CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

All living beings struggle for existence. But animals and plants struggle without a conscious plan but act merely by instincts. Humans beings being endowed with a superior intellect can understand the conditions well and with a gift of freewill can plan things, devise strategies to ensure success. An individual wishes to conduct his life in the light of his knowledge of himself and the world, taking into consideration all possible consequences; and in his vision he is limited. When you see something but do not recognize it as what it is, then you may take it as something else other than what it is. Failure to perceive an object for what it is leads to a mistake of the object. If the object is totally unseen, there is only ignorance; no mistake can be attributed to that. A totally unperceived, unknown object can never become the locus of error concerning its nature. Being conscious of himself he has the locus in which a mistake about him can be made. So by looking at himself he doesn’t recognize himself for what he is and hence makes a judgment about himself that will be something other than what actually he is.

In order to fulfill his inadequacy a wanting person with his compulsive behavior and his constantly attempts to pursue security and pleasure. Being aware of right and wrong means of gaining these goals, the individual often disregards this knowledge, thereby choosing the ethical means. A great importance to the pursuit of artha and kāma can be seen in everyone’s action. The gain of security and pleasures assumes importance because it is by this gain one hopes to escape oneself from want of inadequacy and incompleteness and become a free person. Therefore, everyone seeks to be a complete person as one thinks of oneself as incomplete. All struggles in life are expressions of incompleteness. The conclusion is that everyone seeks freedom from the struggle of inadequacy and wants to gain fulfillment in his or her life.
1.2 The attempt for completeness

In most situations one finds oneself as incomplete, not wholly adequate. Whatever the circumstances, one does not feel oneself truly at home; something further is needed. And he tries to achieve completeness by changing the situation. If you look closely at the variety of changes you work to bring about in the situations in your life, you will find that you make changes so that you will feel adequate. My attempt to change the situation is really an attempt to change myself. One does not try to change the situation in which one is at home with me. But when one sees oneself as inadequate, he adds new things into the situation so that he may feel better; or, he may eliminate some aspects from the situation in order to be comfortable.

From looking at one’s own experiences and the fact that human beings desire seeking various pursuits shows that what really underlies is the desire to become totally free from all deficiencies, and become completely adequate at all times in all situations. But only finds fleeting moments of adequacy and continues to be inadequate mostly. The fundamental problem being inadequacy and the solution chosen is the gain of artha and kāma. The result is temporary and not a total end to the sense of inadequacy. Thus we find neither security nor fulfillment of any pleasures can put an end to the sense of inadequacy as stated in the upanishad.¹

Having analyzed life’s experiences one gains dispassion towards the results of one’s effort, the gain of dispassion shows the inability of the result of efforts to solve the basic human problem. His worldly experiences involving changes through effort has not brought a lasting solution to this sense of incompleteness.

However, everyone at some point of time experiences adequacy in his life. This insight of adequacy comes whenever one enjoys moments of joy one sees
oneself as adequate. When a desire is fulfilled one experiences adequacy for a while. However momentary this experience of adequacy be, one sees oneself at that moment as a person not wanting anything, in other words, he sees himself as a happy person. That experience of being not wanting in anything becomes the norm by which the experience of being wanting in something is judged. One cannot consider something as bad unless one knows what is good. There is no dissatisfaction if there is no norm for satisfaction. We do not lack such a norm for adequacy.

Thus moksha becomes relevant when one realizes that behind one’s struggle for security and pleasures, is the basic human desire to be adequate, free from all incompleteness, and that no amount of security or pleasure achieves that goal. Moksha means freedom from inadequacy. Desiring moksha, a mumukshu seeks various means for liberation. Here is where different Schools of philosophies contend various means by establishing many theories for achieving the above.

1.3. The various Schools of Philosophy

According to a traditional principle of classification, most likely adopted by orthodox thinkers, the Schools or systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes, namely, orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika). The first group can be further divided into six philosophical systems namely, Mimāmsā, Vedānta, Sānkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. These are regarded as Āstika Darśanas, not because they believe in God, but because they accept the authority of the Vedas. The Mimāmsā and the Sānkhya do not believe in God as the creator of the world, yet they are Āstika Darśanas in nature, because they believe in Veda as a pramāna. The six systems mentioned here are not the only orthodox systems but they are the chief ones, also there are some other less important orthodox Schools, such as the Grammarian School, the medical School, etc. Under the other class of heterodox systems, the chief three are the Schools of the materialists like the Cārvākas, the Baudhās and Schools of the materialists
like the Cārvākas, the Baudhhas and the Jainas. They are called nāstikas because they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas.

