolution. This exercise in turn compels us to reflect upon the failure of a revolution to establish a stable or benign government. All the major revolutions as historical eruptions, become important 'signs' of history. How one deciphers these 'signs' makes all the difference. A perceptive mind like Solzhenitsyn's is able to unravel the complex dimensions of such 'signs'. Solzhenitsyn does not read Russian history merely at a linear level but sees it in a retrospective manner. Thus he is aware of the basic paradigm
that these 'signs' reflect. The dimensions may vary but the fundamental signification is the same. Solzhenitsyn locates the underlying 'ideology', the distorted version of the original impulse, as the root cause, portending disaster. He senses that violence unleashed without any rationale begets only violence. Hence Solzhenitsyn's abhorrence of violent revolutions has never abated.

When we speak of revolutions, we cannot afford to ignore two major events in history. The very concept of a revolution in modern times has been shaped largely by these two bloody revolutions — the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. The socio-economic and political conditions prevailing in their respective periods led to the outbreak of disorder, nay anarchy. Both these historical events, although deeply inspired by lofty ideals, turned self-defeating. These revolutions have gained a status (now questioned) as two exemplary revolutions that made a clarion call for the freedom of the individual. But in reality the latter-day events became an affront to human dignity. The course of these two revolutions contains an ambivalence. They initially symbolized a struggle for human liberty and emancipation, envisioning a classless society, but both resulted in the formation of another authoritarian set-up. The end could not justify the means. The bloodbath that these two revolutions has led their countries into, has inexorably
stamped the label of violence on the concept of a revolution. Before the eighteenth century revolutions were not internationally acclaimed, being narrow in their scope. The French Revolution transformed this provincial scenario. The dire consequences of the French Revolution compelled thinkers to locate the underlying forces which had ushered in the Revolution. At this juncture Karl Marx came up with his analysis of the contemporary industrial society and its relation to the inherent forces of history. Marx paved the way for a proletarian revolution emphasizing the need for a party to pursue the end of fighting against the middle-class liberals. With Marx revolution became aligned with class-conflict. The Russian Revolution is one such revolution, a parallel to the French Revolution. Unfortunately both these revolutions backfired. They prove that a stifled revolutionary movement bodes a subsequent revolution, having necessitated the conditions arising from its misfired ambitions. They fail to persuade that violence is a beneficial and productive force in a revolution. History has repeatedly shown through its various radical movements and wars that the ideals of a revolution get "filched or deflected", to use Sir Lewis Namier's apt words (Vanished Supremacies 34), once the revolution is set in motion.
After the major revolutions societies have entertained the fallacy that mankind is moving towards enlightenment. But is this a fact? Ironically enough the violent repercussions of these major revolutions have been felt as recent as 1989 in the Tiananmen Square Massacre in China and the breaking-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. In China the lesson Tiananmen Square Massacre teaches is a bitter truth whose violent reflections are echoed in several parts of the country today. We have to acknowledge sadly that even the contemporary post-modern era has witnessed political atrocities at several levels. The Tiananmen Square tragedy is a counter-revolution aspiring to set right the earlier cultural revolution in China. This square in the capital of China has come to signify the inefficacy of individuals in the face of socio-political pressures exercised by the authorities. Since June 4th, 1989, this square has become a symbol of protest, and the massacre has been one tortuous memory. Another major crisis which took the world by surprise was the dramatic splitting up of the Soviet Union, which of course, Solzhenitsyn had predicted in his *Rebuilding Russia*.

When there is such violence in the recent times, we cannot afford to sideline the kind of timely prognostication that a writer like Solzhenitsyn made. We may also realize that though the perspectives differ, the basic paradigm of violence and chaos is not altered. We have to recognize the grim fact
that such crises are not random occurrences but latter-day disruptions or echoes of the past. Craig Calhoun in "The Beijing Spring, 1989: An Eye-Witness Account" points out that the Tiananmen affair was not an "isolated event but the latest in a series of pro-democratic protests" (447) which include the protests of 1979-80 and 1986-87, the mourning of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the May 4th movement of 1919, the Republican Revolution of 1911 and the repression of 1895. In the case of the Soviet Union, the contemporary setback is definitely a reflection, or rather, an inevitable result of the past history of the Soviet Union. It is no pure coincidence that such traumas have occurred more often in Communist countries than in non-communist countries. In Russia, the Revolution of 1917 has cast its shadow to the very present. As Xan Smiley in "Beyond Gorbachev" (1990) holds, "Russian history is a mere continuum of tyranny" (26). Solzhenitsyn has echoed a similar sentiment in his third volume of The Gulag Archipelago in which he refers to Russian society as "an electro-magnetic field" where "all the lines of force in it point away from freedom and toward tyranny" (479). But change seemed imminent with the recent revolution in Russia of the late 80s and early 90s.

