THE LIBERALS IN THE POST-ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE ERA

Inspite of the unfavourable reactions of the Liberals, Indian National Congress, Muslim League and other groups, the India Bill received Royal assent. This Bill came to be known as the Government of India Act of 1935.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935:

A Federation was established by the Government of India Act of 1935. The Indian States were given the option to join on their own free will. An Instrument of Accession was a devise through which they were to join the Federation. Whilst there was uniformity in the scope of legislative and executive powers of the Central Government with regard to provinces, there was no such thing with regard to the Indian States. It depended on the terms of each instrument of accession. The Government at the centre was not wholly responsible. The whole scheme was so devised as to make it impossible for progressive and Liberal elements in Indian society to obtain power and carry out reforms. The Federal Legislature was to be bicameral, consisting of the Federal Assembly and the Council of States. The Provinces sent elected representatives to the Upper Chamber. The Indian States were to send in their nominees. Unitary control was evident in the powers of the centre.
Three lists were created namely, Central list, Provincial list and Concurrent list and residuary powers 1 lay with the centre.

It is said that this Act was a final defeat of the Liberal Movement. This was not actually the case. Their idea of a Federation had really not been totally ignored. The fact that a Federation could be brought about by a Union of the British India Provinces and Princely Indian States was essentially a Liberal idea. In so far as this was concerned, the Liberals could claim that they had a small victory.

Sapru by this time however could not see eye to eye with Chintamani on many issues and he disassociated 2 himself from the Liberals. Sastri blamed the Liberal Party for its lack of propaganda work and funds. He felt that the Liberals must reconcile to taking a second place and play 3 their part in this meaningfully and efficiently. The Liberals who later sank into political oblivion had contributed to the political development of the country by their constructive criticism and suggestions.
Sastri was foremost in this work. He undertook to deliver 'educative' lectures under the auspices of the Mysore University and gave lectures on Gokhale. Besides in 1935, Sir Annamalai Chettiyar requested him to accept the Vice-Chancellorship of Annamalai University. He accepted only an honorarium. During his two terms he also taught in the University. In 1936, Sastri visited Malaya on Government deputation which has already been discussed in an earlier chapter. In the meantime, elections took place in 1937.

**ELECTIONS OF 1937:**

Elections were held in 1937. By the Government of India Act of 1935, 11 Provinces of British India were provided with directly elected legislative assemblies. Here, the Ministers were subject to the reserved powers of the Governors. The Liberals, like Sapru were requested to take part in the election. He refused as he thought that he could not cope with the existing circumstances. The Liberals lost in the election. Hridayanath Kunzru was elected to the Central Legislature. C.P. Ramaswamy Iyer had by this time became the Dewan of Travancore. Tej Bahadur Sapru and Chimanlal Setalwad had lost credibility amongst the people and they could no longer influence the Legislatures.
The Congress decided to take part in the election and in 1936 it issued an election manifesto announcing their decision. Originally Gandhi had wanted the Congress to accept office during the Patna session on 18th May 1934. This decision was momentous because it had been influenced by the views as they had always felt that any constitution should be worked out for what it was worth. The President of the Indian National congress however did not want them to accept office because the Governor General had not given an assurance that the Governors would not interfere in the day to day working of the Ministers. However the Congress decided to accept the office when the Viceroy accepted the condition reluctantly. The U.P., Bihar, Orissa, C.P., Madras, Bombay N.W.F.P. thus had their Congress Ministries and in their accepting the Office, lay the vindication of Liberal ideology.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR :

LIBERAL REACTION TO THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESS MINISTRIES :

The Congress had held office for more than two years and had worked out the constitution in a statesman-like manner.
Sastri was nominated by the Governor to the Legislative Council of Madras. He was the leader of the opposition and played an important part in the Legislative Council debates. He participated in most of the discussions on salaries, prohibition, agricultural relief and so on. He took part in a discussion on the "Madras payment of salaries and removal of disqualifications Bill 1937, as passed by the Legislative Assembly". Mr. T. S. S. Rajan moved the Bill. Sastri felt thankful for getting an opportunity to greet the Bill in the House. He said that a measure of this kind by which for the first time the representatives of the people sitting in the seats of the Treasury would consent to take Moderate salaries marked the advent of a time to which they had been looking forward a long time. He remarked that the State of the Ministers' salaries had been the concern of all political parties. There had been a desire to bring them down to a standard that would correspond in some little measure at least with the poverty stricken condition of the people. He congratulated the Ministers for undertaking this progressive step and considered it an idle question to raise whether the Ministers had fixed the salaries at a proper figure, there being no proper figure in this matter. However, he felt that it was not enough that the "first examplars of
self-sacrifice considered themselves for themselves. They must ... in arriving at that figure consider whether it has any chance of being established on a stable basis. These high attitudes of idealism are not attained by a common run of mankind. It may not be possible for the successors of the Ministers to deny themselves to the same extent as they have done. He further said that "it was difficult to be precise or definite or confident upon a subject of this kind" and cited an example of the British Cabinet which had the opportunity to place before the Legislature a measure for the enhancement of the salaries of the Prime Minister and certain other persons. This matter had attracted the attention of great Britain fifteen or twenty years ago. "For people who are sitting in these positions themselves to bring forward a measure asking for enhancement of emoluments was an exceedingly delicate situation. It had taken time, gone before many committees, many tentative proposals were made before an adequate enhancement of salaries was accepted. He pointed out that in Britain, the original salaries were not fixed on self-sacrificing scale. In India they had been fixed with this consideration in view. His opinion was that the figures were much too low and would be found inadequate for people in whom the ideal of
It was under his vehement criticism that the amendment was ruled out.

In a discussion on the Madras Agriculturists Relief Bill which was moved by C. Rajagopalachari, Sastri pointed out that the Legislative Council had not had sufficient time to find out what had been done in the other House. "We do not get the official reports so quickly as in other countries. It is not fair to ask us to proceed on the bare text of the Bill and to get as much information as we can from such reports as the newspapers might have published. We would like to know precisely what was said on a given topic."

He further pointed out that "this House is an accredited arm of the legislature and it must be allowed to exercise its functions to the full." He supported the Bill because it included measures that would grant relief from distress during times of streets and strain. The motion was carried through.