The Vedas are the earliest available source in Indian literature and all the later thoughts that had originated in India are greatly found to follow the Vedas. Some systems accepted the Veda as authority whereas others did not. Of those who accepted the Veda, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā are considered to be directly flowing in the Vedas. The Vedas essentially deal with two portions. One is ritualistic portion, namely karma, and other is the portion dealing with Jnāna. Mīmāṃsā deals with the ritualistic aspect and evolves a philosophy to justify and help the continuation of the Vedic rites and rituals. Vedānta deals with the latter aspect of the Vedas and develops an elaborate philosophy out of Vedas. Thus the word Vedānta is a positional name given. As both these Schools were direct continuations of Vedic culture, both together sometimes are called ‘Mīmāṃsā’; and for the sake of distinction, the first is called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Karma-Mīmāṃsā) and the second, Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (Jnāna-Mīmāṃsā). The Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika primarily hold their theories on ordinary human experiences and reasoning, and used Vedas as a support to their rationally established theories. Since they never questioned the authority of the Vedas they are also classified as Āstika Darśanas. On the other hand, the Carvaka, Bauddha and Jaina Schools object the authority of the Vedas and hence called Nāstika Darśanas. Since our discussion is related to Āstika system, let us confine only to Āstika Darśana here.

1.4. Development of Indian Philosophy

Different Schools in India, though not originating simultaneously, flourish together during many centuries, and they pursue parallel courses of growth. Each system had a group of followers who formed a School of that philosophy. Not only they lived they also handed it down to succeeding generations. Thus each system of thought continued to exist for generations now.
Even though different systems had different followings, still each system allowed many possible objections rose against its views. That means the objections raised were only with regard to the philosophy that was contended by them and had nothing to do with the exponent of philosophy. In fact it is by mutual objections raised against each others philosophy that this huge literature has come into existence. This again created a passion for clarity and preciseness in ideas in order to guard the statements against objections from other Schools of thought. As said by Satiścandra Catterjī, mutual criticism further makes Indian Philosophy its own best critic.²

So most philosophical approaches have been greatly influenced by the Vedas. Next to the Vedas we find the Sūtras being employed by orthodox School of thoughts. A Sūtra³ etymologically means a ‘thread ‘and here it means a brief statement. As the tradition held discussions orally, this method of Sūtra was employed to the students for syntactically holding together the ideas of the Upanishad as well as its discussions. Brahmasūtra by Bādarāyana for example contains the aphorisms that sum up the teachings of all Upanishads. Similarly we have Sūtras like the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras by Jaimini, the Sūtras of Kaṇāda for Vaiśeshika and the Yoga Sūtras of patanjali for Yoga School, etc.

The Sūtras being brief and subtle in nature require explanations called Vṛttīs, and also require elaborate interpretations through commentaries. These commentaries were called Bhāṣyas and sometimes different authors wrote different Bhāṣyas on one and the same-work and interpreted the work in order to justify their standpoints. Thus came different commentaries from Śri Rāmānujācārya, Śri Śaṅkarācārya, Śri Madhvācārya, Śri Vallabhācārya, and so on. Thus one Vedānta Philosophy itself has different Schools in it.

As time went, commentaries upon commentaries arose and sometimes even independent texts came into existence to bring out the ideas communicated
in these commentaries or for further elaboration or to criticize existing doctrines. Even though different Schools held different ideas, a sort of harmony among them was also conceived by these thinkers. They believed that there is an *adhikāri bheda* when it comes to the study of these. All were not fit to do all things and so in the matter of philosophy, religion or social affairs we should take the *adhikāri bheda* into consideration and recognize the distinctions. Hence there are also some similarities between these Schools of thoughts though they hold different ideas.