What Russia has produced is a continuum of terror. The Lenin and post-Stalin periods have proved no better than the Czarist times. Russia was under Lenin's rule for half a
decade, three decades under Stalin, ten years under Khrushchev, eighteen years under Brezhnev and three years under Andropov and Chernenko. In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev took over, soon to be ejected by Boris Yeltsin. Under Gorbachev the several attempts at a change by means of "Perestroika" and "Glasnost" failed. In 1991 the Soviet Union splintered into fifteen newly independent states. Sheer instability characterized the moment. Solzhenitsyn had very clearly stated even earlier that "the painful and costly process of separation will make the beginning of the transitional period, that first phase of our new development, an especially difficult time for us . . ." (Rebuilding Russia 24). Be it Gorbachev or Yeltsin at the helm, the history of the erstwhile Soviet Union has taken its own course. The post cold-war era has ushered in a disastrous power crisis leading to the collapse of political economy. A bleak future seems to haunt Russia. John Blaney and Mike Gfoeller in "Lessons From the Failure of Perestroika" (1993) have concluded that "historically based economic instability has become the vortex of a political blackhole that has swallowed the Soviet Union" (496). Solzhenitsyn had foreseen such a political and economic impasse much in advance.

We are obliged to concede that history has demonstrated with its era of violent revolts, both in the West and the East, that bloody revolutions end in disenchantment,
containing within, a self-destroying force, so that violence is not the means to an end, but an end in itself. It is in this context that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn attempts to bring about a totally different kind of revolution, which will be dealt with later in this chapter.

Traditional historiography or original recorded history fails actually to expose the origin, cause and subsequent course of deviations of a revolution nor does it allow any scope for a really objective interpretation or reassessment. The void created from such a situation is filled by writers/intellectuals/artists in each historical epoch. They perform the role of a chronicler and their writings perform the function of a recorded history. We must understand how the self-subversive element in a revolution is embedded in history. When ideology gets warped some leaders make use of it to kindle the embers that are simmering beneath deep layers of historical structures. We come to know of this because often some elites take upon themselves the role of a chronicler. Here we are primarily concerned with such writers who help us to comprehend the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of history. Their writings fulfil the lacunae in recorded history. A comparative perspective underscores Solzhenitsyn's seminal contribution in this regard.
Writers and Revolution

It is evident that behind every revolution there operates an ideology which influences its course to a considerable extent. Earlier we had noted the discrepancy between the ideal of a revolution and its deviant materialization as an event. Lewis Feuer explains that "the irrational and unconscious side of man longs for ideology to the extent it longs for revolutionary experience" (192). Hence ideology as the "mode of thought which, issuing most often from the generational unconscious" as speaking the "language of 'Revolution' . . ." (Ideology and the Ideologists [1975] 192). The nature of ideology is such that once institutionalized in power structures, it is naturally deflected from its original purpose. As Lewis Feuer rightly puts it, "ideology, by dividing people into two classes, one elected, the other rejected, sets the stage for untrammelled violence and warfare" (193). A revolution thus becomes unsuccessful when its ideology fails. We cannot definitely claim any one ideology as the right ideology capable of inspiring a totally gratifying revolution. There is no such ideology. But this much can be said that an ideology that necessitates bloody and dreadful results, and belittles the importance of an individual, cannot be the right ideology. As we noted earlier writers help to puncture the various fallacies perpetrated by ideology, and also enhance our understanding of the double-edged phenomenon which a revolution is.
Here we are concerned with three writers who were intimately influenced by revolution and its backlash in their own-individual ways each — George Orwell, Boris Pasternak and of course Solzhenitsyn.

We have taken up Orwell's and Pasternak's works at this point for gaining a comparative insight into our topic. In this section we will be dealing with Orwell's Homage to Catalonia (1938), Animal Farm (1945), 1984 (1949), Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago (1957), and relevant works of Solzhenitsyn.

Orwell, Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn realized that revolutions are neither sporadic nor local but have far-reaching consequences for humanity. Revolution, its vicious machinery and an individual's role and place in the process of history, are a common ground for all these writers to articulate their artistic and intellectual convictions. However, the impact of revolution on these three varied from writer to writer.

All of them have responded to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, but we have to bear in mind that what separates Orwell from the other two writers is that he was an outsider to the Revolution. Yet Orwell's intuitive perception and insight into the Revolution is not to be missed. We should also remember that it has its moorings in another historically significant event, namely, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939).
Orwell's participation in this war had basically shaped his ideas on revolution, later meditated upon in his *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). The Spanish Civil War was an affront to Western liberal thinking, indeed a massive blow to Western liberal faith. Orwell could sense the hand of totalitarianism in this war and his deep introspection into the nature of this phenomenon found articulation in the form of an allegorical fable in *Animal Farm* and a dystopia in *1984*.