At the discussion stage Sastri wanted to move an amendment. His "object was to include within the benefits of this measure the landless labourers - Kudiyanavan ... give them freedom for one day and you will have conferred
self sacrifice did not burn with the same warmth as in the "present holders of office ...."

He gave his farsighted advice, but ultimately voted for the Bill. Sastri took part in a discussion on the Madras Prohibition Bill which was introduced by C.Rajagopalachari. This bill sought to introduce and extend the prohibition of the manufacture, sale and consumption of liquor and drugs in Madras.

Diwan Bahadur R.Srinivasan wanted to amend it wherein a time limit was set for the evening between five to eight on week days except on Sunday were allotted for the sale and consumption of liquors. At this juncture, Sastri took part in the discussion and dealt with the issue clause by clause.

Sastri doubted whether it was proper to discuss this amendment. He logically stated that the amendment violated the principles of the Bill. "Secondly, the amendment should not be allowed not by the side door, not by the window, but through the cranny of the wall".
on them a blessing". The landless labourers were bonded labourers. He suggested that their debts could be struck off and they should be declared, as free men. Sastri was moving along with the times. He had been advocating the rights of the labourers as he had been influenced by Socialistic ideals like other Liberals had been.

Sastri fought tooth and nail on certain items of the budget of 1938-1939.

The Government was intending to grant Rs.50/- lakhs for assistance by means of loans to those agricultural debtor whose debts were to be scaled down. He questioned the Government intentions and insisted that the Government should inform the particular schemes.

Besides this, he spoke on several other problems. He felt that Policemen, village school master and others paid had been/too low and that therefore they adopted other means of eking out a living. He wanted the Government to improve matters.
He next attacked the scheme on remissions of land tax about which there had been a good deal of public discussion. During the previous two years, the land tax to the extent of Rs. 75 lakhs was remitted. This remission was granted year after year and was felt that this relief should be of a permanent nature and properly defined. The land owning class had been crying out for this relief with justification. It had been granted, but granted tardily. Sastri hoped that it would be now made secure and permanent. The Government was however prevaricating in this matter and had declared that the remissions of Rs. 75 lakhs was not to be considered as any indication of the shape of the ultimate land revenue policy of the Government. According to Sastri these words "are not calculated to reassure the class supposed to be benefitted by the remission". He wanted a permanent basis for remission of taxes so that land tax would be permanently lowered so as to be within the capacity of those who have to pay it.

The next topic he spoke on during the Budget session referred to the betterment of the rural population. They were illiterate and ignorant and needed help. He wanted the Government to pay some more attention to creating an
agency which would look after the rural interest. He pointed out that the details proposed in the Budget of United Provinces, of having a new scheme of rural development and to employ in every district about five to six persons paid on a small salary for development of cottage industry, farming, health, hygiene, promotion of joint stock companies etcetera would be difficult to implement. He did not approve of clothing villages with powers.

Sastri should have supported this scheme as it would have helped India to be a bit more self-sufficient. However, he wanted to harness electricity for industrial purposes and reiterated that those who were keen about rural development should be glad to support any project which would start electrical power for advancing small scale industries. He thought correctly that this aspect of economic life should receive top priority.

With regard to Education, he felt that the question of the introduction of Hindustani in schools had called forth expressions of alarm and indignation which were uncalled for. According to him, this step of the Government was possibly out of a desire to respond to the ill-judged criticism which have been made. Therefore this measure was being experimented in certain selected schools. He hoped that "Government would
pay heed to the natural disturbance in the hearts of the people and that moderation and restriction in the operation of this scheme is called for. He also pointed out that the Congress had also not support the Wardha Scheme in its Harpur Session. However, he felt that the Wardha Scheme ought to be introduced in select schools as it was an experiment which was desirable before any further steps were taken. The Wardha Scheme of Education was propounded by Mahatma Gandhi. According to him, the course of Primary education should extend to seven years. It should include general knowledge less English and vocational training. Vocational training should be profit oriented. The State should guarantee the students jobs. The State should also buy from the schools their manufacturers at fixed prices. Higher education should be left to private enterprise and State Universities should be examining bodies.

With regard to Muslim and Indian Christian education it was essential to give them a liberal education. He remarked that in the budget "there was not an extra rupee allotted to the progress of liberal education". Universities and Secondary Schools were bidden to manage with resources they had. No further secondary schools were to be opened and no college of any kind was to be started or to be helped. He urged the Government to taken steps in these areas. 

From the above discussion, it is clear that Sastri was anxious to stick to democratic processes. He pointed out the danger of Congress Ministries to centralised authority. He did not allow them to push bills through, especially over the question of improvement of rural areas. He advised C. Rajagopalachari to proceed slowly on prohibition policy, basic education and Hindi which should be experimented upon.
During this time, the second world war broke out. The Congress resigned as the British Government took a unilateral decision in including India as a belligerent party. The Congress stated that the issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian people. If the war was to defend the status quo of imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India had nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue was democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India was intensely interested in it. The Congress working committee demanded self determination and that India should be given freedom after the war as a basis of their support to the Government. At the Tripura Congress, March 1939, India dissociated itself from British policy and the All India Congress Committee called upon the Provincial Governments, not to accept the dictatorship of the centre. The Congress had observed April 23, as anti-war day.

The Muslim League during this period had opposed the Congress. Jinnah had emerged as their leader and asserted that the Muslim League was the one and only political organ of the Muslims and emphatically denied that the Congress represented India. He represented the middle class among the
Muslims and rallied them under the Muslim League. Jinnah demanded safeguards for the Muslim. He found that the Muslim League had been able to win only 109 seats out of 485 allotted to the Muslims in 1937. He wanted to get Congress co-operation so that the League could share power and gain prestige. But, he did not want to modify the conditions on which he would co-operate. He played a double game by parleying with the Congress and working for Muslim solidarity at the same time.

He condemned the Congress Governments and gave a warning to the Congress that if they interfered, in Muslim affairs, it would result in disaster. The Congress refused to yield to Jinnah's demands and Jinnah demanded that the British Government should not effect any changes in the administration without the approval of the Muslim League, if they wanted the support.