1.5. **Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita as per Śri Śaṅkarācārya and Śri Rāmānujācārya**

*Jīva, Īsvara and Jagat* are three primary principles in Vedānta. It is difficult to explain as to how each one is related to each other. The advaita holds that all these three are apparent diversifications of one and the same Brahman which is non-dual and only one.\(^5\) The apparent diversification of Brahman into these three is explained as an effect of Māya, which cannot be categorically said to be existent or non-existent.\(^6\) Māya which has three guṇa\(^s\) undergoes modification into this jagat consisting of mind, senses and objects such as earth. The nature of *jagat* is also said to be *Mithyā* like Māya.

According to Advaita, Brahman gets reflected in Māya and the mind; the reflection is called as Īsvara and Jīva respectively. Thus from the standpoint of Māya it gets the name of Īsvara and from the standpoint of mind or avidyā, Brahman gets the name of Jīva. The essential nature of these two is Pure being, ‘Sat’. This status of being Īsvara and Jīva are Mithyā as they are caused by Māya\(^7\). Thus the *upādhi* of Īsvara being *śuddhasatvapradhāna* is not affected by anything, thus is essentially aware of his identity with Brahman and is ever-free, whereas that of Jīva being malina *satva*, loses the sense of its identity with its essential nature and falsely attributes itself with body mind sense complex and performs karma and thereby experiences their fruits by undergoing births
continuously. In order to get rid of this cycle, the Jīva should understand its true nature as identical with Brahman. Such an understanding can take place from the Mahāvākyas taught by the scriptures.

Śri Śaṅkarācārya adopts the traditional method of superimposition and denial known as adhyāropa and apavāda as a method of communicating and this was later employed by Śri Maṇḍanamiśra too. Advaita is a philosophy of standpoints. Śri Śaṅkarācārya distinguishes between two standpoints, the absolute and the relative. They both are the standpoints of vidyā and avidyā respectively. What is true from one standpoint is not from the other. Thus advaita accepts all kinds of distinctions from relative or empirical point of view and denies the same from the absolute standpoint. Even the distinction between standpoints is from the standpoint of avidyā only. Considering the theory of Nirguṇa Brahman Śri Śaṅkarācārya maintains that the distinction between the Nirguṇa and Sagguṇa Brahman is from the above two standpoints as he states in Brahma sūtra

The advaita theory is based on three important principles. First, the self is self-revealing in nature. The mind and senses happen to know things only by the backing of Ātmā. They reveal things only by borrowing from the self - so is the statement made by the scriptures. The mind and senses are instruments by which the self-functions assuming the status as subject. This status is also only a relative status. Secondly, in the absence of Adhyāsa between the self and upādhi, there will neither be pramāṭr nor pramāṇa. Third, Śri Śaṅkarācārya recognizes the srūti as a pramāṇa to know the self while other pramānas know things which are empirical in nature.

1.6. The Possibility of Adhyāsa

Śri Śaṅkarācārya introduces Brahmasūtra in his Bhāṣyam through the introduction of Adhyāsa. This is called Adhyāsa-Bhāṣyam where Śri Śaṅkarācārya explains the common misconception of every human being. The
purpose of the Adhyāsa-Bhāṣyam is to show that the human problem is the result of an error about one's Self. The solution lies in removing this error through knowledge.

When a rope is not clearly visible, a person mistakes it for a snake. This is called partial knowledge (sāmānya Jnānam). The Existence that is perceived as "There is" is the sāmānyāṁśa. Being ever evident, it is called the satyāṁśa. The specific feature (viśeṣaṁśa) that it is a rope covered partially by darkness. When the visesaṁśa is covered then it gets replaced by another viśeṣaṁśa called snake, which is false (mithyā). When the existence of rope is known and we say, ‘there is a rope’, the correction takes place in viśeṣaṁśa.

Śri Śaṅkarācārya says, similarly, when we say ‘I am a human being’, the "I" is sāmānyāṁśa and the human being status is viśeṣaṁśa; this mithyā viśeṣaṁśa is the result of covering of the real sāmānyāṁśa. The real viśeṣaṁśa is Brahman or Ānanda which is revealed by Vedāntic teaching.

Error as defined by Śri Śaṅkarācārya
➢ is misapprehension of the rope - anyathā grahaṇam.
➢ is super-imposition of snake - Adhyāsa āropa.
➢ is a combination of a real rope and unreal snake – satya-anṛta-mithunī-karaṇam.

The aim of the entire Brahmaṣūtra is to remove this error by negating the superimposed misconceptions.