Though Orwell returned from Spain as an utterly disenchanted man, the civil war had no doubt sensitized him to the dual aspects of a revolution and to the insidious thrust of diplomacy and foreign policy, especially of the Soviet Union. In a retrospective vein in a later essay "Looking Back on the Spanish War", Orwell explicitly states that in "essence" the Spanish War was a "class war" (Orwell 1978, 300). Orwell's firsthand experiences in Spain gave him a taste of what Socialism was like in the militia, and he felt disappointed with the intellectuals and parties associated with the left who officially worked for the Socialists. As Jeffrey Meyers pertinently notes in "'An Affirming Flame': Homage to Catalonia", Orwell's "hostility to the Russian Communists was a direct result of the betrayal in Spain" (*A Reader's Guide to George Orwell* 129). We see from Orwell's critique of the Spanish Civil War that a revolution had once again deflected. Orwell was able to realize not only the
failure of a revolution but was also provoked to evaluate the role of Stalinism in this civil war, which indirectly gave him a feel of totalitarianism. Spain was then close to the liberal concerns of the Europe of the 1930s although distantly controlled by Stalinism. Normon Podhoretz in "If Orwell were Alive Today", (published in his The Bloody Cross Roads: Where Literature and Politics Meet [1968]), notes that Orwell learned from the Spanish Civil War that "the Spanish Communists were more interested in furthering the aims of Soviet foreign policy than in making a socialist revolution at home . . ." (54). And towards the end of World War II "Orwell began brooding more and more on the possibility that Communist totalitarianism might turn out to be the inevitable wave of the future" (55). Normon Podhoretz is right in stating that when Orwell wrote about the "dangers of totalitarianism", "it is mainly the Communist version he had in mind", and what Orwell "most cared about was resisting the spread of Soviet style totalitarianism" (64). Orwell's concern about the "dangers of totalitarianism" reached a point of obsession when it took the shape of Animal Farm and 1984. In Orwell's writings we get a sample of how a Westerner responded to revolution in general and specifically to the Revolution in Russia.
Apart from Orwell, two great Russian minds have creatively responded to the Russian Revolution — Boris Pasternak and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Pasternak's assessment of the Revolution is woven into his moving novel Doctor Zhivago. His response was initially one of fascination. To be precise, he was more concerned with the October Revolution than its later phase. The central character of this novel, Doctor Zhivago reviews the October Revolution thus:

... the idea of social betterment as it is understood since the October Revolution doesn't fill me with enthusiasm ... it is so far from being put into practice, and the mere talk about it has cost such a sea of blood, and I'm not sure the end justifies the means. (Doctor Zhivago 339)

Pasternak's reflections on the Revolution was more at a synchronic level. Robert Louis Jackson in "Doctor Zhivago: Liebestod of the Russian Intelligentsia" remarks that "the revolution of 1917 ... released violently centrifugal forces which blew apart the entire structure of Russian society" and Pasternak "has depicted this explosion at the moment the parts of this once integral society are being scattered, but at a moment when the memories of the old world order are still intact" (Pasternak: A Collection of Critical Essays ed. Victor Erlich [1978] 139). We see that Pasternak was in reality concerned with the very concept of the Revolution. In the novel, Pasternak declares: "no single man makes history.
History cannot be seen, just as one cannot see grass growing. Wars and revolutions, kings and Robespierres, are history's organic agents, its yeast" (456). He goes on to analyse the basis for a revolution and puts forth his view that revolutions are made by fanatical men of action with one-track minds, geniuses in their ability to confine themselves to a limited field. They overturn the old order in a few hours or days, the whole upheaval takes a few weeks or at most years, but the fanatical spirit that inspired the upheaval is worshipped for decades thereafter, for centuries. (456)

Now let us see how Solzhenitsyn has responded to revolutions. Of course, in one sense he is himself a product of the Russian Revolution having been born in 1918. In an interview with Janis Sapiets in 1975, Solzhenitsyn had affirmed that "physical revolutions have never provided a solution and have never fulfilled their promises" ("Conversation with Solzhenitsyn" 72). In The First Circle, Ruska Doronin, a prisoner shares with Clara, a free employee, his view about the Revolution:

What was the Revolution against? Against privileges. What were the Russian people sick of? Privileges: some being dressed in overalls and others in sables, some dragging along on foot while others rode in carriages, some listening for the factory whistle while others were fattening their faces in restaurants. 268)
Solzhenitsyn was able to offer such an evaluation on account of his direct involvement in the making of Russian history. He confesses in his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*: "from my experience of Russian history I have become an opponent to all revolutions and all armed convulsions, including future ones . . ." (68). In this same "Letter" he says that an "intensive study" has convinced him that "bloody mass revolutions are always disastrous for the people in whose midst they occur" (68).