The Liberals however lent their support to the British. Sastri became a member of the Madras War Committee and paid 15 Rs.100/- towards the war effort. Sapru also felt that India 16 should help the British to save Democracy.
On September 14, 1939, the Congress working committee has passed a resolution asking the Government "to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims were in regard to democracy and the new order that was envisaged. The Government tried to bring about a compromise with the Congress but failed. In October 1939, they announced the Dominion Status for India and announced that they would consult every community after the war regarding the future constitution of India.

The Congress clarified its stand further. It declared in November, 1939 that the Congress "wishes to declare again that the recognition of India's independence and of the right of her people to frame their constitution through a constituent assembly, is essential in order to remove the taint of imperialism from Britain's policy and to enable the Congress to consider further cooperation (in the war effort). It held that a constituent assembly was the only democratic method of determining the constitution of a free country, and "no one who believes in democracy and freedom can possibly take exception to it". The Congress further felt that the constituent assembly alone was an adequate measure for solving the communal and other difficulties."
The Government was however adamant. The Congress Ministries therefore resigned in October-November, 1939 and the Muslim League considered it as a Day of Deliverance.

The Liberals like Sastri disapproved of these events but they were not strong enough to prevent the communal upheaval.

Lord Linlithgow played his divide and rule policy, and lent his support to the League. He now announced the offer of 8th August, 1940. Accordingly, he proposed to expand the Governor-General's Council and establish a body which would more closely associate Indian public opinion with the conduct of the war. The Government was to invite a certain number of representative Indians to join the Executive Council, and a War Advisory Council was to be established to meet at regular intervals. It would also contain representatives of the Indian States and of other interests in the national life of India as a whole.

With regard to the minorities, full weight was to be given to the views of the minorities in any revision. The Government could not contemplate the transfer of their responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any
system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements an India's national life.

Other points dealt with the machinery for building a new constitutional scheme within the British Commonwealth of nation. This should primarily be the responsibility of the Indians. The Government had been "sympathetic to this scheme but it was to be subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations which great Britain's connexion with India had imposed upon her and for which the Government could not divest themselves of responsibility".

The Congress Committee could not submit to this policy and pledged under Gandhi's leadership to non-violent protest. The Muslim League turned down the August offer also.

Although Tej Bahadur Sapru had dissociated himself form the National Liberal Federation as already stated, he still carried on the struggle for the Liberal ideals. It was he and Sastri who played a more prominent role than the other Liberals from this point of time. It was Sapru however who joined the main stream of national struggle. He convened a non-party conference in Bombay on the 13-4th March, 1941 for the purposes of resolving the communal tangle.
BOMBAY CONFERENCE:

Tej Bahadur Sapru felt that the differences between the Congress and Muslim League should be composed before any progress could be made. At the Conference he put forward following proposals. He was of the opinion that the vast mass of unattached opinion in this country should have been mobilised by the Government, and that India's defences should be put on a firm basis. The Executive Council should consist of non-official Indians drawn from important elements in public life. This would involve transfer of all portfolios including vital ones of Finance and Defence to Indians. During the war period, however, the reconstructed centre may remain responsible to the Crown so far as Defence was concerned. Sapru felt that the reconstructed Government should not merely be a collection of departmental heads, but should deal with all important matters of policy on a basis of joint and collective responsibility. In regard to all inter-imperial and international matters, the reconstructed Government should be treated on the same footing as a Dominion Government. He further felt that the Government should remove the doubts of the people by fixing a time limit when Dominion Status would conferred. The Bombay Conference met
with a good response and they proposed to meet every third month. The second session was held in Poona on 26th and 27th July, 1941. The Third was held in New Delhi on 21st and 22nd February, 1942. It was decided that Sapru submit a copy of those proposals with a memorandum to the Viceroy on 7th April, 1940. The Viceroy gave lip sympathy to the proposals but nothing was done although Sapru hoped for the interim constitution to be established.

Cowasji Jehangir as well as Chimanlal Setalwad doubted the wisdom of demanding these rights without the spirit of unity being established between the Congress and the League, Hindus and Muslims. They favoured the establishment of a centre party. Certain congress members considered the proposals reactionary. Sapru received congratulations from the Hindu-Muslim Unity Board Lucknow. This Board appealed to Indians to maintain national unity.

As was expected, Jinnah turned down the Bombay proposals. He pointed out that the proposals went against the August Declaration. If it was accepted, it meant breach of faith with the Muslims and other minorities. He opined out that the Conference was called to secure British support to condemn the Muslim League's demand for the partition of India.
The Government had been criticised by Sapru for not appointing new Indian members to the important posts. He spoke against the two nation theory and the Pakistan scheme. Lord Linlithgow had selected Hormusji Mody for supply, Mr. Rao and Peroz Khan Noon for Civil Defence and Labour, Sir Akbar Hydari for Information, Mr. Aney for the work of Legislature, Sir Zafrulla Khan to Federal Court, followed by Sultan Ahmad; G.S. Bajpai was the Indian Agent General in Washington. He was succeeded by Mr. Nalini Sarkar.

Jinnah disapproved of the plan as it meant breach of faith with Muslim India. L.S. Amery, the Secretary of State, stated that Tej Bahadur Sapru's suggestion had superseded the present form of Government which could not be thought in the war situation. Instead he urged Sapru to bring about unity among Hindus and Muslim before embarking on a plan for administration.

The National Liberal Federation meeting of December, 1941 passed a resolution supporting Sapru's ideas of expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council. It considered it a step in the right direction but inadequate. The Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Liberal Conference in December, 1941 felt that the British Government should convince the Indians of their good intentions and accept and help implement the recommendations of the Non-party conference.
The Liberals wanted the Central Government to be fully national in character. The Executive Council should consist of non-officials only and should be responsible for Defence and Finance on the basis of joint responsibility with regard to all inter imperial and international matters. The reconstructed Government must be treated on the same footing as Dominion Government. They protested against the Prime Minister's speech excluding India from the scope of the Atlantic Charter.

The Atlantic Charter was the result of a meeting between Roosevelt, the President of U.S.A. and the British Prime Minister Churchill in August, 1941. It promised the right of self-determination to all people. It also pledged to respect the right of all people to choose the form of Government under which they would like to live. It pledged to restore sovereign rights and self-government to those areas which had been deprived of them. Sapru condemned Churchill's attitude of excluding India from the purview of the Charter. He strongly held the opinion that after the War, India should not be recognised as a dependency but should be recognised as an equal.
Thus, in the last few years of the British Raj, the Liberals were slowly moulding their policy to suit the conditions in addition to their earlier stand of working out the constitution for what it was worth. They may not have been activists as the Gandhian and Nehru groups had been but they became more active, more vigorous and forceful in their arguments and activities and joined the mainstream of the national struggle.