The Adhyāsa Bhāṣyam of Śri Śaṅkarācārya is broadly classified into six topics.
• Adhyāsa Lakṣaṇam - Defining the error.
• Adhyāsa Śankā - Objection to the idea of error raised by other Schools of Philosophy.
• Adhyāsa Śankā Samādhānam - Answering the objections.
• Adhyāsa Sambhāvanā - Showing the possibility of the error that occurs.
• Adhyāsa Pramāṇam - Proof to show the error.
• Adhyāsa Upasamhāram - Conclusion.

1.6.1. **ADHYĀSA LAKṢAŅAM**

Śri Śaṅkarācārya gives two direct definitions and one indirect.

- *Smṛti rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ Adhyāsah*\(^1\) - The perception of a previously experienced object (which is in the form of memory) on a wrong locus i.e., perceiving an experienced snake on a rope.
- *Athāsmin tad buddhiḥ*\(^2\) - the notion of something upon something else.
- *satya-anṛta-mithunī-karaṇam*\(^3\) - (indirect definition) combining the real and the unreal.

1.6.2. **ADHYĀSA ŚANKĀ**

It is the objection raised by other Schools of Philosophy. They object to the very introduction of Adhyāsa claiming that an error in ātma-anātma is not possible. According to these philosophers Adhyāsa requires four conditions to be fulfilled. They are:

- Rope is pratyakṣa viṣayaḥ i.e. an object perceived in front.
- Rope should not be completely known. One should be ignorant of the fact that there is rope - ajñāna tatvam.
- Sādṛṣṭyaṃ - there should be a similarity between what is superimposed (snake) and the object (rope) perceived.
- A false snake is superimposed because of the experience of a real snake as it is called *Pūrva anubhava janya samskāraḥ* vāsana born out of the experience of the ‘real’ snake before.
These conditions do not hold good for ātma-anātma-adhyāsa. Ātma being self-evident, ignorance of ātma is impossible. In addition, there are no similarities between ātma and anātma for a misconception to take place because ātma is a conscious changeless subject and anātma an insentient object subject to modifications.

Adhyāsa requires the previous experience of a real object in order to create a samskāra of the superimposed entity. Anātma being unreal, a previous experience of anātma is not possible. Therefore, no vāsana or samskāra of anātma is created. Hence, ātma-anātma-adhyāsa is not possible.

These are the objections raised by other Schools of Philosophy. Śri Śaṅkarācārya refutes these claims and proves the possibility of Adhyāsa.

Śri Śaṅkarācārya's answers to the objections raised by the other systems of Philosophy are presented below:

1.6.3. ADHYĀSA-ŚANKĀ-SAMĀDHĀNAM AND SAMBHĀVANĀ

The adhyāsa-śankā-samādhānam and adhyāsa sambhāvanā are dealt together because of their close relationship

1.6.3.1. Pratyaksha vishayatvam

- Objection: The thing which is mistaken should be a pratyaksha vishaya, an object perceived in front. Ātmā is not an object that can be perceived in front.

- Answer: For a mistake to take place an object must be evident but it need not necessarily be an object in front. Ātmā is not an object in front, but it is a subject, evident enough to commit a mistake.
1.6.3.2. Ajñātātvaṃ

- **Objection**: Since the Self is self-effulgent, there cannot be any possibility of ignorance.

- **Answer**: Ātmā, the self, is partially known. The sat (existence) and cit (consciousness) aspects of the Self are known, but the ānanda (happiness) aspect is not known. This is evident from our own personal experience. The fact that ‘I’ exist as a conscious person is ever-evident but I am ignorant of the fact that ānanda is my nature. If self-ignorance is not there, Upanishads need not teach Ātmā Jñānam. Chandogya Upanishad says: ‘the knower of the self-crosses the ocean of sorrow’.

1.6.3.3. Sādṛśyam

- **Objection**: How can there be a similarity between self and non-self, confusion between two entirely different entities is not possible, Ātmā being consciousness and anātmā being inert.

- **Answer**: Sādṛśyam is a general condition but there are exceptions. We do have cases where error takes place without any similarity. Example: Blueness superimposed upon the colourless space.