More than Orwell and Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn was deeply obsessed with Russian history. He experienced at first hand the results of the 1917 Revolution. His deep-seated ambition to write the history of Russia expressed in *The Gulag Archipelago* I (213) had become his life-long passion. Frederick Jackson Turner says, the aim of history "is to know the elements of the present by understanding what came into the present from the past" ("An American Definition of History" 200). As a chronicler Solzhenitsyn fulfils this role, and in reassessing Russian history has responded to the Russian Revolution in an incisive manner. Hence his contention that the 1917 Revolution alone was not responsible for thrusting Russia into a state of radical discontent; rather the root-cause lay in Russia's war of 1914 with Germany. This insight led him to write *August 1914*, the first part of the trilogy *The Red Wheel* (*Lenin in Zurich* forming the second
part). Solzhenitsyn’s assimilation of the 1917 events in relation to the past as well as the future has enabled him to approach Russian history from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives. In August 1914, stressing the idea that the war of 1914 was unnecessary, he believed that this war heralded a “great rebirth of Russia” (129) but it was ironically Russia under a terrorist rule. Solzhenitsyn relentlessly pursued the idea that the 1914 war had drained the energy of Russia. Due to the ignorance and indifference of senior officers at the higher rungs of command, several talented army men lost their lives. Colonel Vorotyntsev in August 1914 believes that all “Russian officers bear a responsibility for the history of Russia” (714). Solzhenitsyn is highly critical of the indifference of the higher authorities to the actual tragedy of this war. His vision has encompassed the whole gamut of Russian history, and he always had the future of Russia in mind. This makes him avow that “the era of physical revolutions must end” (qtd. in Sapiets 17, emphasis added).

We can arrive at a consensus that Orwell, Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn were unconvinced of the validity of any bloody revolution. They also realized the deplorable state of the individual who was pitted against the malevolent forces unleashed by the Revolution. Above all they were sensitive to the betrayal of the original cause. Now, Orwell and Solzhenitsyn not only analysed the Revolution, but went
further into the manifestation of the betrayal, thus hitting upon the uglier form of totalitarianism that the Revolution had taken. Solzhenitsyn and Orwell have gone into the deep structures of the totalitarian regime, and the role of ideology in establishing such a set-up, whereas Pasternak's less keen involvement with these aspects is evident in his works. One is reminded of Mikhail Sholokhov's reference to Pasternak as a "hermit crab" (qtd. in Slonim 223).

In sheer opposition to such a "hermit crab" existence, Orwell and Solzhenitsyn have lashed out at the prevailing criminal political culture. In his essay "Why I Write", Orwell confessed: "Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been directly or indirectly against totalitarianism . . ." (Selected Essays 102). This is how Solzhenitsyn saw totalitarianism. In his interview with Janis Sapiets he observes:

a totalitarian regime does not exist by itself. It exists without our help. This is why I always point out the dreadful, almost mystically evil, significance which Marxist ideology has in our country. It is by accepting this ideology which holds our souls in its claws, that we are buttressing the regime. (70)

Orwell and Solzhenitsyn were able to see beyond the facade of totalitarianism into its institutionalised ideology which rationalized what in Louis Althusser's terms would be "State
Apparatuses". Both went into the workings of these apparatuses and represented them in their writings. Where Orwell with an intensity described the diabolical functioning of such an inhuman system, Solzhenitsyn went a step further to trace its roots. The latter was convinced that Lenin who inaugurated the establishment of the concentration camps, made a devious use of a Marxist dictum. Thus it was Lenin who sowed the seeds for the creation of a totalitarian state. Although an outsider, Orwell had portrayed in 1984 the grim features of the State Apparatus remarkably well, but he had not analysed its originating point. Solzhenitsyn fills that gap.

Bruce Donahue in "Viewing the West from the East: Solzhenitsyn, Milosz and Kundera" (1983), notes that "Writers and artists are usually among the first to be sentenced by a totalitarian regime because they represent both a continuity with the past and a challenge to the present" (255). Orwell, Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn represent such a "continuity" and "challenge" although each in his own way.