THE LIBERALS AND CRIPPS MISSION 1942:

Sapru, Sastri, M.R.Jayakar, Jagadish Prasad and other Liberals in the meantime sent a cable to Churchill to focus the latter's attention towards the need for better reforms. This was in connection of Dominion status for India on the basis of his (Tej Bahadur Sapru's) proposals. At the same time, America took interest in the Indian situation and pressure was applied to England urging her to improve the situation. The British were given warning that they should implement the promises of the Atlantic Charter, on pain of losing American help in the war effort.
Sapru, Sastri, P.S. Sivarswami Aiyer pleaded that the Government should accept the Liberal programme of a national Government responsible to the crown and a give national status to India in international affairs. They had wanted the Government to release all political prisoners. As a result of external and internal pressures, the Congress leaders were released and Sir Strafford Cripps come to India.

The officials at the India office opposed this move. Amery and Linlithgow drew a plan and sent it to the Cabinet. This proposed the creation of a representative Indian Constituent Assembly. Treaties must be signed between the British Government and Union of Provinces and States. The constituent body should be elected by provincial legislature. This plan could not have worked out well as there could not have been any compromise on the question of Minorities.

Ultimately, a compromise was reached between Atlee's proposal and that of Amery and Linlithgow. It accepted Amery's ideas for a Constituent Assembly. It also accepted the right of an independent India to secede from the commonwealth. Further, it also provided that a province could
have the right to secede out of the Indian Union and set itself up as an independent State. But, in the meanwhile, it asked the Indians to help in the war effort.

The Choice of Cripps was a clever move. He was a radical and a friend of the Congress especially Nehru. However, his presence in India aroused suspicion amongst the Muslims. Sapru and Sastri welcomed his presence.

Strafford Cripps announced that India would have self-government with a constitution "as free in every respect as our own in great Britain ..." India would be associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown and equal to them in every respect. To achieve this goal, steps would be taken to set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India. The Indian States would be associated with the constitution making body. The constitution thus framed would be subject to

(1) the right of any province that was not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession, if it so desired. With such non-acceding provinces,
if they so desired, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree upon a new constitution, giving them the same full status as the Indian Union in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(ii) A treaty which would be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution making body. This treaty would cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. It would make provision in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities, but would not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide on the future and its relationship to the other member states of the British Commonwealth.

It was necessary to negotiate a revision of the treaty arrangements between the Indian States and the Indian Government.

The Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures would make a single electoral college and proceed to elect a constitution making body by a system of proportional representation. This new body would be about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.
Indian States would be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of representative of British India and with the same powers as the British Indian Members.

During this period, the British would be responsible for the defence of India. The task of organising military, moral and material resources of India would be the responsibility of the Government of India.

Cripps wanted the Union to be elastic. In this lay the weakness of his proposal. With regard to defence, a further suggestion was made that Indians would be represented in the war Cabinet, Pacific Council and the United Nations.

The Congress considered the Cripps proposals as a post-dated cheque and took no part in the deliberations and rejected most of the Cripps offer. They accepted the interim suggestions provided Defence was given to an Indian member of the Council. It further opposed the right to secede from the Union. The Muslim League rejected the scheme on the ground that the post-war provisions permitting partition of India did not give real protection to the Muslims.
Sastri, Sapru, Chimanlal Setalwad, Naushir Bharucha had condemned the secession clause. Setalwad and Bharucha met Cripps on 2nd April, 1942 and presented a memorandum to him. The National Liberal Federation Council felt that this clause would affect the unity of India. Besides, the permission that was to be granted to independent units to have independent armies, would lead to dangers of conflicts between the units themselves and would complicate matters. The Federation felt that the communal situation would worsen due to this particular clause.

The Liberal Federation criticised the proposals regarding the quorum of the Lower House of the Legislature. The Cripps proposals were that if 60% of the members of the Lower House did not vote for accession to the India Union the question would be decided by a plebiscite by a simple majority vote. The Liberals felt that such questions should not be decided by a simple majority, but that there should be minimum percentage prescribed. Women should be given franchise. The Liberals emphasized the need for appointing an Indian as Defence member in the Executive Council of the Viceroy and told the British that if they wanted full co-operation in the war, the British should include an Indian as Defence Member.
With regard to the executive council, the federation urged that the Viceroy's Council be Indianised so that sooner or later, the position of the Viceroy would be more or less equal to a constitutional head of State. These are demands had been included in the memorandum of Sapru and Jayakar. Sastri and Sapru appealed for the abandonment of Civil disobedience as it would be prejudicial to the best interests of the country in respect of defence and other matters.

In this way, the Liberals stepped up the agitation for more reforms. They became more vociferous in their demands and joined the congress in the national struggle.

The Cripps Mission ended in a dismal failure. Before he left ... His broadcast to India in April gave reasons for the failure. He realised that the opportunity of bringing India together had been missed and blamed the Congress for the debacle. He pointed out that they had demanded at the last moment a change in the constitution and asked for a National Government devoid of the Viceroyal control. Actually, the failure was more due to the politics of Churchill, Linlithgow and Amery who did not want India to be free.
On 2nd July, 1942 Linlithgow announced that the Executive Council would be expanded. This council included 10 Indian members, but this was a paltry increase, nor did the increase show any particular departure from past policies. For although the defence portfolio had been created the Home and Finance Department was still held by the British. War Transport was still with the British non-official member. It was not the type of National Government that the Liberals had contemplated. As a result of the unsatisfactory situation, the Congress lost faith in the sincerity of the British and the All India Congress committee met at Bombay on the August 7, 1942. It took into consideration the motion of July, 14 at Wardha and adopted a resolution which called for the British to Quit India. Gandhi was placed in command of the movement. On the 9th August, Gandhi and all Congress leaders were arrested. Sastri and Sapru had tried to discourage him but to no avail.