1.6.3.4. Samskāraḥ

- **Objection**: satya-anṛta-mithunī-karaṇam is possible in ātmānātmā only when a real anātmā is experienced before. In the example, a real rope and unreal snake are possible because a real snake has been already experienced by us and from that we get the snake samskāraḥ and we super-impose a false snake. This implies that a false anātmā is possible only if there is an experience of real anātmā.
Answer: Samskāra is required, which comes from the previous experience. The previous experience of a snake is required for mistaking a rope for a snake, but it need not be a real snake. Super-imposition is possible even by experience of an unreal thing. In that case of anātmā also, one anātma-adhyāsa is possible because of the previous anātma-adhyāsa which is unreal. There is no real anātmā. Therefore, all the four conditions are fulfilled and Adhyāsa is possible.

1.6.4. Possibility of Adhyāsa – Some more reasons

Śri Śaṅkarācārya defends the possibility of Adhyāsa by giving some more reasons:

- Adhyāsa is based on Veda-Pramānam. Adhyāsa is not derived from snake-rope example but from Veda. The snake-rope example is given only to show some corollaries of Adhyāsa.
- This Adhyāsa should not be questioned by other philosophers as they themselves have accepted this Adhyāsa without being aware of it. They talk about ātmā as eternal and accept the karma-kāṇḍa. They also accept that ātmā refers to 'I', the Self, which is eternal based on Veda-Pramānam. Stating that "I am a human being" is an error.
- They should neither question the Ātmānātma-adhyāsa because they have already accepted the ātma-sthūlaśarīra-adhyāsa. The similarity between ātmā and sthūlaśarīra cannot be talked about since it fails to fulfill their own condition of sādṛśyam. They still accept based on śruti that ātmā is not the body.
- From the śruti statement we know that ātmā is eternal and from our own experience we know that anātmā is mortal. Thus, ātmā is different from anātmā. Still adhyāsa is taking place based on the śruti pramānam. The worldly experience of anātmā should not be taken while talking about ātmānātma-adhyāsa as it is based on śruti pramānam.
• Similarly, the rope-snake example also cannot be questioned by other systems because that adhyāsa is experienced by us and not proved logically by khyāti Vāda. Each philosopher explains differently how the rope-snake adhyāsa takes place.

• Thus, the controversy is only with regard to the extent of adhyāsa which takes place.

Therefore, we find that the adhyāsa is possible.

1.6.5. Adhyāsa Pramānam

It is a proof which shows the existence of adhyāsa. It is based on śruti statement classified into two.

1.6.5.1. Arthāpatti Pramāṇam

An idea is postulated to explain a proven fact. Through this the kartā (doer) and the bhoktā (experimenter) are proved as adhyāsa.

Example: When in the morning we see the roads flooded, then it is postulated that at night it had rained. The process of postulation is called Arthāpatti jñānam and the knowledge derived from such postulation is called pramāṇa. It is pratyaksha based Arthāpatti pramāṇam and these ideas are based on śruti, hence called śruti-arthāpatti pramānam.

The other conclusions based on Arthāpatti:

➢ Naiyāyikas say ātmā is kartā and the Sānkhyas are of the view that ātmā is bhoktā. In contrast to these views the śruti says ‘Neither Ātma does kill nor he is killed’. Therefore, the doer and the bhoktā are super-impositions on ātmā.
I am (pramatā) the knower, is super-imposed on ātmā. Ātmā is knowledge and not the knower, as śruti says Ātmā is not the waker, the dreamer or the sleeper but the non-knowing witness consciousness’.  

Ātmā is nirvikāra, not subject to any modifications.

If Ātmā is kartā, bhoktā, pramātā then it requires an association with an instrument (karaṇam or pramāṇam). Hence the Ātmā will necessarily have to be Sasangaḥ but the śruti says: ’Ātmā is asangaḥ (not associated with anything).

Paricchinnatvam or limitation is also an error as śruti says: Ātmā is aparicchinam (limitless).

Anekatvam (plurality) is also an error as the śruti declares: ’The non-dual ātmā appears as many.’

1.6.5.2. Anumāna Pramāṇam

Inference is based on vyāpti (co-existence of two things) as it is inferred that: “Yatra yatra vyavahāratvam tatra tatra Adhyāsatvam”.