Throughout Solzhenitsyn had been uncompromising in his encounters with the totalitarian regime. On the contrary Pasternak was very compliant and never openly defied the Regime as Solzhenitsyn did. Of course Pasternak felt the shallowness of the revolutionary spirit when he wrote: "It was the disease, the revolutionary madness of the age, that at
heart everyone was different from his outward experience and his words. No one had a clear conscience. Everyone could justifiably feel that he was guilty . . ." (Doctor Zhivago 459). Marc Slonim aptly sums up Pasternak's temperament when he states that "in a society in which action was hailed as a supreme virtue, Pasternak turned to contemplation" (250). This is not to conclude that he was cowed down before the authorities. Pasternak's is basically an artist's detached vision. Marc Slonim epitomizes Pasternak's whole philosophy as one "which blended the pagan exultation of life and pantheistic love of nature with the Christian concepts of spirituality and brotherhood" and this "ran counter to the Communist dogma" (223-224). Pasternak did not go into totalitarianism but contented himself with his insights into Marxism. In Doctor Zhivago a doctor remarks:

Marxism a science? . . . . Marxism is too uncertain of its ground to be a science . . . . I don't know a movement more self-centred and further removed from facts than Marxism. Everyone is worried only about proving himself in practical matters, and as for the men in power, they are more anxious to establish the myth of their infallibility that they do their utmost to ignore the truth. (259)
Pasternak as a predecessor of Solzhenitsyn was not in a position to perceive the aggressiveness of totalitarianism. He had thought that with the Russian Revolution there appeared "his dream of living on his own land by the work of his hands, in complete independence and with no obligations to anyone (Doctor Zhivago 224). But he realized that he "had only exchanged the oppression of the former state for the new harsher yoke of the revolutionary state" (224). Pasternak in a poetic manner exclaims:

Oh, how one wishes sometimes to escape from the meaningless dullness of human eloquence, from all those sublime phrases, to take refuge in nature, apparently so in articulate, or in the wordlessness of long, grinding labor, or sound sleep, of true music, or of a human understanding rendered speechless by emotion. (Doctor Zhivago 139-140)

It is evident that Pasternak took interest only in the early phase of the Revolution. Since his concerns were metaphysical, he did not deal with the fabric of politics but only with religion and spirituality. Marc Slonim rightly observes that "Pasternak treats politics as fleeting externals, and concentrates on the unchangeable fundamentals of the human mind, emotions and creativity" (233-34). He also finds Zhivago's main objection to the "accepted Communist dogma" to be "its ignorance of the link between man and the universe"
Pasternak's "dispute with the epoch is not political but primarily philosophical and moral" (234). Pasternak does not "share the illusion of revolutionary leaders that their decrees and executions can really transform human beings", and "rejects violence . . ." (234), but believes in "human virtues glorified in the Christian ethic" asserting the "supremacy of nature, love and beauty" (234).

Orwell's quarrel with the Regime is political, whereas Solzhenitsyn's is both "philosophical and moral". Solzhenitsyn and Pasternak share a deep Christian piety. Where Pasternak focuses on the individual's relationship with religion, Solzhenitsyn concentrates on the community and the possibility of its being influenced by religion. Solzhenitsyn wishes to revive religion which now stands desecrated, so that it will be a beacon for the Russian nation.

Though Orwell and Solzhenitsyn are also in the same orbit of ideas as Pasternak, they do not certainly treat politics as "fleeting externals". For Solzhenitsyn politics is a hard reality. Placing the individual in this reality, he reveals his degraded status and impels him to think of restructuring his relationship with his socio-political milieu. Orwell also takes politics seriously as a material reality and concentrates on the domineering power set-up. Both Orwell and Solzhenitsyn find that they cannot ignore the fact
that man is partly a political animal. They emphasize the primacy of the human conscience, having had to confront politics in their own personal situations. David Burg and George Feifer in Solzhenitsyn (1972) observe that "individual conscience as opposed to any written moral or political code" is "the pivot of Solzhenitsyn's ethics" (138).

James Clive in First Reactions: Critical Essays (1980) perceptively says: "Solzhenitsyn's contemporary novels . . . the novels set in the Soviet Union — are not really concerned with society. They are concerned with what happens after society has been destroyed" (211). It is remarkable that Orwell had much earlier represented such a "society" in his novel 1984 and hence may be regarded as a predecessor of Solzhenitsyn. However Orwell was concerned with the contemporary ideological dimension rather than the historical. Hence to Orwell the synchronic aspect of the system was more important.

In portraying totalitarianism, Orwell and Solzhenitsyn resorted to their own literary modes each. Orwell's immediate interest was the Spanish Civil War which was a challenge to the liberal humanist faith of Europe in the twenties and thirties. His immersion in the Spanish cause made him aware of the distant forces operating on Spanish grounds — namely Stalinism. Hence he naturally took upon himself the task of
enquiring into the subject of the various forms of government and specifically the negative aspects of a revolution. Even as Solzhenitsyn employed the features of dialogism to rewrite Soviet history, Orwell chose the modes of fable/political allegory and dystopia to revise received history. Here we have to point out that as a Western Socialist, Orwell had an intensely moral and humanistic concern. In *A Preface to George Orwell* David Wykes says that Orwell's "greatest prophecy is that the second half of the twentieth century will have as its central problem the spread and containment of totalitarian systems" (46). It is remarkable that Orwell anticipated the devastating forms of totalitarianism as early as 1949 (when he depicted the creation of State Apparatuses in *1984*), long before Solzhenitsyn directly became a victim of this apparatus.