Linlithgow had been replaced by Lord Wavell in October, 1943. The new Viceroy insisted on unity. He was resented by Jinnah who accused of "fishing in Congress Waters".
The Congress played a vital role in the Quit India Movement. The new Viceroy refused to release the Congress leaders till the policy of non cooperation and obstruction was withdrawn.

At this time, Jinnah was trying to secure the Punjab as a Muslim League stronghold. They had been against the Quit India Movement. Jinnah utilised this time in seeing that the pro-Congress ministries were dismissed and captured the Muslim provinces, except Punjab which was still under the unionist party. It was now easy for the Muslims to proceed on the road to creating Pakistan. In 1943, December, they adopted the resolution of divide and quit.

The Muslim League attitude certainly harmed the nationalist forces. The British Government naturally did not support the Congress, rather, they rallied the Muslim.

The Liberals were trying at this time to resolve the deadlock between the Government and the Congress. A non-party conference was held at Lucknow on 7th and 8th April, 1944. This Conference recommended a number of resolutions urging the restoration of ministerial Government in the Provinces. At this time the Provinces were under
section 93, i.e. ruled directly by the Government in an autocratic manner. The Governors had 18 advisers whose advice could be rejected or accepted. Out of the 18 advisers, only 3 were Indians. The inclusion of Indians was just an eyewash as they did not have much of a role to play.

Besides the above, the Liberals demanded the structuring of the Governor-General's executive council with a Prime Minister, release of the Congress leaders and elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures. Tej Bahadur Sapru was authorised to prepare a memorandum to be submitted to the Government. He pressed for the restoration of constitutional Government in the Provinces and the establishment of a national government at the centre.

Sapru pointed out that the Government in these Provinces were autocratic. There were only 3 Indians out of 18 advisers. The Government was not subject to the control of the Governor-General-in-Council, but only to the control of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State. The Secretary, was totally kept away from Indian influence, whether provincial or central. Sapru condemned the Defence of India Rules as it provided safeguards for the Governors and suggested that an attempt should be made
to establish coalition ministries or ministries representing important elements in the legislature. The Viceroy felt that such drastic reforms should not be made during the war time and instead, he wanted a National Government within the frame work of the existing constitution. The Congress Indian leaders refused to accept this suggestion.

Tej Bahadur Sapru regretted the decision of the Congress to withdraw from office. He questioned whether it was right for a mistake committed by the Congress that the electorate should continue to be deprived of their constitutional rights. He felt that the Governors should have executive councillors instead of ministers, and allow the legislatures to work. Tej Bahadur Sapru felt that changes could be brought in within the existing constitution without disturbing the prosecution of the war. He realised how important it was to form an independent body to study political problems for a permanent settlement and to provide a smooth means for the transfer of power after the war. This body should not be formed by a Government which had little backing from political parties.
The Viceroy was not very enthusiastic in his attitude towards the suggestions of the Non-party conference. He felt that this set up should not be instituted during war time., and pointed out that a great deal of constitutional difficulty existed in the way of setting up a National Government. Wavell did not have much faith in Sapru's capacity as a constitutionalist or political leader and criticised has demand for the release of political leaders. He (Viceroy) wrongly thought that release of Gandhi was no solution to the communal and constitutional problem. There now existed a stalemate in Indian politics, which the British Government was keen on solving as they wanted to cling on to their power in India as they stood to gain by it.

The communal question now became the stumbling block. People had faith in Gandhi and hoped he would thaw the ice in Jinnah. They wanted the Government to release him and he was ultimately released in May, 1944. He took it on himself to solve the communal issue and tried to talk the issue over with Jinnah but failed.

Sapru made a last minute bid to break the stalemate. It was at this time that a Non-party Leaders' Conference met on 19th December, 1944 in New Delhi with T.B. Sapru as President.
The Conference decided to appoint a committee to give suggestions as to how to solve the political and communal problems. This committee was to examine the communal and other minorities question. It was to contact various parties to enquire into the problem. A standing committee was to be created to take all steps to formulate a plan/action acceptable to all. Discussions were to be conducted objectively. The committee urged Sapru to appoint members to a conciliation committee.

Sapru, in fact and suggested this idea much earlier to Gandhi, who had welcomed it. Gandhi suggested that it should be on a non-sectarian basis and Sapru accepted this advice. He therefore did not appoint any one from the Congress, the League or the Mahasabha to the committee. His intention was only to include retired judges in this committee as he believed they would bring in the legal viewpoint in dealing with the country's problem. The Government was sceptical about the success of this committee, but welcomed the move.
On December 3, 1944, Tej Bahadur Sapru had announced the names of the members of the Conciliation Committee of which he was to be the Chairman. Among the members were M.R. Jayakar, P.R. Das, Syed Wazeer Hasan, S. Radhakrishnan, N. Gopalswami Ayyanagar, Homi Modi, Maharaj Singh, Muhammad Yunus, Sachidananda Sinha, N.R. Joshi, Harnam Singh, N.R. Sarkar, John Mathai, Frank R. Anthony and Fazal Rahimtoola. He intended to write to leaders belonging to various parties and organisations to grant him personal interviews. It was decided that the committee would publish its report. This committee was not a constitution making committee and therefore its scope was limited. Its function was just to find a solution to the communal problem. The Chairman, Sapru visited the Punjab, Madras and Calcutta and deeply regretted his inability to visit Bombay. The committee received 168 memoranda.

Sapru requested Jinnah for a meeting to clarify some points. Jinnah wrote back saying that he neither recognised the Non-party conference, nor its standing committee and these circumstances, he could not comply with Sapru's request. However, if Sapru wanted to meet him in any other capacity, he would be happy to do so.
Ambedkar was inclined to cooperate initially but withdrew later as he disliked the composition of the committee. With all these obstacles strewn in its path, the Sapru committee went ahead.

The first meeting was held in December, 1944. The committee appointed four sub-committees, namely

1) General sub-committee with Sapru as Convener
2) Scheduled Castes - under S. Radhakrishnan
3) Minorities under Rajah Maharaj Singh
4) Economic sub-committee under John Mathai.