1.6.6. Adhyāsa Upasamhāra

Adhyāsa is harmful to the entire humanity as it brings mortality which is the cause of constant fear of death, insecurity etc., “Adhyāsa eva samsārasya kāraṇam”

The Adhyāsa leads to karma, which gives punyam and pāpam leading to the cycle of birth-death. This Adhyāsa is removed only by knowledge.

1.7. The Theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita

Viśiṣṭādvaita holds that Ṣvāra, Ṣīva and the world are three realities distinctly present. Ṣvāra is Brahman, the ultimate reality and is endowed with all
auspicious qualities. He is ever with Lakshmi or Śri and together with Her; He is the supreme reality and is denoted as Śrīman Nārāyaṇa. The world that is made of sentient and insentient entities constitutes the body of the Lord. Viśiṣṭādvaita defines body as as an entity which is entirely subservient, supported and controlled by another sentient entity and is inseparable from that. The one that is controlled supported and subservient is the body of the other. Thus these three entities form one complex whole. In other words, Brahman is qualified by sentient and in-sentient entities and that Brahman is without a second. The self and the body are inseparable (apṛthaksiddha) and the Jīvas and the world are inseparable attributes of Īsvara (apṛthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa), thus together stand as an adjectival feature of Him who is therefore the substantive one (prakārin). The Jīvas are eternal and are infinite in number. They are classified as baddhas, muktas and nityas. The baddhas undergo samsāra, the muktas are those who are free from bondage and are liberated and the Nityas are those that have never come into the spell of samsāra. It is due to karma that the Jīvas experience samsāra. Liberation is attaining the abode of Lord Narayana and it is Śri Vaikunṭha. This is accomplished by either by bhakti or prapatti as per Viśiṣṭādvaita. The insensent entity namely prakṛti transforms itself as the world by the resolve of Īsvara. Thus both these Schools claim their validity based on the authority of the scriptures. The difference in their view points is dependent on the mode of interpretation from different standpoints.

1.8. THE TEACHINGS OF ĀLWĀRS

One of the popular system of Vedānta philosophy namely, Viśiṣṭādvaita was propagated by Śrī Rāmānujā, who was well known as Śrī Bhāṣyakāra. He systematized the teachings of the ṛṣis and the Ālwārs as expounded by Nāthamuni and Ālavandar. The Spiritual experiences of the Ālwārs and the Ācāryas recorded in the Guruparamparās become the root cause for the advent of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. The Prophecy of the Śrīmad Bhāgavata that in the Kali Yuga, the ṛṣis devoted to
Nārāyana would be born in on the banks of rivers Kāveri, Tāmraparṇī and the Pālāru in Drāviḍadeśa or in the land of Agastya was fulfilled in the lives and teachings of the Ālwārs. The only aim of the Ālwārs was to contact God in His beauteous aprākrta form and to communicate the joy of their communion with Him to humanity. They were all messengers of God who spread the Viśiṣṭādvaita gospel that Brahman, the śarīri of all, has the chief quality of Saulabhya even on the perceptual level and that by rooting out ahankara and by self-surrender to His love; every man can attain Mukti.

1.9. Sri Rāmānujācharya and His Contribution

Sri Rāmānujācharya, who followed Yāmunācārya, was born in Śrīperumbūdūr near Kāncī in the year 1017 A.D. as the son of Āsuri Keśava Somayāji and Kantimati, sister of Śrī Śailapurna, the grandson of Yāmunācārya. He has systematized the entire teachings of Viśiṣṭādvaita, expounded by his predecessors through his works. He did a great service in spreading the Viśiṣṭādvaitic literature till the end of his life which lasted for 120 years. The writings of Ramanuja comprise only nine works. They are Sri Bhāṣya, Gita Bhāṣya, Vedanta dīpa, Vedanta Sarāḥ, Vedārtha Sangraha, Nitya Grantha, Sri Ranga Gadyam, Saranagati Gadyam and Vaikunda Gadyam. Of these three are short devotional compositions and the devotion in them is such that they contain the quintessence of his philosophy.