*Orwell's dystopia* *1984* is a bizarre futuristic world where children see "hanging" as a "popular spectacle" (25). Individuality is a mere myth as the tragic end of Winston Smith proves. Like Gleb Nerzhin of *The First Circle*, Smith attempts to write the truth. But he becomes a "lonely ghost uttering a truth that nobody would hear" (*1984* 28). The society that surrounds him is replete with "fear, hatred and pain" and there is "no dignity of emotion, no deep or complex sorrows" (31). *1984* presents a world where Big Brother is an actuality and Winston Smith a myth. Big Brother's presence is
"on coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters and on the wrappings of a cigarette packet . . . ." (27). Orwell laments that "Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters in your head" (27). Big Brother and his henchmen cold-bloodedly pervert the course of history. Individual memory is transformed into collective memory implanted by the Regime. Sessions of ideological conditioning called "Two Minutes Hate" take place. These sessions are a prerequisite for the Party's existence and in turn the establishment of totalitarianism. We get a clear picture of the system from O'Brien, a member of the "Thought Police", some other institutionalised forms being "Thought Crime", "Double Think", "Face Crime", "The Ministry of Truth", "The Ministry of Peace", "The Ministry of Love", "The Inner Party" and the like. O'Brien states that "one does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution, one makes a revolution in order to establish a dictatorship" (227). In a long passage he proclaims:

Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation. Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes . . . . Do you begin to see, then, what kind of a world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic utopias . . . . A world of fear and treachery is torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will
grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more pain. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph, and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy — everything . . . . we have cut off links between child and parent, and between man and man, and between man and woman. No one dares trust a wife or a child or a friend any longer. But in the future there will be no wives and no friends . . . . There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother . . . There will be no art, no literature no science. There will be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed . . . . If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — for ever.

(230)

In 1984 Orwell presents his version of history. The world is divided into three parts — Oceania, Eastasia and Eurasia, and they are always at war with each other. Each moment of history is rewritten, and there is no such thing as objective truth. Fear haunts everyone. What, then, is history? Orwell writes in
an acrimonious vein that "all history was a palimpsest, scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as was necessary" (1984 39). Before Orwell went on to create this kind of a world in 1984, he also wrote a spoof on the Russian Revolution, namely Animal Farm. Mathew Hodgarth in "From Animal Farm to Nineteen Eighty-Four" identifies the "driving force behind his two satires" as "an intense revulsion against totalitarianism, combined with an even stronger revulsion against its defenders among left-wing intellectuals". He adds that from about 1935, Orwell was "convinced that Russia had taken the wrong path and had become a tyranny: it was therefore important for the cause of world socialism to show up the Stalin myth" (The World of George Orwell ed. M. Gross 136). As mentioned earlier, Orwell's insights crystallized as Animal Farm and 1984.

Animal Farm written in the mode of an Aesopian fable is a political allegory. Every character in this fable is a pointed caricature, and the events also correspond to actual events in history. Mathew Hodgarth establishes that Animal Farm is a political allegory "since it has a point-to-point correspondence with the events of Russian history from 1917 to 1943" which he elucidates as "the war of intervention, the New Economic Plan, the First-Five Year Plan, the expulsion of Trotsky and the seizing of power by Stalin, the Stakhanovites, the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the invasion by Germany (138-139).
Thus we can affirm that Orwell has concentrated on the contemporary facets of totalitarianism as it obtained in the Russia of his day. Of course, he and Solzhenitsyn regard them as a natural outcome of the Revolution. In "The Writing of History" Orwell deplores that "the really frightening thing about totalitarianism is not that it commits 'atrocities' but that it attacks the concept of objective truth: it claims to control the past as well as the future" (Selected Essays 65). This concern for "objective truth" is shared by Orwell and Solzhenitsyn, but is more obsessive with the latter.