All these sub-committees submitted separate reports. The main committee dealt with Pakistan and the Partition problem. It condemned the idea of Pakistan as it was not possible to make provisions for future economic development on a scale sufficient to raise the general standard of living to a reasonable level and adequate measures for defence were not available. Under modern conditions, any scheme of political separation should provide means of effective continuous cooperation in matters affecting the safety of the country and its economic development. If such cooperation did not exist, the position of Hindustan
and Pakistan would be jeopardised. The division of India into separate sovereignty could spell stagnation.

It recommended joint electorates on the assurances of party. The committee felt that Indian Christians, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs would supply the ballast in the Legislature. It further said that room should be given in the legislatures for special interest and hoped that the working of the forces of time would make these classes recognise that the time had gone when they could keep themselves aloof from the community or from their tenants.

The members emphasized on the need of Labour and women to be represented. According to the committee, commerce and industry would require national support at this stage. The future of India was bound up with the industrial development of the country and considered it most desirable that commerce and industry should supply to the legislature men with practical knowledge and experience of complex problems which the Legislatures would be called upon to face. It suggested for the Union Assembly, the necessity of adult franchise other than those reserved for special interests. It was hoped reconstruction would take place in the field
of education and suggested further expansion of University and primary education which should receive top priority.

It was decided that Indians should draw up their new constitution consisting of Indian States and British India Provinces. They were opposed to disrupting the unity which now existed between the Indian States and British India. Their accession to the Federation depended on the individual state's wish.

The committee thought it would be appropriate that paramountcy jurisdiction would stand transferred from the Crown Representative to the Union Cabinet, for it was the Central Government - the Governor-General-in-Council which had, from 1858 up to the time the committee met, been implementing the obligations of paramountcy. S.145 of the Government of India Act of 1935 directed that the expenditure required for the discharge of the functions of the Crown Representative should on demand by him, be met out of the Central revenues.

As far as Defence was concerned, it emphasized the need for Indianisation of armed forces and control of social prejudices. The commander-in-chief was to be under
the Ministry of Defence. Defence was to be held by a Minister responsible to the Legislature. As soon as the war was over, all direct recruitment of British Officers to the Indian forces should cease. An institution should be established for training sufficient number of officers of the air force, army and navy and all deterrents preventing rapid Indianisation were to be removed.

As far as the new constitution was concerned, they recommended the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to frame a new constitution and suggested the creation of an interim government which would be the responsible of the Indians themselves. The committee authorised Tej Bahadur Sapru to communicate its demands to the Government. These were that (1) all political prisoners and detenues be released, (2) India should be granted Dominion status, (3) Proclamations issued in several Provinces under section 93 of the Act be withdrawn and (4) Popular Ministries be re-established. The Prime Minister should represent the largest single party in the Legislature. (5) Autonomy should be granted in the Provinces and National Government should be established at the centre. (6) The Political Advisor to the Crown
Representative should be an Indian and have the rank and status of an Executive Councillor.

However, the question on communal problem remained unsettled.

This scheme was widely criticised by various sectarian groups. However it did not adopt the extreme viewpoint of any particular group and as such rejected the Muslim League's idea of partition of India and gave parity to all sections of society in the constitutional making body, the central legislature and the Union Cabinet. It desired independence but left the door for a Dominion Constitution equally open. It made the office of the Head of State elective but restricted the choice of the electors to the order of Provinces. People should be elected on the basis of proportionate representation. It placed relations with Princes in the hands of Cabinet, but made the Princes exclusively eligible for election as Head of their State. It was this that was not approved of. The Princes had given no proof of their ability in working out democratic constitution. It was at this time that a subtle merger of Liberal and Congress group occurred. In fact, Jinnah charged Sapru of playing Gandhi's tune. The Muslim League
was vociferous in their criticism of the Sapru proposal. It was considered it as a threat to Muslim either to join the union as was proposed or accept the award of the British. The members looked upon this as an attempt to bribe the Muslims into giving up their fundamental right of self-determination.

The Hindustan Times and the Hindu, supported the proposals. Throughout the proceedings of the committee it was not swayed by the opinions of any particular group. One cannot totally write off the Sapru proposal as a paper solution only, for many of its parts are included in the constitution of 1950. It established conditions which tried to foster ideas of fundamental rights.

The above interim proposals were sympathetically received by the Government which sent that full text of the Resolution to London on 31st March 1945. Wavell went to England to discuss the matter and was able to get the grudging support of the Churchill Government to call Indians for close consultation for a solution of the Indian problem. Accordingly, the Viceroy issued a call for a conference on 14th June, 1945 to be held at Simla.
Although Sastri did not take a lead role in the politics of the day he was a keen observer of events, since the time C. Rajagopalachari announced his formula.

Rajaji had formulated a scheme in March, 1944 to resolve the political deadlock between the Congress and the Muslim League. It consisted of the following clauses:

(1) The Muslim League would endorse the Indian demand for independence and would cooperate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of war, a commission would be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the northwest and east of India, wherein the Muslims were in an absolute majority. In these areas, a plebiscite of all inhabitants would be held on the basis of adult franchise to decide the issue of separation.

(3) It would be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite was to be held.
(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements would be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications.

(5) The transfer of population would be absolutely on a voluntary basis.

(6) These terms would be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power to the Government of India.

Sastri, through his speeches and statements made from time to time, made known to the public his opinions on the above matter. He totally felt that C. Rajagopalachari's suggestions was a lynch pin. He opposed the idea of Pakistan and threw out a suggestion that the issue be decided by a board of arbitrators consisting of a Chinese, a French man and American.

By this time, Sastri had lost trust in the British. China, being a nation near the Indian borders, whom he felt India could not alienate, could be a possible help. France, although allied with the British during the war, had her own interests to protect as a rival power and would be useful. America, a new nation was comparatively strong and had showed her interest in Indian affairs. But, he erred in
thinking the way he did as any solution to a problem must come from within for it to be permanent.

He appealed to Gandhi not to resort to civil disobedience in order to strive for a communal solution. He pleaded for a fair stand on the question of undivided India and urged the country to adopt the Cripps proposals minus the principle of self-determination and gave a warning that posterity would curse those who started the Pakistan idea. He forecast the possibility of the Cripps proposals being offered again.