In the remaining works of Śrī Rāmānujā, who established the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, expounds his theory by quoting the relevant passages from the Vedas and the Upanishads. In order to establish the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita the author discusses various topics pertaining to the system, giving validity not
only to the Vedas and Upanishads, but also to the Smṛtis and Purāṇas as the source of true knowledge and refutes the views of mīmāṃsa-kāśa and other rival philosophical systems. An exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaita, the views of rival schools, criticisms against the tenets of Advaita, criticism on Bhāskara’s system, criticism on Yādavaprakāśa’s school, the explanation of tattva, hita and puruṣārtha, sources of knowledge, Supremacy of Viṣṇu, God as material and instrumental cause, criticisms on mīmāṃsa, the eternal abode of nitya vibhūti, the validity of the Vedas are all explained clearly and the whole system can be understood thoroughly by these works.

1.9.1. Vedānta Deśika and his efforts in spreading the principles of Sri Rāmānujācharya

Three centuries after Sri Rāmānuja, arose another great teacher of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Vedānta Deśika, who, by his unrivalled jnāna and vairāgya, established the teachings of Ubhaya Vedānta and spread gospel of Prapatti as a Vedantic means to the attainment of Brahman. He was born in 1268 A.D. at Tūpppul in Kāñci, to the couple Anantasūri and Totāramba and named as Venkatanātha. His main contribution to Viśiṣṭādvaitic literature was the further elucidation of Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachings of Rāmānuja by his works. He lived 101 years and established the system on a firm footing. Thus, the system that was popularized asnd established by Śrī Rāmānuja was known as Viśiṣṭādvaita, which was later spread by Śrī Vedānta Deśika and his followers.
1.10. Other Viśiṣṭādvaita Literature

There are various works that followed the principles of Viśiṣṭādvaita as expounded by Śri Rāmānujācārya. Some of the basic works are discussed below in brief:

1.10.1. Yatīndramata Dīpīkā

His work was written by Śrīnivāsadāsa (17th century A.D.) was the son of Govindācārya of Tirupati. This work is one of the most favourable works among the students of Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is also known as the Sariraka Paribhāṣā and is one of the prakaraṇa granthas for understanding the basic principles of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Ten chapters are dedicated inorder to understand the important principles of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. The author follows the Nyāya Siddhaṇjana of Vedānta Deśika in presenting the important tenets of the system.

1.10.2. Vedāntakarikavali

This work has been written by Surpam Bucci Venkatācārya, who was the son of Annarya of Śrī Śaila family. Around 200 verses of poetry narrating the acceptable principles of Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta is the primary teaching of this work. He was honoured by Veṅkaṭānāyaka, who was the the Nijam ruler of Gulbarga district. He belongs to the beginning of 19th century.

1.10.3. Samprādaya Sudhā

This great work has been presented to us by Śrī Vīrarāghavāchariyār, who was popularly known as Madurāntakam Swāmi. Here, the author describes the ten important principles, which are supported by our system. The author was an erudite scholar who has clearly expounded the theories of Viśiṣṭādvaita based on the works and commentaries of Śrī Vedānta Deśika.
End Notes

1. MU 1.2.12
2. Satish Chandra Chatterjee - An introduction to Indian Philosophy, p- 10.
3. alpāksharam-asandigdham Sāravad-visvatomukham |
   astobham-anavadyam ca Sūtram sūtravido viduh || Vāyu Purāna
4. Śūtrārtho varṇyate yatra, Padaih sūtrānusāribhih |
   Svapadāni ca varṇyante Bhāṣyam Bhāṣyavido viduh ||
   Paratattvaganita Darsanam, p.314
5. CU, 6.1.1
6. Sadasadbhyām Anirvacaniyam…, Tattva Bodha, p-
7. Yā Mā Sā Māyā... Śankara sampradāya vacanam
8. BG, XIII. 2, Śankara Bhāṣya
10. Rūpam Drṣyam locanam … Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka, Verse 1 and also KU, 1.1.2
11. See BU, Adhyāsa Bhāṣya. p.6
12. Ibid.,p.7
13. Ibid.,p.8
14. Ibid.,p.9
15. CU 7.1.3
16. BU, Adhyāsa Bhāṣya
17. KU, 1.2.19
18. MAU,2.7
19. BRU, 4.3.15
20. SU, 6.11
21. BU, See Adhyāsa Bhāṣya
22. BU, Śri Bhāṣya ,1.1.1, also see Śrīraṅga Gadyam of Śri Rāmānujacārya
23. BU Śri Bhāṣya ,1.1.13