Where Orwell uses a combination of fantasy and realism to render his version of totalitarianism, Solzhenitsyn uses critical realism, polyphony and carnival for the same purpose. Solzhenitsyn has envisaged a "moral revolution", and we will look at it in some detail later in this chapter. For now it is enough if we understand that Solzhenitsyn's moral revolution is "a revolutionary change of the social system, not only by physical but by spiritual methods" (Sapiets 72). This urges on us the need for an alternate mode of revolution diametrically opposed to traditional revolution. The impulse to destroy one class in order to promote another class must be overcome, thereby helping a subject to meet another subject on equal footing. Solzhenitsyn attempts to bring this about through 'discourse'. 
Solzhenitsyn's use of "polyphony" and "carnivalization" and "dialogism" leads to the evolution of a paradigm which helps us to study the nature of history transcending 'specificities'. Every subject relates himself to the 'history' that Solzhenitsyn reconstructs, be it a novel or a non-fictional work. This facilitates an awareness that need not be specifically Russian. The relationship between a subject and Russian history thus shifts from a specific level to a universal one. The temporal order of events also acquires a spatial dimension. This 'trans-spatial' (universal) vision, derived from a reading of Solzhenitsyn's works, testifies that every culture can be both committed and detached in relation to its inner history. It implies that every culture should be self-critical. The universality is achieved by a new form of discourse which allows a dialogic reconstruction of history. Solzhenitsyn's works can be seen as an attempt at a critical historiography. In this regard Solzhenitsyn is a penetrating, perceptive, and far-sighted commentator.

In evaluating the complex political phenomenon of Revolution, though all the three writers we have considered here have contributed their might, Solzhenitsyn's comprehensive appraisal qualitatively supersedes that of Orwell and Pasternak. As we have pointed out earlier, Pasternak was not in a position to critique totalitarianism. Orwell justly deserves the accolades showered on him for the
stunning portrayal of the ominousness of totalitarianism. But
given his position outside of the set-up, he could not create
an alternate awareness or consciousness as Solzhenitsyn did.
Neither in Animal Farm nor in 1984 does Orwell point a way
out. His is a bleak vision. 1984 ends on an appallingly
pessimistic note trapping us in a closed world. Winston Smith
as a victim and rebel, simply collapses and is pathetic.
Surely Orwell did not miss the enormity of politics. Though
living outside the sphere of Russian power, Orwell's picture
of the decadent totalitarian system is astonishingly
authentic and no doubt an audacious one. Yet we have to
recognize the fact that Orwell's work renders the system at an
abstract level as a fabulous nightmare. It is representative
of what Bakhtin would see as a work of "one sided", "official
seriousness", born of fear, and is "dogmatic" and "inimical to
change" (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics 160).

On the contrary Solzhenitsyn's vision does open up the
closed world of the power structures, though we have to esteem
highly Orwell's prophetic vision. Solzhenitsyn has a
comprehensive and totalised view of revolution. He saw it as
historically important and as having its basis in power. He
strongly believed that the machinery of revolution should be
dispensed with, but the ideal of revolution should be upheld.
Raymond Williams in "On Solzhenitsyn" elaborates the "kinds of relationship between literature and revolution" (318). First he sets forth the idea of the work of writers who precede a social revolution, who directly or indirectly expose the values of a society that needs radical change, and who sometimes succeed in articulating the consciousness that will surpass it. (318)

He cites as examples literary people like Blake, Dickens, Hardy and Wells. These writers are subordinated to history and we see "not works but phases" (318). Then he speaks of another relationship, "that of literature created in and by a revolution: the works of a disturbed and heroic, a transforming and liberating time" (319). Raymond Williams gives the examples of Blok, Pasternak and Yeats. He then delineates a third relationship between literature and revolution. He states that "a new society is created by a real revolution, and then, in the modalities of history, it lasts . . ." and "acquires its own developing and difficult history" (319). If literature has to survive within such a society, the time must come when the "experiences of liberation and transition are not enough to write about" (319-20). In the name of revolution a kind of literature or "one version of reality, has come to be consecrated" and "formalized" (320). Williams asks, what happens if a writer chooses to
question this reality. He will be "slandered" by "his own contemporaries" (320). A "writer of this kind is exposed, almost at once, to a virtually unbearable tension", "directly repressed", "simultaneously" "flattered, publicized, promoted by people and organizations who are indeed . . . enemies of his society" (320). Williams, after sketching the plight of such a writer, goes further to suggest the various possibilities. A writer may "emigrate, physically or spiritually". If he is not a "revolutionary writer" but shares the values of his enemies, then he experiences no tension. But "the man who stays, and more important the writer who stays, is under extraordinary pressure" (320). He belongs neither to his colleagues nor his enemies. If he is a "radical visionary", his "social situation may" go hand in hand "with his literary situation . . ." (320). If he is a "realist novelist", "overwhelmingly concerned with contemporary actuality, and with the actuality of his own people and society who are officially rejecting him, the tension and the challenge are obviously very great" (320). Raymond Williams hails Solzhenitsyn as "the outstanding example of such a writer . . ." (320). We have cited the theoretical perceptions of Raymond Williams at length to support the argument that even in the understanding of the revolution, Solzhenitsyn surpasses the contribution of Orwell and Pasternak.
David Close in *Revolution: A History of the Idea*, maintains that "the construction of a new order is just as much a part of the revolution as the destruction of an old one, and all the more worth studying because it is a comparatively neglected aspect of the phenomenon" (152). Solzhenitsyn has paid as much attention to the new as to the old order, because he has derived his concept of a revolution from his inclusive historical vision. Solzhenitsyn views it both from a linear as well as a spiral standpoint. Solzhenitsyn's concept may be said to displace the simple notion of revolutions as beginning in hope and ending in disillusionment. Moreover he approaches revolution not merely from a political point of view, but from a spiritual one too. While remaining within Russia, he could only look at the Russian Revolution in an insular perspective. Once out of Russia, his judgement of revolutions as futile was further confirmed by his observations on Western European history. Solzhenitsyn as an emigre was in a better position to place revolution as a global phenomenon. His understanding has in fact been made more complete by the second Russian Revolution (we shall refer to it as the modern Russian Revolution), which he has witnessed in the form of the break-up of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
From a study of the major revolutions, and the response of selected writers, we have been able to foreground the double-edged thrust of a revolution. The focus so far was on revolutions that made history. The impact of 1789 and 1917 was felt not only in France and Russia but worldwide. Raymond Williams asserts that "a new society is created by a real revolution" ("On Solzhenitsyn" 319). Both the major revolutions created a "new society". But was it a permanent change, a happy and positive change? The answer is perhaps not very positive. This is not to deny the humanistic and humanitarian values about individual liberty and concern for the needy which have become permanently absorbed in the fabric of modern societies in the West and even in the democratic countries of Asia. However the thread of violence offsets the good that has been realized. The futility of violent revolutions is felt once again when we look at more recent revolutions.