Sastri talked in terms of a composite Government, Provincial Governments where would not be wholly composed of representative of the majority party in power. According to him, they should also contain representatives of important minorities and recommended a coalition Governments in the Provinces and centre. He conceded that any permanent constitution for India would have to be deferred till the end of the war. Perhaps, this suggestion would have helped in the long run in establishing the elusive unity. Today, we do find Muslims taking part in our country's politics as congressmen too. Besides, congress of the yester years had also Muslim members.
He joined the others in condemning the Government for the insufficient measures taken for the Bengal famine. The National Liberal Federation regretted the gravity of food situation and Sastri suggested improved methods of agriculture to be introduced and called for an expansion of cultivation. He wanted an improvement in the standard of living among the masses and proper distribution of food rationing and demanded real control of the fiscal policy. He felt that only by improving the economic conditions of India, could become independent and pleaded the other politicians concentrate on this aspect.

Speaking about the future constitution of India, he wanted Dominion status and, to make the presence of India felt, he wanted Nehru and Gandhi to represent India at the peace conference. He wanted the colour bar to be abolished. Whilst he had been instrumental in focusing western attention towards India, he erred in thinking that colour bar could be abolished. Racial feelings are still very much in existence today.

With regard to unity, he felt that the British Government would not budge an inch with regard to the future
unity. According to him, the British spokesmen were resource-
ful. He felt that they were not likely to grant a national
90
government.

It was the communal problem on which he often. He
warned Gandhi of Aga Khan's move and pointed out that the
Aga Khan had started a separatist game. He was not sure
of C. Rajagopalachari's views on the communal question and
warned of Punjab and Bengal going over to the Pakistan side
and that the creation of Pakistan would end up in creating
91
a lasting enemy for India and a blistering sore.

Sastri had written the above opinion in a letter
to Gandhi on his death bed as he had been ailing for some-
time. Soon after Sastri passed away on April 14, 1946.

Sastri did not live to see India independent. He
was a man of peace. Had he seen the holocaust of the parti-
tion, he would have felt sad. Throughout his career he had
maintained that there were no short cuts to the consolidation
of national unity. Only the spread of education and growth
of public spirit could strengthen. For this 'the unquestioned
continuance of order was essential. No one who reflects on
the near chaotic condition of India today can deny the truth
of this statement.
He continued the spirit of the early pioneers who had laboured to lay the foundations of lasting freedom. Some of his policies have been superseded by time, but whatever he spoke had a hardcore of sense and true insight to serve as warning signals.

His work was continued by men like Tej Bahadur Sapru and others. The Liberals now fought hand in hand with the Congress and thus contributed much towards securing our freedom. They had by now totally lost their faith in the British Government.

To assuage the feelings of the Indian politicians, the Viceroy had proclaimed his June 14, 1945 declaration wherein he said "... I therefore propose with full support of His Majesty's Government, to invite Indian leaders both of Central and Provincial politics to take counsel with me with a view to the formation of a new Executive Council more representative of organised political opinion".

He included in his list of invitees for the proposed conference of 25th June at Simla the following members:
1. The Premiers in Provincial Governments and the Premiers of the section 93 Provinces.

2. The Leader of the Congress Party and the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League in the Central Assembly; the Leaders of the Congress Party and the Muslim League in the Council of State; also the leaders of the Nationalist party and the European group in the assembly.

3. Gandhi and Jinnah as the recognised leaders of the two main political parties. Rao Bahadur N. Shiva Raj to represent the Scheduled Classes, Master Tara Singh to represent the Sikhs.

In accordance with the Viceroy's declaration of 14 June, 1945, the Simla Conference took place on 25th June, 1945.

Just as Sastri had predicted, the Cripps proposal was still valid at this time. The Viceroy announced the immediate release of the members of the Congress working committee in detention, thus satisfying one of the recommendations of the Sapru proposals. This move was meant to secure the lost confidence of the Indians, and the Congress working committee accepted the invitation to attend the Simla Conference.
The Simla Conference was to discuss: (1) the settlement of the communal issue, in accordance with the recommendation of the Sapru proposal; 
(2) the formation of a new Executive Council which was more representative of organised public opinion. The proposed council represented, as pointed out before, the main communities and would include equal proportions of caste Hindus and Muslims. It would work out if formed under the existing constitution. But, it would be an entirely Indian Council except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-chief who would retain his position as war member. This was just a partial concession to the Sapru proposals. Gandhi objected to the term 'Caste Hindus' whom the Congress was supposed to represent. The Viceroy assured that the term was used to denote those Hindus who did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. The Congress claimed the right to include in their quota members of all communities especially the Muslims, Scheduled Caste and Christians. Sivaraj maintained that the Scheduled Caste members should bear the same ratio of their population as the Muslim members bore to theirs. Gandhi wanted a coalition ministry to be formed in the Provinces, the minorities should be represented only by members of their body belonging to the Congress. The Viceroy felt that the minorities should be represented by some one they trusted. 
(3) Finally, the Minister for External Affairs was to be transferred to an Indian.
Before proceeding further, it would be well to compare on broad lines the proposals of His Majesty's Government with the suggestion made by the Sapru committee. Both had for its aim the removal of the feeling of political frustration which had enveloped the country, the restoration of constitutional Government in the section 93 Provinces and the reconstitution of the Executive Council at the centre in order to convert it into one commanding the support of political parties and capable of prosecuting the war against Japan, of having India represented at the peace and other international Conferences by persons with the backing of the nation, of evolving a really national plan of post war rehabilitation and development and of initiating and carrying to successful conclusion the steps necessary for framing of a new and permanent constitution. The actual measures outlined by the Government lacked imaginative statesmanship. The Sapru committee advised the immediate release of all political prisoners, the Viceroy relegated it almost to the end of his broadcast and even so announced the immediate release only of the members of the Congress working committee leaving the final decision about others to the new Central Government if formed and to the Provincial Government.
The Sapru proposals attached great importance to the immediate declaration of India as a Dominion. The British failed to respond to this suggestion.

The major parties in India were committed to winning complete independence. It was Britain's case that she would not be an obstacle but she added that the Dominion status enjoyed by a member of the British commonwealth of nations amounted to full independence. At the time when Sapru proposals were being discussed, there was no clear statutory, or other definition, either of a Dominion or Dominion status. The definition accepted by the committee was that Dominion status indicated the constitutional and internal position of the territorial community concerned.