**Solzhenitsyn and Moral Revolution**

Recorded history has the power to survive. Therein also lies the danger. In the Soviet Union, as disclosed by Solzhenitsyn, it is constituted by "ideological lies" by which he means the language used in Communist regimes. So Solzhenitsyn's counter-move takes the form of a discourse. Solzhenitsyn resorts to "polyphony" as the kind of discourse opposed to the earlier hegemonic discourse (exemplified by
Marxist jargons). The latter is supplanted by a simultaneous presentation of several points of view. Earlier a hegemony has been established in the form of a fictitious total perspective. Official accounts of the modern era are marked by such a spirit. The monologic literary tradition of the Soviet, conditioned as it has been since the Lenin period and the subsequent periods, also is reflective of such a hegemony. In Solzhenitsyn, especially his novels, with polyphony hegemony is inverted. Each point of view has its centre, whereby it justifies itself and there is a subversion of one perspective by the other. These perspectives zero in on a specific event.

In his interview with Janis Sapiets, Solzhenitsyn described his moral revolution thus:

Moral revolution means 'sacrifice yourself, and then, perhaps, justice will be established'. Physical revolution means 'let us kill others, but you may also be killed yourself'. Moral revolution means 'put yourself in a position where you yourself might be killed but don't kill others'. (72) (emphasis added)

Solzhenitsyn's moral revolution reiterates the need for a history which is not mangled by the power it wields. Traditional historiography has subsumed the subject position of the reader and has taken upon itself the authoritative role of interpretation. Marxist history has carried this out perfectly. Solzhenitsyn's revolution in discourse, although
aiming at Russian history specifically and the subject position, transcends such a limit and aspires for a universal paradigm.

It was inevitable that the conflict in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary Russia took the form of a bloody upheaval. In France also a gory change was unstoppable. In both cases, the nature of the conflict was anchored in a socio-political and economic matrix. In the contemporary post-modern society, the central conflict would be a "cultural" one (16) as pointed out by Wlad Godzich in "Correcting Kant: Bakhtin and Intercultural Interaction" (1991). Hence Solzhenitsyn's "moral revolution" gains distinct significance in the present context.

Solzhenitsyn's concern for mankind places him as a 'Man of Letters' who has travelled a long and difficult way to this stage. Xan Smiley viewed Solzhenitsyn as a "mighty fortress of integrity" and confidently predicted that Solzhenitsyn could "play a massive part in a new Russia were he to return" (27). Solzhenitsyn has finally returned. This "master of Russian letters" ("Tolling the Death Knell" 24) now says that he is to "embark" on a "crusade for the spiritual revival of Russia" (Vladimir Radyuhin, "The Return of a Prophet" 24). Solzhenitsyn has austerely declared: "I have not come back to share the fruits of my country's prosperity, but to be with my
people at a time of great trial and hardships" (qtd. in Radyuhin 24). Solzhenitsyn's role in a new Russia will definitely prove interesting, and hopefully beneficial to the Russians. Apparently his 'Talk' shows have not sustained public interest. Neither the people nor the government seems to pay much attention to his opinions. Even so he continues to lambs the power structures. The drama has been set in motion in contemporary Russia. We have to wait to see the 'turn' of events in Russia.