The next recommendation was for the withdrawal of the proclamation under section 93 from the Provinces and resumption of normal functioning and reinstallation of popular ministries in accordance with the Act of 1935 and the Instrument of Instructions to Governors. The new Wavell paper and the Wavell broadcast accepted all these ideas but only verbally, contingent upon the plan for the centre going through successfully, with the result that, when the centre failed, the idea of restoring normal constitutional machinery was dropped. This according to Sapru Committee was a blunder.
Whilst they agreed on a National Government for the centre, the Sapru committee had made two alternative suggestions. The first of these proposed to bring the Federal part of the Act of 1935 into force without insisting on the accession of Indian States and forming a Federal Executive. But this was not favoured by His Majesty's Government. This did not secure any large support from the public. The scheme put forward by the Government was in essence the same as the Sapru proposals. The Central Government was under the 2nd alternative to be conducted under the provisions of the Act of 1935 excluding the provision that not less than 3 members of the Executive Council must have had at least ten years' service under the crown in India. The interim arrangement was to mark a further stage in the evolution of responsible Government without involving any violent breach in the fences erected in 1919 and 1935 for the protection of the State from external danger and ensuring internal law and good Government. It was suggested that the provisions excluded from the control of the legislature such as ecclesiastical affairs, external affairs, defence, tribal areas and the discretionary powers of the Governor General should be repealed. The Government gave only partial support.
One of the cardinal features of British plan was that the new Executive Council should be composed so as to give "balanced" representation of the main communities including "equal proportion of Muslims and Hindus other than the scheduled caste". The committee made no specific reference to communal representation in the Executive Council. They insisted on parity between Muslims and Hindus other than scheduled castes. This was to be secured on the basis of the Muslims agreeing to give up separate communal electorates and accept joint electorals with reservation of seats. The grant of this concession in the case of the new council at the centre without this condition being fulfilled was not in conformity with the spirit of the committee recommendations.

In their cable to the Secretary of State, the Sapru committee recommended that the political Adviser to the Crown Representative should be an Indian and have the rank and status off an Executive Councillor. There was no reference to this functionary in the British plan. Changes took place in England too. The Labour Ministry was in power in July, 1945 and Indian hopes were thereby aroused. Atlee tried to solve the Indian problem and sent parliamentary delegation to India which was not given importance by the Liberals and the Congress. It was then decided that a high
powered committee should be sent called the Cabinet Mission. This arrived on 24th March, 1946 and immediately set about its work. The task of the Cabinet Mission was, two fold. Firstly, to bring about agreement on the method of framing the constitution and secondly to assist in the formation of a new Executive Council, representative of the main Indian political parties, for carrying on the Government while the constitution was being framed. It brought no scheme of constitutional advancement tailored in Britain. The aim was to set up an acceptable machinery as a result of discussions amongst Indians themselves, in which the Viceroy was considered to be a colleague. The Cabinet Mission conferred with the Governor-General, Provincial Governors and prominent Indian leaders. The crucial issue was a united India or Pakistan. The Congress stood for a united India and the Muslim League demanded Pakistan. Jinnah did not budge an inch from his two nation theory. A tripartite discussions were held in Simla between the Muslim League, Congress and the Government between May 5 and 12, 1946. The Congress and the Muslim League could not be reconciled. Thereupon, the Cabinet Mission announced their own decision in an outline scheme on May 16, 1946.
Its salient features were:

1) Immediate arrangements to be made whereby Indians might decide the future constitution of India, and an interim Government would be set up at once to carry on the administration of British India until such time as a new constitution could be brought into being. The Mission rejected the Muslim League proposal for the division of India into two units and recommended a Union of India consisting of British India and Indian States. This would be secured by measures which would assure to the Muslims control in culture, religion, economic and other interests.

The Cabinet Mission accepted the Congress and the Muslim League as the majority parties. The Liberals could not play any important role under this situation. The only thing significant in the mission was that it was against the partition of India and tried to bridge the gulf between the Muslim League and the Congress.

The Viceroy had been given instructions to form an Interim Executive Council. The Muslim League boycotted the new Executive Council, though Wavell wanted to include the Muslims. The League was asked to enter the interim
Government without fulfilling the condition of joining the Constituent Assembly. The Congress threatened to resign. Wavell thus revealed himself as a partisan of Muslim interests. The British Government realising that Wavell could not tackle the situation recalled him.

Wavell was succeeded by Mountbatten on 24th March, 1947, who had a charismatic personality. Mountbatten cultivated the friendship of Nehru and Patel. He realised that it was impossible to satisfy the Muslim League and he persuaded the Congress to accept the idea of separation. His draft regarding the future constitution for India was presented to Nehru who rejected it. In the meantime, the constitutional adviser to the Viceroy, V.P. Menon, helped in solving this political impasse. He persuaded Nehru and Patel to accept transfer of power on Dominion status basis, in keeping with the Liberal tradition. Nehru and Sardar Patel were favourable to this plan and ultimately accepted. The ideas conveyed under the Independence Act of 1947, incorporated the ideals of the Liberals.
The British left India due to a combination of circumstances in which every group played their role. The Liberals, Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Nehru contributed a great deal.

The world war economic strains, shortages in consumer goods, rise in prices, produced a great deal of discontent. The refugees from Burma brought along with them tales of discontent over the racial animosity between the white and brown races, police action and arrests. This led to hartals and protest meetings.

The famine of 1943 brought untold miseries and people began to get restive. Moreover, the Indian National Army trial was the last straw. A military tribunal tried the Indian National Army Officers, who were represented by lawyers belonging to the Congress. The chief defence lawyer was Bhulabhai Desai and Tej Bahadur Sapru was amongst others helping him. The Liberals again played their role in supporting the Indians in this matter.
The final incident that made the British realise that they had to make a gracious exit was after the Mutiny in the Navy at Bombay and they realised that they no longer had administrative / military control of India. Thus India was granted independence on the 15th August, 1947.

In the foregoing pages, the contribution of the Indian Liberals has been traced. It was after the Indian Round Table Conference that they took a very positive attitude to the freedom struggle. They galvanised themselves and injected new vigour into their policies. The torch bearers of their movement were Sastri and Sapru. They never ceased to press the Government to make necessary changes and could boast of certain concrete achievements. They did not cease their political activities right up the end and their ideals have been enshrined in the Constitution of 1950.
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